Tournament: na | Round: 1 | Opponent: na | Judge: na
Interpretation: at least an hour before the round begins, debaters must disclose all broken positions (including ACs, NCs, DAs, CPs and Ks) on the NDCA LD 2016-2017 wiki under their own name, school, and correct side with cites, tags, the first three and the last three words of all cards read.

Tournament: damus | Round: 5 | Opponent: na | Judge: na
this is my first tournament on this topic, so i will probably read an unbroken case not on the wiki. anything broken will be on here. if you have any questions fb message me or email me at nikkibayat19@students.oakwoodschool.org

Tournament: harvard westlake | Round: 1 | Opponent: na | Judge: na
Part 1: Framework

Ought is defined as functionally being obligated to do something based off the factual nature of the agent in question
MacIntyre 81 Alasdair MacinTyre 1981 "After Virtue – A study in Moral Theory" University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana http://epistemh.pbworks.com/f/4.+Macintyre.pdf LB
Some later moral philosophers have gone so far as to describe the thesis that from
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to and apart from all roles that 'man' ceases to be a functional concept

Public universities are Government institutions
Douglas 06 M. Douglas, 3-6-2006, "Public and Private: What's the Difference?," , https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/03/06/lombardi LB
American colleges and universities, especially those that define themselves as public institutions because they
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and friends about the distribution of benefits and costs between private and public entities

The function of action based of the factual nature of the United States is consistency with the consitution
Madison et Al. 1787 James Madison "United States Constitution" Sep 17, 1787 Article VI https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlevi LB
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
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anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Thus the standard is consistency with the US Constitution. Prefer the standard

1) Even if you win that ought generates a moral obligation, morality must be based on the constitutive aim of an action.
Katsafanas Paul Katsafanas. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXIII No. 3, November 2011, Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism. Boston University.
So what’s special about constitutive aims? The constitutive aim’s standard of success differs from
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avoids the disadvantages of externalism, namely the problems of practicality and queerness.

And, the constitution is constitutive of all US government agents
Madison et Al. 2 James Madison "United States Constitution" Sep 17, 1787 Article VI https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlevi LB
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures
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America the Twelfth. In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names.  

2) Moral theories that impose absolute rules fail because there is nothing inherent neither to the rule nor in the interpretation of the rule that can determine how to follow the rule.
LANGSETH: Langesth, Jonathan. "Wittengenstein’s Account of Rule-Following and Its Implications".
This section shows that rules themselves do not determine how they are to be followed
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be posited to apply this same idea to any rule-governed activity.

Three Impacts: A) Social practices are only interpreted through laws. Langseth 2
Over time and in the context of a society, repetition of action becomes a custom, instituted as communal regularity. Rules and rule-following are only possible in the context of a community because what constitutes correct application is determined by agreement. "The word ‘agreement’ and the word ‘rule’ are related to one another, they are cousins."13 The justification for correctly following a rule is found in agreement and practice, by acting in such a way that appears in accordance with what is expected (and such agreement may be reached by either consensus, force or authority). What mental processes occur in an act have no explanatory value in justifying correct rule-following. It was shown in Wittgenstein’s critique of what constitutes correct rule-following that it is pos- sible to follow any number of rules and still act in accordance with expectation, and this may be exactly what we do.14 In this sense: "I (we) obey the rule blindly," for it is never known, beyond the recognition of agreement and acceptance of action, whether or not we adhere to some strict, set-in- stone, definitive rule; for there is no such thing.15 Rules are placeholders for an expected path of action. We "catch on" to what is expected because by continued approval of a specific action given a specific rule, we reach the belief that such an action is right or correct. Language is a practice with correct and incorrect usage. Therefore, it is a rule-governed behavior. Prior to Wittgenstein, most philosophers believed that meaning is what justifies correct language use and that it is something which stands outside of actual practice as arbiter of that practice. For example, Platonists argue that the meaning of words such as "justice," "good," and "truth" are defined by some standard independent of experience, by some form "projected," as it were, into the world of experience. The philosopher need only discover the form of justice, good or truth in order to determine whether use of these terms is correct or not. But Wittgenstein argues language is a tool, an instrument (like a hammer or money), which enables us to get things done.16 And it is only in what we do with words, how they are used as tools, that we can get a sense of what they mean. The rules that allow effective use of language have been shown to consist of the customary and habitual nature of practice itself. If meaning is said to be what justifies correct language use, then meaning is grounded in practice. Wittgenstein calls attempts to locate meaning in some antecedent, prescriptive formulation "entanglements in our rules."17 Such attempts mistake the nature of meaning. Wittgenstein wants to show that philosophical problems rest on this mistaken assumption of the nature of meaning. The error of philosophers, says Wittgenstein, is in their belief that some words such as "truth," "re- ality," "justice" and the "good" have a meaning beyond their use in practice.18 By pointing out this mistake, Wittgenstein wants to cure philosophers of the belief that there are purely philosophical problems. Traditional philosophic questions such as "What is the nature of truth?" or "What is the good?" etc., cannot be given an answer resting on anything outside of the practices in which these words are used. There is nothing outside of use that can justify correct use. The task of phi- losophy, says Wittgenstein, should turn to investigating how language is used

