Tournament: Any | Round: Finals | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any
The AC’s idea of full freedom of speech and expression is a form of ableism that disabled bodies cannot access. Hirschmann 7
Hirschmann 7 - Hirschmann, Nancy J., and Kirstie M. McClure, eds. Feminist Interpretations of John Locke. United States: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007. Print.
This is the dominant model presumed by many philosophers who write on disability, and even more by those who write on freedom. In particular it is an accepted view of contemporary theories of freedom that freedom presupposes ability. Richard Flathman offers the standard example: we are not able “to jump, unaided, twenty-five feet straight up from the surface of the earth, to develop gills instead of or in addition to lungs… Few if any of us decide to stand upright, to walk by moving first one foot and then the other, or to see figures three-dimensionally.” What humans are able to do determines the context for freedom, for even thinking about freedom is conduct within these general facts.

Exposure to hate speech undermines student mental health. Ford 14
Ford 14 - Ford, Zack. “Exposure to hate speech on Facebook undermines users’ mental health.” Think Progress. ThinkProgress, 2 Sept. 2014. Web. 12 July 2016.
A new study from Italy finds that social networking sites like Facebook have a negative impact on individuals’ mental well-being, as well as their levels of social trust, because of their exposure to hate speech and other offensive content. Researchers at Rome’s Sapienza University and the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg analyzed a wide representative sample o,f 50,000 Italian citizens, assessing how much they interacted with social media and how they rated their happiness and self-esteem. Those who used sites like Facebook more often tended to have stronger relationships with people they were connected to, but lower social trust because of the strangers they interacted with in venues like comment threads. The researchers note that “there is a tendency for people to assume that their own opinions, beliefs, preferences, values, and habits are ‘normal’ and that others also think the same way that they do.” In online networks, however, exposure to a greater diversity of ideas may causes individuals to realize they are “surrounded with preference types they dislike (e.g. a racist person may find out that most people appreciate ethnic diversity, or vise versa).” For example, “tolerant users may easily find themselves to interact with unknown, racist or homophobic readers in a ‘public’ page,” which can turn into a “powerful source of frustration and distrust.” The study notes that the high risk of being targeted with offensive behaviors and hate speech is “particularly significant for womyn and users belonging to minorities or discriminated groups.” This is exacerbated by the fact that online discussions do not obey “the same social norms usually acknowledged in physical interactions.” Because strangers’ reactions are “invisible,” the study suggests, “people care less of the risk of offending others in a conversation.” That’s why “in online interactions, dealing with strangers who advance opposite views in an aggressive and insulting way seems to be a widespread practice.” This risk of worsening people’s trust in others in turn has an impact on people’s life satisfaction. The researchers recommend that Facebook do more to moderate content and create avenues for feedback and review to hold accountable those proliferating offensive, hurtful, or hateful speech. A recent study of how young people are using social networking found that LGBT youth turn to the internet to find social support, but it also opens them to cyberbullying. LGBT young people were nearly three times as likely (42 percent vs. 15 percent) to experience cyberbullying, especially in rural areas. Back in 2012, Facebook rolled out a series of new tools to assist users who encounter cyberbullying, but it remains unclear how effectively the site has been at moderating content.

Hate speech forces negative perceptions on cultural AND handicapped minorities causing a lower psychological state. Smith 04
Smith 4 - Smith, Craig. “Circumventing the ‘True Threat’ Standard in Campus Hate Speech Codes.” The center for First amendment studies CSULB. 2004. Web. 12 July 2016.
Words can reinforce and/or maintain social inequality in the home, in the classroom, in the workplace, and in social settings. Hate messages are real and immediate for victims. In her article in the Miami Law Review, Professor Patricia Williams called hate messages "spirit murder."3 According to research completed by professors Kitano and Allport, the effects of hate speech include displaced aggression, avoidance, retreat, withdrawal, alcoholism, and suicide. The special report of the Attorney General of California 1988 demonstrates that epithets and harassment "often cause deep emotional scarring and bring feelings of intimidation and fear that pervade every aspect of a victim's life." In his book Words that Wound, Professor Delgado demonstrates that hate speech victims suffer High Blood Pressure and loss of self-worth. In the Journal of Social Psychiatry, Professor Hafner demonstrates that psychological disturbances including headaches, social withdrawal, depression, and anxiety attacks result from working or learning in a hostile environment. Other reports clearly demonstrate that hate speech results in feelings of ethnic or gender inferiority. In the Journal of Experimental Sociology (1985), Greenberg and Pysczynski Piszynski demonstrate that overhearing a racist slur causes the listener to evaluate members of the slurred group more harshly in the future. Hostile environments trigger avoidance strategies that limit personal freedom and have serious economic consequences. Students who are victims of hate speech often avoid classes and other places of hate speech such as food courts and libraries. Their grades then suffer along with their socialization into a healthy diverse community. According to Lieberson, Stereotypes: The Consequences for Race and Ethnic Interaction in Marrett and Leggon, eds (1985) Research on Race and Ethnic Relations).

Ableism is a method of oppression that permeates all forms of discrimination – categorization based on normative biological standards justifies every form of discrimination and violence. Sierbers 09
Siebers 9 Tobin Siebers (Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism @ University of Michigan), “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”, 10/28/9, Lecture, http:disabilities.temple.edu/media/ds/lecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.doc

Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.

