Tournament: Loyola | Round: 1 | Opponent: Alex Bauman | Judge: Amanda Drummond
Route 1 (Maybe)
Moral agents have to be responsible for all rights.
(Motilal, Sashi. "Human Rights: Moral Authority and Philosophical Doubts."Human Rights and Environmental Sustainability (n.d.): n. pag. Web.) (http://www.geisteswissenschaften.fu-berlin.de/v/dagg/termine/shashi-motilal_human-rights1.pdf)  (Department of philosophy)  (2013)
Motilal 13
It is widely held that social justice can be achieved when people in society actually enjoy human rights, i.e., can actually make claims that are moral and may be legal claims against other individuals/institutions for what morally belongs to them by virtue of being human. This “individualistic” conception of human rights with its roots in the largely western political system of liberal democracy has come in for criticism from various quarters, amongst which the cultural relativist critique is perhaps the strongest. The main contention of the cultural relativist is that such a conception of a human right is not universally present in all cultures e.g., some pre-modern Western cultures and Non-Western
Thus my standard is upholding equality
Upholding Equality is the best way to ensure that all people get these innate values.
Burke 13 – Anthony, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, 2013 (“Security cosmopolitanism,” Critical Studies on Security (Vol. 1, No. 1, 13–28) Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Tandfonline)
The historical ontology outlined above – one based on the factual immanence of insecurity to modernity – has profound implications for the kind of ethics that underpins security cosmopolitanism. Its three basic principles would be as follows.
First, the responsibility of all states and security actors 2 is to create deep and enduring security for all human beings in a form that harmonises human social, economic, cultural and political activity with the integrity of global ecosystems. The fundamental end must be the creation of a global security system that enables human security universally in similar terms to those set out by the United Nations’ Commission on Human Security: ‘to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment’ by ‘creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity’ (Commission on Human Security 2003, 4). While what these systems are and how they function opens up great complexity and must be permanently contestable, all states, all actors, and all organizations, must share this basic, foundational common end.
This principle is also aimed at ensuring that deployments of the human security concept and practice be fully cosmopolitan; that they serve, empower, and involve people, rather than be paternalistic slogans to cover national or organizational agendas that fail to achieve systemic change which enables communities to sustain their own security over the long-term (Turner, Cooper, and Pugh 2011; McCormack 2011). This I take to be the original intent of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1994) and the Commission on Human Security, whose 2003 report speaks of ‘including the excluded’ and places the empowerment of people and communities – what Sadako Ogata terms ‘developing the capability of individuals and communities to make informed choices and to act on their own behalf’ – at the centre of its agenda (2003: 5). There are affinities here with Oliver Richmond's (2011, 53) call for a ‘post-liberal’ and ‘post-colonial’ form of human security, ‘contextually driven and negotiated’, which now needs to be incorporated within a cosmopolitan framework that ensures that no community's security is privileged over any others’.
Second, all states and security actors have fundamental responsibilities to future generations and the long-term survival of global ecosystems: to consider the impact of their decisions, choices and commitments through time. This reflects the rule that Iris Marion Young places at the core of her global political theory 3 : ‘the meaning of political responsibility is forward-looking. One has the responsibility always now, in relation to current events and their future consequences’ (Young 2011, 92). Actions today, and the norms that are immanent to them, will inspire others in potentially unknown ways through decades and centuries to come. Those actions, and the commitments, institutions, and human possibilities they create or at least make tenable, will open space for potential futures and close off others. When Osama Bin Laden used the examples of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Vietnam to justify a norm that would allow the targeting and slaughter of civilians, such a temporal stretching of consequences was being put into effect, in ways that the original architects of those decisions could not have predicted (Burke 2008, 32–41).
Just as the insecurities we face today are the complex product of myriad choices and interactions dating back decades and sometimes centuries, our collective choices shape the potential of security for future generations: nuclear weapons and climate change are just two examples of such futuristic temporal reverberations. In such cases the potential for security and insecurity endures through indefinite time, if we consider the almost geological ‘half-lives’ of high-level radioactive waste, which extend from hundreds to millions of years, or the scientific projection of anthropogenic climate change though hundreds of years (IPCC 2007, 46), leaving an enduring legacy of past decisions that future generations must cope with. Hannah Arendt's warning is apposite here: ‘It is the very nature of things human that every act that has once made its appearance and been recorded in the history of mankind stays with mankind as a potentiality long after its actuality has become a thing of the past…the unprecedented, once it has appeared, may become a precedent for the future’ (Arendt 2005, 98–99). To extend Arendt's argument: acts, processes, and their material effects, endure, and cannot be wished away. Just as a cliché of nuclear discourse states that ‘the Bomb cannot be uninvented’, neither can an idea be uninvented nor an action entirely unmade. Our concern should not just be about the proliferation of destructive norms or the repetition of international crimes, but about the long-range implications of individual and collective actions whose effects will eventually escape our direct control and persevere long after they have begun.
It might be argued that having to peer long into an uncertain future through the prism of one's choices is an impossible burden. I disagree. Uncertainty is also potentiality; it opens up the potential for more just and secure paths, and the possible effects of particular technological, policy, and strategic choices can often be reasonably predicted through a combination of critical history, social science, public dialogue, and scenario-based planning. A consistent aim must be to create legal and structural frameworks that work to build security and ward off disastrous outcomes in a systemic fashion. This process will be assisted by a third ethical principle: a principle that can responsibly guide security actions in the face of their future impacts, some of them potentially unknowable. This, in a modification of Kant, one could call a global categorical imperative. Recall that Kant's categorical imperative of morality stated that one ‘must act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law…act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature’ (Kant 2004, 31). The global categorical imperative refines Kant's categorical imperative in two ways. First, its address expands from the individual to collectivities and organizations – governments, NGOs, international organizations, militaries, defence ministries, diplomats, insurgents, and more – to any actor or agency whose activities will affect the security of others (a principle that modifies the criteria for institutional moral responsibility developed in Erskine 2003, 6–8). Second, its scope moves beyond the moral individual wrestling with their duties to take in the world as a whole: actors must consider the systemic context and impact of their actions, work to understand their potential collective consequences, and act collectively to manage those impacts and resolve global insecurities. The global categorical imperative would thus state: act as if both the principles and consequences of your action will become global, across space and through time, and act only in ways that will bring a more secure life for all human beings closer.
We must act as if the principles and consequences of our actions will become global because they are likely to: because norms, ideas, and effects spread, or they lie dormant until they appear at other times and in other places, and because the complex security processes that actions feed into reverberate widely through space and time; they take on momentum that is difficult to arrest. The global categorical imperative tests norms and actions against their global consequences and the complex causal chains they feed into. What is the impact on global security if bad norms become commonplace-torture, the violation of human rights, military aggression, proxy warfare, targeted killings, terrorism, corruption, gender or racial discrimination, colonialism, and other great injustices? Can the world really bear them, and judge itself secure? The global categorical imperative demands that security actors look into a distant and open future, and take responsibility for it, in the face of the particularly challenging quality that Arendt attributed to action: ‘action has no end. The process of a single deed can quite literally endure through time until mankind itself has come to an end’ (Arendt 1998, 233). The global categorical imperative asks us to consider what violence, conflict, and insecurity put into the world – grief, radicalization, impoverishment, resentment, pain, trauma, and fear – and then of the myriad ways that the insecurity that manifests them can multiply and mutate. The long-standing security concern with ‘proliferation’ here widens to take in its systemic potentials: proliferation of weapons, doctrines, tactics, norms, ideas, feelings, dilemmas, and consequences. The ethical principles of security cosmopolitanism, then, are not merely normative preferences: they are strategic necessities.

