Tournament: voices round 4 | Round: 4 | Opponent: Jack Stern | Judge: Micheal Dittmer
Global water shortage is higher than ever, new studies take everyone into account and show us that this is a global issue we never took into account.
Bellware 2k16 Kim Bellware, 2-15-2016, "Global Water Shortage Risk Is Worse Than Scientists Thought," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/water-scarcity-study_us_56c1ebc5e4b0b40245c72f5e
The growing risk of worldwide water shortages is worse than scientists previously thought, according to a new study. About 66 percent, which is 4 billion people, of the world’s population lives without sufficient access to fresh water for at least one month of the year, according to a new paper published Friday in the journal Science Advances. Previous studies calculated a lower number, estimating that between 1.7 and 3.1 billion people lived with moderate to severe water scarcity for at least a month out of the year. Scientists, led by Dr. Arjen Hoekstra of the Netherlands’ University of Twente, used a computer model that is both more precise and comprehensive than previous studies have used to analyze how widespread water scarcity is across the globe. Their model considers multiple variables including: climate records, population density, irrigation and industry. “Up to now, this type of research concentrated solely on the scarcity of water on an annual basis, and had only been carried out in the largest river basins,” Hoekstra said in a statement. “That paints a more rosy and misleading picture, because water scarcity occurs during the dry period of the year.” “The fact that the scarcity of water is being regarded as a global problem is confirmed by our research,” Hoekstra added. “For some time now, the World Economic Forum has placed the world water crisis in the top three of global problems, alongside climate change and terrorism.” About two-thirds of the world’s population faces water scarcity for at least one month out of the year. Severe water scarcity happens when consumption is twice as high as available resources, according to the study’s researchers. Consequently, half of those suffering from water scarcity are in the world’s two most populous countries — India and China — where demand is high. High-scarcity levels are also widespread in areas with significant irrigated agriculture (like the Great Plains in the United States) or low natural availability of fresh water (like the Arabian Desert) where populations are also relatively dense, according to the study. Similar patterns exist in the south and western United States where heavily populated states like California have been in a drought for years. The consequences of water scarcity can result in economic losses due to crop failure, limited food availability and poor business viability, and can threaten environmental biodiversity. When faced with scarcity, areas in need of water often resort to pumping groundwater, which can permanently deplete the supply. Water shortages have also precipitated or heightened the potential for global conflicts in places like the Middle East and Africa. “Freshwater scarcity is a major risk to the global economy, affecting four billion people directly,” Hoekstra told The New York Times. “But since the remaining people in the world receive part of their food from the affected areas, it involves us all.”
Offshore SMRs allowed now and desalinate key to solving water crises worldwide.
WNA 2k16 New Technologies for Seawater Desalination Using Nuclear Energy, TecDoc 1753, International Atomic Energy Agency (January 2015) updated in 2k16 by World Nuclear Association
Small and medium sized nuclear reactors are suitable for desalination, often with cogeneration of electricity using low-pressure steam from the turbine and hot seawater feed from the final cooling system. The main opportunities for nuclear plants have been identified as the 80-100,000 m³/day and 200-500,000 m³/day ranges. US Navy nuclear powered aircraft carriers reportedly desalinate 1500 m3/d each for use onboard.A 2006 IAEA report based on country case studies showed that costs would be in the range ($US) 50 to 94 cents/m3 for RO, 60 to 96 c/m3 for MED and $1.18 to 1.48/m3 for MSF processes, with marked economies of scale. These figures are consistent with later reports. Nuclear power was very competitive at 2006 gas and oil prices. A French study for Tunisia compared four nuclear power options with combined cycle gas turbine and found that nuclear desalination costs were about half those of the gas plant for MED technology and about one-third less for RO. With all energy sources, desalination costs with RO were lower than MED costs.At the April 2010 Global Water Summit in Paris, the prospect of desalination plants being co-located with nuclear power plants was supported by leading international water experts.As seawater desalination technologies are rapidly evolving and more countries are opting for dual-purpose integrated power plants (i.e. cogeneration), the need for advanced technologies suitable for coupling to nuclear power plants and leading to more efficient and economic nuclear desalination systems is obvious. The IAEA Coordinated Research Program (CRP) New Technologies for Seawater Desalination using Nuclear Energy was organized in the framework of a Technical Working Group on Nuclear Desalination that was established in 2008. The CRP ran over 2009-2011 to review innovative technologies for seawater desalination which could be coupled to main types of existing nuclear power plant. The CRP focused on low temperature horizontal tube multi-effect distillation, heat recovery systems using heat pipe based heat exchangers, and zero brine discharge systems.An IAEA preliminary feasibility study on nuclear desalination in Algeria was published in 2015, for Skikda on the Mediterranean coast, using cogeneration. The nuclear energy option was very competitive compared with fossil fuels.Desalination: nuclear experience The feasibility of integrated nuclear desalination plants has been proven with over 150 reactor-years of experience, chiefly in Kazakhstan, India and Japan. Large-scale deployment of nuclear desalination on a commercial basis will depend primarily on economic factors. Indicative costs are US$ 70-90 cents per cubic metre, much the same as fossil-fuelled plants in the same areas.One obvious strategy is to use power reactors which run at full capacity, but with all the electricity applied to meeting grid load when that is high and part of it to drive pumps for RO desalination when the grid demand is low.The BN-350 fast reactor at Aktau, in Kazakhstan, successfully supplied up to 135 MWe of electric power while producing 80,000 m³/day of potable water over some 27 years, about 60 of its power being used for heat and desalination. The plant was designed as 1000 MWt but never operated at more than 750 MWt, but it established the feasibility and reliability of such cogeneration plants. (In fact, oil/gas boilers were used in conjunction with it, and total desalination capacity through ten MED units was 120,000 m³/day.)In Japan, some ten desalination facilities linked to pressurised water reactors operating for electricity production yield some 14,000 m³/day of potable water, and over 100 reactor-years of experience have accrued. MSF was initially employed, but MED and RO have been found more efficient there. The water is used for the reactors' own cooling systems.India has been engaged in desalination research since the 1970s. In 2002 a demonstration plant coupled to twin 170 MWe nuclear power reactors (PHWR) was set up at the Madras Atomic Power Station, Kalpakkam, in southeast India. This hybrid Nuclear Desalination Demonstration Project (NDDP) comprises a reverse osmosis (RO) unit with 1800 m3/day capacity and a multi-stage flash (MSF) plant unit of 4500 m³/day costing about 25 more, plus a recently-added barge-mounted RO unit. This is the largest nuclear desalination plant based on hybrid MSF-RO technology using low-pressure steam and seawater from a nuclear power station. They incur a 4 MWe loss in power from the plant.In 2009 a 10,200 m3/day MVC (mechanical vapour compression) plant was set up at Kudankulam to supply fresh water for the new plant. It has four stages in each of four streams. An RO plant there supplied the plant's township initially. The full MVC plant is being commissioned in mid 2012, with quoted capacity of 7200 m3/day to supply the plant’s primary and secondary coolant and the local town. Cost is quoted at INR 0.05 per litre (USD 0.9/m3).A low temperature (LTE) nuclear desalination plant uses waste heat from the nuclear research reactor at Trombay has operated since about 2004 to supply make-up water in the reactor. Pakistan in 2010 commissioned a 4800 m3/day MED desalination plant, coupled to the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP, a 125 MWe PHWR) near Karachi, though in 2014 it was quoted as 1600 m3/day. It has been operating a 454 m3/day RO plant for its own use.China General Nuclear Power (CGN) has commissioned a 10,080 m3/day seawater desalination plant using waste heat to provide cooling water at its new Hongyanhe project at Dalian in the northeast Liaoning province.Much relevant experience comes from nuclear plants in Russia, Eastern Europe and Canada where district heating is a by-product.Large-scale deployment of nuclear desalination on a commercial basis will depend primarily on economic factors. The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is fostering research and collaboration on the issue.In 2014 Rusatom Overseas said it was planning to promote thermal desalination plants using nuclear power on a BOO (build-own-operate) basis. The first meeting of the Rusatom Overseas’ International Expert Council on Desalination took place in September in Moscow.In California, a county’s Drought Task Force is teaming up with Diablo Canyon nuclear plant owner Pacific Gas and Electric with a view to using the site's 5700 m3/day RO desalination plant to supply up to 3100 m3/day surplus water for county residents.Small nuclear reactors suitable for desalination SMART: South Korea has developed a small nuclear reactor design for cogeneration of electricity and potable water. The 330 MWt SMART reactor (an integral PWR) has a long design life and needs refuelling only every 3 years. The main concept has the SMART reactor coupled to four MED units, each with thermal-vapour compressor (MED-TVC) and producing total 40,000 m3/day, with 90 MWe. CAREM: Argentina has designed an integral 100 MWt PWR suitable for cogeneration or desalination alone, and a prototype in being built next to Atucha. A larger version is envisaged, which may be built in Saudi Arabia. NHR-200: China's INET has developed this, based on a 5 MW pilot plant. Floating nuclear power plant (FNPP) from Russia, with two KLT-40S reactors derived from Russian icebreakers, or other designs for desalination. (If primarily for desalination the twin KLT-40 set-up is known as APVS-80.) ATETs-80 is a twin-reactor cogeneration unit using KLT-40 and may be floating or land-based, producing 85 MWe plus 120,000 m3/day of potable water. The small ABV-6 reactor is 38 MW thermal, and a pair mounted on a 97-metre barge is known as Volnolom floating NPP, producing 12 MWe plus 40,000 m3/day of potable water by reverse osmosis. A larger concept has two VBER-300 reactors in the central pontoon of a 170 m long barge, with ancillary equipment on two side pontoons, the whole vessel being 49,000 dwt. The plant is designed to be overhauled every 20 years and have a service life of 60 years. Another design, PAES-150, has a single VBER-300 unit on a 25,000 dwt catamaran barge. See also: Small Nuclear Power Reactors paper.  Wastewater and groundwater treatment for irrigation In the Middle East, a major requirement is for irrigation water for crops and landscapes. This need not be potable quality, but must be treated and with reasonably low dissolved solids. In Oman, the 76,000 m3/day first stage of a submerged membrane bioreactor (SMBR) desalination plant was opened in 2011. Eventual plant capacity will be 220,000 m3/day. This is a low-cost wastewater treatment plant using both physical and biological processes and which produces effluent of high-enough quality for some domestic uses or reinjection into aquifers. In Australia AGL plans to install a 2000 m3/d RO desal plant to treat water from fracking in its Gloucester coal seam gas project. This will be used for irrigation, rather than being potable quality. Also in Australia the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) has found that the addition of nutrients could make desalinated water more financially attractive to farmers, who normally pay 20 cents/kilolitre for irrigation water, whereas most desal groundwater costs more than A$1/kL. New desalination projects Algeria has undertaken a study on nuclear power generation and desalination using RO and MED. The 500,000 m3/d Magtaa seawater RO desal plant at Oran costing $495 million was commissioned in November 2014, following the 120,000 m3/d Fouka seawater RO desal plant at Tipaza near Algiers in 2011, costing $185 million. The country is also considering MSF desalination for two new plants in addition to the 91,000 m3/d Arzew MSF plant now operating. Total capacity is 2.3 million m3/d. Argentina: A 3000 m3/day seawater RO plant is being built at Puerto Deseado, Santa Cruz, about 1800 km south of Buenos Aries. Australia: Six major seawater RO plants were commissioned at a cost of A$ 12 billion between 2006 and 2012. However, the Kurnell plant near Sydney is not used but costs some A$500,000 per day on care and maintenance. In Victoria, a 440,000 m3/day (150 GL/yr) RO desalination plant near Wonthaggi built by Degremont has been commissioned to supply Melbourne. It claims to use 90 to 120 MWe of renewable energy, and is expandable to 200 GL/yr. However, it has never been used since 2012 completion and remains on standby. Melbourne Water’s A$ 18 billion in repayments due over 27 years from 2015 is proposed to be spread over 60 years. The A$ 607 million pa maintenance cost is billed to customers. The state government in 2016 ordered 50 GL of water costing A$ 27 million (over the maintenance figure). Adelaide's 100,000 m3/d (36 GL/yr) plant started operation in 2011, with plans to expand it to 100 GL/yr. A 200-280,000 m3/d desalination plant to serve the expanded Olympic Dam mine in South Australia has environmental approval but now may not proceed. Perth has two RO seawater desal plants, a 123,000 m3/day (45 GL/yr) one (costing A$ 387 million) completed in 2006 powered by a wind farm, and a 100 GL/yr one powered by 65 MWe of dedicated renewable energy, which together provide half the city’s needs. Following extensive trials, the city plans a groundwater replenishment scheme from treated wastewater which is expected to be half the cost and use half the energy of seawater desalination. It will include a new Advanced Water Recycling Plant and provide 7 GL/yr from 2016 and 28 GL/yr eventually about 2022. Chile: BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto plan a $3.43 billion, 220,000 m3/day (79 GL/yr) seawater desal plant with twin 1.07m diameter pipes and pumps for their Escondida copper mine, which is 3100 m above sea level and 185 km inland. It will require over 1000 MWe from the grid for desal alone and be commissioned in 2017. Doosan is to build the plant at Caleta Coloso under Bechtel supervision. In November 2015 the Chilean state copper commission Cochilco said that desalination will provide half of the water demand for the country’s copper mines by 2026 – 924 ML/d. There are 16 mining-related desalination projects worth US$10 billion planned or under construction in the country, and nine are already operating.  China built 112 seawater desal plants in 2014, with total output of 927,000 m3/day, according to the State Oceanic Administration. It is looking at the feasibility of a nuclear seawater desalination plant in the Yantai area of Shandong Peninsula, producing 80-160,000 m3/day by MED process, using a 200 MWt NHR-200 reactor. A 100,000 m3/d seawater RO plant supplied by Abengoa of Spain started operating early in 2013 at Qingdao in Shandong province. Another project is for a 330,000 m3/day plant near Daya Bay. A 50,000 m3/day Aqualyng plant was completed in October 2011 at Caofeidian on Bohai Bay in Hebei province, and a second stage doubled this in 2012. The Hong Kong based Beijing Enterprises Water Group (BEWG) with Aqualyng is building a 1 million m3/day RO plant at Caofeidian for CNY 7 billion to supply Beijing through a 270 km pipeline by 2019, and a 3 million m3/d plant is planned to expand this to supply the capital, providing about one-third of its needs. The pipeline, itself a major part of the project,  will cost about CNY 10 billion, and supply desalinated water at CNY 8/m3 ($1.28/m3). In March 2013 the National Development and Reform Commission announced new plans for seawater desalination, including for the cities of Shenzhen and Zhoushan, Luxixiang Island in Zhejiang Province, Binhai New Area in Tianjin, Bohai New Area in Hebei, and several industrial parks and companies. The cost is likely to be some CNY 21 billion ($3.35 billion). China aims to produce 2.2 million m3/day of desal water by 2015, more than three times the 2011 level. More than half of the freshwater channelled to islands and more than 15 of water delivered to coastal factories will come from the sea by 2015, according to the plan. A 300,000 m3/d seawater desal plant at Tianjin is under construction and will be the first zero-liquid discharge (ZLD) plant in the world. It is due to supply petrochemical plants from 2017. Egypt has undertaken a feasibility study for a cogeneration plant for electricity and potable water at El-Dabaa, on the Mediterranean coast. In 2010 plans were being formed for four 1000 MWe-class reactors to be built there and coming on line 2019-25, with significant desalination capacity. Egypt's largest desalination plant, 24,000 m3/day RO, being built at Marsa Matrouh in the northwest is to be supplied with Pressure Exchanger (PX) energy-recovery devices by Energy Recovery Inc of California. The first of four modules is due to start in 2013. Ghana: Abengoa has built a 60,000 m3/day seawater RO plant at Nungua to supply Accra. The $125 million contract covers operation and maintenance for 25 years. In India, further plants delivering 45,000 m3 per day are envisaged, using both MSF and RO desalination technology, and building on the extensive experience outlined above. For Chennai, the 100,000 m³/d Minjur RO seawater desalination plant was commissioned in 2010, the 100,000 m3/d Nemmeli RO seawater desalination plant was commissioned in 2013, and a 150,000 m3/day expansion is planned. A 200,000 m3/day plant is planned for Pattipulam nearby, with potential for doubling in size, and also serving Chennai. In Tamil Nadu two 60,000 m3/day seawater RO plants are being built at Kuthiraimozhi in Ramanathapuram and Alanthalai in the port city of Tuticorin to supply potable water. Indonesia: South Korea investigated the feasibility of building a SMART nuclear reactor with cogeneration unit employing MSF desalination technology for Madura Island, and later studies have been on larger-scale PWR cogeneration by Batan. Iran: A 200,000 m³/day MSF desalination plant was designed for operation with the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran in 1977, but initially lapsed due to prolonged construction delays. It is being completed by AEOI subsequently. In June 2016 Doosan signed a $186 milllion agreement to build a 200,000 m3/d seawater RO plant at Bandar Abbas. Iraq: Basrah has 400,000 m3/d desalination for saline river water, and a Hitachi-led consortium is building a new 199,000 m3/day RO plant there, for completion in 2016. Israel has four desal plants including the 627,000 m3/day seawater RO plant at Soreq. It plans further capacity, including purchase of about 35-40 GL/yr from a planned plant at Aqaba jointly run with Jordan. Jordan has a 'water deficit' of about 1.4 million m3 per day and is actively looking at nuclear power to address this, as well as supplying electricity. An 80 GL/yr/220,000 m3/d plant at Aqaba is planned, with Jordan using half the output. Kenya plans a 100,000 m3/day desal plant near Mombasa. Kuwait has been considering cogeneration schemes up to a 1000 MWe reactor coupled to a 140,000 m3/day desalination plant. Meanwhile it has a $1.4 billion contract with Hyundai and a Veolia subsidiary to build the Az-Zour North gas-fired combined cycle 1500 MWe power plant and 486,000 m3/d MED plant. It will account for about 10 of Kuwait’s power capacity and 20 of its desal capacity from 2016. Libya: in mid 2007 a memorandum of understanding was signed with France related to building a mid-sized nuclear plant for seawater desalination. Areva TA would supply this. Libya is also considering adapting the Tajoura research reactor for a nuclear desalination demonstration plant with a hybrid MED-RO system. Mexico has a 21,000 m3/day El Salitral plant in operation from the end of 2013, and has begun construction of a 22,000 m3/d plant at San Quintin in Baja California, and another similar one at Ensenada, both using public-private partnerships. A 379,000 m3/day seawater RO desalination plant is contracted at Rosarito Beach, in Baja California near the US border, with 189,500 m3/day as phase 1 from 2019, and phase 2 by 2024, making it the largest desalination plant in the Western hemisphere. Expected cost including 37 years operation and maintenance is $490 million, offset by $56 million annual revenue. Ownership will transfer to the state in the late 2050s. Morocco has completed a pre-project study with China, at Tan-Tan on the Atlantic coast, using a 10 MWt heating reactor which produces 8000 m3/day of potable water by distillation (MED). The government has plans for building an initial nuclear power plant in 2016-17 at Sidi Boulbra, and Atomstroyexport is assisting with feasibility studies for this. In 2014 Abengoa was awarded a contract to build and run for 20 years a 100,000 m3/day seawater RO desal plant in Agadir, 45 km from that city. The capital cost is €82 million. Oman relies on large-scale desalination for 76 of its water (20 is from wells).  It has had 128,000 m3/d plant at Sur since 2009.  It commissioned a 45,460 m3/d seawater RO plant at Barka in November 2013 as a BOO Independent Water Project (IWP), expanding an existing facility to 136,000 m3/d. Barka 2 will add 120,000 m3/d. Another BOO project is the 191,000 m3/d Muscat RO plant with commercial operation from February 2016, replacing the old Ghubrah plant serving the city.  The Salalah plant was opened in May 2013 - a 69,000 m3/d seawater desal plant with 445 MWe gas-fired generation. Another seawater RO plant at Sohar is planned to produce 250,000 m3/d, on top of 150,000 m3/d since 2007. Oman Power and Water Procurement Company (OPWP) awarded a BOO contract to Hyflux for a 200,000 m3/day IWP at Qurayyat, to be operating by May 2017. The 225,000 m3/d Suwaiq IWP is planned and will bring supplies to over 1.2 million m3/d. Contracts for Salalah III were expected in 2016, followed by Salalah IV of 100,000 m3/d. Pakistan: A 10,000m3/day RO plant costing US$ 3 million has been commissioned in the drought-ridden Sindh province, where the government is installing 300 RO plants of about 40 m3/day. A 2000 m3/day plant was commissioned in 2015 at Karwat, for Gwadar city, Balochistan. Qatar has been considering nuclear power and desalination for its needs which reached about 1.3 million m3/day in 2010. The Ras Abu Fontas A2 144,000 m3/d MSF seawater desal plant built by Mitsubishi Corporation for $504 million was commissioned in 2015, as was the Ras Abu Fontas A3 project – a 164,000 m3/d RO plant also built by Mitsubishi is due to operate from late 2016, the country’s first large RO plant. In May 2015 Qatar General Electricity and Water Corporation (QEWC, Kahramaa) selected a Japanese consortium of Mitsubishi Corporation and Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco), named K1 Energy, to build an electricity and water plant comprising a 590,000 m3/d desalination facility and a 2.4 GW gas-fired power station at Umm Al Houl, 20km south of Doha. Russia: A new 10,000 m3/d seawater RO plant is being built offshore near Vladivostok, for commissioning over 2011-12. It is designed for severe climatic conditions. Saudi Arabia's Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC) increased its desalinated water output in 2014 by 10, to more than 1.1 billion cubic metres. It is expanding its Yanbu desalination plant to supply the Medina region. Phase 1 is a 146,000 m3/d hybrid plant, mostly MSF using heat recovered from a gas turbine power plant, but with two RO units. Phase 2 upgrades this and adds a 68,000 m3/day MED plant from Doosan using the heat from an associated 690 MWe power plant, all costing over $1 billion. It will be the world's largest MED plant. Doosan will also build Yanbu 3, a 550,000 m3/day MSF plant due for completion in 2016. A 600,000 m3/d RO plant is planned at Rabigh in the west. The world's largest thermal desalination plant is Saudi Arabia’s 1,025,0003/d Ras Al Khair (Ras Azzour) MSF project northwest of Jubail, costing SAR 27 billion ($7.2 billion) and built by Doosan. The project includes a 2.6 GWe power plant. The hybrid desalination facility has a capacity of 727,000 m3/d multi-stage flash (MSF) evaporation and 307,000 m3/d RO membrane filtration. It will supply water from the Gulf to 3.5 million people in the Riyadh area. The 880,000 m3/d Shoaiba 3 plant was formerly the largest. Veolia has a $402 million contact to build a 178,600 m3/d ultrafiltration and RO plant for Marafiq at the $19.3 billion Sadara petrochemical complex, to come on line in mid-2015. The water will be for two cooling towers and as boiler feedwater. The first of three phases of the King Abdullah Solar water initiative were expected to be operating by the end of 2013. Phase 1 involves construction of two solar plants which will generate 10 MW of power for a 30,000 m3/d reverse-osmosis (RO) desalination plant at Al Khafji, near the Kuwait border. Phase 2 will involve construction of a 300,000 m3/d desalination plant over three years. The third phase aims to implement the solar water initiative throughout Saudi Arabia, with the eventual target of seeing all the country's desalination plants powered by solar energy by 2020. One of the main objectives of this initiative under King Abdullah City for Science and Technology (KACST) is to desalinate seawater at a cost of less than Riyal 1.5/m3 (US$ 0.40/m3) compared with the current cost of thermal desalination, which KACST says is in the range Riyal 2.0-5.5/m3 (US$ 0.53-1.47/m3), and desalination by RO, which is Riyal 2.5-5.5/m3 (US$ 0.67-1.47/m3) for a desalination plant producing 30,000 m3/d. Saudi Arabia's General Establishment for Water Desalination (GEWD) is, over the four years to 2019, implementing new projects with a total production capacity of up to 2.5 million m³/d in the Makkah region and the eastern province. Singapore: The 318,500 m3/d Tuaspring RO plant was commissioned in 2013 as the second desal plant. A Chinese 228,000 m3/d RO plant at Changi is due online in 2016, built by an 80 subsidiary of Beijing Enterprises Water Group on BOO basis for 25 years at a first-year price of SGD 0.276/m3 (US$ 0.22). A new 136,000 m3/d plant is planned at Jurong Island. South Africa: Veolia is building a 1700 m3/d seawater desal plant at Lamberts Bay, Cederberg municipality, upgradable to5000 m3/d. This will be the seventh plant along the west and south Cape coasts installed by Veolia. A 450,000 m3/d plant costing $1.23 billion is planned for Koeberg, near Cape Town Spain is building 20 RO plants in the southeast to supply over 1 of the country's water. Spain has 40 years of desalination experience in the Canary Islands, where some 1.1 million m3/day is provided. Tunisia is looking at the feasibility of a cogeneration (electricity-desalination) plant in the southeast of the country, treating slightly saline groundwater. It plans a tender for a 150,000 m3/day plant at Sfax. The UAE is planning a 68,000 m3/d plant at Ras Al Kaimah. Sembcorp is expanding the Fujairah 1 136,000 m3/d RO plant, to bring its UAE capacity to 591,000 m3/d of which 307,000 is RO and 284,000 m3/d is MSF. Also the Shuweihat S2 IPP and seawater desal plant at Al Ruwais started full operation in 2011 and provides 1510 MWe and 454,000 m3/d by MSF. The Fujairah 2 plant is hybrid SWRO-MED and produces 454,600 m3/d. The Taweelah A1 cogeneration plant produces 1430 MWe and 385,000 m3/day and Umm Al Nar produces 394,000 m3/day. The 91,000 m3/d Al Hamriya RO desal plant with 400 MWe power station opened in June 2014 to supply Sharjah near Dubai, as part of a 636,000 m3/d and 2500 MWe complex. The 136,400 m3/d Al Zawra seawater desal plant is planned at Ajman. GdF Suez has a 25-year power and water supply agreement with Abu Dhabi for the Mirfa project, including a new 136,380 m3/d RO plant and 1100 MWe power plant, costing $1.5 billion, alongside three existing 34,095 m3/d MSF units and a power plant. The Emirates' Federal Electricity and Water Authority (FEWA) announced in April 2016 that it plans four further desalination facilities at a cost of more than Dh 3 billion (US$ 750 million) to produce 600,000 m3/d. The first plant of 180,000 m3/d and costing $260 million will be in Umm Al Quwain emirate for operation from 2020. The second will be 120,000 m3/d costing $170 million, at Ajman, also to start in 2020 (this may be the same as mentioned above). The third will be identical, at Ras Al Khaimah to operate from 2026. The fourth is planned as a 180,000 m3/d, $260 million plant operating from 2023 with location to be determined. In Dubai the Jebel Ali M cogeneration plant opened in 2013 with 6x243 MWe gas turbines and 8 MSF units providing 640,000 m3/d. Earlier, Dubai invited bids for constructing a 450,000 m3/day (165 GL/yr) seawater desalination plant as part of its Hassyan independent power project, but then announced its deferral. In the UK, a 150,000 m3/day RO plant is proposed for the lower Thames estuary, utilising brackish water. USA-Mexico: The 375,000 m3/day Rosarito seawater plant in Baja, California, is to supply potable water on both sides of the border. A 22,000 m3/d seawater desal plant is contracted for San Quintín, Baja. USA: San Antonio, Texas, is building a 60,000 m3/day RO desal plant for brackish water from aquifers, to operate from 2016 and costing $193 million. Additions are planned to take capacity to 150,000 m3/day by 2026.  A $1 billion, 200,000 m3/day salt water desal plant at Carlsbad, California, opened in 2015. It will require about 40 MWe in full operation and can provide 10 of the San Diego county’s potable water. San Diego has ordered a 415,000 m3/day RO wastewater treatment plant costing $3.5 billion. It is expected to meet one-third of the city’s daily drinking water requirement by 2035, making it the second largest potable reuse plant in the USA. Most or all these have requested technical assistance from IAEA under its technical cooperation project on nuclear power and desalination. A coordinated IAEA research project initiated in 1998 reviewed reactor designs intended for coupling with desalination systems as well as advanced desalination technologies. This programme, involving more than 20 countries, is expected to enable further cost reductions of nuclear desalination.
The plan bans the most feasible way to produce useable water worldwide(literally in deserts like Dubai there’s abundant water because of nuclear desalinization). They make this impossible and will allow global water shortages to continue to increase.
Lack of water causes structural violence and death; root cause for disease and conflict
Rasmussen 09 (Britt Debes Rasmussen-Aalborg University: Development and International Relations, “The Impacts of Water Scarcity on the Prospects for Poverty Alleviation, and the Role of Development Aid in this,” 31 June 2009, http://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/17815112/water_scarcity__poverty__and_development_aid.docx, XM)
Water scarcity affects people all over the planet but it is particularly disastrous to the extremely poor people most of whom live on a subsistence basis in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Climate change will not only increase scarcity and make it harder for people in SAA to produce food, it is also projected to bring along an increasing share of natural disasters. Lester R. Brown has been one of the most influential sources of the argument that water is so scarce that it is running out many places. If that is true, how will the extremely poor cope and can development aid prevent water scarcity from exacerbating extreme poverty and its many security related consequences? To investigate that further this paper will look specifically at: the impacts of water scarcity on the prospects for poverty alleviation, and the role of development aid in this. It is difficult to show how much water scarcity affects poverty alleviation and even harder to determine what role development aid plays in all of this because it is all a matter of degree, which again is dependant on the readers point of view on what is acceptable and what is not. Yet there seems to be a lack of awareness as to just how essential water scarcity is. Water scarcity is commonly at the core of security issues such as diseases, conflicts, slums, and perhaps most importantly hindering the production of food and thereby development.
OSMR CP
CP: Countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power except for offshore small modular reactors.
Offshore SMR’s are the only viable source of desalination
Science Daily 7 – Science News Source(“Could Nuclear Power Be The Answer To Fresh Water?”, Nov 20, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/11/071120082429.htm, Daehyun)
Scientists are working on new solutions to the ancient problem of maintaining a fresh water supply. With predictions that more than 3.5 billion people will live in areas facing severe water shortages by the year 2025, the challenge is to find an environmentally benign way to remove salt from seawater. Global climate change, desertification, and over-population are already taking their toll on fresh water supplies. In coming years, fresh water could become a rare and expensive commodity. Research results presented at the Trombay Symposium on Desalination and Water Reuse offer a new perspective on desalination and describe alternatives to the current expensive and inefficient methods. Pradip Tewari of the Desalination Division at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, in Mumbai, India, discusses the increasing demand for water in India driven not only by growing population and expectancies rapid agricultural and industrial expansion. He suggests that a holistic approach is needed to cope with freshwater needs, which include primarily seawater desalination in coastal areas and brackish water desalination as well as rainwater harvesting, particularly during the monsoon season. "The contribution of seawater and brackish water desalination would play an important role in augmenting the freshwater needs of the country." Meenakshi Jain of CDM and Environmental Services and Positive Climate Care Pvt Ltd in Jaipur highlights the energy problem facing regions with little fresh water. "Desalination is an energy-intensive process. Over the long term, desalination with fossil energy sources would not be compatible with sustainable development; fossil fuel reserves are finite and must be conserved for other essential uses, whereas demands for desalted water would continue to increase." Jain emphasizes that a sustainable, non-polluting solution to water shortages is essential. Renewable energy sources, such as wind, solar, and wave power, may be used in conjunction to generate electricity and to carry out desalination, which could have a significant impact on reducing potential increased greenhouse gas emissions. "Nuclear energy seawater desalination has a tremendous potential for the production of freshwater," Jain adds. The development of a floating nuclear plant is one of the more surprising solutions to the desalination problem. S.S. Verma of the Department of Physics at SLIET in Punjab, points out that small floating nuclear power plants represent a way to produce electrical energy with minimal environmental pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Such plants could be sited offshore anywhere there is dense coastal population and not only provide cheap electricity but be used to power a desalination plant with their excess heat. "Companies are already in the process of developing a special desalination platform for attachment to FNPPs helping the reactor to desalinate seawater," Verma points out. A. Raha and colleagues at the Desalination Division of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, in Trombay, point out that Low-Temperature Evaporation (LTE) desalination technology utilizing low-quality waste heat in the form of hot water (as low as 50 Celsius) or low-pressure steam from a nuclear power plant has been developed to produce high-purity water directly from seawater. Safety, reliability, viable economics, have already been demonstrated. BARC itself has recently commissioned a 50 tons per day low-temperature desalination plant. Co-editor of the journal*, B.M. Misra, formerly head of BARC, suggests that solar, wind, and wave power, while seemingly cost effective approaches to desalination, are not viable for the kind of large-scale fresh water production that an increasingly industrial and growing population needs. India already has plans for the rapid expansion of its nuclear power industry. Misra suggests that large-scale desalination plants could readily be incorporated into those plans. "The development of advanced reactors providing heat for hydrogen production and large amount of waste heat will catalyze the large-scale seawater desalination for economic production of fresh water," he says.
Solves the aff - Contextualize
The counterplan is feasible and safe – only offshore avoids nuclear meltdowns
Chandler 14 – Mit News Office(David, “Floating nuclear plants could ride out tsunamis”, Apr 6, 2014, http://newsoffice.mit.edu/2014/floating-nuclear-plants-could-ride-out-tsunamis-0416, Daehyun)
When an earthquake and tsunami struck the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant complex in 2011, neither the quake nor the inundation caused the ensuing contamination. Rather, it was the aftereffects — specifically, the lack of cooling for the reactor cores, due to a shutdown of all power at the station — that caused most of the harm. A new design for nuclear plants built on floating platforms, modeled after those used for offshore oil drilling, could help avoid such consequences in the future. Such floating plants would be designed to be automatically cooled by the surrounding seawater in a worst-case scenario, which would indefinitely prevent any melting of fuel rods, or escape of radioactive material. The concept is being presented this week at the Small Modular Reactors Symposium, hosted by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, by MIT professors Jacopo Buongiorno, Michael Golay, and Neil Todreas, along with others from MIT, the University of Wisconsin, and Chicago Bridge and Iron, a major nuclear plant and offshore platform construction company. Such plants, Buongiorno explains, could be built in a shipyard, then towed to their destinations five to seven miles offshore, where they would be moored to the seafloor and connected to land by an underwater electric transmission line. The concept takes advantage of two mature technologies: light-water nuclear reactors and offshore oil and gas drilling platforms. Using established designs minimizes technological risks, says Buongiorno, an associate professor of nuclear science and engineering (NSE) at MIT. Although the concept of a floating nuclear plant is not unique — Russia is in the process of building one now, on a barge moored at the shore — none have been located far enough offshore to be able to ride out a tsunami, Buongiorno says. For this new design, he says, “the biggest selling point is the enhanced safety.” A floating platform several miles offshore, moored in about 100 meters of water, would be unaffected by the motions of a tsunami; earthquakes would have no direct effect at all. Meanwhile, the biggest issue that faces most nuclear plants under emergency conditions — overheating and potential meltdown, as happened at Fukushima, Chernobyl, and Three Mile Island — would be virtually impossible at sea, Buongiorno says: “It’s very close to the ocean, which is essentially an infinite heat sink, so it’s possible to do cooling passively, with no intervention. The reactor containment itself is essentially underwater.” Buongiorno lists several other advantages. For one thing, it is increasingly difficult and expensive to find suitable sites for new nuclear plants: They usually need to be next to an ocean, lake, or river to provide cooling water, but shorefront properties are highly desirable. By contrast, sites offshore, but out of sight of land, could be located adjacent to the population centers they would serve. “The ocean is inexpensive real estate,” Buongiorno says. In addition, at the end of a plant’s lifetime, “decommissioning” could be accomplished by simply towing it away to a central facility, as is done now for the Navy’s carrier and submarine reactors. That would rapidly restore the site to pristine conditions. This design could also help to address practical construction issues that have tended to make new nuclear plants uneconomical: Shipyard construction allows for better standardization, and the all-steel design eliminates the use of concrete, which Buongiorno says is often responsible for construction delays and cost overruns. There are no particular limits to the size of such plants, he says: They could be anywhere from small, 50-megawatt plants to 1,000-megawatt plants matching today’s largest facilities. “It’s a flexible concept,” Buongiorno says. Most operations would be similar to those of onshore plants, and the plant would be designed to meet all regulatory security requirements for terrestrial plants. “Project work has confirmed the feasibility of achieving this goal, including satisfaction of the extra concern of protection against underwater attack,” says Todreas, the KEPCO Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering and Mechanical Engineering. Buongiorno sees a market for such plants in Asia, which has a combination of high tsunami risks and a rapidly growing need for new power sources. “It would make a lot of sense for Japan,” he says, as well as places such as Indonesia, Chile, and Africa. This is a “very attractive and promising proposal,” says Toru Obara, a professor at the Research Laboratory for Nuclear Reactors at the Tokyo Institute of Technology who was not involved in this research. “I think this is technically very feasible. ... Of course, further study is needed to realize the concept, but the authors have the answers to each question and the answers are realistic.” The paper was co-authored by NSE students Angelo Briccetti, Jake Jurewicz, and Vincent Kindfuller; Michael Corradini of the University of Wisconsin; and Daniel Fadel, Ganesh Srinivasan, Ryan Hannink, and Alan Crowle of Chicago Bridge and Iron, based in Canton, Mass.