The alt is to embrace vulnerability which allows for a non-oppressive space for the disabled body. Goggin 9.
 Goggin 9 - Goggin, G., Disability, Media, and the Politics of Vulnerability, Asia Paci c Media Educator, 19, 2009, 1-13.
Available at:h p://ro.uow.edu.au/apme/vol1/iss19/2
I have argued that conceptions of vulnerability and media remain problematic and narrow, and fail to grasp the conditions of media. In relation to disability and media, vulnerability is even more problematic, because it encapsulates a highly politicised and potentially oppressive account of disability — that misrecognises the social relations of disability and the construction of media helps constitute these. Should we just cast vulnerability aside, in favour of other operative concepts? Actually, I think not. There is an important revaluing and radical turn in vulnerability that critical accounts of disability allow us to recognise. Disability teaches us — and my relationships with friends, colleagues, and associates with disability have taught me personally — that vulnerability is enormously important, because it goes to the heart of what it is to be human.The dif culty has been that disability is marked out as the abnormal, the problem, the lack, and, in this case, the vulnerable.The non-disabled, the normate, and the ordinary is coded as unmarked, an operation of powerful differentiation we are familiar with from critical race, sexuality, gender, and whiteness studies (Goggin and Newell, 2005). Once we recognise that the centre, the normal, the masculine is only phantasmally invulnerable — constitutionally not admitting to weakness — then we can proceed to knowingly trace the operations of vulnerability. Here I am informed by the work of various disability studies scholars, including Michelle Jarman, who proposes: a transgressive reading of vulnerability which not only critiques these discursive practices of disability, but also understands vulnerability as a radical element in forging cross-identity, cross-cultural alliances committed to exposing and interrogating the ways western values become inscribed upon the bodies of ‘Third World’ the unrepresented subjects (Jarman, 2005: 108). Jarman draws upon the important work of another disability studies scholar, Margrit Shildrick, whose important study of the monstrous is premised on a critique of the ‘self-possession’ that underpins Western notions of the self — and the formulation of an alternative ethics of embracing, rather than disavowing, the vulnerable self (Shildrick 2000 and 2002). More recently,Angharad Beckett has presented a new model of ‘active citizenship’ based upon an account of ‘vulnerable personhood’ (Beckett 2006). Conclusion While there is a developed body of work on disability and vulnerability, I would suggest there is much work ahead in bringing this to bear on media — and also
using new work in media and journalism studies to better conceptualise the cultural dimensions of this. Space only permits brief concluding remarks to indicate what I see as useful directions here. In journalism, then, the idea of vulnerable subjectivity and the kinds of active citizenship that can be predicated upon it would allow us to acknowledge the vulnerability in journalists, as well as particular kinds of sources and audiences historically approached as vulnerable.This is the value of this special issue, it seems to me — because it pluralises and proliferates the gures of the vulnerable.And in Issue No.19, June 2008/July 2009 Asia Paci c Media Educator paying such attention to this, opens the way for us to better understand and recast relationships among these cardinal points of contemporary media. Such recognition of the politics of vulnerability allows us to nd new strategies
to rethink and improve the relationships in which media is constructed, as well as reforming the institutions and organisations which still wield much power over media producers, consumers and audiences alike. Disability scholars and activists also offer
an ethics of engagement, which can be enormously fruitful too.A sharpened sense of vulnerability can help us to draw upon, critique and reformulate the work on trauma, mental illness, grieving, and other concepts that have gured in media and journalism research and practice. Research on an expanded concept of vulnerability and how
this takes shape through media, is likely to lead to contributions to the debates and questioning with disability studies and movements about accepted forms of identity and expression — and how these can themselves lead to new forms of exclusion (Goggin and Newell 2005; Shakespeare 2006; Matthews 2008). As Ellis reminds us, for instance,‘pain and exclusion are very real aspects of the lives of people with disability and this must be acknowledged within any model that purports to empower this group’ (Ellis 2009). With a renewed, reoriented concern for questions of voice and representation comes too a new emphasis on the importance of listening (Goggin 2009), acknowledgement and collaboration — all of which promise to see better media springing from a much wider and deeper notions of vulnerability, which comprehends the broken, fragile, and still hopeful nature of whom we are. 

