Tournament: All | Round: 1 | Opponent: You, probably | Judge: idk
Hi! I'm Logan, i hope our round goes well!
I intend to probably maybe disclose some this year.
ANYONE ON MY TEAM WILL DISCLOSE HERE TOO. It will be here. dont you dare read disclosure theory on my novices or i will cut you lol.(not serious about that but its not cool to do that)
i will at bids maybe not at locals because like nobody does?
If I haven't, or I have and you have questions/comments/anything debate related you want to talk about contact me at 817-995-0135, loganreed101@att.net, or FB. Texts get the quickest responses generally. If i did something in round that upset you i need you to tell me PLEASE because i want debate to be a good space for all of us!!!!
She/they pronouns (even if I'm not passing please-its very appreciated)
I bracket for gendered language and grammar. If this is a problem tell me before the round?
trigger warnings- suicide, queer and trans violence and trans homelessness. ask me before reading. Thank you.
Just please be nice. I try to be. lets have fun and learn something from an activity we all love!
0-read first
1-misc and non topical affs
2-sepoct
3-novdec
4-janfeb
5-march april
6-national tournaments

Tournament: Byron Nelson | Round: 3 | Opponent: Lovejoy EH | Judge: John Sims
interp- if debaters read explicit rape impacts, they must provide explicit trigger warnings before their speech. 

standards- 

1. triggering
   2. safe spaces
   3. jurisdiction

vote on Edu/fairness as gateway to Edu

Tournament: Cypress Bae | Round: 1 | Opponent: Same person | Judge: Also same
interp- The affirmative may specify a method of implementing qualified immunity if they assert their method in an unconditional advocacy text with a carded advocate within the topic lit.
i meet
standards- 

1. predictability
   2. limits
   3. inevitability
   4. real world edu
   ROB 1st- but also F

Tournament: UT | Round: 1 | Opponent: All | Judge: All
See open source

Tournament: St James | Round: Finals | Opponent: St Andrews Episcopal BM | Judge: panel
Interp- Negatives must not advocate for the aff plan in addition to another action. For clarification, no plans plus counterplans.
a. predictability
b. limits
c. clash
vote on fairness, ROB

Tournament: Unbroken | Round: 1 | Opponent: NA | Judge: NA
Anthro K AFF

Resolved: Countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power.

Part 1 is the Framework
I affirm and value morality, derived from ought.
The resolution is a guide from which we derive any meaning and with that meaning we must understand and accept the assumptions that come with the discourse that we use. We must investigate this discourse in order to determine what is inherent in the acceptance of the terms we use. This is especially true in the context of non human animals and the discourse involving them. Our representations of the Other in the form of the animal is the self-fulfilling prophecy we tell ourselves to justify the relegation of animals as lesser beings and as a way to justify our immoral actions.
Bekoff 1, Marc. “A Global Explanation of Our Connections with Animals.” Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships 3 .Eth-Liv (2007): 1044-1045. The University of New Mexico. Web. 1 Sept. 2014.
Every instance of communication serves to negotiate and construct meaning. If one refers to “the human relationship with other animals,” the inclusion of the word “other” before the word “animals” emphasizes the state of humans as animals themselves. This is contrary to the popular usage of the term “animals,” which has conventional mean¬ings that generally exclude humans. A reader might take the next step and ask, How does this particular popular usage of the word “animals” serve to construct knowledge of the human relationship with animals—through its repeated usage does it help reproduce the idea that humans are different from animals or are not animals? Or a reader might ask, Why is this perception of humans as different or separate from animals ingrained in the way we communicate—do overarching cultural, scientific, economic, religious, or other social forces help maintain this understanding? These are precisely the types of questions asked by scholars who study discourse. French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault (1926-84) developed the theory that discourses, or systems of language and representation, are productive, net-like organ¬izations of communication that permeate society at every level with power relations. For Foucault, not only do discourses produce meaning, but this meaning also regulates the way people behave and constructs the way people view themselves and the world. Con¬temporary scholars have been profoundly influenced by this idea. This move toward dis¬course, or the cultural or discursive turn, is one of the most significant paradigm shifts in the social sciences to occur in recent years. The level o words is a good place to start, looking at small-scale but important ele¬ments of discursive systems and their connection to the human relationship with ani¬mals. When a criminal is described on the evening news as “an animal,” or a survivor of genocide exclaims, “We were treated like animals,” certain culturally conventional mean¬ings are associated with the word “animal”. In the criminal's case, “animal” carries the connotation that one is violent and out of control; in the survivor's case, “animal” con¬notes that one is unworthy of respect or even life. Likewise, when someone calls another a “chicken” or a “pig,” certain meanings are conventionally associated: “chicken” con¬notes cowardly, and “pig” connotes gluttonous or filthy Although it may be obvious that the popular connotations in these instances are negative and often inaccurate (chickens bravely protect their chicks, and pigs avoid messing their living areas, tend not to overeat, and lack functional sweat glands to even “sweat like a pig”), scholars argue that these meanings serve to reinforce and are reinforced by larger-scale socially constructed understandings about animals. So, how do these animal metaphors work to actually inform or shape knowledge? Without associated meanings, words are neutral symbols. It is through the sociocultural constructive process of communication that humans negotiate what these symbols signify. The words are generated within larger discourses and get their meaning by virtue of their relatedness to other words, grammars, and practices within their respective systems. In turn, the particular uses of words help to uphold an respective knowledge system, or ide¬ology, giving hidden assumptions the appearance of being merely common sense, of being normal (as it should be), natural (as it is supposed to be), and neutral (neither bad nor good and having nothing to do with power). The examples of “animal,” “chicken,” and “pig” are that of metaphor, and more extensive animal metaphors permeate discourse about the human relationship with ani¬mals. For example, one Western metaphor for animals is that of commodities or machines that generate resources For human consumption (e.g., “animal units' in agri¬cultural talk), Metaphors, like other symbolic elements of communication, help to shape knowledge by privileging some options of conceptualizing and concealing others. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that metaphors often serve as guides for future action that will fit the metaphor. Such action will, in turn, and reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. Metaphors, in this sense, can be self-fulfilling prophecies. If, in different discourses, an animal is seen as a dumb brute, a spirit guide, a majestic icon, a loved companion, a pest, a respected member of a shared ecosystem, a pet, or a powerful and sacred entity, that animal will accordingly be treated as such. Scholars who study discourse assert that all communication is interested. By this, scholars mean that all communication contains an action plan of how to think about something or how to act with or toward something. Dominant ways of representing animals, therefore, favor certain ways of seeing and thinking about and relating with animals. At the same time, alternative ways of representing animals that might encourage different rela¬tions are often rendered difficult to 'select in part because taken-for-granted dominant representations preclude other such choices.
Therefore, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best performatively and methodologically deconstructs the non-human animal, human animal binary, allowing for an authentic relationship that terminates this otherizing violence. This requires that we embrace an ecopedagological stance that recognizes the solidarity between the two groups and works towards a strategy that forces us to reconsider and reform our relationship to our shared environment.
Kahn, Richard V. The afterword from “Critical pedagogy, ecoliteracy, and planetary crisis: the ecopedagogy movement.” New York: Peter Lang, 2010. Print.
Richard Kahn’s groundbreaking work Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement is distinguished by its merging of perspectives from a Frankfurt School–inspired critical theory of society with a broad range of figures within critical pedagogy to provide conceptual foundations on behalf of a critical ecopedagogy movement that is mounting both within the academy and the larger activist community. Kahn opens by evoking the magnitude of the current ecological crisis and a corresponding crisis in environmental education. He cites figures indicating that although most serious educators are in favor in principle of offering environmental education, the actually existing programs are few and are usually marginalized. Moreover, as Kahn argues, the dominant models of environmental education abstract the ecosphere from developments in the economy, science, and technology, and are generally uncritical of the existing society and. Hence, they are unable to provide real insight into the causes of our ecological crisis and to mobilize on behalf of adequate responses. In addition, existing eco-education all too often lacks solid philosophical and ethical vision, needed to discern the dialectical relationships between nature and culture as well as to produce forms of consciousness that recognize the importance of a sustainable society that is inclusive of all forms of life. Kahn argues that part of the ecological crisis is the historical development of an anthropocentric worldview grounded in a sense that nature is a stuff of domination to be used by humans to meet their needs and purposes. Hence, a critical ecopedagogy needs to be rooted in a critique of the domination of nature, of the global technocapitalist infrastructure that puts profit and market forces before humans, nature, and social goods, and of an unfettered Big Science and Technology that has instrumental and mechanistic perspectives on nature and that fails to see the need for a robust ecological science and appropriate technologies. Kahn interprets ecopedagogy as a development of critical pedagogy that first took place in Latin America after the UN Earth Summit of 1992 held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil which inspired educators like Paulo Freire to see that a critical pedagogy must cultivate an ecological dimension. Kahn points out that the later Freire (and his Latin American associates) perceived ecopedagogy as part of a planetary movement for social and educational change through work at the grassroots level in social movements and through global educational institutions such as the Earth Charter Initiative. Kahn recognizes previous efforts that began to articulate a critical ecopedagogy in North America and lays out the contributions of previous advocates of critical pedagogy and ecoliteracy, but argues for a broader philosophical and critical vision rooted in the works of Ivan Illich and Herbert Marcuse, as well as Freire. To correct existing forms of environmental education, Kahn calls for a critical ecopedagogy that is concerned with understanding how political economy and ideology produce the domination of nature. A critical ecopedagogy promotes a dynamic and complex definition of ecoliteracy that seeks to promote the idea that while we are hemmed in by the limits of and interpolated by destructive institutional forms, we can recognize and transcend these thresholds through measures of individual transformation and collective action, which aim for sustainable place-based relationships. Fleshing out his project, Kahn engages an emergent tripartite model of ecoliteracy that involves interlocking forms of functional/technical literacy(e.g., environmental science), cultural literacy (e.g., which cultural practices/traditions further sustainability or hinder it?), and critical intersectional literacy focusing on the oppressive and liberatory potentials within political and economic structures. The project is related to normative goals of peace, social and environmental justice, and ecological well-being across species. Hence, Kahn seeks to transcend the limited framework of environmental education and to radicalize contemporary demands for sustainable development. He envisions a critical ecopedagogy that calls for analysis of ecological crisis and sustainable development to be mandated across the curriculum, that entire schools and communities come to focus on the problem of sustainability in all its myriad aspects, unlike present educational standards or policies. Yet he is wary of a too uncritical perception of the concept of “sustainable development” as a panacea to crisis since the concept itself is both nebulous and presently being utilized by all manner of corporations and states to legitimate ecologically unsustainable forms of globalization and imperialism. Kahn is thus sketching out a project that requires further development, debate, and new concepts and teaching strategies as we learn more about the environment, ecological crisis, and ways we can develop a more sustainable lifestyle and ways of living on the planet. It could be that the current global economic crisis, in conjunction with growing ecological crisis, will force us to rethink the consumer society and our drive to always create more and bigger technologies and cities and to celebrate high-consumption and high-tech lifestyles. Likewise, the global energy crisis could force us to produce new energy technologies and modes of transportation and habitation that are more ecologically sound. Or, more provocatively, it may require us to reconstruct educational emphases on the “new” and “improved” so that society can more effectively evaluate and adopt past options that became unfortunately outmoded through the unceasing drive for hegemonic forms of progress. Currently, educational, environmental, and economic policies are up for grabs in the United States and globally, as the political class and citizens grope with tremendous socioeconomic, environmental, and existential crises. The era of neoliberalism, based on a market fundamentalism that saw corporate laissez-faire solutions as the key to all social problems and economic development, is certainly ending but it is not yet clear what policies and philosophies will replace it. What follows could be worse still. In this uncertain situation, it is up to critical educators and concerned citizens to re-envision the importance of education as a means through which we can engage our current set of crises, as we develop pedagogies adequate to the challenges of the contemporary moment that can promote social transformation guided by concerns of sustainability and justice. Richard Kahn has produced an important pedagogical intervention into the ever-mounting global ecological crisis and offered critical perspectives on ways that ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy can be developed as palpable an alternatives to the status quo. It is important now for others to take up this task and to make critical ecopedagogy an important component of the reconstruction of education and society.
Part 2 is the Advocacy
My advocacy is that countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power to resist the anthropocentric mindset of the status quo. Put away your T and theory shells. My evidence indicates that the only reason why non human animals are not as heavily present in the topic lit is because the system has excluded them from its very conception. My unique advocacy is a radical deconstruction of what it means to live, and what it means to be a being worth of consideration, and most importantly, what it means to prohibit the production of nuclear power in the context of the non-human animal.
My replacement of the conventional subject of the resolution turns anthropocentrism on its head. What was normally used only to refer to the human animal is now being used to describe the non-human animal – this is the only way to tear the machine down. We’ve never given the non human animals a real chance to live, which means that any solvency deficits are just uniqueness arguments for me.
Bekoff 2, Marc. “A Global Explanation of Our Connections with Animals.” Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships 3 .Eth-Liv (2007): 1044-1045. The University of New Mexico. Web. 1 Sept. 2014.
Because discourse is systemic, the problem of dominant discourses such as mas¬tery discourse creating a wide gulf between humans and animals cannot simply be fixed by erasing certain words From the vocabulary. These erasures do little if the meanings and associations of the new words that replace them reproduce similar con¬figurations of meanings. Struggles over discourse, however, are a necessary and inter¬related part of wider struggles for change. For example, the feminist movement, in addition to battles on economic, domestic, and public fronts, has waged a protracted and successful struggle over nonsexist discourse. Deborah Cameron writes that eliminating the use of “he” as a generic pronoun in the English language does serves to help change the repertoire of social meanings and choices available. Thus, change in linguistic practice itself can be social change if it coincides with and contributes to larger-scale societal transformations. In ways similar to feminist language activism, scholars have begun to offer sugges¬tions of word and grammar change for the human relationship with animals, including the use of narration to convey a sense of individual animals' lives, grammatical choices that make animals subjects if they are the primary actors or victims (e.g., the horse approached the girl), and verbs that imply animal emotional intention (e.g., the deer “fled” instead of “ran”). Dunayer also suggests avoiding expressions that elevate humans above other animals (e.g., “the sanctity of human life”); human-animal com¬parisons that patronize animals (e.g., “my dog is almost human”); terms that portray animals relatively Free of human control and genetic manipulation as dangerous or infe¬rior awareness about the metaphors one lives by and by having one's personal experiences with animals form the basis of alternative metaphors. In this way, one can develop what Lakoff and Johnson call an “experiential flexibility” to engage to an unending process of viewing one's life through new metaphors that open alternative ways of thinking. Ethnographic research on whale watching in the Pacific Northwest provides an example. Many whale watch boat naturalists and captains frequently use the word “show” to describe the physically close and emotionally exciting experiences people have with the killer whales, or orcas. For example, a captain might tell another captain over the marine radio, or a naturalist might say to tourists on the boat, “That was quite a show today,” after orcas swim close by the boat or engage in nearby boisterous activity, such as fin slapping or breaching out of the water. Because each word gets its meaning by virtue of its relatedness to other words and discursive formations within its respective structure, one can interpret how the partic¬ular word choice of “show” relates to popular Western communication, informed by anthropocentric mastery representations of exciting or amusing animal behavior as per¬formance or, more directly and ironically, representations by the marine entertainment industry of captive orcas trained to perform tricks for humans. Such mastery represen¬tations, however, are contradictory to the good-faith intentions of naturalists and cap¬tains to educate tourists about the behavior of whales in their natural habitats and to inform respectful understandings.
My advocacy brings to light the plight of millions of non human animals all over the world. When they can be killed without regard in the most brutal ways, it is time for a change. Gross violations should no longer be tolerated. It is because the 1AC opens the gates for revolution and change, that I stand in affirmation.
Part 3 is the Contention Level Offense
First, the universe does not belong to humans: the value placed on nuclear power as a resource detaches us from nature and entrenches anthropocentrism.
Berry 95 (Thomas, Ph.D. from the Catholic University of America in European intellectual history  “The viable human” in Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, ed. George Sessions)
Ecologists recognize that reducing the planet to a resource base for consumer use in an industrial society is already a spiritual and psychic degradation. Our main experience of the divine, the world of the sacred, has been diminished as money and utility values have taken precedence over spiritual, aesthetic, emotional, and religious values in our attitude toward the natural world. Any recovery of the natural world will require not only extensive financial funding but a conversion experience deep in the psychic structure of the human. Our present dilemma is the consequence of a disturbed psychic situation, a mental imbalance, an emotional insensitivity, none of which can be remedied by any quickly contrived adjustment. Nature has been severely, and in many cases irreversibly, damaged. Healing can occur and new life can sometimes be evoked, but only with the same intensity of concern and sustained vigor of action as that which brought about the damage in the first place. Yet, without this healing, the viability of the human is severely limited. The basic orientation of the common law tradition is toward personal rights and toward the natural world as existing for human use. There is no provision for recognition of nonhuman beings as subjects having legal rights. To the ecologists, the entire question of possession and use of the earth, either by individuals or by establishments, needs to be profoundly reconsidered. The naive assumption that the natural world exists solely to be possessed and used by humans for their unlimited advantage cannot be accepted. The earth belongs to itself and to all the component members of the community. The entire earth is a gorgeous celebration of existence in all its forms. Each living thing participates in the celebration as the proper fulfillment of its powers of expression. The reduction of the earth to an object simply for human possession and use is unthinkable in most traditional cultures. To Peter Drucker, the entrepreneur creates resources and values. Before it is possessed and used, “every plant is a weed and every mineral is just another rock” (innovation and Entrepreneurship, 1985 pg. 30). To the industrial entrepreneur, human possession and use is what activates the true value of any natural object.

Second, Nuclear power constantly puts the environment danger at every step of the process, which perpetuates the anthropocentric mindset society is obsessed with. (process)
Jaffer 11 (Misam, Standford university student, “Impact of Nuclear Power Plants”) Perhaps the impact which is easiest to notice is the effect on the environment, particularly in terms of flora and fauna. To start with, the setting up of a nuclear plant requires a large area, preferably situated near a natural water body. This is usually accompanied with clearing of forests which disturbs the natural habitat of several creatures and gradually upsets the ecological balance of the region. Apart from this, studies have shown that due to the heat rejected into the water bodies, there have been significant drops in the populations of several species of fish in certain regions of US. Another significant effect is the increased amount of sulfur dioxide in the air which causes acid rain to form which then leads to contamination of surface water bodies and of the region, reduction of productivity of the soil, and has several other negative effects on the region's vegetation and human health. 3

Further, the after effects of nuclear power are always left unaccounted for. We continue to produce nuclear power without any regard for what the consequences might be. 

PFSR writes (US affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, recipient of 1985 Nobel Prize for Peace. “Dirty, Dangerous and Expensive: The Truth About Nuclear Power” No date, cites as recent as 2005, website copyrighted at 2016) Each year, enormous quantities of radioactive waste are created during the nuclear fuel process, including 2,000 metric tons of high-level radioactive waste(1) and 12 million cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste(2) in the U.S. alone. More than 58,000 metric tons of highly radioactive spent fuel already has accumulated at reactor sites around the U.S. for which there currently is no permanent repository. Even without new nuclear production, the inventory of commercial spent fuel in the U.S. already exceeds the 63,000 metric ton statutory capacity of the controversial Yucca Mountain repository, which has yet to receive a license to operate. Even if Yucca Mountain is licensed, the Department of Energy has stated that it would not open before 2017. Uranium, which must be removed from the ground, is used to fuel nuclear reactors. Uranium mining, which creates serious health and environmental problems, has disproportionately impacted indigenous people because much of the world’s uranium is located under indigenous land. Uranium miners experience higher rates of lung cancer, tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases. The production of 1,000 tons of uranium fuel generates approximately 100,000 tons of radioactive tailings and nearly one million gallons of liquid waste containing heavy metals, and arsenic in addition to and radioactivity.(3) These uranium tailings have contaminated rivers and lakes. A new method of uranium mining, known as in-situ leaching, does not produce tailings but it does threaten contamination of groundwater water supplies.

And, Anthropocentric human domination over the natural world is an ongoing systematic genocide that gets ignored in ethical discussions. This is why having the discussion in academic space is key. It stems from the same mindset that causes racism, sexism, all discrimination; this cycle of violence must be broken.
Deckha 10 writes
While the intersection of race and gender is often acknowledged in understanding the etiology of justificatory narratives for war, the presence of species distinctions and the importance of the subhuman are less appreciated.  Yet, the race (and gender) thinking that animates Razack’s argument in normalizing violence for detainees (and others) is also centrally sustained by the subhuman figure.  As Charles Patterson notes with respect to multiple forms of exploitation:  Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animas and do the same to them.  Patterson emphasizes how the human/animal hierarchy and our ideas about animals and animality are foundational for intra-human hierarchies and the violence they promote.  The routine violence against beings designated subhuman serves as both a justification and blueprint for violence against humans.  For example, in discussing the specific dynamics of the Nazi camps, Patterson further notes how techniques to make the killing of detainees resemble the slaughter of animals were deliberately implemented in order to make the killing seem more palatable and benign. That the detainees were made naked and kept crowded in the gas chambers facilitated their animalization and, in turn, their death at the hands of other humans who were already culturally familiar and comfortable with killing animals in this way.  Returning to Razack’s exposition of race thinking in contemporary camps, one can see how subhuman thinking is foundational to race thinking.  One of her primary arguments is that race thinking, which she defines as “the denial of a common bond of humanity between people of European descent and those who are not”, is “a defining feature of the world order” today as in the past.  In other words, it is the “species thinking” that helps to create the racial demarcation.  As Razack notes with respect to the specific logic infusing the camps, they “are not simply contemporary excesses born of the west’s current quest for security, but instead represent a more ominous, permanent arrangement of who is and is not a part of the human community”.  Once placed outside the “human” zone by race thinking, the detainees may be handled lawlessly and thus with violence that is legitimated at all times. Racialization is not enough and does not complete their Othering experience. Rather, they must be dehumanized for the larger public to accept the violence against them and the increasing “culture of exception” which sustains these human bodily exclusions.  Although nonhumans are not the focus of Razack’s work, the centrality of the subhuman to the logic of the camps and racial and sexual violence contained therein is also clearly illustrated in her specific examples.  In the course of her analysis, to determine the import of race thinking in enabling violence, Razack quotes a newspaper story that describes the background mentality of Private Lynndie England, the white female soldier made notorious by images of her holding onto imprisoned and naked Iraqi men with a leash around their necks.  The story itself quotes a resident from England’s hometown who says the following about the sensibilities of individuals from their town:  To the country boys here, if you’re a different nationality, a different race, you’re sub-human. That’s the way that girls like Lynndie England are raised. Tormenting Iraqis, in her mind, would be no different from shooting a turkey. Every season here you’re hunting something. Over there they’re hunting Iraqis.  Razack extracts this quote to illustrate how “race overdetermined what went on”, but it may also be observed that species “overdetermined what went on”. Race has a formative function, to be sure, but it works in conjunction with species difference to enable the violence at Abu Ghraib and other camps.  Dehumanization promotes racialization, which further entrenches both identities. It is an intertwined logic of race, sex, culture and species that lays the foundation for the violence.
Part 4 is Impact and Ballot Framing
The role of the intellectual in academic spaces is to reject the proliferation of harmful mindsets. This is the only impact that we can access outside of the debate round. When you sign your ballot the resolution doesn’t automatically become true or false, but you CAN endorse a mindset change that can actually spark real world change. Moreover, our mindset in framing social issues shapes our ability to effectively solve the problems we discuss in the real world.
Blum (Andrew Managing Partner, the Triumph Group “Managing Mindset to Break the Cycle of Reactive Decision-Making”, March 31, 2012, Training, JS)
Mindset is the underlying beliefs and assumptions we bring to a situation, conscious or unconscious. It is our inner dialogue reflecting our view of reality, and it shapes how we interpret situations, how we act, and how we are acted upon. For instance, when you enter a dialogue with a creative mindset, you look to advance and build on the discussion at hand. On the other hand, if you approach a conversation with a critical mindset, you believe your value-add is to point out flaws and missing elements. Both creative and critical mindsets are essential in business, but when people’s mindsets are inconsistent with the needs and goals of the situation, problems occur—often in the form of unproductive or counterproductive action. Skills training will not lead to sustained behavior change unless you address underlying mindsets in parallel. For example, people can be trained in innovation practices—tools to advance creativity, such as the “plussing” Pixar is known for (Sims. Peter, Little Bets: How Breakthrough Ideas Emerge from Small Discoveries, New York: Free Press, 2011)—but those skills will never be effectively applied by someone with an unconsciously skeptical mindset. Skepticism will surface as negative languageand lead to a focus on flaws. Similarly, someone with rigorous quality management training operating from a creative mindsetmight tend to focus on what is working or look for opportunities to innovate but fail to identify and address flaws, breakdowns, or substandard outcomes. Managing and Changing Mindset Through Responsible Inquiry As success largely depends on ensuring the mindset people bring is appropriate to the situation, the first step in managingand changingmindset is creating awareness. When people are unaware of their own mindset, they remain in a reactive pattern driven by unconscious beliefs and assumptions. Though they may believe they’re trying to do things differently, they often experience repeated failures in the same activities because their actions are shaped continually by the same unconscious, unproductive mindsets. In working with a senior leader at a large technology company (let’s call him Bill), I observed this dynamic in play and helped him apply a simple strategy to get control of and manage his mindset. Bill operated predominantly from a fear-based mindset with the underlying belief that he was “at risk.” Regardless of the situation, his immediate orientation was to look at the places where he was likely to be held unfairly accountable, or to the places where the opinion of others might negatively affect him. With that unconscious predisposition, nearly every action he took had some measure of defensiveness in it. No matter how much Bill tried to reshape his actions, they were unconsciously driven by a mindset of fear. This changed as we began to note and question his fear-based assumptions through a process called “Responsible Inquiry.” When he would say something such as, “If I blow this, I am gone,” we agreed to pause, call it out as an assumption, and note the mindset behind it. With just a bit of dialogue he was able to see that his general fear of failure often was applied inappropriately to situations that, in reality, entailed little risk. We took this a step further and examined the actionsthat arose from his assumptions, and saw that as soon as Bill believed his mistake would get him fired, he immediately took a set of defensive and largely unproductive actions. Ironically, he began to see that those defensive actions were more likely to lead to him being fired than courageous actions he might have taken if he weren’t being driven by fear. Through this simple process, Bill saw the connection between his mindset and actions. More importantly, he began to understand that his results were less a function of his actions than of his underlying thinking, and he was able to break the cycle of unconscious reactivity and make choices more consistent with his true intent. The entire process of mindset management is based on three premises: My mindset drives my actions. I am in control of my mindsets. To take different actions and produce different results, I must own and manage my mindsets. Until a leader accepts his/her own “responsibility” in all of this, mindsets and their subsequent actions are something that will remain “outside of the leader.” Much of the work in mindset management focuses on developing awareness, followed by a responsible mindset driven by the underlying belief: “I am an integral factor in everything that occurs and can influence every situation through my thinking, actions, and reactions.” Defining and managing mindset, along with developing a responsible mindset, offers leaders the key to fundamental change and previously unachievable results. Without these distinctions and practices, however, mindset joins the multitude of esoteric buzzwords that are thrown around without clear definition.

And the AC framing comes first for 2 additional reasons -
First, Anthropocentrism is always epistemically suspect. We must privilege alternative forms of knowledge production, especially in academic spaces.
Das 14 writes
Parallax describes the apparent change in the direction of a moving object caused by alteration in the observer's position. In the graphic work of M.C. Escher, human faculties are similarly deceived and an impossible reality made plausible. While not strictly a scientific theorem, anthropocentrism, the assessment of reality through an exclusively human perspective, is deeply embedded in science and culture. Improving knowledge requires abandoning anthropocentricity or, at least, acknowledging its existence. Anthropocentrism's limits derives from the physical constraints of human cognition and specific psychological attitudes. Being human entails specific faculties, intrinsic attitudes, values and belief systems that shape enquiry and understanding. The human mind has evolved a specific physical structure and bio-chemistry that shapes thought processes. The human cognitive system determines our reasoning and therefore our knowledge. Language, logic, mathematics, abstract thought,and cultural beliefs, history and memories create a specific human frame of reference, which may restrict what we can know or understand. There may be other forms of life and intelligence. The ocean has revealed creatures that live from chemo-synthesis in ecosystems around deep-sea hydrothermal vents, without access to sunlight. Life forms based on materials other than carbon may also be feasible. An entirely radical set of cognitive frameworks and alternative knowledge cannot be discounted. Like a train that can only run on tracks that determine direction and destination, human knowledge may ultimately be constrained by what evolution has made us. Knowledge was originally driven by the need to master the natural environment to meet basic biological needs—survival and genetic propagation. It was also needed to deal with the unknown and forces beyond human control. Superstition, religion, science and other belief systems evolved to meets these human needs. In the eighteenth century, medieval systems of aristocratic and religious authority were supplanted by a new model of scientific method, rational discourse, personal liberty and individual responsibility. But this did not change the basic underlying drivers. Knowledge is also influenced by human factors—fear and greed, ambition, submission and tribal collusion, altruism and jealousy, as well as complex power relationships and inter-personal group dynamics. Behavioural science illustrates the inherent biases in human thought. Announcing a boycott of certain "luxury" scientific journals, 2013 Nobel laureate Dr. Randy Schekman argued that to preserve their pre-eminence they acted like "fashion designers who create limited-edition handbags or suits…knowing scarcity stokes demand". He argued that science is being distorted by perverse incentives whereby scientists who publish in important journals with a high "impact factor" can expect promotion, pay rises and professional accolades. Understanding operates within these biological and attitudinal constraints. As Friedrich Nietzsche wrote: "every philosophy hides a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding place, every word is a mask". Understanding of fundamental issues remains limited. The cosmological nature and origins of the universe are contested. The physical source and nature of matter and energy are debated. The origins and evolution of biological life remain unresolved. Resistance to new ideas frequently restricts the development of knowledge. The history of science is a succession of controversies—a non geo-centric universe, continental drift, theory of evolution, quantum mechanics and climate change. Science, paradoxically, seems to also have inbuilt limits. Like an inexhaustible Russian doll, quantum physics is an endless succession of seemingly infinitely divisible particles. Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle posits that human knowledge about the world is always incomplete, uncertain and highly contingent. Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems of mathematical logic establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems of arithmetic. Experimental methodology and testing is flawed. Model predictions are often unsatisfactory. As Nassim Nicholas Taleb observed: "You can disguise charlatanism under the weight of equations … there is no such thing as a controlled experiment." Challenging anthropocentrism does not mean abandoning science or rational thought. It does not mean reversion to primitive religious dogma, messianic phantasms or obscure mysticism. Transcending anthropocentricity may allow new frames of reference expanding the boundary of human knowledge. It may allowing human beings to think more clearly, consider different perspectives and encourage possibilities outside the normal range of experience and thought. It may also allow a greater understanding of our existential place within nature and in the order of things. As William Shakespeare's Hamlet cautioned a friend: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy". But fundamental biology may not allow the required change of reference framework. While periodically humbled by the universe, human beings remain enamoured, for the most part, with the proposition that they are the apogee of development. But as Mark Twain observed in Letters from Earth: "He took a pride in man; man was his finest invention; man was his pet, after the housefly." Writing in The Hitchhikers' Guide to the Galaxy, the late English author Douglas Adams speculated that the earth was a powerful computer and human beings were its biological components designed by hyper-intelligent pan-dimensional beings to answer the ultimate questions about the universe and life. To date, science has not produced a conclusive refutation of this whimsical proposition. Whether or not we can go beyond anthropocentrism, it is a reminder of our limits. As Martin Rees, Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics, at Cambridge and Astronomer Royal, noted:  "Most educated people are aware that we are the outcome of nearly 4 billion years of Darwinian selection, but many tend to think that humans are somehow the culmination. Our sun, however, is less than halfway through its lifespan. It will not be humans who watch the sun's demise, 6 billion years from now. Any creatures that then exist will be as different from us as we are from bacteria or amoebae."  

