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Cites
Entry
Date
Interps
Tournament: f | Round: 5 | Opponent: f | Judge: f Interpretation: If the AFF argues that you drop the arg on theory and revaluate the aff under the interpretation, they must have their spikes on top of case.
Plan Flaw: you say United States, not USFG- a landmass cannot implement them
Interp: All theory spikes must be read at the top of the AC
Interpretation. The affirmative cannot limit qualified immunity for only one specific instance of police acting badly, and defend the implementation of “the Ninth Circuit's decision on Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act's applicability to arrest situations in Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco”.
Interpretation: The Aff must defend that legislative branches of the United States limit qualified immunity – they may not defend courts do it
Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the U.S. Constitution
Interpretation: If the aff reads evidence specifying what the role of the judge or ballot ought to be, they must have a text in the 1AC which clarifies what constitutes offense under their role of the judge / ballot, how to weigh offense under their paradigm, and provide definitions for terms of arts.
Intepretation: The affirmative must defend a policy that guarantees a right to housing for all people unconditionally
Interpretation: Must defend implementation by a state actor
Tournament: uh | Round: Finals | Opponent: On Tabroom | Judge: On Tabroom Counterplan Text: Colleges in the United States should prohibit the distribution of revenge porn. Rennison and Addington 14 Callie Rennison (associate professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Colorado Denver) and Lynn Addington (associate professor in the Department of Justice, Law and Criminology, School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, DC), "Violence Against College Women: A Review to Identify Limitations in Defining the Problem and Inform Future Research" Trauma, Violence, and Abuse. July 2014. Vol. 15, no. 3. Pgs. 159-169. http://tva.sagepub.com/content/15/3/159.full The current violence against college women literature has expanded knowledge about the prevalence and characteristics of sexual violence occurring on campus. These findings, in turn, have been translated into policies designed to reduce this form of violence and assist victims. Additional work has considered the prevalence and characteristics of dating violence and stalking against college women and also has informed specific programmatic development on campuses. Despite these advances, our review of the literature identifies three important gaps that limit defining violence against college women and arguably inhibit future development in this area. The most critical gap or limitation is the lack of any assessment of the literature to consider the current approaches of how violence is defined and operationalized. This assessment would help identify whether behaviors are missing that should be included as well as promote a current and comprehensive understanding violence against college women. The two other limitations are not as directly related to defining violence but would assist in conducting such a reassessment. The second limitation concerns the need to provide a context for the victimization experiences of college women, especially the importance of comparing these experiences with those of young adult women who are not students. A third, and related, limitation concerns a need to consider how “college student” is defined and measured. The first limitation concerns the failure to explicitly define violence as it is used in the area of violence against college women. As a result, researchers tend to implicitly define violence against college women as synonymous with sexual violence and to a lesser extent dating violence and stalking. No effort has been made to take stock of the scope of this definition and reassess how well the construct has been operationalized. In addition, no explicit discussion has occurred with regard to whether using a criminal justice perspective or a public health perspective would assist in defining violence in this area. As a result, the violence against college women area has evolved to incorporate aspects of both perspectives but also has failed to fully embrace aspects of either. For example, if a criminal justice perspective was accepted, this view would encourage inclusion of other forms of violent crime such as robbery and nonsexual assaults that are currently absent from the literature. Similarly, if a public health perspective were utilized, this focus would expand the study to emerging forms of violence that may or may not be criminalized such as so-called revenge porn (or the posting of intimate and explicit photographs online) and other forms of online reputational harm as well as forms of criminal behavior that are committed by intimates such as cyberstalking or identity theft (which can generate significant emotional harm). Competition: The distribution of revenge pornography is constitutionally protected speech – aff allows it on college campuses. Goldberg 16 Erica Goldberg Columbia Law Review Volume 116, No. 3 April 2016 "FREE SPEECH CONSEQUENTIALISM" The regulation of revenge porn presents thorny First Amendment issues, even though the speech is considered both highly injurious and of low value.300 Some argue that revenge porn can be regulated as obscenity,301 but, like much pornography, sexually explicit speech that does not rise to the level of obscenity is still protected speech.302 Criminal statutes and torts based on the invasion of privacy and emotional distress caused by revenge porn compromise the freedom to distribute protected speech lawfully obtained. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized a right for the media to publish even unlawfully obtained content, so long as the publisher was not involved in the illegal so long as the publisher was not involved in the illegal conduct that produced the content.303 And in United States v. Stevens , the Supreme Court held that individuals cannot be held criminally liable for distributing speech depicting illegal acts, so long as the individuals did not perpetrate the underlying act.304 Revenge porn, as defined here, is both legally obtained and depicts a legal act. In the ultimate articulation of free speech consequentialism, Mary Anne Franks argues for criminalization of revenge porn because "some expressions of free speech are just considered so socially harmful and don't contribute any benefits to society."305 Yet this does not separate revenge porn from any number of categories of protected speech that may cause others emotional distress and are considered by some to pos- sess little value; this is nothing more than a call for judges to make whole- sale and retail judgments about the value and harms that flow from particular forms of speech. If revenge porn can be regulated, legislators should not target the victim's emotional distress or the invasion of pri- vacy, as these focal points threaten to undermine strong free speech pro- tections exceptional to America's free speech regime.