Plan text:
The government of Japan ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power.

Links
Pre-FD evidence shows that people faced inequality in the past because of Nuclear Power.
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(O’Neill Family Endowed Professor Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy/ http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-ej-2012-fukushima.pdf/ Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. "Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: Prima-Facie Evidence for a Japanese “Katrina”." Environmental Justice 5.3 (2012): 133-39. Web.)

One of the first clues about pre-FD-accident EI is that Japanese economic inequality ‘‘is now higher than the OECD average; the ratio of people with incomes below the poverty line.ranks in the highest group’’ among OECD countries.’’4,5 In fact, economic inequality appears worse in Japan than the US—long considered the most economically unequal developed nation.6 Moreover, because Japanese ‘‘social stratification.is quite rigid,’’ its middle class is smaller than in the US and much smaller than in western Europe.7 Yet, the Japanese government neither acknowledges nor measures poverty,8 which contributes to prima facie evidence for pre-FD-accident EI.3 (Following ethicists John Rawls and W.D. Ross, prima-facie evidence is preliminary evidence that—in the absence of available, specific data—establishes a presumptive claim. Ultima-facie evidence is final-analysis (not merely presumptive) evidence based on specific, complete data.9 Because of incomplete FD radiation-risk and demographic data, this article surveys only prima-facie evidence for FD EI.)

