Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
The AC’s idea of full freedom of speech and expression is a form of ableism that disabled bodies cannot access.
Hirschmann 7 - Hirschmann, Nancy J., and Kirstie M. McClure, eds. Feminist Interpretations of John Locke. United States: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007. Print.
This is the dominant model presumed by many philosophers who write on disability, and even more by those who write on freedom. In particular it is an accepted view of contemporary theories of freedom that freedom presupposes ability. Richard Flathman offers the standard example: we are not able “to jump, unaided, twenty-five feet straight up from the surface of the earth, to develop gills instead of or in addition to lungs… Few if any of us decide to stand upright, to walk by moving first one foot and then the other, or to see figures three-dimensionally.” What humans are able to do determines the context for freedom, for even thinking about freedom is conduct within these general facts.
Exposure to hate speech undermines student mental health.
Ford 14 - Ford, Zack. “Exposure to hate speech on Facebook undermines users’ mental health.” Think Progress. ThinkProgress, 2 Sept. 2014. Web. 12 July 2016.
A new study from Italy finds that social networking sites like Facebook have a negative impact on individuals’ mental well-being, as well as their levels of social trust, because of their exposure to hate speech and other offensive content. Researchers at Rome’s Sapienza University and the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg analyzed a wide representative sample o,f 50,000 Italian citizens, assessing how much they interacted with social media and how they rated their happiness and self-esteem. Those who used sites like Facebook more often tended to have stronger relationships with people they were connected to, but lower social trust because of the strangers they interacted with in venues like comment threads. The researchers note that “there is a tendency for people to assume that their own opinions, beliefs, preferences, values, and habits are ‘normal’ and that others also think the same way that they do.” In online networks, however, exposure to a greater diversity of ideas may cause individuals to realize they are “surrounded with preference types they dislike (e.g. a racist person may find out that most people appreciate ethnic diversity, or vise versa).” For example, “tolerant users may easily find themselves to interact with unknown, racist or homophobic readers in a ‘public’ page,” which can turn into a “powerful source of frustration and distrust.” The study notes that the high risk of being targeted with offensive behaviors and hate speech is “particularly significant for womyn and users belonging to minorities or discriminated groups.” This is exacerbated by the fact that online discussions do not obey “the same social norms usually acknowledged in physical interactions.” Because strangers’ reactions are “invisible,” the study suggests, “people care less of the risk of offending others in a conversation.” That’s why “in online interactions, dealing with strangers who advance opposite views in an aggressive and insulting way seems to be a widespread practice.” This risk of worsening people’s trust in others in turn has an impact on people’s life satisfaction. The researchers recommend that Facebook do more to moderate content and create avenues for feedback and review to hold accountable those proliferating offensive, hurtful, or hateful speech. A recent study of how young people are using social networking found that LGBT youth turn to the internet to find social support, but it also opens them to cyberbullying. LGBT young people were nearly three times as likely (42 percent vs. 15 percent) to experience cyberbullying, especially in rural areas. Back in 2012, Facebook rolled out a series of new tools to assist users who encounter cyberbullying, but it remains unclear how effectively the site has been at moderating content.
Hate speech forces negative perceptions on cultural AND handicapped minorities causing a lower psychological state
Smith 4 - Smith, Craig. “Circumventing the ‘True Threat’ Standard in Campus Hate Speech Codes.” The center for First amendment studies CSULB. 2004. Web. 12 July 2016.
Words can reinforce and/or maintain social inequality in the home, in the classroom, in the workplace, and in social settings. Hate messages are real and immediate for victims. In her article in the Miami Law Review, Professor Patricia Williams called hate messages "spirit murder."3 According to research completed by professors Kitano and Allport, the effects of hate speech include displaced aggression, avoidance, retreat, withdrawal, alcoholism, and suicide. The special report of the Attorney General of California 1988 demonstrates that epithets and harassment "often cause deep emotional scarring and bring feelings of intimidation and fear that pervade every aspect of a victim's life." In his book Words that Wound, Professor Delgado demonstrates that hate speech victims suffer High Blood Pressure and loss of self-worth. In the Journal of Social Psychiatry, Professor Hafner demonstrates that psychological disturbances including headaches, social withdrawal, depression, and anxiety attacks result from working or learning in a hostile environment. Other reports clearly demonstrate that hate speech results in feelings of ethnic or gender inferiority. In the Journal of Experimental Sociology (1985), Greenberg and Pysczynski Piszynski demonstrate that overhearing a racist slur causes the listener to evaluate members of the slurred group more harshly in the future. Hostile environments trigger avoidance strategies that limit personal freedom and have serious economic consequences. Students who are victims of hate speech often avoid classes and other places of hate speech such as food courts and libraries. Their grades then suffer along with their socialization into a healthy diverse community. According to Lieberson, Stereotypes: The Consequences for Race and Ethnic Interaction in Marrett and Leggon, eds (1985) Research on Race and Ethnic Relations).
Ableism is a method of oppression that permeates all forms of discrimination – categorization based on normative biological standards justifies every form of discrimination and violence.
Siebers 9 Tobin Siebers (Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism @ University of Michigan), “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”, 10/28/9, Lecture, http:disabilities.temple.edu/media/ds/lecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.doc
Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.
The alt is to embrace vulnerability as a counter strategy for disabled bodies
 Goggin 9 - Goggin, G., Disability, Media, and the Politics of Vulnerability, Asia Paci c Media Educator, 19, 2009,
1-13.
Available at:h p://ro.uow.edu.au/apme/vol1/iss19/2
I have argued that conceptions of vulnerability and media remain problematic and narrow, and fail to grasp the conditions of media. In relation to disability and media, vulnerability is even more problematic, because it encapsulates a highly politicised and potentially oppressive account of disability — that misrecognises the social relations of disability and the construction of media helps constitute these. Should we just cast vulnerability aside, in favour of other operative concepts? Actually, I think not. There is an important revaluing and radical turn in vulnerability that critical accounts of disability allow us to recognise. Disability teaches us — and my relationships with friends, colleagues, and associates with disability have taught me personally — that vulnerability is enormously important, because it goes to the heart of what it is to be human.The dif culty has been that disability is marked out as the abnormal, the problem, the lack, and, in this case, the vulnerable.The non-disabled, the normate, and the ordinary is coded as unmarked, an operation of powerful differentiation we are familiar with from critical race, sexuality, gender, and whiteness studies (Goggin and Newell, 2005). Once we recognise that the centre, the normal, the masculine is only phantasmally invulnerable — constitutionally not admitting to weakness — then we can proceed to knowingly trace the operations of vulnerability. Here I am informed by the work of various disability studies scholars, including Michelle Jarman, who proposes: a transgressive reading of vulnerability which not only critiques these discursive practices of disability, but also understands vulnerability as a radical element in forging cross-identity, cross-cultural alliances committed to exposing and interrogating the ways western values become inscribed upon the bodies of ‘Third World’ subjects (Jarman, 2005: 108). Jarman draws upon the important work of another disability studies scholar, Margrit Shildrick, whose important study of the monstrous is premised on a critique of the ‘self-possession’ that underpins Western notions of the self — and the formulation of an alternative ethics of embracing, rather than disavowing, the vulnerable self (Shildrick 2000 and 2002). More recently,Angharad Beckett has presented a new model of ‘active citizenship’ based upon an account of ‘vulnerable personhood’ (Beckett 2006). Conclusion While there is a developed body of work on disability and vulnerability, I would suggest there is much work ahead in bringing this to bear on media — and also
using new work in media and journalism studies to better conceptualise the cultural dimensions of this. Space only permits brief concluding remarks to indicate what I see as useful directions here. In journalism, then, the idea of vulnerable subjectivity and the kinds of active citizenship that can be predicated upon it would allow us to acknowledge the vulnerability in journalists, as well as particular kinds of sources and audiences historically approached as vulnerable.This is the value of this special issue, it seems to me — because it pluralises and proliferates the gures of the vulnerable.And in  10 Issue No.19, June 2008/July 2009                 Asia Paci c Media Educator paying such attention to this, opens the way for us to better understand and recast relationships among these cardinal points of contemporary media. Such recognition of the politics of vulnerability allows us to nd new strategies
to rethink and improve the relationships in which media is constructed, as well as reforming the institutions and organisations which still wield much power over media producers, consumers and audiences alike. Disability scholars and activists also offer
an ethics of engagement, which can be enormously fruitful too.A sharpened sense of vulnerability can help us to draw upon, critique and reformulate the work on trauma, mental illness, grieving, and other concepts that have gured in media and journalism research and practice. Research on an expanded concept of vulnerability and how
this takes shape through media, is likely to lead to contributions to the debates and questioning with disability studies and movements about accepted forms of identity and expression — and how these can themselves lead to new forms of exclusion (Goggin and Newell 2005; Shakespeare 2006; Matthews 2008). As Ellis reminds us, for instance,‘pain and exclusion are very real aspects of the lives of people with disability and this must be acknowledged within any model that purports to empower this group’ (Ellis 2009). With a renewed, reoriented concern for questions of voice and representation comes too a new emphasis on the importance of listening (Goggin 2009), acknowledgement and collaboration — all of which promise to see better media springing from a much wider and deeper notions of vulnerability, which comprehends the broken, fragile, and still hopeful nature of whom we are.
The role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who best challenges structural oppression.
Structural violence locks in social and environmental tension – culminates in Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 4¶ (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)¶ (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)
This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e.  preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34).  Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite.  As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible.  Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002).  In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life.  The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families.  Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989).  Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate.  While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
Interpretation: The aff must defend that no constitutionally protected speech may be restricted by public colleges or universities. To clarify, they can’t defend a restriction on only a kind, setting, or timing of speech.

Counterplans that restrict only certain forms of speech are theoretically illegitimate.

The term “any” is the res is the weak form of “any”  -  “not any” statements refer to “all”.  Cambridge Dictionary

Cambridge Dictionary, Any, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/grammar/british-grammar/quantifiers/any.  NS

We use any before nouns to refer to indefinite or unknown quantities or an unlimited entity: Did you bring any bread? Mr Jacobson refused to answer any questions. If I were able to travel back to any place and time in history, I would go to ancient China. Any as a determiner has two forms: a strong form and a weak form. The forms have different meanings. Weak form any: indefinite quantities We use any for indefinite quantities in questions and negative sentences. We use some in affirmative sentences: Have you got any eggs? I haven’t got any eggs. I’ve got some eggs. Not: I’ve got any eggs. We use weak form any only with uncountable nouns or with plural nouns: talking about fuel for the car Do I need to get any petrol? (+ uncountable noun) There aren’t any clean knives. They’re all in the dishwasher. (+ plural noun) Warning: We don’t use any with this meaning with singular countable nouns: Have you got any Italian cookery books? (or … an Italian cookery book?) Not: Have you got any Italian cookery book? Strong form any meaning ‘it does not matter which’ We use any to mean ‘it does not matter which or what’, to describe something which is not limited. We use this meaning of any with all types of nouns and usually in affirmative sentences. In speaking we often stress any:. (+ uncountable noun) When you make a late booking, you don’t know where you’re going to go, do you? It could be any destination. (+ singular countable noun) talking about a contract for new employees Do we have any form of agreement with new staff when they start? (+ singular countable noun) a parent talking to a child about a picture he has painted A: I don’t think I’ve ever seen you paint such a beautiful picture before. Gosh! Did you choose the colours? B: We could choose any colours we wanted. (+ plural countable noun) See also: Determiners and types of noun Some and any Any as a pronoun Any can be used as a pronoun (without a noun following) when the noun is understood. A: Have you got some £1 coins on you? B: Sorry, I don’t think I have any. (understood: I don’t think I have any £1 coins.) parents talking about their children’s school homework A: Do you find that Elizabeth gets lots of homework? Marie gets a lot. B: No not really. She gets hardly any. (understood: She gets hardly any homework.) A: What did you think of the cake? It was delicious, wasn’t it? B: I don’t know. I didn’t get any. (understood: I didn’t get any of the cake.) See also: Determiners used as pronouns Any of We use any with of before articles (a/an, the), demonstratives (this, these), pronouns (you, us) or possessives (his, their): Shall I keep any of these spices? I think they’re all out of date. Not: … any these spices? We use any of to refer to a part of a whole: Are any of you going to the meeting? I couldn’t answer any of these questions. I listen to Abba but I’ve never bought any of their music.  Any doesn’t have a negative meaning on its own.  It must be used with a negative word to mean the same as no.  Compare Not Any: there aren’t any biscuits left.  They’ve eaten them all.  No: There are no biscuits left.  They’ve eaten them all.     
Outweighs -  it takes into account AFF definitions which assume a strong form of “any” that justifies singular cases.
Determining semantics comes before other standards:

A.  It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.

B.  Grammar is the most objective since it doesn’t rely on arbitrary determinants of what constitutes the best type of debate – it’s the only impact you can evaluate. 