Solvency: Restrictions work- they are key to forming a cultural shift in society. Citron 14 Danielle Keats Citron, Mary Anne Franks"CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN" 4/21/2014 https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/isp/documents/danielle_citron_-_criminalizing_revenge_porn_-_fesc.pdf A criminal law solution is essential to deter judgment-proof perpetrators. As attorney and revenge porn expert Erica Johnstone puts it, “even if people aren’t afraid of being sued because they have nothing to lose, they are afraid of being convicted of a crime because that shows up on their record forever.”68 Nonconsensual pornography’s rise is surely related to the fact that malicious actors have little incentive to refrain from such behavior. While some critics believe that existing criminal law adequately addresses nonconsensual pornography, this Part highlights how existing criminal law fails to address most cases of revenge porn. A. The Importance of Criminal Law Criminal law has long prohibited privacy invasions and certain violations of autonomy. Criminal law is essential to send the clear message to potential perpetrators that nonconsensual pornography inflicts grave privacy and autonomy harms that have real consequences and penalties.69 While we share general concerns about over-incarceration, rejecting the criminalization of serious harms is not the way to address those concerns. We are also sensitive to objections that criminalizing revenge porn might reinforce the harmful and erroneous perception that women should be ashamed of their bodies or their sexual activities, but maintain that recognizing and protecting sexual autonomy does exactly the opposite.70 A criminal law solution would send the message that individuals’ bodies (mostly female bodies) are their own and that society recognizes the grave harms that flow from turning individuals into objects of pornography without their consent. In this way, a criminal law approach will help us conceptualize the involuntary publication of someone’s sexually explicit images as a form of sexual assault. When sexual abuse is inflicted on an individual’s physical body, it is considered rape or sexual assault. The fact that nonconsensual pornography does not involve physical contact does not change the fact that it is a form of sexual abuse. Federal and state criminal laws regarding voyeurism demonstrate that physical contact is not necessary to cause great harm and suffering. Video voyeurism laws punish the nonconsensual recording of a person in a state of undress in places where individuals enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy. 71 Criminal laws prohibiting voyeurism rest on the commonly accepted assumption that observing a person in a state of undress or engaged in sexual activity without that person’s consent not only inflicts dignitary harms upon the individual observed, but also inflicts a social harm serious enough to warrant criminal prohibition and punishment. International criminal law provides precedent and perspective on this issue. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) have employed a definition of sexual violence that does not require physical contact. In both tribunals, forced nudity was found to be a form of sexual violence.72 In the Akayesu case, the ICTR found that “sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.” 73 In the Furundzija case, the ICTY similarly found that international criminal law punishes not only rape, but also “all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of force or intimidation in a way that is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s dignity.”74 The legal and social condemnation of child pornography exemplifies our collective understanding that the production, viewing, and distribution of certain kinds of sexual images are harmful.
Don't let them say free speech good; discursive objectification of women on college campuses takes away their speech. Turns case. Pinar 12 William F. Pinar (American educator, curriculum theorist and international studies scholar; has taught at LSU, Colgate, Columbia, and Ohio State), "The Gender of Violence on Campus" Published in Gendered Futures in Higher Education: Critical Perspectives for Change. Edited by Becky Ropers-Huilman. Feb 1, 2012. SUNY Press Fraternities demand conformity and solidarity. Conformity which is created by men bonding together against women (Hirsch, 1990). And against gay men. The sexual objectification of women remains a primary element of fraternity life; it is sometimes evident in fraternity serenades. In 1992, the UCLA-based feminist magazine Together (now called FEM) received an anonymous copy of the Phi Kappa Psi songbook in which one song— “SandM Man”—contained lyrics depicting female genital mutilation. At Cornell University, four male undergraduates posted on the Internet the “Top 75 reasons why women (bitches) should not have freedom of speech.” Reason #20: “This is my dick. I’m gonna fuck you. No more stupid questions”
1/28/17
Jan-Feb DA
Tournament: UH | Round: Finals | Opponent: On Tabroom | Judge: On Tabroom The aff is just the myth of the free market—remove barriers and a “market place of ideas” will just magically show up. That fails to account for systemic oppression and marginalization of minorities. Sean McElwee 13 (researcher and writer based in New York. His work has been featured on Policyshop, Salon, The Atlantic and The Rolling Stone.). “The Case for Censoring Hate Speech”. Huffington Post, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sean-mcelwee/hate-speech-online_b_3620270.html RC It’s interesting to note how closely this idea resembles free market fundamentalism: simply get AND groups looking to bring their pet issue to the attention of Facebook’s censors.” Autonomy is not why we value free speech, rather it is only instrumentally valuable to promote good discourse, which autonomy ruins. Owen M. Fiss 86 (Sterling Professor at Yale Law School). “Free Speech and Social Structure”. Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1986. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2211andcontext=fss_papers RC From this perspective, the protection of CBS's autonomy through the no-content- AND one book or to include one course necessarily entails the exclusion of another. Don’t view this as free speech vs. censorship. Regulations can be used to ultimately enhance free speech. Not all voices are equal in the status quo—this prevents us from hearing all perspectives. Robert Amdur 99 reviews Owen M. Fiss, “The Irony of Free Speech”. Review by: Robert Amdur, the University of Chicago Press, 1999. RC As an alternative, Fiss suggests that we should see regulations on speech AND of ‘‘racists, pornographers, and the rich’’ (p. 17).
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Jan-Feb DA
Tournament: UH | Round: Semis | Opponent: On Tabroom | Judge: On Tabroom International law banned hate speech Matsuda 89 Mari J. Matsuda (Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, the William S. Richardson School of Law), "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story," Michigan Law Review, 1989 The international community has chosen to outlaw racist hate propaganda. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimi- nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states: Article 4 States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of per- sons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or pro- mote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incite- ment to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimi- nation, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organ- ized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organization or activities as an offence punishable by law; and (c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.105 Under this treaty, states are required to criminalize racial hate messages. Prohibiting dissemination of ideas of racial superiority or hatred is not easily reconciled with American concepts of free speech. The Convention recognizes this conflict. Article 4 acknowledges the need for "due regard" for rights protected by the Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights and by article 5 of the Convention - including the rights of freedom of speech, association, and conscience. Recognizing these conflicting values, and nonetheless concluding that the right to freedom from racist hate propaganda deserves affirm- ative recognition, represents the evolving international view. An American lawyer, trained in a tradition of liberal thought, would read article 4 and conclude immediately that it is unworkable. Acts of vio- lence, and perhaps imminent incitement to violence are properly pro- hibited, but the control of ideas is doomed to failure. This position was voiced continually in the debates'06 preceding adoption of the Convention, leading to the view that article 4 is both controversial and troublesome. 107 To those who struggled through early international attempts'08 to deal with racist propaganda, the competing values had a sense of ur- gency. 09 The imagery of both book burnings and swastikas was clear in their minds. 10 Hitler had banned ideas. He had also murdered six million Jews in the culmination of a campaign that had as a major theme the idea of racial superiority. While the causes of fascism are complex,11 the knowledge that anti-Semitic hate propaganda and the rise of Nazism were clearly connected guided development of the emerging international law on incitement to racial hatred. In 1959 and 1960, the United Nations faced an "outburst of anti- Semitic incidents in several parts of the world.""'2 The movement to implement the human rights goals of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal Declaration gained momentum as member states sought effective means of eliminating discrimination.
