Tournament: Any | Round: Finals | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any
Free speech is a pre-requisite to any rational moral system- without it self-realization is impossible. Eberle 94
Eberle, Law @ Roger Williams, 94  (Wake Forest LR, Winter)

The Court's decision in R.A.V. reaffirms the preeminence of free speech in our constitutional value structure. n62 Theoretically, free speech is intrinsically valuable as a chief means by which we develop our faculties and control our destinies. n63 Free speech is also of instrumental value in facilitating other worthy ends such as democratic or personal self-government, n64 public and private decisionmaking, n65 and the advancement of knowledge and truth. n66 Ultimately, the value of free speech rests upon a complex set of justifications, as compared to reliance on any single foundation. n67 The majority of the Court in R.A.V. preferred a nonconsequentialist view, finding that speech is valuable as an end itself, independent of any consequences that it might produce. In this view, free speech is an essential part of a just and free society that treats all people as responsible moral agents. Accordingly, people are entrusted with the responsibility of making judgments about the use or abuse of speech. n68 From this vantage point, the majority saw a certain moral equivalency in all speech. Even hate speech merits protection under the First Amendment, because all speech has intrinsic value. This is so because all speech, even hate speech, is a communication to the world, and therefore implicates the speaker's autonomy or self-realization. Additionally, any information might be valuable to a listener who can then decide its importance or how best to use it. Accordingly, any suspicion or evidence of governmental censorship must be vigilantly investigated.

Free speech facilitates the development of moral reasoning- restrictions should be prima facie rejected. Dwyer 01
(Susan, Phil@Maryland, Nordic Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 2 ® Philosophia Press 2001)

Direct Nonconsequentialism Let us return to the central topic: free speech. From the perspective just sketched, the value of a marketplace of ideas – that notion so central to the consequentialist justification of free speech – lies not so much in its long-term all-things-considered good consequences (the avoidance of dogmatism, democracy, truth, etc.) Rather, free speech is seen as a necessary condition for the realization of any human goods. Constraints on inquiry and expression are constraints on humanity itself. Echoing this thought, Nagel (1995) writes: That the expression of what one thinks and feels should be overwhelmingly one's own business, subject to restriction only when clearly necessary to prevent serious harm distinct from the expression itself, is a condition of being an independent thinking being. It is a form of moral recognition that you have a mind of your own: even if you never want to say anything to which others would object, the idea that they could stop you if they did object is in itself a violation of your integrity (96). A simple yet powerful fact both explains why speech is valuable in and of itself and justifies its stringent protection: when speech is threatened, we are threatened. Direct nonconsequentialism stands in stark contrast to consequentialist approaches which, as we have seen, make the value of speech contingent on its effects. And unlike indirect nonconsequentialism, it makes our status as language users, not our autonomy, the ground for limiting the state's attempts to interfere with our liberty. To repeat: direct nonconsequentialism asserts that speech is valuable because linguistic capacities are the expression of the essence of creatures (us) to whom we attribute the highest moral status. The way in which the direct nonconsequentialist makes explicit what is special about speech helps to make sense of a commonly experienced wariness regarding restrictions on speech we hate. We worry equally when the state seeks to prohibit the speech of sexists or Flat-Earthers. The consequentialist thinks this reaction is explained by attributing to us the belief that any state restriction of speech is the thin end of a wedge: we are discomforted by the thought of the muzzled sexist or Flat-Earther because we think our speech may be next. This may well be the right account of human psychology in these matters. But it is hardly an explanation of the prima facie wrongness of restrictions on lunatics' and sexists’ speech. Our discomfort is a moral discomfort. In bringing out the idea that speech is the expression of our essence, the direct nonconsequentialist is able to capture the true nature of our reaction to state restrictions on others' speech we do not particularly care for. Direct nonconsequentialism also gives substance to a powerful idea that some influential critics – notably, Catharine Mackinnon (1987) – find hopelessly abstract. This is the thought that “every time you strengthen free speech in one place, you strengthen it everywhere (164).” And seeing how direct nonconsequentialism does so will help illustrate some of the practical implications of this strategy for justifying free speech. Proponents of legislation designed to restrict or prohibit problematic speech and courts that rule on the constitutionality of such legislation, often reason in terms of how free speech interests are to be balanced with other interests. For example, proponents of speech codes argue that racist speech harms minorities’ interests in social and political equality; and in the United States, the constitutionality of restrictions on ‘fighting words’ is defended in light of the state’s interests in maintaining law and order. These arguments imply that the expressive rights of individual racists and troublemakers may sometimes be infringed in order to promote the good of some collective. But as the history of free speech debates reveal, once we admit that collective interests can trump individual rights, it is extremely difficult consistently to maintain the belief that a right to free speech imposes severe limits on what the state may do. The direct nonconsequentialist justification of free speech avoids this particular difficulty. Recall, we are working within the context of constitutional provisions – that is, we are thinking about rationales for stringent protections of speech, where these are understood as mechanisms for keeping the government out of some aspect of our lives. In this sense, such provisions express rights had by individuals against the state. But the direct nonconsequentialist’s account of the basis of these rights suggests that it is a mistake to think of them as radically individualistic. True, each of us has a right to free speech, but we have that right in virtue of our membership in a collective – the species H. sapiens – where every member has the same right for the same reason. Thus, in stressing that a universal feature of the species – language mastery – grounds protections on speech, the direct nonconsequentialist avoids individualizing the right to free speech in a way that makes it perpetually vulnerable to the assertion of some collective good. If we think of a person’s right to free speech as protecting just one aspect of his liberty among others, we run the risk of obscuring what is morally relevant about speech. The hatemonger and the pornographer each have a right to free speech, but this is not to be understood in terms of their being free to act on contingent desires they have. My occurrent desire to eat ice-cream holds no weight in the big scheme of things; even I would concede that it is permissible for the state to thwart my satisfying this desire, if doing so meant promoting some very important collective good. But speech is different. It is worthy of protection not because people want to say certain things, but (to repeat) because speech expresses our very nature. What someone wants to say is neither here nor there. Thus, in decoupling the value of free speech from individual desires, direct nonconsequentialism gives content to the idea that when we strengthen (protect) free speech in one place, we strengthen (protect) it everywhere.