Pre-FD evidence shows that poor people are more likely to live near nuclear facilities.
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(O’Neill Family Endowed Professor Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy/ http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-ej-2012-fukushima.pdf/ Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. "Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: Prima-Facie Evidence for a Japanese “Katrina”." Environmental Justice 5.3 (2012): 133-39. Web.)

At least four reasons suggest prima-facie evidence that Japanese poor near FD have faced DREI. One prima-facie reason is that because poor people tend to live near dangerous facilities, like reactors, they face the worst accident risks. Within weeks after the FD accident began, long-lived cesium-134 and other radioactive isotopes had poisoned soils at 7.5 million times the regulatory limit; radiation outside plant boundaries was equivalent to getting about seven chest X-rays per hour.47 Roughly 19 miles Northwest of FD, air-radiation readings were 0.8 mSv per hour; after 10 days of this exposure, IARC dose- response curves predict 1 in 5 fatal cancers of those exposed would be attributable to FD; two-months exposure would mean most fatal cancers were caused by FD. Such exposures are likely because many near-Fukushima residents were too poor to evacuate.20

Poor people also experience Disaster Related Environmental Injustice.
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(O’Neill Family Endowed Professor Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy/ http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-ej-2012-fukushima.pdf/ Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. "Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: Prima-Facie Evidence for a Japanese “Katrina”." Environmental Justice 5.3 (2012): 133-39. Web.)

A second prima-facie reason for Fukushima DREI is that poor people, living near reactors, have higher probabilities of being hurt by both normal and disaster-related radiation releases. Reactors normally cause prima facie EI because they release allowable radiation that increases local cancers and mortality, especially among infants/ children.51–55 Because zero is the only safe dose of ionizing radiation (as the US National Academy of Sciences warns), its cumulative LNT (Linear, No Threshold for increased risk) effects are worst closer to reactors, where poor people live. The US EPA says even normal US radiation releases, between 1970–2020, could cause up to 24,000 additional US deaths.56,57

Buraku workers are EI and DREi victims.
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(O’Neill Family Endowed Professor Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy/ http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-ej-2012-fukushima.pdf/ Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. "Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: Prima-Facie Evidence for a Japanese “Katrina”." Environmental Justice 5.3 (2012): 133-39. Web.)

w shows buraku nuclear workers are both EI and DREI victims. Internationally, nuclear workers are prominent EI victims because even without accidents, they are allowed to receive ionizingradiation doses (50 mSv annually) 50 times higher than those received by the public. Yet, only low socioeconomic-status people—like buraku—tend to take such risks. This double standard is obviously ethically questionable, given that many developed nations (e.g., Germany, Scandinavian countries) prohibit it because it encourages EI—workers’ trading health for paid work, and innocent worker-descendants’ (future generations’) dying from radiation-induced genomic instability. Thus, both buraku children and their distant descendents face EI—higher radiation-induced death/disease.17,61,62

Buraku workers face many environmental issues due to nuclear power.
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(O’Neill Family Endowed Professor Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy/ http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-ej-2012-fukushima.pdf/ Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. "Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: Prima-Facie Evidence for a Japanese “Katrina”." Environmental Justice 5.3 (2012): 133-39. Web.)

Prima-facie evidence shows, second, that FD-burakunuclear workers also are EI and DREI victims because they likely consented to neither normal-, nor accidentlevel, radiation exposures. Why not? Under normal conditions, 90 percent of all 83,000 Japanese nuclear workers are temporary-contract workers who receive about 16 times more radiation than the already-50-times-higherthan-public doses received by normal radiation workers. For non-accident exposures, buraku receive $350–$1,000 per day, for several days of high-radiation work. They have neither full-time employment, nor adequate compensation, nor union representation, nor health benefits, nor full dose disclosure, yet receive the highest workplace-radiation risks. Why? Industry is not required to ‘‘count’’ temporary workers’ radiation exposures when it calculates workers’ average-radiation doses for regulators. However, even if buraku were told their nonaccident doses/risks, they could not genuinely consent. They are unskilled, socially shunned, temporary laborers who are forced by economic necessity to accept even deadly jobs. This two-tier nuclear-worker system—where buraku bear most (unreported) risks, while highly-paid employees bear little (reported) risk—’’ ‘is the hidden world of nuclear power’ said.a former Tokyo University physics professor.’’ In 2010, 89 percent of FD nuclear workers were temporary-contract employees, ‘‘hired from construction sites,’’ local farms, or ‘‘local gangsters.’’ With a ‘‘constant fear of getting fired,’’ they hid their injuries/ doses—to keep their jobs.61–65

