Tournament: Blake | Round: 1 | Opponent: Golda Meir AH | Judge: Lai, William

Habermas NC LB

1NC

Framework

Agents lack the ability to fully ground knowledge since people come to their own conclusions, so our perspectives is the most indicative of truth.

Anker 09 Michael Anker "The Ethics of Unvertainty: Aporetic Openings" 2009 Atropos Press LB
As mentioned and affirmed, all things (concepts, words, objects, subjects
AND
furthermore affirms the uncertainty of an indeterminate subject, object, and conceptual becoming

Each agent has their own experience that makes their ethics unique, so ethics should focus in closing the gap between agents

Nagel 86 Thomas Nagel "The View from Nowhere" 1986 Oxford University Press https://www.scribd.com/doc/168073579/Nagel-The-View-From-Nowhere-pdf LB
In the pursuit of this goal, however, even at its most successful,
AND
any objective conception of reality must include an acknowledgment of its own incompleteness. 

NC framework outweighs AC. It their framework were true it could only be understood and acted upon through interactions within the community. Any ethic must facilitate inclusion to derive a truth.

Habermas 98 Jurgen Habermas "The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory" MIT Press 1998 LB
In the absence of a substantive agreement on particular norms, the participants must now
AND
good, from the form and perspectival structure of unimpaired, intersubjective socialization.

Justifying an ethical theory means nothing if the agent isn’t included in the discussion. We can only understand and create ethics through discourse.

Habermas 2 Jurgen Habermas "The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory" MIT Press 1998
Social interactions mediated by the use of language oriented to mutual understanding are constitutive for
AND
seated than the tangible vulnerability of bodily integrity, though connected with it.

The state only has power to make decisions from the communicative process.

Flynn, (Jeffery, Communicative Power in Habermas’s Theory of Democracy, Middlebury College, Vermont, European Journal of Political Theory)
Habermas argues that the attempt to interpret popular sovereignty in procedural terms must be ‘
AND
administrative power is only legitimate if bound to this discursively generated communicative power.

Thus the standard is ensuring equal inclusion in discourse

Contention

Hate speech is a huge problem on college campuses

Ma 95 Alice K. Ma "Campus Hate Speech Codes: Affirmative Action in the Allocation of Speech Rights" California Law Review Volume 83 Issue 2 http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1679andcontext=californialawreview LB
It should not be surprising, therefore, that hate crime and hate speech permeate
AND
a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.28

Hate speech preempts the ability for agents to be in an equal discursive position

Lawrence 90 Charles Lawrence III "If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech On Campus." Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1990, No. 3. June 01, 1990. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1372554?seq=1~~#page'scan'tab'contents LB
Face-to-face racial insults, like fighting words, are undeserving of
AND
survival techniques of suppressing and disguising rage and anger at an early age. 

College Speech codes create an increase of free speech. 3 warrants

Garrett 02 Deanna M. Garrett Deanna M. Garrett graduated from the University of Virginia in 1997 with a bachelor's degree in Religious Studies and a minor in Biology. She is a second-year HESA student and a Graduate Assistant in the Department of Residential Life. "Silenced Voices:  Hate Speech Codes on Campus" University of Vermont July 29, 2002 http://www.uvm.edu/~~vtconn/?Page=v20/garrett.html LB
Advocates of hate speech codes contend that the inclusion of racist, sexist, and
AND
shock" of racist speech systematically preempts response. (p. 143)

Tournament: Blake | Round: 2 | Opponent: Appleton East JV | Judge: Jalan, Akhil

JF17 Constitution AC LB

Part 1: Framework

Ought is defined as functionally being obligated to do something based off the factual nature of the agent in question

MacIntyre 81 Alasdair MacinTyre 1981 "After Virtue – A study in Moral Theory" University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana http://epistemh.pbworks.com/f/4.+Macintyre.pdf LB
Some later moral philosophers have gone so far as to describe the thesis that from
AND
to and apart from all roles that 'man' ceases to be a functional concept

Public universities are Government institutions

Douglas 06 M. Douglas, 3-6-2006, "Public and Private: What's the Difference?," , https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/03/06/lombardi LB
American colleges and universities, especially those that define themselves as public institutions because they
AND
and friends about the distribution of benefits and costs between private and public entities

The function of action based of the factual nature of the United States is consistency with the consitution

Madison et Al. 1787 James Madison "United States Constitution" Sep 17, 1787 Article VI https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlevi LB
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
AND
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Thus the standard is consistency with the US Constitution. Prefer the standard

1) Even if you win that ought generates a moral obligation, morality must be based on the constitutive aim of an action.