Consequentially, Free speech is a gateway to every other impact. D’Souza 96
(Frances, Prof. Anthropology Oxford, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/19960425/droi/freedom_en.htm?textMode=on)

In the absence of freedom of expression which includes a free and independent media, it is impossible to protect other rights, including the right to life. Once governments are able to draw a cloak of secrecy over their actions and to remain unaccountable for their actions then massive human rights violations can, and do, take place. For this reason alone the right to freedom of expression, specifically protected in the major international human rights treaties, must be considered to be a primary right. It is significant that one of the first indications of a government's intention to depart from democratic principles is the ever increasing control of information by means of gagging the media, and preventing the freeflow of information from abroad. At one end of the spectrum there are supposedly minor infringements of this fundamental right which occur daily in Western democracies and would include abuse of national security laws to prevent the publication of information which might be embarrassing to a given government: at the other end of the scale are the regimes of terror which employ the most brutal moves to suppress opposition, information and even the freedom to exercise religious beliefs. It has been argued, and will undoubtedly be discussed at this Hearing, that in the absence of free speech and an independent media, it is relatively easy for governments to capture, as it were, the media and to fashion them into instruments of propaganda, for the promotion of ethnic conflict, war and genocide. 2. Enshrining the right to freedom of expression The right to freedom of expression is formally protected in the major international treaties including the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, it is enshrined in many national constitutions throughout the world, although this does not always guarantee its protection. Furthermore, freedom of expression is, amongst other human rights, upheld, even for those countries which are not signatories to the above international treaties through the concept of customary law which essentially requires that all states respect the human rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by virtue of the widespread or customary respect which has been built up in the post World War II years. 3. Is free speech absolute? While it is generally accepted that freedom of expression is, and remains the cornerstone of democracy, there are permitted restrictions encoded within the international treaties which in turn allow for a degree of interpretation of how free free speech should be. Thus, unlike the American First Amendment Rights which allow few, if any, checks on free speech or on the independence of the media, the international treaties are concerned that there should be a balance between competing rights: for example, limiting free speech or media freedom where it impinges on the individual's right to privacy; where free speech causes insult or injury to the rights and reputation of another; where speech is construed as incitement to violence or hatred, or where free speech would create a public disturbance. Given that these permitted restrictions are necessarily broad, the limits of free speech are consistently tested in national law courts and, perhaps even more importantly, in the regional courts such as the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. In recent years several landmark cases have helped to define more closely what restrictions may be imposed by government and under what circumstances. In particular, it has been emphasised by the European Court that any restriction must comply with a three-part test which requires that any such restriction should first of all be prescribed by law, and thus not arbitrarily imposed: proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, and demonstrably necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the individual and/or the state. 4. Who censors what? Despite the rather strict rules which apply to restrictions on free speech that governments may wish to impose, many justifications are nevertheless sought by governments to suppress information which is inimical to their policies or their interests. These justifications include arguments in defence of national and/or state security, the public interst, including the need to protect public morals and public order and perfectly understandable attempts to prevent racism, violence, sexism, religious intolerance and damage to the indi-vidual's reputation or privacy. The mechanisms employed by governments to restrict the freeflow of information are almost endless and range from subtle economic pressures and devious methods of undermining political opponents and the independent media to the enactment of restrictive press laws and an insist-ence on licensing journalists and eventually to the illegal detention, torture and disappearances of journalists and others associated with the expression of independent views. 