Tournament: CPS | Round: 1 | Opponent: LOOK ON TAB | Judge: LOOK ON TAB
FRAMEWORK
The value is justice because ought is “used to express justice.” That’s Random House 2k16.
"ought". Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 22 Jul. 2016. Dictionary.comhttp://www.dictionary.com/browse/ought.
The criterion is minimizing human suffering and subsequently death through youngs politics of differnce
Every person and institution has an obligation to minimize suffering everywhere-this is critical to promote justice.; everyone has their own lives but our relationships form conflict and oppression thus we must all acknowledge that minimizing the suffering for everyone everywhere is our priority.
Young 2010 Iris Marion. Professor of Political Science at the University ofx Chicago, affiliated with the Center for Gender Studies and the Human Rights program @ UChicago. Responsibility for Justice, published by Oxford University Press in 2010. pp.137-9
Some philosophers reject the claim that the scope of obligations of justice extends only to members of the same political community. On a cosmopolitan-utilitarian view, nation-state membership or any other sort of particularist relationship among persons is irrelevant to assessing the nature, depth, or scope of obligations that those persons have to one another. Moral agents have identical obligations to all human beings, as well as perhaps to some nonhuman beings. There is a moral imperative to minimize suffering, wherever it occurs. Every agent is obliged to do what he or she can to minimize suffering everywhere, right up to the point where he or she begins to suffer. Membership in a common political community, on the part of either the agent or the sufferers, is relevant only instrumentally as sometimes providing efficient means of discharging obligations and distributing particular tasks. Much about global relationships, however, can override this convenience. Peter Singer and Peter Under are two prominent theorists who hold this view.22 I think both of these positions are wanting. Some critics of the cosmopolitan-utilitarian position argue that it is implausibly demanding. There are some reasons for persons to distinguish bet- ween obligations they derive from special particular relationships, and sometimes to give these priority over more general cosmopolitan obligations.23 It is certainly not sufficient to argue against a claim of moral obligation that it asks more of moral agents than they are inclined to do. Our intuitions and inclina- tions about our obligations are likely to be self-serving and underdemanding. I think that several different objections should be brought against the cosmopolitan-utilitarian position. First, to the extent that it asserts that political jurisdiction makes no difference for what obligations people have to one another, and thus what some agents in one place may have a legitimate right to do in relation to people in another jurisdiction, this position challenges too much a collective right to self-determination. Local political or nation-state borders certainly should not have absolute moral force. If, for example, members of a political community suffer severe repression or deprivation because the political regime under which they live is either too evil or too weak to protect their lives, then outsiders may have obligations to intervene. Even apart from direct intervention, as I will discuss, outsiders do have obligations to promote justice across borders. It is wrong to take political community as merely instrumental to discharging obliga- tion, however. Most people value a sense of local membership, and there are rights for those who share this sense of membership to set the terms of their relationships among themselves.24 As articulated by writers such as Singer and Unger, moreover, the cosmopolitan-utilitarian position is overly individualist and offers few guidelines to set action priorities. One gets the impres- sion that each individual is obliged to act on her own to discharge her demanding cosmopolitan responsibilities, by, for example, giving away her individually owned property. The position has too thin an account of the role of institutions and collective action. The view that says that the scope of obligations of justice is limited to members of the same political community all should  is even more flawed, however. Critics of this view are right to argue that nation-state membership is somewhat arbitrary from a moral point of view; political communities have evolved in contingent ways that derive more from power struggle than from moral right. People often stand in dense relationships with others prior to, apart from, or outside of political communities. These relationships may be such that people’s actions affect one another in ways that tend to produce conflict. Or people may cooperate with numbers of others in ongoing practices and institutions across jurisdictions. In such relations, we expect fair terms of conflict-resolution and coopera- tion. In contrast with the cosmopolitan-utilitarian position, some account needs to be offered of the nature of social relationships that ground claims that people have obligations of justice to one another. It is not enough to say that the others are human. The nation-state view, however, makes prior what is posterior from a moral point of view. As I argued in chapter 2, ontologically and morally, though not necessarily temporally, social connection is prior to political institutions. This is the great insight of social contract theory. The social connections of civil society may exist without political institutions to govern them. A society consists in connected or mutually influencing institutions and practices through which people enact their projects and seek their happi- ness, and in doing so they affect the conditions under which others act, often profoundly. A social contract theory like that of John Locke argues that the need and desire for political institu- tions arises because socially connected persons with multiple and sometimes conflicting institutional commitments recognize that their relationships are liable to conflict and that inequalities of power can lead to mistrust, violence, exploitation, and domina- tion.25 It is these structural relationships and vulnerabilities that generate obligations of justice. They create the need for public regulation and strong institutions to implement such regulation, so that people can maximize their ability to act jointly and minimize violent conflict among them.