Katsafanas Paul Katsafanas. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXIII No. 3, November 2011, Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism. Boston University.
So what’s special about constitutive aims? The constitutive aim’s standard of success differs from
AND
avoids the disadvantages of externalism, namely the problems of practicality and queerness.

And, the constitution is constitutive of all US government agents

Madison et Al. 2 James Madison "United States Constitution" Sep 17, 1787 Article VI https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlevi LB
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures
AND
America the Twelfth. In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names.  

2) Moral theories that impose absolute rules fail because there is nothing inherent neither to the rule nor in the interpretation of the rule that can determine how to follow the rule.

LANGSETH: Langesth, Jonathan. "Wittengenstein’s Account of Rule-Following and Its Implications".
This section shows that rules themselves do not determine how they are to be followed
AND
be posited to apply this same idea to any rule-governed activity.

Three Impacts: A) Social practices are only interpreted through laws. Langseth 2

Over time and in the context of a society, repetition of action becomes a custom, instituted as communal regularity. Rules and rule-following are only possible in the context of a community because what constitutes correct application is determined by agreement. "The word ‘agreement’ and the word ‘rule’ are related to one another, they are cousins."13 The justification for correctly following a rule is found in agreement and practice, by acting in such a way that appears in accordance with what is expected (and such agreement may be reached by either consensus, force or authority). What mental processes occur in an act have no explanatory value in justifying correct rule-following. It was shown in Wittgenstein’s critique of what constitutes correct rule-following that it is pos- sible to follow any number of rules and still act in accordance with expectation, and this may be exactly what we do.14 In this sense: "I (we) obey the rule blindly," for it is never known, beyond the recognition of agreement and acceptance of action, whether or not we adhere to some strict, set-in- stone, definitive rule; for there is no such thing.15 Rules are placeholders for an expected path of action. We "catch on" to what is expected because by continued approval of a specific action given a specific rule, we reach the belief that such an action is right or correct. Language is a practice with correct and incorrect usage. Therefore, it is a rule-governed behavior. Prior to Wittgenstein, most philosophers believed that meaning is what justifies correct language use and that it is something which stands outside of actual practice as arbiter of that practice. For example, Platonists argue that the meaning of words such as "justice," "good," and "truth" are defined by some standard independent of experience, by some form "projected," as it were, into the world of experience. The philosopher need only discover the form of justice, good or truth in order to determine whether use of these terms is correct or not. But Wittgenstein argues language is a tool, an instrument (like a hammer or money), which enables us to get things done.16 And it is only in what we do with words, how they are used as tools, that we can get a sense of what they mean. The rules that allow effective use of language have been shown to consist of the customary and habitual nature of practice itself. If meaning is said to be what justifies correct language use, then meaning is grounded in practice. Wittgenstein calls attempts to locate meaning in some antecedent, prescriptive formulation "entanglement~s~ in our rules."17 Such attempts mistake the nature of meaning. Wittgenstein wants to show that philosophical problems rest on this mistaken assumption of the nature of meaning. The error of philosophers, says Wittgenstein, is in their belief that some words such as "truth," "re- ality," "justice" and the "good" have a meaning beyond their use in practice.18 By pointing out this mistake, Wittgenstein wants to cure philosophers of the belief that there are purely philosophical problems. Traditional philosophic questions such as "What is the nature of truth?" or "What is the good?" etc., cannot be given an answer resting on anything outside of the practices in which these words are used. There is nothing outside of use that can justify correct use. The task of phi- losophy, says Wittgenstein, should turn to investigating how language is used

B) Grounding morality in inviolable contracts is the only way to avoid skepticism since it spells out the exact permissible and prohibited aspects of a moral rule and removes the abstractness that the rule could have.