5. Examples of censorship To some the right to free speech may appear to be one of the fringe human rights, especially when compared to such violations as torture and extra-judicial killings. It is also sometimes difficult to dissuade the general public that censorship, generally assumed to be something to do with banning obscene books or magazines, is no bad thing! It requires a recognition of some of the fundamental principles of democracy to understand why censorship is so immensely dangerous. The conditon of democracy is that people are able to make choices about a wide variety of issues which affect their lives, including what they wish to see, read, hear or discuss. While this may seem a somewhat luxurious distinction preoccupying, perhaps, wealthy Western democracies, it is a comparatively short distance between government censorship of an offensive book to the silencing of political dissidents. And the distance between such silencing and the use of violence to suppress a growing political philosophy which a government finds inconvenient is even shorter. Censorship tends to have small beginnings and to grow rapidly. Allowing a government to have the power to deny people information, however trivial, not only sets in place laws and procedures which can and will be used by those in authority against those with less authority, but it also denies people the information which they must have in order to monitor their governments actions and to ensure accountability. There have been dramatic and terrible examples of the role that censorship has played in international politics in the last few years: to name but a few, the extent to which the media in the republics of former Yugoslavia were manipulated by government for purposes of propaganda; the violent role played by the government associated radio in Rwanda which incited citizens to kill each other in the name of ethnic purity and the continuing threat of murder issued by the Islamic Republic of Iran against a citizen of another country for having written a book which displeased them. 6. The link between poverty, war and denial of free speech There are undoubted connections between access to information, or rather the lack of it, and war, as indeed there are between poverty, the right to freedom of expression and development. One can argue that democracy aims to increase participation in political and other decision-making at all levels. In this sense democracy empowers people. The poor are denied access to information on decisions which deeply affect their lives, are thus powerless and have no voice; the poor are not able to have influence over their own lives, let alone other aspect of society. Because of this essential powerlessness, the poor are unable to influence the ruling elite in whose interests it may be to initiate conflict and wars in order to consolidate their own power and position. Of the 126 developing countries listed in the 1993 Human Development Report, war was ongoing in 30 countries and severe civil conflict in a further 33 countries. Of the total 63 countries in conflict, 55 are towards the bottom scale of the human development index which is an indicator of poverty. There seems to be no doubt that there is a clear association between poverty and war. It is reasonably safe to assume that the vast majority of people do not ever welcome war. They are normally coerced, more often than not by propaganda, into fear, extreme nationalist sentiments and war by their governments. If the majority of people had a democratic voice they would undoubtedly object to war. But voices are silenced. Thus, the freedom to express one's views and to challenge government decisions and to insist upon political rather than violent solutions, are necessary aspects of democracy which can, and do, avert war. Government sponsored propaganda in Rwanda, as in former Yugoslavia, succeeded because there weren't the means to challenge it. One has therefore to conclude that it is impossible for a particular government to wage war in the absence of a compliant media willing to indulge in government propaganda. This is because the government needs civilians to fight wars for them and also because the media is needed to re-inforce government policies and intentions at every turn.

