Phoenix Country Day Whitfil Aff
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| All | 8 | x | x |
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| All | 9 | x | x |
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| Emory | 6 | Jason Yang | X |
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| Glenrbooks | 2 | X | x |
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| Glenrbooks | 2 | X | x |
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| Greenhill | 1 | Kinkaid JY | Alberto Tohme |
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| Greenhill | 1 | Kinkaid JY | Alberto Tohme |
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| Greenhill | Semis | Peninsula JL | Panel |
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| Greenhill | 2 | Cypress Woods CJ | Terrence |
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| HWL | 2 | X | x |
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| HWL | 3 | x | x |
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| HWL | Doubles | X | x |
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| Harvard | 4 | Oakwood AW | Danny Li |
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| Harvard Westlake | 2 | Loyola DW |
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| Voices | 3 | x | x |
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| Voices | Finals | X | x |
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| Voices | Finals | X | x |
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| Voices | 1 | San Marino KW | Tinuola Dada |
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| Tournament | Round | Report |
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| Greenhill | 1 | Opponent: Kinkaid JY | Judge: Alberto Tohme 1AC- Whole Res Util v1 |
| Greenhill | Semis | Opponent: Peninsula JL | Judge: Panel 1AC- Whole Res Util v2 |
| Greenhill | 2 | Opponent: Cypress Woods CJ | Judge: Terrence 1AC- Non-Ideal Whole Res |
| Voices | Finals | Opponent: X | Judge: x 1AC- Kant |
| Voices | 1 | Opponent: San Marino KW | Judge: Tinuola Dada AC- Democracy AC |
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
| Entry | Date |
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0 - 1AR Theory InterpsTournament: All | Round: 9 | Opponent: x | Judge: x Interps we think neg’s should comply with:
^Exact text of interp depends on the round. Usually the interp is synthetic to the actual debate. | 1/31/17 |
0 - Contact InformationTournament: All | Round: 8 | Opponent: x | Judge: x -Parker | 10/23/16 |
0- Extra K Pre-emptsTournament: HWL | Round: Doubles | Opponent: X | Judge: x 5. The narrative of “no progress” is affectively appealing but historically imprecise. Political access proves. 6. Root cause explanations of politics don’t exist- methodological pluralism is key to open up new ideas and avoid violence. | 1/16/17 |
0- Non-Ideal FW more warrantsTournament: HWL | Round: 3 | Opponent: x | Judge: x | 1/14/17 |
ERRORTournament: Greenhill | Round: 1 | Opponent: Kinkaid JY | Judge: Alberto Tohme | 2/23/17 |
Jan-Feb Patriotic Correctness ACTournament: Harvard Westlake | Round: 2 | Opponent: Loyola DW | Judge: Ideal theory strips away particularities making ethics inaccessible and epistemically skewed This censorship prevents higher education from being the uniquely key institution that can create a cultural shift away from militarism by teaching students to resist. Empowering academics is uniquely key to disrupting the culture of militarism in universities. The only way the system survives is if academia continues to produce scholarship uncritical of it Part 4 is Theory
2. Vote aff if I win a counter-interp Part 5 is Method
| 1/12/17 |
Jan-Feb Patriotic Correctness AC v3Tournament: Emory | Round: 6 | Opponent: Jason Yang | Judge: X Public colleges and universities are the hallmark for society’s commitment to critical education of students who will become the leaders of tomorrow. These institutions are renowned for their commitment to academic freedom that are glossed over in day-in day-out life. That changed post 9/11- now patriotic correctness runs rampant Thus, the plan text, Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict constitutionally protected speech that criticizes the military’s policies. Ideal theory strips away particularities making ethics inaccessible and epistemically skewed Part 3 is Offense In the status quo, members of college campuses are routinely fired if they criticize the military, causing a chilling effect on such discussion. Multiple empirical examples prove: This is devastating because higher education is the uniquely key institution that can provide spaces for conversations and action that snowball into cultural shifts away from militarism. History proves, anti-military dissent has always been silenced when the State is hell-bent on imposing its agenda and quieting opposition. Voting aff helps teach students to refuse complicity with militarism 2 impacts Militarism is part of the culture, making people disposable- justifying and creating everyday violence against the Middle Eastern Other. The aff allows student and professors to refuse this culture.