C.  The AFF isn’t topical regardless of fairness or education since it doesn’t affirm the text - we wouldn’t debate rehab again just because it was a good topic..  

Violation: 

Standards: 

1. Limits: They allow way too many affs, newpapers, protests, specific races, sexual orientations, and places on campuses. That explodes neg prep burden and predictability which kills fairness and engagement.  Procedurally, if I can’t access their education it doesn’t matter.  T version of the AFF solves their offense – they can read advantages in any topic area which ensures NEG responses.

2. Legal precision – multiple court rulings agree with our interp. Elder 91
Elder ‘91(David S. Elder, October 1991, "Any and All": To Use Or Not To Use?” "Plain Language' is a regular feature of the Michigan Bar Journal, edited by Joseph Kimble for the State Bar Plain English Committee. Assistant editor is George H. Hathaway. Through this column the Committee hopes to promote the use of plain English in the law. Want to contribute a plain English article? Contact Prof. Kimble at Thomas Cooley Law School, P.O. Box 13038, Lansing, MI 48901, http://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/plainenglish/pdfs/91_oct.pdf | SP)
The Michigan Supreme Court seemed to approve our dictionary definitions of "any" in Harrington v Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n, 210 Mich 327, 330; 178 NW 19 (1920), when it quoted Hopkins v Sanders, 172 Mich 227; 137 NW 709 (1912). The Court defined "any" like this: "In broad language, it covers 'arl'v final decree' in 'any suit at law or in chancery' in 'any circuit court.' Any' means ,every,' 'each one of all."' In a later case, the Michigan Supreme Court again held that the use of "any" in an agency contract meant "all." In Gibson v Agricultural Life Ins Co, 282 Mich 282, 284; 276 NW 450 (1937), the clause in controversy read: "14. The Company shall have, and is hereby given a first lien upon any commissions or renewals as security for any claim due or to become due to the Company from said Agent." (Emphasis added.) The Gibson court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's insistence that the word "any" meant less than "all": "Giving the wording of paragraph 14 oJ the agency contract its plain and unequivocable meaning, upon arriving at the conclusion that the sensible connotation of the word any' implies 'all' and not 'some,' the legal conclusion follows that the defendant is entitled to retain the earned renewal commissions arising from its agency contract with Gibson and cannot be held legally liable for same in this action," Gibson at 287 (quoting the trial court opinion). The Michigan Court of Appeals has similarly interpreted the word "any" as used in a Michigan statute. In McGrath v Clark, 89 Mich App 194; 280 NW2d 480 (1979), the plaintiff accepted defendant's offer of judgment. The offer said nothing about prejudgment interest. The statute the Court examined was MCL 600.6013; MSA 27A.6013: "Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment recovered in a civil action...." The Court held that "the word 'any' is to be considered all-inclusive," so the defendants were entitled to interest. McGrath at 197 Recently, the Court has again held that "alny means 'every,' 'each one of all,' and is unlimited in its scope." Parker v Nationwide Mutual Ins Co, 188 Mich App 354, 356; 470 NW2d 416 (1991) (quoting Harrington v InterState Men's Accident Ass'n, supra)

Legal precision determines topic literature and pre round prep – it’s a legal topic about first amendment jurisprudence. This is key to predictability and giving the neg a fair research burden to engage the affirmative. 

Vote on substantive engagement:  otherwise we’re speaking without debating and there’s nothing to separate us from dueling oratory.   It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics.

Drop the debater on T:

A. Hold them accountable for their interp – a topical advocacy frames the debate - drop the arg lets them jump ship to a new layer killing NEG ground.

B. Drop the arg on T is the same thing as drop the debater since T indicts their advocacy 

Competing interps since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

No RVIs:

 A. They incentivize debaters to go all in in theory and bait it with abusive practices, killing substantive clash on other flows. B. They can run theory on me too if I’m unfair so 1) theory is reciprocal because we’re both able to check abuse and 2) also cures time skew because they can collapse in the 2ar to their shell.

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
CP Text: Public Colleges and Universities will ban all hate speech on campus.

Competition: Aff can’t not restrict free speech and place a ban on it at the same time
Regulating hate speech isn’t about censorship but about ensuring equality of education.
Alison 92
Alison, Myhra. "The Hate Speech Conundrum And Public Schools." North Dakota Law Review. 1992. Web. December 07, 2016. http://repository.law.ttu.edu/handle/10601/632.
This authority to regulate involves not a privilege of arbitrary discretion to censor, but rather the ability to devise a scheme of regulation that comports with principles of equality and equal access to education, the First Amendment as applicable to the public schools, and normative theories of the educational purposes and authorities. One dimension of this power involves thoughtful consideration of hate, its causes, and its effects on target students, perpetrators, and the learning environment.26 Another dimension of this power requires contemplation of nonregulatory countermeasures, including, inter alia, education and training, designed to elicit student participation in public condemnation and repudiation of hate incidents and to encourage student discussion on the elimination of inter-group conflict and tension.

Majority of schools can maintain restrictive speech policies. University of California schools empirically prove.
Watanabe 14
Watanabe, Teresa. "Students Challenge Free-speech Rules On College Campuses." LA Times. July 01, 2014. Web. December 05, 2016. http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lnfree-speech-20140701-story.html.
In a report published this year, the foundation found that 58 of 427 major colleges and universities surveyed maintain restrictive speech codes despite what it called a "virtually unbroken string of legal defeats" against them dating to 1989. Even in California — unique in the nation for two state laws that explicitly bar free speech restrictions at both public and private universities — the majority of campuses retain written speech codes, he said. Among 16 California State University campuses surveyed by the group, for instance, 11 were rated "red" for employing at least one policy that "substantially restricts" free speech. "Universities are scared of people who demand censorship -- they're afraid of lawsuits and PR problems," said Robert Shibley, the foundation’s senior vice president. "Unfortunately, they are more worried about that than about ignoring their 1st Amendment responsibilities," he added. "The point of the project is to balance out the incentives that cause universities to institute rules that censor speech." 

Campus rules against hate speech will reduce racism
Delgado 91 

Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narra tives in Collision, 85 NW.U.L. Rev. 343, 371-75 (1991) , https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2104287 Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. J.D. 1974, U-C Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). 

Unlike with racism's etiology, there is relative agreement on the part of social scientists on how to control its expression. Much prejudice is situational-individuals express it because the environment encourages or tolerates it.264 The attitude may be relatively constant, but most of us express it selectively-at times we hold it in check, at other times we feel freer to express it in action. 265 The main inhibiter of prejudice is the certainty that it will be remarked and punished. This " confrontation theory" 266 for controlling racism holds that most individuals are ambivalent in matters of race. We realize that the national values-those enshrined in the "American Creed"-call for fair and respectful treatment of all. But the fair-mindedness of our public norms is not always matched by our private behavior. 267 During moments of intimacy we feel much freer to tell or laugh at an ethnic joke, to make a racist or sexist remark. 268 Rules, formalities, and other environmental reminders put us on notice that the occasion requires the higher formal values of our culture. The existence of rules forbidding certain types of racist acts causes us not to be inclined to carry them out. Moreover, threat of public notice and disapproval operates as a reinforcer-the potential racist refrains from acting, out of fear of notice and sanction. The confrontation theory is probably today the majority view among social scientists on how to control racism. Most who subscribe to this approach hold that laws and rules play a vital role in controlling racism. According to Allport, they "create a public conscience and a standard for expected behavior that check overt signs of prejudice. ' 269 Nor is the change merely cosmetic. In time, rules are internalized, and the impulse to engage in racist behavior weakens. 270 The current understanding of racial prejudice thus lends some support to campus antiracism rules. The mere existence of such rules will often cause members of the campus community to behave in a more egalitarian way, particularly when others may be watching. Even in private settings, some people will refrain from acting because the law has set an example. Those whose prejudice is associated with authoritarianism will do so because the rules represent society's legitimate voice. Further, social science casts doubt on both the "hydraulic" theory of racism, according to which controlling racism in one arena will simply cause it to crop up somewhere else,271 and the theory that racist remarks are relatively harmless. A large body of literature shows that incessant racial categorization and treatment seriously impair the prospects and development of persons of minority race,272 deepen rigidity and set the stage for even more serious transgressions on the part of persons so disposed. 273

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
The Affirmative’s portrayal of the racial Other is intimately tied to processes of violent biological colonialism.  ‘Benign’ representations of difference necessitate attempts to purify racial identity. 

Antonio Hardt, Prof of Lit @ Duke, and Michael Negri, Indi Researcher, Empire, 2000
In the logic of colonialist representations, the construction of a separate colonized other and the segregation of identity and alterity turns out paradoxically to be at once absolute and extremely intimate. The process consists, in fact, of two moments that are dialectically related. In the first moment difference has to be pushed to the extreme. In the colonial imaginary the colonized is not simply an other banished outside the realm of civilization; rather, it is grasped or produced as Other, as the absolute negation, as the most distant point on the horizon. Eighteenth-century colonial slaveholders, for example, recognized the absoluteness of this difference clearly. "The Negro is a being, whose nature and dispositions are not merely different from those of the European, they are the reverse of them. Kindness and compassion excite in his breast implacable and deadly hatred; but stripes, and insults, and abuse, generate gratitude, affection, and inviolable attachment!"25 Thus the slaveholders' mentality, according to an abolitionist pamphlet. The non-European subject acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European.
Precisely because the difference of the Other is absolute, it can be inverted in a second moment as the foundation of the Self. In other words, the evil, barbarity, and licentiousness of the colonized Other are what make possible the goodness, civility, and propriety of the European Self. What first appears strange, foreign, and distant thus turns out to be very close and intimate. Knowing, seeing, and even touching the colonized is essential, even if this knowledge and contact take place only on the plane of representation and relate little to the actual subjects in the colonies and the metropole. The intimate struggle with the slave, feeling the sweat on its skin, smelling its odor, defines the vitality of the master. This intimacy, however, in no way blurs the division between the two identities in struggle, but only makes more important that the boundaries and the purity of the identities be policed. The identity of the European Self is produced in this dialectical movement. Once the colonial subject is constructed as absolutely Other, it can in turn be subsumed (canceled and raised up) within a higher unity. The absolute Other is reflected back into the most proper. Only through opposition to the colonized does the metropolitan subject really become itself. What first appeared as a simple logic of exclusion, then, turns out to be a negative dialectic of recognition. The colonizer does produce the colonized as negation, but, through a dialectical twist, that negative colonized identity is negated in turn to found the positive colonizer Self. Modern European thought and the modern Selfare both necessarily bound to what Paul Gilroy calls the "relationship of racial terror and subordination."26 The gilded monuments not only of European cities but also of modern European thought itself are founded on the intimate dialectical struggle with its Others.

Race as a system perpetuates itself on the basis of racial identification. This method of purging racism ignores the broader desire for the “pure race” and a separation from it.  Such an investment of power relations leads to inevitable violence and disastorous politics.

Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, assistant professor of English at Boston College, Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian analysis of race, 2000, p. 8-9
My contention that the category of race is inherently a discourse of supremacy may seem inattentive to the advances that our legal systems and liberal social ideologies have made precisely in relation to “racism” and “racist" practices. Modern civil society refuses to permit its subjects the enjoyment of supremacist rhetoric, the rhetoric of exceptionality, by distinguishing between race and racism. It draws this distinction between a supposed ontology (the study of physical or cultural differences) and an epistemology (discriminatory logic) in the name of preserving a semblance of inter-subjectivity Race, it suggests, is a neutral description of human difference; racism, it suggests, is the misappropriation of such difference. The liberal consensus is that we must do away with such ideological misappropriation, but that we must “celebrate difference.” It is understood as a “baby and the bath water” syndrome, in which the dirty water of racism must be eliminated, to reveal the cleansed and beloved “fact” of racial identity. This rather myopic perspective refuses to address the peculiar resiliency of “race,” the subjective investment in racial difference, and the hypervalorization of appearance. It dismisses these issues or trivializes them because race seems a historical inevitability. The logic is that people have been constituted for material and other reasons as black and white and that this has had powerful historical consequences for peoples thus constituted. Whether race exists or not, whether race and racism are artificial distinctions or not, racialization is a hard historical fact and a concrete instance of social reality We have no choice, according to this reasoning, but to inhabit our assigned racial positions. Not to do so is a form of idealism, and a groundless belief that power can be wished away In making this ostensibly pragmatic” move, such social theorists effectively reify “race.” Lukacs, who elaborated Marx’s notion of reification in relation to the commodity form in History and Class Consciousness, is worth recalling here: Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing, and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonmy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people (1923: 89). To arrest analysis of race at the point where one discerns and marks its historical effects is to reproduce those very relations of power that one intends to oppose. It is to render race so objective that it is impossible to conceive human difference or inter-subjectivity anew. Modern civil society engages in such reification because ultimately its desire is to keep the dialectic between races alive. It must thus prohibit what it terms racism in order to prevent the annihilation not so much of the “inferior” races but of the system of race itself. This is how the system of “desiring purenessWhiteness” perpetuates itself, even in the discourses that are most pragmatically aimed against racism. The resilience and endurability of race as a structure can thus be attributed to its denials and disavowals. On the one hand, it is never in the place that one expects it to be: it disavows its own historicity in order to hold out the promise of being to the subject — the something more than symbolic — a sense of wholeness, of exceptionality. On the other hand, as a social law, it must disavow this object in order to keep the system viable and to perpetuate the dialectic: the race for Whiteness. Exploring the structure of race requires a toleration of paradox, an appreciation of the fact that it is an inherently contradictory discourse, and a willingness to see beyond relations of power in order to mine the depth of subjective investment in it.

Racial representations necessitates a framework where war and genocide against the Other are expected to reaffirm the boundaries of one’s own identified race, as well as the creation of other ‘threats’ that cause oppression and turn the AC.
Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire, 1995
For Foucault, this is the point where racism intervenes.  It is not that all racisms are invented at this moment.  Racisms have existed in other forms at other times: Now, “what inscribes racism in the mechanisms of the state is the emergence of biopower . . . . racism inscribes itself as a fundamental mechanism of power that exercises itself in modern states” (TM: 53).  What does racist discourse do?  For one, it is a “means of introducing . . . a fundamental division between those who must live and those who must die” (TM: 53).  It fragments the biological field, it establishes a break (cesure) inside the biological continuum of human beings by defining a hierarchy of races, a set of subdivisions in which certain races are classified as “good,” fit, and superior.
More Importantly, it establishes a positive relation between the right to kill and the assurance of life.  It posits that “the more you kill and . . . let die, the more you will live.”  It is neither racism nor the state that invented this connection, but the permanency of war-like relations inside the social body.  Racism now activates this discourse in a novel way, establishing a biological confrontation “between my life and the death of others” (TM 53).  It gives credence to the claim that the more “degenerates” and “abnormals” are eliminated, the lives of those who speak will be stronger, more vigorous, and improved.  The enemies are not political adversaries, but those identified as external and internal threats to the population.  “Racism is the condition that makes it acceptable to put certain people to death in a society of normalization” (TM: 54).  The murderous function of the biopolitical state can only be assured by racism which is “indispensable” to it (TM: 54).
Several crucial phenomena follow from this.  One is evidence in the knot that binds nineteenth-century biological theory and the discourse of power:
Basicly, evolutionism understood in the broad sense, that is not so much Darwin’s theory itself but the ensemble of its notions, has become . . .in the nineteenth century, not only a way of transcribing political discourse in biological terms, . . . of hiding political discourse in scientific dress, but a way of thinking the relations of colonization, the necessity of war, criminality, the phenomena of madness and mental illness. . . (TM: 55) In addition, racism will develop in modern societies where biopower is prevalent and particularly at certain “privileged points” where the right to kill is required, “primo with colonization, with colonizing genocide.”  How else, Foucault rhetorically asks, could a biopolitical state kill “peoples, a population, civilizations” if not by activating the “themes of evolutionism” and racism (TM: 55).  Colonialism is only mentioned in passing because what really concerns him is not racism’s legitimating function to kill “others,” but its part in justifying the “exposure of one’s own citizens” to death and war.  In modern racist discourse, war does more than reinforce one’s own kind by eliminating a racial adversary; it “regenerates” one’s own race (TM: 56).
   

The method through which we frame and discuss racial representations forms the fabric of social reality.  Unless they justify their conception of racial difference, solvency based on that conception is impossible.
Martin Jones, Prof of Law at U. of Miami, Darkness Made Visible:  Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 1993
But race, for all its rhetorical power, is an incoherent fiction. "The truth is," as Anthony Appiah notes, "there are no races."  Racial categories are neither objective nor natural, but ideological and constructed. In these terms race is not so much a category but a practice: people are raced.  Consequently, the problems of race have been viewed not only as political or psychological or cultural, but somehow external to language itself.
For these reasons, the problem in conventional legal theory is that significance is often irrationally attributed to race.  Race is understood as something that is already "there," freestanding. This conventional account ultimately collides with its own lurking objectivism. Thus, as a construction, as a social product, and as a barrier to discourse, race lies beyond the ken of the conventional legal theory.
From President Lincoln to Justice O'Connor, from classical to modern American law, this specious perspective has imposed false horizons on our values and discourse. This figure of race seeks to draw its line of difference in the dialogue about democracy and equality between those who fit within and those who fit without. So long as this unreconstructed trope of difference remains as the lens -- indeed as the dark glass

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
No anti-cyberbullying laws in the 1AC b/c they are restrictions on free speech – increases cyberbullying
Hayward 13. John O. Hayward, Senior Lecturer in Law at Bentley Universityds, "Anti-Cyberbullying Laws Are a Threat to Free Speech," Netiquette and Online Ethics, Gale: Opposing Viewpoints in Context, 2013, http:ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/ViewpointsDetailsPage/DocumentToolsPortletWindow?displayGroupName=Viewpointsandjsid=86b8d9990680ac70437ab043a7b61192andaction=2andcatId=anddocumentId=GALE7CEJ3010868216andu=nysl'we'bcsdandzid=e5792b8229fbb3d88a51bec521a1e8cf
While forty-three states have anti-bullying statutes, only twenty-one prohibit cyber bullying, which usually is defined as "bullying" conducted by electronic means. Additionally, the laws can be grouped into prohibitions that explicitly include off-campus cyber bullying or implicitly include or exclude it. Typical legislative language is "immediately adjacent to school grounds," "directed at another student or students," "at a school activity," or "at school-sponsored activities or at a school-sanctioned event." The statutes also usually contain language prohibiting cyber bullying if it results in one or more of the following: (1) causes "substantial disruption" of the school environment or orderly operation of the school, (2) creates an "intimidating," "threatening" or "hostile" learning environment, (3) causes actual harm to a student or student's property or places a student in reasonable fear of harm to self or property, (4) interferes with a student's educational performance and benefits, (5) includes as a target school personnel or references "person" rather than "student," and (6) incites third parties to carry out bullying behavior. Five states prohibit cyber bullying if it is motivated by an actual or perceived characteristic or trait of a student. Presumably this protects gay and lesbian students and school personnel from criticism because of their sexual orientation but it could also shield obese, bulimic, short and tall students from disparagement due to their weight or height. While many applaud anti-cyber bullying legislation, some are concerned that it gives school officials unbridled authority that will be used to burnish their image, not protect bullying victims, or that it threatens student free speech. Furthermore, if their authority is unleashed beyond the school yard, it is essentially limitless. Thus no student, even in the privacy of their home, can write about controversial topics of concern to them without worrying that it may be "disruptive" or cause a "hostile environment" at school. In effect, students will be punished for off-campus speech based on the way people react to it at school. Many of the terms are so vague that they offer no guidance to distinguish permissible from impermissible speech. In this sense, they are akin to campus speech codes that courts invalidated in the 1990s for vagueness and overbreadth. Consequently, these laws don't simply "chill" student free speech, they plunge it into deep freeze. This viewpoint argues that for these reasons, some anti-cyber bullying laws violate the First Amendment and should be struck down as unconstitutional.
Anti-cyberbullying laws key to prevent cyberbullying – squo solves and checks off campus behavior
Patchin 10. Justin W. Patchin, Professor of Criminal Justice in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 09/28/10, "Cyberbullying Laws and School Policy: A Blessing or Curse?," Cyberbullying Research Center, http:cyberbullying.org/cyberbullying-laws-and-school-policy-a-blessing-or-curse
Many schools are now in a difficult position of having to respond to a mandate to have a cyberbullying policy, without much guidance from the state about the circumstances under which they can (or must) respond. When folks ask me if I think there needs to be a “cyberbullying law” I basically respond by saying “perhaps – but not the kind of law most legislators would propose.” I would look for a law to be more “prescriptive” than “proscriptive.” By that, I mean I would like to see specific guidance from states about *how* and *when* schools can take action in cyberbullying incidents. Many states have taken the easy way out by simply passing laws saying effectively “schools need to deal with this.” Not only have they stopped short in terms of providing specific instructions or even a framework from which schools can evaluate their role, but they have not provided any additional resources to address these issues. Some states are now requiring schools to educate students and staff about cyberbullying or online safety more generally, but have provided no funding to carry out such activities. Unfunded mandates have become cliché in education, and this is just another example. Moreover, school administrators are in a precarious position because they see many examples in the media where schools have been sued because they took action against a student when they shouldn’t have or they failed to take action when they were supposed to. Schools need help determining where the legal line is. Many states already have existing criminal and civil remedies to deal with cyberbullying. Extreme cases would fall under criminal harassment or stalking laws or a target could pursue civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or defamation, to name a few. Bullying (whatever the form) that occurs at school is no doubt already subject to an existing bullying policy. To be sure, schools should bring their bullying and harassment policies into the 21st Century by explicitly identifying cyberbullying as a proscribed behavior, but they need to move beyond the behaviors that occur on school grounds or those that utilize school-owned resources. But in order to do this they need guidance from their state legislators and Departments of Education so that they draft a policy and procedure that will be held up in court. School, technology, and privacy lawyers disagree about what should (or must) be in a policy. It’s no wonder many educators are simply throwing their hands up. We really like New Hampshire’s recently passed bullying law, even though like other efforts it demands a lot from schools without a corresponding increase in resources. This section is key: “Bullying or cyberbullying shall occur when an action or communication as defined in RSA 193-F:3: … (b) Occurs off of school property or outside of a school-sponsored activity or event, if the conduct interferes with a pupil’s educational opportunities or substantially disrupts the orderly operations of the school or school-sponsored activity or event.” This puts schools, students, and parents on notice that there are instances when schools can discipline students for their off campus behavior. It will take many years, though, before we will know if this law can be used as a model. Schools will need to pass policies based on the law; a school will then need to discipline a bully based on the new policy; then they will need to be sued; then the case will need to be appealed. Perhaps then the case will get to a significant enough court that it will matter. Hang on and see how it turns out. In the meantime, lobby your legislators to pass meaningful, prescriptive laws instead of laws that simply say “cyberbullying is wrong, now YOU do SOMETHING about it.” It’s election time, so I’m sure your local representative will be all ears…
Cyberbullying is conducive to abuse and kills self worth – impedes the ability to get education, turns case
ETCB 16, End To Cyber Bullying, The End to Cyber Bullying (ETCB) Organization was founded in 2011 to raise global awareness on cyberbullying, and to mobilize youth, educators, parents, and others in taking efforts to end cyberbullying, "A Surprising Long-Term Effect of Cyberbullying, ETCB Organization, 2016, http:www.endcyberbullying.org/a-surprising-long-term-effect-of-cyberbullying
If someone repeatedly tells the victim online that they is are worthless, useless, a waste of space or that they should kill themselves, soon the victim might – at least partially – begin to believe it. According to Psychcentral.com, signs that someone is experience low self-esteem include: • Self-critical or a negative opinion of themselves • Sensitivity to even constructive criticism • Fatigue, insomnia, headaches • Poor performance at school or work due to lack of trying or lethargy It is important for an individual to maintain a healthy self-esteem so that they can achieve in life. A cyberbullying victim may miss out on opportunities because the victim believes they is unworthy of achievement. It’s important to realize that these two effects go well beyond being in a bad mood and not liking something about oneself. Depression, Low Self-Esteem and Dating Abuse Research is inconclusive, but most would agree that people who are victimized in abusive dating relationships often choose those relationships because of their depression or low self-esteem. Findyouthinfo.gov states that past experience with stressful life events – cyberbullying, for example – can put someone at risk for entering an abusive dating relationship. This is especially true if the cyberabuse included abuse directed at a female victim’s sexuality, or lack thereof. Feelings of worthlessness and a negative outlook on life can throw a previously-cyberbullied victim into yet another abusive relationship. However, instead of faceless strangers and bullies dolling out abuse, it would be the victim’s significant other. Dating abuse can encompass many forms of abuse, including cyberabuse. According to Dosomething.com, other forms of abuse in dating relationships include: • Physical abuse – in the form of “hitting, punching, slapping, biting” and anything that causes physical pain. • Mental abuse – in the form of verbal putdowns and belittling. The abuser might call their victim names, “make threats, or accuse the other person of cheating.” • Emotional abuse – in the form of control over the victim’s “behavior, personality, and life.” • Sexual abuse – in the form of unwanted touching, pressuring the victim to have sex, or rape. It’s getting harder to track cyberbullying since most people make their online profiles and social networking pages private. Also, apps like Snapchat would allow cyberbullies to attack their victim and have the evidence wiped away within seconds. According to this tech expert, “Users are drawn to the impermanence of the site’s uploads and the anonymity that impermanence provides.” However impermanent the actual abusive message may be, the lasting effects of the abuse upon the psyche of the victim are anything but impermanent.
Cyberbullying disproportionately affects racial/sexual minorities
Brandon 14. Mary Howlett-Brandon, Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University "CYBERBULLYING: AN EXAMINATION OF GENDER, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS FROM THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: STUDENT CRIME SUPPLEMENT, 2009", 2014, http:scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4485andcontext=etdAD
Other and mixed race students reported cyberbullying victimization at 4.2, 26 Black students at 1.9, and Hispanic students at 1.3. Whites, however, experienced 3.1 victimization by electronic   technology. Wang et al. (2009) also reported the percentage of cyberbullying by race. Black students reported the highest level of cyberbullying activity at 10.9, Hispanic students at 9.6, and the category of students classified as other at 7.3. White students reported cyberbullying victimization at 6.7. The Kessel Schneider et al. (2012) study also addressed the cyberbullying behavior of students by race and ethnicity. The race/ethnic breakdown of the sample is as follows: 75.2 White, 12.3 mixed/other, 5.8 Hispanic, 3.9 Asian, and 2.8 Black. Kessel Schneider et al. (2012) found that 5.7 of the White students and 8.4 of the non-White students conveyed they had been cyberbullied during the previous 12 months.