Thus I value morality because it is our moral obligation to protect liberty. Crane 96
Edward Crane, President of the Cato Institute, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY,  September 15-17, 1996, p. 597

Those are words that we need to hear more of. It's true, freedom and morality do, ultimately, depend on each other for their existence. But as government grows year in and year out, under Democratic and Republican administrations, as regulations multiply, politically correct public education expands, and our tax burden gets ever greater, I can't help but think the reservoir of morality in America is much deeper than our reservoir of political liberty. The crisis we confront is a political crisis - one that merits our immediate attention. We have, it seems to me, a moral imperative to challenge the political status quo and to roll back the 20th century's legacy of statism. It is our heritage as Americans to live in a civil society - not a society that is increasingly politicized. If we want a more moral society, then, as Barry Goldwater said, liberty must be our main interest. Thank you. 

And my value criterion is autonomy
Text: The United States ought to allow for total free speech on public university and college campuses

Issues with free speech that the neg will bring up can be solved better through total free speech than anything other than that. ACLU 16
ACLU 16 (American Civil Liberties Union, 2016, “Hate Speech on Campus”, https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus)  DK

The ACLU believes that hate speech stops being just speech and becomes conduct when it targets a particular individual, and when it forms a pattern of behavior that interferes with a student's ability to exercise his or her right to participate fully in the life of the university. The ACLU isn't opposed to regulations that penalize acts of violence, harassment or intimidation, and invasions of privacy. On the contrary, we believe that kind of conduct should be punished. Furthermore, the ACLU recognizes that the mere presence of speech as one element in an act of violence, harassment, intimidation or privacy invasion doesn't immunize that act from punishment. For example, threatening, bias-inspired phone calls to a student's dorm room, or white students shouting racist epithets at a woman of color as they follow her across campus -- these are clearly punishable acts. Several universities have initiated policies that both support free speech and counter discriminatory conduct. Arizona State, for example, formed a "Campus Environment Team" that acts as an education, information and referral service. The team of specially trained faculty, students and administrators works to foster an environment in which discriminatory harassment is less likely to occur, while also safeguarding academic freedom and freedom of speech.

Strossen 1 cooperates that increasing speech is a better strategy for combating racism that censorship
Nadine Strossen Professor of Law, New York Law School, “Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?” Duke Law Journal, 1990.
In the context of countering racism on campus, the strategy of increasing speech-rather than decreasing it-not only would be consistent with first amendment principles, but also would be more effective in advancing equality goals. All government agencies and officers, including state universitiesy officials, should condemn slavery, de jure segregation, and other racist institutions that the government formerly supported. State universitiesy and other government officials also should affirmatively endorse equality principles. Furthermore, these government representatives should condemn racist ideas ex- pressed by private speakers.400 In the same vein, private individuals and groups should exercise their first amendment rights by speaking out against racism. Traditional civil libertarians have exercised their own speech rights in this fashion401 and also have de- fended the first amendment freedoms of others who have done so.402 In addition to the preceding measures, which could be implemented on a society-wide basis, other measures would be especially suited to the academic setting. First, regardless of the legal limitations on rules bar- ring hate speech, universities should encourage members of their com- munities voluntarily to restrain the form of their expression in light of the feelings and concerns of various minority groups.403 Universities could facilitate voluntary self-restraint by providing training in communications, information about diverse cultural perspectives, and other education designed to promote intergroup understanding. Members of both minority and majority groups should be encouraged to be mutually respectful. Individuals who violate these norms of civility should not be subject to any disciplinary action, but instead should be counseled.404 These educational efforts should be extended to members of the faculty and administration, as well as students. Of course, universities must vigilantly ensure that even voluntary limits on the manner of academic dis- course do not chill its content. 