Part 5 is Method
We should focus on particular circumstances which best tackle material violence. Root cause explanations of politics don’t exist- methodological pluralism is key to open up new ideas and avoid violence. | 1/29/17 |
Jan-Feb Patriotic Correctness PW AC v4Tournament: Harvard | Round: 4 | Opponent: Oakwood AW | Judge: Danny Li prefer
Part 2 is Advocacy Part 3 is Offense In the status quo, members of college campuses are routinely fired if they criticize the military, causing a chilling effect on such discussion. Multiple empirical examples prove: This is devastating because higher education is the uniquely key institution that can provide spaces for conversations and action that snowball into cultural shifts away from militarism. History proves, anti-military dissent has always been silenced when the State is hell-bent on imposing its agenda and quieting opposition. Voting aff helps teach students to refuse complicity with militarism 2 impacts Militarism is part of the culture, making people disposable- justifying and creating everyday violence against the Middle Eastern Other. The aff allows student and professors to refuse this culture. Military power is unsustainable. Trying to expand power when it’s failing triggers resentment, which link turns their offense. Part 4 is Theory
Also means presumption and permissibility flow aff- I did the better debating if the round is tied. But nothing in the case triggers presumption. 2. Analytic 3. Analytic
More analytics | 2/19/17 |
Jan-Feb Patriotic Correctness v2Tournament: HWL | Round: 2 | Opponent: X | Judge: x Part 2 Advocacy Part 3 Offense Anti-military dissent has been silenced throughout history, which prevents higher education from being the uniquely key institution that can create a cultural shift away from militarism by teaching students to refuse complicity with militarism 2 impacts Militarism is part of the culture, making people disposable- justifying and creating everyday violence against the Middle Eastern Other. The aff allows student and professors to refuse this culture. | 1/14/17 |
Nov-Dec SCOTUS ACTournament: Glenrbooks | Round: 2 | Opponent: X | Judge: x Thus the standard is minimizing oppression. Prefer
Inherency Plantext Advantage 1: Decision-Making Advantage 2: Judicial Legitimacy Providing reasons is the keystone of court legitimacy Judicial Legitimacy is key to the Court’s power Court power is key to check back the legislator from hugely oppressive laws- Brown v. Board proves. Most recent empirics of late elim rounds show huge neg side bias The aff deploys the state as a heuristic to learn scenario planning- even if politics is bad, scenario analysis of politics is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills | 11/19/16 |
Sept-Oct Democracy ACTournament: Voices | Round: 1 | Opponent: San Marino KW | Judge: Tinuola Dada This debate should center on tangible policies that address oppression. Thus the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater whose advocacy best breaks down the technocratic elite and reasserts democratic debate. This means the aff comes epistemically prior to other frameworks. Advocacy Contention 1 is centralization of power Nuclear power was chosen by government elites because it enabled authoritarian control over civilian energy sources- this justifies massive amounts of state control, capitalism and oppression. This is supercharged by the fact that nuclear reactors require centralized infrastructure for waste disposal and regulation. Any shift to renewables is a reason to vote aff- it removes state control and reintroduces democracy. Voting aff also causes spillover to attacking vulnerable points of state control and capitalism. Only long term-concrete demands can solve. What is a strategy anyway? …. behind nuclear power. Contention 2 is technocratic elites False epistemological viewpoints make us think that nuclear power is the silver bullet technology- this justifies securitization and state violence. Contention 3 is impact calculus | 2/23/17 |
Sept-Oct Kant ACTournament: Voices | Round: Finals | Opponent: X | Judge: x The implication is that ethics must be universizable If ethics must be universizable, we cannot will maxims that hurt freedom. This would be contradictory. Thus the standard is respecting a system of equal and outer freedom. Contention 2 is offense: Willing the use of finite, natural resources like uranium is incompatible with equal outer freedoms. The institution of property is such that it provides one with the ability to employ usable things fully to achieve one’s purposes, so the destruction of property involves a contradiction in willing. 3. Nuclear waste disposal destroys the environment. WILPF 07 | 2/23/17 |
Sept-Oct Non Ideal FrameworkTournament: Greenhill | Round: 2 | Opponent: Cypress Woods CJ | Judge: Terrence Debate cannot be a discussion of ideal theory- it must be a discussion of tangible policies that reorient value. | 2/23/17 |