1NC – Hate Speech DA
Current protections against hate speech are working – on campus harrassment is decreasing nationally now.  Sutton 16  
Sutton 16 Halley Sutton, Report shows crime on campus down across the country, Campus Security Report 13.4 (2016), 9/9/16,http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/casr.30185/full LADI
A recent report released by the National Center for Education Statistics found an overall decrease in crimes at educational institutions across the country since 2001. The overall number of crimes reported by postsecondary institutions has dropped by 34 percent, from 41,600 per year in 2001 to 27,600 per year in 2013. The report, titled Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2015, covers higher education campuses as well as K–12 schools and includes such topics as victimization, teacher injury, bullying and cyberbullying, use of drugs and alcohol, and criminal incidents at postsecondary institutions. The report found significant decreases in instances of bullying, harassment due to sexual orientation, and violent crime at all levels of education. The number of on-campus crimes reported at postsecondary institutions in 2013 was lower than in 2001 for every category except forcible sex offenses and murder.
Removing restrictions on free speech allows hate speech – hate speech IS free speech
Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh,No, There’s No “hate Speech” Exception to the First Amendment, The Washington Post, 5/7/15, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.05cfdd01dea4 LADI
I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.)
Hate speech leads to a genocidal increase in crimes against marginalized groups.  
Greenblatt 15 Jonathan Greenblatt, When Hateful Speech Leads to Hate Crimes: Taking Bigotry Out of the Immigration Debate, Huffington Post, 8/21/15, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-greenblatt/when-hateful-speech-leads_b_8022966.html LADI
When police arrived at the scene in Boston, they found a Latino man shaking on the ground, his face apparently soaked in urine, with a broken nose. His arms and chest had been beaten. One of the two brothers arrested and charged with the hate crime reportedly told police, “Donald Trump was right — all these illegals need to be deported.” The victim, a homeless man, was apparently sleeping outside of a subway station in Dorchester when the perpetrators attacked. His only offense was being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The brothers reportedly attacked him for who he was — simply because he was Latino. In recent weeks anti-immigrant — and by extension anti-Latino — rhetoric has reached a fever pitch. Immigrants have been smeared as “killers” and “rapists.” They have been accused of bringing drugs and crime. A radio talk show host in Iowa has called for enslavement of undocumented immigrants if they do not leave within 60 days. There have been calls to repeal the 14th Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship to people born in the United States, with allegations that people come here to have so-called “anchor babies.” And the terms “illegal aliens” and “illegals” — which many mainstream news sources wisely rejected years ago because they dehumanize and stigmatize people — have resurged. The words used on the campaign trail, on the floors of Congress, in the news, and in all our living rooms have consequences. They directly impact our ability to sustain a society that ensures dignity and equality for all. Bigoted rhetoric and words laced with prejudice are building blocks for the pyramid of hate. Biased behaviors build on one another, becoming ever more threatening and dangerous towards the top. At the base is bias, which includes stereotyping and insensitive remarks. It sets the foundation for a second, more complex and more damaging layer: individual acts of prejudice, including bullying, slurs and dehumanization. Next is discrimination, which in turn supports bias-motivated violence, including apparent hate crimes like the tragic one in Boston. And in the most extreme cases if left unchecked, the top of the pyramid of hate is genocide. Just like a pyramid, the lower levels support the upper levels. Bias, prejudice and discrimination — particularly touted by those with a loud megaphone and cheering crowd — all contribute to an atmosphere that enables hate crimes and other hate-fueled violence. The most recent hate crime in Boston is just one of too many. In fact, there is a hate crime roughly every 90 minutes in the United States today. That is why last week ADL announced a new initiative, #50StatesAgainstHate, to strengthen hate crimes laws around the country and safeguard communities vulnerable to hate-fueled attacks. We are working with a broad coalition of partners to get the ball rolling.
Hate speech imposes major long term psychological impacts on its victims
Delgado 82, Delgado, Richard (University of Alabama School of Law), “Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling”. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 17, p. 133, 1982; Seattle University School of Law Research Paper. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2000918
In addition to the harms of immediate emotional distress and infringement of dignity, racial insults inflict psychological harm upon the victim. Racial slurs may cause long- term emotional pain because they draw upon and intensify the effects of the stigmati- zation, labeling, and disrespectful treatment that the victim has previously undergone. Social scientists who have studied the effects of racism have found that speech that com- municates low regard for an individual because of race “tends to create in the victim those very traits of ‘inferiority’ that it ascribes to him.”‘Moreover, “even in the absence of more objective forms of discrimination-poor schools, menial jobs, and substandard housing-traditional stereotypes about the low ability and apathy of Negroes and other minorities can operate as ’self-fulfilling prophecies.” ’ 73 These stereotypes, portraying members of a minority group as stupid, lazy, dirty, or untrustworthy, are often com- municated either explicitly or implicitly through racial insults. Because they constantly hear racist messages, minority children, not surprisingly, come to question their com- petence, intelligence, and worth. Much of the blame for the formation of these attitudes lies squarely on value-laden words, epithets, and racial names. 74 These are the materi- als out of which each child “grows his own set of thoughts and feelings about race.”7 If the majority “defines them and their parents as no good, inadequate, dirty, incompetent, and stupid,” the child will find it difficult not to accept those judgments 