Voting aff takes a standing point next to ableism which fuels the cycle of discrimination and structural violence. Hehir 07
Hehir 07 (Thomas Hehir is Professor of Practice and Director of the School Leadership Program, Harvard Graduate School of Education, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Educational Leadership: “Confronting Ableism.” Published in February, 2007. Accessed July 20th, 2015. http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-leadership/feb07/vol64/num05/Confronting-Ableism.aspx)TheFedora
Negative cultural attitudes toward disability can undermine opportunities for all students to participate fully in school and society. When Ricky was born deaf, his parents were determined to raise him to function in the “normal” world. Ricky learned to read lips and was not taught American Sign Language. He felt comfortable within the secure world of his family, but when he entered his neighborhood school, he grew less confident as he struggled to understand what his classmates seemed to grasp so easily. Susan, a child with dyslexia, entered kindergarten with curiosity about the world around her, a lively imagination, and a love of picture books. Although her school provided her with individual tutoring and other special education services, it also expected her to read grade-level texts at the same speed as her nondisabled peers. Susan fell further and further behind. By 6th grade, she hated school and avoided reading. These two examples illustrate how society's pervasive negative attitude about disability—which I term ableism—often makes the world unwelcoming and inaccessible for people with disabilities. An ableist perspective asserts that it is preferable for a child to read print rather than Braille, walk rather than use a wheelchair, spell independently rather than use a spell-checker, read written text rather than listen to a book on tape, and hang out with nondisabled kids rather than with other disabled kids. Certainly, given a human-made world designed with the nondisabled in mind, children with disabilities gain an advantage if they can perform like their nondisabled peers. A physically disabled child who receives the help he or she needs to walk can move more easily in a barrier-filled environment. A child with a mild hearing loss who has been given the amplification and speech therapy he or she needs may function well in a regular classroom. But ableist assumptions become dysfunctional when the education and development services provided to the disabled children focus on their disability to the exclusion of all else. From an early age, many people with disabilities encounter the view that disability is negative and tragic and that “overcoming” disability is the only valued result (Ferguson and Asch, 1989; Rousso, 1984). In education, considerable evidence shows that unquestioned ableist assumptions are harming the disabled students and contributing to unequal outcomes (see Allington and McGill-Franzen, 1989; Lyon et al., 2001). School time devoted to activities that focus on changing disability may take away from the time needed to learn academic material. In addition, academic deficits may be exacerbated by the ingrained prejudice against performing activities in “different” ways that might be more efficient for disabled people—such as reading Braille, using sign language, or using text-to-speech software to read. The Purpose of Special Education What should the purpose of special education be? In struggling with this issue, we can find guidance in the rich and varied narratives of people with disabilities and their families. Noteworthy among these narratives is the work of Adrienne Asch, a professor of bioethics at Yeshiva University in New York who is blind. In her analysis of stories that adults with disabilities told about their childhood experiences (Ferguson and Asch, 1989), Asch identified common themes in their parents' and educators' responses to their disability. Some of the adults responded with excessive concern and sheltering. Others conveyed to children, through silence or denial, that nothing was “wrong.” For example, one young woman with significant vision loss related that she was given no alternative but to use her limited vision even though this restriction caused her significant academic problems. Another common reaction was to make ill-conceived attempts to fix the disability. For example, Harilyn Rousso, an accomplished psychotherapist with cerebral palsy, recounts, My mother was quite concerned with the awkwardness of my walk. Not only did it periodically cause me to fall but it made me stand out, appear conspicuously different—which she feared would subject me to endless teasing and rejection. To some extent it did. She made numerous attempts over the years of my childhood to have me go to physical therapy and to practice walking “normally” at home. I vehemently refused her efforts. She could not understand why I would not walk straight. (1984, p. 9) In recalling her own upbringing and education, Asch describes a more positive response to disability: I give my parents high marks. They did not deny that I was blind, and did not ask me to pretend that everything about my life was fine. They rarely sheltered. They worked to help me behave and look the way others did without giving me a sense that to be blind—“different”—was shameful. They fought for me to ensure that I lived as full and rich a life as I could. For them, and consequently for me, my blindness was a fact, not a tragedy. It affected them but did not dominate their lives. Nor did it dominate mine. (Ferguson and Asch, 1989, p. 118) Asch's narrative and others (Biklen, 1992) suggest that we can best frame the purpose of special education as minimizing the impact of disability and maximizing the opportunities for students with disabilities to participate in schooling and the community. This framework assumes that most students with disabilities will be integrated into general education and educated within their natural community. It is consistent with the 1997 and 2004 reauthorizations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which requires that individualized education program (IEP) teams address how the student will gain access to the curriculum and how the school will meet the unique needs that arise out of the student's disability. Finally, this framework embraces the diverse needs of students with various disabilities as well as the individual diversity found among students within each disability group. Falling Short of the Goal Minimizing the impact of disability does not mean making misguided attempts to “cure” disability but rather giving students the supports, skills, and opportunities needed to live as full a life as possible with their disability. Maximizing access requires that school practices recognize the right of students with disabilities to participate fully in the school community—not only in academic programs, but also in sports teams, choruses, clubs, and field trips. A look at common problems encountered by students with low-incidence disabilities, specific learning disabilities, and emotional disturbances illustrates that schools still have a long way to go in fulfilling the purpose of special education. Students with Low-Incidence Disabilities In Adrienne Asch's case, minimizing the impact of her blindness meant learning Braille, developing orientation and mobility skills, and having appropriate accommodations available that gave her access to education. Asch also points out that because of New Jersey's enlightened policies at the time, she could live at home and attend her local school, so she and her family were not required to disrupt their lives to receive the specialized services she needed. Unfortunately, many students today with low-incidence disabilities like blindness and deafness are not afforded the opportunities that Asch had in the early 1950s. Parents sometimes face the choice of sending their children to a local school that is ill equipped to meet their needs or to a residential school with specialized services, thus disrupting normal family life. Parents should not be forced to make this Hobson's choice. Services can be brought to blind and deaf students in typical community settings, and most students can thrive in that environment (Wagner, Black-orby, Cameto, and Newman, 1993; Wagner and Cameto, 2004). It is up to policymakers to ensure that such services are available. Students with Specific Learning Disabilities Because those identified as having learning disabilities are such a large and growing portion of the school population, we might expect that these students would be less likely to be subjected to ableist practices. The available evidence, however, contradicts this assumption. Many students with dyslexia and other specific learning disabilities receive inappropriate instruction that exacerbates their disabilities. For example, instead of making taped books available to these students, many schools require those taught in regular classrooms to handle grade-level or higher text. Other schools do not allow students to use computers when taking exams, thus greatly diminishing some students' ability to produce acceptable written work. The late disabilities advocate Ed Roberts had polio as a child, which left him dependent on an iron lung. He attended school from home in the 1960s with the assistance of a telephone link. When it was time for graduation, however, the school board planned to deny him a diploma because he had failed to meet the physical education requirement. His parents protested, and Ed eventually graduated (Shapiro, 1994). We can hardly imagine this scenario happening today, given disability law and improved societal attitudes. Yet similar ableist assumptions are at work when schools routinely require students with learning disabilities to read print at grade level to gain access to the curriculum or to meet proficiency levels on high-stakes assessments. Assuming that there is only one “right” way to learn—or to walk, talk, paint, read, and write—is the root of fundamental inequities. Seriously Emotionally Disturbed Students Perhaps no group suffers from negative attitudes more than students who have been identified as having serious emotional disturbance (SED)—and no other subpopulation experiences poorer outcomes. Students with SED drop out of school at more than double the rate of nondisabled students. Only 15 percent pursue higher education, and approximately 50 percent are taught in segregated settings (U.S. Department of Education, 2003; Wagner and Cameto, 2004). For large numbers of students with serious emotional disturbance, their IEPs are more likely to include inappropriate responses to control the most common symptom of their disability—acting-out behavior—than to provide the accommodations and support the students need to be successful in education. Only 50 percent of students with SED receive mental health services, only 30 percent receive social work services, and only 50 percent have behavior management appropriately addressed in their IEPs (Wagner and Cameto, 2004). What do these students typically receive through special education? They are commonly placed in a special classroom or school with other students with similar disabilities (U.S. Department of Education, 2003)—often with an uncertified teacher. Placing such students in separate classes without specific behavioral supports, counseling, or an expert teacher is unlikely to work. Substantial evidence, indicates, however, that providing these students with appropriate supports and mental health services can significantly reduce disruptive behavior and improve their learning (Sugai, Sprague, Horner, and Walker, 2000). Such supports are most effective when provided within the context of effective schoolwide discipline approaches, such as the U.S. Department of Education's Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports program (www.pbis.org). Schoolwide approaches also produce safer and better-run schools for all students. Guidelines for Special Education Decision Making The goal of minimizing the impact of disability and maximizing opportunities to participate suggests several guidelines for serving students with disabilities.