Children get lets medical care than adults near nuclear reactors, leading to EI
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(O’Neill Family Endowed Professor Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy/ http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-ej-2012-fukushima.pdf/ Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. "Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: Prima-Facie Evidence for a Japanese “Katrina”." Environmental Justice 5.3 (2012): 133-39. Web.)
Japanese children’s weakened FD-radiation protections and resulting prima-facie DREI are problematic because FD children receive less protection than adults, despite their higher sensitivity. Yet all other things being equal, greater vulnerability ethically demands greater government protection. The weakened FD-radiation protections also are problematic because Japanese-governmentradiation-dose standards take account only of external/ airborne-radiation, not internal exposures from food and water—although government and IAEA admit internal exposures are crucial to total FD doses. Only three months after the FD disaster began, Fukushima children tested positive for internal-radiation contamination—that Japanese standards ignored. Even worse, because isotopes such as cesium-134/137 have half-lives greater than 30 years, this contamination will continue for decades, continually causing problems like cancer. Yet PSR says government continues to cover up risks, by ‘‘not adequately monitoring radiation contamination of soil, food, water and air and.not providing.parents with sufficient information to protect their children.’’ Likewise, warning that government-allowed-FD-risks to children are ‘‘unconscionable,’’ government-scientific advisor Toshiso Kosako tearfully resigned. Cover-up of serious risks— which negates risk disclosure and consent—thus provides evidence of prima-facie DREI to Japanese children.22,32,68,70,71

Harms
Japan’s nuclear program came out of a desire for economic securitization against their resource scarcity, which makes them proliferate

Valentine and Sovacool 10 Scott Victor Valentine, Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo, Benjamin K. Sovacool, b Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, “The socio-political economy of nuclear power development in Japan and South Korea,” Energy Policy Vol 38, December 2010 Premier
Following World War II defeat, Japan was in ruins. More than 30 percent of the Japanese population was homeless, communication and transport networks were in shambles and industrial capacity had been bombed into insignificance (Hall, 1990). With the support of Occupation funding, Japan embarked on a modernization program that would achieve unprecedented economic success. By the 1960s, Japan boasted the second largest radio and television manufacturing industries in the world and its automotive industry had grown to become the third-largest in the world (Hall, 1990). Accordingly, when the government turned to development of the nuclear power program, most Japanese were already sold on the merits of technological progress. Japan’s nuclear energy program is an offspring of aspirations for enhanced national energy security. The nuclear power program accelerated in the 1970s, when the oil embargoes in 1973 and 1974 convinced many of the political elite that nuclear power was needed to buffer the Japanese economy from energy shocks. National planners also saw nuclear technology as an important export product, a tool to not only free the nation from energy dependence, but to also extend its economic reach into the Pacific and the world at large (Kim and Byrne, 1996). The sheer lack of indigenous energy resources justified a massive expansion of the nuclear program, including commitment to plutonium fueled fast breeder reactors (Byrne and Hoffman, 1996). The Japanese government’s support for nuclear technology was and is based on the tenet that a greater national risk is posed by dependence on imported energy than by a network of nuclear power plants. Japan imports more than 95 percent of its energy feed-stocks, and other than Italy (which is inter-connected to the European Union electricity grid) no other country in the OECD exhibits such precarious dependence on imported energy (FEPC, 2008). Japanese policymakers believe this places the economic well-being of the country at the mercy of a highly unstable global energy market (ANRE, 2006). For decades in Japan, expansion of the nuclear power program has been perceived as a strategic necessity for enhancing domestic energy security while preserving low energy costs. Recently, the challenge of reducing carbon emissions to fulfill Japan’s Kyoto Protocol commitments has bolstered the allure of nuclear power. Accordingly, if there is any lesson to be derived from Japan’s ongoing experiment with nuclear power, it is that dominant economic priorities can nullify conditions that may otherwise prevent nuclear power development. Not only was Japan in ruins following World War II, the nation’s dearth of natural resources placed industry in a precarious position for recovery. The only resource that Japan had in sufficient quantity was labor. Accordingly, the key tenets of Japan’s modernization strategy lay in supporting technologies that could help industries utilize labor more effectively or add-value to the production process (Inkster and Satofuka, 2000). Such technocratic ideology sired a host of now famous systems for enhancing productivity such as total quality management, just-intime inventory control and kanban production control (Chase and Aquilano, 1995). In the 1960s, the promise of generating cheap energy through applied nuclear technology meshed perfectly with government aspirations to enhance the international competitiveness of industry. For resource-poor Japan, developing the most technologically advanced energy infrastructure was akin to developing a new type of resource—a technological resource.
It overwhelms barriers for expertise
Ackland 9 - Len Ackland, co-director of the Center for Environmental Journalism., (“Weapons proliferation a big risk with nuclear power” February 10, 2009, http://www.cejournal.net/?p=903) RMT
As Tom Yulsman points out in his Feb. 5 posting, the tight connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons is seriously underplayed and often ignored in discussions about the so-called “need” for nuclear power to help meet energy demand while addressing global warming concerns.  (Issues including accidents, terrorism, high-level nuclear waste disposal and economic costs are also important, but I won’t deal with them in this brief commentary.)    While Tom mentions the concern over plutonium, which I’ll return to momentarily in responding to the questions from the commenter on the Feb. 5 post, remember that the convergence between nuclear power and weapons occurs at two points in the nuclear “fuel cycle” — the cradle-to-grave process beginning with uranium mining and ending with nuclear waste or incredible explosions.