Second, critiquing anthropocentrism in debate is key to opening up possibilities for those new forms of thought.
Bell and Russell 2k write
We come to critical pedagogy with a background in environmental thought and education. Of primary concern and interest to us are relationships among humans and the “more-than-human world” (Abram, 1996), the ways in which those relationships are constituted and prescribed in mo- dern industrial society, and the implications and consequences of those constructs. As a number of scholars and nature advocates have argued, the many manifestations of the current environmental crisis (e.g., species extinction, toxic contamination, ozone depletion, topsoil depletion, climate change, acid rain, deforestation) reflect predominant Western concepts of nature, nature cast as mindless matter, a mere resource to be exploited for human gain (Berman, 1981; Evernden, 1985; Merchant, 1980). An ability to respond adequately to the situation therefore rests, at least in part, on a willingness to critique prevailing discourses about nature and to consider alternative representations (Cronon, 1996; Evernden, 1992; Hayles, 1995). To this end, poststructuralist analysis has been and will continue to be invaluable.¶ It would be an all-too-common mistake to construe the task at hand as one of interest only to environmentalists. We believe, rather, that disrupting the social scripts that structure and legitimize the human domination of nonhuman nature is fundamental not only to dealing with environmental issues, but also to examining and challenging oppressive social arrangements. The exploitation of nature is not separate from the exploitation of human groups. Ecofeminists and activists for environ- mental justice have shown that forms of domination are often intimately connected and mutually reinforcing (Bullard, 1993; Gaard, 1997; Lahar, 1993; Sturgeon, 1997). Thus, if critical educators wish to resist various oppressions, part of their project they must entail calling into question, among other things, the instrumental exploitive gaze through which we humans distance ourselves from the rest of nature (Carlson, 1995).¶ For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms.¶ Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke and Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”?¶ This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112).¶ Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90).¶ Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.”¶ To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other crea- tures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale.¶ This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human ente prise is simply not questioned.¶ Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the en- vironmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, and Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.1¶ p. 190-192

Tournament: Holy cross | Round: 1 | Opponent: Isadore Newman SG | Judge: Craig Wall
Part 1 is the ROB
1st, the judge is an educator, 2 warrants
Debate is an educational setting; we represent schools in a school

B. the ballot endorses a truth claim, such as ‘I affirm’, thus the judge endorses a frame of truth, educating students with it
 

Thus, the judge has the primary obligation to deconstruct oppressive regimes. Schooling institutions, like this debate round, are especially important in this role.
Robinson, Kerry, and Cristyn Davies. "Docile bodies and heteronormative moral subjects: Constructing the child and sexual knowledge in schooling." Sexuality and Culture 12.4 (2008): 221-239.
Schools, as a discursive field, are sites where technologies of power produce ‘regimes of truth’ that uphold the hegemonic social, political and moral values of dominant and powerful groups (Foucault 1977). This is obvious within the syllabi that we examine in this discussion, in which children are constructed as heteronormative subjects. Schooling as a disciplining state apparatus has a compulsory captive audience––docile bodies––through which to constructs knowledge and discipline heternormative moral subjects. Foucault’s concept of the powerknowledge nexus operates through hegemonic discourses that are perpetuated through curricula, rules and regulations, philosophies, policies, and pedagogical practices that prevail in schooling (Foucault 1977). The regulative and repetitive practices of schooling become part of children’s habitus as they tap into the cultural, social and economic capital valued in schooling (Bourdieu 1991). Habitus refers to the dispositions, perceptions, and attitudes generated throughout an individuals’ cultural history that can enable or prohibit effective exchange or accumulation of one’s capital (Robinson and Jones-Diaz 2006). However, it is important to point out that part of the way that education is transformed is through teachers’ critical approach towards pedagogy and the curriculum. Some teachers question what constitutes ‘official knowledge’ within the mainstream curriculum to reshape and contest the power of dominant groups. Syllabi are also interpreted by individual teachers, who can include perspectives that challenge regimes of truth operating in schools. So despite our critique of educational syllabi in this paper, we need to acknowledge that some teachers would have challenged the representation of knowledge about health and its presentation. It is also important to acknowledge that even though we critique the lack of specific Docile Bodies and Heteronormative Moral Subjects 123 detail in the syllabi on sexual identity, we do so with an awareness that some teachers may have used this space (marked by an absence of definition around sexual identity) to address issues of non-heterosexuality. However, this potential ‘queer space’ may also be counteracted by other forms of regulation, including students’ surveillance of heteronormative values, or the introduction of additional policies, such as the Controversial Issues Policy that has operated along side the syllabi in NSW schools since the 1970’s.

And-specifically on topics of nuclear power, academics have a duty to critically challenge the myth of nuclear safety
Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)

of Fukushima. Rather, I count myself as culpable for allowing the existence of nuclear power plants, complying with a framework that excludes certain lives, and letting the Fukushima accident continue to cause humansuffering and environmental damage. Being in a relatively protected place as a tenured 9 professor in academia, teaching Fukushima is one way, however modest it might be, for me to be responsible and even atone for this unprecedented disaster, by bringing to critical visibility the mythic framework within which the precariousness of some lives are overlooked. 

Nuclear power is defined by Merriam Webster as
Energy that is created by splitting apart the nuclei of atoms

Part 2 is framework
Section A is ontology
1st Ontology is social. We are born into society and society sustains us- agents are socially constructed and the recognition of the social is constitutive to us being agents.
 Butler 1, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
, on a broader sociality, and this dependency is the basis of our endurance and survivability. When we assert our “right,” as we do and we must, we are not carving out a place for our autonomy—if by autonomy we mean a state of individuation, taken as self-persisting prior to and apart from any relations of dependency on the world of others. We do not negotiate with norms or with Others subsequent to our coming into the world. We come into the world on the condition that the social world is already there, laying the groundwork for us. This implies that I cannot persist without norms of recognition that support my persistence: the sense of possibility pertaining to me must first be imagined from somewhere else before I can begin to imagine myself. My reflexivity is not only socially mediated, but socially constituted. I cannot be who I am without drawing upon the sociality of norms that precede and exceed me. In this sense, I am outside myself from the outset, and must be, in order to survive, and in order to enter into the realm of the possible. To assert sexual rights, then, takes on a specific meaning against this background. It means, for instance, that when we struggle for rights, we are not simply struggling for rights that attach to my person, but we are struggling to be conceived as persons. And there is a difference between the former and the latter. If we are struggling for rights that attach, or should attach, to my personhood, then we assume that personhood as already constituted. But if we are struggling not only to be conceived as persons, but to create a social transformation of 32 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 32 the very meaning of personhood, then the assertion of rights becomes a way of intervening into the social and political process by which the human is articulated. International human rights is always in the process of subjecting the human to redefinition and renegotiation. It mobilizes the human in the service of rights, but also rewrites the human and rearticulates the human when it comes up against the cultural limits of its working conception of the human, as it does and must. Lesbian and gay human rights takes sexuality, in some sense, to be its issue. Sexuality is not simply an attribute one has or a disposition or patterned set of inclinations. It is a mode of being disposed toward others, including in the mode of fantasy, and sometimes only in the mode of fantasy. If we are outside of ourselves as sexual beings, given over from the start, crafted in part through primary relations of dependency and attachment, then it would seem that our being beside ourselves, outside ourselves, is there as a function of sexuality itself, where sexuality is not this or that dimension of our existence, not the key or bedrock of our existence, but, rather, as coextensive with existence, as Merleau-Ponty once aptly suggested.6 I have tried here to argue that our very sense of personhood is linked to the desire for recognition, and that desire places us outside ourselves, in a realm of social norms that we do not fully choose, but that provides the horizon and the resource for any sense of choice that we have. This means that the ec-static character of our existence is essential to the possibility of persisting as human. In this sense, we can see how sexual rights brings together two related domains of ec-stasy, two connected ways of being outside of ourselves. As sexual, we are dependent on a world of others, vulnerable to need, violence, betrayal, compulsion, fantasy; we project desire, and we have it projected onto us. To be part of a sexual minority means, most emphatically, that we are also dependent on the protection of public and private spaces, on legal sanctions that protect us from violence, on safeguards of various institutional kinds against unwanted aggression imposed upon us, and the violent actions they sometimes instigate. In this sense, our very lives, and the persistence of our desire, depend on there being norms of recognition that produce and sustain our viability as human. Thus, when we speak about sexual rights, we are not merely talking about rights that pertain to our individual desires but to the norms on which our very individuality depends. That means that the discourse of rights Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 33 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 33 avows our dependency, the mode of our being in the hands of others, a mode of being with and for others without which we cannot be

2rd, Our relationship to the Other is inescapable, the distinction between the social and the self is non-existent.
Butler 2, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
eeks to tell the story is stopped in the midst of the telling. The very “I” is called into question by its relation to the one to whom I address myself. This relation to the Other does not precisely ruin my story or reduce me to speechlessness, but it does, invariably, clutter(s) my speech with signs of its undoing. Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing something. If this seems so clearly the case with grief, it is only because it was already the case with desire. One does not always stay intact. It may be that one wants to, or does, but it may also be that despite one’s best efforts one is undone, in the face of the other, , by the touch, by the scent, by the feel, by the prospect of the touch, by the memory of the feel. And so when we speak about my sexuality or my gender, as we do (and as we must) we mean something complicated by it. Neither of these is precisely a possession, but both are to be understood as modes of being dispossessed, ways of being for another or, indeed, by virtue of another. It does not suffice to say that I am promoting a relational view of the self over an autonomous one, or trying to redescribe autonomy in terms of relationality. The term “relationality” sutures the rupture in the relation we seek to describe, a rupture that is constitutive of identity itself. This means that we will have to approach the problem of conceptualizing dispossession with circumspection. One way of doing this is through the notion of ecstasy. We tend to narrate the history of the broader movement for sexual freedom in such a way that ecstasy figures in the 60s and 70s and Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 19 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 19 persists midway through the 80s. But maybe ecstasy is more historically persistent than that, maybe it is with us all along. To be ec-static means, literally, to be outside oneself, and this can have several meanings: to be transported beyond oneself by a passion, but also to be beside oneself with rage or grief. I think that if I can still speak to a “we,” and include myself within its terms, I am speaking to those of us who are living in certain ways beside ourselves, whether it is in sexual passion, or emotional grief, or political rage. In a sense, the predicament is to understand what kind of community is composed of those who are beside themselves. We have an interesting political predicament, since most of the time when we hear about “rights,” we understand them as pertaining to individuals, or when we argue for protection against discrimination, we argue as a group or a class. And in that language and in that context, we have to present ourselves as bounded beings, distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law, a community defined by sameness. Indeed, we had better be able to use that language to secure legal protections and entitlements. But perhaps we make a mistake if we take the definitions of who we are, legally, to be adequate descriptions of what we are about. Although this language might well establish our legitimacy within a legal framework ensconced in liberal versions of human ontology, it fails to do justice to passion and grief and rage, all of which tear us from ourselves, bind us to others, transport us, undo us, and implicate us in lives that are not are own, sometimes fatally, irreversibly. It is not easy to understand how a political community is wrought from such ties. One speaks, and one speaks for another, to another, and yet there is no way to collapse the distinction between the other and myself. When we say “we” we do nothing more than designate this as very problematic. We do not solve it. And perhaps it is, and ought to be, insoluble. We ask that the state, for instance, keep its laws off our bodies, and we call for principles of bodily self-defense and bodily integrity to be accepted as political goods. Yet, it is through the body that gender and sexuality become exposed to others, implicated in social processes, inscribed by cultural norms, and apprehended in their social meanings. In a sense, to be a body is to be given over to others even as a body is, emphatically, “one’s own,” that over which we must claim rights of autonomy. This is as true for the claims made 20 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 20 by lesbians, gays, and bisexuals in favor of sexual freedom as it is for transsexual and transgender claims to self-determination; as it is for intersex claims to be free of coerced medical, surgical, and psychiatric interventions; as it is for all claims to be free from racist attacks, physical and verbal; and as it is for feminism’s claim to reproductive freedom. It is difficult, if not impossible, to make these claims without recourse to autonomy and, specifically, a sense of bodily autonomy. Bodily autonomy, however, is a lively paradox. I am not suggesting, though, that we cease to make these claims. We have to, we must. And I’m not saying that we have to make these claims reluctantly or strategically. They are part of the normative aspiration of any movement that seeks to maximize the protection and the freedoms of sexual and gender minorities, of women, defined with the 

THUS without mutual recognition the possibility of life becomes impossible. This means their framework is derived from a flawed starting point, social recognition is a precondition to their framework. This also means that ideal theory makes no sense, as it abstracts from ontology of agents.
Butler 3, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
Is the problem that we have no norm to distinguish among kinds of possibility, or does that only appear to be a problem if we fail to comprehend “possibility” itself as a norm? Possibility is an aspiration, something we might hope will be equitably distributed, something that might be socially secured, something that cannot be taken for granted, especially if it is apprehended phenomenologically. The point is not to prescribe new gender norms, as if one were under an obligation to supply a measure, gauge, or norm for the adjudication of competing gender presentations. The normative aspiration at work here has to do with the ability to live and breathe and move and would no doubt belong somewhere in what is called a philosophy of freedom. The thought of a possible life is only an indulgence for those who already know themselves to be possible. For those who are still looking to become possible, possibility is a necessity. It was Spinoza who claimed that every human being seeks to persist in his own being, and he made this principle of self-persistence, the conatus, into the basis of his ethics and, indeed, his politics. When Hegel made the claim that desire is always a desire for recognition, he was, in a way, extrapolating upon this Spinozistic point, telling us, effectively, that to persist in one’s own being is only possible on the condition that we are engaged in receiving and offering recognition. If we are not recognizable, if there are no norms of recognition by which we are recognizable, then it is not possible to persist in one’s own being, and we are not possible beings; we have been foreclosed from possibility. We think of norms of recognition perhaps as residing already in a cultural world into which we are born, but these norms change, and with the changes in these norms come changes in what does and does not count as recognizably human. To twist the Hegelian argument in a Foucaultian direction: norms of recognition function to Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 31 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 31 produce and to deproduce the notion of the human. This is made true in a specific way when we consider how international norms work in the context of lesbian and gay human rights, especially as they insist that certain kinds of violences are impermissable, that certain lives are vulnerable and worthy of protection, that certain deaths are grievable and worthy of public recognition. To say that the desire to persist in one’s own being depends on norms of recognition is to say that the basis of one’s autonomy, one’s persistence as an “I” through time, depends fundamentally on a social norm that exceeds that “I,” that positions that “I” ec-statically, outside of itself in a world of complex and historically changing norms. In effect, our lives, our very persistence, depend upon such norms or, at least, on the possibility that we will be able to negotiate within them, derive our agency from the field of their operation. In our very ability to persist, we are dependent on what is outside of us

Part two is the death of being
1st Grievability is defined as the capacity to mourn a person’s death- when an agent dies they are connected to the social in a way that changes others. 

2nd Certain forms of marginalization have been rendered some agents ungrievable because of oppressive power structures- lives do not matter, not considered to be agents.
Butler 4, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
given over to nothing, or to brutality, or to no sustenance. No matter what the valence of that scene is, however, the fact remains that infancy constitutes a necessary dependency, one that we never fully leave behind. Bodies still must be apprehended as given over. Part of understanding the oppression of lives is precisely to understand that there is no way to argue away this condition of a primary vulnerability, of being given over to the touch of the other, even if, or precisely when, there is no other there, and no support for our lives. To counter oppression requires that one understand that lives are supported and maintained differentially, that there are radically different ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe. Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. And other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as “grievable.” What are the cultural contours of the notion of the human at work here? And how do the contours that we accept as the cultural frame for the human limit the extent to which we can avow loss as loss? This is surely a question that Lesbian, gay, and bi-studies has asked in relation to violence against sexual minorities, and that transgendered people have asked as they have been singled out for harassment and sometimes murder, and that intersexed people have asked, whose formative years have so often been marked by an unwanted violence against their bodies in the name of a normative notion of human morphology. This is no doubt as well the basis of a profound affinity between movements centered on gender and sexuality with efforts to counter the normative human morphologies and capacities that condemn or efface those who are physically challenged. It must, as well, also be part of the affinity with antiracist struggles, given the racial differential that undergirds the culturally viable notions of the human—ones that we see acted out in dramatic and terrifying ways in the global arena at the present time. So what is the relation between violence and what is “unreal,” between violence and unreality that attends to those who become the victims of violence, and where does the notion of the ungrievable life 24 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 24 come in? On the level of discourse, certain lives are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized; they fit no dominant frame for the human, and their dehumanization occurs first, at this level. This level then gives rise to a physical violence that in some sense delivers the message of dehumanization which is already at work in the culture. So it is not just that a discourse exists in which there is no frame and no story and no name for such a life,
This implies that the aff framework is the only way to interrogate oppression as it fights the root cause of violence. ROOT CASUSE K SPIKE

And, quiet is violent-representational and media silence coupled with social power structures creates a hegemonic truth, preventing access to agency
Butler 5, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
 or that violence might be said to realize or apply this discourse. Violence against those who are already not quite lives, who are living in a state of suspension between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark. If there is a discourse, it is a silent and melancholic writing in which there have been no lives, and no losses, there has been no common physical condition, no vulnerability that serves as the basis for an apprehension of our commonality, and there has been no sundering of that commonality. None of this takes place on the order of the event. None of this takes place. How many lives have been lost from AIDS in Africa in the last few years? Where are the media representations of this loss, the discursive elaborations of what these losses mean for communities there? I began this chapter with a suggestion that perhaps the interrelated movements and modes of inquiry that collect here might need to consider autonomy as one dimension of their normative aspirations, one value to realize when we ask ourselves, in what direction ought we to proceed, and what kinds of values ought we to be realizing? I suggested as well that the way in which the body figures in gender and sexuality studies, and in the struggles for a less oppressive social world for the otherwise gendered and for sexual minorities of all kinds, is precisely to underscore the value of being beside oneself, of being a porous boundary, given over to others, finding oneself in a trajectory of desire in which one is taken out of oneself, and resituated irreversibly in a field of others in which one is not the presumptive center. The particular sociality that belongs to bodily life, to sexual life, and to becoming gendered (which is always, to a certain extent, becoming gendered for others) establishes a field of ethical enmeshment with others and a sense of disorientation for the first-person, that is, the perspective of the ego. As bodies, we are always for something more than, and other than, ourselves. To articulate this as an entitlement is not always easy, but perhaps not impossible. It suggests, for instance, that “association” Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 25 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 25 is not a luxury, but one of the very conditions and prerogatives of freedom. Indeed, the kinds of associations we maintain importantly take many forms. It will not do to extol the marriage norm as the new ideal for this movement, as the Human Rights Campaign has erroneously done.1 No doubt, marriage and same-sex domestic partnerships should certainly be available as options, but to install either as a model for sexual legitimacy is precisely to constrain the sociality of the body in acceptable ways. In light of seriously damaging judicial decisions against second parent adoptions in recent years, it is crucial to expand our notions of kinship beyond the heterosexual frame. It would be a mistake, however, to reduce kinship to family, or to assume that all sustaining community and friendship ties are extrapolations of kin relations. I make the argument in “Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual” in this volume that kinship ties that bind persons to one another may well be no more or less than the intensification of community ties, may or may not be based on enduring or exclusive sexual relations, may well consist of ex-lovers, nonlovers, friends, and community members. The relations of kinship cross the boundaries between community and family and sometimes redefine the meaning of friendship as well. When these modes of intimate association produce sustaining webs of relationships, they constitute a “breakdown” of traditional kinship that displaces the presumption that biological and sexual relations structure kinship centrally. In addition, the incest taboo that governs kinship ties, producing a necessary exogamy, does not necessarily operate among friends in the same way or, for that matter, in networks of communities. Within these frames, sexuality is no longer exclusively regulated by the rules of kinship at the same time that the durable tie can be situated outside of the conjugal frame. Sexuality becomes open to a number of social articulations that do not always imply binding relations or conjugal ties. That not all of our relations last or are meant to, however, does not mean that we are immune to grief. On the contrary, sexuality outside the field of monogamy well may open us to a different sense of community, intensifying the question of where one finds enduring ties, and so become the condition for an attunement to losses that exceed a discretely private realm. Nevertheless, those who live outside the conjugal frame or maintain modes of social organization for sexuality that are neither monogamous nor quasi-marital are more and more considered unreal, and their loves 26 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 26 and losses less than “true” loves and “true” losses. The derealization of this domain of human intimacy and sociality works by denying reality and truth to the relations at issue. The question of who and what is considered real and true is apparently a question of knowledge. But it is also, as Michel Foucault makes plain, a question of power. Having or bearing “truth” and “reality” is an enormously powerful prerogative within the social world, one way that power dissimulates as ontology. According to Foucault, one of the first tasks of a radical critique is to discern the relation “between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge.”2 Here we are confronted with the limits of what is knowable, limits that exercise a certain force, but are not grounded in any necessity, limits that can only be tread or interrogated by risking a certain security through departing from an established ontology: “Nothing can exist as an element of knowledge if, on the one hand, it . . . does not conform to a set of rules and constraints characteristic, for example, of a given type of scientific discourse in a given period, and if, on the other hand, it does not possess the effects of coercion or simply the incentives peculiar to what is scientifically validated or simply rational or simply generally accepted, etc.”3 Knowledge and power are not finally separable but work together to establish a set of subtle and explicit criteria for thinking the world: “It is therefore not a matter of describing what knowledge is and what power is and how one would repress the other or how the other would abuse the one, but rather, a nexus of knowledge-power has to be described so that we can grasp what constitutes the acceptability of a system . . . .”4 What this means is that one looks both for the conditions by which the object field is constituted, and for the limits of those conditions. The limits are to be found where the reproducibility of the conditions is not secure, the site where conditions are contingent, transformable. In Foucault’s terms, “schematically speaking, we have perpetual mobility, essential fragility or rather the complex interplay between what replicates the same process and what transforms it.”5 To intervene in the name of transformation means precisely to disrupt what has become settled knowledge and knowable reality, and to use, as it were, one’s unreality to make an otherwise impossible or illegible claim. I think that when the unreal lays claim to reality, or enters into its domain,
AND, this comes first-their ethical system and ideal theory justifications might account for oppression, but they do not account for this specific annihilation of the subject, which means that A. their system fails to guide action as some are outside their notion of subjectivity and B. their system cannot access the subject.
Butler 6, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
a reality, and to insist that these are lives worthy of protection in Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 29 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 29 their specificity and commonality; but it is quite another to insist that the very public assertion of gayness calls into question what counts as reality and what counts as a human life. Indeed, the task of international lesbian and gay politics is no less than a remaking of reality, a reconstituting of the human, and a brokering of the question, what is and is not livable? So what is the injustice opposed by such work? I would put it this way: to be called unreal and to have that call, as it were, institutionalized as a form of differential treatment, is to become the other against whom (or against which) the human is made. It is the inhuman, the beyond the human, the less than human, the border that secures the human in its ostensible reality. To be called a copy, to be called unreal, is one way in which one can be oppressed, but consider that it is more fundamental than that. To be oppressed means that you already exist as a subject of some kind, you are there as the visible and oppressed other for the master subject, as a possible or potential subject, but to be unreal is something else again. To be oppressed you must first become intelligible. To find that you are fundamentally unintelligible (indeed, that the laws of culture and of language find(s) you to be an impossibility) is to find that you have not yet achieved access to the human, to find yourself speaking only and always as if you were human, but with the sense that you are not, to find that your language is hollow, that no recognition is forthcoming because the norms by which recognition takes place are not in your favor. We might think that the question of how one does one’s gender is a merely cultural question, or an indulgence on the part of those who insist on exercising bourgeois freedom in excessive dimensions. To say, however, that gender is performative is not simply to insist on a right to produce a pleasurable and subversive spectacle but to allegorize the spectacular and consequential ways in which reality is both reproduced and contested. 

Thus the standard is reducing frames of ungreivabillity
To clarify, this is an intents based famework- impacts relate to a frame of agency, not material conditions
And, prohibition is key. Norms of grievability depend upon the reproduction of their existance through frames. Our stance must impede upon the reproduction of this frame, which requires we recognize that nuclear power is inseparable from its norms of usage.

Part 3 is the advocacy- countries should prohibit land based fission reactors
This advocacy is fair, it’s the type of reactor that all my authors talk about-most literature consistent

Part 4 is case
Advantage one- the nuclear myth
First- the nuclear myth functions as a social frame in line with Butlers notion of ontology
Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)
Judith Butler illuminates this issue. According to Butler, “there is no life and no death without a relation to some frame ” 12 — in this case, the framework of the nuclear myth. In other words, the framework that organizes and orders our worldview makes people visible or invisible within the public realm. The lives of those excluded from the frame are unrecognized, and therefore more vulnerable, more precarious than the lives of those within the frame. Those within the framework are notnecessarily malevolent or inhumane. Rather, they do not question or challenge the framework that is making certain lives more precarious than others. Concealment is therefore an issue of epistemology and ontology. As Butler claims, “The epistemological capacity to apprehend a life is partially dependent on that life being produced according to norms that qualify it as a life or, indeed, as part of life. ” 13 But this epistemological problem also raises ethical concerns. “ In this way, ” continues Butler, “ the normative production of ontology thus produces the epistemological problem of apprehending a life, and this in turn gives rise to the ethical problem of what it is to acknowledge or, indeed, to guard against injury and violence.” 14 That is to say, when one‟s suffering is unrecognized, un-apprehended, and therefore concealed from the public eye, injury and violence are also unacknowledged. When such violence
second-nuclear power plants create a sacrificial system where lives near the plant are rendered ungreivable
Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)
 But perhaps the most palpable harm caused by this invisible radiation is whatnuclear waste. “Typically uranium concentrat ions can be as high as 0.7 in mined ore, 5meaning that well over 99 of what is mined is rejected after processing .” 6 This meansthat to secure 70 tons of uranium from a mine, 22,500 steel barrels of low-levelradioactive waste will be produced. slide #11 Once uranium is enriched and is used atthe reactors, spent or irradiated high-level radioactive material is accumulated. Neither the US nor Japan has settled on a final storage site for the waste. At one point, bothcountries inquired into whether the Mongol ian People‟s Republic would accept it in their land. Meanwhile, Finland slide #12 continues its long-standing project of constructing amassive underground repository, called onkalo , whose projected completion date issometime in the 22 nd century. Even more unbelievable is the idea — or fantasy — that thefacility will remain integral, securing the toxic and highly hazardous poison for the next100,000 years. Some experts are therefore concerned about how the message of danger will be communicated to whatever beings, human or otherwise, are inhabiting this land before the waste is no longer dangerous.Another hazardous emission is radiation. Recent scientific research has established a correlation between the presence of nuclear power plants and elevated leukemia rates, especially among children living in proximity to the plants slide #13.Studies in Germany in 2007 and France in 2012 respectively revealed that among children living near nuclear plants leukemia rates are twice as high as elsewhere. Thoughfurther studies on the connection between cancer rates and proximity to nuclear power plants are certainly needed, the indications, as I see them, belie the myth of nuclear safety. Ethical Implications of Subverting Power 6Thus far, I have tried to call into question and debunk the nuclear myth. Althoughmy expertise is not in scientific, economic, or environmental study, I see Fukushima asan urgent call to deepen my own and my students‟ understanding of our social structures.To this end, I believe, further research into environmental studies, economics, politicalscience, and literature, to name a few, in collaboration with my colleagues on and off campus, is necessary. Meanwhile, as someone trained in ethics, I want to argue thatteaching about Fukushima is itself an ethical task.Born and raised in Fukushima, philosopher Takahashi Tetsuya describes the nuclear industry as a “gisei no shisutemu” or “sacrificial system.” “In this sacrificial system, ” he writes, “one‟s benefits are made possible and maintained at the expense of others ‟ lives — whether life itself, health, everyday life, property, dignity, hope, and so on.” 7 In stating so, Takahashi is aware that some would argue that sacrifice on behalf of one‟s society is, though perhaps unfortunate, also unavoidable for the collective life of human beings. It is for this reason that Takahashi emphasizes the differences between inevitable sacrifice for collective life on the one hand, and the kind of sacrifice forced upon people by nuclear energy. What I am criticizing here writes Takahashi are those more serious cases in which this sacrifice violates human rights. Given the potential risk of severe accidents and the enforcement of labor conditions that inevitably expose workers to radiation, nuclear power plants threaten and violate fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and the right to the pursuit of happiness. (…) Althoug h nuclear power plants are built andoperated as the result of the formal procedures of a democratic society,once this violates human rights, imputing responsibility for such aviolation is a necessary consequence. 8 Takahashi claims that this system of sacrifice , in fact, is coextensive with a “ system of irresponsibility, ” an idea borrowed from Mar

Third- These lives are rendered ungreivable through concealment
Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)
uyama Masao. In securing the benefits and interests of some, rather than maintaining a community for all, the sacrificial system and the system of irresponsibility go hand in hand. According to Takahashi, a “sacrifice made in this system is usually concealed from the public. If it is not, the sacrifice is glorified and justified by being labeled as toutoi gisei, or „ sacred sacrifice. ‟” 9 The familiar rhetoric of the “sacred sacrifice” that purportedly contributes to the “ common good ” of the community functions to cast anysort of counter-argument or form of resistance as anti-social or anti-institutional, as can be seen in regard to the anti-nuclear movement in Japan, which has been characterized in just this manner. Such characterizations, however, generally take no real account of whatconstitutes the common good. Since I have already expressed my thoughts on the rhetoricof sacred sacrifice elsewhere, 10 today I would like to focus on the concealment of sacrifice, and to reveal the ethical problems of such concealment.Takahashi is convinced that nuclear power requires workers ‟ exposure to radiation, and that their sickness and diseases too often remain concealed. 11 Such concealment stems from the fact that a correlation between radiation exposure and a given sickness have yet to be scientifically verified. But I would emphasize that just because such scientific verification has not yet been established does not mean, as some would seem to suggest, that these cases are nonexistent. What clearly does exist is an absence of attention to such illnesses beneath the veil of the nuclear myth. Thus, the phrase “scientifically unproven” functions as an instance of rhetorical concealment and diversion. Systemic concealment of this sort also contributes to a normative structure thatcomes to be taken for granted

Advantage two-natives

The nuclear industry is fueled by racism and colonialism.
Green 7 Jim; “RADIOACTIVE RACISM IN AUSTRALIA”; Jim Green Friends of the Earth; Australia; February 2007; http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/racism. Accessed August 8 2016 Premier
The nuclear industry feeds off, profits from, and reinforces racism. The industry and its political allies have a long history of forcing uranium mines, nuclear reactors, radioactive waste dumps, and weapons tests on the land of Indigenous peoples. The industry also feeds off and reinforces imperialist, colonial patterns: colonies and Third World countries are generally home to the filthiest uranium mines, they have often been used for weapons testing, and are sometimes used as radioactive waste dumping grounds. This paper details some aspects
of 'radioactive racism' in Australia. The final section also includes some articles about radioactive racism in the US and other countries.
Native Americans are disproportionately affected by nuclear waste.  
Earth Talk 10 "Reservations About Toxic Waste: Native American Tribes Encouraged To Turn Down Lucrative Hazardous Disposal Deals". March 31, 2010. Scientific American. Accessed August 8 2016. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/earth-talk-reservationsabout-toxic-waste/.Premier
Native tribes across the American West have been and continue to be subjected to significant amounts of radioactive and otherwise hazardous waste as a result of living near nuclear test sites, uranium mines, power plants and toxic waste dumps. And in some cases tribes are actually hosting hazardous waste on their sovereign reservations—which are not subject to the same environmental and health standards as U.S. land—in order to generate revenues. Native American advocates argue that siting such waste on or near reservations is an “environmental justice” problem, given that twice as many Native families live below the poverty line than other sectors of U.S. society and often have few if any options for generating income. “In the quest to dispose of nuclear waste, the government and private companies have disregarded and broken treaties, blurred the definition of Native American sovereignty, and directly engaged in a form of economic racism akin to bribery,” says Bayley Lopez of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He cites example after example of the government and private companies taking advantage of the “overwhelming poverty on native reservations by offering them millions of dollars to host nuclear waste storage sites.” 

This form of nuclear racism creates ungreivability- colonized lives are rendered ungrievable by the nuclear model
WISE 93 Environmental Racism and Nuclear Development By the WISE-Amsterdam Collective WISE News Communique; 387-388; March
28, 1993; www.antenna.nlwise; Accessed August 8 2016 Premier
With its specialization and compartmentalization, the current model pushes us to be nuclear and racist, or anti-nuclear, or anti-racist. By accepting its divisions, we find ourselves still caught within its confines. In this way we play the game of those enforcing this model, of those in power. We need to be creative and change the rules. We must redefine power and reshape it. We must see that it becomes something shared with others, something empowering, and not something exercised over them or used against them. And we need to link these two movements, now separated under the current model, and move together to create a healthy society, based on justice, equality and sustainability, where people are no longer afraid of differences in others, or afraid to be different. But to do that, we first have to make the connections between all systems of domination. And we must recognize that the dominant culture is willing -- to a frightening extent -- to write off the lives and interests of those groups of people it considers of low value. 

Advantage 3- the state
Nuclear power is directly responsible for states forcing ungrievabillity onto its citizens, and the discourses surrounding nuclear technology specifically spill over to other forms of state control
Welsh 2k, PhD, 00 (Ian, Prof Sociology @Cardiff, Mobilising Modernity)
I argue here that the implementation of nuclear power recasts state citizen relations, weakening the automatic association between state and citizen welfare. The pursuit of interstate ambitions demanded the sacrifice of private citizens. Democratic states injected plutonium into vulnerable social groups and deliberately exposed civilian populations to radioactive fallout and discharges. The issues confronted here are hardly of less importance at the start of the twenty-first century where they have become writ large within a wider environmental agenda. Third, there is a widespread assumption that the nuclear case is somehow a relic from a bygone age dominated by state-sponsored corporatist 'Big' science. Whilst the wartime military origins of nuclear power appear unique, to assume that free-market ascendancy has banished the social, cultural and political forces influential in the premature launch of 'Big' science projects is a chimera. Despite the massive dominance of private capital in the world system, nation states and coalitions of nation states continue to play a pivotal role in shaping scientific and technological trajectories. They seed-fund new technologies and shape their subsequent development through regulatory interventions in an increasingly global sphere which requires instruments of global governance (Welsh 1996, 1999). Despite this, large corporatist science reliant on state sector finance continues to colonise futures on society's behalf but largely without societal knowledge. The scale of these projects is now so immense that nothingless than global collaboration between the most prosperous economies in the world is required. I Just as the joint stock company transformed the face of capitalism in the nineteenth century, global research and development are transforming the productive and communication bases of the new century. The quantitative changes brought about by these efforts will result in immense qualitative social transformations which we cannot envisage. The science and technology of these productive bases are under development now; Freud's bridge to the future has been replaced by technology already. Rather than speculate about what is around the corner, as both post-modernists and reflexive modernisers do, is it not worth identifying those trails which disappear beyond the omega point that is the future now, and ask certain questions of them? How and by whom were these trails first conceived? How were these particular trails blazed? Why were other trails ignored and not pursued? Who did the trailblazing? Why were people willing or unwilling to follow? The nuclear and space ages were born together in the aftermath of World War II. It is my argument that many of the key sociological insights needed to navigate in relation to the 'new' technologies can be derived from studying the sets of relations established in this era. Fourth, we remain relatively uninformed about the kinds of strategies which propel certain technologies to the forefront of scientific RandD (Research and Development) agendas. It would be naive in the extreme to assume that there are simply technological winners which stand out clearly from the throng of competitors. Amongst other things this would require the absolute demonstration of the superiority of the scientific knowledge and engineering feasibility of particular projects over others. Closure and ascendancy are never the product of absolute knowledge. The ascendancy of scientific discoveries are crucially dependent upon the articulation of a wide range of discursive claims around them. Perhaps controversially I will show how eminent scientists playa key role in such claims-making. In this connection it is crucially important to pay attention to the particular discourses which are constructed around particular technologies. The extent to which a technological narrative articulates sympathetically with other ascendant discourses plays a crucial role in determining its success in gaining funding - whether state or private. If we are to begin these processes sociologists need to abandon the practice of addressing 'science' as if it was a unified set of institutions, practices and techniques. 