Tournament: Any | Round: Finals | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any
The Affirmative’s portrayal of the racial Other is intimately tied to processes of violent biological colonialism.  ‘Benign’ representations of difference necessitate attempts to purify racial identity. 

Antonio Hardt, Prof of Lit @ Duke, and Michael Negri, Indi Researcher, Empire, 2000
In the logic of colonialist representations, the construction of a separate colonized other and the segregation of identity and alterity turns out paradoxically to be at once absolute and extremely intimate. The process consists, in fact, of two moments that are dialectically related. In the first moment difference has to be pushed to the extreme. In the colonial imaginary the colonized is not simply an other banished outside the realm of civilization; rather, it is grasped or produced as Other, as the absolute negation, as the most distant point on the horizon. Eighteenth-century colonial slaveholders, for example, recognized the absoluteness of this difference clearly. "The Negro is a being, whose nature and dispositions are not merely different from those of the European, they are the reverse of them. Kindness and compassion excite in his breast implacable and deadly hatred; but stripes, and insults, and abuse, generate gratitude, affection, and inviolable attachment!"25 Thus the slaveholders' mentality, according to an abolitionist pamphlet. The non-European subject acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European.
Precisely because the difference of the Other is absolute, it can be inverted in a second moment as the foundation of the Self. In other words, the evil, barbarity, and licentiousness of the colonized Other are what make possible the goodness, civility, and propriety of the European Self. What first appears strange, foreign, and distant thus turns out to be very close and intimate. Knowing, seeing, and even touching the colonized is essential, even if this knowledge and contact take place only on the plane of representation and relate little to the actual subjects in the colonies and the metropole. The intimate struggle with the slave, feeling the sweat on its skin, smelling its odor, defines the vitality of the master. This intimacy, however, in no way blurs the division between the two identities in struggle, but only makes more important that the boundaries and the purity of the identities be policed. The identity of the European Self is produced in this dialectical movement. Once the colonial subject is constructed as absolutely Other, it can in turn be subsumed (canceled and raised up) within a higher unity. The absolute Other is reflected back into the most proper. Only through opposition to the colonized does the metropolitan subject really become itself. What first appeared as a simple logic of exclusion, then, turns out to be a negative dialectic of recognition. The colonizer does produce the colonized as negation, but, through a dialectical twist, that negative colonized identity is negated in turn to found the positive colonizer Self. Modern European thought and the modern Selfare both necessarily bound to what Paul Gilroy calls the "relationship of racial terror and subordination."26 The gilded monuments not only of European cities but also of modern European thought itself are founded on the intimate dialectical struggle with its Others.

Race as a system perpetuates itself on the basis of racial identification. This method of purging racism ignores the broader desire for the “pure race” and a separation from it.  Such an investment of power relations leads to inevitable violence and disastorous politics.

Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, assistant professor of English at Boston College, Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian analysis of race, 2000, p. 8-9
My contention that the category of race is inherently a discourse of supremacy may seem inattentive to the advances that our legal systems and liberal social ideologies have made precisely in relation to “racism” and “racist" practices. Modern civil society refuses to permit its subjects the enjoyment of supremacist rhetoric, the rhetoric of exceptionality, by distinguishing between race and racism. It draws this distinction between a supposed ontology (the study of physical or cultural differences) and an epistemology (discriminatory logic) in the name of preserving a semblance of inter-subjectivity Race, it suggests, is a neutral description of human difference; racism, it suggests, is the misappropriation of such difference. The liberal consensus is that we must do away with such ideological misappropriation, but that we must “celebrate difference.” It is understood as a “baby and the bath water” syndrome, in which the dirty water of racism must be eliminated, to reveal the cleansed and beloved “fact” of racial identity. This rather myopic perspective refuses to address the peculiar resiliency of “race,” the subjective investment in racial difference, and the hypervalorization of appearance. It dismisses these issues or trivializes them because race seems a historical inevitability. The logic is that people have been constituted for material and other reasons as black and white and that this has had powerful historical consequences for peoples thus constituted. Whether race exists or not, whether race and racism are artificial distinctions or not, racialization is a hard historical fact and a concrete instance of social reality We have no choice, according to this reasoning, but to inhabit our assigned racial positions. Not to do so is a form of idealism, and a groundless belief that power can be wished away In making this ostensibly pragmatic” move, such social theorists effectively reify “race.” Lukacs, who elaborated Marx’s notion of reification in relation to the commodity form in History and Class Consciousness, is worth recalling here: Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing, and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonmy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people (1923: 89). To arrest analysis of race at the point where one discerns and marks its historical effects is to reproduce those very relations of power that one intends to oppose. It is to render race so objective that it is impossible to conceive human difference or inter-subjectivity anew. Modern civil society engages in such reification because ultimately its desire is to keep the dialectic between races alive. It must thus prohibit what it terms racism in order to prevent the annihilation not so much of the “inferior” races but of the system of race itself. This is how the system of “desiring purenessWhiteness” perpetuates itself, even in the discourses that are most pragmatically aimed against racism. The resilience and endurability of race as a structure can thus be attributed to its denials and disavowals. On the one hand, it is never in the place that one expects it to be: it disavows its own historicity in order to hold out the promise of being to the subject — the something more than symbolic — a sense of wholeness, of exceptionality. On the other hand, as a social law, it must disavow this object in order to keep the system viable and to perpetuate the dialectic: the race for Whiteness. Exploring the structure of race requires a toleration of paradox, an appreciation of the fact that it is an inherently contradictory discourse, and a willingness to see beyond relations of power in order to mine the depth of subjective investment in it.

Racial representations necessitates a framework where war and genocide against the Other are expected to reaffirm the boundaries of one’s own identified race, as well as the creation of other ‘threats’ that cause oppression and turn the AC.
Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire, 1995
For Foucault, this is the point where racism intervenes.  It is not that all racisms are invented at this moment.  Racisms have existed in other forms at other times: Now, “what inscribes racism in the mechanisms of the state is the emergence of biopower . . . . racism inscribes itself as a fundamental mechanism of power that exercises itself in modern states” (TM: 53).  What does racist discourse do?  For one, it is a “means of introducing . . . a fundamental division between those who must live and those who must die” (TM: 53).  It fragments the biological field, it establishes a break (cesure) inside the biological continuum of human beings by defining a hierarchy of races, a set of subdivisions in which certain races are classified as “good,” fit, and superior.
More Importantly, it establishes a positive relation between the right to kill and the assurance of life.  It posits that “the more you kill and . . . let die, the more you will live.”  It is neither racism nor the state that invented this connection, but the permanency of war-like relations inside the social body.  Racism now activates this discourse in a novel way, establishing a biological confrontation “between my life and the death of others” (TM 53).  It gives credence to the claim that the more “degenerates” and “abnormals” are eliminated, the lives of those who speak will be stronger, more vigorous, and improved.  The enemies are not political adversaries, but those identified as external and internal threats to the population.  “Racism is the condition that makes it acceptable to put certain people to death in a society of normalization” (TM: 54).  The murderous function of the biopolitical state can only be assured by racism which is “indispensable” to it (TM: 54).
Several crucial phenomena follow from this.  One is evidence in the knot that binds nineteenth-century biological theory and the discourse of power:
Basicly, evolutionism understood in the broad sense, that is not so much Darwin’s theory itself but the ensemble of its notions, has become . . .in the nineteenth century, not only a way of transcribing political discourse in biological terms, . . . of hiding political discourse in scientific dress, but a way of thinking the relations of colonization, the necessity of war, criminality, the phenomena of madness and mental illness. . . (TM: 55) In addition, racism will develop in modern societies where biopower is prevalent and particularly at certain “privileged points” where the right to kill is required, “primo with colonization, with colonizing genocide.”  How else, Foucault rhetorically asks, could a biopolitical state kill “peoples, a population, civilizations” if not by activating the “themes of evolutionism” and racism (TM: 55).  Colonialism is only mentioned in passing because what really concerns him is not racism’s legitimating function to kill “others,” but its part in justifying the “exposure of one’s own citizens” to death and war.  In modern racist discourse, war does more than reinforce one’s own kind by eliminating a racial adversary; it “regenerates” one’s own race (TM: 56).
   

The method through which we frame and discuss racial representations forms the fabric of social reality.  Unless they justify their conception of racial difference, solvency based on that conception is impossible.
Martin Jones, Prof of Law at U. of Miami, Darkness Made Visible:  Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 1993
But race, for all its rhetorical power, is an incoherent fiction. "The truth is," as Anthony Appiah notes, "there are no races."  Racial categories are neither objective nor natural, but ideological and constructed. In these terms race is not so much a category but a practice: people are raced.  Consequently, the problems of race have been viewed not only as political or psychological or cultural, but somehow external to language itself.
For these reasons, the problem in conventional legal theory is that significance is often irrationally attributed to race.  Race is understood as something that is already "there," freestanding. This conventional account ultimately collides with its own lurking objectivism. Thus, as a construction, as a social product, and as a barrier to discourse, race lies beyond the ken of the conventional legal theory.
From President Lincoln to Justice O'Connor, from classical to modern American law, this specious perspective has imposed false horizons on our values and discourse. This figure of race seeks to draw its line of difference in the dialogue about democracy and equality between those who fit within and those who fit without. So long as this unreconstructed trope of difference remains as the lens -- indeed as the dark glass