B) Grounding morality in inviolable contracts is the only way to avoid skepticism since it spells out the exact permissible and prohibited aspects of a moral rule and removes the abstractness that the rule could have.

IMPACT CALCULUS:

To say something is permitted is not to say that there is no possibility of a prohibition; rather it just matters that it is permitted under one locus of duty. A) This is true of obligations because the existence of an obligation doesn’t mean that there can’t be another obligation to do something else, as an obligation is just a locus of duty. B) Proving the resolution true under a specific index is sufficient to affirm regardless of any other type of index that negates. Rödl :
This view is untenable for reasons this is analogous to those we mounted against the corresponding account of instrumental reasoning. Suppose the normative order of the question what to believe, on an occasion of its being asked, is a set of propositions Σ. In order to indicate this, we give the imperative an index specifying that set; we write, not "It is right to believe p because Σof an index" but "It is right given an indexΣ to believe p". Now, nothing we said about Σan index excludes that it may be right Σ given an index to believe p and right Σ given an index to believe non p. Thinking it is right Σ to believe p peacefully coexists with thinking it is right Σ to believe non p. This shows that, thinking it is right given an indexΣ to believe p, I have not determined what to believe. For, thinking this is not having affixed myself to p in a manner that excludes affixing myself in the same way to non p. But thinking it right to believe p—thinking is true—is so affixing myself to p.

Proving a legal obligation exists is sufficient to affirm independent of moral considerations. Legal obligations are a separate locus of duty. Glos
The mutual relation of law and ethics can profitably be investigated only if ethics is understood as a normative science.31 If we compare legal norms with ethical norms, it appears that the contents of ethical norms are in agreement with a given concept or principle, whereas legal norms originate from a certain lawgiver regardless of contents. It follows that legal and ethical norms may be likened to two circles which cover the same area: legal and ethical norms may coincide, and the same norms may at the same time be both a legal and an ethical norm; but there are legal norms the contents of which have no relevance in ethics (norms regulating highway traffic), and there are legal norms which may contradict ethical norms (norms according to which a soldier is bound to fight and kill).

Part 2: Offense

I contend that the constitution affirms

The supreme court has consistently rule against speech codes at public universities

FIRE ND Foundation for Individual Rights in Education "State of the Law: Speech Codes" https://www.thefire.org/in-court/state-of-the-law-speech-codes/ LB
That the First Amendment applies on the public university campus is settled law. Public
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of the First Amendment apply on public campuses is well-settled law.

Part 3: ROTB

The role of the judge and ballot is to vote for the debater who best defends the truth or falsity of the resolution. The aff burden is to prove the resolution true or the quality or state of being true; the neg burden is to prove its falsity not according with truth. Prefer this"

1) Text: Dictionary.com  define to negate as to deny the truth of which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution’s truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified.

2) We can only follow the constitutive rules of an activity, even if they interfere with the pragmatic or ultimate rules of the activity i.e truth or falsity.
Terry 92 Nardin, Terry. "International Ethics and International Law". Review of International Studies 18.1 (1992): 19–30. Web. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097279 Oakwood AW Terry Nardin 2. 1992 3. ". Review of International Studies 4. International Ethics and International Law 5. 1/30/2016 6. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097279 7. Professor of Political Science at the University of Singapore and 8. 19-30
The first thing to observe in considering this objection is that the 'purposes' of a
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, Cross apply Katsafanas from the framework as another warrant for following constitutive rules

3) Any other role of the ballot devolves to mine. Truth is constitutive of warrants. Frege
 "It may nevertheless be thought that We cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time realizing the thought that this thing has this property to be true. So with every property of a thing is joined a property of a thought, namely, that of truth. It is also worthy of notice that the sentence "I smell the scent of violets " has just the same content as the sentence "it is true that I smell the scent of violets ". So it seems, then, that Nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth. And yet is it not a great result when the scientist after much hesitation and careful inquiry, can finally say " what I supposed is true " The meaning of the word " true " seems to be altogether unique. May we not be dealing here with something which cannot, in the ordinary sense, be called a quality at all? In spite of this doubt I want first to express myself in accordance with ordinary usage, as if truth were a quality, until something more to the point is found."