The first power-weapons crossover comes during uranium “enrichment,” after uranium ore is milled to extract uranium in the form called “yellow cake” that is then converted to uranium hexafluoride gas.  Enrichment of the gas means increasing the amount of the fissile uranium-235 isotope, which comprises 0.7 percent of natural uranium, to the 3-6 percent needed to make fuel rods for commercial nuclear reactors.  The same centrifuges (the modern technology of choice) that separate the U-235 from the U-238 can be kept running until the percentage of U-235 reaches about 90 percent and can be used for the kind of nuclear bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.  Enrichment — low for nuclear power plants and high for bombs — is at the heart of the current controversy over Iran’s plans and capabilities.

The second power-weapons crossover comes when low-enriched uranium fuel is burned in nuclear reactors, whether military, civilian, or dual use.  Neutrons produced in the chain reaction are captured by the U-238 to form U-239 then neptunium-239 which decays into plutonium-239, the key fissile isotope for nuclear weapons.  Other plutonium isotopes, such as Pu-240, Pu-241, and Pu-242 are also produced.  The extent to which the uranium fuel elements are irradiated is called “fuel burnup.”  Basically, military reactors designed specifically to produce Pu-239 burn the fuel for shorter periods, a few weeks, before the fuel rods are removed from the reactors in order to minimize the buildup of Pu-240 and other elements.  Commercial reactors, aimed at maximizing the energy output in order to produce electricity, burn the fuel for a year or so before the fuel rod assemblies are changed out.  The used or “spent” fuel contains higher percentages of the undesirable (for bomb builders) plutonium isotopes.  Dual-use reactors, such as the one that caused the Chernobyl accident in 1986, tend toward the shorter fuel burnup times.

The plutonium in the spent fuel is the 20,000 kilograms that the Federation of American Scientists estimates is produced each year by the world’s currently operating 438 reactors.  Other sources estimate the amount of plutonium in spent fuel as much higher.  For a good description of these issues, see David Albright, et. al., “Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies,” SIPRI, Oxford U. Press, 1997.

Finally, before the plutonium-239 created in nuclear reactors can be used in weapons, it must first be separated from the uranium, transuranics and other fission products.  This is done in “reprocessing” plants and is often benignly referred to as plutonium recycling.  Currently there are only a handful of commercial reprocessing facilities, the one in France and the one in the United Kingdom having operated the longest.  Much of the plutonium extracted by these plants is mixed with uranium and reused for nuclear fuel in commercial reactors.    But reprocessing plants also exist in countries using plutonium for nuclear weapons.   Thus, North Korea, the most recent country to join the nine-member nuclear weapons “club,” made weapons through its reprocessing facility. 