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
Endowments are high now but dropping rapidly - protests are alienating alumni donors, who are of older generations. Hartocollis 16
Anemona Hartocollis, writer for NYT: August 4, 2016(“College Students Protest, Alumni’s Fondness Fades and Checks Shrink” New York Times Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/us/college-protests-alumni-donations.html?_r=0 Accessed on 12/15/16

Scott MacConnell cherishes the memory of his years at Amherst College, where he discovered his future métier as a theatrical designer. But protests on campus over cultural and racial sensitivities last year soured his feelings. Now Mr. MacConnell, who graduated in 1960, is expressing his discontent through his wallet. In June, he cut the college out of his will. “As an alumnus of the college, I feel that I have been lied to, patronized and basically dismissed as an old, white bigot who is insensitive to the needs and feelings of the current college community,” Mr. MacConnell, 77, wrote in a letter to the college’s alumni fund in December, when he first warned that he was reducing his support to the college to a token $5. A backlash from alumni is an unexpected aftershock of the campus disruptions of the last academic year. Although fund-raisers are still gauging the extent of the effect on philanthropy, some colleges — particularly small, elite liberal arts institutions — have reported a decline in donations, accompanied by a laundry list of g5. Alumni from a range of generations say they are baffled by today’s college culture. Among their laments: Students are too wrapped up in racial and identity politics. They are allowed to take too many frivolous courses. They have repudiated the heroes and traditions of the past by judging them by today’s standards rather than in the context of their times. Fraternities are being unfairly maligned, and men are being demonized by sexual assault investigations. And university administrations have been too meek in addressing protesters whose messages have seemed to fly in the face of free speech. Scott C. Johnston, who graduated from Yale in 1982, said he was on campus last fall when activists tried to shut down a free speech conference, “because apparently they missed irony class that day.” He recalled the Yale student who was videotaped screaming at a professor, Nicholas Christakis, that he had failed “to create a place of comfort and home” for students in his capacity as the head of a residential college. A rally at New Haven Superior Court demanding justice for Corey Menafee, an African-American dining hall worker at Yale’s Calhoun College who was charged with breaking a window pane that depicted black slaves carrying cotton. Credit Peter Hvizdak/New Haven Register, via Associated Press “I don’t think anything has damaged Yale’s brand quite like that,” said Mr. Johnston, a founder of an internet start-up and a former hedge fund manager. “This is not your daddy’s liberalism.” “The worst part,” he continued, “is that campus administrators are wilting before the activists like flowers.” Yale College’s alumni fund was flat between this year and last, according to Karen Peart, a university spokeswoman. Among about 35 small, selective liberal arts colleges belonging to the fund-raising organization Staff, or Sharing the Annual Fund Fundamentals, that recently reported their initial annual fund results for the 2016 fiscal year, 29 percent were behind 2015 in dollars, and 64 percent were behind in donors, according to a steering committee member, Scott Kleinheksel of Claremont McKenna College in California. His school, which was also the site of protests, had a decline in donor participation but a rise in giving. At Amherst, the amount of money given by alumni dropped 6.5 percent for the fiscal year that ended June 30, and participation in the alumni fund dropped 1.9 percentage points, to 50.6 percent, the lowest participation rate since 1975, when the college began admitting women, according to the college. The amount raised from big donors decreased significantly. Some of the decline was because of a falloff after two large reunion gifts last year, according to Pete Mackey, a spokesman for Amherst. At Princeton, where protesters unsuccessfully demanded the removal of Woodrow Wilson’s name from university buildings and programs, undergraduate alumni donations dropped 6.6 percent from a record high the year before, and participation dropped 1.9 percentage points, according to the university’s website. A Princeton spokesman, John Cramer, said there was no evidence the drop was connected to campus protests.
Protest lead to reduced donations, enrollments, and financial support by the government. Keller 16
Rudi Keller writer for the Columbia tribune: 2/21/16(“University of Missouri fundraising takes $6 million hit in December as donors hold back funds” Available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/education/turmoil_at_mu/university-of-missouri-fundraising-takes-million-hit-in-december-as/article_ed7cfd5b-3b3e-5b18-95d9 f2945ac51172.html Accessed on 12/15/16.
New pledges and donations to the University of Missouri fell $6 million in December as the campus weathered the fallout of public discontent that also threatens to erode the school’s finances via state support and tuition revenue. December combines Christmas generosity and the promise of tax deductions on returns due April 15, making it a prime time for fundraisers at major institutions. In December 2014, new pledges and donations for all campus activities including athletics totaled $19.6 million, according to figures compiled by the university’s advancement office. Only $13.6 million came in this December, a drop of about 31 percent. The figures represent new commitments and donations that are not given in fulfillment of previous pledges, Vice Chancellor of University Advancement Tom Hiles said. For the three complete months since campus protests made international news in November, new pledges and donations to MU declined by about $7.4 million. Along with the decrease in new support, pledges totaling about $2 million were withdrawn, Hiles said. About 10 were gifts of $25,000 or more, including one for $500,000, he said. Total new pledges and donations in fiscal year 2015 totaled $147.6 million, down from a record $164.1 million in fiscal year 2014. The advancement office has fielded more than 2,000 calls from people upset with the university and tracks them by topic on a heat map. “It ran the gamut from” Assistant Professor Melissa “Click to Planned Parenthood to just a general lack of leadership,” Hiles said. “‘Who’s in charge? Are the students running it?’ If I heard inmates are running the asylum one more time I was going to … . Those were the general categories.” Student demonstrations over racism and marginalization on campus made international headlines after the Tiger football team announced it would boycott athletic activities in support of a hunger strike by Concerned Student 1950 member Jonathan Butler. Athletic donations also have dipped, including a 68 percent drop in December cash gifts compared to December 2014 and a 38 percent decline in new pledges and donations as tallied in Hiles’ office during November, December and January. The Athletic Department’s decreased fundraising over that period — $1.3 million — is included in the total campus decline of $7.4 million. Giving by smaller donors, defined as those who give less than $10,000, declined by about 5 percent in the three-month period, with drops in November and December somewhat offset by a January increase in giving. Small donors gave or pledged $4.76 million in the period, down from $5.02 million the previous year. “We definitely got hit in our annual fund and other points,” Hiles said. “It was rough because normally December is our best month.” While his office fielded calls, Hiles said staff members researched callers who said they would never donate again. The result, he said, was “about a 90 percent correlation with people who ... have never given.” The final word on other financial issues is unresolved. A House committee already has denied the university a portion of the budget increase allocated to other state colleges and universities. Chairwoman Donna Lichtenegger, R-Jackson, cited Click’s continued employment and a demonstration that interrupted a UM System Board of Curators meeting for the cut. At a Wednesday hearing of the Joint Committee on Education, interim MU Chancellor Hank Foley said figures show an anticipated enrollment drop of 900 students, which roughly equates to a $20 million loss of tuition revenue.
Endowment funds are key to US competitiveness – ensures college quality and helps universities support their faculty. Leigh 14
Leigh 14 Steven R. Leigh (dean of CU-Boulder’s College of Arts and Sciences), "Endowments and the future of higher education," UColorado Boulder, March 2014
These broad trends point directly to the need for CU-Boulder’s College of Arts and Sciences to increase endowment funding across the college. Endowments drive improvements in the quality of an institution and reflect alums, donors and supporters who recognize the importance of research universities in the 21st century. Endowed professorships are the first and most important component of increasing our academic quality. Named chairs recognize significant faculty achievements and help the university support faculty salary and research. CU-Boulder professors are among the most productive in the nation and are heavily recruited by competitors, including Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Cornell, Berkeley, Illinois, UC Irvine and many others. Often, these competitors offer our faculty endowed professorships, conferring prestige and research support. CU must provide its faculty with comparable support to be competitive. A second major area for endowments is student scholarships and, for graduate students, fellowships. A stable source of income that helps pay tuition is the most direct and effective way to offset the costs of education. Endowed scholarships are also effective recruiting tools for admitting the nation’s best to CU. Our dynamic programs, departments and majors are attracting more and more applicants, including the best in the nation. Like faculty support, endowed scholarships and fellowships confer prestige and, most importantly, allow students to focus entirely on academics without balancing jobs and worrying about future loan repayments. Finally, endowment funding for programs greatly enriches the institution, providing capabilities that are difficult to attain when tuition revenue provides the majority of funding. Institutions funded mainly by tuition must make sure that expenditures directly benefit students, which sometimes limits options for innovation and risk-taking. Programmatic funding enables faculty and students to take risks in their research and creative work. For example, in my own field, this might involve traveling to an unexplored region to prospect for human fossils or archaeological sites. Support for high-risk projects allows our faculty and students to develop new areas of knowledge, benefitting society by broadening the capacity of the institution to innovate. The future of higher education, including CU’s future, depends to a large degree on how successfully we can build major endowments.  Ultimately, U.S. competitiveness and leadership in the global knowledge economy depends on this as well. For alums, donors and supporters, endowments indelibly affirm the importance of higher education and enduringly preserve its viability and vitality.
Innovation solves great power war. Taylor 04
Taylor 4 – Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Mark, “The Politics of Technological Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 4/1/2004, http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor)
I. Introduction Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost every aspect of the sub-field. First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them. Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on international scene. This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on international relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding causal variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. At the very least, they describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics. Jervis tells us that the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. Walt agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the international balance of threats. Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. Technology also lowers information and transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”, Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation; to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technology inevitably drives nations to form a world state. However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology changes people’s identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics. Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as running between economic classes rather than nation-states. Finally, Buzan and Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place
US leadership prevents great power war and existential governance crises. Brooks et al 13
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)
A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
CP Text: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech except hate speech in graffiti.