Hate Speech PIC
AFF actors should remove all restrictions on constitutionally protected free speech, and ban the usage of all hate speech, including hate speech not protected by the First Amendment. Hate speech poses a direct threat to the oppressed. Banning it is necessary to promote inclusiveness.
Jared Taylor summarizes Waldron, 12, Why We Should Ban “Hate Speech”, American Renaissance, summarizing Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, Harvard University Press, 2012, 292 pp., 26.95. 8/24/12, http://www.amren.com/features/2012/08/why-we-should-ban-hate-speech/ Note – Taylor does not agree with but is summarizing Waldron’s position LADI
First-Amendment guarantees of free speech are a cherished part of the American tradition and set us apart from virtually every other country. They are not without critics, however, and the free speech guarantees under sharpest attack are those that protect so-called “hate speech.” Jeremy Waldron, an academic originally from New Zealand, has written a whole book explaining why “hate speech” does not deserve protection—and Harvard University Press has published it. Prof. Waldron teaches law and philosophy at New York University Law School, is a professor of social and political theory at Oxford, and is an adjunct professor at Victoria University in New Zealand. Perhaps his foreign origins influence his view of the First Amendment.  In this book, Professor Waldron makes just one argument for banning “hate speech.” It is not a good argument, and if this is the best the opponents of free speech can do, the First Amendment should be secure. However, in the current atmosphere of “anti-racism,” any argument against “hate speech” could influence policy, so let us understand his argument as best we can.  First, Professor Waldron declares that “we are diverse in our ethnicity, our race, our appearance, and our religions, and we are embarked on a grand experiment of living and working together despite these sorts of differences.” Western societies are determined to let in every sort of person imaginable and make them feel respected and equal in every way. “Inclusiveness” is something “that our society sponsors and that it is committed to.” Therefore, what would we make of a “hate speech” billboard that said: “Muslims and 9/11! Don’t serve them, don’t speak to them, and don’t let them in”? Or one with a picture of Muslim children that said “They are all called Osama”? Or posters that say such things as “Muslims out,” “No blacks allowed,” or “All blacks should be sent back to Africa”? Professor Waldron writes that it is all very well for law professors and white people to say that this is the price we pay for free expression, but we must imagine what it must be like for the Muslim or black who must explain these messages to his children. “Can their lives be led, can their children be brought up, can their hopes be maintained and their worst fears dispelled, in a social environment polluted by these materials?” Professor Waldron insists that a “sense of security in the space we all inhabit is a public good,” like pretty beaches or clean air, and is so precious that the law should require everyone to maintain it: Hate speech undermines this public good . . . . It does this not only by intimating discrimination and violence, but by reawakening living nightmares of what this society was like . . . . It creates something like an environmental threat to social peace, a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and there, word by word, so that eventually it becomes harder and less natural for even the good-hearted members of the society to play their part in maintaining this public good. Professor Waldron tells us that the purpose of “hate speech” is to try to set up a “rival public good” in which it is considered fine to beat up and drive out minorities.