Tournament: Any | Round: Finals | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any
The promotion of the “marketplace of ideas” converts the political process into an economic one, making speech a commodity, which only strengthens neoliberalism. Brown 15
Brown, Wendy. Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism's stealth revolution. MIT Press, 2015. 2 January 2017.
At times, kennedy raises the pitch in Citizens United to depict limits on corporate funding of PAC ads as “an outright ban on speech”;19 at other times, he casts them merely as inappropriate government inter- vention and bureaucratic weightiness.20 But beneath all the hyperbole about government’s chilling of corporate speech is a crucial rhetorical move: the figuring of speech as analogous to capital in “the political marketplace.” on the one hand, government intervention is featured throughout the opinion as harmful to the marketplace of ideas that speech generates.21 Government restrictions damage freedom of speech just as they damage all freedoms. on the other hand, the unfettered accumulation and circulation of speech is cast as an unqual- ified good, essential to “the right of citizens to inquire...hear... speak...and use information to reach consensus itself a precondi- tion to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”22 not merely corporate rights, then, but democracy as a whole is at stake in the move to deregulate speech. Importantly, however, democ- racy is here conceived as a marketplace whose goods—ideas, opinions, and ultimately, votes—are generated by speech, just as the economic market features goods generated by capital. In other words, at the very moment that Justice kennedy deems disproportionate wealth irrele- vant to the equal rights exercised in this marketplace and the utili- tarian maximization these rights generate, speech itself acquires the status of capital, and a premium is placed on its unrestricted sources and unimpeded flow.¶ What is significant about rendering speech as capital? economiza- tion of the political occurs not through the mere application of market principles to nonmarket fields, but through the conversion of political processes, subjects, categories, and principles to economic ones. This is the conversion that occurs on every page of the kennedy opinion. If everything in the world is a market, and neoliberal markets con- sist only of competing capitals large and small, and speech is the capital of the electoral market, then speech will necessarily share cap- ital’s attributes: it appreciates through calculated investment, and it advances the position of its bearer or owner. Put the other way around, once speech is rendered as the capital of the electoral marketplace, it is appropriately unrestricted and unregulated, fungible across actors and venues, and existing solely for the advancement or enhancement of its bearer’s interests. The classic associations of political speech with freedom, conscience, deliberation, and persuasion are nowhere in sight.¶ How, precisely, is speech capital in the kennedy opinion? How does it come to be figured in economic terms where its regulation or restriction appears as bad for its particular marketplace and where its monopolization by corporations appears as that which is good for all? The transmogrification of speech into capital occurs on a number of levels in kennedy’s account. First, speech is like capital in its tendency to proliferate and circu- late, to push past barriers, to circumvent laws and other restrictions, indeed, to spite efforts at intervention or suppression.23 speech is thus rendered as a force both natural and good, one that can be wrongly impeded and encumbered, but never quashed.¶ second, persons are not merely producers, but consumers of speech, and government interference is a menace—wrong in prin- ciple and harmful in effect—at both ends. The marketplace of ideas, kennedy repeats tirelessly, is what decides the value of speech claims. every citizen must judge the content of speech for himself or herself; it cannot be a matter for government determination, just as govern- ment should not usurp other consumer choices.24 In this discussion, kennedy makes no mention of shared deliberation or judgment in politics or of voices that are unfunded and relatively powerless. He is focused on the wrong of government “commanding where a per- son may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, using censorship to control thought.”25 If speech generates goods consumed according to individual choice, govern- ment distorts this market by “banning the political speech of millions of associations of citizens” (that is, corporations) and by paternal- istically limiting what consumers may know or consider. Again, if speech is the capital of the political marketplace, then we are polit- ically free when it circulates freely. And it circulates freely only when corporations are not restricted in what speech they may fund or promulgate.¶ Third, kennedy casts speech not as a medium for expression or dialogue, but rather as innovative and productive, just as capital is. There is “a creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expres- sion” that intersects in a lively way with “rapid changes in technol- ogy” to generate the public good.26 This aspect of speech, kennedy argues, specifically “counsels against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”27 Again, the dynamism, innovativeness, and generativity of speech, like that of all capital, is dampened by government intervention.¶ Fourth, and perhaps most important in establishing speech as the capital of the electoral marketplace, kennedy sets the power of speech and the power of government in direct and zero-sum-game opposition to one another. Repeatedly across the lengthy opinion for the majority, he identifies speech with freedom and government with control, cen- sorship, paternalism, and repression.28 When free speech and govern- ment meet, it is to contest one another: the right of speech enshrined in the First Amendment, he argues, is “premised on mistrust of gov- ernmental power” and is “an essential mechanism of democracy because it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”29 Here are other variations on this theme in the opinion:¶ The First Amendment was certainly not understood by the framers to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media. It was understood as a response to the repression of speech.30¶ When Government seeks to use its full power, including criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.... The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.31 This reading of the First Amendment and of the purpose of political speech positions government and speech as warring forces parallel to those of government and capital in a neoliberal economy.