 Part 6 is the underview
The state is inevitable – we recognize it can be bad, but we can use it for good, to change thought patterns. This turns the K, they aff is needed to change the thought that can produce the alt. –AND- the aff is try or die, we must try for change
Sotiris 15. Nov. 13; Panagiotis Sotiris; Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy, and Communication and Media @ University of Athens, Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophical and Social Studies @ University of Crete, Department of Psychology @ Panteion University, Department of Sociology @ University of the Aegean; “The Realism of Audacity: Rethinking Revolutionary Strategy Today”; http://salvage.zone/online-exclusive/the-realism-of-audacity-rethinking-revolutionary-strategy-today YS 11.14.15
Unfortunately, historical experience shows both the catalytic and indispensable aspect of the insurrectionary sequence and the difficulty to initiate a process of transformation afterwards: mass civil unrest can lead to a regime crisis, but then the question is what comes next. Nor is the answer the imaginary ‘October’ of a supposedly Leninist insurrectionary sequence, which is the definition many tendencies of the anticapitalist Left propose for a revolution for which conditions are is never ripe enough. Here, strategy is replaced by an anti-capitalist verbalism that feels more comfortable with failure, since this justifies the position that from the beginning it was determined that nothing could change. Of course, enumerating problems is not a substitute for an answer to open questions. This can only be a collective process of reflection and self-criticism. However, we can discuss some starting points for a rethinking of revolutionary strategy today. We need a fresh conceptualisation that combines the question of government with something close to a permanent dual power strategy. Dual power in this reading is not a question of catastrophic equilibrium and antagonistic coexistence of two competing state forms. Rather, it refers to the new forms of popular power, self-management, worker’s control, and solidarity and coordination that are resisting the counterattacks of state apparatuses and capital even after the arrival of the left to government. A war of position is necessary both before and after the seizure of power, as a continuous process of struggles, collective experimentation, forms of power from below, new social configurations, along with deep institutional changes, in the form of a Constituent Process. In this reading dual power is not only about worker’s councils or soviets. It is also about self-managed enterprises, and solidarity clinics and popular assemblies. It is about looking carefully at the new forms of organisation that have emerged in movements like 15M or the ‘Squares’ as collective political forms that in certain aspects transcend the social/political division. In such a perspective there is no ‘moment’ of passage from ‘radical governance’ to ‘socialist transformation’, only an uneven and contradictory process that will face counter attacks and perhaps also what Georges Labica called the ‘impossibility of ‘non-violence’. We need a new practice of politics. Any attempt towards radical transformation must base itself upon the short-circuit between politics and economics that Etienne Balibar suggests is at the heart of the Marxian project, treating the economy as terrain of political intervention and experimentation, insisting that movements representing the working classes have a say in politics, initiating novel forms of democracy from below. This also includes what Lenin described as a Cultural Revolution, or Gramsci as ethico-political reform, the emergence of new forms of mass political intellectuality and a new collective ethos of participation. Again, we can start by the formative and learning experiences in the movements, the ways they have facilitated the emergence of new forms of thinking and new ethics of solidarity and resistance. Rebuilding the United Front cannot be a repetition. Nor can it be simply a regroupment. We need an ‘epistemological break’ in our thinking of both the front and party. The Modern Prince can only be the result of a process of recomposition and profound transformation, learning also from the experiences of political self-organisation in contemporary movements. We have to learn from our mistakes and be profoundly self-critical avoiding all forms of arrogant know-all mentality, bureaucratic thinking, and theoretical laziness. So far, we have failed to create the kind of laboratory of a new politics that was needed, that kind of democratic political process, non-sectarian dialogue, collective experimentation, creative militancy. Regarding the Greek case, we can see the beginning of the problem in the inability of the forces of the Left that realised the necessity of rupture regarding debt and the Eurozone, to initiate in 2010-11 a process of a new front incorporating the new forms of organisation emerging from the movement. We must confront this task of recomposition, transformation and experimentation because otherwise the elements, practices, experiences that could be part of potential new historical block will remain dispersed and disintegrated. Antonio Gramsci has always insisted that historical changes take the form also of molecular changes. The notion of the ‘molecular’ refers to the multifarious, complex, over-determined, non-teleological and non-deterministic character of historical process. Gramsci’s famous ‘Autobiographical Note’ from Notebook 15, is not only a personal meditation on molecular transformation –contemplating his own life in prison, the choice he made not to flee the country, and how disaster can affect one person – but also a small treatise on molecular changes in periods of defeat, shows the small changes that in the end lead to a new relation of forces. His observations have, I think, a certain resonance in countries like Greece: the truth is that the person of the fifth year is not the same as in the fourth, the third, the second, the first and so on; one has a new personality, completely new, in which the years that have passed have in fact demolished one’s moral braking system, the resistive forces that characterised the person during the first year.2 This means that any process of recomposition of the radical Left must be attentive to this molecular aspect. New forms of movement for organisations, especially in relation to social strata that lack any form of representation (unemployed, precarious etc), new democratic practices in movements, forms of political self-organisation, new forms of coordination and solidarity, expanding the experimentation with forms of self-management, creating alternatives forms of (counter)information, organising new forms of militant research are more urgent than ever. They also enable us to rethink political organisation under this prism of a necessary molecular recomposition, of collective democratic processes for the elaboration of alternatives, of a collective new practice of politics. Communist or revolutionary politics are in the last instance about subterranean currents that came to the surface only in critical moments, because they are dispersed, fragmented, ruptured, the results of encounters that did not last. The challenge is exactly to have the ‘slow impatience’ to learn from defeat, to regroup, to experiment, to rethink all aspects of the conjuncture, from the molecular to the ‘integral’, to ‘organise good encounters’ (Deleuze) and bring these subterranean currents to the surface. The tragic defeat of the Greek Left, opens a period of necessary self-criticism, reflexion and experimentation with new forms of political fronts, organisations and coordination along with all the necessary effort to rebuild the resistance to the new wave of neoliberal reforms, fight collective despair and resignation and bring back confidence to the ability to change things. It is will not be easy and it will be like trying to build a ship when you are already out in rough sea. However, it is the only way to continue to say NO. No to pessimism, no to surrender, no to defeat.

Tournament: Holy Cross | Round: 5 | Opponent: Harvard-Westlake JN | Judge: Sean Fahey
Part 1 is the ROB
1st, the judge is an educator, 2 warrants
Debate is an educational setting; we represent schools in a school

the ballot endorses a truth claim, such as ‘I affirm’, thus the judge endorses a frame of truth, educating students with it
2nd- the ballot
1st- dromology defined
Wood     Considered - the Faculty of Education blog at Canterbury Christ Church University Should education policy have a speed limit? Slowing down the process of change by Phil Wood on Thursday, 11 April 2013 in Education Policy Phil Wood is a lecturer in education at the University of Leicester. His research interests focus on understanding and developing learning and teaching through participatory research. In this piece he considers the extent to which the pace of change is damaging education. http://www.consider-ed.org.uk/should-education-policy-have-a-speed-limit/

Over the past 15 years policy development in English education has seen an ever more acute acceleration. This acceleration was first identifiable under New Labour and ‘deliverology’ which demanded ever faster increases in examination outcomes. Driven by a need for higher and ever more improbable targets, faster and more complex policy initiatives were developed, self-evaluation forms, personalised learning, learning styles, curriculum innovation, and diplomas. Since the Coalition government has taken power, this need for accelerated policy development has continued. Much of the educational landscape is seeing radical change, sometimes untried and untested, sometimes not even seeing initial implementation before being abandoned or changed. Paul Virilio, urbanist and cultural theorist, defines social and political acceleration, particularly relating to technology, as ‘dromology’, the compression of time as a consequence of geopolitics, technology and the media leading to an emerging process of velocity and acceleration. Rather than leading to better, more efficient social systems acceleration can lead to detrimental impacts.
2nd- the political- Status qou politics construct truth through dromology- a prerequisite to engage in ethics, the political or debate itself is to deconstruct dromology
Wood     Considered - the Faculty of Education blog at Canterbury Christ Church University Should education policy have a speed limit? Slowing down the process of change by Phil Wood on Thursday, 11 April 2013 in Education Policy Phil Wood is a lecturer in education at the University of Leicester. His research interests focus on understanding and developing learning and teaching through participatory research. In this piece he considers the extent to which the pace of change is damaging education. http://www.consider-ed.org.uk/should-education-policy-have-a-speed-limit/
 Neoliberal policies have brought greater volumes of data and information often identified as some form of analytic ‘truth’. Virilio, however, sees greater information and data as a recipe for disinformation and confusion. Politicians are able to hide, embed and control, ‘speed is power itself’ (Virilio, 1999, 15). As policy generation accelerates, those outside of government are in a constant state of reaction attempting to understand and analyse new sets of ideas as the next policy is already being announced. By instigating reform at a very fast pace, a Secretary of State essentially creates a ‘power-grab’, the sheer velocity and acceleration of change eroding debate, ensuring less resistance and short-circuiting the democratic process. In addition, the media become the dromological troops of politicians (Eriksen, 2001). Eriksen (see Levy’s associated lecture) focuses on the dromological impact of modern society, arguing that ‘fast’ time increasingly drives out ‘slow’ time. Slow time is important as it allows for deliberation, thought, debate, and considered ways of working which are important in all facets of the educative process. But society and the commercial world eradicates slow time; fast time is becoming dominant in society at large, and in education. Eriksen identifies six problems with this change: speed is an addictive drug speed leads to simplification speed creates an assembly line (Taylorist) effect speed leads to a loss of precision speed demands space (it fills gaps in the lives of others, just consider your e-mail in box!) speed is contagious, spreading and killing off slow 

Thus the role of the ballot is to reject systems of dromology
Wood     Considered - the Faculty of Education blog at Canterbury Christ Church University Should education policy have a speed limit? Slowing down the process of change by Phil Wood on Thursday, 11 April 2013 in Education Policy Phil Wood is a lecturer in education at the University of Leicester. His research interests focus on understanding and developing learning and teaching through participatory research. In this piece he considers the extent to which the pace of change is damaging education. http://www.consider-ed.org.uk/should-education-policy-have-a-speed-limit/
time In education, these effects are all too obvious. Recourse to ever more complex data systems allows rapid generation of targets and tracking sheets which become regarded as ‘truth’. Learning must be ‘measured’ in every lesson, and progress assessed- sometimes not even every 50 minutes, but every 15! The illusion persists that we can ‘know’ the extent of the learning of every child at the end of every lesson. As a result, the desired speed for learning and progress has indeed demanded the space of professional dialogue and reflection. Data systems are ‘fast’ processes – they give the illusion of progress, of learning – and so the acceleration of education has in part gone hand in hand with ever greater reliance on numeric data, both internal and external (league tables for example). The dromological impact of social and political change might lead us to believe that we need to make faster, better decisions and changes. The mantra of fast time leads to perpetual revolution and a chimera of perfection constantly found just ahead of us. But I argue that this is (self-) destructive. Kahneman (2011) highlights that acceleration in decision-making and change is based on gut reactions, emotions and biased perceptions. Decisions become based on associating new information with old rather than synthesising information to bring new insights. The constant speeding up of reform, demands for progress and an increasing focus on the short-term have served to blunt critical capacities, to surrender professional and community debate to ever more rapid production and enslavement to numeric data. This is what Hargreaves and Fullan (2012) describe as the ‘business capital’ model of education. An alternative view of the process of education, both in school and at policy level is the notion of ‘professional capital’ again outlined by Hargreaves and Fullan. This approach to education is based on seeing teachers as valued professionals who require time and resources to develop and perfect their professional skills and thinking. They argue that this is best achieved in groups, through collaborative endeavour. However, this is not to be a top-down model driven by senior leaders, fulfilling their own agendas or those of government, but driven by teacher groups who are given the space to exercise their own professional judgement – in short it is a dialogic approach. Data is still important, but it acts as the starting point for discussion and development, not as a numeric yoke under which teachers are expected to toil. A dialogic approach may be criticised as ‘soft’, ‘cosy’, a system where individuals can hide and be left to do as they wish. Nothing could be further from the truth; for example, the Finns understood in the 1980s that they needed to improve their education system but it was only thirty years later that they felt in any definable way they had achieved what they set out to do. No quick fixes, no acceleration in policy change, but a reasoned, debated and consensus driven approach, where honest dialogue about educational processes, theory and practice built strong foundations to aid in the emergence of the system as it stands today. Hardly a rulebook for standing still, more one of considered and transformatory change. Education in England has been under an increasing dromological pressure over the past 15 to 20 years, with more and more policy used as a lever to bring faster and faster change. However, how far has this brought us? Gains in academic achievement are questioned by many; ever greater incursion of private finance into education has started to break the system apart, both organisationally and increasingly professionally and politically. We are accelerating into an uncertain future, with little reasoned debate or consensus building. Dialogue may not feed an event hungry news-media, it may not promise increased examination outcomes in a matter of weeks. However, if developed professionally, if used to engage with local communities, and used to forge strong foundations for sustained development and professional capital, surely dialogue is a better basis for our country’s education system than that of dromology?

Part 2 is framing
Dromology institutes itself in technological militarism- preventing access to politics and resistance. Thus the standard is to reduce technological militarism.
Kellner 8 – Professor, George F. Kneller Philosophy of Education Chair, Social Sciences and Comparative Education, UCLA (8/31/2008, Douglas, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”, Illuminations: The Critical Theory Website, http://intermedios.geografias.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/virilioilluminationskellner.pdf
In addition, for Virilio, the acceleration of events, technological development, and speed in the current¶ era designates “a double movement of implosion and explosion,” so that “the new war machine¶ combines a double disappearance: the disappearance of matter in nuclear disintegration and the¶ disappearance of places in vehicular extermination“ (Virilio 1986: 134). The increased speed of¶ destruction in military technology is moving toward the speed of light with laser weapons and¶ computer-controlled weapons systems constituting a novelty in warfare in which there are no longer¶ geo-strategic strongpoints since from any given spot we can now reach any other, producing what¶ Virilio calls “a strategy of Brownian movement through geostrategic homogenization of the globe”¶ (Virilio 1986: 135). Thus, “strategic spatial miniaturization is now the order of the day,” with¶ microtechnologies transforming production and communication, shrinking the planet, and preparing¶ the way for what Virilio calls “pure war,” a situation in which military technologies and an¶ accompanying technocratic system come to control every aspect of life.¶ In Virilio’s view, the war machine is the demiurge of technological development and an ultimate¶ threat to humanity, producing “a state of emergency” in which nuclear holocaust threatens the very¶ survival of the human species. This involves a shift from a “geo-politics” to a “chrono-politics,” from¶ a politics of space to a politics of time, in which whoever controls the means of instant information,¶ communication, and destruction is a dominant socio-political force. For Virilio, every technological¶ system contains its specific for of accident and a nuclear accident would, of course, be catastrophic.¶ Hence, in the contemporary nuclear era, in which weapons of mass destruction could create an instant¶ world holocaust, we are thrust into a permanent state of emergency that enables the nuclear state to¶ impose its imperatives on ever more domains of political and social life.¶ Politics too succumbs to the logic of speed and potential holocaust as increased speed in military¶ violence, instantaneous information and communication, and the flow of events diminishes the time¶ and space of deliberation, discussion, and the building of consensus that is the work of politics. Speed¶ and war thus undermine politics, with technology replacing democratic participation and the¶ complexity and rapidity of historical events rendering human understanding and control ever more¶ problematical. Ubiquitous and instantaneous media communication in turn makes spin-control and¶ media manipulation difficult, but essential, to political governance. Moreover, the need for fast spin¶ control and effective media politics further diminishes the space and role of democratic political¶ participation and interaction.
And, the squo erases subjectivity through the imperial gaze-the aff is needed to a. restore subjectivity b. eliminate unjust domination- precondition to any framework.
Harris 6 — Chad Vincent Harris, Lecturer at the University of California-San Diego and Adjunct Professor in the School of Journalism and Media Studies at San Diego State University, holds a Ph.D. in Communication from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 (“The Omniscient Eye: Satellite Imagery, ‘Battlespace Awareness,’ and the Structures of the Imperial Gaze,” Surveillance and Society, Volume 4, Issue 1/2, Available Online at http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/viewFile/3457/3420, Accessed 10-05-2011, p. 101-103)
located at the center of military command structures, where surveillance, control, and organized state violence come together in a set of abstracted and routine social and technical practices. It is where surveillance is most directly attached to concrete purposive action: the precise application of force and violence for organized warfare, perhaps the ultimate act of purposive agency. In this article, I explore, in close detail and with some deep description, a specific historical instance of the use of aerial and satellite imagery in a military C4I (command, control, computers, communications, and intelligence) system during combat operations. The focus on a warfare scenario provides an extreme example of what is at stake with systems of overhead surveillance that are deployed in the larger society, systems seemingly as mundane as commercial observation satellites or Google Earth. Ultimately what is at stake is the creation of a specific kind of subjectivity, an attempt to create an omniscient or imperial gaze by connecting what Sturken and Cartwright (2001) call “practices of looking” directly to the technologies and practices of state administrative control. Large satellite imagery and intelligence architectures are what Donald MacKenzie calls “technologies of power” (MacKenzie, 1990: 28, 34-36), deployed by nation states for the administrative control of space and territory. In warfare these systems are deployed for the precise application of force and violence. Large intelligence and weapons systems in the US military and their interoperation as system architectures provide a rich context for exploring how satellite imagery surveillance and reconnaissance systems not only detect objects and people, but also produce both objects on the ground and surveillant subjects. These ideas may have relevance to other civilian surveillance systems like closed circuit television (CCTV) systems, police command and control centers, and publicly-available satellite imagery databases like Google EarthÔ.2 They produce objectivity, a techno-discursive distance between the observer and the observed, and a particular kind of modern surveillant subject. This subjectivity is structured by an omniscient, imperial gaze, a particular kind of subjectivity that signifies dominance over what is being observed. In order to illustrate this process, I will discuss how violence can be rendered everyday, bureaucratic, and even mundane by the technologies and practices of imagery production. Technologically, distance is produced by layers of systems that combine surveillance with weapons control, referred to in the US military as “C4I” systems that combine the practices and technologies of “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence.” The targeting cycle in Operation Instant Thunder was a feedback system that transformed data into targets and then back into data, a center through which information and commands generated by the entire U.S. war effort had to pass through on their way towards the destruction of these targets. The personnel who ran this center were never actually required to be in direct proximity to the carnage of combat, but they were nevertheless central to its organization. It is where extreme forms of violence and normal bureaucratic practices are co-extensive, because we must step back from this series of mundane translations (images into data, data and images into targets, targets turned back into data, and thus back again to images), in order to see the destruction that these activities were committing. It is this distance that creates an isolated and dominant subjectivity: isolated from the violence on the ground, but interpellated in a dominant imperial gaze. 

 
*slower* Part 3 is the plan- Countries should to prohibit the production of nuclear power in orbit.
To clarify- countries only ban space based nuclear power within earth orbit.
The next two Aftergood explain the plan and some of its effects
Aftergood Chicago Tribune It`s Time To Ban The Use Of Nuclear Power In Orbit May 25, 1988|By Steven Aftergood, executive director of the Committee to Bridge the Gap, a Los Angeles-based public interest research organization. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-05-25/news/8801020099_1_space-reactors-nuclear-reactors-nuclear-power
`there are serious risks, and I regard it as inappropriate to havenuclear reactors orbiting the Earth.``  A ban on space nuclear power would eliminate these serious risks, disable the Soviet reconnaissance satellite program and create a major obstacle to future deployment of weapons in space. (The peaceful use of nuclear power in deep-space scientific and exploratory missions would not be affected.)As the development of new types of space weapons continues, newconstraints may become necessary if their deployment is to be prevented. A ban on nuclear power in orbit would be a simple yet effective way to ``pull the plug`` on a space-based weapons system.
Aftergood et al SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN _  Nuclear Power in Space  The best course for space-borne  reactors? Ban them from .barth orbit and  use them in deep space, the authors say  by Steven Aftergood, David W. Hafemeister, Oleg F. Prilutsky, Joel R. Primack and Stanislav N. Roclionov june 1991
In view of the various dangers they present, we favor an international agreement to ban nuclear reactors and RTGs from Earth orbit. Thlis readily verifiable measure would elinlinate many environmental hazards, enhance international stability and help to pra-also preserve the possibility of using nuclear power for scientific and exploratory missions in deep space. Since space nuclear reactors possess a variety of distinguishing characteristics, an international agreement to prohibit them in orbit could be verified with confidence. In the first place, space reactors necessarily radiate large amounts of waste heat. They therefore give off a strong infrared signal that can be easily detected. Soviet RORSATs have been observed with a satellite-watching telescope at the Air Force Maui Optical Station on Mount Haleaka-la. An operating SP-lOO reactor would be readily detectable at geosynchro-nous orbit or even beyond. Operating reactors also emit strong gamma and neutron radiation signals that are easy to spot. Indeed, the type of gamma-ray interference that has dis-rupted scientific missions is Uniquely produced by orbiting reactors and is a highly reliable, though unwelcome, sign of their presence. "break out" of an arms-control treaty could conceivably place reactors in or-bit without activating them, thus mak-ing the violation much more difficult to detect. But until large reactors have been thoroughly tested in space, they are unlikely to be covertly deployed. Nuclear power has greatly enhanced space exploration. But it has also dem-onstrated the potential to produce sig-nificant environmental damage. Even if it is wisely controlled, nuclear power in space is likely to remain a challenging and costly technology.

Part 4 is case
Advantage 1 is survallience
The number of nuclear powered satellites is increasing, and existing satellites function as both dromologic surveillance apparatuses and forms of threat construction
Aftergood2  Chicago Tribune It`s Time To Ban The Use Of Nuclear Power In Orbit May 25, 1988|By Steven Aftergood, executive director of the Committee to Bridge the Gap, a Los Angeles-based public interest research organization. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-05-25/news/8801020099_1_space-reactors-nuclear-reactors-nuclear-power
A fully deployed space-based weapons system could require ``perhaps ahundred or more`` space reactors, according to the landmark Report of theAmerican Physical Society Study Group on Directed Energy Weapons. Theauthors explained that the need for even ``a few tens of kilowatts of electrical power necessitates nuclear power reactors`` because of the irrelative survivability against offensive and natural threats. Similar conclusions have been expressed by Soviet scientists, who wrote in1986 that ``space power engineering for military purposes is likely to rely upon nuclear reactors with various energy converters.`` It is commonlyagreed that the ``weaponization`` of space will entail, and depend upon,the placement of many nuclear reactors in orbit. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have space nuclear power programs underway. The Strategic Defense Initiative, with its projectedneeds for electrically powered directed-energy weapons in orbit, is thedriving force behind the U.S. programs. Currently, the Soviet Union is the only nation that uses nuclear reactors in space. Compact reactors are required to power the Soviet reconnaissance satellites that track and target U.S. shipping. These satellites, which have no exact equivalent among American space systems, are regarded as particularly threatening to our national security, and have been cited by Air Force officials as justification for an anti-satellite program. Meanwhile, there are indications that the Soviet Union, like the U.S., is developing a new generation of space reactors.

And, satellite surveillance is always already an extension of biopolicital control.
Harris 11 — Chad Vincent Harris, Lecturer at the University of California-San Diego and Adjunct Professor in the School of Journalism and Media Studies at San Diego State University, holds a Ph.D. in Communication from the University of California-San Diego, 2011 (“Technology and Transparency as Realist Narrative,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, Volume 36, Number 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 97-98)
In the controversy over the availability and popular use of satellite imagery, debates about transparency are important, because transparency is not just a technical outcome but a political idea that has a long history in debates about the normative structures of power in democratic systems. Satellite imagery is one of the latest technologies to fit into and affect this debate. As a tool of the unprecedented administrative control of territory and boundaries that is part of the evolving history of modern nation-states, satellite imagery is powerful because it can convey information that states can use materially. Satellite imagery is also more than a single technological artifact but constitutes a whole set of technological systems, architectures, and professional practices that can only be developed in any comprehensive way by the largest power structures; that is, at the level of nation-state or very large corporations dependent on state contracts. However, satellite imagery is also powerful as a form of evidence because of components of technological objectivity and distancing that lend images the authority of scientific truth, an implicit authority that is useful in international diplomacy and negotiations over military power.23 If satellite imagery is analyzed in this way, I believe it becomes necessary to rethink the relationship between administrative control and democratic access to the mechanisms of the administrative functions of state. That is, while being a concept associated with popular scrutiny of state power, satellite-produced transparency is always already, and quite fundamentally, about the administrative power of the nation-state. This should be kept in mind in any discussions about satellite imagery data as a new form of democratic access to state power structures.
Implications-
the aff is negative state action as only states can create nuclear power in the first place. This link turns the K and means their state bad responses aren’t responsive
satellite surveillance outweighs- allows states to influence both material conditions and is inherently dromologetic 

From its inception, the logistics of perception was the battlefield logic of informational domination from an elevated position. Satellites are simply the next technological step in this ever expanding tactic of warfare resulting in the scale of every conflict being raised to a global one.
Der Derian and Virilio 76 (Paul Virilio and James Der Derian. Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Switzerland and research professor with a focus on global security and media studies respectively. Transcription of an interview of Virilio by Der Derian in Paris. 1976. http://asrudiancenter.wordpress.com/2008/11/26/interview-with-paul-virilio/.)

Virilio:Cinema interested me enormously for its kinematic roots; all my work is dromological. After having treated metabolic speed, the role of the cavalry in history, the speed of the human body, the athletic body, I became interested in technological speed. It goes without saying that after relative speed (the railroad, aviation) there was inevitably absolute speed, the transition to the limit of electromagnetic waves. In fact, cinema interested me as a stage, up to the point of the advent of electromagnetic speed. I was interested in cinema as cinematisme, that is the putting into movement of images. We are approaching the limit that is the speed of light. Der Derian: This is a significant historical event. Has this changed the nature of war? -Of course. It changes with the logistics of perception. The logistics of perception began by encompassing immediate perception, which is to say that of elevated sites, of the tower, of the telescope. War is waged from high points. The logistics of perception was from the start the geographic logistics of domination from an elevated site. Thus the “field of battle” which is also a “field of perception” – a theater of operation – will develop on the level of perception of the tower, of the fortified castle or on the level of perception of the bombardier. Such is the Second World War and the bombings over Europe. The battlefield is at first local, then it becomes worldwide and finally global; which is to say expanded to the level of orbit with the invention of video and with reconnaissance satellites. Thus we have a development of the battlefield corresponding to the development of the field of perception made possible by technical advancements, successively through the technologies of geometrical optics: that of the telescope, of wave-optics, of electro-optics; that of the electro-magnetic transmission of a signal in video; and, of course, computer graphics, that is to say the new multi-media. Henceforth the battlefield is global. It is no longer “worldwide” mondialisÈe in the sense of the First or Second World Wars. It is global in the sense of the planet. For every war implicates the “rotundity” rotonditÈ of the earth, the sphere, the geosphere. 

Advantage 2 is millitarization
Space militarization and spying require space nukes, other sources of power fail. Space nukes are unique- dromologizing space requires nuclear energy
Aftergood Chicago Tribune It`s Time To Ban The Use Of Nuclear Power In Orbit May 25, 1988|By Steven Aftergood, executive director of the Committee to Bridge the Gap, a Los Angeles-based public interest research organization. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-05-25/news/8801020099_1_space-reactors-nuclear-reactors-nuclear-power
A Soviet satellite now orbiting the Earth is steadily losing altitude and will re-enter the atmosphere in several months. What makes this a troubling prospect is that the Cosmos 1900 is powered by a nuclear reactor. When it re- enters, the reactor will break up and release radioactivity into the environment. There is apparently nothing that can be done to reverse the fall of the reactor, which resulted from a loss of radio contact. But now is an opportune time to consider a ban on the use of nuclear power in orbit, particularly because its use for military space applications is likely to increase dramatically otherwise.For many types of space weapons, including Star Wars systems, orbitingnuclear reactors would be necessary to provide power, and advancedreactors much larger than Cosmos 1900 are being developed for thispurpose. A negotiated ban on nuclear power in orbit could help restrain thedeployment of weapons in space, while averting a significantenvironmental hazard.  A fully deployed space-based weapons system could require ``perhaps a hundred or more`` space reactors, according to the landmark Report of theAmerican Physical Society Study Group on Directed Energy Weapons. Theauthors explained that the need for even ``a few tens of kilowatts of electrical power necessitates nuclear power reactors`` because of the irrelative survivability against offensive and natural threats. Similar conclusions have been expressed by Soviet scientists, who wrote in1986 that ``space power engineering for military purposes is likely to rely upon nuclear reactors with various energy converters.`` It is commonlyagreed that the ``weaponization`` of space will entail, and depend upon,the placement of many nuclear reactors in orbit.Both the United States and the Soviet Union have space nuclear powerprograms underway. The Strategic Defense Initiative, with its projectedneeds for electrically powered directed-energy weapons in orbit, is thedriving force behind the U.S. programs.Currently, the Soviet Union is the only nation that uses nuclear reactors inspace. Compact reactors are required to power the Soviet reconnaissancesatellites that track and target U.S. shipping. These satellites, which haveno exact equivalent among American space systems, are regarded asparticularly threatening to our national security, and have been cited by AirForce officials as justification for an anti-satellite program. Meanwhile, there are indications that the Soviet Union, like the U.S., is developing anew generation of space reactors. 

Advantage 3 is disruption- our obsession with speed has blinded us to the harms caused by nuclear satilites-they damage other non-dromologetic tec in orbit
Aftergood et al SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN _  Nuclear Power in Space  The best course for space-borne  reactors? Ban them from .barth orbit and  use them in deep space, the authors say  by Steven Aftergood, David W. Hafemeister, Oleg F. Prilutsky, Joel R. Primack and Stanislav N. Roclionov june 1991
 Furthermore, even while they are op-erating safely, reactors can disrupt the operation of other satellites. To mini-mize mass and cost, orbiting reactors are largely unshielded. They thus pro-duce strong emissions of radiation that can make it difficult for astronomical satellites. This phenomenon (which was kept secret by the U.S. government un-til 1988) has already significantly inter-fered with the work of orbiting gamma-ray detection systems such as that on board the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Solar Maximum Mission. The gamma rays emitted by orbiting reactors do not just outshine distant supernovas or black holes; in addition, the more energetic gamma rays interact with the outer shell of the reactor to produces streams of electrons and positrons. These charged particles are trapped in the earth's magnetic field, forming a temporary radiation belt. When another spacecraft passes through such a cloud, the positrons annihilate electrons in the spacecraft's skin, producing penetrating gamma rays that can overload the spacecraft's detectors. These brief interruptions of astro-nomical observations afflicted the Solar Maximum Mission spacecraft an aver-age of eight times a day for much of 1987 and early 1988, when the Topaz reactors were operating. Similar inter-ference with the gamma-ray burst de-tector on board the Japanese Ginga sat-ellite effectively blinded it during about a fifth of the same period. NASA is endeavoring to limit the threat from orbiting reactors to its $500-million Gamma Ray Observatory mission, launched in April of this year. One proposed safeguard involves sim-ply shutting off the gamma-ray burst trigger at times when it might be sub-ject to interference. This strategy as-sumes, however, that only one or two low-power reactors, in predictable orbits, will be operating at any given time. If the number and operating pow-er of orbiting reactors increase, the abil-ity to conduct X-and gamma-ray ob-servations from near-Earth platforms will be severely restricted.

Advantage 4 is total vision
Total vision and high speed information transmissions require the chaos of death and the domination of life in order to secure ocular dominance.
Featherstone 03 (Mark Featherstone. “The Eye of War: Images of Destruction in Virilio and Bataille”. Journal for Cultural Research, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2003, 433–447. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=89ad8900-11a6-40b1-ae14 a2bb1e2db3b840sessionmgr12andvid=1andhid=21andbdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=aphandAN=11985206)
Reading this thesis it is clear that the obstacles of the world and the slowness of the body are necessarily expendable as war becomes a military assault on both the land and civilian population of the enemy power. Therefore, we can see that what lies beneath this battle for total vision, through the shock of high-speed information transmissions, is the chaos of death that is required to secure ocular dominance. Like  Bentham’s panopticon, famously described by Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1977), Virilio’s version of total vision refers to the progress of a machine that dominates life by imposing a system of suffocating idealism: sense as abstract theory. Moreover, as with Bentham’s mechanical terror, that relied on the light of a lantern to create the silhouette of an omniscient observer (Bo˘zovi˘c 2000), Virilio’s fatal system requires total light, or frontality, to disciplines its object of scrutiny. Here, world and body become criminal elements that require technological correction. Such contingencies must be over-written by abstract sight. The gaze must freeze chance because total vision is impossible without the monstrosity of shock, the speed of light that illuminates everything through the instantaneity of a global flash.
Underview

Tournament: Valley | Round: 1 | Opponent: Harker KS | Judge: Sean Hilzendeger
Part 1 is observations

Nuclear power is defined by Merriam Webster as
Energy that is created by splitting apart the nuclei of atoms
AND, even if they win their definition is better, the AC will only advocate for prohibiting this form of nuclear power

Part 2 is the ROB
1st, the judge is an educator, 3 warrants
Debate is an educational setting; we represent schools in a school

B. the ballot endorses a truth claim, such as ‘I affirm’, thus the judge endorses a frame of truth, educating students with it 

C. The TFA defines it's purpose as to ‘create a means of educating’, the judge is confined by the rules of the tournament thus the judge must be an educator THEORY SPIKE- constitutive and tournament
 

Thus, the judge has the primary obligation to deconstruct oppressive regimes. Schooling institutions, like this debate round, are especially important in this role.
Robinson, Kerry, and Cristyn Davies. "Docile bodies and heteronormative moral subjects: Constructing the child and sexual knowledge in schooling." Sexuality and Culture 12.4 (2008): 221-239.
Schools, as a discursive field, are sites where technologies of power produce ‘regimes of truth’ that uphold the hegemonic social, political and moral values of dominant and powerful groups (Foucault 1977). This is obvious within the syllabi that we examine in this discussion, in which children are constructed as heteronormative subjects. Schooling as a disciplining state apparatus has a compulsory captive audience––docile bodies––through which to constructs knowledge and discipline heternormative moral subjects. Foucault’s concept of the powerknowledge nexus operates through hegemonic discourses that are perpetuated through curricula, rules and regulations, philosophies, policies, and pedagogical practices that prevail in schooling (Foucault 1977). The regulative and repetitive practices of schooling become part of children’s habitus as they tap into the cultural, social and economic capital valued in schooling (Bourdieu 1991). Habitus refers to the dispositions, perceptions, and attitudes generated throughout an individuals’ cultural history that can enable or prohibit effective exchange or accumulation of one’s capital (Robinson and Jones-Diaz 2006). However, it is important to point out that part of the way that education is transformed is through teachers’ critical approach towards pedagogy and the curriculum. Some teachers question what constitutes ‘official knowledge’ within the mainstream curriculum to reshape and contest the power of dominant groups. Syllabi are also interpreted by individual teachers, who can include perspectives that challenge regimes of truth operating in schools. So despite our critique of educational syllabi in this paper, we need to acknowledge that some teachers would have challenged the representation of knowledge about health and its presentation. It is also important to acknowledge that even though we critique the lack of specific Docile Bodies and Heteronormative Moral Subjects 123 detail in the syllabi on sexual identity, we do so with an awareness that some teachers may have used this space (marked by an absence of definition around sexual identity) to address issues of non-heterosexuality. However, this potential ‘queer space’ may also be counteracted by other forms of regulation, including students’ surveillance of heteronormative values, or the introduction of additional policies, such as the Controversial Issues Policy that has operated along side the syllabi in NSW schools since the 1970’s.
Implication; There’s an infinite number of ways we could structure the burdens such that both debaters have equal access to the ballot. HOW we choose to structure the rules means some goal we wish to attain through fairness. Only the ROB provides an external standard to why we debate.