It competes – the CP restricts hate speech in graffiti.

Hate speech through graffiti on college campuses is on the rise since Trump’s presidency – it’s not open discourse – it’s a completely malicious act with the intent of intimidation. Weill 16
Weill ‘16: Kelly Weill writes in “The Hate After Trump’s Election: Swastikas, Deportation Threats, and Racist Graffiti” for The Daily Beast. About Kelly Weill. Kelly Weill is Editor-In-Chief at NYU Local. She writes about politics for POLITICO New York. She's also done words for MSNBC, the New York Times and other news outlets. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/11/13/the-hate-after-trump-s-election-swastikas-deportation-threats-and-racist-graffiti.html}
In the chaotic wake of Donald Trump’s election, many Americans fear a surge in hate acts based on race or religion. Trump, who campaigned on an anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant platform, managed to mobilize a uniquely hateful base, garnering the endorsement of the KKK. And now that Trump’s been elected, his newly emboldened fans are already testing boundaries. As of Friday, the Southern Poverty Law Center had collected reports on over 200 alleged incidents of harassment. And while some skeptics say the unverified reports look like fraud or run-of-the-mill racism, others worry that the incidents forecast a grim future. Muslim Americans have reported a spike in physical and verbal attacks since Trump’s election. On Wednesday morning, just hours after Trump declared victory, Muslim students at New York University found the word “Trump!” scrawled on the door of their prayer room. The school’s Muslim Students Association called the graffiti a “chilling wake-up call,” a feeling many Muslims shared across the country. “Your time’s up, girlie,” a man on a subway platform reportedly told journalist Mehreen Kasana while she was wearing a headscarf on Wednesday morning. That same day at San Diego State University, a Muslim student was walking to her car when two men confronted her with “comments about President-elect Trump and the Muslim community,” a report from campus police reads. The men reportedly robbed her of her purse, along with her keys, and drove away in her car. A Muslim student at San Jose State University reportedly experienced a similar attack in a parking garage on Wednesday, when an unknown man pulled at her hijab from behind, choking the student and causing her to fall, according to a campus-wide alert. Also on Wednesday, a University of New Mexico freshman said one of her Trump-supporting classmates attempted to rip her hijab off her head. After the girl fought off her classmate, she reportedly confronted the man, who mentioned Trump and told her “I am going to sit down before you throw a grenade at me,” the Albuquerque Journal reports. Near the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on Wednesday, a Muslim woman was reportedly confronted on a bus with a knife. At the University of Michigan on Friday, a student wearing a hijab was confronted by a stranger who brandished a lighter at her and threatened to set her on fire if she did not remove the scarf, police say. Muslim educators also reportedly came under attack in their schools. A Georgia high-school teacher who wears a hijab reported that someone left a threatening note on her desk on Friday. “Your head scarf isn’t allowed anymore. Why don’t you tie it around your neck and hang yourself,” reads the handwritten card, which is signed “America!” And in a nearby Georgia high school, a pro-Trump teacher reportedly joined the offensive against minorities, launching into a tirade about undocumented immigrants. The unnamed teacher has been placed on leave pending an investigation into her allegedly “abusive” rant against immigrants on Wednesday. Eighty-six percent of the students at the teacher’s school are Latino, and many speak English as a second language. In a Los Angeles middle school on Wednesday, a substitute teacher was recorded mocking sixth-grade students over deportations. “If you were born here, then your parents got to go. Then they will leave you behind, and you will be in foster care,” the teacher is heard saying on the recording. When a student asks how Trump’s administration will find her parents, the teacher threatens that “I have your phone numbers, your address, your mama’s address, your daddy’s address. It’s all in the system, sweetie.” Students at a California high school were also subjected to deportation threats, after a classmate handed out “deportation letters” to minorities and posted footage to social media. Video from a middle school outside Detroit shows students chanting “build the wall” in the cafeteria, while their Latino classmates cried or looked on with extreme discomfort on Wednesday. At a different Detroit-area middle school that same day, white students reportedly linked arms to block minority students from passing. A teacher in Washington state reported similar anti-Latino comments in school. “‘Build a wall’ was chanted in our cafeteria Wed at lunch,” the teacher told the SPLC. “‘If you aren’t born here, pack your bags’ was shouted in my own classroom. ‘Get out spic’ was said in our halls.” A Mexican-American high school teacher told the SPLC that one of his students told him to leave the country as “he wasn’t welcome any longer.” A Harvard professor registered an official complaint with the U.S. Postal Service after he reportedly witnessed an employee shouting “go back to your country. This is Trump land. You ain’t getting your check no more,” at a Latino man. A University of Denver law professor of Asian descent said a man shouted “build the wall” at her from a distance on Thursday. “Guessing he saw a brown woman at a distance and assumed I was Latina,” she wrote on Twitter. African Americans have reported a dramatic rise in racist remarks since Trump’s Tuesday election. At the University of Pennsylvania, black students were added to a chat group where users with names like “Daddy Trump” sent them racial and sexist slurs, along with an invitation to an event called “Daily Lynching.” The anonymous users also called the students “dumb slaves” and sent a picture of a mass-lynching with the caption “I love America.” A University of Oklahoma student has been suspended in connection with the messages. In Louisiana, a black woman says she was waiting to cross the street when a truck with three white men pulled up alongside her. “One of them yelled, ‘Fuck your black life!’” the woman told the SPLC. “The other two began to laugh. One began to chant ‘Trump!’ as they drove away.” A bathroom at a Minnesota high school was defaced with racist messages: “whites only,” “Trump train,” “white america,” and explicit racial slurs were written inside a stall, pictures reveal. In Durham, North Carolina, a large outdoor wall was graffitied with an anti-black message: “Black lives don’t matter and neither does your votes,” the message read. In the Upstate New York town of Wellsville, a large swastika was found painted on a baseball dugout, accompanied by the words “Make America White Again.” The swastika was one of many to appear across the country in the wake of the election, including one an hour away on the campus of SUNY Geneseo. In New York City, students at the New School reported finding swastikas drawn on four dorm rooms, including those of Jewish students. Another swastika appeared on a sidewalk in a heavily Jewish neighborhood in Brooklyn. In Philadelphia, two swastikas and the words “sieg heil” were spray painted on a storefront early Wednesday morning. In Indiana, an Episcopal church shared pictures of a swastika and the words “fag church” and “heil Trump” spray painted on the side. In Montana, self-professed Nazis allegedly began campaigning in earnest after Trump’s victory. Flyers promoting the American Nazi Party and disparaging Jewish people began appearing on Missoula doorsteps last week.
Turns case – graffiti is an explicit violation of property rights. It’s vandalism. MacDonald 14
MacDonald ‘14: Heather MacDonald writes in “Graffiti Is Always Vandalism” for the New York Times Opinion Pages on December 4th, 2014 @ 9:16 AM. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/07/11/when-does-graffiti-become-art/graffiti-is-always-vandalism;
Anyone who glorifies graffiti needs to answer one question: If your home were tagged during the night without your consent, would you welcome the new addition to your décor or would you immediately call a painter, if not the police? No institution that has celebrated graffiti in recent years – like the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles or the Museum of the City of New York – would allow its own premises to be defaced for even one minute. Graffiti is something that one celebrates, if one is juvenile enough to do so, when it shows up on someone else’s property but never on one’s own. The question “When does graffiti become art?” is meaningless. Graffiti is always vandalism. By definition it is committed without permission on another person’s property, in an adolescent display of entitlement. Whether particular viewers find any given piece of graffiti artistically compelling is irrelevant. Graffiti’s most salient characteristic is that it is a crime. John Lindsay, the progressive New York politician who served as mayor from 1966 to 1973, declared war on graffiti in 1972. He understood that graffiti signaled informal social controls and law enforcement had broken down New York’s public spaces, making them vulnerable to even greater levels of disorder and law-breaking. A 2008 study from the Netherlands has shown that physical disorder and vandalism have a contagious effect, confirming the “broken windows theory.” There is nothing “progressive about allowing public amenities to be defaced by graffiti; anyone who can avoid a graffiti-bombed park or commercial thoroughfare will do so, since tagging shows that an area is dominate by vandals who may be involved in other crimes as well. New York’s conquest of subway graffiti in the late 1980s was the first sign in decades that the city was still governable; that triumph over lawlessness paved the way for the urban renaissance that followed.

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
A: Public universities and colleges should either create policies, or reform their current policies on sexual harassment, to set strict harassment guidelines for in classroom behavior for teachers that prohibits speech that creates a hostile learning environment. They should also implement guidelines prohibiting student-to-student content that creates a hostile learning environment due to the sexual nature of the speech. These regulations will be enforced consistent with Title IX and VII of the Civil Rights Act. Dower 12 J.d
Dower, Benjamin. Assistant Attorney General at Texas Attorney General "Scylla of Sexual Harassment and the Charybdis of Free Speech: How Public Universities Can Craft Policies to Avoid Liability, The." Rev. Litig. 31 (2012): 703.
Sexual Harassment Policy for University Students¶ Students are prohibited from committing sexual harassment.¶ Sexual harassment for students is defined as:¶ (1) Words of a sexual nature directed at the person of the¶ addressee that, by their very utterance, inflict injury, provoke¶ resentment in the addressee, and tend to incite an immediate breach¶ of the peace. Breach of the peace, as contemplated by this provision,¶ is defined as public disorder that involves the outbreak of physical¶ violence.¶ (2) Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,¶ and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when¶ (a) submission to such conduct is made either¶ explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's¶ academic or employment status; or¶ (b) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an¶ individual is used as the basis for employment or academic¶ decision affecting such individual.¶ (3) Conduct of a sexual nature that is so severe and¶ pervasive-viewed both objectively and from the perspective of the¶ recipient of the remarks and considering the totality of the¶ circumstances-as to create a hostile learning environment.¶ Sexual Harassment Policy for University Employees¶ University employees are prohibited from committing sexual harassment.¶ Sexual harassment for university employees is defined as:¶ (1) Words of a sexual nature directed at the person of the addressee that, by their very utterance, inflict injury, provoke resentment in the addressee, and tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Breach of the peace, as contemplated by this provision, *746 is defined as public disorder that involves the outbreak of physical violence.¶ (2) Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when¶ (a) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s academic or employment status; or¶ (b) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment or academic decision affecting such individual.¶ ¶ (3) Conduct of a sexual nature that is so severe or pervasive--viewed both objectively and from the perspective of the recipient of the remarks and considering the totality of the circumstances--as to create a hostile learning environment.¶ ¶ Possible Addition¶ ¶ A university employee accused of sexual harassment stemming from speech conducted in the classroom may raise, as a defense, that his or her classroom expression was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical interest. If the employee is able to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her classroom expression was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical interest, the committee shall weigh the value of that interest against the harm of the alleged harassment in determining both guilt and punishment.¶ 