Sept-Oct Whole Res Util AC v1Tournament: Greenhill | Round: 1 | Opponent: Kinkaid JY | Judge: Alberto Tohme I haven’t said much about metaethics – the nature of morality – because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven’t gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless. And this appears to be a general syndrome – people do much better when discussing whether torture is good or bad than when they discuss the meaning of “good” and “bad”. Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level wherever I possibly can. Occasionally people object to any discussion of morality on the grounds that morality doesn’t exist, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that “exist” is not the right term to use here, I generally say, “But what do you do anyway?” and take the discussion back down to the object level. Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of “utilitarianism”, depend on “intuition”. He says I’ve argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now “intuition” is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word “intuition” as a term of art, bearing in mind that “intuition” in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. I see the project of morality as is a project of renormalizing intuition. We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. Delete all the intuitions, and you aren’t left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, you’re left with a rock. Keep all your specificintuitions and refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren’t left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, you’re left with a grunting caveperson running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. “Intuition”, as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality – there is nothing else to argue from. Even modus ponens is an “intuition” in this sense – it‘sjust that modus ponens still seems like a good idea after being formalized, reflected on, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is “intuition”. However, Gowder did not say what he meant by “utilitarianism”. Does utilitarianism say… That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50 probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is… anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the “intuitions” upon which my “utilitarianism” depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I’ll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it’s not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded “intuitive”. Among other things, if you try to violatinge “utilitarianism”, you runs into paradoxes, contradictions, circular preferences, and other things that aren’tmsymptoms of moral wrongness so much as moral incoherence. After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I’ve drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I’m “utilitarian”?) The question of where a road goes – where it leads – you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. After the two hundred and eighty-seventh research study showsing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you’ve read enough research on scope insensitivity shows – people will pay only 28 more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives… that sort of thing… Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I’ve ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There’s other research along similar lines, but I’m just presenting one example, ’cause, y’know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious – focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, you could look at this intuition, and think it wasrevealing some kind of incredibly deep moral truth which shows that one child’s good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children’s good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn’t it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? Or you could look at that and say: “Thuse intuition is wrong: the brain can’t successfully multiply by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. But it ought to, normatively speaking.” And once you realize that the brain can’t multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don’t get the impression you’re looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It’s just that the brain doesn’t goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of “shut up and multiply” arises from the simple preference to have more of something – to save as many lives as possible – when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn’t depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That’s aggregation. When you’ve read enough heuristics and biases research, and enough coherence and uniqueness proofs for Bayesian probabilities and expected utility, and you’ve seen the “Dutch book” and “money pump” effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, then you don’t see the preference reversals in the Allais Paradox as revealing some incredibly deep moral truth about the intrinsic value of certainty. It just goes to shows that the brain doesn’t goddamn multiply. The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice “feel good” don’t handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don’t think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that primitive intuitions don’t successfully diminish the emotional impact of symbols standing for small quantities – anything you talk about seems like “an amount worth considering”. And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there’s any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no “but” following it. Not even “but a thousand dollars isn’t worth a 0.0000000001 probability of saving a life”. Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don’t conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don’t conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don’t conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov’s robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics (“A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm”) then no robot’s behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don’t say that morality should always be simple. I’ve already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize – that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that’s for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided – at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. When you’ve reflected on enough intuitions, and corrected enough absurdities, you start to see a common denominator, a meta-principle at work, which one might phrase as “Shut up and multiply.” Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. And that’s why I’m a utilitarian – at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it – which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone. Thus the standard is maximizing expected happiness. Advocacy Text I advocate the countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power. I defend normal means—countries will phase out nuclear power similar to how Germany has. Lucas 12 explains: Lucas 12 Caroline Lucas, MP for Brighton Pavilion and a member of the cross-party parliamentary environment audit committee, “Why we must phase out nuclear power,” The Guardian, February 17, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/feb/17/phase-out-nuclear-power Contention 1 is Radiation To evaluate the global risks, we can use empirical evidence to estimate the factors 5 (a) and (b) from above. In the past decades, four INES level 7 catastrophic nuclear meltdowns have occurred, one in Chernobyl and three reactors in Fukushima. Note that we are not considering INES 6 and lower level accidents with partial core melts such as Three Mile Island (USA), Mayak (a plutonium production and reprocessing plant in Siberia) and Sellafield (UK). The total number of operational reactor years 10 since the first plant in Obninsk (1954) until 2011 has been about 14 500 (IAEA, 2011; Supplement). This suggests that the probability of a major reactor accident, i.e. the combined probability of the factors (a) and (b), is much higher than estimated in 1990. Simply taking the four reactor meltdowns over the 14 500 reactor years would indicate a probability of 1 in 3625 per reactor per year, 275 times larger than the 1990 15 estimate (NRC, 1990). However, since we are at a junction in time with impacts of a catastrophic meltdown still unfolding, this direct estimate is high-biased, and we round it off to 1 in 5000 per reactor per year for use in our model simulations. This is actually only a factor of two higher than the estimated core melt probability noted above, factor (a). Based on the past evidence, this principally assumes that if a core melt 20 occurs, the probability of containment before substantial radioactivity release is very small. We thus argue that including the factors (b)–(e) can distort the risk perception. Our rounded estimate implies that with 440 reactors worldwide a major accident can be expected to occur about once every 1 to 2 decades, depending on whether we count Fukushima as a triple or a single event These meltdowns are horrific, subjecting upwards of 30 million innocent people to radioactive contamination. Best case scenario for the neg is no meltdowns but even normally operating nuclear power plants significantly increase radiation risk. This means our impact is unavoidable. Alldred 9, Mary and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, 2012, Department of Ecology and Evolution at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, in Stony Brook, New York. Dr. Shrader-Frechette is O’Neill Fam- ily Endowed Professor, Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosoph, Environmental Injustice in Siting Nuclear Plants, 2009, Contention 2 is Animals Nuclear power kills billions of aquatic animals and can lead to ecosystem collapse. Biodiversity loss spills over and has a domino effect. Species extinction destroys biodiversity—means extinction. The evidence decisively concludes aff that fish feel pain- Contention 3 is Energy The original justification for nuclear power was the global need for alternative energy sources. But this project has been an utter failure—nuclear energy accounts for roughly 11 of global energy production. Analytic Contention 4 is big picture weighing Kritik Underview Activist focus on meta-issues breeds utopianism, which leads to the failure of the movement, Occupy Wall Street and The Farm empirically confirms. Only the combination of thought and action can create change. | 9/28/16 |
Sept-Oct Whole Res Util v2Tournament: Greenhill | Round: Semis | Opponent: Peninsula JL | Judge: Panel Contention 1 is Armenia The Metsamor power plant – Armenia’s only form of nuclear power – is incredibly dangerous. It uses old tech, is unreliable, and lies on earthquake territory. Lavelle 2 continues: But the VVER …. mitigation at all." Contention 2 is Taiwan Taiwan is uniquely vulnerable – nuclear meltdown is only a matter of time – 2 warrants. Shyi-min 15 Thanks for the feedback! Undo Closing ad: 1$d And, best case scenario for the neg is no meltdowns but even normally operating nuclear power plants significantly increase radiation risk. This means our impact is unavoidable. Alldred 9, Mary and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, 2012, Department of Ecology and Evolution at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, in Stony Brook, New York. Dr. Shrader-Frechette is O’Neill Fam- ily Endowed Professor, Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosoph, Environmental Injustice in Siting Nuclear Plants, 2009, Contention 3 is Animals Nuclear power kills billions of aquatic animals and can lead to ecosystem collapse. Evidence decisively concludes aff that fish feel pain- | 2/23/17 |
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