And-specifically on topics of nuclear power, academics have a duty to critically challenge the myth of nuclear safety
Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)

of Fukushima. Rather, I count myself as culpable for allowing the existence of nuclear power plants, complying with a framework that excludes certain lives, and letting the Fukushima accident continue to cause humansuffering and environmental damage. Being in a relatively protected place as a tenured 9 professor in academia, teaching Fukushima is one way, however modest it might be, for me to be responsible and even atone for this unprecedented disaster, by bringing to critical visibility the mythic framework within which the precariousness of some lives are overlooked. 

Part 3 is framework
The value is morality derived from ought, which functions as the evaluative term in the resolution.
Section A is ontology
1st Ontology is social. We are born into society and society sustains us- agents are socially constructed and the recognition of the social is constitutive to us being agents.
 Butler 1, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
, on a broader sociality, and this dependency is the basis of our endurance and survivability. When we assert our “right,” as we do and we must, we are not carving out a place for our autonomy—if by autonomy we mean a state of individuation, taken as self-persisting prior to and apart from any relations of dependency on the world of others. We do not negotiate with norms or with Others subsequent to our coming into the world. We come into the world on the condition that the social world is already there, laying the groundwork for us. This implies that I cannot persist without norms of recognition that support my persistence: the sense of possibility pertaining to me must first be imagined from somewhere else before I can begin to imagine myself. My reflexivity is not only socially mediated, but socially constituted. I cannot be who I am without drawing upon the sociality of norms that precede and exceed me. In this sense, I am outside myself from the outset, and must be, in order to survive, and in order to enter into the realm of the possible. To assert sexual rights, then, takes on a specific meaning against this background. It means, for instance, that when we struggle for rights, we are not simply struggling for rights that attach to my person, but we are struggling to be conceived as persons. And there is a difference between the former and the latter. If we are struggling for rights that attach, or should attach, to my personhood, then we assume that personhood as already constituted. But if we are struggling not only to be conceived as persons, but to create a social transformation of 32 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 32 the very meaning of personhood, then the assertion of rights becomes a way of intervening into the social and political process by which the human is articulated. International human rights is always in the process of subjecting the human to redefinition and renegotiation. It mobilizes the human in the service of rights, but also rewrites the human and rearticulates the human when it comes up against the cultural limits of its working conception of the human, as it does and must. Lesbian and gay human rights takes sexuality, in some sense, to be its issue. Sexuality is not simply an attribute one has or a disposition or patterned set of inclinations. It is a mode of being disposed toward others, including in the mode of fantasy, and sometimes only in the mode of fantasy. If we are outside of ourselves as sexual beings, given over from the start, crafted in part through primary relations of dependency and attachment, then it would seem that our being beside ourselves, outside ourselves, is there as a function of sexuality itself, where sexuality is not this or that dimension of our existence, not the key or bedrock of our existence, but, rather, as coextensive with existence, as Merleau-Ponty once aptly suggested.6 I have tried here to argue that our very sense of personhood is linked to the desire for recognition, and that desire places us outside ourselves, in a realm of social norms that we do not fully choose, but that provides the horizon and the resource for any sense of choice that we have. This means that the ec-static character of our existence is essential to the possibility of persisting as human. In this sense, we can see how sexual rights brings together two related domains of ec-stasy, two connected ways of being outside of ourselves. As sexual, we are dependent on a world of others, vulnerable to need, violence, betrayal, compulsion, fantasy; we project desire, and we have it projected onto us. To be part of a sexual minority means, most emphatically, that we are also dependent on the protection of public and private spaces, on legal sanctions that protect us from violence, on safeguards of various institutional kinds against unwanted aggression imposed upon us, and the violent actions they sometimes instigate. In this sense, our very lives, and the persistence of our desire, depend on there being norms of recognition that produce and sustain our viability as human. Thus, when we speak about sexual rights, we are not merely talking about rights that pertain to our individual desires but to the norms on which our very individuality depends. That means that the discourse of rights Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 33 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 33 avows our dependency, the mode of our being in the hands of others, a mode of being with and for others without which we cannot be

2rd, Our relationship to the Other is inescapable, the distinction between the social and the self is non-existent.
Butler 2, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
eeks to tell the story is stopped in the midst of the telling. The very “I” is called into question by its relation to the one to whom I address myself. This relation to the Other does not precisely ruin my story or reduce me to speechlessness, but it does, invariably, clutter(s) my speech with signs of its undoing. Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing something. If this seems so clearly the case with grief, it is only because it was already the case with desire. One does not always stay intact. It may be that one wants to, or does, but it may also be that despite one’s best efforts one is undone, in the face of the other, , by the touch, by the scent, by the feel, by the prospect of the touch, by the memory of the feel. And so when we speak about my sexuality or my gender, as we do (and as we must) we mean something complicated by it. Neither of these is precisely a possession, but both are to be understood as modes of being dispossessed, ways of being for another or, indeed, by virtue of another. It does not suffice to say that I am promoting a relational view of the self over an autonomous one, or trying to redescribe autonomy in terms of relationality. The term “relationality” sutures the rupture in the relation we seek to describe, a rupture that is constitutive of identity itself. This means that we will have to approach the problem of conceptualizing dispossession with circumspection. One way of doing this is through the notion of ecstasy. We tend to narrate the history of the broader movement for sexual freedom in such a way that ecstasy figures in the 60s and 70s and Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 19 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 19 persists midway through the 80s. But maybe ecstasy is more historically persistent than that, maybe it is with us all along. To be ec-static means, literally, to be outside oneself, and this can have several meanings: to be transported beyond oneself by a passion, but also to be beside oneself with rage or grief. I think that if I can still speak to a “we,” and include myself within its terms, I am speaking to those of us who are living in certain ways beside ourselves, whether it is in sexual passion, or emotional grief, or political rage. In a sense, the predicament is to understand what kind of community is composed of those who are beside themselves. We have an interesting political predicament, since most of the time when we hear about “rights,” we understand them as pertaining to individuals, or when we argue for protection against discrimination, we argue as a group or a class. And in that language and in that context, we have to present ourselves as bounded beings, distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law, a community defined by sameness. Indeed, we had better be able to use that language to secure legal protections and entitlements. But perhaps we make a mistake if we take the definitions of who we are, legally, to be adequate descriptions of what we are about. Although this language might well establish our legitimacy within a legal framework ensconced in liberal versions of human ontology, it fails to do justice to passion and grief and rage, all of which tear us from ourselves, bind us to others, transport us, undo us, and implicate us in lives that are not are own, sometimes fatally, irreversibly. It is not easy to understand how a political community is wrought from such ties. One speaks, and one speaks for another, to another, and yet there is no way to collapse the distinction between the other and myself. When we say “we” we do nothing more than designate this as very problematic. We do not solve it. And perhaps it is, and ought to be, insoluble. We ask that the state, for instance, keep its laws off our bodies, and we call for principles of bodily self-defense and bodily integrity to be accepted as political goods. Yet, it is through the body that gender and sexuality become exposed to others, implicated in social processes, inscribed by cultural norms, and apprehended in their social meanings. In a sense, to be a body is to be given over to others even as a body is, emphatically, “one’s own,” that over which we must claim rights of autonomy. This is as true for the claims made 20 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 20 by lesbians, gays, and bisexuals in favor of sexual freedom as it is for transsexual and transgender claims to self-determination; as it is for intersex claims to be free of coerced medical, surgical, and psychiatric interventions; as it is for all claims to be free from racist attacks, physical and verbal; and as it is for feminism’s claim to reproductive freedom. It is difficult, if not impossible, to make these claims without recourse to autonomy and, specifically, a sense of bodily autonomy. Bodily autonomy, however, is a lively paradox. I am not suggesting, though, that we cease to make these claims. We have to, we must. And I’m not saying that we have to make these claims reluctantly or strategically. They are part of the normative aspiration of any movement that seeks to maximize the protection and the freedoms of sexual and gender minorities, of women, defined with the 

THUS without mutual recognition the possibility of life becomes impossible. This means their framework is derived from a flawed starting point, social recognition is a precondition to their framework. This also means that ideal theory makes no sense, as it abstracts from ontology of agents.
Butler 3, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
Is the problem that we have no norm to distinguish among kinds of possibility, or does that only appear to be a problem if we fail to comprehend “possibility” itself as a norm? Possibility is an aspiration, something we might hope will be equitably distributed, something that might be socially secured, something that cannot be taken for granted, especially if it is apprehended phenomenologically. The point is not to prescribe new gender norms, as if one were under an obligation to supply a measure, gauge, or norm for the adjudication of competing gender presentations. The normative aspiration at work here has to do with the ability to live and breathe and move and would no doubt belong somewhere in what is called a philosophy of freedom. The thought of a possible life is only an indulgence for those who already know themselves to be possible. For those who are still looking to become possible, possibility is a necessity. It was Spinoza who claimed that every human being seeks to persist in his own being, and he made this principle of self-persistence, the conatus, into the basis of his ethics and, indeed, his politics. When Hegel made the claim that desire is always a desire for recognition, he was, in a way, extrapolating upon this Spinozistic point, telling us, effectively, that to persist in one’s own being is only possible on the condition that we are engaged in receiving and offering recognition. If we are not recognizable, if there are no norms of recognition by which we are recognizable, then it is not possible to persist in one’s own being, and we are not possible beings; we have been foreclosed from possibility. We think of norms of recognition perhaps as residing already in a cultural world into which we are born, but these norms change, and with the changes in these norms come changes in what does and does not count as recognizably human. To twist the Hegelian argument in a Foucaultian direction: norms of recognition function to Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 31 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 31 produce and to deproduce the notion of the human. This is made true in a specific way when we consider how international norms work in the context of lesbian and gay human rights, especially as they insist that certain kinds of violences are impermissable, that certain lives are vulnerable and worthy of protection, that certain deaths are grievable and worthy of public recognition. To say that the desire to persist in one’s own being depends on norms of recognition is to say that the basis of one’s autonomy, one’s persistence as an “I” through time, depends fundamentally on a social norm that exceeds that “I,” that positions that “I” ec-statically, outside of itself in a world of complex and historically changing norms. In effect, our lives, our very persistence, depend upon such norms or, at least, on the possibility that we will be able to negotiate within them, derive our agency from the field of their operation. In our very ability to persist, we are dependent on what is outside of us

Part two is the death of being
1st Grievability is defined as the capacity to mourn a person’s death- when an agent dies they are connected to the social in a way that changes others. 

2nd Certain forms of marginalization have been rendered some agents ungrievable because of oppressive power structures- lives do not matter, not considered to be agents.
Butler 4, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
given over to nothing, or to brutality, or to no sustenance. No matter what the valence of that scene is, however, the fact remains that infancy constitutes a necessary dependency, one that we never fully leave behind. Bodies still must be apprehended as given over. Part of understanding the oppression of lives is precisely to understand that there is no way to argue away this condition of a primary vulnerability, of being given over to the touch of the other, even if, or precisely when, there is no other there, and no support for our lives. To counter oppression requires that one understand that lives are supported and maintained differentially, that there are radically different ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe. Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. And other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as “grievable.” What are the cultural contours of the notion of the human at work here? And how do the contours that we accept as the cultural frame for the human limit the extent to which we can avow loss as loss? This is surely a question that Lesbian, gay, and bi-studies has asked in relation to violence against sexual minorities, and that transgendered people have asked as they have been singled out for harassment and sometimes murder, and that intersexed people have asked, whose formative years have so often been marked by an unwanted violence against their bodies in the name of a normative notion of human morphology. This is no doubt as well the basis of a profound affinity between movements centered on gender and sexuality with efforts to counter the normative human morphologies and capacities that condemn or efface those who are physically challenged. It must, as well, also be part of the affinity with antiracist struggles, given the racial differential that undergirds the culturally viable notions of the human—ones that we see acted out in dramatic and terrifying ways in the global arena at the present time. So what is the relation between violence and what is “unreal,” between violence and unreality that attends to those who become the victims of violence, and where does the notion of the ungrievable life 24 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 24 come in? On the level of discourse, certain lives are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized; they fit no dominant frame for the human, and their dehumanization occurs first, at this level. This level then gives rise to a physical violence that in some sense delivers the message of dehumanization which is already at work in the culture. So it is not just that a discourse exists in which there is no frame and no story and no name for such a life,
This implies that the aff framework is the only way to interrogate oppression as it fights the root cause of violence. ROOT CASUSE K SPIKE

And, quiet is violent-representational and media silence coupled with social power structures creates a hegemonic truth, preventing access to agency
Butler 5, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
 or that violence might be said to realize or apply this discourse. Violence against those who are already not quite lives, who are living in a state of suspension between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark. If there is a discourse, it is a silent and melancholic writing in which there have been no lives, and no losses, there has been no common physical condition, no vulnerability that serves as the basis for an apprehension of our commonality, and there has been no sundering of that commonality. None of this takes place on the order of the event. None of this takes place. How many lives have been lost from AIDS in Africa in the last few years? Where are the media representations of this loss, the discursive elaborations of what these losses mean for communities there? I began this chapter with a suggestion that perhaps the interrelated movements and modes of inquiry that collect here might need to consider autonomy as one dimension of their normative aspirations, one value to realize when we ask ourselves, in what direction ought we to proceed, and what kinds of values ought we to be realizing? I suggested as well that the way in which the body figures in gender and sexuality studies, and in the struggles for a less oppressive social world for the otherwise gendered and for sexual minorities of all kinds, is precisely to underscore the value of being beside oneself, of being a porous boundary, given over to others, finding oneself in a trajectory of desire in which one is taken out of oneself, and resituated irreversibly in a field of others in which one is not the presumptive center. The particular sociality that belongs to bodily life, to sexual life, and to becoming gendered (which is always, to a certain extent, becoming gendered for others) establishes a field of ethical enmeshment with others and a sense of disorientation for the first-person, that is, the perspective of the ego. As bodies, we are always for something more than, and other than, ourselves. To articulate this as an entitlement is not always easy, but perhaps not impossible. It suggests, for instance, that “association” Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 25 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 25 is not a luxury, but one of the very conditions and prerogatives of freedom. Indeed, the kinds of associations we maintain importantly take many forms. It will not do to extol the marriage norm as the new ideal for this movement, as the Human Rights Campaign has erroneously done.1 No doubt, marriage and same-sex domestic partnerships should certainly be available as options, but to install either as a model for sexual legitimacy is precisely to constrain the sociality of the body in acceptable ways. In light of seriously damaging judicial decisions against second parent adoptions in recent years, it is crucial to expand our notions of kinship beyond the heterosexual frame. It would be a mistake, however, to reduce kinship to family, or to assume that all sustaining community and friendship ties are extrapolations of kin relations. I make the argument in “Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual” in this volume that kinship ties that bind persons to one another may well be no more or less than the intensification of community ties, may or may not be based on enduring or exclusive sexual relations, may well consist of ex-lovers, nonlovers, friends, and community members. The relations of kinship cross the boundaries between community and family and sometimes redefine the meaning of friendship as well. When these modes of intimate association produce sustaining webs of relationships, they constitute a “breakdown” of traditional kinship that displaces the presumption that biological and sexual relations structure kinship centrally. In addition, the incest taboo that governs kinship ties, producing a necessary exogamy, does not necessarily operate among friends in the same way or, for that matter, in networks of communities. Within these frames, sexuality is no longer exclusively regulated by the rules of kinship at the same time that the durable tie can be situated outside of the conjugal frame. Sexuality becomes open to a number of social articulations that do not always imply binding relations or conjugal ties. That not all of our relations last or are meant to, however, does not mean that we are immune to grief. On the contrary, sexuality outside the field of monogamy well may open us to a different sense of community, intensifying the question of where one finds enduring ties, and so become the condition for an attunement to losses that exceed a discretely private realm. Nevertheless, those who live outside the conjugal frame or maintain modes of social organization for sexuality that are neither monogamous nor quasi-marital are more and more considered unreal, and their loves 26 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 26 and losses less than “true” loves and “true” losses. The derealization of this domain of human intimacy and sociality works by denying reality and truth to the relations at issue. The question of who and what is considered real and true is apparently a question of knowledge. But it is also, as Michel Foucault makes plain, a question of power. Having or bearing “truth” and “reality” is an enormously powerful prerogative within the social world, one way that power dissimulates as ontology. According to Foucault, one of the first tasks of a radical critique is to discern the relation “between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge.”2 Here we are confronted with the limits of what is knowable, limits that exercise a certain force, but are not grounded in any necessity, limits that can only be tread or interrogated by risking a certain security through departing from an established ontology: “Nothing can exist as an element of knowledge if, on the one hand, it . . . does not conform to a set of rules and constraints characteristic, for example, of a given type of scientific discourse in a given period, and if, on the other hand, it does not possess the effects of coercion or simply the incentives peculiar to what is scientifically validated or simply rational or simply generally accepted, etc.”3 Knowledge and power are not finally separable but work together to establish a set of subtle and explicit criteria for thinking the world: “It is therefore not a matter of describing what knowledge is and what power is and how one would repress the other or how the other would abuse the one, but rather, a nexus of knowledge-power has to be described so that we can grasp what constitutes the acceptability of a system . . . .”4 What this means is that one looks both for the conditions by which the object field is constituted, and for the limits of those conditions. The limits are to be found where the reproducibility of the conditions is not secure, the site where conditions are contingent, transformable. In Foucault’s terms, “schematically speaking, we have perpetual mobility, essential fragility or rather the complex interplay between what replicates the same process and what transforms it.”5 To intervene in the name of transformation means precisely to disrupt what has become settled knowledge and knowable reality, and to use, as it were, one’s unreality to make an otherwise impossible or illegible claim. I think that when the unreal lays claim to reality, or enters into its domain,
AND, this comes first-their ethical system and ideal theory justifications might account for oppression, but they do not account for this specific annihilation of the subject, which means that A. their system fails to guide action as some are outside their notion of subjectivity and B. their system cannot access the subject.
Butler 6, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
a reality, and to insist that these are lives worthy of protection in Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 29 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 29 their specificity and commonality; but it is quite another to insist that the very public assertion of gayness calls into question what counts as reality and what counts as a human life. Indeed, the task of international lesbian and gay politics is no less than a remaking of reality, a reconstituting of the human, and a brokering of the question, what is and is not livable? So what is the injustice opposed by such work? I would put it this way: to be called unreal and to have that call, as it were, institutionalized as a form of differential treatment, is to become the other against whom (or against which) the human is made. It is the inhuman, the beyond the human, the less than human, the border that secures the human in its ostensible reality. To be called a copy, to be called unreal, is one way in which one can be oppressed, but consider that it is more fundamental than that. To be oppressed means that you already exist as a subject of some kind, you are there as the visible and oppressed other for the master subject, as a possible or potential subject, but to be unreal is something else again. To be oppressed you must first become intelligible. To find that you are fundamentally unintelligible (indeed, that the laws of culture and of language find(s) you to be an impossibility) is to find that you have not yet achieved access to the human, to find yourself speaking only and always as if you were human, but with the sense that you are not, to find that your language is hollow, that no recognition is forthcoming because the norms by which recognition takes place are not in your favor. We might think that the question of how one does one’s gender is a merely cultural question, or an indulgence on the part of those who insist on exercising bourgeois freedom in excessive dimensions. To say, however, that gender is performative is not simply to insist on a right to produce a pleasurable and subversive spectacle but to allegorize the spectacular and consequential ways in which reality is both reproduced and contested. 

Thus the standard is reducing frames of ungreivabillity
To clarify, this is an intents based famework- impacts relate to a frame of agency, not material conditions
And, prohibition is key. Norms of grievability depend upon the reproduction of their existance through frames. Our stance must impede upon the reproduction of this frame, which requires we recognize that nuclear power is inseparable from its norms of usage.

Part 4 is the advocacy
I advocate banning land based fission Reactors-I will spek in CX to meet your interp.
This is A JUSTIFIED advocacy- all of my authors are specific to this form of power
Part 5 is case
Advantage one- the nuclear myth
First- the nuclear myth functions as a social frame in line with Butlers notion of ontology
Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)
Judith Butler illuminates this issue. According to Butler, “there is no life and no death without a relation to some frame ” 12 — in this case, the framework of the nuclear myth. In other words, the framework that organizes and orders our worldview makes people visible or invisible within the public realm. The lives of those excluded from the frame are unrecognized, and therefore more vulnerable, more precarious than the lives of those within the frame. Those within the framework are notnecessarily malevolent or inhumane. Rather, they do not question or challenge the framework that is making certain lives more precarious than others. Concealment is therefore an issue of epistemology and ontology. As Butler claims, “The epistemological capacity to apprehend a life is partially dependent on that life being produced according to norms that qualify it as a life or, indeed, as part of life. ” 13 But this epistemological problem also raises ethical concerns. “ In this way, ” continues Butler, “ the normative production of ontology thus produces the epistemological problem of apprehending a life, and this in turn gives rise to the ethical problem of what it is to acknowledge or, indeed, to guard against injury and violence.” 14 That is to say, when one‟s suffering is unrecognized, un-apprehended, and therefore concealed from the public eye, injury and violence are also unacknowledged. When such violence
second-nuclear power plants create a sacrificial system where lives near the plant are rendered ungreivable
Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)
 But perhaps the most palpable harm caused by this invisible radiation is whatnuclear waste. “Typically uranium concentrat ions can be as high as 0.7 in mined ore, 5meaning that well over 99 of what is mined is rejected after processing .” 6 This meansthat to secure 70 tons of uranium from a mine, 22,500 steel barrels of low-levelradioactive waste will be produced. slide #11 Once uranium is enriched and is used atthe reactors, spent or irradiated high-level radioactive material is accumulated. Neither the US nor Japan has settled on a final storage site for the waste. At one point, bothcountries inquired into whether the Mongol ian People‟s Republic would accept it in their land. Meanwhile, Finland slide #12 continues its long-standing project of constructing amassive underground repository, called onkalo , whose projected completion date issometime in the 22 nd century. Even more unbelievable is the idea — or fantasy — that thefacility will remain integral, securing the toxic and highly hazardous poison for the next100,000 years. Some experts are therefore concerned about how the message of danger will be communicated to whatever beings, human or otherwise, are inhabiting this land before the waste is no longer dangerous.Another hazardous emission is radiation. Recent scientific research has established a correlation between the presence of nuclear power plants and elevated leukemia rates, especially among children living in proximity to the plants slide #13.Studies in Germany in 2007 and France in 2012 respectively revealed that among children living near nuclear plants leukemia rates are twice as high as elsewhere. Thoughfurther studies on the connection between cancer rates and proximity to nuclear power plants are certainly needed, the indications, as I see them, belie the myth of nuclear safety. Ethical Implications of Subverting Power 6Thus far, I have tried to call into question and debunk the nuclear myth. Althoughmy expertise is not in scientific, economic, or environmental study, I see Fukushima asan urgent call to deepen my own and my students‟ understanding of our social structures.To this end, I believe, further research into environmental studies, economics, politicalscience, and literature, to name a few, in collaboration with my colleagues on and off campus, is necessary. Meanwhile, as someone trained in ethics, I want to argue thatteaching about Fukushima is itself an ethical task.Born and raised in Fukushima, philosopher Takahashi Tetsuya describes the nuclear industry as a “gisei no shisutemu” or “sacrificial system.” “In this sacrificial system, ” he writes, “one‟s benefits are made possible and maintained at the expense of others ‟ lives — whether life itself, health, everyday life, property, dignity, hope, and so on.” 7 In stating so, Takahashi is aware that some would argue that sacrifice on behalf of one‟s society is, though perhaps unfortunate, also unavoidable for the collective life of human beings. It is for this reason that Takahashi emphasizes the differences between inevitable sacrifice for collective life on the one hand, and the kind of sacrifice forced upon people by nuclear energy. What I am criticizing here writes Takahashi are those more serious cases in which this sacrifice violates human rights. Given the potential risk of severe accidents and the enforcement of labor conditions that inevitably expose workers to radiation, nuclear power plants threaten and violate fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and the right to the pursuit of happiness. (…) Althoug h nuclear power plants are built andoperated as the result of the formal procedures of a democratic society,once this violates human rights, imputing responsibility for such aviolation is a necessary consequence. 8 Takahashi claims that this system of sacrifice , in fact, is coextensive with a “ system of irresponsibility, ” an idea borrowed from Mar

Third- These lives are rendered ungreivable through concealment
Miyamoto 1 Transgressing Boundaries: Teaching on Fukushima, the Nuclear Safety Myth, andEthics Yuki Miyamoto (no publishing dates provided, cites in article are as recent as 2013)
uyama Masao. In securing the benefits and interests of some, rather than maintaining a community for all, the sacrificial system and the system of irresponsibility go hand in hand. According to Takahashi, a “sacrifice made in this system is usually concealed from the public. If it is not, the sacrifice is glorified and justified by being labeled as toutoi gisei, or „ sacred sacrifice. ‟” 9 The familiar rhetoric of the “sacred sacrifice” that purportedly contributes to the “ common good ” of the community functions to cast anysort of counter-argument or form of resistance as anti-social or anti-institutional, as can be seen in regard to the anti-nuclear movement in Japan, which has been characterized in just this manner. Such characterizations, however, generally take no real account of whatconstitutes the common good. Since I have already expressed my thoughts on the rhetoricof sacred sacrifice elsewhere, 10 today I would like to focus on the concealment of sacrifice, and to reveal the ethical problems of such concealment.Takahashi is convinced that nuclear power requires workers ‟ exposure to radiation, and that their sickness and diseases too often remain concealed. 11 Such concealment stems from the fact that a correlation between radiation exposure and a given sickness have yet to be scientifically verified. But I would emphasize that just because such scientific verification has not yet been established does not mean, as some would seem to suggest, that these cases are nonexistent. What clearly does exist is an absence of attention to such illnesses beneath the veil of the nuclear myth. Thus, the phrase “scientifically unproven” functions as an instance of rhetorical concealment and diversion. Systemic concealment of this sort also contributes to a normative structure thatcomes to be taken for granted

Advantage two-natives

The nuclear industry is fueled by racism and colonialism.
Green 7 Jim; “RADIOACTIVE RACISM IN AUSTRALIA”; Jim Green Friends of the Earth; Australia; February 2007; http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/racism. Accessed August 8 2016 Premier
The nuclear industry feeds off, profits from, and reinforces racism. The industry and its political allies have a long history of forcing uranium mines, nuclear reactors, radioactive waste dumps, and weapons tests on the land of Indigenous peoples. The industry also feeds off and reinforces imperialist, colonial patterns: colonies and Third World countries are generally home to the filthiest uranium mines, they have often been used for weapons testing, and are sometimes used as radioactive waste dumping grounds. This paper details some aspects  of 'radioactive racism' in Australia. The final section also includes some articles about radioactive racism in the US and other countries.
Native Americans are disproportionately affected by nuclear waste.  
Earth Talk 10 "Reservations About Toxic Waste: Native American Tribes Encouraged To Turn Down Lucrative Hazardous Disposal Deals". March 31, 2010. Scientific American. Accessed August 8 2016. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/earth-talk-reservationsabout-toxic-waste/.Premier
Native tribes across the American West have been and continue to be subjected to significant amounts of radioactive and otherwise hazardous waste as a result of living near nuclear test sites, uranium mines, power plants and toxic waste dumps. And in some cases tribes are actually hosting hazardous waste on their sovereign reservations—which are not subject to the same environmental and health standards as U.S. land—in order to generate revenues. Native American advocates argue that siting such waste on or near reservations is an “environmental justice” problem, given that twice as many Native families live below the poverty line than other sectors of U.S. society and often have few if any options for generating income. “In the quest to dispose of nuclear waste, the government and private companies have disregarded and broken treaties, blurred the definition of Native American sovereignty, and directly engaged in a form of economic racism akin to bribery,” says Bayley Lopez of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He cites example after example of the government and private companies taking advantage of the “overwhelming poverty on native reservations by offering them millions of dollars to host nuclear waste storage sites.” 

This form of nuclear racism creates ungreivability- colonized lives are rendered ungrievable by the nuclear model
WISE 93 Environmental Racism and Nuclear Development By the WISE-Amsterdam Collective WISE News Communique; 387-388; March
28, 1993; www.antenna.nlwise; Accessed August 8 2016 Premier
With its specialization and compartmentalization, the current model pushes us to be nuclear and racist, or anti-nuclear, or anti-racist. By accepting its divisions, we find ourselves still caught within its confines. In this way we play the game of those enforcing this model, of those in power. We need to be creative and change the rules. We must redefine power and reshape it. We must see that it becomes something shared with others, something empowering, and not something exercised over them or used against them. And we need to link these two movements, now separated under the current model, and move together to create a healthy society, based on justice, equality and sustainability, where people are no longer afraid of differences in others, or afraid to be different. But to do that, we first have to make the connections between all systems of domination. And we must recognize that the dominant culture is willing -- to a frightening extent -- to write off the lives and interests of those groups of people it considers of low value.
 Part 6 is the underview
analytic
Neg has a 3 side bias this year according to vbriefly
Analytic
(vbriefly, http://vbriefly.com/side-bias/,  LD Side Bias, full article avalible)
The state is inevitable – we recognize it can be bad, but we can use it for good, to change thought patterns. This turns the K, they aff is needed to change the thought that can produce the alt. –AND- the aff is try or die, we must try for change

Sotiris 15. Nov. 13; Panagiotis Sotiris; Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy, and Communication and Media @ University of Athens, Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophical and Social Studies @ University of Crete, Department of Psychology @ Panteion University, Department of Sociology @ University of the Aegean; “The Realism of Audacity: Rethinking Revolutionary Strategy Today”; http://salvage.zone/online-exclusive/the-realism-of-audacity-rethinking-revolutionary-strategy-today YS 11.14.15

Unfortunately, historical experience shows both the catalytic and indispensable aspect of the insurrectionary sequence and the difficulty to initiate a process of transformation afterwards: mass civil unrest can lead to a regime crisis, but then the question is what comes next. Nor is the answer the imaginary ‘October’ of a supposedly Leninist insurrectionary sequence, which is the definition many tendencies of the anticapitalist Left propose for a revolution for which conditions are is never ripe enough. Here, strategy is replaced by an anti-capitalist verbalism that feels more comfortable with failure, since this justifies the position that from the beginning it was determined that nothing could change. Of course, enumerating problems is not a substitute for an answer to open questions. This can only be a collective process of reflection and self-criticism. However, we can discuss some starting points for a rethinking of revolutionary strategy today. We need a fresh conceptualisation that combines the question of government with something close to a permanent dual power strategy. Dual power in this reading is not a question of catastrophic equilibrium and antagonistic coexistence of two competing state forms. Rather, it refers to the new forms of popular power, self-management, worker’s control, and solidarity and coordination that are resisting the counterattacks of state apparatuses and capital even after the arrival of the left to government. A war of position is necessary both before and after the seizure of power, as a continuous process of struggles, collective experimentation, forms of power from below, new social configurations, along with deep institutional changes, in the form of a Constituent Process. In this reading dual power is not only about worker’s councils or soviets. It is also about self-managed enterprises, and solidarity clinics and popular assemblies. It is about looking carefully at the new forms of organisation that have emerged in movements like 15M or the ‘Squares’ as collective political forms that in certain aspects transcend the social/political division. In such a perspective there is no ‘moment’ of passage from ‘radical governance’ to ‘socialist transformation’, only an uneven and contradictory process that will face counter attacks and perhaps also what Georges Labica called the ‘impossibility of ‘non-violence’. We need a new practice of politics. Any attempt towards radical transformation must base itself upon the short-circuit between politics and economics that Etienne Balibar suggests is at the heart of the Marxian project, treating the economy as terrain of political intervention and experimentation, insisting that movements representing the working classes have a say in politics, initiating novel forms of democracy from below. This also includes what Lenin described as a Cultural Revolution, or Gramsci as ethico-political reform, the emergence of new forms of mass political intellectuality and a new collective ethos of participation. Again, we can start by the formative and learning experiences in the movements, the ways they have facilitated the emergence of new forms of thinking and new ethics of solidarity and resistance. Rebuilding the United Front cannot be a repetition. Nor can it be simply a regroupment. We need an ‘epistemological break’ in our thinking of both the front and party. The Modern Prince can only be the result of a process of recomposition and profound transformation, learning also from the experiences of political self-organisation in contemporary movements. We have to learn from our mistakes and be profoundly self-critical avoiding all forms of arrogant know-all mentality, bureaucratic thinking, and theoretical laziness. So far, we have failed to create the kind of laboratory of a new politics that was needed, that kind of democratic political process, non-sectarian dialogue, collective experimentation, creative militancy. Regarding the Greek case, we can see the beginning of the problem in the inability of the forces of the Left that realised the necessity of rupture regarding debt and the Eurozone, to initiate in 2010-11 a process of a new front incorporating the new forms of organisation emerging from the movement. We must confront this task of recomposition, transformation and experimentation because otherwise the elements, practices, experiences that could be part of potential new historical block will remain dispersed and disintegrated. Antonio Gramsci has always insisted that historical changes take the form also of molecular changes. The notion of the ‘molecular’ refers to the multifarious, complex, over-determined, non-teleological and non-deterministic character of historical process. Gramsci’s famous ‘Autobiographical Note’ from Notebook 15, is not only a personal meditation on molecular transformation –contemplating his own life in prison, the choice he made not to flee the country, and how disaster can affect one person – but also a small treatise on molecular changes in periods of defeat, shows the small changes that in the end lead to a new relation of forces. His observations have, I think, a certain resonance in countries like Greece: the truth is that the person of the fifth year is not the same as in the fourth, the third, the second, the first and so on; one has a new personality, completely new, in which the years that have passed have in fact demolished one’s moral braking system, the resistive forces that characterised the person during the first year.2 This means that any process of recomposition of the radical Left must be attentive to this molecular aspect. New forms of movement for organisations, especially in relation to social strata that lack any form of representation (unemployed, precarious etc), new democratic practices in movements, forms of political self-organisation, new forms of coordination and solidarity, expanding the experimentation with forms of self-management, creating alternatives forms of (counter)information, organising new forms of militant research are more urgent than ever. They also enable us to rethink political organisation under this prism of a necessary molecular recomposition, of collective democratic processes for the elaboration of alternatives, of a collective new practice of politics. Communist or revolutionary politics are in the last instance about subterranean currents that came to the surface only in critical moments, because they are dispersed, fragmented, ruptured, the results of encounters that did not last. The challenge is exactly to have the ‘slow impatience’ to learn from defeat, to regroup, to experiment, to rethink all aspects of the conjuncture, from the molecular to the ‘integral’, to ‘organise good encounters’ (Deleuze) and bring these subterranean currents to the surface. The tragic defeat of the Greek Left, opens a period of necessary self-criticism, reflexion and experimentation with new forms of political fronts, organisations and coordination along with all the necessary effort to rebuild the resistance to the new wave of neoliberal reforms, fight collective despair and resignation and bring back confidence to the ability to change things. It is will not be easy and it will be like trying to build a ship when you are already out in rough sea. However, it is the only way to continue to say NO. No to pessimism, no to surrender, no to defeat.
Neg must explicitly propose all T interpretations about my advocacy such as specification and implementation as well as theoretical concerns and give me the chance to comply to prevent norm creation based on ambiguity and allow the aff to rectify possible abuse to encourage better substantive debate else assume I meet.