The counterplan resolves a grey area within harassment law – right now professor speech gets protected under the first amendment. The counterplan shifts the precedent to take a stance against harassment. Marcus 08
Kenneth L  Marcus Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College¶ School of Public Affairs. "Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism." Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 16 (2007): 1025.
These incidents highlight a puzzling phenomenon in contemporary constitutional¶ culture. The puzzle has been the relatively recent appearance and eager¶ acceptance, especially in higher education, of First Amendment or academic¶ freedom arguments in areas which had long been beyond their reach. For at least¶ the "first fifteen years of its development," the law of harassment had been wellunderstood¶ to regulate a sphere of constitutionally unprotected, proscribable¶ conduct, even when it incidentally included the use of words.2' Yet in recent years¶ free-speech arguments have become a favorite topic-changing device for defenders¶ of all forms of harassment, 22 especially in post-secondary education where many are¶ especially sensitized to issues of free speech and academic freedom. The tendency¶ to construct harassing conduct as speech has important ramifications since the¶ appearance of the First Amendment, with its powerful array of standards and¶ presumptions, augurs ill for any area of regulation which is brought within its¶ shifting boundaries. As Frederick Schauer put it, "Once the First Amendment shows¶ up, much of the game is over., 23 And indeed, arguably, the game may now be over¶ for harassment law, which is to say, free speech issues may have obtained too much traction in this area to be dismissed out of hand. On the other hand, it remains at¶ best unclear as to whether the First Amendment is even salient as to this area of law.¶ The appearance of the First Amendment in this area was likely hastened by¶ overreaching on the part of civil rights advocates who, during the 1980s and 1990s,¶ introduced campus speech codes which could not help but raise First Amendment¶ attention.24 For many years, this conflict played itself out in a series of arguments¶ about campus speech codes, which were devised to protect various groups from¶ expressions which might be considered offensive or "hateful."' While these codes¶ drew some support from academic commentators, 26 the courts generally found them¶ to violate the First Amendment and other commentators agreed.27 Interestingly, few institutions have withdrawn speech or harassment codes unless threatened with the¶ risk of litigation or faced with adverse judicial decisions, and many apparently¶ remain on the books.28¶ At the same time, however, most universities have also promulgated antidiscrimination¶ and harassment policies pursuant to the requirements of various¶ federal civil rights statutes (especially Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 and¶ Title IX3¶ " of the Education Amendments Act).3¶ ' Unlike hate speech codes,¶ harassment regulations (such as the federal regulations or public universities'¶ implementing policies) are not directly aimed at speech, although the harassing¶ conduct they regulate may include words.32 Given the prominence of speech¶ interests to the academic setting, however, free speech claims are now regularly¶ raised in response to various allegations of harassment; this is nowhere more true¶ than with respect to allegations of anti-Semitic harassment. Indeed, Justice Kennedy¶ once remarked in dissent that federal education harassment law is "circumscribed by the First Amendment,"33 and federal regulatory policy has assumed this to be so¶ for over a decade. 34 Nevertheless, there is reason to question the validity of this¶ assumption and the salience of free speech to the regulation of education harassment.¶ To the extent that harassment regulation encompasses some speech activities by¶ state actors on the basis of content, the most difficult constitutional question may be¶ whether First Amendment doctrine even applies to such questions or whether they¶ lay outside of the boundaries of First Amendment coverage. 35 This Article will¶ argue that the salience of the First Amendment to questions of academic harassment¶ is at best unsettled; that efforts to apply First Amendment doctrine to harassment¶ law may be seen as a form of what Frederick Schauer has described as "First¶ Amendment opportunism; ' 36 and that such efforts to extend the boundaries of the¶ First Amendment are ultimately unresolvable on the basis of constitutional doctrine¶ alone. Special attention is given to the recently resurgent problem of campus antiSemitism¶ because harassment allegations under this rubric have been subjected to¶ frequent, intense challenge as of late.37z

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
Crimes on campus are decreasing right now. Sutton 16
Sutton, Halley. "Report shows crime on campus down across the country." Campus Security Report 13.4 (2016): 9-9. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/casr.30185/full nhs-VA
A recent report released by the National Center for Education Statistics found an overall decrease in crimes at educational institutions across the country since 2001. The overall number of crimes reported by postsecondary institutions has dropped by 34 percent, from 41,600 per year in 2001 to 27,600 per year in 2013. The report, titled Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2015, covers higher education campuses as well as K–12 schools and includes such topics as victimization, teacher injury, bullying and cyberbullying, use of drugs and alcohol, and criminal incidents at postsecondary institutions. The report found significant decreases in instances of bullying, harassment due to sexual orientation, and violent crime at all levels of education. The number of on-campus crimes reported at postsecondary institutions in 2013 was lower than in 2001 for every category except forcible sex offenses and murder.

Hate speech is protected by the constitution – they can’t restrict ANY constitutionally protected speech. Volokh 15.
Volokh, Eugene. "No, There’s No “hate Speech” Exception to the First Amendment." The Washington Post. WP Company, 07 May 2015. Web. 09 Dec. 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.05cfdd01dea4.//nhs-VA
I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) 

Hate speech leads to hate crimes against marginalized groups. Greenblatt 15.
Greenblatt, Jonathan. "When Hateful Speech Leads to Hate Crimes: Taking Bigotry Out of the Immigration Debate." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 21 Aug. 2015. Web. 14 Dec. 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-greenblatt/when-hateful-speech-leads_b_8022966.html.//nhs-VA
The words used on the campaign trail, on the floors of Congress, in the news, and in all our living rooms have consequences. They directly impact our ability to sustain a society that ensures dignity and equality for all. Bigoted rhetoric and words laced with prejudice are building blocks for the pyramid of hate. Biased behaviors build on one another, becoming ever more threatening and dangerous towards the top. At the base is bias, which includes stereotyping and insensitive remarks. It sets the foundation for a second, more complex and more damaging layer: individual acts of prejudice, including bullying, slurs and dehumanization. Next is discrimination, which in turn supports bias-motivated violence, including apparent hate crimes like the tragic one in Boston. And in the most extreme cases if left unchecked, the top of the pyramid of hate is genocide. Just like a pyramid, the lower levels support the upper levels. Bias, prejudice and discrimination — particularly touted by those with a loud megaphone and cheering crowd — all contribute to an atmosphere that enables hate crimes and other hate-fueled violence. The most recent hate crime in Boston is just one of too many. In fact, there is a hate crime roughly every 90 minutes in the United States today. That is why last week ADL announced a new initiative, #50StatesAgainstHate, to strengthen hate crimes laws around the country and safeguard communities vulnerable to hate-fueled attacks. We are working with a broad coalition of partners to get the ball rolling. Laws alone, however, cannot cure the disease of hate. To do that, we need to change the conversation. We would not suggest that any one person’s words caused this tragedy — the perpetrators did that — but the rhetorical excesses by so many over the past few weeks give rise to a climate in which prejudice, discrimination and hate-fueled violence can take root. Reasonable people can differ about how we should fix our broken immigration system, but stereotypes, slurs, smears and insults have no place in the debate.  Immigrants have been a frequent target of hate, and unfortunately, prejudice and violence are not new. Many of our ancestors faced similar prejudice when they came to the United States. In the 1800s, the attacks were against Irish and German immigrants. Next was a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment culminating with the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. Then the hatred turned on the Jews, highlighted by the lynching of Leo Frank in 1915. Then came bigotry against Japanese immigrants and people of Japanese dissent, which led to the shameful internment of more than 110,000 people during World War II. Today, anti-immigrant bigotry largely focuses on Latinos. The targets have changed, but the messages of hate remain largely the same. It is long past time for that to end.

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
International law has banned hate speech. Matsuda 89
Mari J. Matsuda (Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawaii, the William S. Richardson School of Law), "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story," Michigan Law Review, 1989. Web. 20 December 2016. nhs-VA
The international community has chosen to outlaw racist hate propaganda. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states: Article 4 States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of per- sons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or pro- mote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organization or activities as an offence punishable by law; and (c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.105 Under this treaty, states are required to criminalize racial hate messages. Prohibiting dissemination of ideas of racial superiority or hatred is not easily reconciled with American concepts of free speech. The Convention recognizes this conflict. Article 4 acknowledges the need for "due regard" for rights protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by article 5 of the Convention - including the rights of freedom of speech, association, and conscience. Recognizing these conflicting values, and nonetheless concluding that the right to freedom from racist hate propaganda deserves affirmative recognition, represents the evolving international view. An American lawyer, trained in a tradition of liberal thought, would read article 4 and conclude immediately that it is unworkable. Acts of violence, and perhaps imminent incitement to violence are properly prohibited, but the control of ideas is doomed to failure. This position was voiced continually in the debates'06 preceding adoption of the Convention, leading to the view that article 4 is both controversial and troublesome. 107 To those who struggled through early international attempts'08 to deal with racist propaganda, the competing values had a sense of urgency. 09 The imagery of both book burnings and swastikas was clear in their minds. 10 Hitler had banned ideas. He had also murdered six million Jews in the culmination of a campaign that had as a major theme the idea of racial superiority. While the causes of fascism are complex,11 the knowledge that anti-Semitic hate propaganda and the rise of Nazism were clearly connected guided development of the emerging international law on incitement to racial hatred. In 1959 and 1960, the United Nations faced an "outburst of anti- Semitic incidents in several parts of the world.""'2 The movement to implement the human rights goals of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal Declaration gained momentum as member states sought effective means of eliminating discrimination.
US adherence to international law concerning hate speech is key to credibility in human rights. Cohen 15
Tanya Cohen, "It’s Time To Bring The Hammer Down On Hate Speech In The U.S." Thought Catalog. 1 May 2015. Web. 20 December 2016. nhs-VA
Recent scandals involving right-wing hatemongers like Phil Robertson, Donald Sterling, Bill Maher, and the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity have brought to light one of America’s biggest embarrassments: the fact that America remains the only country in the world without any legal protections against hate speech. In any other country, people like Phil Robertson and Donald Sterling would have been taken before a Human Rights Commission and subsequently fined and/or imprisoned and/or stripped of their right to public comment for making comments that incite hatred and violence against vulnerable minorities. But, in the US, such people are allowed to freely incite hatred and violence against vulnerable minorities with impunity, as the US lacks any legal protections against any forms of hate speech – even the most vile and extreme forms of hate speech remain completely legal in the so-called “land of the free”. Not only is this a violation of the most basic and fundamental human rights principles, but it’s also an explicit violation of legally-binding international human rights conventions. For many decades, human rights groups around the world – from Amnesty International to Human Rights First to the United Nations Human Rights Council – have told the United States that it needs to pass and enforce strong legal protections against hate speech in accordance with its international human rights obligations. As of 2015, the US is the only country in the world where hate speech remains completely legal. This is, in fact, a flagrant violation of international human rights law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) both mandate that all countries outlaw hate speech, including “propaganda for war” and the dissemination of any “ideas based on racial superiority or hatred”. The ICCPR and ICERD are both legally-binding international human rights conventions, and all nations are required to uphold them in the fullest. By failing to prosecute hate speech, the US is explicitly and flippantly violating international human rights law. No other country would be allowed to get away with this, so why would the US? The United Nations has stated many times that international law has absolute authority. This is quite simply not optional. The US is required to outlaw hate speech. No other country would be able to get away with blatantly ignoring international human rights standards, so why should the US be able to? The US is every bit as required to follow international human rights law as the rest of the world is.
International law solves multiple scenarios for extinction – US compliance shapes global compliance. IEER 02
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy. Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties. May 2002. Web. 20 December 2016. nhs-VA
The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system offered by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments by the United States that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. If the United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance.