US adherence to international law concerning hate speech is key to credibility in international human rights. Cohen 15 Tanya Cohen, "It’s Time To Bring The Hammer Down On Hate Speech In The U.S." Thought Catalog, 5/1/2015 Recent scandals involving right-wing hatemongers like Phil Robertson, Donald Sterling, Bill Maher, and the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity have brought to light one of America’s biggest embarrassments: the fact that America remains the only country in the world without any legal protections against hate speech. In any other country, people like Phil Robertson and Donald Sterling would have been taken before a Human Rights Commission and subsequently fined and/or imprisoned and/or stripped of their right to public comment for making comments that incite hatred and violence against vulnerable minorities. But, in the US, such people are allowed to freely incite hatred and violence against vulnerable minorities with impunity, as the US lacks any legal protections against any forms of hate speech – even the most vile and extreme forms of hate speech remain completely legal in the so-called “land of the free”. Not only is this a violation of the most basic and fundamental human rights principles, but it’s also an explicit violation of legally-binding international human rights conventions. For many decades, human rights groups around the world – from Amnesty International to Human Rights First to the United Nations Human Rights Council – have told the United States that it needs to pass and enforce strong legal protections against hate speech in accordance with its international human rights obligations. As of 2015, the US is the only country in the world where hate speech remains completely legal. This is, in fact, a flagrant violation of international human rights law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) both mandate that all countries outlaw hate speech, including “propaganda for war” and the dissemination of any “ideas based on racial superiority or hatred”. The ICCPR and ICERD are both legally-binding international human rights conventions, and all nations are required to uphold them in the fullest. By failing to prosecute hate speech, the US is explicitly and flippantly violating international human rights law. No other country would be allowed to get away with this, so why would the US? The United Nations has stated many times that international law has absolute authority. This is quite simply not optional. The US is required to outlaw hate speech. No other country would be able to get away with blatantly ignoring international human rights standards, so why should the US be able to? The US is every bit as required to follow international human rights law as the rest of the world is.
ILaw solves multiple scenarios for extinction—US compliance with ILaw shapes global ILaw compliance IEER 02 Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy. Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties. May 2002. http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system offered by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments by the United States that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. If the United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance.
The only alternative to I-Law is genocide and nuclear war. Shaw, Martin Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex. “The unfinished global revolution: intellectuals and the new politics of international relations.” October 3, 2001. http://www.martinshaw.org/unfinished.pdf The new politics of international relations require us, therefore, to go beyond the anti-imperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline. We need to recognize three fundamental truths. First, in the twenty-first century people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity. Courageous academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals in the West. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction—despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people. This consciousness will become a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and (like it or not) they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power, the increasingly internationalized Western conglomerate. The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends first on how well it is consolidated in each national context—but second, on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, democratic movements cannot regard non-governmental organizations and civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilize local states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power. Second, democratizing local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global and often Western-centred networks. Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war. Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence. (To put this another way: the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. We need these power networks, but we need to tame them too, to make their messy bureaucracies enormously more accountable and sensitive to the needs of society worldwide. This will involve the kind of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ argued for by David Held. It will also require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address the literally catastrophic scale of world social inequalities. This is not a separate problem: social and economic reform is an essential ingredient of alternatives to warlike and genocidal power; these feed off and reinforce corrupt and criminal political economies. Fourth, if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratize it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop international political interventions, legal institutions and robust peacekeeping as strategic alternatives to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid. As political intellectuals in the West, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state, as well as between state and state. We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western and other governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions. What I have outlined is a huge challenge; but the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into partial defeat, or degenerate into new genocidal wars—perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for students of international relations and politics, are intertwined.
1/28/17
Jan-Feb Kant NC
Tournament: uh | Round: Semis | Opponent: d | Judge: d The standard is consistency with universal freedom. First, an agent’s will acts on a law that it gives to itself. If pleasure were a law to you, then you would straightaway do the pleasurable act, but since you’re autonomous, you can reason about taking the action. Thus a condition of action is that the will is self-determined. KORSGAARD: “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” by Christine M. Korsgaard “Now I’m going to argue that that sort of willing is impossible. The first step is this: : to conceive of yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. A rational will is a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is aware of itself as a cause. To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the principle of choice. For instance, suppose you experience a conflict of desire: you have a desire to do both A and B, and they are incompatible. You have some principle that favors A over B, so you exercise this principle, and you choose to do A. In this kind of case, you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. Yo regard the choice as yours, as the product of your own activity, because you regard the principle of choice as expressive, or representative, of yourself. You must do so, for the only alternative to identifying with the principle of choice is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in you, another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. But then you are not the cause of the action. Self-conscious or rational agency, then, requires identification with the principle of choice on which you act.” (123) And, a rational will must set ends within a system of reciprocal constraints. Anything else justifies that someone could impede your ability to achieve your end in the first place, which also means reason constrains end-based frameworks. SIYAR: Jamsheed Aiam Siyar: Kant’s Conception of Practical Reason. Tufts University, 1999 LW-DD “Recall that insofar as I represent a rationally determined end, I represent it having rational and hence objective worth. That is—as noted above—I represent my end as to be done just in virtue of the perfectly general rational grounds that I take to be decisive for its adoption. I will now argue that I must also represent my objectively worthy end as recognizable as such by all other subjects—this is just what my representation of communicability consists in. Now, when I represent my end as to be done, I represent it as binding me to certain courses of actions, precluding other actions, etc. Thus, my ends and function as constraints for me in that they determine what I can or must do (at least if I am to be consistent). I may of course give up an end such as that of eating ice cream at a future point; yet while I have the end, I must see myself as bound to do what is necessary to realize it.35 Thus, I must represent my ends as constraints that I have adopted, constraints that structure the possible space of choice and action for me. Further, given that my end is rationally determined, I take it to be generally recognizable that my end functions as a rationally determined constraint. That is, I take it that others subjects can also recognize my end it as an objective constraint, for I take it that they as well as myself can cognize its determining grounds—the source of its objective worth—through the exercise of reason. Indeed, in representing an end, I in effect demand recognition for it from others subjects: since the end functions as an objective though self-imposed constraint for me, I must demand that this constraint be recognized as such. The thought here is simply that if I am committed to some end, e.g. my ice cream eating policy, I must act in certain ways to realize it. In this context, I cannot be indifferent to the attitudes and actions of others, for these may either help or hinder my pursuit of my end. Hence, if I am in fact committed to realizing my end, i.e. if I represent an end at all, I must demand that the worth of my end, its status as to be done, be recognized by others. For instance, my ice cream eating policy entails the demand that where practically possible, others not hinder my actions in its service. Further, at least in principle, the actions and attitudes of any other subject could have some bearing on my pursuit of my end. Hence, my demand for recognition must be fully general: it must be directed to rational beings per se. In representing an end, I must demand that this end in effect function as a law for all rational beings. I must demand, in other words, that all other subjects recognize and represent my end as constraining their actions just as I represent it as constraining my actions.” (80-81)
Second, action theory (analytic)
Third, freedom is key to all frameworks (analytic)
Impact Calc: This is means based.
