Tournament: Berkeley | Round: 6 | Opponent: forgot | Judge: forgot
The construction of hypothetical fiat in the debate round is a destructive mode of thought.. The concept of normativity critiques our acceptance of the structure of debate as an immutable status quo we must conform to, as explained by
SCHLAG, PROFESSOR OF LAW@ UNIV. COLORADO, 1990 (PIERRE, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, NOVEMBER, PAGE LEXIS)
In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it.
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Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students — persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.
Normative discourse reinstates the harms of the status quo by making us spectators of political life. Our traditional conceptualization of solvency doesn’t solve anything, but only makes our problems worse by paralyzing solvency action in the future.
Mitchell in 1995 (Gordon, Univ. of Pittsburgh Communications prof, "REFLEXIVE FIAT: INCORPORATING THE OUTWARD ACTIVIST TURN INTO CONTEST STRATEGY", paper presented to the 1995 SCA National Convention)
One problem with approaches to fiat which feature such a structural separation between advocate and agent of change is that such approaches tend to instill political apathy by inculcating a spectator mentality. The function of fiat which gives debaters simulated political control over external actors coaxes students to gloss over consideration of their concrete roles as involved agents in the controversies they research. The construct of fiat, in this vein, serves as a political crutch by alleviating the burden of demonstrating a connection between in-round advocacy and the action by external actors defended in plan or counterplan mandates.
And, this speculative mindset only allows us to condone and exploit oppression and suffering of others.
Mitchell in 1998 (Gordon, Pitt Communications Professor, "Pedagogical possibilities for argumentative agency in academic debate", Argumentation and Advocacy, fall)
The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead of focusing on the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of debate-speak).
And, normative discourse desensitizes us to the suffering of others, perpetuates cruelty and justifies violence against the other.
Delgado, Professor of Law @ The University of Colorado, 1991 (Richard, NORMS AND NORMAL SCIENCE: TOWARD A CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVITY IN LEGAL THOUGHT, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, April, Lexis)
Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles.
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We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid. n86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem.
Normativity thus enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us.
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Not only does normativity help us justify indifference to others' needs, but we sometimes use it to rationalize treatment of others that would otherwise be seen as injurious, if not downright cruel. As I pointed out earlier, those in a position to dictate norms rarely, if ever, see their own favorite forms of behavior as immoral. … Even when we do not pronounce outgroups' behavior positively vicious, we may declare it lazy and indolent, so as to justify our own aggressive behavior. Warfaring nations, for example, often gain ascendancy over more peaceloving nations (e.g., Native Americans). The conquerors then decide it was their own spiritual, aesthetic, and ethical superiority that enabled them to prevail, not their superior weapons, numbers, or bloodthirst.