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
The promotion of the “marketplace of ideas” converts the political process into an economic one, making speech a commodity, which only strengthens neoliberalism. Brown 15
Brown, Wendy. Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism's stealth revolution. MIT Press, 2015. 2 January 2017.
At times, kennedy raises the pitch in Citizens United to depict limits on corporate funding of PAC ads as “an outright ban on speech”;19 at other times, he casts them merely as inappropriate government inter- vention and bureaucratic weightiness.20 But beneath all the hyperbole about government’s chilling of corporate speech is a crucial rhetorical move: the figuring of speech as analogous to capital in “the political marketplace.” on the one hand, government intervention is featured throughout the opinion as harmful to the marketplace of ideas that speech generates.21 Government restrictions damage freedom of speech just as they damage all freedoms. on the other hand, the unfettered accumulation and circulation of speech is cast as an unqual- ified good, essential to “the right of citizens to inquire...hear... speak...and use information to reach consensus itself a precondi- tion to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”22 not merely corporate rights, then, but democracy as a whole is at stake in the move to deregulate speech. Importantly, however, democ- racy is here conceived as a marketplace whose goods—ideas, opinions, and ultimately, votes—are generated by speech, just as the economic market features goods generated by capital. In other words, at the very moment that Justice kennedy deems disproportionate wealth irrele- vant to the equal rights exercised in this marketplace and the utili- tarian maximization these rights generate, speech itself acquires the status of capital, and a premium is placed on its unrestricted sources and unimpeded flow.¶ What is significant about rendering speech as capital? economiza- tion of the political occurs not through the mere application of market principles to nonmarket fields, but through the conversion of political processes, subjects, categories, and principles to economic ones. This is the conversion that occurs on every page of the kennedy opinion. If everything in the world is a market, and neoliberal markets con- sist only of competing capitals large and small, and speech is the capital of the electoral market, then speech will necessarily share cap- ital’s attributes: it appreciates through calculated investment, and it advances the position of its bearer or owner. Put the other way around, once speech is rendered as the capital of the electoral marketplace, it is appropriately unrestricted and unregulated, fungible across actors and venues, and existing solely for the advancement or enhancement of its bearer’s interests. The classic associations of political speech with freedom, conscience, deliberation, and persuasion are nowhere in sight.¶ How, precisely, is speech capital in the kennedy opinion? How does it come to be figured in economic terms where its regulation or restriction appears as bad for its particular marketplace and where its monopolization by corporations appears as that which is good for all? The transmogrification of speech into capital occurs on a number of levels in kennedy’s account. First, speech is like capital in its tendency to proliferate and circu- late, to push past barriers, to circumvent laws and other restrictions, indeed, to spite efforts at intervention or suppression.23 speech is thus rendered as a force both natural and good, one that can be wrongly impeded and encumbered, but never quashed.¶ second, persons are not merely producers, but consumers of speech, and government interference is a menace—wrong in prin- ciple and harmful in effect—at both ends. The marketplace of ideas, kennedy repeats tirelessly, is what decides the value of speech claims. every citizen must judge the content of speech for himself or herself; it cannot be a matter for government determination, just as govern- ment should not usurp other consumer choices.24 In this discussion, kennedy makes no mention of shared deliberation or judgment in politics or of voices that are unfunded and relatively powerless. He is focused on the wrong of government “commanding where a per- son may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, using censorship to control thought.”25 If speech generates goods consumed according to individual choice, govern- ment distorts this market by “banning the political speech of millions of associations of citizens” (that is, corporations) and by paternal- istically limiting what consumers may know or consider. Again, if speech is the capital of the political marketplace, then we are polit- ically free when it circulates freely. And it circulates freely only when corporations are not restricted in what speech they may fund or promulgate.¶ Third, kennedy casts speech not as a medium for expression or dialogue, but rather as innovative and productive, just as capital is. There is “a creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expres- sion” that intersects in a lively way with “rapid changes in technol- ogy” to generate the public good.26 This aspect of speech, kennedy argues, specifically “counsels against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”27 Again, the dynamism, innovativeness, and generativity of speech, like that of all capital, is dampened by government intervention.¶ Fourth, and perhaps most important in establishing speech as the capital of the electoral marketplace, kennedy sets the power of speech and the power of government in direct and zero-sum-game opposition to one another. Repeatedly across the lengthy opinion for the majority, he identifies speech with freedom and government with control, cen- sorship, paternalism, and repression.28 When free speech and govern- ment meet, it is to contest one another: the right of speech enshrined in the First Amendment, he argues, is “premised on mistrust of gov- ernmental power” and is “an essential mechanism of democracy because it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”29 Here are other variations on this theme in the opinion:¶ The First Amendment was certainly not understood by the framers to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media. It was understood as a response to the repression of speech.30¶ When Government seeks to use its full power, including criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.... The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.31 This reading of the First Amendment and of the purpose of political speech positions government and speech as warring forces parallel to those of government and capital in a neoliberal economy.

Thus you turn the AC because the commodification of speech reflects the capitalist illusion of freedom. Commodification of capitalism means there is no value to life which turns the framework. Smith 14
R.C. Smith April 24, 2014 “POWER, CAPITAL and THE RISE OF THE MASS SURVEILLANCE STATE: ON THE ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY, ETHICS, DISENCHANTMENT and CRITICAL THEORY” Heathwood Institute and Press http://www.heathwoodpress.com/power-capital-the-rise-of-the-mass-surveillance-state-on-the-absence-of-democracy-ethics-disenchantment-critical-theory/
One pressing issue, moreover, is that majority of the popular movements that have emerged in response to the Snowden leaks appear to be reformist in character. As a result, the discourse isn’t so much about fundamental system change; rather it becomes crafted into making mass surveillance less repulsive and more socially acceptable, even marketable. (Consider, for instance, the latest reforms proposed by President Barack Obama). For Adorno, this reformist inclination can be explained in part through an analysis of the logic of the system of capital. We read in Adorno how under modernity – i.e., capitalism – human beings are treated as commodities4 and the political-economy, which is principled on concentrations of power (i.e., ‘contradictory recognition’5), goes over the head of the individual, particularly as ‘coercive society’ aims to ‘shape people’ on behalf of the economic, social and political status quo.6 The system of capital, along with the instrumental use of Enlightenment ideals to promote a rational, efficient system7 have laid a foundation for society wherein the political-economy influences individuals and manufactures consent.8 Accordingly, people are seen as “substitutable entities valued merely for their instrumental uses or ability to command market resources,” and even where “commodification is resisted, the overriding pull of society is toward the status quo and those forms that are valued by society”. 9 As Kate Schick writes: The mind thus shapes itself into socially acceptable, marketable forms and freedom becomes an illusion, made all the more dangerous and difficult to resist because of the appearance of freedom. This is not the fault of Enlightenment ideals as such, but the instrumental use of these ideals in the promotion of a rational, efficient system: ‘The network of the whole is drawn ever tighter, modelled after the act of exchange’ (Adorno 1981: 21).10 Present in the logic of the system of capital itself is not an ‘emancipatory reason’ that aims toward universal guiding principles of an actually egalitarian democracy – i.e., Equality, Egalitarianism, Justice, Rights, etc. Rather, in modern capitalism, with its instrumental reason and positivist logic, such concepts lose their meaning.11 The social narrative no longer accommodates these fundamental principles or judges them to be delusions, because all concepts must be strictly functional in order to be considered “reasonable”.12 In turn, the ideals of a ‘good’ society, for example ideals toward an actual egalitarian democracy, become dependent on the “interests” of the dominant and governing system, which produces and reproduces the epistemic context of its own validity

Capitalism means that there is no value to life by causes both the biological and ontological extinction of humanity- is is a try or die for the alt. Simonovic 07
Simonovic 07 Ljubodrag Simonovic, Ph.D., Philosophy; M.A., Law; author of seven books, 2007, A New World is Possible, “Basis of contemporary critical theory of capitalism.”
The final stage of a mortal combat between mankind and capitalism is in progress. A specificity of capitalism is that, in contrast to "classical" barbarism (which is of destructive, murderous and plundering nature), it annihilates life by creating a "new world" – a "technical civilization" and an adequate, dehumanized and denaturalized man. Capitalism has eradicated man from his (natural) environment and has cut off the roots through which he had drawn life-creating force. Cities are "gardens" of capitalism where degenerated creatures "grow". Dog excrement, gasoline and sewerage stench, glaring advertisements and police car rotating lights that howl through the night - this is the environment of the "free world" man. By destroying the natural environment capitalism creates increasingly extreme climatic conditions in which man is struggling harder and harder to survive – and creates artificial living conditions accessible solely to the richest layer of population, which cause definitive degeneration of man as a natural being. "Humanization of life" is being limited to creation of micro-climatic conditions, of special capitalistic incubators - completely commercialized artificial living conditions to which degenerated people are appropriate. The most dramatic truth is: capitalism can survive the death of man as a human and biological being. For capitalism a "traditional man" is merely a temporary means of its own reproduction. "Consumer-man" represents a transitional phase in the capitalism-caused process of mutation of man towards the "highest" form of capitalistic man: a robot-man. "Terminators" and other robotized freaks which are products of the Hollywood entertainment industry which creates a "vision of the future" degenerated in a capitalist manner, incarnate creative powers, alienated from man, which become vehicles for destruction of man and life. A new "super race" of robotized humanoids is being created, which should clash with "traditional mankind", meaning with people capable of loving, thinking, daydreaming, fighting for freedom and survival - and impose their rule over the Earth. Instead of the new world, the "new man" is being created - who has been reduced to a level of humanity which cannot jeopardize the ruling order. Science and technique have become the basic lever of capital for the destruction of the world and the creation of "technical civilization". It is not only about destruction achieved by the use of technical means. It is about technicization of social institutions, of interpersonal relations, of the human body. Increasing transformation of nature into a surrogate of "nature", increasing dehumanization of the society and increasing denaturalization of man are direct consequences of capital's effort, within an increasingly merciless global economic war, to achieve complete commercialization of both natural and the social environment. The optimism of the Enlightenment could hardly be unreservedly supported nowadays, the notion of Marx that man imposes on himself only such tasks as he can solve, particularly the optimism based on the myth of the "omnipotence" of science and technique. The race for profits has already caused irreparable and still unpredictable damage to both man and his environment. By the creation of "consumer society", which means through the transition of capitalism into a phase of pure destruction, such a qualitative rise in destruction of nature and mankind has been performed that life on the planet is literally facing a "countdown". Instead of the "withering away" (Engels) of institutions of the capitalist society, the withering away of life is taking place. sic

Thus, the alt is to reject the AC and its neoliberalist ideas AND to engage in a ruthless critique of neoliberalism.
Johnston 04 (Adrian, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of New Mexico, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, Volume 9/Issue 3)
Perhaps the absence of a detailed practical roadmap in Žižek’s political writings isn’t a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby truly to open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Žižek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance 127 (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle 128). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining just an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the earlier analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing 93 more than a kind of “magic,” that is, the belief in money’s social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance’s powers. The “external” obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, “internally” believe in it—capitalism’s life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others’ belief in the socioperformative force emanating from this same material.

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
The AC’s representations of the suffering are a form of a commodification of the ballot that factionalizes and fractures momentum necessary to allow meaningful social change- an attempt at winning the battle while forfeiting the war. Karlberg 03
(Michael Karlberg, Assistant Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PEACE and CHANGE, v28, n3, July, p. 339-41)

Granted, social activists do "win" occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger "wars" arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles the most committed environmentalists acknowledge things are not going well. In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the "left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century's closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the a new left under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict. In this regard, the political "left" and "right" both define themselves in terms at a common adversary—the "other"—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right axe both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources at conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facing us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its "left" and is "right," or its "north" and its "south," or its "east" and its "west" are locked in adversarial relationships.