Contention: Freedom implies an innate right to determine the course of your actions. In the state of nature, might rather than right governs these judgments. Absent of a public authority, rights violations are inevitable. VARDEN: “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” by Helga Varden Chapter from: “Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World” edited by Deirdre Golash 2010 LM-DD “The first important distinction between Kant and much contemporary liberal thought issues from Kant’s argument that it is not in principle possible for individuals to realize right in the state of nature. Kant explicitly rejects the common assumption in liberal theories of his time as well as today that virtuous private individuals can interact in ways reconcilable both with one another’s right to freedom and their corresponding innate and acquired private rights. All the details of this argument are beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that ideal problems of assurance and indeterminacy regarding the specification, application and enforcement of the principles of private right to actual interactions lead Kant to conclude that rightful interaction is in principle impossible in the state of nature.5 Kant argues that only a public authority can solve these problems in a way reconcilable with everyone’s right to freedom. This is why we find Kant starting his discussion of public right with this claim: however well disposed and right-loving men might be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established individuals human beings... can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has her own right to do what seems right and good to her and not be dependent upon another’s opinion about this (6: 312).6 There are no rightful obligations in the state of nature, since in this condition might (‘violence’, or arbitrary judgments and ‘opinion’ about ‘what seems right and good’) rather than right (freedom under law) ultimately governs interactions. According to Kant, therefore, only the establishment of a public authority can enable interaction in ways reconcilable with each person’s innate right to freedom. Moreover, only a public authority can ensure interaction consistent with what Kant argues are our innate rights (to bodily integrity and honor) and our acquired rights (to private prop- erty, contract and status relations). The reason is that only the public authority can solve the problems of assurance and indeterminacy without violating anyone’s right to freedom. The public authority can solve these problems because it represents the will of all and yet the will of no one in particular. Because the public authority is representative in this way – by being “united a priori ” or by being an “omnilateral” will (6: 263) – it can regulates on behalf of everyone rather than on behalf of anyone in particular. For these reasons, civil society is seen as the only means through which our interactions can become subject to universal laws that restrict everyone’s freedom reciprocally rather than as subject to anyone’s arbitrary choices.” (46-47) And, according to Cornell Law, the Brandenburg v. Ohio U.S. Supreme Court decision maintains that seditious speech is protected by the First Amendment so long as it does not indicate an “imminent” threat. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444 But, seditious speech is never compatible with an omnilateral will and must be restricted. The intent requires the right to destroy the state, which justifies the annihilation of all rights. VARDEN 2: “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” by Helga Varden Chapter from: “Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World” edited by Deirdre Golash 2010 LM-DD “To understand Kant’s condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does considers seditious speech a public crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the government or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as seditious, the speaker’s intention must be to encourage and support efforts to subvert the government or to instigate its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might. Since the state is the only means through which right can replace might, the state outlaws it. And since it is a crime that “endangers the commonwealth” rather than citizens qua private citizens, it is a public crime (6: 331).” (52)
1/28/17
Jan-Feb PIK
Tournament: Barkley Forum | Round: 1 | Opponent: On Tabroom | Judge: On Tabroom CP Text: All relevant aff actors shall not restrict constitutionally protected speech except in -instances where speech involves triggering material. -instances of hate speech happening in CEDA This is competitive with your advocacy- you say that you defend all free speech in CEDA which means the perm is severance. Hate speech incites violence through a distorted depiction of the Other Halpern 95 Howard Halpern, president of the American Academy of Psychotherapists, “How Hate Speech Leads Readily to Violence,” New York Times, May 5, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/05/opinion/l-how-hate-speech-leads-readily-to-violence-477795.html Social psychologists and demagogues have long known that if ordinary citizens are to be provoked to violent actions against individuals or groups of fellow citizens, it is necessary to sever the empathic bond with those to be attacked by painting them as different and despicable. We are unlikely to harm a friendly neighbor because she has strong views about equal rights for women, but if we call her a "femi-Nazi," she becomes "the other" -- evil, dangerous, hated. We are unlikely to harm the couple down the block who are active on behalf of protecting endangered species, but if we call them "environmental whackos," they become "the other" -- weirdos who must be vilified and suppressed as enemies to "normal" Americans. When our shared humanity with those with whom we disagree is stripped away, it becomes acceptable to blow them up. The answer is certainly not to censor such speech, but those who recognize this danger must challenge it wherever it exists, even in those with whom we politically agree. Trigger Warning stop debate exclusion Berman, Mia, 2014, A plea to debaters by Mia Berman, http://premierdebatetoday.com/2014/11/03/a-plea-to-debaters-by-mia-berman-2/ What is “triggering?” Triggers are events that may remind someone of a traumatic experience or cause flashbacks and bring up strong negative emotions, often making one feel unsafe and upset. Recently, many feminist blogs, newspapers, and even college classes have been useing “trigger warnings” which aim to alert individuals what is about to be discussed. In the context of articles, there has been some backlash about how useful these are, however, in the context of debate rounds, they are valuable.¶ Debaters do not choose the topics. We cannot expect a debater who may be triggered by a topic to quit the community, to not debate on that topic or to just tune out certain ACs. Putting a victim in an adversarial scenario in which they are forced to respond to something that is triggering is unfair and morally wrong. A debate round is no longer a fair, fun or educational endeavor when a participant feels threatened. If you are the one running these arguments, especially on a speech act/pre-fiat level, the only way they could ever be persuasive is if you ensure you are running them as a way to help victims, not to further and reinforce the original trauma. To prevent these situations, I propose using a trigger warning.¶ Here’s how it works. One debater simply asks the other debater and the judge whether or not they feel comfortable hearing a case related to revenge porn/domestic violence/etc. There have been some criticisms of trigger warnings, but it’s always better to ask. First, the act of asking may be triggering in of itself. If this unfortunate event occurs, opponents should offer time and space needed to recover before beginning the round. Still, a slight trigger before the round is preferable to the shock of finding out in-round when the case is read at 400 words per minute and you’re forced to respond. Another debate-specific problem is that opponents could abuse the goodwill of the individual running the potentially triggering case by claiming they will be triggered to avoid debating the case. For this, debaters individually must take it upon themselves to be honest and respectful to those in the community that have been through traumatic experiences and not abuse a system put in place to help them. Feigning trauma to avoid an argument is an atrocious thing to do, and I would honestly like to believe our community is better than that.¶
1/27/17
Mar-Apr Kant NC