Extensions/Extra Cards
The role of the ballot is to challenge dominant epistemologies- vote for the debater who provides the best challenge to oppressive social practices
Owen 94
David Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy @ University of Southampton, 1994 (Maturity and Modernity, pp 209-210) 

The ‘universal’ intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth’ of our being (e.g.. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic forms of this type of intellectual practice is the central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the figure of the ‘specific’ intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present. (PPC p. 124) The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘we are always in the position of beginning again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in so far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, ‘a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and partiality of criticisms which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and ‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the practices we accept rest’ (PPC p. 154)This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s points if intelligence if we recognize his concerns to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that ‘criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. (PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident as one believed to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for reposting of the question ‘ who are we?’ The role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on the behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the space within which their struggles become visible such that these others can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this critical activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

Tournament: idk | Round: 1 | Opponent: idr | Judge: idr
I value justice

Ethics devolve to the individual perspective since people constantly gain new knowledge, making their perspective the most indicative of truth.

Anker, (Michael Anker, PhD Dissertation “The Ethics of Uncertainty: Aporetic Openings”, Atropos Press, 2009. Pg 25)

As mentioned and affirmed, all things (concepts, words,  objects, subjects, etc.) are in a state of becoming.  Gaining knowledge or insight into any of these particulars thus entails an unstable terrain.  If some-thing is constantly in a state of also becoming some-thing other,  there is no stable ground for absolute knowledge and judgment.   Furthermore, and to complicate matters even more so, it is not only the  object being considered that exists in a state of transformation, but also the  “subject” doing the interpretation.  What we have left is a thoroughly perspectival (Nietzsche) relation to viewing and interpreting what we see and know of this world.  By affirming this, knowledge becomes not a ground or an end in itself, but the means for a continual perspectival shifting.  Perspectivism, as a thoroughly ungrounded and continuously shifting mode of interpretation, furthermore affirms the uncertainty of an  indeterminate subject, object, and conceptual becoming.

And, disagreement plagues objectivist systems of justice since there’s no way to resolve differences, so evaluation devolves to the first person.

McGrath, (Sarah McGrath, Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise, http://www.princeton.edu/~smcgrath/moraldisagreement.pdf)

In some ways, moral disagreement seems to parallel the diversity of opinion as color to which shade of green is unique green. Unique green is that shade of green that is neither bluish nor yellowish. When asked to select the a particular shade shade which is unique green, different subjects with normal color vision will select different shades. As in the case of our controversial moral views, opinion about which shade is unique green not only fails to be unanimous, but is substantially divided. Perhaps if there were relatively widespread agreement as to which shade is unique green, then the dissenting judgments of a few who possessed otherwise normal color vision could be dismissed. But the fact that the actual division of opinion is substantial suggests that human beings are not reliable detectors of the relevant property. That relevantly similar creatures—since creatures with the same type of visual system—arrive at different verdicts when similarly situated seems to show that that kind of creature is simply not well equipped to detect the presence or absence of the property in question. That human beings are not, as a species, reliable detectors of unique green seems to tell against crediting any individual with knowledge that a certain shade is unique green, particularly if the individual knows of this general lack of reliability and has no good reason to think that he is exceptional in this respect. Note that although questions about which shade of green is unique green are hard questions for human beings, such questions do not present themselves to us as difficult ones. In fact, most subjects are quite confident of their initial judgments; each person’s view strikes her as obviously correct. This seems parallel to the moral case: in the moral case too, many find that their own views about controversial moral questions strike them as obviously correct. 

In order to reconcile our subjective beliefs, we must look towards community desires. In a first person world, community is epistemologically most likely to be true and key to identity construction.

Christiano, (Thomas Christiano. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Jul 27, 2006. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/#NonInsVal Democracy)

Two kinds of in instrumental benefits are commonly attributed to democracy: relatively good laws and policies and improvements in the characters of the participants. John Stuart Mill argued that a democratic method of making legislation is better than non-democratic methods in three ways: strategically, epistemically and via the improvement of the characters of democratic citizens (Mill, 1861, Chapter 3). Strategically, democracy has an advantage because it forces decision-makers to take into account the interests, rights and opinions of most people in society. Since democracy gives some political power to each more people are taken into account than under aristocracy or monarchy. The most forceful contemporary statement of this instrumental argument is provided by Amartya Sen, who argues, for example, that “no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press” (Sen 1999, 152). The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor. Epistemologically, democracy is thought to be the best decision-making method on the grounds that it is generally more reliable in helping participants discover the right decisions. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and critical assessment of laws and policies. Democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. Furthermore, the broad based discussion typical of democracy enhances the critical assessment of the different moral ideas that guide decision-makers. Many have endorsed democracy on the basis of the proposition that democracy has beneficial effects on character. Many have noted with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes collective decisions depend on them more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. In addition, democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference whether they do or not. Finally, some have argued that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. In Addition When they participate in making decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they come genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and against other forms of rule (Mill 1861, p. 74, Elster 2002, p. 152).Some argue in addition that the above effects on character tend to enhance the quality of legislation as well. A society of autonomous, rational, and moral decision-makers Democracy is more likely to produce good legislation than a society ruled by a self-centered person or small group of persons who rule over slavish and unreflective subjects.

We should frame the debate in terms of US society because
We all have epistemic boundaries that force us to understand the topic locally
 The US has yet to ban nuclear power, making it one of the best hypothetical scenarios to discuss
The US offers a wide demographic in perspectives, allowing for accuracy in polls.
As the United States grows more diverse, the Census Bureau reported, it is becoming a “plurality nation”. “The next half century marks key points in continuing trends — the U.S. will become a plurality nation, where the non-Hispanic white population remains the largest single group, but no group is in the majority,” the bureau’s acting director, Thomas L. Mesenbourg, said in a statement. The new projections — the first set based on the 2010 Census — paint a picture of a nation whose post-recession population is growing more slowly than anticipated, where the elderly are expected to make up a growing share of the populace, and that is rapidly becoming more racially and ethnically diverse. All of these trends promise to shape the nation’s politics, economics and culture in the decades to come.
And 4. this isn’t a theoretical issue, I will accept impacts unrelated to the US under the standard.

The US is a federal republic defined as “a state in which power rests with the people or their representatives” (CIA.gov), so the US definitionally ought to do what its people will, making it justified. This means not only that democracy is the only way to say what the US should do in terms of justice, but also that any other ethical system would change the agent we are talking about, and is thus incoherent, so textually it precedes other justifications.

Thus, the standard is consistency with communal norms, defined as looking towards what the majority of Americans view on an issue. 

Next is offense:

Americans oppose nuclear energy- by a wide margin
Riffkin March 2-6, 2016 For First Time, Majority in U.S. Oppose Nuclear Energy  by Rebecca Riffkin
STORY HIGHLIGHTS 54 of Americans oppose nuclear energy, 44 in favor First time in Gallup's trend that majority oppose nuclear energy Both major parties less likely to favor nuclear energy than in 2015 WASHINGTON, D.C. -- For the first time since Gallup first asked the question in 1994, a majority of Americans say they oppose nuclear energy. The 54 opposing it is up significantly from 43 a year ago, while the 44 who favor using nuclear energy is down from 51.   
Gallup asks Americans as part of its annual Environment poll if they favor or oppose the use of nuclear energy as one way to provide electricity. Results for this Gallup poll are based on telephone interviews conducted March 2-6, 2016, with a random sample of 1,019 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. For results based on the total sample of national adults, the margin of sampling error is ±4 percentage points at the 95 confidence level. All reported margins of sampling error include computed design effects for weighting.
Each sample of national adults includes a minimum quota of 60 cellphone respondents and 40 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas by time zone within region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers are selected using random-digit-dial methods.
Prefer my evidence because
Counter studies are biased; the gallup conducted this poll in 2016 with the aim of understanding the public’s opinion. A private polling institution doesn’t have an agenda to endorse through a descriptive poll- they profit from being unbiased.
My evidence is the most recent poll on the subject

Because the American public supports the plan, you affirm.

Tournament: St James | Round: 4 | Opponent: James Torbert | Judge: Greg Butrus
I affirm the resolution ‘resolved, countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power’
I Value morality derivative of ought in the resolution. Any other value is nonsensical since one could always ask why that value is important, this is infinitely regressive until we arrive at morality.
Part one the definitions
Nuclear power is defined by Merriam Webster as
Energy that is created by splitting apart the nuclei of atoms
AND, even if they win their definition is better, the AC will only advocate for prohibiting this form of nuclear power
Part two is framework

1. Structural violence is a form of structural oppression, where certain groups are structurally disadvantaged in a society
   2. Structural violence is based in moral exclusion, which is fundamentally flawed because exclusion is not based on dessert but rather on arbitrarily perceived differences.
   Susan Opotow 01 Susan Opotow is a social and organizational psychologist. Her work examines the intersection of conflict, justice, and identity as they give rise to moral exclusion -- seeing others as outside the scope of justice and as eligible targets of discrimination, exploitation, hate, or violence. Sh  e studies moral exclusion and moral inclusion in such everyday contexts as schooling, environmental and public policy conflict, and in more violent contexts, such as deadly wars and the post-war period. She has guest edited The Journal of Social Issues and Social Justice Research and co-edited Identity and the Natural Environment: The Psychological Significance of Nature (MIT Press, 2003). She is associate editor of Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology and Past President of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, “Social Injustice”, Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Centuryl Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2001, BE
   Both structural and direct violence results from moral justifications and rationalizations. Morals are the norms, rights, entitlements, obligations, responsibilities, and duties that shape our sense of justice and guide our behavior with others (Deutsch, 1985). Morals operationalize our sense of justice by identifying what we owe to whom, whose needs, views, and well-being count, and whose do not. Our morals apply to people we value, which define who is inside our scope of jus- tice (or “moral community”), such as family members, friends, compatriots, and coreligionists (Deutsch, 1974, 1985; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989). We extend considerations of fairness to them, share community resources with them, and make sacrifices for them that foster their well- being (Opotow, 1987, 1993).¶ We see other kinds of people such as enemies or strangers outside our scope of justice; they are morally excluded. Gender, ethnicity, religious identity, age, mental capacity, sexual orientation, and political affiliation are some criteria used to define moral exclusion. Excluded people can be hated and viewed as “vermin” or “plague” or they can be seen as expendable non-entities. In either case, disadvantage, hardship, and exploitation inflicted on them seems normal, accept- able, and just—as “the way things are” or the way they “ought to be.” Fairness and deserving seem irrelevant when applied to them and harm befalling them elicits neither remorse, outrage, nor demands for restitution; instead, harm inflicted on them can inspire celebration.¶ Many social issues and controversies, such as aid to school drop-outs, illegal immigrants, “welfare moms,” people who are homeless, substance abusers, and those infected with HIV are essentially moral debates about who deserves public resources, and thus, ultimately, about moral inclusion. When we see other people’s circumstances to be a result of their moral failings, moral exclusion seems warranted. But when we see others’ circumstances as a result of structural violence, moral exclusion seems unwarranted and unjust.¶ Psychological Bases for Moral Exclusion¶ While it is psychologically more comfortable to perceive harm-doers to be evil or demented, we each have boundaries for justice. Our moral obligations are stronger toward those close to us and weaker toward those who are distant. When the media reports suffering and death in Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, we often fail—as a nation, as com- munities, and as individuals—to protest or to provide aid. Rationalizations include insufficient knowledge of the political dynamics, the futility of doing much of use, and not knowing where to begin. Our tendency to exclude people is fostered by a number of normal perceptual tendencies:¶ 1. Social categorization. Our tendency to group and classify objects, including social catego- ries, is ordinarily innocuous, facilitating acquisition of information and memory (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963). Social categorizations can become invidious, however, when they serve as a basis for rationalizing structural inequality and social injustice. For example, race is a neutral physical characteristic, but it often becomes a value-loaded label, which generates unequal treatment and outcomes (Archer, 1985; Tajfel, 1978).¶ 2. Evaluative judgments. Our tendency to make simple, evaluative, dichotomous judgments (e.g., good and bad, like and dislike) is a fundamental feature of human perception. Evaluative judgments have cognitive, affective, and moral components. From a behavioral, evolutionary, and social learning perspective, evaluative judgments have positive adaptive value because they provide feedback that protects our well-being (Edwards and von Hippel, 1995; Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957). Evaluative judgments can support structural violence and exclusionary thinking, however, when they lend a negative slant to perceived difference. In-group-out-group and we-them thinking can result from social comparisons made on dimensions that maximize a positive social identity for oneself or one’s group at the expense of others (Tajfel, 1982).
   3. Before evaluating any ethical theory, we must end structural violence and oppression in order to include everyone in ethical decision making.
   Winter and Leighton 99 |Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton. Winter|Psychologist that specializes in Social Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social psychology, peace psychology, and ustice and intergroup responses to transgressions of justice “Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century.” Pg 4-5 ghsVA
   Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social jus- tice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.

Thus the standard is reducing structural violence.
Prefer this standard because:
Structural oppression functions as a utilitarian harm, oppression causes misery amongst those in society in an unending way
Structural violence prevents human flourishing because it treats humans as disposable
Structural violence eliminates freedom as it coerces individuals to act against their wishes in order to survive
Structural violence must be reduced, not just prevented, because without elimination it’s impossible to remove from society
Thus, vote for the debater who best prevents structural violence 

Part 3 is the contention- I contend that prohibiting nuclear power reduces structural violence
Contention 1 is meltdowns
Subpoint a: meltdowns happen relatively frequently
Planck  Severe nuclear reactor accidents likely every 10 to 20 years, European study suggests Date: May 22, 2012 Source: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/05/120522134942.htm
Catastrophic nuclear accidents such as the core meltdowns in Chernobyl and Fukushima are more likely to happen than previously assumed. Based on the operating hours of all civil nuclear reactors and the number of nuclear meltdowns that have occurred, scientists at the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry in Mainz have calculated that such events may occur once every 10 to 20 years (based on the current number of reactors) -- some 200 times more often than estimated in the past. The researchers also determined that, in the event of such a major accident, half of the radioactive caesium-137 would be spread over an area of more than 1,000 kilometres away from the nuclear reactor. Their results show that Western Europe is likely to be contaminated about once in 50 years by more than 40 kilobecquerel of caesium-137 per square meter. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, an area is defined as being contaminated with radiation from this amount onwards. In view of their findings, the researchers call for an in-depth analysis and reassessment of the risks associated with nuclear power plants. The reactor accident in Fukushima has fuelled the discussion about nuclear energy and triggered Germany's exit from their nuclear power program. It appears that the global risk of such a catastrophe is higher than previously thought, a result of a study carried out by a research team led by Jos Lelieveld, Director of the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry in Mainz: "After Fukushima, the prospect of such an incident occurring again came into question, and whether we can actually calculate the radioactive fallout using our atmospheric models." According to the results of the study, a nuclear meltdown in one of the reactors in operation worldwide is likely to occur once in 10 to 20 years. Currently, there are 440 nuclear reactors in operation, and 60 more are planned.
Prefer this evidence because it takes into account the number of reactors running- there may be a low meltdown chance for each reactor, but when there are hundreds of reactor a meltdown becomes likely
And, this outweighs on inevitability. Other forms of structural violence can be permanently stopped, but meltdowns will always happen
Subpoint B. meltdowns result in massive structural violence against minorities and the poor, in a unique way. Accidents in other forms of power production do not create this violence-fukeshima proves   
Shrader-Frechette 12 Kristin Shrader-Frechette, O’Neill Family Endowed Professor,
Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy, and also the director of the
Center for Environmental Justice and Children’s Health, at the University of Notre Dame,
“Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: PrimaFacie Evidence for a Japanese ‘‘Katrina’’” ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE Volume 5, Number 3, 2012    
University scientists, nuclear-industry experts, and physicians say FD radiation will cause at least 20,000- 60,000 premature-cancer deaths.41,42 Japanese poor people are among the hardest hit by FD DREI because, like those abandoned after Hurricane Katrina, Japan’s poor received inadequate post-FD disaster assistance. Abandoned by government and ‘‘marooned’’ for weeks without roads, electricity, or water, many poor people had no medical care,43,44 transportation, or heat—despite frigid, snowy conditions.45,46 At least four reasons suggest prima-facie evidence that Japanese poor near FD have faced DREI. One primafacie reason is that because poor people tend to live near dangerous facilities, like reactors, they face the worst accident risks. Within weeks after the FD accident began, long-lived cesium-134 and other radioactive isotopes had poisoned soils at 7.5 million times the regulatory limit; radiation outside plant boundaries was equivalent to getting about seven chest Xrays per hour.47 Roughly 19 miles Northwest of FD, air-radiation readings were 0.8 mSv per hour; after 10 days of this exposure, IARC dose- response curves predict 1 in 5 fatal cancers of those exposed would be attributable to FD; two-months exposure would mean most fatal cancers were caused by FD. Such exposures are likely because many near-Fukushima residents were too poor to evacuate.20 Farther outside the evacuation zone—less than two weeks after the accident began—soil 25 miles Northwest of FD had cesium-137 levels ‘‘twice as high as the threshold for declaring areas uninhabitable around Chernobyl,’’ suggesting ‘‘the land might need to be abandoned.’’48 Not until a month after US and international agencies recommended expanding FD evacuation zones, did Japanese-government officials consider and reject expanding evacuation.49, 50 A second prima-facie reason for Fukushima DREI is that poor people, living near reactors, have higher probabilities of being hurt by both normal and disaster-related radiation releases. Reactors normally cause prima facie EI because they release allowable radiation that increases local cancers and mortality, especially among infants/ children.51–55 Because zero is the only safe dose of ionizing radiation (as the US National Academy of Sciences warns), its cumulative LNT (Linear, No Threshold for increased risk) effects are worst closer to reactors, where poor people live. The US EPA says even normal US radiation releases, between 1970–2020, could cause up to 24,000 additional US deaths.56,57 A third prima-facie reason for Fukushima DREI is that although nearby (poor) people bear both higher preaccident and post-accident risks, others receive little/no risks and most benefits. Wealthier Tokyo residents—140 miles away—received virtually all FD electricity, yet virtually no EI or DREI. A fourth prima-facie reason for DREI burdens on FD poor is that their poverty/powerlessness arguably forced them into EI and accepting reactor siting. Companies hoping to site nuclear facilities target economically depressed areas, both in Japan and elsewhere.17,58 Thus, although FD-owner Tokyo Electric Company (TECO) has long-term safety and ‘‘cover-up scandals,’’ Fukushima residents agreed to accept TECO reactors in exchange for cash. With Fukushima $121 million in debt, in 2007 it approved two new reactors in exchange for ‘‘$45 million from the government.60 percent’’ of total town revenue.17,59 Yet if economic hardship forced poor towns to accept reactors in exchange for basic-services monies, they likely gave no informed consent. Their choice was not voluntary, but coerced by their poverty. Massive Japanese-nuclear-industry PR and media ads also have thwarted risk-disclosure, thus consent, by minimizing nuclear risks.17,53,60–62 Scientists say neither industry nor government disclosed its failure to (1) test reactor-safety equipment; (2) thwart many natural-event disasters; (3) withstand seismic events worse than those that already had occurred; (4) withstand Fukushima-type disasters; (5) admit that new passive-safety reactors require electricity to cool cores and avoid catastrophe; or (6) base reactorsafety on anything but cost-benefit tests.17,53,60–62 Thus, because prima facie evidence suggests Fukushima poor people never consented to FD siting, they are EI victims whose reactor proximity caused them also to become DREI victims.
Subpoint C is disaster relief- poor minority workers are forced to clean up radioactive nuclear disasters in dangerous conditions and for below minimum wage  
McCurdy 15 Claire McCurdy, writer @ International Policy Digest, “Japan’s Nuclear Gypsies: The Homeless, Jobless and Fukushima,” International Policy Digest, August 21, 2015, http://intpolicydigest.org/2015/08/21/japan-s-nuclear-gypsies-the-homeless-jobless-andfukushima/   
The cleanup efforts in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster in northern Japan have Has  revealed the plight of the Japanese unemployed, marginally employed day laborers and the homeless. They are called the “precariat,” Japan’s proletariat, living precariously on the knife-edge of the work world, without full employment or job security. They are derided as “glow in the dark boys,” “jumpers” (one job to another) and “nuclear gypsies.” They have even been dubbed “burakumin,” a hostile term for Japan’s untouchables, members of the lowest rung on the ladder in Japanese society. They are unskilled and virtually untrained and are the nuclear decontamination workers recruited by Japanese gangsters, Yakuza, to make Fukushima in northern Japan livable again. These jobs are some of the most dangerous and undesirable jobs in the industrialized world, a $35 billion, taxpayer-funded effort to clean up radioactive fallout across an area of northern Japan larger than Hong Kong. Reuters and the L.A. Times have both described the project as an unprecedented effort. Reuters made a direct comparison between Fukushima and the Chernobyl “incident.” Unlike Ukraine and the 1986 nuclear “accident” at Chernobyl, where authorities declared a 1,000 square-mile no-habitation zone, resettled 350,000 people and allowed radiation to take care of itself, Japan is attempting to make the Fukushima region livable again. The army of itinerant decontamination workers has been hired at well below the minimum wage to clean up the radioactive debris and build tanks to store the contaminated water generated to keep the reactor core cool. They work in unregulated environments, without adequate supervision, training or monitoring or the protection of health insurance. Most of the workers are subcontractors, drifters, unskilled and poorly paid. In an article for Al Jazeera’s “America Tonight,” David McNeill, a blogger about nuclear gypsies, commented: “They move from job to job. They’re unqualified, of course, in most cases.” Jeff Kingston, Dept. of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan, noted in October 2014 that the numbers of these nuclear gypsies or members of the “precariat” have increased from 15 percent of the Japanese workforce in the late 1980s to 38 percent to date and the numbers are expected to continue to rise. 

Contention 2 is racism
In the operation of nuclear power, racial minorities are coerced into harmful levels of radiation and lied to by the government, facing structural violence. Japan proves
Shrader-Frechette 12 Kristin Shrader-Frechette, O’Neill Family Endowed Professor,
Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy, and also the director of the
Center for Environmental Justice and Children’s Health, at the University of Notre Dame,
“Nuclear Catastrophe, Disaster-Related Environmental Injustice, and Fukushima, Japan: PrimaFacie Evidence for a Japanese ‘‘Katrina’’” ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE Volume 5, Number 3, 2012    
Prima-facie evidence likewise shows buraku nuclear workers are both EI and DREI victims. Internationally, nuclear workers are prominent EI victims because even without accidents, they are allowed to receive ionizingradiation doses (50 mSv annually) 50 times higher than those received by the public. Yet, only low socioeconomic-status people—like buraku—tend to take such risks. This double standard is obviously ethically questionable, given that many developed nations (e.g., Germany, Scandinavian countries) prohibit it because it encourages EI— workers’ trading health for paid work, and innocent worker-descendants’ (future generations’) dying from radiation-induced genomic instability. Thus, both buraku children and their distant descendents face EI—higher radiation- induced death/disease.17,61,62 Prima-facie evidence shows, second, that FD-buraku nuclear workers also are EI and DREI victims because they likely consented to neither normal-, nor accident level, radiation exposures. Why not? Under normal conditions, 90 percent of all 83,000 Japanese nuclear workers are temporary-contract workers who receive about 16 times more radiation than the already-50-times- higherthan-public doses received by normal radiation workers. For non-accident exposures, buraku receive $350– $1,000 per day, for several days of high-radiation work. They have neither full-time employment, nor adequate compensation, nor union representation, nor health benefits, nor full dose disclosure, yet receive the highest workplace-radiation risks. Why? Industry is not required to ‘‘count’’ temporary workers’ radiation exposures when it calculates workers’ average-radiation doses for regulators. However, even if buraku were told their nonaccident doses/risks, they could not genuinely consent. They are unskilled, socially shunned, temporary laborers who are forced by economic necessity to accept even deadly jobs. This two-tier nuclear-worker system—where buraku bear most (unreported) risks, while highly-paid employees bear little (reported) risk—’’ ‘is the hidden world of nuclear power’ said.a former Tokyo University physics professor.’’ In 2010, 89 percent of FD nuclear workers were temporary-contract employees, ‘‘hired from construction sites,’’ local farms, or ‘‘local gangsters.’’ With a ‘‘constant fear of getting fired,’’ they hid their injuries/ doses—to keep their jobs.61–65 Among post-FD-accident buraku, lack of adequate consent also caused prima-facie DREI because government raised workers’ allowable, post-accident-radiation doses to 250 mSv/year—250 times what the public may receive annually.63 Yet IARC says each 250-MSv FD exposure causes 25 percent of fatal cancers. Two-years’ exposure (500 MSv) would cause 50 percent of all fatal cancers. Given such deadly risks and the dire economic situation of buraku, their genuine consent is unlikely.24,25 Still another factor thwarting FD-buraku consent—and indicating prima-facie DREI—is that FD workers likely received higher doses than government admitted. ‘‘The company refused to say how many FD contract workers had been exposed to post-disaster radiation’’; moreover, nuclear-worker-protective clothing and respirators, whether in the US or Japan, protect them only from skin/lung contamination; no gear can stop gamma irradiation of their entire bodies.56,63,66 Neither TECO, nor Japanese regulators, nor IAEA has released statistics on post-FDradiation exposures, especially to buraku inside the plant. IAEA says merely: ‘‘requirements for occupational exposure of remediation workers can be fulfilled’’ at FD, not that they have been or will be fulfilled—a fact also suggesting prima-facie DREI toward buraku.67,68

This outweighs on dehumanization. This structural violence is made worse by regimes of power lying to individuals about this violence, dehumanizing them more than material conditions.
Contention 3 is natives
Subpoint A- The nuclear industry is fueled by structural violence
Green 7 Jim; “RADIOACTIVE RACISM IN AUSTRALIA”; Jim Green Friends of the Earth; Australia; February 2007; http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/racism. Accessed August 8 2016    
The nuclear industry feeds off, profits from, and reinforces racism. The industry and its political allies have a long history of forcing uranium mines, nuclear reactors, radioactive waste dumps, and weapons tests on the land of Indigenous peoples. The industry also feeds off and reinforces imperialist, colonial patterns: colonies and Third World countries are generally home to the filthiest uranium mines, they have often been used for weapons testing, and are sometimes used as radioactive waste dumping grounds. This paper details some aspects
of 'radioactive racism' in Australia. The final section also includes some articles about radioactive racism in the US and other countries.
Subpoint B-The storage of nuclear waste functions as structural violence against native Americans.  
Earth Talk 10 "Reservations About Toxic Waste: Native American Tribes Encouraged To Turn Down Lucrative Hazardous Disposal Deals". March 31, 2010. Scientific American. Accessed August 8 2016. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/earth-talk-reservationsabout-toxic-waste/.   
Native tribes across the American West have been and continue to be subjected to significant amounts of radioactive and otherwise hazardous waste as a result of living near nuclear test sites, uranium mines, power plants and toxic waste dumps. And in some cases tribes are actually hosting hazardous waste on their sovereign reservations—which are not subject to the same environmental and health standards as U.S. land—in order to generate revenues. Native American advocates argue that siting such waste on or near reservations is an “environmental justice” problem, given that twice as many Native families live below the poverty line than other sectors of U.S. society and often have few if any options for generating income. “In the quest to dispose of nuclear waste, the government and private companies have disregarded and broken treaties, blurred the definition of Native American sovereignty, and directly engaged in a form of economic racism akin to bribery,” says Bayley Lopez of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He cites example after example of the government and private companies taking advantage of the “overwhelming poverty on native reservations by offering them millions of dollars to host nuclear waste storage sites.” 

Subpoint C-Indigenous people are also oppressed through nuclear mining and testing.  
Green 7 Jim; “RADIOACTIVE RACISM IN AUSTRALIA”; Jim Green Friends of the Earth; Australia; February 2007; http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/racism. Accessed August 8 2016    
Racism and atomic testing have gone hand in hand since 1945. Examples include US and British testing on Pacific islands, and French testing in the Pacific and Algeria. From 1952 to 1963, a series of nuclear weapons tests took place at Maralinga and Emu Field in South Australia, and on Monte Bello Island off the coast of Western Australia. It is highly likely that some of the uranium used in the weapons tests at Maralinga came from mines on Aboriginal land in South Australia. The tests, primarily under the control of the British government, included 12 atomic blasts as well as hundreds of "minor" tests. The twelve major nuclear tests were as follows: Operation Hurricane (Monte Bello Islands, Western Australia)* 3 October, 1952 - 25 kilotons – plutonium Operation Totem (Emu Field, South Australia)* 'Totem 1' - 15 October, 1953 - 9.1 kilotons - plutonium* 'Totem 2' - 27 October, 1953 - 7.1 kilotons – plutonium Operation Mosaic (Monte Bello Islands, Western Australia)'G1' - 16 May, 1956 - Trimouille Island - 15 kilotons'G2' - 19 June, 1956 - Alpha Island - 60 kilotons Operation Buffalo (Maralinga, South Australia)'One Tree' - 27 September, 1956 - 12.9 kilotons – plutonium 'Marcoo' - 4 October 1956 - 1.4 kilotons – plutonium 'Kite' - 11 October, 1956 - 2.9 kilotons – plutonium 'Breakaway' - 22 October, 1956 - 10.8 kilotons – plutonium Operation Antler (Maralinga, South Australia) 'Tadje' - 14 September, 1957 - 0.9 kilotons – plutonium 'Biak' - 25 September, 1957 - 5.7 kilotons – plutonium 'Taranaki' - 9 October, 1957 - 26.6 kilotons - plutonium The general attitude of white settlers towards Aborigines was profoundly racist; Aboriginal society was considered one of the lowest forms of civilisation and doomed to extinction. Their land was considered empty and available for exploitation - 'terra nullius'. The British nuclear testing program was carried out with the full support of the Australian government. Permission was not sought for the tests from affected Aboriginal groups such as the Pitjantjatjara, Tjarutja and Kokatha.
Subpoint D- the nuclear industry disrespects native culture equating the value of their culture with money.  
Green 7 Jim; “RADIOACTIVE RACISM IN AUSTRALIA”; Jim Green Friends of the Earth; Australia; February 2007; http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/racism. Accessed August 8 2016    
Dr. Roger Thomas, a Kokatha man, told an ARPANSA forum on February 25, 2004: "The most disappointing aspect to the negotiations that the Commonwealth had with us, as Kokatha, is to try to buy our agreement. This was most insulting to us as Aboriginal people and particularly to our elders. For the sake of ensuring that I don't further create any embarrassment, I will not quote the figure, but let me tell you, our land is not for sale. Our Native Title rights are not for sale. We are talking about our culture, our lore and our dreaming. We are talking about our future generations we're protecting here. We do not have a "for sale" sign up and we never will." According to The Age, the meetings took place at a Port Augusta motel in September 2002 and the Commonwealth delegation included representatives of the Department of the Attorney- General, the Department of Finance and the Department of Education and Science and Training. (Penelope Debelle, "Anger over native title cash offer", The Age, May 17, 2003.) The Age article quotes Dr. Thomas saying: "The insult of it, it was just so insulting. I told the Commonwealth officers to stop being so disrespectful and rude to us by offering us $90,000 to pay out our country and our culture." The Age article quotes Kokatha Land Council representative Andrew Starkey saying "It was just shameful. They were wanting people to sign off their cultural heritage rights for a minuscule amount of money. We would not do that for any amount of money." 