This proscription of power to the ballot; a tool of the oppressing majority, is a form of charity which forever indebts the affirmative team to the judge and only serves to reinforce the empowerment of the oppressor. Williams 2000
WILLIAMS 2k (Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, “The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the ‘Gift’ of the Majority,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2000, pgs. 321-343)

Reciprocation on your part is impossible. Even if one day you are able to return our monetary favor twofold, we will always know that it was us who first hosted you; extended to and entrusted in you an opportunity given your time of need. As the initiators of such a charity, we are always in a position of power, and you are always indebted to us. This is where the notion of egoism or conceit assumes a hegemonic role. By giving to you, a supposed act of generosity in the name of furthering your cause, we have not empowered you. Rather, we have empowered ourselves. We have less than subtlely let you know that we have more than you. We have so much more, in fact, that we can afford to give you some. Our giving becomes, not an act of beneficence, but a show of power, that is, narcissistic hegemony! Thus, we see that the majority gift is a ruse: a simulacrum of movement toward aporetic equality and a simulation of democratic justice. By relying on the legislature (representing the majority) when economic and social opportunities are availed to minority or underrepresented collectives, the process takes on exactly the form of Derrida’s gift. The majority controls the political, economic, legal, and social arenas; that is, it is (and always has been) in control of such communities as the employment sector and the educational system. The mandated opportunities that under- or nonrepresented citizens receive as a result of this falsely eudemonic endeavor are gifts and, thus, ultimately constitute an effort to make minority populations feel better. There is a sense of movement toward equality in the name of democratic justice, albeit falsely manufactured. 18 In return for this effort, the majority shows off its long-standing authority (this provides a stark realization to minority groups that power elites are the forces that critically form society as a community), forever indebts under- and nonrepresented classes to the generosity of the majority (after all, minorities groups now have, presumably, a real chance to attain happiness), and, in a more general sense, furthers the narcissism of the majority (its representatives have displayed power and have been generous). Thus, the ruse of the majority gift assumes the form and has the hegemonical effect of empowering the empowered, relegitimating the privileged, and fueling the voracious conceit of the advantaged. 

Voting aff is a simulation of real change- it produces change no more than liking a progressive post on Facebook. It created no tangible results when we walk out of the round and frames the ballot to be no more than pseudo-progress. Williams 2k
WILLIAMS 2k (Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, “The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the ‘Gift’ of the Majority,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2000, pgs. 321-343)

The impediments to establishing democratic justice in contemporary American society have caused a national paralysis; one that has recklessly spawned an aporetic1 existence for minorities. The entrenched ideological complexities afflicting under- and nonrepresented groups (e.g., poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, crime) at the hands of political, legal, cultural, and economic power elites have produced counterfeit, perhaps even fraudulent, efforts at reform: Discrimination and inequality in opportunity prevail (e.g., Lynch and Patterson, 1996). The misguided and futile initiatives of the state, in pursuit of transcending this public affairs crisis, have fostered a reification, that is, a reinforcement of divisiveness. This time, however, minority groups compete with one another for recognition, affirmation, and identity in the national collective psyche (Rosenfeld, 1993). What ensues by way of state effort, though, is a contemporaneous sense of equality for all and a near imperceptible endorsement of inequality; a silent conviction that the majority still retains power. The “gift” of equality, procured through state legislative enactments as an emblem of democratic justice, embodies true (legitimated) power that remains nervously secure in the hands of the majority. The ostensible empowerment of minority groups is a facade; it is the ruse of the majority gift. What exists, in fact, is a simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981, 1983) of equality (and by extension, democratic justice): a pseudo-sign image (a hypertext or simulation) of real sociopolitical progress.

Thus the Alt is to vote neg as a way of not voting aff. Their plea for change through wining the ballot only serves to reproducing the very evil that they critique. Atchison and Panetta 09
ATCHISON AND PANETTA 2009 (Jarrod Atchison, Director of Debate @ Trinity University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate @ the University of Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, p. 317-34)

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

Tournament: any | Round: Finals | Opponent: any | Judge: any
The affirmative leads to more student lawsuits against universities
Jensen 93. Ejner J. Jensen, Senate Assembly Chair, 2-8-1993, "The pros and cons of a policy covering hate speech," The University Record, http:ur.umich.edu/9293/Feb08'93/8.htm AD
Universities have a right and duty to provide an educational environment, a climate of civility, where all students can learn and live free from bigotry. 2. A university’s objective is to educate and to instill within students fundamental values of human decency. 3. Numerous responses from students to the rights and responsibilities document last summer indicated that a significant proportion of the harassment experienced by U-M students comes from faculty. They described in-class harassment, racial harassment at a public event, harassment based on ethnic origin, and clear cultural bias in classroom settings. 4. Speech codes publicly announce a university’s support of civil rights and equal dignity of all persons; the failure to adopt a speech code implies that the University condones hate speech. 5. The University may be held liable for damages by persons who were subjected to harassment, if the University knowingly tolerates such conduct. 6. Faculty and staff, as well as students, should be prohibited from violating the rights of other members of the University community. 7. While harassment by faculty may be quite rare, it is important to have a mechanism for dealing with reported incidents and resolving misunderstandings that may be interpreted as harassment. 
Increased lawsuits kill university budgets
Ryman 9. Anne Ryman, 12-20-2009, "Christian group wages fight against censorship on campus," The Arizona Republic, http:archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/12/20/20091220alliance1220.html
At a sprawling, glass-and-brick office complex in north Scottsdale, a dozen or so attorneys and colleagues gather each morning in a dim, ornate room to pray. The group of Christians is seeking God's guidance in an ongoing quest to preserve family values and freedom of religious expression. The group draws strength from prayers and from a well of assets: a $30 million annual budget, paid and volunteer lawyers across the country, and the organization's years of doing battle in court. That organization, the non-profit Alliance Defense Fund, is now undertaking a special campaign on a familiar front of the culture wars. Armed with a $9.2 million donation from an anonymous family plus its own matching funds, the group is stepping up efforts to combat what it says is widespread and unconstitutional censorship at public colleges. With an estimated three years of funding, the University Project, as it is called, will deploy more attorneys to defend students or student groups that feel they are being prevented from expressing socially conservative or religious views. The 15-year-old Alliance Defense Fund has long been involved in freedom-of-speech cases at universities, but members believe censorship is growing. The new project represents one of many areas in which the group and similar organizations are waging legal fights as a growing enforcement of anti-discrimination laws by governments and schools clashes with religious rights. The Defense Fund now has 55 legal cases in which it either sued a college or is working with student groups to assert their rights. The cases include issues such as students who feel their pro-life views were censored, a student who tangled with a professor over religious views in class, and an independent student newspaper whose distribution bins were removed from campus. The University Project will likely mean dozens more lawsuits at a time when college budgets are stretched thin because of state funding cuts. Some advocacy groups say the organization's effort is misguided because religious students have many opportunities to promote their beliefs on campuses. For their part, universities say their policies are crafted to both protect free speech and ensure a safe, respectful environment. At Arizona State University, for instance, a law professor worked closely with the American Civil Liberties Union to write guidelines to encourage free speech rather than to restrict it, said Nancy Tribbensee, staff attorney for the Arizona Board of Regents. Tribbensee said she hopes the Defense Fund also will seek constructive dialogue with institutions with which the group has concerns before launching into litigation.
Loss of funding kills quality of education – turns case
Mitchell et al 16. Mitchell, MichaelMichael Mitchell is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Center’s State Fiscal Policy division. Prior to joining the Center, Mitchell worked as a State Policy Fellow for the Washington State Budget and Policy Center, where he conducted research on state taxes and borrowing, the effects of budget cuts on communities of color, and the impacts of the recession on young adults. Mitchell holds a B.A. in Economics and Political Science from the University of Connecticut and an MPA from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University , Michael LeachmanMichael Leachman is Director of State Fiscal Research with the State Fiscal Policy division of the Center, which analyzes state tax and budget policy decisions and promotes sustainable policies that take into account the needs of families of all income levels. Since joining the Center in 2009, Leachman has researched a range of state fiscal policy issues including the impact of federal aid, the debt states owe in their Unemployment Insurance trust funds, and the wisdom of state spending limits. Prior to joining the Center, he was a policy analyst for nine years at the Oregon Center for Public Policy (OCPP), a member of the State Priorities Partnership. His work at OCPP included research on corporate income taxes, reserve funds, spending limits, the Earned Income Tax Credit, food stamps, and TANF. Earlier in his career, Leachman worked as a community organizer in Chicago and, during graduate school, conducted a range of research projects in collaboration with community organizations. Leachman holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Loyola University Chicago, and Kathleen MastersonKathleen Masterson joined the Center as a Research Assistant for the State Fiscal Project in April 2015. Prior to joining SFP, she interned at the Center with the Food Assistance team, primarily tracking the implementation of the community eligibility provision. Masterson has also interned with the Arms Control Association and spent a year teaching English in China. She holds a MPIA from the University of Pittsburgh, and a B.A. in History and Political Science from The College of William and Mary. "Funding Down, Tuition Up." Funding Down, Tuition Up. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 15 Aug. 2016. Web. 11 Dec. 2016. http:www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/funding-down-tuition-up
Years of cuts in state funding for public colleges and universities have driven up tuition and harmed students’ educational experiences by forcing faculty reductions, fewer course offerings, and campus closings. These choices have made college less affordable and less accessible for students who need degrees to succeed in today’s economy. YEARS OF CUTS HAVE MADE COLLEGE LESS AFFORDABLE AND LESS ACCESSIBLE FOR STUDENTS.Though some states have begun to restore some of the deep cuts in financial support for public two- and four-year colleges since the recession hit, their support remains far below previous levels. In total, after adjusting for inflation, funding for public two- and four-year colleges is nearly $10 billion below what it was just prior to the recession. As states have slashed higher education funding, the price of attending public colleges has risen significantly faster than the growth in median income. For the average student, increases in federal student aid and the availability of tax credits have not kept up, jeopardizing the ability of many to afford the college education that is key to their long-term financial success. States that renew their commitment to a high-quality, affordable system of public higher education by increasing the revenue these schools receive will help build a stronger middle class and develop the entrepreneurs and skilled workers that are needed in the new century. Of the states that have finalized their higher education budgets for the current school year, after adjusting for inflation:2 Forty-six states — all except Montana, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming — are spending less per student in the 2015-16 school year than they did before the recession.3 States cut funding deeply after the recession hit. The average state is spending $1,598, or 18 percent, less per student than before the recession. Per-student funding in nine states — Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina — is down by more than 30 percent since the start of the recession. In 12 states, per-student funding fell over the last year. Of these, four states — Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, and Vermont — have cut per-student higher education funding for the last two consecutive years. In the last year, 38 states increased funding per student. Per-student funding rose $199, or 2.8 percent, nationally. Deep state funding cuts have had major consequences for public colleges and universities. States (and to a lesser extent localities) provide roughly 54 percent of the costs of teaching and instruction at these schools.4 Schools have made up the difference with tuition increases, cuts to educational or other services, or both. Since the recession took hold, higher education institutions have: Increased tuition. Public colleges and universities across the country have increased tuition to compensate for declining state funding and rising costs. Annual published tuition at four-year public colleges has risen by $2,333, or 33 percent, since the 2007-08 school year.5 In Arizona, published tuition at four-year schools is up nearly 90 percent, while in six other states — Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, and Louisiana — published tuition is up more than 60 percent. These sharp tuition increases have accelerated longer-term trends of college becoming less affordable and costs shifting from states to students. Over the last 20 years, the price of attending a four-year public college or university has grown significantly faster than the median income.6 Although federal student aid and tax credits have risen, on average they have fallen short of covering the tuition increases. Tuition increases have compensated for only part of the revenue loss resulting from state funding cuts. Over the past several years, public colleges and universities have cut faculty positions, eliminated course offerings, closed campuses, and reduced student services, among other cuts. A large and growing share of future jobs will require college-educated workers.7 Sufficient public investment in higher education to keep quality high and tuition affordable, and to provide financial aid to students who need it most, would help states develop the skilled and diverse workforce they will need to compete for these jobs. Sufficient public investment can only occur, however, if policymakers make sound tax and budget decisions. State revenues have improved significantly since the depths of the recession but are still only modestly above pre-recession levels.8 To make college more affordable and increase access to higher education, many states need to supplement that revenue growth with new revenue to fully make up for years of severe cuts. But just as the opportunity to invest is emerging, lawmakers in a number of states are jeopardizing it by entertaining tax cuts that in many cases would give the biggest breaks to the wealthiest taxpayers. In recent years, states such as Wisconsin, Louisiana, and Arizona have enacted large-scale tax cuts that limit resources available for higher education. And in Illinois and Pennsylvania ongoing attempts to find necessary resources after large tax cuts threaten current and future higher education funding