Thus you turn the AC because the commodification of speech reflects the capitalist illusion of freedom. It makes speech meaningless and kills value to life. Smith 14
R.C. Smith April 24, 2014 “POWER, CAPITAL and THE RISE OF THE MASS SURVEILLANCE STATE: ON THE ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY, ETHICS, DISENCHANTMENT and CRITICAL THEORY” Heathwood Institute and Press http://www.heathwoodpress.com/power-capital-the-rise-of-the-mass-surveillance-state-on-the-absence-of-democracy-ethics-disenchantment-critical-theory/
One pressing issue, moreover, is that majority of the popular movements that have emerged in response to the Snowden leaks appear to be reformist in character. As a result, the discourse isn’t so much about fundamental system change; rather it becomes crafted into making mass surveillance less repulsive and more socially acceptable, even marketable. (Consider, for instance, the latest reforms proposed by President Barack Obama). For Adorno, this reformist inclination can be explained in part through an analysis of the logic of the system of capital. We read in Adorno how under modernity – i.e., capitalism – human beings are treated as commodities4 and the political-economy, which is principled on concentrations of power (i.e., ‘contradictory recognition’5), goes over the head of the individual, particularly as ‘coercive society’ aims to ‘shape people’ on behalf of the economic, social and political status quo.6 The system of capital, along with the instrumental use of Enlightenment ideals to promote a rational, efficient system7 have laid a foundation for society wherein the political-economy influences individuals and manufactures consent.8 Accordingly, people are seen as “substitutable entities valued merely for their instrumental uses or ability to command market resources,” and even where “commodification is resisted, the overriding pull of society is toward the status quo and those forms that are valued by society”. 9 As Kate Schick writes: The mind thus shapes itself into socially acceptable, marketable forms and freedom becomes an illusion, made all the more dangerous and difficult to resist because of the appearance of freedom. This is not the fault of Enlightenment ideals as such, but the instrumental use of these ideals in the promotion of a rational, efficient system: ‘The network of the whole is drawn ever tighter, modelled after the act of exchange’ (Adorno 1981: 21).10 Present in the logic of the system of capital itself is not an ‘emancipatory reason’ that aims toward universal guiding principles of an actually egalitarian democracy – i.e., Equality, Egalitarianism, Justice, Rights, etc. Rather, in modern capitalism, with its instrumental reason and positivist logic, such concepts lose their meaning.11 The social narrative no longer accommodates these fundamental principles or judges them to be delusions, because all concepts must be strictly functional in order to be considered “reasonable”.12 In turn, the ideals of a ‘good’ society, for example ideals toward an actual egalitarian democracy, become dependent on the “interests” of the dominant and governing system, which produces and reproduces the epistemic context of its own validity

AND

Capitalism means that there is no value to life by causes both the biological and ontological extinction of humanity- is is a try or die for the alt. Simonovic 07
Simonovic 07 Ljubodrag Simonovic, Ph.D., Philosophy; M.A., Law; author of seven books, 2007, A New World is Possible, “Basis of contemporary critical theory of capitalism.”
The final stage of a mortal combat between mankind and capitalism is in progress. A specificity of capitalism is that, in contrast to "classical" barbarism (which is of destructive, murderous and plundering nature), it annihilates life by creating a "new world" – a "technical civilization" and an adequate, dehumanized and denaturalized man. Capitalism has eradicated man from his (natural) environment and has cut off the roots through which he had drawn life-creating force. Cities are "gardens" of capitalism where degenerated creatures "grow". Dog excrement, gasoline and sewerage stench, glaring advertisements and police car rotating lights that howl through the night - this is the environment of the "free world" man. By destroying the natural environment capitalism creates increasingly extreme climatic conditions in which man is struggling harder and harder to survive – and creates artificial living conditions accessible solely to the richest layer of population, which cause definitive degeneration of man as a natural being. "Humanization of life" is being limited to creation of micro-climatic conditions, of special capitalistic incubators - completely commercialized artificial living conditions to which degenerated people are appropriate. The most dramatic truth is: capitalism can survive the death of man as a human and biological being. For capitalism a "traditional man" is merely a temporary means of its own reproduction. "Consumer-man" represents a transitional phase in the capitalism-caused process of mutation of man towards the "highest" form of capitalistic man: a robot-man. "Terminators" and other robotized freaks which are products of the Hollywood entertainment industry which creates a "vision of the future" degenerated in a capitalist manner, incarnate creative powers, alienated from man, which become vehicles for destruction of man and life. A new "super race" of robotized humanoids is being created, which should clash with "traditional mankind", meaning with people capable of loving, thinking, daydreaming, fighting for freedom and survival - and impose their rule over the Earth. Instead of the new world, the "new man" is being created - who has been reduced to a level of humanity which cannot jeopardize the ruling order. Science and technique have become the basic lever of capital for the destruction of the world and the creation of "technical civilization". It is not only about destruction achieved by the use of technical means. It is about technicization of social institutions, of interpersonal relations, of the human body. Increasing transformation of nature into a surrogate of "nature", increasing dehumanization of the society and increasing denaturalization of man are direct consequences of capital's effort, within an increasingly merciless global economic war, to achieve complete commercialization of both natural and the social environment. The optimism of the Enlightenment could hardly be unreservedly supported nowadays, the notion of Marx that man imposes on himself only such tasks as he can solve, particularly the optimism based on the myth of the "omnipotence" of science and technique. The race for profits has already caused irreparable and still unpredictable damage to both man and his environment. By the creation of "consumer society", which means through the transition of capitalism into a phase of pure destruction, such a qualitative rise in destruction of nature and mankind has been performed that life on the planet is literally facing a "countdown". Instead of the "withering away" (Engels) of institutions of the capitalist society, the withering away of life is taking place. sic

Thus, the alt is to reject the AC and its neoliberalist ideas AND to engage in a ruthless critique of neoliberalism.
Johnston 04 (Adrian, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of New Mexico, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, Volume 9/Issue 3)
Perhaps the absence of a detailed practical roadmap in Žižek’s political writings isn’t a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby truly to open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Žižek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance 127 (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle 128). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining just an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the earlier analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing 93 more than a kind of “magic,” that is, the belief in money’s social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance’s powers. The “external” obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, “internally” believe in it—capitalism’s life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others’ belief in the socioperformative force emanating from this same material. 