Tournament: Loyola | Round: 2 | Opponent: Jackson Decocini | Judge: Sarah Sherwood
Text: All countries already or considering developing nuclear power should join the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation.

It creates networks for nuclear power without having to establish domestic facilities, educates countries on the safe and proper use of nuclear power—solves prolif and warming.
WNA 15 World Nuclear Association; Information on nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle; August 2015; “International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation”; http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/international-framework-for-nuclear-energy-coopera.aspx; PREMIER
The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), formerly the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), aims to accelerate the development and deployment of advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies while providing greater disincentives to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. GNEP was initiated by the USA early in 2006, but picked up on concerns and proposals from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Russia. The vision was for a global network of nuclear fuel cycle facilities all under IAEA control or at least supervision. Domestically in the USA, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) was based on the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI), and while GNEP faltered with the advent of the Barack Obama administration in Washington from 2008, the AFCI was being funded at higher levels than before for RandD "on proliferation-resistant fuel cycles and waste reduction strategies." Two significant new elements in the strategy were new reprocessing technologies which separate all transuranic elements together (and not plutonium on its own), and advanced burner (fast) reactors to consume the result of this while generating power. However, this then disappeared from the US Department of Energy (DOE) budget. GNEP was set up as both a research and technology development initiative and an international policy initiative. It addresses the questions of how to use sensitive technologies responsibly in a way that protects global security, and also how to manage and recycle wastes more effectively and securely. The USA had a policy in place since 1977 which ruled out reprocessing used fuel, on non-proliferation grounds. Under GNEP/IFNEC, reprocessing is to be a means of avoiding proliferation, as well as addressing problems concerning high-level wastes. Accordingly, the DOE briefly set out to develop advanced fuel cycle technologies on a commercial scale. As more countries consider nuclear power, it is important that they develop the infrastructure capabilities necessary for such an undertaking. As with GNEP, IFNEC partners are working with the IAEA to provide guidance for assessing countries' infrastructure needs and for helping to meet those needs. For countries that have no existing nuclear power infrastructure, IFNEC partners can share knowledge and experience to enable developing countries to make informed policy decisions on whether, when, and how to pursue nuclear power without any need to establish sensitive fuel cycle facilities themselves. With the USA taking a lower profile and effectively relinquishing leadership from 2009, the partners are focused on collaboration to make nuclear energy more widely accessible in accordance with safety, security and non-proliferation objectives, as an effective measure to counter global warming, and to improve global energy security. A change of name to International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) was adopted in June 2010, along with a new draft vision statement, which read: "The Framework provides a forum for cooperation among participating states to explore mutually beneficial approaches to ensure the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes proceeds in a manner that is efficient, safe, secure, and supports non-proliferation and safeguards." By some accounts, this envisages "cradle to grave" fuel management as central, along with assurance of fuel supply.In mid-2015 the technical secretariat transferred from the DOE to the OECD NEA which will play a similar role as with the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) and the Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP).