IMPACT CALCULUS:

To say something is permitted is not to say that there is no possibility of a prohibition; rather it just matters that it is permitted under one locus of duty. A) This is true of obligations because the existence of an obligation doesn’t mean that there can’t be another obligation to do something else, as an obligation is just a locus of duty. B) Proving the resolution true under a specific index is sufficient to affirm regardless of any other type of index that negates. Rödl :

This view is untenable for reasons ~this is~ analogous to those we mounted against the corresponding account of instrumental reasoning. Suppose the normative order of the question what to believe, on an occasion of its being asked, is a set of propositions Σ. In order to indicate this, we give the imperative an index specifying that set; we write, not "It is right to believe p because Σ~of an index~" but "It is right ~given an index~Σ to believe p". Now, nothing we said about Σ~an index~ excludes that it may be right Σ ~given an index~ to believe p and right Σ ~given an index~ to believe non p. Thinking it is right Σ to believe p peacefully coexists with thinking it is right Σ to believe non p. This shows that, thinking it is right ~given an index~Σ to believe p, I have not determined what to believe. For, thinking this is not having affixed myself to p in a manner that excludes affixing myself in the same way to non p. But thinking it right to believe p—thinking is true—is so affixing myself to p.

Proving a legal obligation exists is sufficient to affirm independent of moral considerations. Legal obligations are a separate locus of duty. Glos 

The mutual relation of law and ethics can profitably be investigated only if ethics is understood as a normative science.31 If we compare legal norms with ethical norms, it appears that the contents of ethical norms are in agreement with a given concept or principle, whereas legal norms originate from a certain lawgiver regardless of contents. It follows that legal and ethical norms may be likened to two circles which cover the same area: legal and ethical norms may coincide, and the same norm~s~ may at the same time be both a legal and an ethical norm; but there are legal norms the contents of which have no relevance in ethics (norms regulating highway traffic), and there are legal norms which may contradict ethical norms (norms according to which a soldier is bound to fight and kill).

Part 2: Offense

I contend that the constitution affirms

====The supreme court has consistently rule against speech codes at public universities====
FIRE ND Foundation for Individual Rights in Education "State of the Law: Speech Codes" https://www.thefire.org/in-court/state-of-the-law-speech-codes/ LB
That the First Amendment applies on the public university campus is settled law. Public
AND
of the First Amendment apply on public campuses is well-settled law.

Part 3: ROTB

The role of the judge and ballot is to vote for the debater who best defends the truth or falsity of the resolution. The aff burden is to prove the resolution true or the quality or state of being true; the neg burden is to prove its falsity not according with truth. Prefer this"

1) Text: Dictionary.com  define to negate as to deny the truth of which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution’s truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified.

2) We can only follow the constitutive rules of an activity, even if they interfere with the pragmatic or ultimate rules of the activity i.e truth or falsity.

Terry 92 Nardin, Terry. "International Ethics and International Law". Review of International Studies 18.1 (1992): 19–30. Web. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097279 Oakwood AW Terry Nardin 2. 1992 3. ". Review of International Studies 4. International Ethics and International Law 5. 1/30/2016 6. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097279 7. Professor of Political Science at the University of Singapore ~and~ 8. 19-30
The first thing to observe in considering this objection is that the 'purposes' of a
AND
, Cross apply Katsafanas from the framework as another warrant for following constitutive rules

3) Any other role of the ballot devolves to mine. Truth is constitutive of warrants. Frege 

 "It may nevertheless be thought that ~W~e cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time realizing the thought that this thing has this property to be true. So with every property of a thing is joined a property of a thought, namely, that of truth. It is also worthy of notice that the sentence "I smell the scent of violets " has just the same content as the sentence "it is true that I smell the scent of violets ". So it seems, then, that ~N~othing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth. And yet is it not a great result when the scientist after much hesitation and careful inquiry, can finally say " what I supposed is true " The meaning of the word " true " seems to be altogether unique. May we not be dealing here with something which cannot, in the ordinary sense, be called a quality at all? In spite of this doubt I want first to express myself in accordance with ordinary usage, as if truth were a quality, until something more to the point is found."

Part 4: Underview

1. Frameworks that put an emphasis on criticism liberation or emancipation from violence are self defeating Hägglund 08’

Martin Hägglund: Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life, Stanford: Stanford University Press, Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, 2008. 
Emancipatory politics does not aspire to a telos of absolute liberation, but must always
AND
since it may be negated by the coming of other futures).