Racist speech increases public consciousness about underlying societal racism. The aff solves for the root problem rather than putting a bandage over the real issue. Strossen 2
Nadine Strossen Professor of Law, New York Law School, “Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?” Duke Law Journal, 1990.
The positive effect of racist speech-in terms of making society aware of and mobiliz- ing its opposition to the evils of racism-are illus- trated by the wave of campus racist incidents now under discussion. Ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtedly have had the beneficial result of raising public consciousness about the under- lying societal problem of racism. If these expressions had been chilled by virtue of university sanctions, then it is doubtful that there would be such widespread dis- cussion on campuses, let alone more generally, about the real problem of racism.394 Consequently, society would be less mobilized to attack this problem. Past experience confirms that the public airing of racist and other forms of hate speech catalyzes com- munal efforts to re- dress the bigotry that underlies such expression and to stave off any dis- criminatory conduct that might follow from it.395 

Free speech is the single best method to combat offensive and harmful perspectives. Dessayer 91
Kathryn Marie Dessayer JD, University of Michigan and Arthur J. Burke JD, Univer- sity of Michigan, “Leaving Them Speechless: A Critique on Speech Restrictions on Campus,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 1991.
While revisionist proposals are likely to provide obvious advantages, they are not the most efficient means of combatting offensive speech. Public discussion and discourse serve better in opposing racism, sexism, and other forms of intolerance than rigid re- strictions on speech. The traditional “marketplace of ideas” should discourage the pur- veyors of ignorance and faslehood. As Justice Holmes wrote: When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is bet- ter reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.57 According to Dean Lee Bollinger, this statement by Justice Holmes “stands as one of the central organizing pronouncements for our contemporary vision of free speech.”5” Open exchange and discussion play a particularly vital role in the truth-seeking mission of colleges and universities. By forc- ing students to confront and address differing views, free campus debate ultimately advances the goals of toleration and understanding. As the Supreme Court stated in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of New York: 59 “The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that ro- bust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection.’
Free speech is key to protect individual autonomy. Badmachi 15
Badamchi, Devrim Kabasakal Badamchi (Izmir University, Turkey). “Justifications of freedom of speech: Towards a double-grounded non-consequentialist approach.” Philosophy and Social Criticism. 2015, Vol. 41(9) 907–927.
In On Liberty, Mill argues that, even if the received opinions is are the whole truth, it is in need of contestation and criticism (Mill, 1986: 60–1). Otherwise, the held opinion would be no more than a prejudice with little comprehension of rational grounds. Moreover, he adds that without the contestation of counter-opinions, the meaning of the doctrine will be lost and the dogmas will prevent the growth of real convictions from reason or personal experience (ibid.). Without the challenge of contestation and criticism, the opinions and doctrines will be left lacking any real justification and rational grounds. Why is being justified in one’s criticism significant for autonomy and free speech? I think what Mill wants to argue is that, as autonomous and rational beings, individuals are required to hear all the opinions, regardless of the nature of these opinions, in order to develop justified criticisms as part of whatever conception of good they want to follow in life. Censorship of certain opinions would prevent those persons who would criticize these opinions from fully justifying their claims, and justified claims are signif- icant for choosing and following a conception of good freely. In this sense, as Daniel Jacobson rightly argues, Mill’s argument is not straightforwardly consequentialist in the sense that a marketplace of ideas maximizes true belief and that Mill’s argument con- cerns justification rather than truth (Jacobson, 2007: 89). It is a requirement of autonomy to experience all sorts of counter-opinions and arguments freely, both as a speaker and a listener, and therefore to be justified in one’s opinions and criticisms. As autonomous individuals, we should be able to develop freely whatever conception of good we want to follow in life, and this is only possible without an external intervention on opinions that we need to hear. We encounter a similar listener-based argument in Scanlon, which will be be taken up later in this section of the article. 