Solves efficiency and cost.
WNA 15 World Nuclear Association; Information on nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle; August 2015; “International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation”; http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/international-framework-for-nuclear-energy-coopera.aspx; PREMIER
A second issue addressed by IFNEC is the efficiency of the current nuclear fuel cycle. The USA, the largest producer of nuclear power, has employed a 'once through' fuel cycle. This practice only uses a small part of the potential energy in the fuel, while effectively wasting substantial amounts of useable energy that could be tapped through recycling. The remaining fissionable material can be used to create additional power, rather than treating it as waste requiring long-term storage. Others, notably Europe and Japan, recover the residual uranium and plutonium from the used fuel to recycle at least the plutonium in light water reactors. However, no-one has yet employed a comprehensive technology that includes full actinide recycle. In the USA, this question is pressing since significant amounts of used nuclear fuel are stored in different locations around the country awaiting shipment to a planned geological repository which was to be at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. This project is delayed, and in any case will fill very rapidly if it is used simply for used fuel rather than the separated wastes after reprocessing it. IFNEC also aims to address cost issues associated with the development and expansion of nuclear power in developing countries. Nuclear programs require a high degree of technical and industrial expertise. This is a serious obstacle for emerging countries attempting to develop nuclear power, although efforts are underway to increase the number of indigenously-trained nuclear experts through a variety of education and training initiatives. Internationally, the countries identified by the US Department of Energy (DOE) as likely participants at both enrichment and recycling ends were the USA, UK, France, Russia and Japan. The USA now provides the steering group chairman, and Japan, China and France the vice-chairmen.

Eliminates extra plutonium—solves terror and war.
WNA 15 World Nuclear Association; Information on nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle; August 2015; “International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation”; http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/international-framework-for-nuclear-energy-coopera.aspx; PREMIER
An early priority was seen to be the development of new reprocessing technologies to enable recycling of most of the used fuel. One of the concerns when reprocessing used nuclear fuel is ensuring that separated fissile material is not used to create a weapon. One chemical reprocessing technology – PUREX – has been employed for over half a century, having been developed in wartime for military use (see page on Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel). This has resulted in the accumulation of 240 tonnes of separated reactor-grade plutonium around the world (though some has been used in the fabrication of mixed oxide fuel). While this is not suitable for weapons use, it is still regarded as a proliferation concern. New reprocessing technologies are designed to combine the plutonium with some uranium and possibly with minor actinides (neptunium, americium and curium), rendering it impractical to use the plutonium in the manufacture of weapons. GNEP/IFNEC creates a framework where states that currently employ reprocessing technologies can collaborate to design and deploy advanced separations and fuel fabrication techniques that do not result in the accumulation of separated pure plutonium.

Solves waste—prevents eco collapse.
WNA 15 World Nuclear Association; Information on nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle; August 2015; “International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation”; http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/international-framework-for-nuclear-energy-coopera.aspx; PREMIER
With respect to the ultimate disposition of nuclear waste from recycling, three options exist conceptually:
User responsibility. The radioactive wastes from the nuclear fuel recycling centre could be considered as processed waste belonging to the user nation that sent its used nuclear fuel to the recycling centre. These wastes might then be shipped back to that user nation for final disposal.
Supplier responsibility. The nation hosting the recycling centre might retain the waste or, if a different supplier nation had manufactured the original fuel, all wastes arising from the original fuel could be considered the responsibility of that fuel supplier nation.
Third-party responsibility. A disposal facility might be sited in a country that is, in particular cases, neither the supplier nor the user, but is using its technological capability and geological suitability to manage the safe delivery of a commercially and environmentally valuable service.
The IFNEC program is considering the ownership and final disposal of waste, but this discussion has not yet reached beyond the preliminary stages. The second and third conceptual options for waste disposal would require one or more international radioactive waste final disposal facilities (see page on International Nuclear Waste Disposal Concepts), and serious discussion of those options will begin only when nations enter into real consideration of the sensitive issue of the hosting of such facilities.

Makes Reactors smaller and safer—Solves Accidents.
WNA 15 World Nuclear Association; Information on nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle; August 2015; “International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation”; http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/international-framework-for-nuclear-energy-coopera.aspx; PREMIER
Finally, IFNEC is concerned to foster the development of 'grid-appropriate reactors', i.e. smaller units (perhaps 50-350 MWe) for electricity grids of up to 3 GWe. These should incorporate advanced features including safety, simplicity of operation, long-life fuel loads, intrinsic proliferation-resistance and security3. In mid-2014 Jordan hosted a small modular reactors workshop to consider how SMRs could be effectively deployed in specific types of markets while identifying key challenges and opportunities.
International organizations and regulatory frameworks solve
IEA 15 "Technology Roadmap: Nuclear Energy." IEA Technology Roadmaps (n.d.): n. pag. 2015. Web. 8 Aug. 2016 Premier
Regulators, whether in newcomer countries or established nuclear countries, should be strong and independent. They need to have sufficient, well-qualified and resourced staff to carry out their missions (NEA, 2014a). There is an important role for international organisations to promote efficient regulation, harmonise requirements and share experience (see Box 11). In particular, peer review processes, whether among operators or among regulators, is seen as an effective process to improve the overall level of nuclear safety. The nuclear industry is sometimes concerned about the risk of over-regulation, through the multiplication or duplication of regulatory requirements. Better co-ordination and harmonisation of these requirements is needed in order to have an efficient regulation of the industry. Finally, to accelerate the deployment of new technologies, licensing frameworks should be flexible enough to regulate such technologies in a risk-informed manner. The United States is addressing this challenge for SMRs through the DOE’s Licensing Technical Support programme, which supports the development of certification and licensing requirements for US-based SMR projects. Similar initiatives should be launched in other countries, for SMR and advanced technologies such as Gen IV designs, so as to facilitate the deployment of these technologies once they have been demonstrated. It should be noted, however, that there are examples of regulatory regimes around the world (United Kingdom and Canada) whose frameworks already contain this flexibility and are prepared to address SMRs and Gen IV technologies. In general, greater international collaboration is needed so that a design approved in one major nuclear-competent country can be built elsewhere with a minimum of duplicated effort and time.

Tournament: Loyola | Round: 2 | Opponent: Jackson Decocini | Judge: Sarah Sherwood
NEG—Resource Wars DA
Energy insecurity is rampant and especially prominent in low income countries.
Cherp 12 Aleh; Professor of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University; 2012; “Chapter 5 – Energy and Security. In Global Energy Assessment – Toward a Sustainable Future”; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria; pp. 325-384 Premier
Uninterrupted provision of vital energy services (see Chapter 1 , Section 1.2.2 ) – energy security – is a high priority of every nation. Energy security concerns are a key driving force of energy policy. These concerns relate to the robustness (suffi ciency of resources, reliability of infrastructure, and stable and affordable prices); sovereignty (protection from potential threats from external agents); and resilience (the ability to withstand diverse disruptions) of energy systems. Our analysis of energy security Issues in over 130 countries shows that the absolute majority of them are vulnerable from at least one of these three perspectives. For most industrial countries, energy insecurity means import dependency and aging infrastructure, while many emerging economies have additional vulnerabilities such as insufficient capacity, high energy intensity, and rapid demand growth. In many low-income countries, multiple vulnerabilities overlap, making them especially insecure. 

Resource concentration and increased demand cause resource wars over oil.
Cherp 12 Aleh; Professor of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University; 2012; “Chapter 5 – Energy and Security. In Global Energy Assessment – Toward a Sustainable Future”; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria; pp. 325-384 Premier
Oil and its products lack easily available substitutes in the transport sector, where they provide at least 90 of energy in almost all countries. Furthermore, the global demand for transport fuels is steadily rising, especially rapidly in Asian emerging economies. Disruptions of oil supplies may thus result in catastrophic effects on such vital functions of modern states as food production, medical care, and internal security. At the same time, the global production capacity of conventional oil is widely perceived as limited. These factors result in rising and volatile prices of oil affecting all economies, especially low-income countries, almost all of which import over 80 of their oil supplies. The costs of energy (primarily oil) imports exceed 20 of the export earnings in 35 countries with 2.5 billion people and exceed 10 of gross domestic product (GDP) in an additional 15 countries with 200 million people. The remaining conventional oil resources are increasingly geographically concentrated in just a few countries and regions. This means that most countries must import an ever-higher share or even all of their oil. More than three billion people live in 83 countries that import more than 75 of the oil products they consume. This does not include China, where oil import dependency is projected to increase from the current 53 to 84 in 2035. The increasing concentration of conventional oil production and the rapidly shifting global demand patterns make some analysts and politicians fear a “scramble for energy” or even “resource wars.” 

Nuclear infrastructure is aging and limited to a handful of rich countries—Continued investment key.
Cherp 12 Aleh; Professor of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University; 2012; “Chapter 5 – Energy and Security. In Global Energy Assessment – Toward a Sustainable Future”; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria; pp. 325-384 Premier
Many countries using nuclear power are experiencing an aging of the reactor fleet and workforce, as well as difficulties in accessing capital and technologies to renew, expand, or launch new nuclear programs. Twenty of the 31 countries with nuclear power programs have not started building a new reactor in the last 20 years, and in 19 countries the average age of nuclear power plants is over 25 years. Large-scale enrichment, reactor manufacturing, and reprocessing technologies and capacities are currently concentrated in just a few countries. Transfer of these technologies and capacities to a larger number of countries is constrained by serious concerns over nuclear weapons proliferation, which is one of the main controversies and risks associated with nuclear energy. If nuclear energy can address energy security challenges, it will only happen in a few larger and more prosperous economies. 