This outweighs on erasure- the nuclear industry uniquely eliminates the cultural value of natives. Even if the aff makes material conditions worse, it solves for the erasure of culture which will always outweigh as is it key to native identity
Thus, I affirm

Contention 4 is elitism
The risky, esoteric, and highly technical nature of nuclear power demands elitism. A ban on nuclear reactors is the first step away from the root cause of structural violence.
Lovins 3, cofounder and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute; energy advisor to major firms and governments in 65+ countries for 40+ years; author of 31 books and 600 papers; and an integrative designer of superefficient buildings, factories, and vehicles, 1976
 (Amory B., “Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?”, Foreign Affairs, October Issue, Online: http://courses.washington.edu/pbaf595/Readings/Lovins_1976.pdf, Accessed September 8 – MG)
Any demanding high technology tends to develops influential and dedicated constituencies of those who link its commercial success with both the public welfare and their own welfare. Such sincerely held beliefs, peer pressures, and the harsh demands that of the work itself places on time and energy all tend to discourages such people from acquiring a similarly thorough knowledge of alternative policies and the need to discuss them. Moreover, the money and talent invested in an electrical program tend to give it disproportionate influence in the counsels of government, often directly through staff-swapping between policy and mission-oriented agencies. This incestuous position, now well developed in most industrial countries, distorts both social and energy priorities in a lasting way that resists political remedy.

Part 4 is the underview
analytics

Tournament: UT | Round: 3 | Opponent: Tompkin AG | Judge: Brian Lee
CHEATING TO THE EXTREME
Counter interpretation-
 affirmatives may limit QI by reducing it’s prescribed bounds.
Blacks law Dictionary defines limit http://thelawdictionary.org/limit/
In General, this is a boundary of scope, be it authority, power, privilege, or right. Prescribed bounds.
This means that I am topical-  analytic
Prefer- 

1. I am textually topical. Textuality comes first analytic
   2. Finding the ‘best’ way to engage the topic is BULLSHIT IVORY TOWER- analytic

A few implications-
a. This is defense on their standards
analytic
b. Theres no way to mediate between competing textuality standards- even if your interp is externally better for debate, I still resolve the internal question of if I am textually topical.
3. The entire aff is a net benefit to my interp- analytic

Tournament: Cypress Bay | Round: 1 | Opponent: American Heritage Plantation RG | Judge: Erica Stickna
Part one is our experience
WELCOME TO AMERICA! TRUMP IS THE PRESIDENT, YOUR VP SUPPORTS STATE FUNDED CONVERSION THERAPY, AND THE QUEER AND TRANS PANIC LEGAL DEFENSE MEANS ITS MY FAULT IF YOU MURDER ME 

American Bar Association 2013
(American Bar Association Adopted by the House of Delegates August 12-13, 2013, Resolution http://lgbtbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Gay-and-Trans-Panic-Defenses-Resolution.pdf )
The “gay panic” and “trans panic” legal defenses are surprisingly long-lived historical artifacts, remnants of a time when widespread public antipathy was the norm for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (‘LGBT’) individuals. These defenses ask the jury to find that the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity is to blame for the defendant’s violent reaction. They characterize sexual orientation and gender identity as objectively reasonable excuses for loss of self-control, and thereby mitigate a perpetrator’s culpability for harm done to LGBT individuals. By fully or partially excusing the perpetrators of crimes against LGBT victims, these defenses enshrine in the law the notion that LGBT lives are worth less than others. Historically, the gay and trans panic defenses have been used in three ways to mitigate a charge of murder to manslaughter or justified homicide. First, the defendant uses gay panic as a reason to claim insanity or diminished capacity. The defendant alleges that a sexual proposition by the victim triggered a nervous breakdown in the defendant, and then claims to have been afflicted with “homosexual panic disorder.” This insanity defense has been discredited since 1973, when the American Psychiatric Association removed the diagnosis of homosexual panic disorder from its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. However, the legal field has yet to catch up with medical progress, and variations on the defense are still being raised in court. Second, defendants make a gay panic argument to bolster a defense of provocation by arguing argue that the victim’s sexual advance, although entirely non-violent, was sufficiently provocative to induce the defendant to kill. Similarly, defendants make a trans panic argument for provocation by pointing to the discovery of the victim’s biological sex, usually after the defendant and victim have engaged in consensual sexual relations, as the sufficiently provocative act that drove the defendant to kill. Third, defendants use gay/trans panic arguments to strengthen their case for self-defense. In these cases, defendants contend that they reasonably believed the victim was about to cause them serious bodily harm because of the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity. Although the threat of danger would otherwise fall short of the standard for self-defense, the defendant asserts that the threat was heightened solely due to the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity. 

Queer people have been damned by the whole system- overkill is a symptom of a culture that accepts gratuitous violence against queer bodies. This produces an ontological condition where queer lives don’t matter at all-there is complete disposability.
Stanley, fellow in departments of Communication and Critical Gender Studies, 2011, Eric A. Stanley, President’s Postdoctoral fellow in the departments of Communication and Critical Gender Studies at the University of California, San Diego. Along with Chris Vargas, Eric directed the films Homotopia (2006) and Criminal Queers(2013). A co\editor of the anthology Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex (AK Press, 2011) which won the Prevention for a Safe Society award and was recently named a finalist for a Lambda Literary Award, Eric’s other writing can be found in the journals Social Text, American Quarterly, and Women and Performance as well as in numerous collections, “Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture”, http://socialtext.dukejournals.org/content/29/2_107/1.abstract, 2011 ED
Overkill is a term used to indicate such excessive violence that it∂ pushes a body beyond death. Overkill is often determined by the postmortem∂ removal of body parts, as with the partial decapitation in the case∂ of Lauryn Paige and the dissection of Rashawn Brazell. The temporality∂ of violence, the biological time when the heart stops pushing and pulling∂ blood, yet the killing is not finished, suggests the aim is not simply the end∂ of a specific life, but the ending of all queer life. This is the time of queer∂ death, when the utility of violence gives way to the pleasure in the other’s∂ mortality. If queers, along with others, approximate nothing, then the task∂ of ending, of killing, that which is nothing must go beyond normative times∂ of life and death. In other words, if Lauryn was dead after the first few stab∂ wounds to the throat, then what do the remaining fifty wounds signify?∂ The legal theory that is offered to nullify the practice of overkill often∂ functions under the name of the trans- or gay-panic defense. Both of these∂ defense strategies argue that the murderer became so enraged after the∂ “discovery” of either genitalia or someone’s sexuality they were forced to∂ protect themselves from the threat of queerness. Estanislao Martinez of∂ Fresno, California, used the trans-panic defense and received a four-year∂ prison sentence after admittedly stabbing J. Robles, a Latina transwoman,∂ at least twenty times with a pair of scissors. Importantly, this defense is∂ often used, as in the cases of Robles and Paige, after the murderer has∂ engaged in some kind of sex with the victim. The logic of the trans-panic∂ defense as an explanation for overkill, in its gory semiotics, offers us a∂ way of understanding queers as the nothing of Mbembe’s query. Overkill∂ names the technologies necessary to do away with that which is already∂ gone. Queers then are the specters of life whose threat is so unimaginable∂ that one is “forced,” not simply to murder, but to push them backward out∂ of time, out of History, and into that which comes before.27∂ In thinking the overkill of Paige and Brazell, I return to Mbembe’s∂ query, “But what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing?”28 This∂ question in its elegant brutality repeats with each case I offer. By resituating∂ this question in the positive, the “something” that is more often than not∂ translated as the human is made to appear. Of interest here, the category∂ of the human assumes generality, yet can only be activated through the∂ Social Text∂ Published by Duke University Press∂ 10 Stanley ∙ Near Life, Queer Death∂ Ahuja • Abu Zubaydah and the Caterpillar∂ specificity of historical and politically located intersection. To this end,∂ the human, the “something” of this query, within the context of the liberal∂ democracy, names rights-bearing subjects, or those who can stand as subjects∂ before the law. The human, then, makes the nothing not only possible∂ but necessary. Following this logic, the work of death, of the death that is∂ already nothing, not quite human, binds the categorical (mis)recognition∂ of humanity. The human, then, resides in the space of life and under the∂ domain of rights, whereas the queer inhabits the place of compromised∂ personhood and the zone of death. As perpetual and axiomatic threat∂ to the human, the queer is the negated double of the subject of liberal∂ democracy.∂ Understanding the nothing as the unavoidable shadow of the human∂ serves to counter the arguments that suggest overkill and antiqueer violence∂ at large are a pathological break and that the severe nature of these killings∂ signals something extreme. In contrast, overkill is precisely not outside of,∂ but is that which constitutes liberal democracy as such. Overkill then is∂ the proper expression to the riddle of the queer nothingness. Put another∂ way, the spectacular material-semiotics of overkill should not be read as∂ (only) individual pathology; these vicious acts must indict the very social∂ worlds of which they are ambassadors. Overkill is what it means, what it∂ must mean, to do violence to what is nothing 

And this shit is just going to get worse on a national level- president trump will appoint anti queer justices and congress is on his side.
Michelangelo Signorile Queer Voices Editor-at-Large, The Huffington PostTHE BLOG Donald Trump’s Long-Held Promise To Pick Rabidly Anti-LGBT Supreme Court Justices 10/19/2016 08:21 am ET | Updated Oct 19, 2016, The Huffington Post INFORM • INSPIRE • ENTERTAIN • EMPOWERhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelangelo-signorile/donald-trumps-promise-anti-lgbt-supreme-court_b_12551640.html
In tonight’s third and final presidential debate between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in Las Vegas, moderated by Fox News’s Chris Wallace, the Supreme Court is one issue we’re told will be focused on. Donald Trump, however, made his intentions quite clear at the last debate, and many times before: He will appoint justices to the high court “very much in the mold of Justice Scalia.” You can’t hold up a better example of anti-LGBT extremism on the Supreme Court than Antonin Scalia, the most homophobic force ever on the court, who made hateful comments, on and office the court, about gay people for several decades. The late Scalia had compared homosexuality to bestiality, incest and child pornography and believed that banning homosexuality was similar to banning murder. Scalia not only wrote a blistering, unhinged dissenting opinion in the historic marriage equality case in 2015, Orbergefell v. Hodges; he was virulently opposed to striking down sodomy laws, writing the dissenting opinion in the Lawrence v. Texas 

And I’m still not done- even if well-meaning legislative efforts get passed, they still have negative effects- legislation paints too broad a brush and conflates protection with cohesion
Natalie Knight, Joint J.D. and M.P.P. candidate at UCLA School of Law and UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, 2014, Keeping the closets in our classrooms: How the qualified immunity test is failing LGBT students , http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Knight-Natalie-Student-Note-2014.pdf, pp. 35-50
Even well-intentioned statutes can have unintended consequences. For example, the Massachusetts Legislature passed a law that included many provisions designed to reduce bullying of LGBT students, but the law also included a provision requiring required school officials to notify parents of bullying incidents which could lead to intentionally or incidentally outing students to their parents. n110 Legislation to protect LGBT students from being outed in a school environment may also be very difficult to pass. Federal legislation would depend on congressional agreement, which can be hard to attain. n111 Since the current House majority leadership vehemently fought federal recognition of same-sex marriages, there is little reason to expect LGBT-friendly legislation would be considered in the current House. State legislation will almost certainly be more difficult to pass in some states, leaving perhaps many LGBT youth without statutory privacy protections.

Seems pretty hopeless right? Not quite. Part two is the court. 

1st. The legal system contains one hope for queer humanity- individual courts can be LGBT friendly and set precedents that give predictable protections to queer peoples.
Natalie Knight, Joint J.D. and M.P.P. candidate at UCLA School of Law and UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, 2014, Keeping the closets in our classrooms: How the qualified immunity test is failing LGBT students , http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Knight-Natalie-Student-Note-2014.pdf, pp. 35-50
During the civil rights era, the courts played a leading role in recognizing and expanding civil rights for people of color. In this era of gay civil rights, the courts should not be the slower and less reliable vehicle for recognizing implicit rights. If courts were to more regularly apply the prong-one analysis of qualified immunity and faithfully adhere to the actual holdings of Supreme Court precedent, the law related to civil rights violations under § 1983 could provide both parties with the predictability they need and deserve from the law.

However-Queer protections are unclear- current precedents make it nearly impossible for one to say that queers have ANY clearly established rights.
Robin B. Wagner, J.D. Candidate Spring 2014, Are gay rights clearly established? The problems with the qualified immunity doctrine, Depaul Law Review, Spring, http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029andcontext=law-review, p. 870-1
limits the ability of an individual to bring, as a "private attorney general," a claim that would clarify the contours of clearly established rights a government official may not violate. B. The Clearly Established Constitutional Rights Regarding Sexual Orientation Several key challenges arise in evaluating the constitutional guarantees associated with sexual orientation. Courts have traditionally been reluctant to address sexual orientation as a status akin to race, religion, or gender. Instead courts sometimes framed constitutional issues raised by sexual minorities in terms of homosexual acts and conduct. n95 As Pamela Karlan explained: The situation of gay people provokes an "analogical crisis" because in some ways it involves regulation of particular acts in which gay people engage, and so seems most amenable to analysis under the liberty prong of the Due Process Clause, while in other ways it involves regulation of a group of people who are defined not so much by what they do in the privacy of their bedrooms, but by who they are in the public sphere. n96 Furthermore, it is challenging to evaluate what rights exist in the rapidly changing landscape of legislation relating to sexual minorities, state and federal court decisions on specific issues like marriage and adoption, and social discourse on gay rights.

This isn’t just about police action- qualified immunity prevents precedents that would establish protections for queer people in general. 

Robin B. Wagner, J.D. Candidate Spring 2014, Are gay rights clearly established? The problems with the qualified immunity doctrine, Depaul Law Review, Spring, http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029andcontext=law-review, p. 870-1
who violate an individual's rights. n71 But the Gill, Lathrop, and Ambris plaintiffs seemingly presented the easiest cases - there was clear animus in each allegation of discrimination, and clear precedent from Romer that "'a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.'" n72 Yet one plaintiff got her day in court, n73 a second received the opportunity to press the case that discrimination against him was indeed unconstitutional, n74 and the third did not even get an opportunity to have the substance of her issues heard. n75 These cases illuminate problems with the qualified immunity doctrine that are gaining significance: the analysis results in a defendant-friendly environment in which it is harder to identify clearly established rights, and courts do not serve society by clarifying and defining rights so that future actors are put on notice. Despite the stated purpose of the first prong of the qualified immunity doctrine to put government actors on notice going forward, in practice, a ruling that there is a violation of a constitutional right without a ruling that the right was clearly established does not create effective notice. n76 Pamela Karlan has associated the qualified immunity doctrine with part of the Court's trend to "undermine the concept of the 'private attorney general' who brings suit to vindicate both her own claims and the broader public interest." n77 A court can issue declaratory and injunctive relief altering the practice of defendants who otherwise have qualified immunity from damage claims. n78 However, without attorney's fees or even minimal damages, a plaintiff may be reluctant to appeal a prong-one decision. n79 Moreover, a defendant may appeal the prong-one holding, but only by taking on the risk that an affirmation would create circuit-wide precedent, rather than a more limited district court holding. n80 When the Court in 2009 overturned the short-lived practice of requiring a prong-one analysis before prong two, it spared the district courts from tackling unnecessary constitutional questions when a reasonable person would not have known the right was clearly established (prong two). n81 Now that courts can rely primarily on prong two, as the Ambris court did, n82 and find that even if there were a right, it was not clearly established, an appeal is even less likely. And with fewer appeals, it is less likely that a right can be identified and established by court precedent. The Supreme Court has acted recently to remove the "clearly established" label from a right if there is disagreement among the circuits. n83 In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on both prongs of its qualified immunity analysis, holding that it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to seize an individual under a material witness warrant when the government official has no intent to use him as a witness, and that no jurisdiction had ruled in such a way to clearly establish that such an action would be unconstitutional. n84 A year later in Reichle v. Howards, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's denial of qualified immunity to Secret Service agents who violated *880 the First Amendment by arresting a suspect in retaliation for comments they heard him make against the Vice President under their protection. n85 The Court averred that qualified immunity will not be granted when the legal issue is defined at a "high level of generality." n86 Additionally, the Court held that when the impact of a new Supreme Court 

Moreover, even when a protection is established, it is never ‘clearly established’, meaning police can perpetrate anti-queer violence with impunity.
Robin B. Wagner explains this through the Lawrence case, J.D. Candidate Spring 2014, Are gay rights clearly established? The problems with the qualified immunity doctrine, Depaul Law Review, Spring, http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029andcontext=law-review, p. 870-1
Bowers decision Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. n134 But the opinion ranged beyond these cases' conceptions of liberty as "the absence of interference" by the state; n135 instead, the Court "described the liberty at issue as gay people's right to 'control their destiny,' because 'at the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." n136 However, because the same decision concludes that "the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal life of the individual," n137 it can be inferred that there might be other situations in which a state could provide a legitimate interest that would justify such an intrusion. Indeed, Lawrence includes a long list of exceptions limiting the protection for individual sexual and moral choices. n138 *888 Both Karlan and Tribe interpret the Lawrence decision as a significant "doctrinal innovation" linking the "due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty" with "equality of treatment." n139 The Court in Lawrence identified the interrelatedness of the moral stigma attached to homosexual conduct and the ways in which laws against gay sex contributed to the social ostracization of homosexuals and burdened their rights to "equal liberty" through privacy inside the bedroom and dignity in society at large. n140 Despite the powerful statement for both due process and equality rights in Lawrence, most courts have not confirmed it as clearly established law. n141 In one of the few lower court decisions to embrace Lawrence for its full meaning, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a Texas law grounded in morality justifications. n142 Holding that Texas's ban on sex toys "impermissibly burdened the individual's substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing," n143 the court explained that "to uphold the statute would be to ignore the holding in Lawrence and allow the government to burden consensual private intimate conduct simply by deeming it morally offensive." n144 The Fifth Circuit, then, has unequivocally accepted the holding of Lawrence - that one's intrinsic human dignity encompasses moral and sexual choices, and that these choices are constitutionally protected. 3. Avoiding the Clearly Established Law of Romer and Lawrence Rights related to sexual orientation provide a useful context for evaluating the doctrine of qualified immunity because of the unusual reasoning employed in Romer and Lawrence. By eschewing the standard forms of scrutiny applied in equal protection and due process considerations, these two cases, particularly Lawrence, have presented challenges to courts attempting to apply their holdings. n145 *889

And, since rights for queers are not clearly established, current QI standards make it difficult for us to actually establish protections in the first place. Courts are incentivized to ignore the issue, allowing replications of anti-queerness. 

Natalie Knight, Joint J.D. and M.P.P. candidate at UCLA School of Law and UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, 2014, Keeping the closets in our classrooms: How the qualified immunity test is failing LGBT students , http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Knight-Natalie-Student-Note-2014.pdf, pp. 35-50
assert a Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim, only a Fourth Amendment privacy claim and a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. The plaintiff chose not to appeal so Nguon's significance for future privacy cases is uncertain at best. n96 One important conclusion one could draw from Sterling
and Nguon is that the qualified immunity inquiry greatly depends on judicial discretion. The contours of what counts as a "clearly established right" vary from circuit to circuit and are ultimately up to judges. Thus, the grant of qualified immunity in Wyatt is not a forgone conclusion at all. The qualified immunity inquiry does not require judges to demand as precise a precedent as was demanded in Wyatt. Indeed, in his dissent, Judge James Graves agreed with the district court judge who found that the coaches were not entitled to qualified immunity. n97 Judge Graves stated that while a Fifth Circuit court had "never explicitly held that a student has a right to privacy in keeping his or her sexual orientation confidential, an analysis of precedent compels the finding of such a right." n98 It is therefore fair to say that qualified immunity is not always a catch-22 for LGBT students, but it permits judges to make it one. Thus, as in many areas of the law, judges who understand LGBT issues are more likely to render LGBT-friendly decisions. The qualified immunity inquiry thus creates a catch-22 at worst and a gamble on a favorable judge at best. Surely, the privacy of LGBT students is worthy of more than a gamble. V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS Progressive LGBT advocates are likely to want more than a judicial gamble to determine LGBT students' rights. There are several possibilities for surmounting the seemingly impossible hurdle that qualified immunity has created in this context. A. Reinstate Mandatory Sequencing of the Qualified Immunity Inquiry A possible solution would be to return to a sequenced qualified immunity inquiry which would require judges to first address whether the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff amount to the violation of a constitutional right. Only then could they proceed to whether the right was clearly established. As the Supreme Court has stated, "the two-step procedure promotes the development of constitutional precedent and is especially valuable with respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable." n99 The outing of students by public school teachers and officials will probably never arise in a case where qualified immunity is unavailable since all public school teachers are protected by it. By requiring courts to engage in the first part of the inquiry, courts could determine that a particular set of facts, like the outing of a student to a parent by a teacher, is unconstitutional and then proceed to grant qualified immunity if the court found that a reasonable teacher would not have known that such an action was unconstitutional. n100 Thus, reinstating sequencing would resolve the catch-22 while still protecting qualified immunity's purpose of ensuring that government officials are not held liable for violations they would not reasonably have known about (if outing a student is indeed such a case in the first place). After a court has determined in one suit that a teacher or school official outing a student to her parent is unconstitutional, the decision would give notice to schools such that future defendants would have an increasingly difficult time showing that despite past rulings, a right is still not clearly established. n101 Empirical evidence supports that giving courts the discretion to address only the clearly established right prong when granting qualified immunity has led courts to avoid making a determination of whether a constitutional violation may have occurred. n102 Since the Supreme Court lifted the sequencing requirement, circuit courts have avoided the constitutional inquiry and granted qualified immunity in 24.6 of claims that were ultimately dismissed either due to a grant of immunity or due to the absence of a constitutional violation, compared to only 6.2 when sequencing was required. n103 Still, mandatory sequencing has raised concerns about its potential to create bad constitutional law since it requires judges to make constitutional determinations on a limited record with potentially low-quality briefs. n104 Additionally, a unanimous Supreme Court decided to lift sequencing in part because of the substantial criticism it received from judges. n105 Thus, while sequencing may help LGBT students, numerous judges are wary of its broader consequences and a return to sequencing is not especially 

This is a gateway issue- qualified immunity precedents spill over, justifying even larger abuses as not being prevented by ‘clearly established’ rights. This allows legislation with the sole intent of dehumanizing queers to become legal.
Robin B. Wagner, J.D. Candidate Spring 2014, Are gay rights clearly established? The problems with the qualified immunity doctrine, Depaul Law Review, Spring, http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029andcontext=law-review, p. 870-1
l, "taxpayers have no duty of good faith to maximize the government's goals, and political officials, after Engquist, apparently have no duty of good faith to make discretionary decisions conform to the Constitution's goals." n203 Here the impact on future treatment of the qualified immunity doctrine becomes clear and alarming to potential plaintiffs. Where the Constitution or a statute has not specifically enshrined an applicable prohibition or external rule - that is, when no existing suspect classification or enumerated right is implicated - the courts may in the future only evaluate a law against whether it is rational or whether it is irrational, with no consideration of whether the government purpose was legitimate or illegitimate. n204 The key to how the qualified immunity doctrine will survive this emerging approach to rational-basis review lies in the definition of discretion. In a case central to the establishment of the judge-made qualified immunity doctrine, the Court explained that the doctrine shields "government officials performing discretionary functions ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." n205 Romer's susceptibility to being ignored may depend on whether it is viewed as more closely allied with the highly deferential rational-basis cases or with the rational-review-with-bite cases. The first element in the Romer Court's reasoning illustrated the need to demonstrate that a classification bore merely a relationship, however tenuous, to a governmental goal. n206 The Romer Court adamantly rejected laws drawing classifications that disadvantaged a group and had no "independent and legitimate legislative end." n207 A law drawn for no purpose other than to disadvantage a specific group is, and should remain to be, seen as precisely the kind of irrational law the Constitution prohibits, even under the Roberts Court's articulation of rational-basis review. By contrast, the Romer majority's second line of reasoning, "that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 

Thus, part three is the plan:
 The United States federal government should phase out the qualified immunity legal standard, instead applying strict liability standard to civil cases with police officers as defendants.
Bernick 15 explains the plan-strict liability is the standard for every other form of processional.
Evan Bernick (Assistant Director of the Center for Judicial Engagement at the Institute for Justice). “To Hold Police Accountable, Don’t Give Them Immunity.” Foundation for Economic Education.
6 May 2015. https://fee.org/articles/to-hold-police-accountable-dont-give-them-immunity/
Simply put, qualified immunity has to go. It should be replaced with a rule of strict liability for bona fide constitutional violations. There are a variety of possible rules. First, police officers could be held personally liable for any rights violations. They’d need to carry personal malpractice insurance, just like lawyers, doctors, and other professionals. Insurance companies are qualified and motivated judges of risk, and they would provide another reasonable level of scrutiny on police conduct, policies, and training. Second, police departments could be held liable for any rights violations by officers and punitive damages could be assessed against individual officers for particularly outrageous conduct. Third, police departments could be required to insure officers up to a certain amount — officers would have to purchase insurance to cover any costs in excess of that amount. As ambitious as these reforms might seem, never underestimate the power of widespreadpublicoutrage. InthecaseofKelo, theCourt’s cavalier treatmentofpropertyrightsled to a number of laws protecting citizens from eminent domain abuse in states across the country. Here, too, the public can force legislators to respond. The question of how to ensure that officers exercise the authority delegated to them with the proper vigor, while also keeping them within the limits of that authority, should be left in the first instance to elected officials — subject to constitutional limits and the requirements of valid federal laws (like Section 1983). Qualified immunity enables officers to flout those limits and those laws. We must replace the judicially invented impunity that police officers currently enjoy with a realistic avenue for the vindication of constitutional rights.
The plan isn’t extra t- I am specifying how I limit qualified immunity. Once you change a legal doctrine, something has to replace it. Thus it is a necessary to describe what doctrine replaces QI
And, limit is defined as “a restriction on the size or amount of something permissible or possible” by Oxford (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/limit) By eliminating qualified immunity I am restricting it
Part 4 is solvency
All we have to do to win solvency is win an increase in the number of civil cases- the aff conceptualized these as test cases that allow for queer protections to be established by judicial precedents. Every one of our harms cards functions as a solvency argument.
And, QI creates a chilling effect on civil claims
Chen 15
Alan K. Chen (The William M. Beaney Memorial Research Chair and professor of law at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law; experienced civil rights litigator and former ACLU staff attorney; does pro bono work in constitutional rights cases). “Qualified Immunity Liming Access to Justice and Impeding Development of the Law.” American Bar Association. Vol. 41 No. 1. 2015. http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2015– vol–41-/vol–41–no–1—lurking-in-the-shadows–the-supreme-court-s-qui/qualified-immunitylimiting-access-to-justice-and-impeding-devel.html
A final critique of qualified immunity is one that is difficult to prove empirically. Because of the many costs associated with this defense that I have identified above, plaintiffs and their attorneys may find that the game is not worth the candle. To prevail on a constitutional tort claim, which may not necessarily involve a large monetary recovery, the plaintiff must navigate the difficult path that the qualified immunity doctrine has hewn. They may be tied down for years litigating qualified immunity and defending multiple interlocutory appeals should they initially prevail on the qualified immunity claim in the trial court. Even with the incentive of attorney fee shifting under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, many plaintiffs may simply be discouraged from ever filing a constitutional tort claim because they anticipate that they will be drawn into a protracted and time consuming dispute. The suppression of potentially meritorious civil rights claims is a cost of qualified immunity that impedes access to justice in profound and troubling ways.
Part 4 is framing
A is the ballot
1st-the judge is an educator, two warrants
A. Debate is primarily an educational setting, we represent schools in a school
b. the ballot endorses a frame of truth, such as I affirm, educating students with it
Second, Foucault’s conception of structure and the intellectual demonstrates the existence of ‘regimes of truth’ and the pivotal role intellectuals have in this capacity
Rider, Shawn. "Michel Foucault: Truth and Power." Michel Foucault: Truth and Power. N.p., n.d. Web. 09 Nov. 2015.
Foucault's ideas gravitate toward the ultra-highly complex and similarly politicized, leaving one to wonder what the real-world impact of his notions might be. The interviewers apparently shared this inquiry, and asked how all of Foucault's analysis of power relations could be used in life, and, specifically, what is the role of the intellectual? Foucault responds with a discussion of the the intellectual, who he says has gravitated from a "universal" intellectual to a "specific" intellectual. Foucault sees scientists and scholars who remain cloistered in their field as specific intellectuals, and cites the writers of old as the universal intellectuals: The intellectual par excellence used to be the writer: as a universal consciousness, a free subject, he was counterposed to the service of the State or Capital – technicians, magistrates, teachers. Even writers have been coopted in modern society by the structure of the "regime," the group that rules the society, including government and business. The society now looks to the university for its knowledge because of the intersection of multiple fields of study. This has incorporated even written expression into the structure of society and led to the devaluation of the "writer of genius" and the elevation of the "absolute savant." The absolute savant, "along with a handful of others, has at his disposal, whether in the service of the State or against it, powers which can either benefit or irrevocably destroy life." Writers who are sanctioned by a powerful structure now affect reality rather than simply tromping around in idealogical terrain. It woud seem that an intellectual could not be effective without the support of some structure, but Foucault makes an argument for individual efficacy. The structure is successful because it creates truth, and it is in this recognition that individuals can succeed: The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power … truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it includes regular effects of power. Each society creates a "regime of truth" according to its beliefs, values, and morales. Foucault identifies the creation of truth in contemporary western society with five traits: the centering of truth on scientific discourse, accountability of truth to economic and political forces, the "diffusion and consumption" of truth via societal apparatuses, the control of the distribution of truth by "political and economic apparatuses," and the fact that it is "the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation." Individuals would do well to recognize that ultimate truth, "Truth," is the construct of the political and economic forces that command the majority of the power within the societal web. There is no truly universal truth at all; therefore, the intellectual cannot convey universal truth. The intellectual must specialize, specify, so that he/she can be connected to one of the truth-generating apparatuses of the society. As Foucault explains it: 'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A 'regime' of truth. Because of this, Foucault sees "the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of 'science' and 'ideology,' but in terms of 'truth' and 'power.'" The question of how to deal with and determine truth is at the base of political and social strife
Thus, the rob is to challenge regimes of heteronormative truth
Robinson, Kerry, and Cristyn Davies. "Docile bodies an d heteronormative moral subjects: Constructing the child and sexual knowledge in schooling." Sexuality and Culture 12.4 (2008): 221-239.
Schools, as a discursive field, are sites where technologies of power produce ‘regimes of truth’ that uphold the hegemonic social, political and moral values of dominant and powerful groups (Foucault 1977). This is obvious within the syllabi that we examine in this discussion, in which children are constructed as heteronormative subjects. Schooling as a disciplining state apparatus has a compulsory captive audience––docile bodies––through which to constructs knowledge and discipline heternormative moral subjects. Foucault’s concept of the powerknowledge nexus operates through hegemonic discourses that are perpetuated through curricula, rules and regulations, philosophies, policies, and pedagogical practices that prevail in schooling (Foucault 1977). The regulative and repetitive practices of schooling become part of children’s habitus as they tap into the cultural, social and economic capital valued in schooling (Bourdieu 1991). Habitus refers to the dispositions, perceptions, and attitudes generated throughout an individuals’ cultural history that can enable or prohibit effective exchange or accumulation of one’s capital (Robinson and Jones-Diaz 2006). However, it is important to point out that part of the way that education is transformed is through teachers’ critical approach towards pedagogy and the curriculum. Some teachers question what constitutes ‘official knowledge’ within the mainstream curriculum to reshape and contest the power of dominant groups. Syllabi are also interpreted by individual teachers, who can include perspectives that challenge regimes of truth operating in schools. So despite our critique of educational syllabi in this paper, we need to acknowledge that some teachers would have challenged the representation of knowledge about health and its presentation. It is also important to acknowledge that even though we critique the lack of specific Docile Bodies and Heteronormative Moral Subjects 123 detail in the syllabi on sexual identity, we do so with an awareness that some teachers may have used this space (marked by an absence of definition around sexual identity) to address issues of non-heterosexuality. However, this potential ‘queer space’ may also be counteracted by other forms of regulation, including students’ surveillance of heteronormative values, or the introduction of additional policies, such as the Controversial Issues Policy that has operated along side the syllabi in NSW schools since the 1970’s.