Part 4: Underview

1. Frameworks that put an emphasis on criticism liberation or emancipation from violence are self defeating Hägglund 08’
   Martin Hägglund: Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life, Stanford: Stanford University Press, Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, 2008.
   Emancipatory politics does not aspire to a telos of absolute liberation, but must always
   AND
   since it may be negated by the coming of other futures).

Tournament: harvard westlake | Round: 5 | Opponent: na | Judge: na

Part 1: Framework

Practical reflection is an inescapable aspect of agency.

Ferrero Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee) "Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency" Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV January 12th 2009 pp. 6-8 JW
3.2 Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the
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agencyʼs own distinctive operation: Agency is closed under itself.15

Impacts:

A~ Justifying a normative claim requires adherence to the norm of the constitutive rules of the activity. Answering the question of why an agent ought to take an action is impossible without practice rules since each link can be taken out with a "why" question-proving the aff framework collapses to infinite regress. Constitutivism solves because the answer to the question can just refer to the aim of the activity.

B~ NC framework devolves to the AC—to even reflect about the legitimacy of your standard concedes the authority of agency since it’s in every action.

Next, rational reflection requires that the maxims we act upon be universalizable. Any reasoner would know that two plus two equals four because there is no a priori distinction between agents so norms must be universally valid. And- willing coercion is a contradiction in conception because you extend your own freedom while simultaneously undermining your ability to act in the first place.

Additionally:

1. All frameworks presuppose liberty. People can only be held responsible for unethical actions if they chose to do them, but choice itself requires that people can pick which actions to take without threat of force. For example, if someone holds a gun to my head and makes me steal someone’s apple, I am not truly culpable because I wasn’t free.

2. Moral uncertainty means you default to my framework - since things like physics have been consistently disproven intellectually, we can’t impose our conceptions of the good on people when we’re not sure we’re correct because absolute knowledge claims are often false.

3. Argumentative ethics – liberty is a priori justified by engaging in debate.

Kinsella Stephen (Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom) "New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory" Journal of Libertarian Studies Vol. 12 No. 2 pp. 313-26 Fall 1996 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract'id=1018797
The first rationalist argument that I will discuss is Hans- Hermann Hoppe's path-
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liberty undercut their own position as soon as they begin to state it.

Impact analysis:

Only freedom violations intrinsic to the structure of the action are relevant as in free speech causes X is insufficient. A) Freedom is a property of agency, not a consequence. Adding two circles doesn’t make anything more circular than it was before, just like two humans aren’t more free than one human. B) We can’t be culpable for consequences—they’re determined by external forces.

Hegel 20 George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel The Philosophy of Right 1820
The will has before it an outer reality, upon which it operates. But
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adopt only the first consequences, since they alone lie in the purpose.

Actions causally contain the freedom to pursue a given end.

Engstrom Stephen (Professor of Ethics at UPitt) "Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge" http://www.philosophie.uni-hd.de/md/philsem/engstrom'vortrag.pdf JW
Kant holds that to set something as one’s end is to represent it in practical
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representation of an end there must correspond two components in the end itself.

Thus the standard is consistency with libertarian self ownership: Prefer additionally because

1. All goods stem from liberty; It’s impossible to value without liberty; Fried 

I would say that what is important about us, what makes us moral human beings, is our individual capacities to think, reason, choose, and value. It is what Kant called our freedom and rationality.2 Individuals, therefore, are the elementary particles of moral discourse. Our value is our taking individual responsibility for our lives, and our choices. And if a person is to count as a person and here we have the difficult questions about the beginning and the end of life then we are all equally valuable in this same way. It is from that base of our equal responsibility for ourselves that we choose our goods: that we choose what to make of the only life we will ever have. My liberty, then, is my ability to choose that life. No one has the right to interfere with that choice, except as it is to further his own good. But that good of the other is worth no more than mine because he is not worth any more than I am. There is, therefore, a right of mutual noninterference: an equal right. By the same token, nobody can interfere with or draft another person to help him achieve his own good if the other person has not chosen voluntarily to enlist in that campaign. 