Tournament: State | Round: 1 | Opponent: g | Judge: g analytics And, and a violation of freedom can’t be true since its a contradiction. Stephen Engstrom (PhD, Professor of Ethics at University of Pittsburg). “Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge”. Pg. 19-20 RC “Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of action that assaults the freedom of others with a view to furthering one’s own ends results in a contradiction when we attempt to will it as a universal law in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom and so also one’s own self-sufficiency. 19In this passage, Kant mentions assaults on property as well as on freedom. But since property is a specific, socially instituted form of freedom, I have omitted mention of it to focus on the primitive case. Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it’s possible for every person—every subject capable of practical judgment—to shares the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every person’s acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. Since here all persons are on the one hand deeming good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own freedom, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom.” The standard is respecting freedom. analytics Kantianism justifies a system of free markets- we have the right to make inferior choices and businesspeople have a right to choose how they want to distribute their own goods. This also means nobody has to sell you a house either- there should be zero interference, positive or negative Jones 04 September 2004, Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies;2004, Vol. 16 Issue 1/2, p65, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/14576363/immanuel-kant-free-market-capitalist This essay argues that Kant's philosophy provides a justification for free markets. The myths about Kant are that he was a recluse, knew nothing about business, and that his epistemology divorced reason from reality, while his primary interest was metaphysics. Yet Kant's categorical imperative demands obedience even in the face of uncertainty about the external world. Adam Smith described this principle as the inward testimony of an impartial observer. Smith and Kant put individual decisions at the center of morality, but agreed that people have a tendency to make morally inferior chokes. Those who propose to regulate the economy are as troubled by this tendency as those they regulate. The self-sacrifice prescription is economically, psychologically, and morally unstable. In recommending market competition, Smith was unconsciously applying a Kantian formula. Market decisions are individual decisions. Individuals prefer to do business with those they trust: this is an incentive to honesty. A morality that depends upon incentives is imperfect but superior to a morality imposed by force. A right to housing requires coercion since it uses the property of others to take actions. Tanner 04 Michael Tanner “Is affordable housing a human right?” The CQ Researcher. June 2004. http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2004061806 Affordable housing for every American is a desirable goal for public policy. But not every good policy can be translated into questions of human rights. When properly defined, rights do not conflict. That is because rights are essentially negative in character. My exercise of my rights in no ways infringes on your exercise of your rights. Your only obligation is negative, to refrain from interfering with my exercise of rights. Thus, my right to speak freely requires no action on your part, takes nothing away from you. My right exists independent of you. Your only obligation is not to stop me from speaking. But the same is not true of a right to affordable housing. It would impose a positive obligation. In order for me to exercise my right, something must be taken away from you. That may be your property, directly through taxes, or indirectly through limits on what you can charge for rent. But in theory, my claim on you could go still further. Suppose there simply was not enough housing being built. If housing is a right, I would have the authority to conscript you to become a carpenter
3/9/17
Mar-Apr NBA CP
Tournament: TFA | Round: 6 | Opponent: f | Judge: f Counterplan Text: The United States should take a needs based approach to the right to housing. Competition:
Textually competitive- I use a needs based approach instead of a rights based approach which is different from the text of the AC. 2. Functional competition- the implication of a right is a demand in absolute instances, whereas the CP PICs out of the absolute claim- rather, we just give housing assistance based on circumstances. Only a needs-based approach can effectively solve neoliberal institutions. It’s empirically proven to be effective. Noonan 17, Jeff (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Windsor), and Josie Watson (clinical nursing Instructor at the University of Windsor). "Against Housing: Homes as a Human Life Requirement." Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research 28 (2017). In these sorts of cases, democratic progress depends upon the mobilization of social forces against exclusionary rights to private property. In these cases, a different social morality is brought into play, the social morality of need-satisfaction. Where the structure of rights blocks access to needed resources, it becomes a means of legitimating objective harm. Since it allows the harms of need-deprivation to proceed unchecked, its own legitimacy comes into question. Its legitimacy is challenged by social movements which do not appeal to authorities or experts to satisfy their rights for them, but draw on their own social power to secure access to and control over the resources that they need to satisfy their own rights. This form of organizing is consistent with the master democratic norm of self-determination, and is, in fact, the only way that needs can be satisfied in an empowering, as opposed to paternalistic, way. To put this crucial point another way, only a needs-based social morality exposes the real problem with the capitalist value system: it subordinates the life-value of goods and services to their money-value. The basic life-value of any good is the contribution that it makes to the satisfaction of non-optional needs (McMurtry 1998: 164). When lifevalue is subordinated to money-value, people can be deprived of that which they need and the economy still judged good, because the basis of judgement is not the satisfaction of people’s life-requirements, but return on investment to the owners of capital. Such is the case with housing markets as currently constituted. Hundreds of thousands of people cannot afford homes, but if house prices are rising, the markets are judged good by those who profit from them. Occasionally (as with the Vancouver foreign buyers tax) governments will intervene to cool markets in order to prevent the emergence of bubbles and the deeper social problems they can cause, but this sort of regulation is distinct from a structural solution to the homelessness crisis. Rights based approaches to housing are extremely vague and inefficient when held to particular instances- guts solvency and proves needs based approaches do more for the oppressed. Noonan 17, Jeff (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Windsor), and Josie Watson (clinical nursing Instructor at the University of Windsor). "Against Housing: Homes as a Human Life Requirement." Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research 28 (2017). The Universal Declaration asserts that housing is a right, but it does not further define the conditions that count as satisfying that right. All rights-statements tend to be programmatic and abstract. A discussion of human life-requirements, by contrast, cannot be carried out without reflection on the nature of the life that has the requirements. In other words, it is never enough to assert that “x is a life-requirement,” one must always unpack the life-value of x in relation to human life to explain just what it is that x contributes to life which, if absent, would cause harm. We tried to provide this complex unpacking in the case of the need for homes in Section One. If we content ourselves with the assertion that ‘housing is a right,’ it remains an open question what is required to satisfy the right. Does any sort of ‘roof over one’s head’ constitute satisfaction of the right? Are the rights of social assistance recipients housed in motels while they await public housing violated? There is no straightforward answer to these questions if we focus only on the right to housing, because it does not explain why it is that human beings need housing, beyond the obvious that we require shelter. When the need deprived mobilize to explain just what they need, and demand the resources to satisfy that need through their own labour and intelligence, this problem disappears because they tell everyone exactly what they require to satisfy their need.