AND-You should focus on the differential allocation of humanness: structural inequality justifies the discursive forces that distribute access to intelligibility along the demarcating line of the construction of the human. You are compelled not to question who mitigates against the most “physical” violence, instead focus on disrupting the forces that control the production of the human by prioritizing resistance to normative violence, which prefigures and predetermines the orientation, agency, and sovereignty.   
Wilcox 2015 (Lauren B., University Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, “Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations,” 187-188)CJQ
The core conclusion that the previous discussion suggests is that ethics and responsibility cannot only be considered a matter of responding to others as if “we” and “they” existed as socially and politically separate entities. By taking embodiment seriously as an effect of, and cause of, entangled engagements, responsibility is rethought as accountability for who and what “matters” in the world—and who and what does not matter—in sharp contrast to discourses of “responsibilization” that shift the site of ethics onto individuals, as in neoliberal discourses. We are mutually entangled with each other such that we cannot separate. Our bodies themselves do not precede social entanglements, and thus we cannot consider an ethics of violence differently from existing frameworks that separate bodily existence from power. Rather than ethics being conceptualized as the proper treatment of others, “ethics is therefore not about the right response to a radically exterior/ized other, but about responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming of which we are a part” (Barad 2007, 393). Responsibility has to do less with seeking security than with resisting regimes of inequality by addressing what Athena Athenasiou describes as “the differential allocation of humanness; the perpetually shifting and variably positioned boundary between those who are rendered properly human and those who are not” (Butler 2013, 31). The broader implications of theorizing bodies as precarious and bound to one another in their production as seemingly autonomous entities is that the question of ethical responsibility lies not only in protecting or rescuing those who have been constructed as grievable but also in the challenging of those discursive practices that constitute some people as grievable tragedies in death, others as justifiably killable. Because we are formed through the violence of norms, it is incumbent upon us to resist imposing the same violence on others (Butler 2009, 169). Butler posits a mode of protection, but it is clear that she does not mean, or does not only mean, the protection of an existing body from violence. Protection from violence is also a struggle with the social and political norms that structure the production of livable lives: to be responsible, to protect from violence in this instance is to work to lessen the violent effects of the norm, to trouble the power of bodily norms to mark certain lives as unlivable and unreal. Responsibility is about where the “cut” between self and other is made. We do not have recourse to the “god’s eye view,” to approach the question of ethics in terms of a disconnected appraisal of a situation in which “we” have no part. Our constitution in and through the world is not only a matter of our perspective being limited or partial. Our subjectivity is a material engagement in the world, creating it as it produces knowledge about it. Taking seriously the bodily precariousness means being attentive to the discourses that produce certain subjects as inhuman or as only bleeding, suffering bodies outside the full political context under which we and they are constituted.

Tournament: Byron Nelson | Round: 2 | Opponent: Garland NC | Judge: idk
Part one is the roll of the ballot
1st-the judge is an educator, two warrants
A. Debate is primarily an educational setting, we represent schools in a school
B. The TFA defines it's purpose as to ‘create a means of educating’, the judge is confined by the rules of the tournament thus the judge must be an educator 

2nd-  Some form of pedagogy is inevitable in debate-participants can never be neutral. Thus debate should operate as a space for critical pedagogy- this is key to accessing identity and agency.
Henry A. Giroux | The Curse of Totalitarianism and the Challenge of Critical Pedagogy Friday, 02 October 2015 00:00 By Henry A. Giroux, Truthout | News Analysis, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33061-the-curse-of-totalitarianism-and-the-challenge-of-critical-pedagogy
Pedagogy is a moral and political practice because it offers particular versions and visions of civic life, community, the future and how we might construct representations of ourselves, others, and our physical and social environment. But it does more; it also "represents a version of our own dreams for ourselves, our children, and our communities. But such dreams are never neutral; they are always someone's dreams and to the degree that they are implicated in organizing the future for others they always have a moral and political dimension." (13) It is in this respect that any discussion of pedagogy must begin with a discussion of educational practice as a particular way in which a sense of identity, place, worth and, above all, value is informed by practices that organize knowledge and meaning. (14) Central to my argument is the assumption that politics is not only about the exercise of economic and political power, but also, as Cornelius Castoriadis points out, "has to do with political judgements and value choices," (15) indicating that questions of civic education and critical pedagogy (learning how to become a skilled citizen) are central to the struggle over political agency and democracy. In this instance, critical pedagogy emphasizes critical reflection, bridging the gap between learning and everyday life, understanding the connection between power and difficult knowledge, and extending democratic rights and identities by using the resources of history and theory.

3rd – militaristic authoritarianism has concentrated power in the police state- violence has become the norm. This destroys the possibility of ethics, politics, or critical thought. The task of critical pedagogy should be primarily concerned with disrupting this- thus the roll of the ballot is to disrupt the police state.
Henry A. Giroux 2 | The Curse of Totalitarianism and the Challenge of Critical Pedagogy Friday, 02 October 2015 00:00 By Henry A. Giroux, Truthout | News Analysis, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33061-the-curse-of-totalitarianism-and-the-challenge-of-critical-pedagogy
racism has become a mark of celebrated audacity and a politics of disposability comes dangerously close to its endgame of extermination for those considered excess. Under such circumstances, it becomes frightfully clear that the conditions for totalitarianism and state violence are still with us smothering critical thought, social responsibility, the ethical imagination and politics itself. As Bill Dixon observes: The totalitarian form is still with us because the all too protean origins of totalitarianism are still with us: loneliness as the normal register of social life, the frenzied lawfulness of ideological certitude, mass poverty and mass homelessness, the routine use of terror as a political instrument, and the ever growing speeds and scales of media, economics, and warfare. (2) In the United States, the extreme right in both political parties no longer needs the comfort of a counterfeit ideology in which appeals are made to the common good, human decency and democratic values. On the contrary, power is now concentrated in the hands of relatively few people and corporations while power is global and free from the limited politics of the democratic state. In fact, the state for all intents and purposes has become the corporate state. Dominant power is now all too visible and the policies, practices and wrecking ball it has imposed on society appear to be largely unchecked. Any compromising notion of ideology has been replaced by a discourse of command and certainty backed up by the militarization of local police forces, the surveillance state and all of the resources brought to bear by a culture of fear and a punishing state aligned with the permanent war on terror. Informed judgment has given way to a corporate-controlled media apparatus that celebrates the banality of balance and the spectacle of violence, all the while reinforcing the politics and value systems of the financial elite. (3) Following Arendt, a dark cloud of political and ethical ignorance has descended on the United States creating both a crisis of memory and agency. (4) Thoughtlessness has become something that now occupies a privileged, if not celebrated, place in the political landscape and the mainstream cultural apparatuses. A new kind of infantilism and culture of ignorance now shapes daily life as agency devolves into a kind of anti-intellectual foolishness evident in the babble of banality produced by Fox News, celebrity culture, schools modeled after prisons and politicians who support creationism, argue against climate change and denounce almost any form of reason. Education is no longer viewed as a public good but a private right, just as critical thinking is devalued as a fundamental necessity for creating an engaged and socially responsible populace. Education has to be seen as more than a credential or a pathway to a job. Politics has become an extension of war, just as systemic economic uncertainty and state-sponsored violence increasingly find legitimation in the discourses of privatization and demonization, which promote anxiety, moral panics and fear, and undermine any sense of communal responsibility for the well-being of others. Too many people today learn quickly that their fate is solely a matter of individual responsibility, irrespective of wider structural forces. This is a much promoted hypercompetitive ideology with a message that surviving in a society demands reducing social relations to forms of social combat. People today are expected to inhabit a set of relations in which the only obligation is to live for one's own self-interest and to reduce the responsibilities of citizenship to the demands of a consumer culture. Yet, there is more at work here than a flight from social responsibility, if not politics itself. Also lost is the importance of those social bonds, modes of collective reasoning, public spheres and cultural apparatuses crucial to the formation of a sustainable democratic society. With the return of the Gilded Age and its dream worlds of consumption, privatization and deregulation, both democratic values and social protections are at risk. At the same time, the civic and formative cultures that make such values and protections central to democratic life are in danger of being eliminated altogether. As market mentalities and moralities tighten their grip on all aspects of society, democratic institutions and public spheres are being downsized, if not altogether disappearing. As these institutions vanish - from public schools to health-care centers - there is also a serious erosion of the discourses of community, justice, equality, public values and the common good. One consequence is a society stripped of its inspiring and energizing public spheres and the "thick mesh of mutual obligations and social responsibilities to be found in" any viable democracy. (5) This grim reality marks a failure in the power of the civic imagination, political will and open democracy. (6) It is also part of a politics that strips the social of any democratic ideals and undermines any understanding of higher education as a public good and pedagogy as an empowering practice, a practice that acts directly upon the conditions that bear down on our lives in order to change them when necessary. At a time when the public good is under attack and there seems to be a growing apathy toward the social contract, or any other civic-minded investment in public values and the larger common good, education has to be seen as more than a credential or a pathway to a job. It has to be viewed as crucial to understanding and overcoming the current crisis of agency, politics and historical memory faced by many young people today. One of the challenges facing the current generation of educators and students is the need to reclaim the role that education has historically played in developing critical literacies and civic capacities. There is a need to use education to mobilize students to be critically engaged agents, attentive to addressing important social issues and being alert to the responsibility of deepening and expanding the meaning and practices of a vibrant democracy. At the heart of such a challenge is the question of what education should accomplish in a democracy. What work do educators have to do to create the economic, political and ethical conditions necessary to endow young people with the capacities to think, question, doubt, imagine the unimaginable and defend education as essential for inspiring and energizing the people necessary for the existence of a robust democracy? In a world in which there is an increasing abandonment of egalitarian and democratic impulses, what will it take to educate young people to challenge authority and in the words of James Baldwin "rob history of its tyrannical power, and illuminate that darkness, blaze roads through that vast forest, so that we will not, in all our doing, lose sight of its purpose, which is after all, to make the world a more human dwelling place"? (7) What role might education and critical pedagogy have in a society in which the social has been individualized, emotional life collapses into the therapeutic and education is relegated to either a private affair or a kind of algorithmic mode of regulation in which everything is reduced to a desired measurable economic outcome. Feedback loops now replace politics and the concept of progress is defined through a narrow culture of metrics, measurement and efficiency. (8) In a culture drowning in a new love affair with empiricism and data, that which is not measurable withers. Lost here are the registers of compassion, care for the other, the radical imagination, a democratic vision and a passion for justice. In its place emerges what Francisco Goya, in one of his engravings, termed "The Sleep of Reason Produces Monster." Goya's title is richly suggestive, particularly about the role of education and pedagogy in compelling students to be able to recognize, as my colleague David Clark points out, "that an inattentiveness to the never-ending task of critique breeds horrors: the failures of conscience, the wars against thought, and the flirtations with irrationality that lie at the heart of the triumph of every-day aggression, the withering of political life, and the withdrawal into private obsessions." (9) Given the multiple crises that haunt the current historical conjuncture, educators need a new language for addressing the changing contexts and issues facing a world in which there is an unprecedented convergence of resources - financial, cultural, political, economic, scientific, military and technological - that are increasingly used to concentrate powerful and diverse forms of control and domination. Such a language needs to be political without being dogmatic and needs to recognize that pedagogy is always political because it is connected to the struggle over agency. In this instance, making the pedagogical more political means being vigilant about those very "moments in which identities are being produced and groups are being constituted, or objects are being created." (10) At the same time it means educators need to be attentive to those practices in which critical modes of agency and particular identities are being denied. For example, the Tucson Unified School District board not only eliminated the famed Mexican-American studies program, but also banned a number of Chicano and Native American books it deemed dangerous. The ban included Shakespeare's play The Tempest, and Pedagogy of the Oppressed by the famed Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. This act of censorship provides a particularly disturbing case of the war that is being waged in the United States against not only young people marginalized by race and class, but also against the very spaces and pedagogical practices that make critical thinking possible. Educators need to be attentive to those practices in which critical modes of agency and particular identities are being denied. Such actions suggest the need for faculty to develop forms of critical pedagogy that not only inspire and energize. They should also be able to challenge a growing number of anti-democratic practices and policies while resurrecting a radical democratic project that provides the basis for imagining a life beyond a social order immersed in inequality, degradation of the environment and the elevation of war and militarization to national ideals. Under such circumstances, education becomes more than an obsession with accountability schemes, an audit culture, market values and an unreflective immersion in the crude empiricism of a data-obsessed, market-driven society. It becomes part of a formative culture in which thoughtlessness prevails, providing the foundation for the curse of totalitarianism. At a time of increased repression, it is all the more crucial for educators to reject the notion that higher education is simply a site for training students for the workforce and that the culture of higher education is synonymous with the culture of business. At issue here is the need for educators to recognize the power of education in creating the formative cultures necessary to both challenge the various threats being mobilized against the ideas of justice and democracy while also fighting for those public spheres, ideals, values and policies that offer alternative modes of identity, thinking, social relations and politics. In both conservative and progressive discourses pedagogy is often treated simply as a set of strategies and skills to use in order to teach prespecified subject matter. In this context, pedagogy becomes synonymous with teaching as a technique or the practice of a craft-like skill. Any viable notion of critical pedagogy must grasp the limitations of this definition and its endless slavish imitations even when they are claimed as part of a radical discourse or project. In opposition to the instrumental reduction of pedagogy to a method - which has no language for relating the self to public life, social responsibility or the demands of citizenship - critical pedagogy illuminates the relationships among knowledge, authority and power. (11) Central to any viable notion of what makes pedagogy critical is, in part, the recognition that pedagogy is always a deliberate attempt on the part of educators to influence how and what knowledge and subjectivities are produced within particular sets of social relations. This approach to critical pedagogy does not reduce educational practice to the mastery of methodologies; it stresses, instead, the importance of understanding what actually happens in classrooms and other educational settings by raising questions regarding what the relationship is between learning and social change, what knowledge is of most worth, what it means to know something, and in what direction one should desire. Pedagogy is always about power because it cannot be separated from how subjectivities are formed, desires are mobilized, some experiences are legitimated and others are not or how some knowledge is considered acceptable while other forms are excluded from the curriculum. Paulo Freire believed that pedagogy was always a form of intervention in the world because it was impossible to separate the teaching of content, theories, values and stories about one's relationship to oneself, each other and the world from how one is formed ethically and politically. Consequently, he rejected the notion that education is neutral just as he embraced a notion of authority that was generous, self-reflective, professionally competent and willing to provide the conditions for students "to question, doubt, and criticize." For Freire, citizens do not develop as a consequence of technical efficiency. They also do not develop under pedagogical conditions that smother the imagination or disable the pedagogical conditions for engaging students in critical dialogue, energizing them to become socially responsible, and making clear that a pedagogy that matters has a relationship to social change. Learning to think critically about the world around them is inextricably related to thinking critically about one's own self and social formation. For Freire, the classroom and any other viable pedagogical space is one in which students come to terms with their own power, make connections to others and cultivate their own sense of agency under conditions in which they engage dangerous memories and historical context, and embrace the right to dream. Freire is quite clear about what it means to be a critical educator. He writes: I am a teacher who stands up for what is right against what is indecent, who is in favor of freedom against authoritarianism, who is a supporter of authority against freedom with no limits, and who is a defender of democracy against the dictatorship of right or left. I am a teacher who favors the permanent struggle against every form of bigotry and against the economic domination of individuals and social classes. I am a teacher who rejects the present system of capitalism, responsible for the aberration of misery in the midst of plenty. I am a teacher full of the spirit of hope, in spite of all signs to the contrary. I am a teacher who refuses the disillusionment that consumes and immobilizes. I am a teacher proud of the beauty of my teaching practice, a fragile beauty that may disappear if I do not care for the struggle and knowledge that I ought to teach. If I do not struggle for the material conditions without which my body will suffer from neglect, thus running the risk of becoming frustrated and ineffective, then I will no longer be the witness that I ought to be, no longer the tenacious fighter who may tire but who never gives up. (12) Pedagogy is a moral and political practice because it offers particular versions and visions of civic life, community, the future and how we might construct representations of ourselves, others, and 

And- before evaluating any ethical theory, we must end structural violence in order to include everyone in ethical decision making
Winter and Leighton 99 |Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton. Winter|Psychologist that specializes in Social Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social psychology, peace psychology, and ustice and intergroup responses to transgressions of justice “Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century.” Pg 4-5 ghsVA
Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social jus- tice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.

Part two is the plan:
 The United States federal government should phase out the qualified immunity legal standard, instead applying strict liability standard to civil cases with police officers as defendants.
Bernick 15 explains the plan-strict liability is the standard for every other form of processional.
Evan Bernick (Assistant Director of the Center for Judicial Engagement at the Institute for Justice). “To Hold Police Accountable, Don’t Give Them Immunity.” Foundation for Economic Education.
6 May 2015. https://fee.org/articles/to-hold-police-accountable-dont-give-them-immunity/
Simply put, qualified immunity has to go. It should be replaced with a rule of strict liability for bona fide constitutional violations. There are a variety of possible rules. First, police officers could be held personally liable for any rights violations. They’d need to carry personal malpractice insurance, just like lawyers, doctors, and other professionals. Insurance companies are qualified and motivated judges of risk, and they would provide another reasonable level of scrutiny on police conduct, policies, and training. Second, police departments could be held liable for any rights violations by officers and punitive damages could be assessed against individual officers for particularly outrageous conduct. Third, police departments could be required to insure officers up to a certain amount — officers would have to purchase insurance to cover any costs in excess of that amount. As ambitious as these reforms might seem, never underestimate the power of widespreadpublicoutrage. InthecaseofKelo, theCourt’s cavalier treatmentofpropertyrightsled to a number of laws protecting citizens from eminent domain abuse in states across the country. Here, too, the public can force legislators to respond. The question of how to ensure that officers exercise the authority delegated to them with the proper vigor, while also keeping them within the limits of that authority, should be left in the first instance to elected officials — subject to constitutional limits and the requirements of valid federal laws (like Section 1983). Qualified immunity enables officers to flout those limits and those laws. We must replace the judicially invented impunity that police officers currently enjoy with a realistic avenue for the vindication of constitutional rights.
The plan isn’t extra t- I am specifying how I limit qualified immunity. Once you change a legal doctrine, something has to replace it. Thus it is a necessary to describe what doctrine replaces QI
And, limit is defined as “a restriction on the size or amount of something permissible or possible” by Oxford (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/limit) By eliminating qualified immunity I am restricting it
Part 3 is method
Armed or political resistance strategies fail-bottom up individual acts of people directly checking government abuses is key to any hope of improvement. The aff allows individuals to hold officers accountable without appeals to the state
Whitehead, Rutherford institute We Are the Government: Tactics for Taking Down the Police State 193 46 61 By John W. Whitehead August 18, 2015 https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/john_whiteheads_commentary/we_are_the_government_tactics_for_taking_down_the_police_state
Saddled with a corporate media that marches in lockstep with the government, elected officials who dance to the tune of their corporate benefactors, and a court system that serves to maintain order rather than mete out justice, Americans often feel as if they have no voice, no authority and no recourse when it comes to holding government officials accountable and combatting rampant corruption and injustice. We’re impotent in the face of SWAT teams that break down doors and leave toddlers scarred for life. We’re helpless to prevent police shootings that leave unarmed citizens dead for no other reason than the police officer involved felt “threatened.” We shrug dismissively over the plight of fellow citizens who have their heads cracked, their bodies broken and their rights violated for failing to jump to attention when a police officer issues an order. And we fail to care about the thousands of individuals who have been punished with extreme sentences for nonviolent offenses and are forced to spend their lives as modern-day slaves in bondage to private prisons and the profit-driven corporations they serve. Make no mistake about it: virtually anything and everything is a crime nowadays (feeding the birds, growing vegetables in your front yard, etc.) to such an extent that if a prosecutor, police officer and judge were so inclined, you could be locked up for any inane reason. This is tyranny dressed up in the official garb of the police state. It is the self-righteous, heavy-handed arm of the law being used as a decoy to divert your attention to the so-called criminals in your midst (the fisherman who threw back small fish into the ocean, the mother who let her child walk to the playground alone, the pastor holding Bible studies in his backyard) so that you don’t focus on the criminal behavior being perpetrated by the government (bribery, cronyism, electoral fraud, slush funds, graft, pork, theft, and on and on). In the face of such abject injustice, outright corruption and overt inequality, it’s hard to feel empowered to believe the average citizen can make a difference. It’s hard to persuade anyone to stand against tyranny when all you can promise them as a reward is persecution, prosecution and a one-way trip to the morgue. And when the outcome seems to be a foregone conclusion—the government always wins—it can seem pointless, even foolhardy, to dare to challenge the system. As such, it’s far easier to buy into the political process, even though elections amount to nothing of consequence. There are also those who subscribe to the notion that an armed revolution is the only thing that will save America. These armed resistors are making themselves easy targets and will be the first to be taken down by militarized police who are trained to kill and armed to the teeth with every kind of weapon imaginable, from grenade launchers and sniper rifles to armored vehicles and Black Hawk helicopters. So how do you not only push back against the police state’s bureaucracy, corruption and cruelty but also launch a counterrevolution aimed at reclaiming control over the government using nonviolent means? You start by changing the rules and engaging in some (nonviolent) guerilla tactics. Employ militant nonviolent resistance and civil disobedience, which Martin Luther King Jr. used to great effect through the use of sit-ins, boycotts and marches. Take part in grassroots activism, which takes a trickle-up approach to governmental reform by implementing change at the local level (in other words, think nationally, but act locally). And then, while you’re at it, nullify everything the government does that is illegitimate, egregious or blatantly unconstitutional. Various cities and states have been using this historic doctrine with mixed results on issues as wide ranging as gun control and healthcare to “claim freedom from federal laws they find onerous or wrongheaded.” Where nullification can be particularly powerful, however, is in the hands of the juror. As law professor Ilya Somin explains, jury nullification is the practice by which a jury refuses to convict someone accused of a crime if they believe the “law in question is unjust or the punishment is excessive.” According to former federal prosecutor Paul Butler, the doctrine of jury nullification is “premised on the idea that ordinary citizens, not government officials, should have the final say as to whether a person should be punished.” Imagine that: a world where the citizenry—not the government or its corporate controllers—actually calls the shots and determines what is just. In a world of “rampant overcriminalization,” where the average citizen unknowingly breaks three laws a day, jury nullification acts as “a check on runaway authoritarian criminalization and the increasing network of confusing laws that are passed with neither the approval nor oftentimes even the knowledge of the citizenry.” Indeed, Butler believes so strongly in the power of nullification to balance the scales between the power of the prosecutor and the power of the people that he advises: If you are ever on a jury in a marijuana case, I recommend that you vote “not guilty” — even if you think the defendant actually smoked pot, or sold it to another consenting adult. As a juror, you have this power under the Bill of Rights; if you exercise it, you become part of a proud tradition of American jurors who helped make our laws fairer. In other words, it’s “we the people” who can and should be determining what laws are just, what activities are criminal and who can be jailed for what crimes. Not only should the punishment fit the crime, but the laws of the land should also reflect the concerns of the citizenry as opposed to the profit-driven priorities of Corporate America. Unfortunately, for thousands of Americans who are serving life sentences for nonviolent crimes as a result of harsh mandatory sentencing laws passed by “tough on crime” politicians, the punishment rarely fits the crime. As I point out in my book Battlefield America: The War on the American People, with every ill inflicted upon us by the American police state, from overcriminalization and surveillance to militarized police and private prisons, it’s money that drives the police state. And there is a lot of money to be made from criminalizing nonviolent activities and jailing Americans for nonviolent offenses. This is where the power of jury nullification is so critical: to reject inane laws and extreme sentences and counteract the edicts of a profit-driven governmental elite that sees nothing wrong with jailing someone for a lifetime for a relatively insignificant crime. Of course, the powers-that-be don’t want the citizenry to know that it has any power at all. They would prefer that we remain clueless about the government’s many illicit activities, ignorant about our constitutional rights, and powerless to bring about any real change. Indeed, so determined are they to keep us in the dark about the powers vested in “we the people” that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1895 that jurors had no right during trials to be told about nullification. Moreover, anyone daring to educate a jury about nullification runs the risk of prosecution. Just recently, for example, 56-year-old Mark Iannicelli was charged with seven counts of jury tampering for handing out jury nullification fliers outside a Denver courtroom. Now Iannicelli is not being accused of advocating for or against any case in progress, nor is he charged with targeting any particular members of the jury. Nevertheless, Iannicelli could be sentenced to one to three years in prison because he dared to educate the jurors about an option that no judge or prosecutor ever mentions in court: the right to acquit someone who may be guilty if they also believe that the law is unjust. Such intimidation tactics proved less successful when used against Julian Heicklen, who was accused of jury tampering for handing out nullifications pamphlets in Manhattan. A federal district court judge found Heicklen not only innocent of the charge of jury tampering, but went so far as to warn that the law—18 U.S.C. § 1504—raises significant First Amendment concerns (“the First Amendment squarely protects speech concerning judicial proceedings and public debate regarding the functioning of the judicial system, so long as that speech does not interfere with the fair and impartial administration of justice”). Jury nullification has played a significant role in our nation’s history. It was championed early on by John Hancock and John Adams and relied on at various points since then to push back against laws deemed egregious, unjust or simply out of step with the times. Most recently, jury nullification has become a popular tactic to thwart laws that mandate harsh punishments for those convicted of possessing even minimal amounts of marijuana. For instance, in one case I worked on years ago, a jury refused to convict a 54-year-old man who had been charged with possession of marijuana. Prosecutors claimed that a SWAT team, doing an area-wide land and air sweep, had spotted two marijuana plants growing in the hollow of a dead tree on the man’s 39-acre property. Had the man been found guilty, he would have been sentenced to jail and his 90-year-old mother, blind, deaf and dependent on him for care, would have had to be institutionalized. In delivering his closing arguments, the prosecutor warned the jury that disagreement with the laws against pot possession and disapproval of police tactics are not valid reasons to nullify a case. Of course, those are exactly the reasons why more Americans should opt for nullification. In an age in which government officials accused of wrongdoing—police officers, elected officials, etc.—are treated with general leniency, while the average citizen is prosecuted to the full extent of the law, jury nullification is a powerful reminder that, as the Constitution tells us, “we the people” are the government. For too long we’ve allowed our so-called “representatives” to call the shots. Now it’s time to restore the citizenry to their rightful place in the republic: as the masters, not the servants. Jury nullification is one way of doing so. The reality with which we must contend is that justice in America is reserved for those who can afford to buy their way out of jail. For the rest of us who are dependent on the “fairness” of the system, there exists a multitude of ways in which justice can and does go wrong every day. Police misconduct. Prosecutorial misconduct. Judicial bias. Inadequate defense. Prosecutors who care more about winning a case than seeking justice. Judges who care more about what is legal than what is just. Jurors who know nothing of the law and are left to deliberate in the dark about life-and-death decisions. And an overwhelming body of laws, statutes and ordinances that render the average American a criminal, no matter how law-abiding they might think themselves. As I’ve said before, when you go into a courtroom, you’re going up against three adversaries who more often than not are operating off the same playbook: the police, the prosecutor and

Part 4 is case

Advantage one is accountability- the aff plan is key to holding officers personally liable for misconduct. This checks back against authoritarianism by insisting that we the people still matter.
1st- due to QI individual police cannot be held responsible. This allows officers to escape justice. 

Robert Hennelly, May 13, 2015, Slate, Poisonous Cops, Total Immunity: Why an epidemic of police abuse is actually going unpunished, http://www.salon.com/2015/05/13/poisonous_cops_total_immunity_why_an_epidemic_of_police_abuse_is_actually_going_unpunished/
No matter how big the settlement might be, Schwartz notes that police officers enjoy a qualified immunity that shields them from personal liability for whatever actions they take while on the job. Schwartz asked 70 of the nation’s largest police departments to submit the total amount they paid out to settle police misconduct cases from 2006 to 2011. Forty-four of the 70 agencies responded. All told, they paid out $730 million to settle 9,225 civil rights suits. Yet in just one half of one percent of those settlements were officers required to pay anything.
2nd- QI has made it effectively impossible to sue police for misconduct, creating a police state. The only way to stop the creation of militaristic authoritarianism is via the plan.
Norm Pattis, attormey, Qualified Immunity and the Police State, http://www.pattisblog.com/index.php?article=Qualified_Immunity_And_The_Police_State_2675
I get many calls each week from people who believe they have been abused by the police. That is because for many years I was at the forefront of police misconduct litigation. But these days I rarely file a complaint against police officers. It is not that I have become a police groupie. Rather, I've read the handwriting on the wall. In the past decade, there has been a silent coup d' etat. Our courts have transformed themselves into the guardians of a police state in a stunning, and largely unnoticed, act of judicial activism. Their primary tool was a tricky legal doctrine known as qualified immunity. This coup has gone unnoticed by the general public. Even academics seem blind to its import. Practitioners know better. Consider the following fact pattern: A man calls to complain that his son was brutalized by local law enforcement officers. He was hit with fists, kicked and subjected to high-voltage shock by a police officer using a Taser. The man is angry. How could police do this? I ask what crime the boy was charged with. The man seems surprised by the question. How had I known his son had been arrested? I know the boy must have been charged with interfering with a police officer, a charge that makes it a misdemeanor to obstruct, hinder or delay an officer in the performance of his lawful duty. Just what does this mean? The statute is so broad that almost anything other a supine bending of the knee is a crime. Police routinely charge the crime when force is used to take a person into custody. It is the first line of defense against a charge of unreasonable force: We needed to use force against resistance. The boy's father did not want to hear a word of it. How can a boy in handcuffs resist arrest?, he asks with scorn. I tell him about cases I have seen. Young men in handcuffs who kicked out windows of police cruisers, in one case kicking so hard as to dislodge a car door from its joints. I try to explain that the law permits the police to use reasonable force to overcome a person's resistance. There are many judges who would conclude that the use of a Taser is justified against a person wildly kicking while cuffed. Bringing a civil action against the police carries with it a substantial risk that the case will be thrown out by a judge granting the police officers qualified immunity. By now the caller has transferred his anger against the police to me. The police were wrong, he tells me. The case is a slam dunk, he insists. I tell him to take the slam dunk elsewhere. There is no such thing in the world of police misconduct. The call ends with the man no doubt wondering whether I am defending police officers. I hate fielding such calls. We boast about the rule of law, saying that no one is beyond the law's reach. That's not quite true. The law recognizes broad immunities. If life is a board game, the rule of law defines what pieces on the board can do to one another. An immunity removes a piece from the board, placing it beyond the reach of the law. Thus, a lawmaker trashing a person on the floor of a legislative chamber is absolutely immune from a suit for defamation. We say the lawmaker is immune by operation of law: In other words, any person who knows the law knows that the lawmaker cannot be sued. A qualified immunity is one that a judge is free to impose or not, depending on the facts presented to the judge. In the context of police misconduct litigation, judges are free to grant a police officer immunity from suit if the officer's conduct does not violate clearly established law or if reasonable police officers could disagree about whether the alleged conduct violated the law. Translated into lay terms, police officers are given the benefit of the doubt in close cases. But judges, not juries, make this call. That's the coup. Qualified immunity is a prime example of judicial activism, yet no one on the right seems very concerned when judicial activism narrows the rights of ordinary Americans. Fifteen years ago, the courts rarely granted qualified immunity to police officers; now it happens with a regularity that makes it pointless to file suit against police officers in all but the most egregious cases. In other words, a powerful legal doctrine created by judges has declared broader and broader ranges of police conduct beyond the reach of the law. Police misconduct cases rarely it to juries any longer. Judges, not the people, decide what is reasonable for police to do. The judiciary is self-satisfied about this, and why not? Throwing a case out of court is a whole lot less trouble than going to trial. But it comes at a cost. The cost is a police state. Officers are free to act with impunity, their conduct beyond the review of ordinary citizens so long as it satisfies the jaundiced eye of a judiciary free to decided without real review what is and is not reasonable. I read these judicial decisions and although I do not weep, I heed what they teach. There is little point in filing a suit that will simply be tossed from court. I send most callers away these days. There are a lot of angry people out there who aren't getting justice in the courts. I suppose when there are enough of them out there someone will listen. But the listeners aren't on the bench; the nation's judges have become accomplices in a police state; most of them don't even realize it.
AND- Criminal law can’t hold police accountable; civil suits are key- its try of die for the affirmative if we ever want change. Criminal suits reinforce state power as they allow the government to control the rules of the game. It also is key to restoring justice to the injured
Geller and Toch William A. Geller, JD, (Director of Geller and Associates) and Hans Toch (professor of psychology in the School of Criminal Justice at the University of Albany). “Police Violence: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force.” Yale University Press, Nov 12, 1959. Google Books.
The main objective of a criminal case is to adjudicate guilt and express societal condemnation of morally culpable individuals.. Criminal law can punish and, in some instances, deter police brutality, but it cannot of itself force fundamental change in how a department is run, supervised, led, and made accountable. Criminal law’s most appropriate application, therefore, is against “bad apples”-individual officers who have committed sanctionable acts. By contrast, the civil law, because of its greater flexibility and scope, has the potential to serve as the instrument of systemic reform. In adjusting rights and settling wrongs, civil remedies generally offer distinct advantages over criminal sanctions. First, a victim of police misconduct can sue on his or her own behalf and need not await the government’s decision to go forward. Second, an injured party need not overcome the heightened procedural protections afforded the criminally accused. For example, a plaintiff can prevail under a preponderance of evidence standard rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, although the civil law, like the criminal law, can punish via its potential for imposition of punitive damages, the civil law provides compensation to victims who have been harmed by police misconduct. Recompense is beneficial in itself, and damage awards can spur reform if the costs of misbehavior are high. Fourth, civil lawsuits permit broad discovery of information and may provide a means to uncover police misbehavior and stir public reaction. Finally, the civil law offers various possibilities for framing relief which go beyond punishment or compensation and include remediation. That is, the civil law offers equitable relief, via court injunction and specific orders, that can force a deficient department not only to pay for harm caused but to reform so that the harm is not likely repeated.