The fact that a country like North Korea could accomplish the manufacture of nuclear weapons should give pause to those who advocate nuclear power plants as an answer to global warming.  A plutonium economy and/or the presence of uranium enrichment facilities in many nations around the world are dangerous prospects.  Even accepting the arguments that life-cycle analysis of nuclear plants — which takes into account the emissions from mining, construction and so forth — puts them on a par with renewable energy sources in terms of greenhouse gas emissions doesn’t overcome their disadvantages.  And the assurance from nuclear advocates that the next generation of plants (Generation IV, still under development) will be more “proliferation resistant,” isn’t comforting given the technologists’ track record.  And that still would be a long way from proliferation proof.
Turns the environment DA – proliferation overwhelms incentives for civilian use of nuclear reactors
Li and Yim 13- Mang-Sung Yim is in the Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, and Jun Li works at UNC Chapel Hill (“Examining relationship between nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power development” Progress in Nuclear Energy Volume 66, July 2013, Pages 108–114http:www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0149197013000504) RMT
This paper attempts to examine the relationship between nuclear weapons proliferation and civilian nuclear power development based on the history of Atoms for Peace Initiative. To investigate the relationship, a database was established by compiling information on a country's civilian nuclear power development and various national capabilities and situational factors. The results of correlation analysis indicated that the initial motivation to develop civilian nuclear power could be mostly dual purpose. However, for a civilian nuclear power program to be ultimately successful, the study finds the role of nuclear nonproliferation very important. The analysis indicated that the presence of nuclear weapons in a country and serious interest in nuclear weapons have a negative effect on the civilian nuclear power program. The study showed the importance of state level commitment to nuclear nonproliferation for the success of civilian nuclear power development. NPT ratification and IAEA safeguards were very important factors in the success of civilian nuclear power development. In addition, for a country's civilian nuclear power development to be successful, the country needs to possess strong economic capability and be well connected to the world economic market through international trade. Mature level of democracy and presence of nuclear technological capabilities were also found to be important for the success of civilian nuclear power program.
Prolif in new states causes nuclear conflict.
Kroenig 14 – Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown University, and Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council (“The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?”, April 2014, http://www.matthewkroenig.com/The20History20of20Proliferation20Optimism_Feb2014.pdf)
The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late Naughts.49 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure second-strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use ‘em or loose ‘em pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.50 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.51 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.52 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”53 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.54 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism. The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.55 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a “religious duty” for Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.56 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them. Indeed, in recent years, many U.S. politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to U.S. national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hezbollah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al Qaeda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. U.S. officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a break down in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability: The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the “stability-instability paradox” maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62
And, it increases conventional wars.
Kahl 7/9 — associate professor in the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University (Colin Kahl, “How worried should U.S. policymakers be about nuclear blackmail?” Washington Post 7.09.14) RMT
But here’s the problem from a policy-making perspective: regardless of whether nuclear weapons actually provide nuclear-armed states with greater capabilities and opportunities to engage in effective coercion, new nuclear states appear to believe they do, at least for some period of time, and act accordingly. At least some nuclear-weapons states appear to think a nuclear deterrent shields them from large-scale conventional retaliation from targets of coercion, tempting them to engage in more assertive military behavior below the nuclear threshold, including conventional aggression, low-level violence, proxy attacks, terrorism and the initiation of crises. And this pattern appears to hold even against stronger adversaries that enjoy nuclear superiority. During the Cold War, for example, nuclear deterrence discouraged large-scale conventional or nuclear war, but the superpowers engaged in several direct crises, as well as proxy wars throughout the so-called Third World. Scholars posited that this was the result of a “stability-instability paradox”in which the very “stability” created by mutually assured destruction (MAD) generated greater “instability” by making superpower provocations, disputes and conflict below the nuclear threshold seem “safe.” More recently, nuclear weapons have similarly made the Indian-Pakistani rivalry more crisis-prone even as they discouraged large-scale war or a nuclear exchange. The historical record also strongly suggests that states with “revisionist” aims become more aggressive — both directly and through the use of proxies — after acquiring nuclear weapons, at least for some period of time. Less than six months passed between the August 1949 testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb and Stalin’s green light to North Korean plans to invade South Korea. And, shortly thereafter, Moscow encouraged Ho Chi Minh to intensify his offensive against the French in Indochina. And, as Gavin’s research suggests, the development of thermonuclear weapons in 1955 and intercontinental ballistic missiles in 1958 also appear to have made Khrushchev more assertive, culminating in the 1958-1961 Berlin crisis. Similarly, five years after China became a nuclear power, Mao Zedong authorized Chinese troops to attack Soviet border forces in 1969. Archival evidence also suggests that Iraq’s quest for nuclear weapons was in part driven by Saddam Hussein’s desire to use them as a cover for conventional aggression against Israel. And, more recently, Pakistan’s emboldened support of anti-Indian terrorism and militancy and North Korea’s escalating provocations provide additional illustrations of the possible incentives and opportunities nuclear weapons create to advance a revisionist agenda. Large-n quantitative studies on the emboldening effects of nuclear weapons have produced mixed results. On average, nuclear weapon states appear no more (or less) likely to become involved in international militarized disputes, or to initiate these disputes. But, with regard to interactions between nuclear states, Robert Rauchhaus finds that nuclear status increases the likelihood of low-level militarized disputes, including threats and the limited use of force, even as it reduces the chances of large-scale war. Time and learning may also play a key role. Michael Horowitz finds that the longer a state possesses nuclear weapons, the less likely it is to become involved in disputes. But new nuclear powers appear to be more prone to involvement in militarized disputes in the initial period of time after developing nuclear weapons against all types of states (including nuclear ones). In short, regardless of whether nuclear weapons are objectively useful — or not — in coercion, at least some nuclear states — especially those with revisionist ambitions — seem to believe they are and act accordingly, even toward more nuclear-armed powerful adversaries. And, in many cases, it is precisely this type of adventurism by adversaries that so worries U.S. policymakers. This was my experience observing the Obama administration’s deliberations on the potential dangers of Iranian nuclearization. U.S. officials believe Iranian nuclear acquisition would embolden Tehran — a state with both defensive and ideologically revisionist motivations — to be even more assertive in supporting terrorism, militancy and making coercive threats against its neighbors. They also fear that Iranian nuclearization would spark conventional and nuclear arms racing by other regional powers. Together, these dynamics would make an already volatile Middle East even more difficult to police and manage, requiring costly and complex U.S. deterrence and reassurance strategies and increasing the risk of irregular and conventional war.