The ability to express is intricately connected to the concept of autonomy, restrictions of freedom threaten freedom. Briston 1
Brison, Susan. "The Autonomy Defense Of Free Speech." Ethics Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 312-339. January 01, 1998. Web. December 05, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/233807?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Joshua Cohen has recently presented an objection to the autonomy defense (which he dubs the ‘‘maximalist view’’ of free speech on account of the high, indeed trumping, value it places on the right to free speech). Cohen points out that the view that ‘‘expression always trumps other values because of its connection with autonomy ... suggests that a commitment to freedom of expression turns on embracing the supreme value of autonomy’’ which ‘‘threatens to turn freedom of expression into a sectarian political position.’’49 Cohen asks, ‘‘Is a strong commitment to expressive liberties really available only to those who endorse the idea that autonomy is the fundamental human good—an idea about which there is much reasonable controversy?’’ In reply, Cohen states, ‘‘I am not doubting that such a strong commitment is available to those whose ethical views are of this kind, but I reject the claim that such views are really necessary.’’50 I want to make it clear that I am doubting, and am in fact rejecting, precisely this: that the acceptance of any theory of autonomy yields a defense of free speech that precludes restrictions on hate speech. This makes my critique of the autonomy approach more decisive and in one important way less controversial than Cohen’s, since the liberal theorists who advocate the autonomy defense of free speech argue, contrary to Cohen, that they do not ‘‘endorse the idea that autonomy is the fundamental human good’’ (my emphases). Rather, they claim that respect for autonomy is required by the correct view of right.51
The importance of free speech presupposes the protection of free speech even in the face of harmful speech. Brison 2
Brison, Susan. "The Autonomy Defense Of Free Speech." Ethics Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 312-339. January 01, 1998. Web. December 05, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/233807?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
A free speech principle does not imply that speech can never be restricted. Rather, it generates a presumption against restricting speech, even harmful speech. A showing of harm will not, by itself, be sufficient to justify restriction. As Scanlon notes, ‘‘On any strong version of the doctrine of freedom of expression there will be have cases where protected acts are held to be immune from restriction despite the fact that they have as consequences harms which would normally be sufficient to justify the imposition of legal sanctions.’’37 On Scanlon’s view, any theory of free speech which counts as a ‘‘significant’’ one—including his own— has this consequence, namely, that it considers immune from restriction not only offensive or morally repugnant speech, but also genuinely harmful speech, even where the resulting harms are so serious that the government would normally be justified in restricting individual liberties in order to prevent them. But why should speech be considered so special as to be worthy of protection, even when it is conceded to cause real harms—harms which, if brought about by any other means, would be considered unjust and legitimately preventable by governmental intervention? 

Valdosta State and University of Delaware show how schools crush conversation and thus free exchange of ideas before they even occur.
Trama, Zachary. "Keeping The Marketplace Of Ideas Open In Schools." Foundation for Individual Rights in Education. December 16, 2011. Web. December 05, 2016. https://www.thefire.org/keeping-the-marketplace-of-ideas-open-in-schools/.
When faced with this test, Valdosta State University failed. Student Hayden Barnes only wanted the school to make decisions that were friendlier to the environment. When he shared this idea, he was hit with the difficult realization that it could only be shared on one small section of the campus labeled as the school’s “free-speech zone.” When the idea caused tension between Barnes and the university’s president, Barnes was removed from the university. Protest speech at Valdosta was relegated to a free speech zone for a clear reason. It is in the nature of protests that their message may be one of controversy, one that not everybody wants to hear. Wishing to cleanse the campus of unpopular messages, Valdosta State put free speech in a vice, turning it as tightly as they could without eliminating it altogether. As proved in the case of Hayden Barnes, even the expression that takes place within the free speech zone may be subject to more content- based restriction. The Hayden Barnes incident showed just how far the school’s president, Ronald Zaccari, was willing to go to silence a lone dissenter. The University of Delaware failed its incoming classes as well. These new students weren’t even given a chance to form ideas before they were bombarded with a concisely stated and often repeated set of beliefs that they were all expected to share. The idea for this was indoctrination came straight from the school’s top Residence Life directors, with an obvious goal in mind: Make every student’s views the same. Proactively eliminateeing diverse ideas about controversial subjects is an abhorrent practice. The University of Delaware Residence Life program sought to systematically weed out touchy conversations before they were even had. Those who may have had different views than the ones being dictated soon realized that they were in the minority. By the end of orientation, the point was hammered home, and their ideas were flushed down the spiral of silence. While the policies of Delaware and Valdosta State were different, the effect was the same. New or unpopular ideas were crushed. Whether they were pushed out of sight or overpowered by indoctrination, they were removed from the marketplace. Students felt less free to explore their educational boundaries, and scholarship stayed inside the box. Exploratory thinking was discouraged. 