2. And, states can’t interfere with the choices of individuals since:

A. When states interfere with people’s individual choices, they aggregate value, which is impossible since value is agent relative, i.e. value requires a valuer, and can’t be measured.

Interference with individual’s action implies that individuals aren’t automatically capable of choosing the correct moral actions absent external coercion, implying that they aren’t moral agents

B. When states violate someone’s self-ownership, they destroy that person’s capability to autonomously exercise their rational capacity since their moral decisions are no longer a result of their own deliberations; rather, they are a result of the government’s interference. C. This is bad since: 1) non-rational agents have no reason to adhere to a moral code, 2) it makes it impossible to rationally derive moral truths, so it’s a prerequisite to your framework. (this o/w since preventing violations of self-ownership is the option that best minimizes moral risk—you haven’t proven 100 credence in your ethical theory.) 3) If agents are prohibited from recognizing the right moral action and instead must blindly follow external rules, ethics becomes too abstracted from normal life and ceases to guide normativity.

3. Self-ownership provides the necessary framework for action and exercise of reason, making it a starting point for ethics and a prerequisite to answering other ethical questions. Boaz  writes:

Any theory of rights has to begin somewhere. Most libertarian philosophers would begin the argument earlier than Jefferson did. Humans, unlike animals, come into the world without an instinctive knowledge of what their needs are and how to fulfill them. As Aristotle said, man is a reasoning and deliberating animal; humans use the power of reason to understand their own needs, the world around them, and how to use the world to satisfy their needs. So they need a social system that allows them to use their reason, to act in the world, and to cooperate with others to achieve purposes that no one individual could accomplish. Every person is a unique individual. Humans are social animals—we like interacting with others, and we profit from it— but we think and act individually. Each individual owns himself or herself. What other possibilities besides self—ownership are there?  • Someone – a king or a master race – could own others. Plato and Aristotle did argue that there were different kinds of humans, some more competent than others and thus endowed with the right and responsibility to rule, just as adults guide children. Some forms of socialism and collectivism are—explicitly or im- plicirly—-based on the notion that many people are not compe- ' tent to make decisions about their own lives, so that the more  talented should make decisions for them. But that would mean there were no universal human rights, only rights that some have and others do not, denying the essential humanity of those who are deemed to be owned.  • Everyone owns everyone, a fully-fledged communist system. In such a system, before anyone could take an action, he would need to get permission from everyone else. But how could each other person grant permission without consulting everyone else? You’d have an infinite regress, making any action at all logically impossible. ln practice, since such mutual ownership is impossible, this system would break down into the previous one: some- one, or some group, would own everyone else. That is what happened in the communist states: the party became a dictato- rial ruling elite.  Thus, either communism or aristocratic rule would divide the world into factions or classes. The only possibility that is humane, logical, and suited to the nature of human beings is self-ownership. Obviously, this discussion has only scratched the surface of the question of self-ownership; in any event, I rather like Jefferson’s simple declaration: Natural rights are self-evident. 

4. The constitutive nature of agency makes critiquing my framework impossible.

Ng 15 Karen Ng (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University) "From the Critique of Reason to the Critique of Ideology: On the Relation between Life and Consciousness from Hegel to Critical Theory" 2015 JW
In order to determine exactly how the relation between life and consciousness can be methodologically
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encompassing, that there is simply no place for the critic to stand.

AND: It is impossible to use consequentialist grounds on the topic and it is not relevant to the framework if we cause allegedly more violations of freedom because its impossible to weigh in terms of free speech Goldberg 16:

====FREE SPEECH CONSEQUENTIALISM Author(s): Erica Goldberg Source: Columbia Law Review, Vol. 116, No. 3 (APRIL 2016), pp. 687-756 Published by: Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43783393 Accessed: 15-12-2016 06:32 UTC Oakwood AW====
Any kind of balancing test that determines whether speech may be constitutionally regulated poses serious challenges to foundational First Amendment principles. The very act of balancing tends to be both subjective and indeterminate - it is difficult to quantify the relevant harms and benefits, and it is equally difficult to sensibly weigh them against one another. In the context of the First Amendment, balancing has the potential to undermine strong free speech protections and our neutral principles underlying the First Amendment. Courts should thus avoid determining whether balancing harms caused by speech against the harms to speech can regulate speech. 

Part 2: Offense

Contention: Freedom Violations

1. Removing restrictions prevents prohibiting speech, which is an essential freedom—restrictions in the status quo prevent people from acting on their agency no matter how miniscule the restrictions is.