Overview: Environmental Injustice is bad
Buraku workers are the ones cleaning up the Fukashima disaster in dangerous conditions and for below minimum wage
McCurdy 15 Claire McCurdy, writer @ International Policy Digest, “Japan’s Nuclear Gypsies: The Homeless, Jobless and Fukushima,” International Policy Digest, August 21, 2015, http://intpolicydigest.org/2015/08/21/japan-s-nuclear-gypsies-the-homeless-jobless-and-fukushima/Premier
The cleanup efforts in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster in northern Japan have revealed the plight of the Japanese unemployed, marginally employed day laborers and the homeless. They are called the “precariat,” Japan’s proletariat, living precariously on the knife-edge of the work world, without full employment or job security. They are derided as “glow in the dark boys,” “jumpers” (one job to another) and “nuclear gypsies.” They have even been dubbed “burakumin,” a hostile term for Japan’s untouchables, members of the lowest rung on the ladder in Japanese society. They are unskilled and virtually untrained and are the nuclear decontamination workers recruited by Japanese gangsters, Yakuza, to make Fukushima in northern Japan livable again. These jobs are some of the most dangerous and undesirable jobs in the industrialized world, a $35 billion, taxpayer-funded effort to clean up radioactive fallout across an area of northern Japan larger than Hong Kong. Reuters and the L.A. Times have both described the project as an unprecedented effort. Reuters made a direct comparison between Fukushima and the Chernobyl “incident.” Unlike Ukraine and the 1986 nuclear “accident” at Chernobyl, where authorities declared a 1,000 square-mile no-habitation zone, resettled 350,000 people and allowed radiation to take care of itself, Japan is attempting to make the Fukushima region livable again. The army of itinerant decontamination workers has been hired at well below the minimum wage to clean up the radioactive debris and build tanks to store the contaminated water generated to keep the reactor core cool. They work in unregulated environments, without adequate supervision, training or monitoring or the protection of health insurance. Most of the workers are subcontractors, drifters, unskilled and poorly paid. In an article for Al Jazeera’s “America Tonight,” David McNeill, a blogger about nuclear gypsies, commented: “They move from job to job. They’re unqualified, of course, in most cases.” Jeff Kingston, Dept. of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan, noted in October 2014 that the numbers of these nuclear gypsies or members of the “precariat” have increased from 15 percent of the Japanese workforce in the late 1980s to 38 percent to date and the numbers are expected to continue to rise.
Workers are exposing themselves to harmful radiation
CCNE 13 Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy, Organization Aiming at Fundamental Reform of Nuclear Energy Policy, “Our path to a nuclear-free Japan: an interim report Executive Summary,” October 2013 Premier
On-site at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants, approximately 3,000 workers per day continue to engage in demanding operations, exposing themselves to high radiation doses. Over 80 of those workers are subcontractor workers. In the two and a half years since the accident, approximately 30,000 workers have worked at the Fukushima Daiichi. Their collective dose during this period already amounts to as much as 10 of the total collective dose of all workers at all nuclear power plants in Japan over the 40 years prior to the accident. This calculation does not include the doses of people who were most likely exposed to a very high level of radiation during emergency operations in March 2011 – such as fire-fighters, rescue workers, and SDF personnel. There are multiple problems concerning radiation protection and working environment (safety, health, and employment conditions) of the workers at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, and fundamental improvements are necessary in all aspects. On top of all these, it seems that a serious shortage of manpower is currently being experienced and is expected to continue in future, due to the amount of work that is and will be required to bring the situation under control and to decommission the plants. This labour shortage is serious and we demand immediate solutions.