3/10/17
Nov-Dec Culpability NC
Tournament: Mineapple | Round: Finals | Opponent: On Tabroom | Judge: On Tabroom I value morality. First, morality must address the nature of individual personhood and reasons for actions, Morse: In brief, the law’s concept of the person is a creature who acts for reasons and is potentially able to be guided by reason. Physical causes explain all the moving parts of the universe, but only human action can also be explained by reasons. It makes no sense to ask the winds or the tides or infrahuman species why they do what they do, but this question makes sense of and is central to our explanations of human behavior. When we want to know why an agent intentionally behaved as she did, we do not desire a biophysical explanation, as if the person were simply biophysical flotsam and jetsam. Instead, we seek the reason she acted, the desires and beliefs that formed the practical syllogism that produced intentional conduct. Only a conception of morality with an understanding of reasons for why people act is able to assess conduct. Just as we don’t place noteworthy blame on a hurricane for killing people, morality must account for the responsibility of its actors, Morse 2 , The law’s concept of responsibility follows from its view of the person and the nature of law itself. Unless human beings are rational creatures who can understand the applicable rules and standards, and can conform to those legal requirements through intentional action, the law would be powerless to affect human behavior. Legally responsible agents are therefore people who have the general capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason in particular legal contexts. They must be capable of rational practical reasoning. The law presumes capability and that the same rules may be applied to all people with this capacity. The law We do does not presume that all people act for good reason all the time. It is sufficient for responsibility that the agent has the general capacity for rationality, even if the capacity is not exercised on a particular occasion. Indeed, it is my claim that lack of the general capacity for rationality explains precisely those cases, such as infancy or certain instances of severe mental disorder or dementia, in which the law now excuses agents or finds them not competent to perform some task. Thus the standard is consistency with individual capabilities. You can only be held to obligations if you are responsible for the reason those obligations are necessary and capable of performing them.
Police officers often have to make split-second decisions in their line of work – it’s inevitable. McGuinness 02 J. Michael McGuinness, Law Enforcement Use of Force: The Objective Reasonableness Standards under North Carolina and Federal Law, 24 Campbell L. Rev. 201 (2002). - http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1387andcontext=clr In a split second, officers are required to evaluate and employ force against criminal suspects to thwart apparent dangers to citizens and themselves.' ° The officer is often alone in this nightmare, like a "pedestrian in Hell."'" The officer's environment in use of force deci- 5. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001). 6. See Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 370 (4th Cir. 2002); Schwartz, 2002 WL 312501; Volpe, 224 F.3d 72. 7. One of the three primary United States Supreme Court cases arose from North Carolina. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In North Carolina, even investigations into alleged excessive force have generated high profile litigation. See In re Brooks, 143 N.C. App. 601, 548 S.E.2d 748 (2001), where an unprecedented ex parte procedure was used by the State Bureau of Investigation, but ultimately declared improper, to obtain confidential personnel and internal affairs files of officers without a warrant and without notice to the officers and opportunity to be heard. 8. See THOMAS T. GILLESPIE ET AL., Police Use of Force: A Line Officer's Guide (Varro 1998); DR. ALEXIS ARTWOHL and LOREN W. CHRISTENSEN, DEADLY FORCE ENCOUNTERS: WHAT Cops NEED TO KNOW TO MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY PREPARE FOR AND SURVIVE A GUNFIGHT ( Penguin Press 1997). 9. See Saucier, 533 U.S. 194; Graham, 490 U.S. 386; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). This trilogy provides the parameters for the typical use of force case. See Bd. of Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)(reviewing governmental liability issues). 10. See Saucier, 533 U.S. 194; Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir. 2001); Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 2001); McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994). "An officer oftentimes only has a split second to make the critical judgment of whether to use his weapon." Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271, 1276 (7th Cir. 1988). 11. "The policeman's world is spawned of degradation, corruption and insecurity .... he walks alone, a pedestrian in Hell." WILLIAM A. WEsTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM and MORALITY V. (MIT Press 1970). "A police officer's life is always at risk, no matter how routine the assignment might seem." National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, Inc., Police Deaths Mount Nationwide, , at 1. "On average, one police officer dies within the line of duty nationwide every 54 hours." Id. "There are more than 3 McGuinness: Law Enforcement Use of Force: The Objective Reasonableness Standa Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2002 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW decision-making is particularly unique because of the time pressures to act immediately without "armchair reflection"12 and because the lives of officers and bystanders are often at immediate risk. Many of these split second decisions by officers to employ force are correct, while some are mistaken. Under what circumstances does a mistaken belief that deadly force is necessary subject an officer to civil, criminal or civil rights liability? Generally, if the officer's mistaken belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances, then the officer is not subject to any liability. The perceived danger must only be apparent, not actual, in order to justify the use of deadly force. North Carolina and federal law provide that where officers make reasonable mistakes, there is generally no liability. Professor Rubin of the Institute of Government at the University of North Carolina has observed that "despite its place in North Carolina jurisprudence, however, the excessive force element has been difficult to apply. The principle difficulty has been with distinguishing the requirement that the Defendant's force not be excessive, or unreasonable, from the reasonable belief requirement embodied" in the law. 13 Recent cases have clarified these issues, especially Saucier v. Katz, 14 where the Supreme Court reaffirmed recognition of the doctrine of mistaken beliefs in use of force cases Officers do not fully act upon their free will during these split second decisions. Studies prove that hormonal responses to these stressful situations make the officers use “instinctive” thinking. Ross 13 Assessing Lethal Force Liability Decisions and Human Factors Research Darrell L. Ross, PhD, Professor and Department Head, Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice, and Director of The Center of Applied Social Sciences, Valdosta State University - Darrell L. Ross, PhD, is a professor and the Department Head for the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice at Valdosta State University in Valdosta, Georgia, as well as the Director of The Center of Applied Social Sciences. His research interests and published works include use-of-force litigation, civil liability issues in policing and corrections, stress and human factors in use-of-force incidents, sudden restraint deaths in custody, criminal law, and criminal procedure. Dr. Ross provides training to criminal justice personnel and expert witness testimony in these subject areas. It is well-known that physiological stress can impact perception (Janis and Mann, 1977; Welford, 1980). In a high-level stress situation in which the person develops the perception that their life is in immediate peril, a cascade of physiological components are automatically released which prepare the body to respond. Cannon (1929) best described this automatic and adaptive response mechanism as the “fight or flight” response. The physiological response under stress activates the autonomic nervous system triggering a sympathetic nervous system (SNS) discharge which results in an immediate release of epinephrine and hydrocortisone; an increase in blood pressure; an increase in heart rate; perspiration; muscle tension; an increase in pupil size; dry mouth; increased breathing rate; and improved blood flow to the brain, heart, and large muscles. This process is activated without conscious thought to prepare the person to respond to the stressful encounter (Groer et al., 2010; Sapolsky, 2004; Schwartz and Begley, 2003). Under an SNS discharge, physiological resources flow to various regions of the body in order to respond to the threat. In a lifethreatening and stressful circumstance, the focus of the brain shifts from thinking to reacting (Easterbrook, 1959). The focus is on the source of the threat; as cognition processing slows, instinctive decisionmaking takes over. As the brain tunes into the source of threat, the visual system is heightened and narrows if it is the dominant source of the information. The more complex the threat and the environment, the more pronounced the effect of the stress on perception will be (Welford, 1980). The phenomenon is referred to as perceptional narrowing (tunnel vision) or selective attention. Intentional blindness may occur, which is a failure to see what is obviously directly in line of the vision due to an attentional focus on a competing visual input. Peripheral vision can be significantly narrowed, and information thought to be of little concern is unconsciously rejected and filtered out. Hearing may be diminished causing auditory exclusion. If hearing is the dominant source of information, visual exclusion may occur when a loud sound is heard. Other senses may also be tuned out.