Over half the world lives in a country that needs to massively expand energy production, blackouts are rampant.
Cherp 12 Aleh; Professor of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University; 2012; “Chapter 5 – Energy and Security. In Global Energy Assessment – Toward a Sustainable Future”; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria; pp. 325-384 Premier
Various vulnerabilities in electricity supply are often made worse by demand-side pressures. Some 4.2 billion people live in 53 countries that will need to expand the capacity of their electricity systems massively in the near future because they have either less than 60 access to electricity or an average demand growth of over 6 over the last decade. Both fuels and infrastructure for such an expansion will need to be provided without further compromising the sovereignty or resilience of national electricity systems. The reliability of electricity supply is a serious concern, especially in developing countries. In almost three-quarters of low-income countries blackouts are on average for more than 24 hours per month, and in about one-sixth of low-income countries blackouts average over 144 hours (six days) a month. In over one-half of low-income countries blackouts occur at least 10 times a month. 

Nuclear energy supply is more stable and secure than oil.
Cherp 12 Aleh; Professor of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University; 2012; “Chapter 5 – Energy and Security. In Global Energy Assessment – Toward a Sustainable Future”; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria; pp. 325-384 Premier
Whereas the energy security concerns related to fossil fuels are primarily related to the supply and demand of resources, in case of nuclear power the primary concerns relate to nuclear energy infrastructure and technologies. Unlike fossil fuels, the fuel of nuclear energy (uranium) has a fairly high security of supply, offers protection from fuel price fluctuations, and is possible to stockpile. In comparison to oil and gas, uranium is abundant and more geographically distributed, with a third of proven reserves in OECD countries (NEA, 2008 ). Recent estimates indicate that even in the face of a large expansion of nuclear energy, proven uranium reserves would last at least a century (Macfarlane and Miller, 2007 ; NEA, 2008 ). 8 Furthermore, electricity produced from nuclear energy offers a greater protection from fluctuations in raw commodity prices; while doubling uranium prices leads to a 5–10 increase in generating cost for nuclear power, doubling the cost of coal and gas leads to a 35–45 and 70–80 increase, respectively (IAEA, 2008 ). Uranium is also a relatively easy fuel to stockpile. The refueling of a nuclear power plant generally provides fuel for two to three years of operation (Nelson and Sprecher, 2008 ), and it is possible to store up to a 10-year supply of nuclear fuel (IAEA, 2007b ). In contrast, oil and gas emergency reserves, where they exist, are measured in days, weeks, or – in exceptional cases – months, not years. 

Nuclear power requires government support.
Cherp 12 Aleh; Professor of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University; 2012; “Chapter 5 – Energy and Security. In Global Energy Assessment – Toward a Sustainable Future”; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria; pp. 325-384 Premier
At the same time, there are significant energy security risks associated with technological, economic, and institutional characteristics of nuclear power production. As the most capital-intensive electricity generation technology, it is economically difficult for nuclear energy to compete in liberalized markets where the investor has to assume the financial risk of investment. As a result, strong government backing is necessary for the development of nuclear power (Finon and Roques, 2008 ).

Tournament: Voices | Round: 1 | Opponent: Lynbrook NA | Judge: Adam Bistagne
The aff’s threat construction shores up an exclusionary and violent identity for the US as a national security state in opposition to threatening Others and justifies mass violence
Grondin 04 (David, Associate Professor in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa) “(Re)Writing the “National Security State” Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies AT
It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of “national security”. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the “Cold War”. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the “reality” of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as “reality”. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it “make it any less real or less significant for being rhetorical” (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, “political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions” (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is “an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population” (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a “national security state”.14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War, the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term “national security state” designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology – the discourse – that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, ... the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “national unity” on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18. If realists are now easily caricatured, they have only themselves to blame. They had become caricatures by their own self-description. Realism, and particularly its offshoot, strategic studies, helped make and was made by the Cold War (Booth, 1997: 92). Much of the Cold War state apparatus and military infrastructure remained in place to meet the challenges and threats of the post-Cold War era. If the attack on Pearl Harbor was the driving force of the postwar national security state apparatus (Stuart, 2003: 303), the 9/11 events have been used as a motive for resurrecting the national security discourse as a justification against a new ‘infamy’, global terrorism.19 Although in this study I am calling into question the political practices that legitimized the very idea of a national security state during the Cold War era, I find even more problematic the reproduction of a similar logic in the post-9/11 era – a rather different historical and socio-political context. As Simon Dalby highlights, Coupling fears of Soviet ambitions, of a repeat of Pearl Harbor, and of nuclear war, these institutions formed the heart of a semipermanent military mobilization to support the policies of containment militarism. If this context is no longer applicable, the case that the national security state is not an appropriate mode for social organization in the future is in many ways compelling. If security is premised on violence, as security-dilemma and national-security literatures suggest (albeit often reluctantly), perhaps the necessity of rethinking global politics requires abandoning the term and the conceptual strictures that go with it (Dalby, 1997: 21). A recent article by David Jablonsky in the U.S. Army War College’s journal Para- meters illustrates such an un-problematized view of a Cold War-like attitude of casting for new enemies and threats, such as global terrorism, that can justify a state of permanent war (Luke, 2002: 10): In those early years of the Cold War, American leaders fashioned a grand strategic vision of the US role in the world, which while innovative in terms of changing concept of national security, did not outrun the experiences of the American people as the Soviet threat unfolded. US leaders face a similar challenge today as they seek to educate the public that the domestic terrorist threat to physical security should not be allowed to skew the American grand strategy of global engagement designed to further that core interest as well as those of economic prosperity and value promotion. ... The new threat assures the continued existence if not growth of the national security state and will certainly cause increased centralization and intrusiveness of the US government. Nevertheless, the Cold War demonstrates that all this need not cause the rise of a garrison state or the diminishment of civil liberties (Jablonsky, 2003: 18). What puzzles me is that this viewpoint reflects an unquestioned normative statecraft practice that might be seen not only as possible but “wise”, since “we” all know that, in the end, the Cold War led to an “American triumph”... From a critical standpoint, national security discourse is constitutive of “social reality”: it is not neutral and it often serves to outfit state actions as objective responses to socio-political problems. U.S. state leaders now use this same discourse – the national security discourse – to wage a global war on terrorism. As Keith Shimko aptly points out, Times of war are no normal times. In addition to being periods of focused effort and all-out expenditure, ‘wartime’ might also be viewed as a period when some of the normal luxuries of life (e.g., material comfort or political liberties) are ‘sacrificed’ to the war effort. As a result, framing an issue as a war could lead to calls for restrictions on behavior and rights that are typically protected but come to be viewed as unaffordable luxuries during wartime (Shimko, 1995:79). The U.S. response to 9/11 is encapsulated as an armed struggle against a phantom enemy who replicates the tactics used in guerrilla wars in its capacity to strike any time, anywhere. The enemy is thus constructed as being both everywhere and nowhere, which allows state leaders to enact a security discourse of an Other against whom the U.S. must be protected as a legitimate and necessary one at the expense of some civil rights (e.g., colour tags for travellers and fingerprint biometric sensors in passports). A “state of war” is indeed incorporated into American political life: “For a society committed to armed struggle, there is little distinction between military and civilian life. ‘The cause’ becomes everything, justifying extraordinary measures, demanding larger-than-life sacrifices. Ordinary life is recruited into the ruthless binary that frames the struggle .... There is no room for a loyal opposition; to question is to betray” (Milner, Krishna, and Ferguson, 2001). In the context of a global war on terrorism, every citizen may become a “terrorist”. As Ronnie Lipschutz argues in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “all individuals, whether citizen or permanent resident, whether legal or illegal, become potential threats to state security” (Lipschtuz, 2000: 51). Surprisingly, not many American citizens contested or protested such undemocratic limitations on civil liberties. Why is that so? One possible answer is that a great many are convinced that such measures will not be applied to them and that their own rights and freedoms will not be threatened. They seem to believe that since they are not doing anything wrong, they are protected. Accordingly, they think that those whose privacy and rights are being violated have done something wrong and that they deserve it. As Iris Marion Young explains, this is where they err, for “the move from a relatively free society to one over which the state exercises authoritarian domination often occurs by means of just this logic: citizens do not realize how easily they may find themselves under suspicion by authorities over whose decisions there is no public scrutiny” (Young, 2003: 12). When societal and individual security is considered, the national security discourse produces more insecurity than security.20 We must therefore question state practices that threaten individuals, rendering the state a source of insecurity for its citizens : “Insecurity, rather than being external to the object to which it presents a threat is both implicated in and an effect of the very process of establishing and re-establishing the object’s identity” (Jutta Weldes, cited in Willey, 2002 : 29). National insecurity is thus revealed as the clear antonym of national security (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281 ; Der Derian, 1992: 75). Linguistically, “national insecurity” corresponds to the female and weak side of Cold War discourses (Tickner, 2001: 52 ; Peterson, 1992: 32). In effect, as Emily Rosenberg correctly observes, the power of national security linguistically comes from this binary opposition, where national security is empowered as representing a “strong emotive and symbolic power” inscribed in the male national security statist discourse (Rosenberg, 1993: 281). The national security state thus functions as a protection racket. Consequently, whether looking inward or outward, it must be rejected for its very discourse necessarily entails the unequal logic of protector-protected (Young, 2003: 14-15, 21). To understand American hegemonic power then is to understand how the theoretical foundations of U.S. hegemony influence the way U.S. leaders think about international politics generally and U.S. foreign policy in particular. As Marysia Zalewski points out, “... events in the world, issues in international politics, are not ontologically prior to our theories about them. This does not mean that people read about, say realism, and act accordingly, but that our (and by ‘our’ I mean theoriser/ global actors) dominant ways of thinking and acting in the world will be (re)produced as ‘reality’” (Zalewski, 1996: 350-51). The 9/11 attacks and the presence of a diffuse and transnational terrorist threat has convinced American state leaders that threats may come from within as well as from abroad. In a Cold War-like national security mindset, separating domestic from international politics was “business as usual”: it required paying attention to foreign and external threats. With a homeland security focus, the “boundaries” of the national security state are exploding inwardly. The “enemy” is not a foreign Other anymore; he may be American or he may strike on American soil. As Donald Pease puts it, “Overall, 9/11 brought to the light of day the Other to the normative representation of the United States. It positioned unheimlich dislocatees within the Homeland in place of the citizens who exercised rights and liberties on the basis of these normalizations. When the signifier of the Homeland substituted for the Virgin Land, the national security state was supplanted by the global state of emergency” (Pease, 2003: 17). The Other has become an undefined terrorist, with no specific territorial base. Just as Soviet communists were represented as barbaric, amoral, and inhuman, so is today’s terrorist. Conclusion Because invoking security is a political act and the discourses that construct dangers and endan- gered subjects are far from natural or neutral reflections of an independent reality, the larger social and political contexts within such discourses are invoked should also be given analytical attention (Dalby, 2002: XXI). In this piece, I have sought to explain how (American) realist theoretical discourses are mainly representative of the American experience of the Cold War. I have treated these historically-based discourses as political practices that frame and reproduce a national security state identity for the United States in the post-9/11 era. It is not the “reality” of the United States as a state that is cast in question by poststructuralists, but rather the way it is written as an unchanging and essentialized entity, as a national security state identity. Indeed, a state is always in the process of (re)construction; its identity is never fixed, nor is its legitimacy uncontested. As Campbell puts it, “with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming” (Campbell, 1998: 12). The poststructuralist approach adopted here made it possible to reveal the normative issues arising in such discourses. In sum, to understand how American or American-based realist discourses facilitated the social construction of a Cold War with the USSR after World War II, one must understand the security culture that allowed for the development of political practices that ushered in the institutionalization of a national security state. On a more metatheoretical level, in International Relations, the poststructuralist/ postmodernist turn has made mainstream positivist scholars fear a lapse into complete relativism. As Christopher Butler points out, “Postmodernist relativism needn’t meant that anything goes. ... What it does mean is that we should be more sceptically aware, more relativist about, more attentive to, the theoretical assumptions which support the narratives produced by all scholars (in the original quote, Butler wrote “historians” for he was addressing historians), whether they see themselves as empiricists or deconstructors or as postmodernist ‘new historicists’” (Butler, 2002: 35). It is increasingly clear that realists of all guises in International Relations are more and more reluctant to take an inflexible position with respect to the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning the discipline. However, in viewing theory as practice, we recognize that our choices have a normative and political value which allows us to distinguish the important from the incidental. As a result, what people see as the “real world” is implicitly bound up with the epistemological, methodological and ontological stance they take in theoretical discourse. If the national security discourse that made the Cold War possible – in American realist discourses at least – is (re)applied to our own era, then a similar pattern of legitimizing and constituting a national security state will be reproduced.