Lambert 16 (Saber, writer @ being libertarian, "The Degradation of Free Speech and Personal Liberty," April 9, 2016, https://beinglibertarian.com/the-degradation-of-free-speech-and-personal-liberty///LADI)
Many individuals in society claim that they live in a free nation full of individual
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is often paralleled to a form of dictatorship – no matter how miniscule.

2. Turns social justice arguments—lack of free speech re-create the majority/minority divide that means the minority loses out on having their voice heard.

Cartwright 3 (Will, "Mill on Freedom of Discussion," Richmond Journal of Philosophy 5 (Autumn 2003), http://www.richmond-philosophy.net/rjp/back'issues/rjp5'cartwright.pdf//LADI)
Though freedom of discussion was widely accepted even in Mill’s own day, he thinks
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balance of risks here makes this argument less persuasive than the other two.

3. Debate and discourse isn’t intrinsically violent so affirmation is easy.

Anderson 6 — Amanda Anderson, Caroline Donovan Professor of English Literature and Department Chair at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, holds a Ph.D. in English from Cornell University, 2006 ("Reply to My Critic(s)," Criticism, Volume 48, Number 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project MUSE, p. 285-287)
Let's first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection
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is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

Tournament: damus | Round: 1 | Opponent: na | Judge: na
The role of the ballot is to endorse the debater that engages in challenging structural oppression against women on the post fiat level. 

Maintaining equality is the fundamental assumption of all moral theories Gosepath
The fundamental ideas
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contemporary political theories 

A government must provide all citizens a baseline level of equality
Daniels
Because of their interest in
AND
its echo of rosseau. 

Oppression to women is the root cause of other oppression and outweighs on scope
Hooks
And solving the patriarchy
AND
domination in all its forms 

Debate space is uniquely key to promote change
Trifonas 3
Just as objective
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the ends of schooling 

LINK 

QI covers up majority of police misconduct
Cherminsky 14 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-the-supreme-court-protects-bad-cops.html?_r=0
In recent years
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Supreme court changes course 

Examining QI is key to stopping police misconduct
Wright 15 http://abovethelaw.com/2015/11/want-to-fight-police-misconduct-reform-qualified-immunity/
Instead, police officers
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accountable for police violence 

Thousands of police officers lose their licenses every year because of sexual misconduct
Antione 2016 http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/the-color-of-lawlessness-sexual-abuse-by-police-nationwide
In November
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profiled his last victim 

Qualified immunity can function to deter victims from seeking damages when police officers abuse civil forfeiture
Byrnes 14 lawprofessors.typepad.com/intfinlaw/2014/12/bipartisan-bill-to-provide-due-process-within-28-days-of-irs-civil-asset-forfeitures.html
The government spends
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immunity as a defense 

The number of actual police misconduct cases are much higher than reported
Antionine 16
In a study published
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compared to that of civilians, at 29

IMPACT 

Black women are disproportionally targeted and killed by police officers Holland 15 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-brutality-against-black-women-comes-into-national-spotlight_us_5634b4e9e4b0c66bae5ca657
According to a 2015 report
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women and man is there 

Qualified immunity makes police accountability impossible. If you kill someone, there should be ramifications
Chemerinsky 14
When there is not
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Supremet Court changes course

Black women killed by police remain invisible
Williams et al 15
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/560c068ee4b0af26f72741df/1443628686535/AAPF_SMN_Brief_Full_singles-min.pdf
The lack of meaningful
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black women remain invisible 

LGBTQ women are vulnerable to police discrimination and harassment
Mallory et al 15
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Discrimination-and-Harassment-in-Law-Enforcement-March-2015.pdf
The United States
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policing in several ways 

Police violence against muslim women is on the rise
Tinsley 15
http://time.com/4153763/violence-against-muslim-women/
Black women, Muslin Women,
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are our issues too.

alt- is a 3 step plan to insure that officers will be held accountable for their actions and misconduct will always be investigates and will get rid of barriers attached to reporting police officers for misconduct. 

Mckesson et al 16
http://www.joincampaignzero.org/reports/
Community oversight- campaign
AND
paid leave

Tournament: harvard westlake | Round: 3 | Opponent: na | Judge: na
this is my first tournament on this topic and will be breaking cases that are not on the wiki!!! for any other questions fb message me

Tournament: alta | Round: 1 | Opponent: na | Judge: na
look at arlo or jacks wiki for broken cases