Free speech is necessary for the moral agency of people. It allows people the ability to express their thoughts which is a hallmark of agency.
Brown, Rebecca. "THE HARM PRINCIPLE AND FREE SPEECH." 89 Southern California Law Review 953 (2016) USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 15-11. September 27, 2016. Web. December 05, 2016. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584080.
Other justifications for protecting speech are more “constitutive,” as Ronald Dworkin called them.258 These theories value freedom of speech because it protects the dignity and moral agency of the people. The constitutive value is implicated both for potential speakers and for potential audiences. Dworkin explained that government denies the moral responsibility of its people when it withholds from them the opportunity to “hear opinions that might persuade them to dangerous or offensive convictions.”259 Being subject to influence from a wide range of ideas, good and bad, is critically important. T.M. Scanlon clarified that these interests of the audience are not served, however, when expression “influences us in ways that are unrelated to relevant reasons, or in ways that bypass our ability to consider these reasons.”260 This is the kind of operation upon us that expression can have, and the suppression of which I am calling non-censorial. Scanlon offered subliminal advertising as an example. “What is objectionable about subliminal advertising, if it works, is that it causes us to act—to buy popcorn, say, or to read Dostoevsky—by making us think we have a good reason for so acting, even though we probably have no such reason.”261 He went on to affirm an important truth relevant to the assessment of governmental restrictions on speech. “The central audience interest in expression,” he wrote, “is the interest in having a good environment for the formation of one’s beliefs and desires.”262 Government can contribute to that environment by protecting against some kinds of speech harms. Indeed, the autonomy interests of an audience could be enhanced by regulation of speech that causes a harmful impact that may not be obvious on the surface. Scanlon’s view speaks favorably to the idea of a non-censorial First Amendment theory.

Speech regulations have the potential to chill speech beyond their intentions.
Strossen, Nadine. "Regulating RACIST SPEECH ON CAMPUS: A MODEST PROPOSAL?." Duke Law Journal 484-573. 1990. Web. December 05, 2016. http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol39/iss3/3/.
Second, there is an inescapable risk that any hate speech regulation, no matter how narrowly drawn, will chill speech beyond its literal scope. Members of the university community may well err on the side of caution to avoid being charged with a violation. For example, there is
evidence that the rule which the University of Wisconsin implemented in 1989 has had
this effect, even though it has not yet been directly enforced. 8 3 A third problem inherent in any campus hate speech policy, as Professor Lawrence concedes,18 4 is that such rules constitute
a precedent that can be used to restrict other types of speech. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the long-range precedential impact of any challenged governmental action should be a factor in evaluating its lawfulness.185 