Many children can die by environmental injustices.
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(O’Neill Family Endowed Professor Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy/ http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-ej-2012-fukushima.pdf/ Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. "Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: Prima-Facie Evidence for a Japanese “Katrina”." Environmental Justice 5.3 (2012): 133-39. Web.)
Local FD children likewise comprise one of the most troubling groups of prima-facie DREI victims. Postaccident, government has allowed FD children to annually receive radiation of 2000 mrem(20mSv)/year—20 times higher than normally allowed for adults, although children are up to 40 times more sensitive than adults to radiation.56,69 Thus, PSR says the FD ‘‘impact on the health of Japanese children is being glossed over’’—that about 350,000 children under age 18 are living in Fukushima and, after four years, FD exposures could cause 5,000 of them to die prematurely from cancer. After eight years exposure, 10,000 of them would die prematurely.
Buraku workers get higher doses because of EI
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(O’Neill Family Endowed Professor Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy/ http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-ej-2012-fukushima.pdf/ Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. "Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: Prima-Facie Evidence for a Japanese “Katrina”." Environmental Justice 5.3 (2012): 133-39. Web.)
Still another factor thwarting FD-buraku consent—and indicating prima-facie DREI—is that FD workers likely FUKUSHIMA AND DISASTER-RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE 135 received higher doses than government admitted. ‘‘The company refused to say how many FD contract workers had been exposed to post-disaster radiation’’; moreover, nuclear-worker-protective clothing and respirators, whether in the US or Japan, protect them only from skin/lung contamination; no gear can stop gamma irradiation of their entire bodies.56,63,66 Neither TECO, nor Japanese regulators, nor IAEA has released statistics on post-FDradiation exposures, especially to buraku inside the plant. IAEA says merely: ‘‘requirements for occupational exposure of remediation workers can be fulfilled’’ at FD, not that they have been or will be fulfilled—a fact also suggesting prima-facie DREI toward buraku.67,68

Environmental injustice causes more poor people by economic hardships.
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
(O’Neill Family Endowed Professor Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy/ http://www3.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-ej-2012-fukushima.pdf/ Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. "Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: Prima-Facie Evidence for a Japanese “Katrina”." Environmental Justice 5.3 (2012): 133-39. Web.)

A fourth prima-facie reason for DREI burdens on FD poor is that their poverty/powerlessness arguably forced them into EI and accepting reactor siting. Companies hoping to site nuclear facilities target economically depressed areas, both in Japan and elsewhere.17,58 Thus, although FD-owner Tokyo Electric Company (TECO) has long-term safety and ‘‘cover-up scandals,’’ Fukushima residents agreed to accept TECO reactors in exchange for cash. With Fukushima $121 million in debt, in 2007 it approved two new reactors in exchange for ‘‘$45 million from the government.60 percent’’ of total town revenue.17,59 Yet if economic hardship forced poor towns to accept reactors in exchange for basic-services monies, they likely gave no informed consent. Their choice was not voluntary, but coerced by their poverty. Massive Japanese-nuclear-industry PR and media ads also have thwarted risk-disclosure, thus consent, by minimizing nuclear risks.17,53,60–62 Scientists say neither industry nor government disclosed its failure to (1) test reactor-safety equipment; (2) thwart many natural-event disasters; (3) withstand seismic events worse than those that already had occurred; (4) withstand Fukushima-type disasters; (5) admit that new passive-safety reactors require electricity to cool cores and avoid catastrophe; or (6) base reactorsafety on anything but cost-benefit tests.17,53,60–62 Thus, because prima facie evidence suggests Fukushima poor people never consented to FD siting, they are EI victims whose reactor proximity caused them also to become DREI victims.