The alt solves because CX is binding, they said the AC gets implemented at public universities and colleges. The only way to prevent the cycle of Neoliberalism is to stop it at its core, and thus you reject the idea of marketplace of ideas and engage in a full out critique of neoliberlisim.

Tournament: Any | Round: Finals | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any
The AC’s representations of the suffering are a form of a commodification of the ballot that factionalizes and fractures momentum necessary to allow meaningful social change- an attempt at winning the battle while forfeiting the war. Karlberg 03
(Michael Karlberg, Assistant Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PEACE and CHANGE, v28, n3, July, p. 339-41)

Granted, social activists do "win" occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger "wars" arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles the most committed environmentalists acknowledge things are not going well. In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the "left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century's closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the a new left under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict. In this regard, the political "left" and "right" both define themselves in terms at a common adversary—the "other"—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right axe both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources at conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facing us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its "left" and is "right," or its "north" and its "south," or its "east" and its "west" are locked in adversarial relationships.

This proscription of power to the ballot; a tool of the oppressing majority, is a form of charity which forever indebts the affirmative team to the judge and only serves to reinforce the empowerment of the oppressor. Williams 2000
WILLIAMS 2k (Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, “The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the ‘Gift’ of the Majority,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2000, pgs. 321-343)

Reciprocation on your part is impossible. Even if one day you are able to return our monetary favor twofold, we will always know that it was us who first hosted you; extended to and entrusted in you an opportunity given your time of need. As the initiators of such a charity, we are always in a position of power, and you are always indebted to us. This is where the notion of egoism or conceit assumes a hegemonic role. By giving to you, a supposed act of generosity in the name of furthering your cause, we have not empowered you. Rather, we have empowered ourselves. We have less than subtlely let you know that we have more than you. We have so much more, in fact, that we can afford to give you some. Our giving becomes, not an act of beneficence, but a show of power, that is, narcissistic hegemony! Thus, we see that the majority gift is a ruse: a simulacrum of movement toward aporetic equality and a simulation of democratic justice. By relying on the legislature (representing the majority) when economic and social opportunities are availed to minority or underrepresented collectives, the process takes on exactly the form of Derrida’s gift. The majority controls the political, economic, legal, and social arenas; that is, it is (and always has been) in control of such communities as the employment sector and the educational system. The mandated opportunities that under- or nonrepresented citizens receive as a result of this falsely eudemonic endeavor are gifts and, thus, ultimately constitute an effort to make minority populations feel better. There is a sense of movement toward equality in the name of democratic justice, albeit falsely manufactured. 18 In return for this effort, the majority shows off its long-standing authority (this provides a stark realization to minority groups that power elites are the forces that critically form society as a community), forever indebts under- and nonrepresented classes to the generosity of the majority (after all, minorities groups now have, presumably, a real chance to attain happiness), and, in a more general sense, furthers the narcissism of the majority (its representatives have displayed power and have been generous). Thus, the ruse of the majority gift assumes the form and has the hegemonical effect of empowering the empowered, relegitimating the privileged, and fueling the voracious conceit of the advantaged. 

Voting aff is a simulation of real change- it produces change no more than liking a progressive post on Facebook. It created no tangible results when we walk out of the round and frames the ballot to be no more than pseudo-progress. Williams 2k
WILLIAMS 2k (Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, “The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the ‘Gift’ of the Majority,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2000, pgs. 321-343)

The impediments to establishing democratic justice in contemporary American society have caused a national paralysis; one that has recklessly spawned an aporetic1 existence for minorities. The entrenched ideological complexities afflicting under- and nonrepresented groups (e.g., poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, crime) at the hands of political, legal, cultural, and economic power elites have produced counterfeit, perhaps even fraudulent, efforts at reform: Discrimination and inequality in opportunity prevail (e.g., Lynch and Patterson, 1996). The misguided and futile initiatives of the state, in pursuit of transcending this public affairs crisis, have fostered a reification, that is, a reinforcement of divisiveness. This time, however, minority groups compete with one another for recognition, affirmation, and identity in the national collective psyche (Rosenfeld, 1993). What ensues by way of state effort, though, is a contemporaneous sense of equality for all and a near imperceptible endorsement of inequality; a silent conviction that the majority still retains power. The “gift” of equality, procured through state legislative enactments as an emblem of democratic justice, embodies true (legitimated) power that remains nervously secure in the hands of the majority. The ostensible empowerment of minority groups is a facade; it is the ruse of the majority gift. What exists, in fact, is a simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981, 1983) of equality (and by extension, democratic justice): a pseudo-sign image (a hypertext or simulation) of real sociopolitical progress.

Thus the Alt is to vote neg as a way of not voting aff. Their plea for change through wining the ballot only serves to reproducing the very evil that they critique. Atchison and Panetta 09
ATCHISON AND PANETTA 2009 (Jarrod Atchison, Director of Debate @ Trinity University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate @ the University of Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, p. 317-34)

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.