Open dialogue allows people to come to a place of mutual understanding.
Rostbøll, Christian. "Freedom Of Expression, Deliberation, Autonomy And Respect." European Journal of Political Theory. January 2011. Web. December 07, 2016. http://ept.sagepub.com/content/10/1/5.full.pdf+html.
Constraints on public expression should ideally be products of learning processes and self- imposed – and not legally imposed or products of fear. Everyone ought to express him- or herself in ways that he or she, following his or her best judgement, believes does not discourage others from participating in public deliberation. The latter constraint might, however, lead to timidity and so much fear of offending others that important issues are not discussed, and particularly in a society in which people from different cultural or religious backgrounds tend to misunderstand and distrust each other this can be inhibiting for public deliberation and its epistemic aims. Under such conditions, it is essential that citizens also give each other some leeway for making errors and do not take any mistake or small provocation as a sign of disrespect. The condition for this is that people generally regard each other as being committed both to common deliberation and to promoting the degree of self-reflection required for living together on equal terms. If what we might refer to as an overall public culture of mutual respect exists, then minor instances of disrespectful expression should be tolerated. The aim of creating a public culture of mutual respect imposes obligations on both speakers and listeners. Listeners (or viewers) can only be expected to give speakers some leeway for making errors if they have reason to think that the latter were actually attempting to promote common deliberation and mutual respect. Conversely, listeners must give speakers reason to think that they, in general, are committed to participating in common learning processes, to speaking and listening as equals, and not merely interested in creating antagonism with speakers. 

Censoring speech on campuses risks politically polarizing the speech on campus.
Welch, Benjamin. "An Examination Of University Speech Codes’ Constitutionality And Eir Impact On High-Level Discourse." DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska–Lincoln. August 01, 2014. Web. December 07, 2016. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/journalismdiss/40 .
The consequences of censoring opinions more typical of one side of the political spectrum is a great cause for concern – though not exactly surprising – in today’s political climate. Extensive studies have shown that the weight of America’s growing political polarization is more increased than in eras past, as technology has advanced to the point where individuals are able to intake content through cyber environments wherein likeminded people confirm pre-existing opinions, causing an echo chamber that leaves no room for new thoughts and ideas.12 Sociologist Diana C. Mutz has confirmed this in her studies, writing that those with the highest level of education have the lowest levels of exposure to people with viewpoints in opposition to their own. Conversely, those who have not even graduated from high school are subjected to the largest amount of differing viewpoints and diverse discussion.13
To restrict this political eco chamber, we must allow for the circulation of ideas in a public space to limit the increasing levels of political polarization that would skyrocket due to the neg.

Free Speech is essential to personal dignity and autonomy – Protecting communication is the way to ensure agency.
Tsesis, Alexander. "FREE SPEECH CONSTITUTIONALISM." UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW. May 21, 2015. Web. December 07, 2016. https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.phpID=102065004071020074093008015067029077054008067084052039088087093121110001072071010065097018031059009044096 126006072028005111005031069088002093028094096071070112067027083041066004064093012127121006030103080069066117031080031017089016112082007121007001 andEXT=pdf.
One of the most often stated rationales for protecting free speech is society’s obligation to safeguard the right of thoughtful and articulate persons to communicatively exercise their intellectual capacities.52 This view gets at the important truth that speech is a dignitary interest of each autonomous human being. Revealing one’s ideas to others is a factor for anyone, which is to say every cognizant person, wishing to relate and convey facts, views, commands, and inquiries to others.53 Personal identity is tied to the ability to formulate opinions and ascertain facts. Freedom of speech enables everyone to explore the innermost workings of his or her mind and to spread knowledge. All humans engage in the construction of semantical and syntactic combinations of words, symbols, or other forms of categorization meant to interact with others and to gain their attention.54 Communication allows us to share what we have learned, our preferences, criticisms, pains, joys, and all the various experiences contained within our personal senses that would remain purely phenomenological without language, signs, and sometimes even grunts and gestures. The speaker may be seeking change, catharsis, or intimacy. As accurate as the personal autonomy perspective is in recognizing the agency aspect of free speech,55 scholars, whose views I parse later in this Section, are mistaken to isolate it as the only reason behind First Amendment protection. As Justice Brennan pointed out in one of his dissents, free expression fosters self-government, and is “intrinsic to individual liberty and dignity,” and advances “society’s search for truth.”56