1/28/17
Nov-Dec Kant NC
Tournament: I Forget | Round: Finals | Opponent: On Tabroom | Judge: On Tabroom Analytic. The intent determines the action, so foreseen harms are irrelevant. Christine Korsgaard 14 (Professor at Harvard University) “How to be an Aristotelian Kantian Constitutivist.” 2014 “First of all, no one thinks a wholly “external performance,” AND to at least intend to transmit the sandwich from my possession to yours.” Thus, the standard is consistency in the rational will. Qualified immunity prevents individuals from being held accountable when there is a good will, they don't know they're in violation of the law at the time. ZIPURSKY: Zipursky, Benjamin. “Reasonableness in and Out of Negligence Law.” No Date AND to pick out epistemic defensibility, as in the case of reasonable mistake.
1/28/17
Nov-Dec monell
Tournament: | Round: Finals | Opponent: | Judge: CP Text: The Supreme Court should modify Monell claims to operate according to a ‘conscious disregard standard instead of the current ‘Deliberate Indifference’ standard. Singh 15 clarifies: Singh, Amit (J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law). "Accountability Matters: An Examination of Municipal Liability in Sec. 1983 Actions." The U. of Pac. L. Rev. 47 (2015): 105. The Court should revisit the standard for municipal liability in § 1983 actions and provide an actual definition to prevent confusion and varying application by lower courts.'7 9 A standard of conscious disregard that combines the California law for imposing punitive damages with the definition from the Nevada Legislature would remedy the failings of the deliberate indifference standard. 80 This comment proposes the courts adopt the following standard for imposing municipal liability in § 1983 actions: (a) knowledge of probable harmful consequences of a wrongful act; and' (b) willful or deliberate failure to avoid those consequences;182 (c) by a municipal policymaker, or those persons acting on behalf of a municipal policymaker. 8 Mutually exclusive- Limiting qualified immunity means lawsuit fall on police, not the system - you can’t sue both. Gilles 2K Gilles, Myriam (Assistant Professor, Cardozo Law School) "In defense of making Government pay: the deterrent effect of constitutional tort remedies." Ga. L. Rev. 35 (2000): 845. Second, the common practice of bifurcation serves to limit the efficacy of municipal liability claims. 7 Many courts reflexively bifurcate the trial of individual and municipal liability claims under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 staying all Monell proceedings, including discovery on Monell issues," until after the resolution of claims against individual officers."' I have a theorem: bifurcation + indemnification = elimination of Monell. Once a case is bifurcated and the plaintiff proceeds against the individual officer, the plaintiff either wins or loses. If plaintiff wins and the officer is indemnified, the plaintiff is made whole. End of case. Plaintiff cannot proceed against the municipality, having been made whole in the first trial against the individual officer. If plaintiff loses against the individual officer, he likely cannot proceed against the municipality. End of case. Having failed to show he suffered any constitutional injury, plaintiff may not then claim that a municipal policy or custom caused him constitutional injury." 1 Either way, the Monell claim never sees the light of day, and the informational and fault-fixing functions of municipal liability lie inert. 10
This modification would lead to more successful lawsuits. Singh 15 Singh, Amit (J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law). "Accountability Matters: An Examination of Municipal Liability in Sec. 1983 Actions." The U. of Pac. L. Rev. 47 (2015): 105. Unlike the deliberate indifference standard, the conscious disregard standard provides an effective remedy for plaintiffs who have suffered constitutional violations at the hands of municipal employees." 9 The current standard often functions as an impossible barrier to relief.'" Although a court may consider a particular municipal "policy" or "custom" as exhibiting an indifference to the rights of a citizen, the court will generally not interpret the policy as amounting to a deliberate indifference.'9 The conscious disregard standard addresses this problem by reducing the burden of proving municipal liability in § 1983 actions.1 92 Instead of the confusing, repetitive language of the deliberate indifference standard, the conscious disregard standard will provide a workable definition for lower courts.' The language is clear and the goal is straightforward: prevent municipalities from engaging in patterns or practices that violate the constitutional rights of citizens.'9 Turns and outweighs the case: Unlike suits, Monell claims lead to policy reform. Lawsuits on police don’t lead to any change and just deflect blame from the institution. Gilles 2 Gilles, Myriam (Assistant Professor, Cardozo Law School) "In defense of making Government pay: the deterrent effect of constitutional tort remedies." Ga. L. Rev. 35 (2000): 845. In addition to serving an informational function, municipal liability claims serve a "fault-fixing" function, localizing culpability in the municipality itself, and forcing municipal policymakers to consider reformative measures. To understand how this fault-fixing function operates, it is important to distinguish between the liability a municipality incurs indirectly, through the indemnification of its officers, and the direct liability it may incur under Monell. Indirect liability does not trigger the fault-fixing function. The municipal indemnification of an individual officer for constitutional damage awards levied against him6" does not necessarily force policy-makers to acknowledge municipal fault and take remedial action, for two reasons. First, indemnification is an ex ante benefit given to individual officers as a form of insurance. The determination to indemnify is made at the front end, as the product of collective bargaining arrangements and political lobbying, and not in response to any constitutional claim.64 The act of indemnifying is largely a ministerial one, and indemnification expenses are easily justified as costs of doing business, along with salaries and other items of overhead.65 Second, where municipalities indemnify officers, they "generally write off the misconduct of an individual officer to the 'bad apple theory,' under which municipal governments or their agencies attribute misconduct to aberrant behavior by a single 'bad apple.'60 This "deflects attention from systemic and institutional factors contributing to recurring constitutional deprivations." 