Securitization causes mass death and makes their impacts more likely
Neocleous 8 (Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel) Critique of Security 2008 AT
Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conflict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen fit to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the figures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identified as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign officials; drug-trafficking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism flowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the five Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new ‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and figuring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difficult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a figure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum figure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum figure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than confirmed by events in the twenty first  century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the official National Security Strategy of the United States in September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-first century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security benefits of ‘economic liberty’, and the benefits to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justification for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’ type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of containment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.
Vote negative to reject the 1AC’s enframing and reevaluate problematisation
Cheeseman and Bruce 96 (Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce, 1996, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)
This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of profession security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defense and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluating of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s’ identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defense and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is itself a considerable part of the problem to be analyzed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defense and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom to remain outside of the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at the least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies, which during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because they were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it means that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. One must be able to say ‘why’ to power and proclaim ‘no’ to power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defense and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that informs conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defense and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognize, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realization that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can  effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policymakers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Ever chapter, however in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defense and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defense practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8) seek to alert policymakers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities that might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought process of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific polices may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not as much at contending policies as they are made for us but challenging ‘the discursive process which gives favored interpretations of “reality” their meaning and which direct Australia’s policy/analytical/ military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defense and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defense and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as it revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defense and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defense and security are informed, underpinned, and. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’. The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western legitimized by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisers are unaware of broader intellectual debates. Or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why? To summarize: a central concern of this book is to democratize the defense and security theory/practice process in Australia so that restrictions on debate can be understood and resisted. This is a crucial enterprise in an analytical/ policy environment dominated by particularly rigid variants of realism which have become so powerful and unreflective that they are no longer recognized simply as particular ways of constituting the world, but as descriptions of the real-as reality itself. The consequences of this (silenced) theory-as-practice may be viewed every day in the poignant, distressing monuments to analytical/policy metooism at the Australian (Imperial) War Memorial in Canberra and the many other monuments to young Australians in towns and cities around the country. These are the flesh and blood installments of an insurance policy strategy which, tragically, remains integral to Australian realism, despite claims of a new mature independent identity in the 1990s. This is what unfortunately, continues to be at stake in the potentially deadly debates over defense and security revealed in this book. For this reason alone, it should be regarded as a positive and constructive contribution to debate by those who are the targets of its criticisms.
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The critique is prior—proliferation discourse undercuts aff solvency by prioritizing supply-side solutions at the expense of addressing legitimate demand-side concerns
Mutimer 94—David Mutimer is Deputy Director of YCISS and Associate Professor of Political Science at York University August 1994, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation,” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, http://pi.library.yorku.ca/dspace/bitstream/handle/10315/1415/YCI0074.pdf?sequence=1
The Assembled Image
The image of PROLIFERATION knits together the metaphors of 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance' to shape the policy responses of the international community. The metaphors have certain entailments, which serve to highlight, downplay and hide aspects of the security environment. Thus, the policy responses which are being developed address primarily those aspects highlighted, while ignoring those downplayed and hidden. The image is of an autonomously driven process of spread, outward from a particular source or sources. It is an apolitical image, which strongly highlights technology, capability and gross accounts of number. As such, it is an image that masks the political interests of those supporting the present structure of proliferation control—a structure which strongly reflects this image and its entailments. To begin with, the control efforts are classified by the technology of concern. Thus there are global instruments for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, of chemical and biological weapons, and a register of conventional arms. There is no global instrument for the control of the spread of missile technology, but the MTCR addresses this technology as a discrete problem, and is considering evolving into a global regime. There is thus little or no recognition in the practical response to PROLIFERATION that the spread of these technologies might all be part of a common 'security' problem. The security concerns which might drive states to acquire one or more of these technologies are hidden by the PROLIFERATION image. This division of the problem into discrete technologies persists, despite the fact that the connection among the various technologies of concern manifests itself in a number of ways. I will mention only two by way of illustration. The first is the common reference to biological weapons as "the poor man's atomic bomb". The implication of this phrase is that a state prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons—in this case for reasons of cost—could turn to biological weapons to serve the same purposes. The second example is of the links being drawn in the Middle East between Arab states' potential chemical arms, and Israel's nuclear arsenal. The Arab states are balking at ratifying the CWC until the Israeli nuclear arms are at least placed on the negotiating table. Conversely, supporters of the Israeli position can cite the Arab states' overwhelming conventional superiority as a justification for Israel's nuclear arms. The common approach to 'controlling' proliferation across the technologies of concern is the limitation and even denial of the supply of technology. Each of the technologies of concern is addressed by at least one suppliers group, and the major Western suppliers maintain export controls to implement the groups' lists. Such an approach is clearly informed by the entailments of the PROLIFERATION image. Supplier controls respond to the 'spread outward from a source' entailment of 'proliferation'. They also reflect the ways in which both the metaphors of 'proliferation' and 'stability' highlight technology, by focussing solely on its nature and movement. In addition, these groups reflect the various entailments of 'stability' and 'balance' outlined above. They seek to prevent "excessive and destabilizing accumulations" of technologies through the application of their controls. Lost entirely in these practices are considerations of the political and economic underpinnings of security. These aspects are hidden by the image, and so are not addressed by the policy responses. The relationship between these political interests, the policy responses and the metaphors of the PROLIFERATION image would form the subject of another paper, at the very least. However, it is not responsible to ignore entirely this relationship, and so I will provide an example by way of illustration. India stands as a leading opponent of the present approach to proliferation control, with its roots in technological denial. India represents a different set of interests from those of the northern states most concerned with PROLIFERATION as presently understood and practiced. For India, access to technology is vital, and the principle of discrimination between the have and have not states—enshrined most notably in the NPT, but seen throughout the non-proliferation measures for denying technologies' spread—is absolutely unacceptable. As such, the Indians reject the image of PROLIFERATION, and call rather for DISARMAMENT. This view is reflected in the following passage, quoted from a paper by the Indian Ambassador to Japan, who was previously the Indian representative on the Conference on Disarmament: It would be futile to pretend that 1995 is 1970, that nothing has changed and nothing requires to be changed in the 1995 NPT. It would be a cruel joke on the coming generation to say that they will be safer with an indefinite extension of the 1970 NPT. 1995 presents an opportunity; there is great scope for non governmental agencies, intellectuals and academics, who believe in nuclear disarmament to work towards changing this mindset and spur governments in nuclear weapon countries to look at reality, to accept that there are shortcomings in the NPT and that nations, both within and outside the NPT have genuine concerns which need to be addressed in order to make the NPT universal, non discriminatory and a true instrument for nuclear disarmament. Emphasis added.66 There are three noteworthy elements of this plea for change. The first is that Ambassador Shah recognises the importance of changing the mindset toward the problem in order to effect change in the policy responses to that problem. This feature of his remarks relates to the second. Ambassador Shah casts his justification for alterations in the NPT as reflecting a changed reality—thereby attacking the naturalisation of the features of the world which are highlighted by the PROLIFERATION image, as reflected in the NPT. Finally, Ambassador Shah calls for the new NPT to be an instrument of 'nuclear disarmament', not non-proliferation. In other words, he recognises that there is a policy problem to be addressed, but it is not a PROLIFERATION problem—that is, a spread of weapons technology from those who have to those who do not presently have. Rather, the problem needs to be imagined as a (DIS)ARMAMENT problem—the possession of nuclear and other arms, regardless of who has them. For the countries of the north, the indefinite extension of an unamended NPT is considered essential. The NPT is seen as the linchpin of the proliferation control effort, without which the entire edifice might fall. What Ambassador Shah's comments demonstrate, reflecting the position taken in India, is the way in which that effort, tied so closely to the entailments of the PROLIFERATION image, serves only a particular set of interests by highlighting only specific features of 'reality'. From where he sits, 'reality' provides Ambassador Shah with a different approach to the problem of nuclear (and other mass destruction) weapons, an approach better captured through an image of (DIS)ARMAMENT than one of PROLIFERATION.