7 As I have argued elsewhere, "the bad apple theory' is essentially an institutionalized belief system ensuring that fault for unconstitutional conduct--even when it results in large damage awards against individual officers or city-approved settlements-will never be localized in the culture of the municipal agency itseltf"' with the result that little or no remedial actions are taken.69 Direct liability, on the other hand, does serve a fault-fixing function. Under the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services," municipal liability cannot be based upon principles of vicarious liability; rather, municipal liability will attach only where an identifiable "policy or custom" of the municipality caused plaintiffs constitutional injury." A finding of Monell liability, therefore, fixes the fault of constitutional violations directly on the municipal entity, which "possesses the resources and broad vantage point with which to identify the particular deficiencies, and... take appropriate corrective action,"72 thereby furthering the deterrence goal of § 1983. Holding the municipality itself liable for injuries caused by its own unconstitutional policies and customs makes it more difficult to take refuge in the "bad apple theory" and more likely that the municipality will take steps to remedy the broader problems. Empirical proof that Monell claims can lead to reform is shown throughout history. Gilles 2K Gilles, Myriam (Assistant Professor, Cardozo Law School) "In defense of making Government pay: the deterrent effect of constitutional tort remedies." Ga. L. Rev. 35 (2000): 845. First, as I have argued elsewhere, too many courts and practitioners have failed to apprehend the broad spectrum of policies or customs that may support the imposition of Monell liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.9o Specifically, greater focus upon the "custom" language of § 1983 holds promise for reinvigorating modern civil rights litigation. Originally enacted as the Ku Klux Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was intended to combat the widespread practices of local officials, including rank-and-file municipal officers, that impeded implementation of the principles enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. In passing the statute, the 42nd Congress understood that, while state and local legislatures were swiftly passing laws throughout the South to conform to the mandates of the Reconstruction amendments, unwritten codes guiding the conduct of local officials in Southern strongholds undermined the new constitutional and statutory edicts.93 The architects of the original Ku Klux Act used the term "custom" to refer to the nefarious unwritten codes of conduct pursuant to which local officials terrorized freedmen and Republicans, and failed to enforce Reconstruction era laws against dissenters.94 While the particular "customs" that prevailed amongst deputy sheriffs, local prosecutors and Klansmen in the post-bellum South have largely subsided, other "customs" in the form of unwritten codes of conduct among modern law enforcement officials regularly impair rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment today. Indeed, I have argued that institutionalized, unwritten "customs"- most particularly the police code of silence-underlie many of the constitutional deprivations suffered at the hands of contemporary police officers.9" As the true range of actionable customs is recognized by more plaintiffs' lawyers and judges, we will see more clearly the deterrent or behavior-altering effect of constitutional damage suits aimed at municipalities under Monell.96
11/19/16
Sep-Oct - Consult CP
Tournament: Greenhill | Round: 2 | Opponent: Marlborough LG | Judge: Aimun Khan Text: Indigenous communities should individually decide for themselves whether they want to prohibit the production of nuclear power in their territory Their plan uses the USFG as the actor. However, American Indians are not part of the United States. The United States is a settler state, which explicitly is premised on oppression of North American Indigenous people. GRANDE, Sandy. 2004’. Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought. Rowman and Littlefield. The United States ... people, one nation.
The aff frames Native Americans as incompetent by grouping their policy with the US- which re-entrenches structural barriers - turns case. Sachs 96 Sachs, Noah (Professor of Law Director, Robert R. Merhige Jr. Center for Environmental Studies at Richmond School of Law). "The Mescalero Apache and monitored retrievable storage of spent nuclear fuel: A study in environmental ethics." Natural Resources Journal 36 (1996): 641.
Second, if a ... and environmental resources. THE NOTION OF PROTECTING INDIANS FROM HARM IS BASED ON ESSENTIALISM/RACISM Collins, Nancy (From 1989 to 1993 she was an Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law and had served as a Trial Attorney in the Environmental Enforcement Section and in the Torts Branch of the U.S. Department of Justice), and Andrea Hall. "Nuclear Waste in Indian Country: A Paradoxical Trade." Law and Ineq. 12 (1993): 267. American law, literature, ... upon Native Americans.
Some indigenous people see waste facilities as good. To clarify, my argument is not that all groups should do this, but they need the option- the aff denies that. Gover et al, Kevin, and Jana L. Walker (Native American Attorneys at Gover, Stetson and Williams). "Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One Tribe's Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country." University of Colorado Law Review 63 (1992): 933. The second and ... for its development.
9/17/16
Sep-Oct - SMR CP
Tournament: Greenhill | Round: 3 | Opponent: Valley MS | Judge: Monica Amestoy CP Text: Countries ought to prohibit all nuclear production except for Small Modular Reactors. Conway Irwin is the Solvency Advocate Breaking Energy, 9-11-2013, "Small Modular Reactors Angling to Fill Nuclear Niche," No Publication, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/small-modular-reactors-angling-to-fill-nuclear-niche JH U.S. Energy Secretary ... a nuclear future.” SMRs solve nuclear downsides – France Proves Ringle 10 John, Professor Emeritus of Nuclear Engineering at Oregon State University, "Reintroduction of reactors in US a major win", November 13, robertmayer.wordpress.com/2010/11/21/reintroduction-of-reactors-in-us-a-major-win/ JH
SMRs can reprocess and solve waste Biello 12 David, March 27, "Small Reactors Make a Bid to Revive Nuclear Power", www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-reactors-bid-to-revive-nuclear-power JH
Tournament: Greenhill | Round: 3 | Opponent: Valley MS | Judge: Monica Amestoy Nuclear power is the only way to generate sufficient energy for large-scale desalination IAEA 15 -- widely known as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization within the United Nations family. Set up in 1957 as the world's centre for cooperation in the nuclear field, the Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies, “New Technologies for Seawater Desalination Using Nuclear Energy,” IEAE TecDoc Series, 2015 JH It is anticipated ... the Mediterranean region
Desal is the only solution to water shortages IAEA 2 -- widely known as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization within the United Nations family. Set up in 1957 as the world's centre for cooperation in the nuclear field, the Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies, “New Technologies for Seawater Desalination Using Nuclear Energy,” IEAE TecDoc Series, 2015 JH Addressing water shortages ... quality and climate.
Water crises cause escalating global conflict. Rasmussen 11 (Erik, CEO, Monday Morning; Founder, Green Growth Leaders) “Prepare for the Next Conflict: Water Wars” HuffPo 4/12 JH For years experts ... wars will accelerate.
That goes nuclear Zahoor 12 (Musharaf, Researcher at Department of Nuclear Politics – National Defense University, Water Crisis can Trigger Nuclear War in South Asia, http://www.siasat.pk) JH Water is an ... through political will.
Moral uncertainty means you default to extinction first. Bostrom 12 Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford; Generally Crazy Person but not this argument because it’s actually pretty sane.“Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012) These reflections on ... any existential catastrophe.