Advantage two is deterrence-qualified immunity is key to the violent actions of the police- they have no incentive to stop abuses. Police abuse functions as the enforcer of state violence- we have to check this
1st- Qualified immunity means the police are never deterred from bad conduct

The Internationalist, Summer 2015, Killer Cops, White Supremacists: Racist Terror Talks Strike Black America, http://www.internationalist.org/killercopswstalkblackamerica1507.html DOA: 10-2-16
One is called qualified immunity, and it is a protection for government officials, such that even if they have violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, they will be immune from liability if that right was not clearly established. The way that the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to assess that question is to look at other published decisions by the Supreme Court or other courts, and to look to see whether the constitutional violation in question has previously been declared unlawful. And if it hasn’t, the officer will be immune from suit. This is a protection that is a very strong one. The Supreme Court has said that the qualified immunity standard protects “all but the plainly incompetent, or those who knowingly violate the law.” It’s a very strong protection. It’s premised on the notion that if you expose police officers and other government officials to liability, it will over-deter them. People won’t apply to become police officers, or when they’re on the street they won’t vigorously enforce the law. But if officers are not subject to financial liability, or if judgments and settlements against them are indemnified by their employers, then there is not that kind of financial pressure that’s assumed by the court in that qualified immunity doctrine. So that’s one area of the law.
2nd- Studies show officers are never held financially liable in the status quo-liability is shifted to the police department, incentivizing future abuses. The aff is absolutely key to stop this.
Joanna Schwartz (Law Professor at UCLA); interview with Paul Rosenberg (California-based writer/activist, senior editor for Random Lengths News, and a columnist for Al Jazeera English). “We must make the police pay: When cops go too far, they must feel the pain too.” Salon. 9 May 2015. http://www.salon.com/2015/05/09/we_must_make_the_police_pay_when_cops_go_too_far_they_must_feel_t
So, what was the scope of your investigation in terms of timeframe and the jurisdictions you looked at? I began this project in 2012, and sent out public records requests to the 70 largest law enforcement agencies, including both municipal agencies and county and state agencies. My public records request essentially asked for information about the amounts spent, in civil rights claims, over six years—from 2006 to 2011—and the frequency with which punitive damage judgments were awarded, and any instances in which officers were required to personally pay, in part, any of those awards. There was, as you might imagine, a lot of runaround with a lot of jurisdictions to get the information. I would say 80 percent of jurisdictions to 20 percent of my time, and the final 20 percent of the jurisdictions took 80 percent of my time. Sometime in about 2013, after about a year and a half, or almost two years, I tracked down information from 44 of those 70 departments, and then I presented the paper at Berkeley, at Boalt Law School, and someone asked a very good question: they said, “These are the 70 largest agencies. How do you know what happens is smaller agencies?” That was a very good question, because there are 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country, and many of those are very small, so I decided to then submit public records requests to a randomly selected group of 70 smaller law enforcement agencies, and got responses from 37 of those 70. So that is how I got the 81. The results you found were sort of what I expected, only more so, I would say personally, but I don’t know about the general public. And certainly it didn’t match the expectations out there in the legal literature. So what did you find? I found that indemnification of officers is virtually certain and universal. During the six year period across the 81 jurisdictions, there were over 9,200 civil rights cases in which plaintiffs received payments. The total awarded was over $730 million, but there were just 37 to 39 cases in which officers contributed something. When they contributed, it was a rather small amount. The median payment was just over $2,000 by officers per case. And those could be cases where there were five- or six-figure settlements for the plaintiffs in most cases. So the officers really contributed, when they contributed—which was very infrequent—they contributed a rather small amount. No officer paid more than $25,000 in any case. The next-highest amount was $16,500, and the next amount was $12,000. And most of the amounts in most cases were far smaller. So, as you said, it was sort of what I imagined, but more. Those findings amazed me, but what I found particularly amazing was jurisdictions indemnified officers for punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded in cases in which officers are found by a jury to have engaged in reckless conduct, intentional misconduct; and punitive damages are intended not compensate victims, but to punish wrongdoers. I found 20 cases in that six-year period, in those 81 jurisdictions, in which a jury had awarded punitive damages against one or more defendants, and the jurors awarded over $9.3 million in punitive damages in those 20 cases. In many instances those awards were reduced by the courts, often based on argument by defense counsel that the punitive damages awarded would be a financial hardship for the individual officer–but not one officer paid a nickel toward any of those punitive damages. They were either indemnified, paid by the cities and counties that employed them, or the cities and counties entered into some post-trial settlement that waived the punitive damages judgment, and essentially the city paid the entirety of the settlement—which was a settlement in the shadow of the punitive damages judgment. The other thing that I suppose really shocked me, there has been an assumption, even with people who believe that officers are usually indemnified, there’s usually some sort of caveat, that of course officers wouldn’t be indemnified if they were fired, if they were criminally prosecuted, if they were criminally convicted. What I found during my study was that in multiple instances in which officers were terminated, when they were indicted, when they were criminally prosecuted, even when they went to prison, they did not suffer these financial consequences of the suits. They were nonetheless indemnified.
3rd- Qualified immunity undermines judicial checks on police authority-prevents even the smallest checks on police power-ending it is key to addressing broader problems with the police.
Evan Bernick (Assistant Director of the Center for Judicial Engagement at the Institute for Justice). “To Hold Police Accountable, Don’t Give Them Immunity.” Foundation for Economic Education. 6 May 2015. https://fee.org/articles/to-hold-police-accountable-dont-give-them-immunity/
from the police. So much for “every person” “shall be liable.” Qualified immunity shields police misconduct not only from liability but also from meaningful judicial scrutiny. Private lawsuits are an essential tool in uncovering the truth about police misconduct. The discovery process can yield information that makes broader policy changes within police departments possible. At trial, judicial engagement — an impartial, evidence-based determination of the constitutionality of the officer’s actions — can take place. Qualified immunity can cut this search for truth short. If qualified immunity is raised as a defense before trial and the judge denies it, that decision is immediately appealable. If it is granted, discovery stops, and there is no trial on the merits.

Advantage three is spillover-ending qualified immunity signals a broader move away from the authoritarian state.  
1st- If QI is lost by police, there is no rationale to extend it to other government officials – police were the first ones to get it
Andrew Weis, 2014, J.D. Candidate, 2014, Georgia State University College of Law, Georgia State University Law Review, Qualified Immunity for “Private” ;$ 1983 defendants after Filarsky v. Delia, p. 1047

The doctrine of qualified immunity represents further importation of traditional tort immunities as § 1983 defenses stemming from the conclusion that Congress would not have abrogated these immunities without doing so expressly. n46 The doctrine emerged in the Court's 1967 decision of Pierson v Ray. n47 In Pierson, police officers who made arrests under a statute later held unconstitutional argued that they should not be held liable if they acted in good faith and with probable cause. n48 The Court agreed because police officers enjoyed such a defense at common law, and § 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability." n49 Under Pierson, the police defendants established qualified immunity (as they would defend under the common law) by satisfying a two-part test that required good faith and probable cause. n50 The Court later extended this qualified immunity test to all government officials and employees. n51 In determining the availability of qualified immunity to private § 1983 defendants, the Court employs a two-part test that looks to historical and policy bases for immunity. The Court's first two decisions addressing private party qualified immunity were narrow decisions denying immunity to the private defendant. As a result, lower courts lacked guidance as to when a private defendant could assert qualified immunity, if ever. The Court's decision in Filarsky brings much needed clarity in this regard. Filarsky offers a broad rule in favor of immunity for those private party § 1983 defendants working for the government, and helps define the reach of the Court's earlier decisions.
2nd- Civil liability is the best starting point for challenging police misconduct more broadly
Lindsey De Stefan (J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law). “ “No Man Is Above the Law and No Man Is Below It:” How Qualified Immunity Reform Could Create Accountability and Curb Widespread Police Misconduct” (2016). Law School Student Scholarship. Paper 850. http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/850
In recent months, it has been impossible to ignore the overwhelming presence of police violence in the media.1 Hardly a month has gone by without headlines asserting use of excessive force, brutality, or other misconduct in some corner of the United States. 2 It seems that no region of the nation has been unaffected by the violence, with civilian deaths at the hands of law enforcement cropping up from San Francisco3 to New York City4 to South Carolina, 5 and almost everywhere in between. And with public confidence in law enforcement at a twenty-two year low—with only 52 percent of U.S. citizens asserting that they have considerable confidence in law enforcement6— the nation has clearly taken notice.7 Naturally, these violent incidents raise important questions for many Americans, regardless of locale or the type of community in which they reside. Why is this happening? And how can we stop it? Unsurprisingly, extensive media commentary has ultimately invited a myriad of proposed answers to these inquiries and has even generated some potential solutions. Some point to a lack of education and opine that officers need more comprehensive training to teach them how to “defuse the sorts of deadly racially charged confrontations” that have recently been highlighted in numerous communities throughout the country.8 Others suggest that allowing citizens to record police would create officer accountability, serve as a disciplinary basis for abusive behavior, encourage the use of justified policing tactics, and generally deter misconduct.9 Others still suggest that police culture is to blame since rookies shape their attitudes about the use of force based on the words and actions of fellow officers, 10 and because the warrior mentality of policing fosters an “us” versus “them” relationship between law enforcement and citizens.11 In fact, a few experts have even suggested that there has not been a wave of police violence, but that mainstream media is merely covering brutality more frequently and comprehensively. 12 Irrespective of whether there has been an increase in the incidence of brutality or whether the nation is merely recognizing what has been an ongoing reality for many U.S. citizens, the existence of a problem is now inescapably obvious. The solution, however, is decidedly less clear. Perhaps none of the aforementioned proposals are the right answer. Alternatively, and more likely, maybe they are all the answer—at least partially and in combination with a number of other considerations. It is improbable that a single factor can be deemed the sole cause of widespread police misconduct. Of course, an elaborate problem with multiple dimensions will require an equally multifaceted solution. In fact, any adequate resolution will likely require the cooperation of many individuals and entities across various disciplines and industries.13 But no matter how winding, every path to change must begin with a single step. And the most logical place to begin is by reforming the stringent protection from civil liability enjoyed by law enforcement officers alleged to have violated individual constitutional rights. This Comment will explore how judicial amendment of the qualified immunity doctrine— specifically as it is applied to law enforcement officers—could serve as a catalyst to begin to rein in police misconduct. Part II will describe the general history of the most significant statutory provision in this context, Section 1983, and the expansion of constitutional torts that occurred in the mid-twentieth century. Part III focuses on the judicial development of qualified immunity in the Supreme Court and explains the status of the doctrine today. Part IV discusses some of the most significant practical problems with the modern qualified immunity jurisprudence and its application. Part V goes on to analyze the recent spotlight on police use of force. Finally, Part VI proposes that judicial amendment of qualified immunity application will serve as an effective first step in decreasing the overall incidence of police misconduct in the United States.
Part five is the underview

Tournament: All Jan Feb | Round: 1 | Opponent: Fuck this topic | Judge: Fuck this topic
Fuck the topic selection committee for making me actually have to say this, but please do not read (out load, in round) any slurs, especially about LGBT+ people when debating me. (queer is not a slur unless used like an insult). Sorry if this infringes on your 'free speech', this is 200 triggering and really not cool. 

Also- there may be slurs in my evidence (because, again, fuck this topic, you cant escape them in the topic lit). I will not read them out loud. If you read through evidence during/before the round, and don't want to be confronted with any of these, contact me and let me know.  

Peace

Tournament: Strake Jesuit | Round: 2 | Opponent: Prosper ZE | Judge: Kris Wright
See open source!

Tournament: Winston Churchill | Round: 1 | Opponent: Elkens MP | Judge: Courtney DeVore
Part one is framework
First- I value morallity derived from ought in the resolution- any other value is nonsense, since we can al

Second, the meta ethic- the resolution asks us a question of public colleges and universities. To answer this question, we should first look to the constitutive nature of colleges and universities to determine what type of framing arguments matter. A few warrants-
analytic

Third- now, we must define the nature of a public institute of higher learning.  It is useful to understand the university in terms of pedagogy, which is the broader educational environment given by these institutions. In an educational space, participants can never be neutral, there will always BE a pedagogy in education, rather, it is a question of what type of pedagogy we should form. Thus universities should operate as a space for critical pedagogy- this is key to accessing identity and agency. Thus the standard is consistency with creating a space of critical pedagogy
Henry A. Giroux | The Curse of Totalitarianism and the Challenge of Critical Pedagogy Friday, 02 October 2015 00:00 By Henry A. Giroux, Truthout | News Analysis, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33061-the-curse-of-totalitarianism-and-the-challenge-of-critical-pedagogy
Pedagogy is a moral and political practice because it offers particular versions and visions of civic life, community, the future and how we might construct representations of ourselves, others, and our physical and social environment. But it does more; it also "represents a version of our own dreams for ourselves, our children, and our communities. But such dreams are never neutral; they are always someone's dreams and to the degree that they are implicated in organizing the future for others they always have a moral and political dimension." (13) It is in this respect that any discussion of pedagogy must begin with a discussion of educational practice as a particular way in which a sense of identity, place, worth and, above all, value is informed by practices that organize knowledge and meaning. (14) Central to my argument is the assumption that politics is not only about the exercise of economic and political power, but also, as Cornelius Castoriadis points out, "has to do with political judgements and value choices," (15) indicating that questions of civic education and critical pedagogy (learning how to become a skilled citizen) are central to the struggle over political agency and democracy. In this instance, critical pedagogy emphasizes critical reflection, bridging the gap between learning and everyday life, understanding the connection between power and difficult knowledge, and extending democratic rights and identities by using the resources of history and theory.
Part two is the contention- I contend that affirming creates a space consistent with the pedagogical goals of the university
First, restrictions on speech damage the purpose of universities
Vince Herron, JD, University of Southern California, “Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech Codes, and the Pursuit of Truth,” Southern California Law Review, 1993-1994.
By reducing speech at the university by eliminating from the marketplace certain ideas which university administrators feel are unacceptable, speech codes also threaten the academic process. Speech codes which inhibit the free exchange of ideas trample on the very canons upon which universities are founded. Although the ideas that may be expressed when no speech code exists may be repugnant, the university is simply not a place where ideas and expression should be suppressed.73 When speech codes exist, “not only are the delicate, vital values of free speech seriously jeopardized, but suppression inevitably creates a climate of thought control, a habit of censorship and an atmosphere of reactionary conformity… .”I “The main purpose of a university is the search for knowledge …. For that reason, any coercive curtailment of unpopular viewpoints… is inconsistent with the very foundation of a university education.”7 5 The university especially is a marketplace of ideas and should be a bastion of unrestricted free speech.76 “Once you start telling people what they can’t say, you will end up telling them what they can’t think.”77 This obstruction of both academic freedom and the freedom to express all ideas threatens grave damage to the educational process and is a price which is far too high to pay for the modest, short-term gains garnered by speech codes.
Second, Colleges and universities should be the last to censor free speech-there’s a constitutive duty of these institutions to create a maximumly educational environment.
Thomas McAllister JD, Tennessee College of Law, “Rules and Rights Colliding: Speech Codes and the First Amendment on College Campuses,” Tennessee Law Review, Vol. 59, 1992.
Would it not be preferable, though, for institutions to refrain from actions that might call into question their respect for First Amendment rights, regardless of those actions’ constitutionality? Colleges and universities should concern themselves with engendering a campus atmosphere in which speech of all kinds flourishes and the bounds of accepted norms and principles are always tested instead of concerning themselves with the nuances of First Amendment jurisprudence. University and college administrators should be the last to restrict speech. Rather they should be the first to protect it. Students have an interest in an unintimidating place of scholarship; however, part of scholarship is learning to cope with views that one finds abhorrent. Students’ verbal battles should not be fought for them by administrators with speech codes. As one writer put it, The same students who insist that they be treated as adults when it comes to their sexuality, drinking and school work, beg to be treated like children when it comes to politics, speech and controversy. They whine to . . . the president or provost of the university, to “protect” them from offensive speech, instead of themselves trying to combat it in the marketplace of ideas. 124 Students must learn tolerance for all ideas no matter how repugnant to their own beliefs. College and university administrators should not cast themselves in the role of censors.
Third, Restrictions on speech only silence moderates, not extremists. This is inconsistent with a pedagogical space where we can critically examine the views of these moderates and in turn.
Hentoff 91, Nat Hentoff. “ ‘Speech Codes’ On The Campus And Problems Of Free Speech.” Dissent v. 38 (Fall 1991) p. 546-9.
At the University of Buffalo Law School, which has a code restricting speech, I could find just one faculty member who was against it. A liberal, he spoke only on condition that I not use his name. He did not want to be categorized as a racist. On another campus, a political science professor for whom I had great respect after meeting and talking with him years ago, has been silent-students told me—on what Justice William Brennan once called “the pall of orthodoxy” that has fallen on his campus. When I talked to him, the professor said, “It doesn’t happen in my class. There’s no ‘politically correct’ orthodoxy here. It may happen in other places at this university, but I don’t know about that.” He said no more. One of the myths about the rise of P. C. (politically correct) is that, coming from the left, it is primarily intimidating conservatives on campus. Quite the contrary. At almost every college I’ve been, conservative students have their own newspaper, usually quite lively and fired by a muckraking glee at exposing “politically correct” follies on campus. By and large, those most intimidated—not so much by the speech codes themselves but by the Madame Defarge-like spirit behind them—are liberal students and those who can be called politically moderate. I’ve talked to many of them, and they no longer get involved in class discussions where their views would go against the grain of P. C. righteousness.
Fourth, free speech is needed to for civic engagement, which is a primary goal of critical pedagogy. This is true for both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons- when you leave school speech codes go away, we have to use the university as a space to learn how to fight the systems that then appear.  Additionally, any censorship is bad because it internalizes power structures and domination
Giroux,
Rethinking Education as the Practice of Freedom: Paulo Freire and the Promise of Critical Pedagogy Friday, 01 January 2010 12:50 By Henry A. Giroux, t r u t h o u t | Op-Ed |, http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/87456:rethinking-education-as-the-practice-of-freedom-paulo-freire-and-the-promise-of-critical-pedagogy
As the market-driven logic of neoliberal capitalism continues to devalue all aspects of the public good, one consequence has been that the educational concern with excellence has been removed from matters of equity, while the notion of schooling as a public good has largely been reduced to a private good. Both public and higher education are largely defined through the corporate demand that they provide the skills, knowledge and credentials that will provide the workforce necessary for the United States to compete and maintain its role as the major global economic and military power. Consequently, there is little interest in both public and higher education, and most importantly in many schools of education, for understanding pedagogy as a deeply civic, political and moral practice - that is, pedagogy as a practice for freedom. As schooling is increasingly subordinated to a corporate order, any vestige of critical education is replaced by training and the promise of economic security. Similarly, pedagogy is now subordinated to the narrow regime of teaching to the test coupled with an often harsh system of disciplinary control, both of which mutually reinforce each other. In addition, teachers are increasingly reduced to the status of technicians and deskilled as they are removed from having any control over their classrooms or school governance structures. Teaching to the test and the corporatization of education becomes a way of "taming" students and invoking modes of corporate governance in which public school teachers become deskilled and an increasing number of higher education faculty are reduced to part-time positions, constituting the new subaltern class of academic labor.
Fifth, our Pedagogy is a prerequisite- a project of freedom not as a goal but as a process is needed.
Giroux,
Rethinking Education as the Practice of Freedom: Paulo Freire and the Promise of Critical Pedagogy Friday, 01 January 2010 12:50 By Henry A. Giroux, t r u t h o u t | Op-Ed |, http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/87456:rethinking-education-as-the-practice-of-freedom-paulo-freire-and-the-promise-of-critical-pedagogy
But there is more at stake here than a crisis of authority and the repression of critical thought. Too many classrooms at all levels of schooling now resemble a "dead zone," where any vestige of critical thinking, self-reflection and imagination quickly migrate to sites outside of the school only to be mediated and corrupted by a corporate-driven media culture. The major issue now driving public schooling is how to teach for the test, while disciplining those students who because of their class and race undermine a school district's ranking in the ethically sterile and bloodless world of high stakes testing and empirical score cards.2 Higher education mimics this logic by reducing its public vision to the interests of capital and redefining itself largely as a credentializing factory for students and a Petri dish for downsizing academic labor. Under such circumstances, rarely do educators ask questions about how schools can prepare students to be informed citizens, nurture a civic imagination or teach them to be self-reflective about public issues and the world in which they live. As Stanley Aronowitz puts it: "Few of even the so-called educators ask the question: What matters beyond the reading, writing, and numeracy that are presumably taught in the elementary and secondary grades? The old question of what a kid needs to become an informed 'citizen' capable of participating in making the large and small public decisions that affect the larger world as well as everyday life receives honorable mention but not serious consideration. These unasked questions are symptoms of a new regime of educational expectations that privileges job readiness above any other educational values."3 Against this regime of "scientific" idiocy and "bare pedagogy" stripped of all critical elements of teaching and learning, Freire believed that all education in the broadest sense was part of a project of freedom, and eminently political because it offered students the conditions for self-reflection, a self-managed life and particular notions of critical agency. As Aronowitz puts it in his analysis of Freire's work on literacy and critical pedagogy: Thus, for Freire literacy was not a means to prepare students for the world of subordinated labor or "careers," but a preparation for a self-managed life. And self-management could only occur when people have fulfilled three goals of education: self-reflection, that is, realizing the famous poetic phrase, "know thyself," which is an understanding of the world in which they live, in its economic, political and, equally important, its psychological dimensions. Specifically "critical" pedagogy helps the learner become aware of the forces that have hitherto ruled their lives and especially shaped their consciousness. The third goal is to help set the conditions for producing a new life, a new set of arrangements where power has been, at least in tendency, transferred to those who literally make the social world by transforming nature and themselves.4 What Paulo made clear in "Pedagogy of the Oppressed," his most influential work, is that pedagogy at its best is about neither training, teaching methods nor political indoctrination. For Freire, pedagogy is not a method or an a priori technique to be imposed on all students, but a political and moral practice that provides the knowledge, skills and social relations that enable students to expand the possibilities of what it means to be critical citizens, while expanding and deepening their participation in the promise of a substantive democracy. Critical thinking for Freire was not an object lesson in test taking, but a tool for self-determination and civic engagement.
And- we have to avoid indoctrination- we are a pre-requisite to actualizing agency in the context of power relations
Giroux,
Rethinking Education as the Practice of Freedom: Paulo Freire and the Promise of Critical Pedagogy Friday, 01 January 2010 12:50 By Henry A. Giroux, t r u t h o u t | Op-Ed |, http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/87456:rethinking-education-as-the-practice-of-freedom-paulo-freire-and-the-promise-of-critical-pedagogy
And as a political and moral practice, way of knowing and literate engagement, pedagogy attempts to "make evident the multiplicity and complexity of history."6 History in this sense is engaged as a narrative open to critical dialogue rather than predefined text to be memorized and accepted unquestioningly. Pedagogy in this instance provides the conditions to cultivate in students a healthy skepticism about power, a "willingness to temper any reverence for authority with a sense of critical awareness."7 As a performative practice, pedagogy takes as one of its goals the opportunity for students to be able to reflectively frame their own relationship to the ongoing project of an unfinished democracy. It is precisely this relationship between democracy and pedagogy that is so threatening to so many of our educational leaders and spokespersons today and it is also the reason why Freire's work on critical pedagogy and literacy are more relevant today than when they were first published. According to Freire, all forms of pedagogy represent a particular way of understanding society and a specific commitment to the future. Critical pedagogy, unlike dominant modes of teaching, insists that one of the fundamental tasks of educators is to make sure that the future points the way to a more socially just world, a world in which the discourses of critique and possibility in conjunction with the values of reason, freedom and equality function to alter, as part of a broader democratic project, the grounds upon which life is lived. This is hardly a prescription for political indoctrination, but it is a project that gives critical education its most valued purpose and meaning, which, in part, is "to encourage human agency, not mold it in the manner of Pygmalion."8 It is also a position, that threatens right-wing private advocacy groups, neoconservative politicians and conservative extremists.
Part three is the underview
analytic

Tournament: Flomo | Round: 9 | Opponent: Southlake | Judge: IDK
RULE UTIL AC
I value morality, derived of ought in the resolution  

1st- The reductionist view is empirically true and mandates util. SHOEMAKER
summarizes Parfit: The Journal of Value Inquiry 33: 183–199, 1999. UTILITARIANISM AND PERSONAL IDENTITY © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 183 Utilitarianism and Personal Identity DAVID W. SHOEMAKER Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 327 Clement Hall, Memphis, TN 38152, USA Doing so has a number of significant implications for rationality and morality. For one thing, the unity of our lives is no longer guaranteed. Our lives may be more or less unified, given the degree to which psychological connectedness holds. For instance, I am presently strongly connected to that stage of myself that existed yesterday, but I am fairly weakly connected to that long-ago existing ten-year-old stage of myself. Parfit suggests the language of successive selves to illuminate the different degrees to which this relation might hold. We might use the word “self,” then, to refer to a collection of person-stages united by strong psychological connectedness, such that my ten-year-old self could be viewed as a past self, while my eighty- year-old self would presumably be a future self. The parts of my life with which I am strongly psychologically connected are united as my present self.7 In this way, different selves occasionally resemble different persons, and Parfit indicates that, at certain times and places, selves might be thought of as the appropriate objects of moral concern.8 But this notion also implies that our lives may not be unified in certain important respects. Psychological connectedness is certainly not guaranteed to unify our entire lives, and so the reductionist view itself implies at least the partial disintegration of persons.9 3. Utilitarianism and Reductionism Utilitarianism is an ethical theory for ranking various outcomes from an impersonal standpoint. Utilitarians hold that the best state of affairs among relevant alternatives contains the greatest net balance of aggregate individual welfare. Utilitarianism is impersonal insofar as it involves a focus solely on the total amounts of utility at stake in various outcomes, and “it makes no moral difference not how these amounts are distributed as between different people.”10 Many utilitarians claim that the impersonality of the theory is entailed by a close analogy that obtains between cases of intrapersonal and interpersonal maximization. As Parfit remarks: “Since their attitude to sets of lives is like ours to single lives, utilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives.”11 Parfit further believes that utilitarians accept this analogy because they accept a reductionismt view about personal identity. If a person’s life is less deeply integrated than it would be on a non-reductionist view, then while principles of distributive justice central to non-utilitarian views ought to be given greater scope, targeting past, present, and future selves, they nevertheless ought to be given less weight. After all, if a person’s life is less unified than we normally think, and this undermines the hard and fast boundaries between lives as well, then distributive principles relying on the separateness of persons and the individual unity of a person’s life as deep facts will have far less moral importance than they would on a non-reductionist view. Some critics have claimed that utilitarians ignore the boundaries between lives because they think of all people as together constituting a collective super-person, but this charge is false, according to Parfit. Because of the partial disintegration of persons suggested by reductionism, utilitarians “may be treating benefits and burdens, not as if they all came within the same life, but as if it made no moral difference where they came.”12 Thus, Parfit suggests that reductionism may lend significant support to utilitarianism, simply because utilitarians can claim to be treating sets of lives like single lives, given that single lives are not deeply unified and are, in fact, metaphysically like sets of lives.

2nd There are no unified subjects of experience we have means-based obligations to. Means are not possessions of a person, so I can’t own anything. Only experiences exist, so any theory distinguishing between lives is wrong – we should aggregate experiences across time.

3rd is epistemology. The mind cannot create its own perceptions without experience; it must know a feeling to be able to perceive it. The natural world imposes limits upon epistemology. This implies maximizing utility since desire to seek out experiences and avoid others collapses into maximizing good experiences.

4th, no intention-foresight distinction - mental states have no bearing on action. ENOCH summarizes Thomson:
 Enoch, David (Professor of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem). Intending, Foreseeing, and the State. Legal Theory, Vol. 13, No. 2. 2007. Pgs. 16-17. Think about a hard medical decision – say, whether to give a suffering patient a deadly dose of morphine in order to relieve his pain (at the price of his likely death). And let’s assume that in the circumstances the (medically, and also morally) right thing to do is to give the morphine. Now add the following piece of information: The physician making the decision and administering the procedure enjoys perverted pleasures from killing patients. If he gives the patient the morphine, he will do it intending to enjoy these perverted pleasures. He foresees that the patient’s pain will be relieved by the morphine, but this is not why she acts as he does. Of course, now that we know these disturbing facts about the doctor and his relevant mental states, we will morally judge him accordingly, and will no doubt try to let someone else decide about the appropriate procedures. But – and this is the crucial point in our context – should this information make us change our mind regarding the permissibility of the relevant action? Could facts about these mental states of the doctor giving the morphine make us take back our judgments that this is the appropriate action in the circumstances, even when all other factors are held equal? The answer, it seems, is “no”. Thomson suggests that we learn from such examples that the agent’s mental states are simply irrelevant for the moral permissibility of the relevant action. They are very relevant, of course, for the evaluation of the agent, but this is an entirely different story. And because mental states are irrelevant for the moral status of the action, the intending-foreseeing distinction, understood as a distinction between two mental states, and applied to the moral evaluation of actions, is without moral weight22. Of course, as it stands this line of thought is too quick. Strictly speaking, what the example at most shows is that sometimes the agent's mental states are irrelevant to the permissibility of the relevant action, not that they never are. But the strength of the intuitive judgment Thomson uses, together with the distinction between the evaluation of the action and that of the agent, and given the absence of an obvious rationale for why it is that the mental states should be relevant to permissibility in some circumstances but not others – all these factors together strongly suggest, I think, the more general conclusion.

If present action causes an effect in the future and there’s no distinction between the two, all harm must be taken into consideration, devolving into util. 

Independently- Rightness depends on whether acts accords with rules chosen for good consequences. Rules we accept must be subject to util consideration. RAWLS:
Professor at Harvard University. “Two Concepts of Rules” The Philosophical Review, 1955. The other conception of rules I will call the practice conception. On this view rules are pictured as defining a practice. Practices are set up for various reasons, but one of them is that in many areas of conduct each person's deciding what to do on utilitarian grounds case-by-case leads to confusion, and that the attempt to coordinate behavior by trying to foresee how others will act will is bound to fail. As an alternative one realizes that what is required is the establishment of a practice, the specification of a new form of activity; and from this one sees that a practice necessarily involves the abdication of full liberty to act on utilitarian and prudential grounds. It is the mark of a practice that being taught how to engage in it involves being instructed in the rules, which define it, and that appeal is made to those rules to correct the behavior of those engaged in it. Those engaged in a practice recognize the rules as defining it. The rules cannot be taken as simply describing how those engaged in the practice in fact behave: it is not simply that they act as if they were obeying the rules. Thus it is essential to the notion of a practice that the rules are publicly known and understood as definitive; and it is essential also that the rules of a practice can be taught and can be acted upon to yield a coherent practice. On this conception, then, rules are not generalizations from the decisions of individuals applying the utilitarian principle directly and independently to recurrent particular cases. On the contrary, rules define a practice and are themselves the subject of the utilitarian principle. 

THUS the standard is rule consequentialism:
Prefer it
We won’t achieve good consequences due to coordination problems. If we punished to deter crime, we could punish the innocent since that would have the same effect, but false convictions would cripple the system. We need rules whose adoption WOULD lead to good results. People could break promises and kill people on util grounds. But with consistent principles we could coordinate given an expectation of how people would act and this benefit is more than individual util benefits. Coordination is allowed if we act on simpler rules that could be learned or internalized easily that usually lead to the greatest good.

Act util leads to tragedies of the commons, where individual acts maximize utility but taken together decrease overall utility of a society 

 It’s hard to calculate results. By calculating I lose time to do util acts, so I must calculate the expected value of calculating, which leads to regress. Different people should do different calculations, but we must calculate who is better for calculative roles. Rule util solves since a rule wouldn’t be beneficial if we couldn’t use it. We adopt principles that are accessible, and usability allows us to act for good without calculative problems.

Act util can be counterintuitive. We should use more plausible principles. HOOKER: Brad Hooker, “Ideal Code Real World.” Oxford: Clarendon Press 2000 Does rule-consequentialism accord with the convictions we share about moral permissibility and requirement? Rule-consequentialism selects rules on the basis of expected value, impartially calculated. Thus the theory is clearly impartial at the level of rule selection. As I shall argue later, the impartial assessment of rules But this will favor rules that (a) allow partiality within limits, towards self and (b) require partiality, within limits, towards family, friends, etc. This partiality towards self and loved ones will then be allowed to guide a great number of people’s day to day decisions (not all, of course). Therefore, while rule-consequentialism is purely impartial at the foundational level where a code is selected, the code thus selected makes demands on action that are moderate and intuitively plausible. Rule-consequentialis is fundamentally impartial, but not implausibly demanding.  Rule-consequentialism It also and accord with common moral beliefs about what we are prohibited from doing to others. As I observed, most of us believe morality prohibits physically attacking innocent people, taking or harming the possessions of others, breaking promises, telling lies, whichand so on. Rule-consequentialism endorses prohibitions on these kinds of act, since on the whole the consequences, considered impartially, will be better if such prohibitions are widely accepted. (In Chapter 6, I argue that rule-consequentialism’s implications concerning prohibitions and special duties are plausible

 public policy decisions, even those of non-governmental institutions, must be consequentialist since collective action results in conflicts that only util can resolve. Side constraints paralyze state action – it's impossible to compare tradeoffs involving opportunity costs. Collectives lack intentionality or internal motivation since they're composed of multiple individuals – there is no act-omission distinction for them since they create permissions and prohibitions in terms of policies so authorizing action could never be considered an omission since the state assumes culpability in regulating the public domain.

Impact calc- Rule util requires a decision calculus based on the adoption of rules. This excludes specific considerations of individual cases as the point is to solve paradoxes when one must evaluate the specifics rather than general patterns. This means a) reject DA scenarios based on unstable conceptions of uniqueness, contingent on variable circumstances, that would require new rules based on each fluctuation or initial set of conditions to coordinate action and devolve to requiring infinitely complex rules and b) no extinction impacts – we would rely on very specific link chains with unstable uniqueness and we can’t compare rules that are more likely to lead to human extinction since it hasn’t happened yet.
 Thus, I affirm the resolution as a general rule for colleges and universities
I’ll specify to meet your interp, within reason
Contentions
Status quo focus on discourse and representations kills the liberal movements you seek to promote- the liberal climate caused by the aff is key to accessing PR needed to create social change
Chait 15 Jonathan Chait “How the language police are perverting liberalism.” NY Magazine January 275h 2015 http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/not-a-very-pc-thing-to-say.html JW
Or maybe not. The p.c. style of politics has one serious, possibly fatal drawback: It is exhausting. Claims of victimhood that are useful within the left-wing subculture may alienate much of America. The movement’s dour puritanism can move people to outrage, but it may and prove ill suited to the hopeful mood required of mass politics. Nor does it bode well for the movement’s longevity that many of its allies are worn out. “It seems to me now that the public face of social liberalism has ceased to seem positive, joyful, human, and freeing,” confessed the progressive writer Freddie deBoer. “There are so many ways to step on a land mine now, so many terms that have become forbidden, so many attitudes that will get you cast out if you even appear to hold them. I’m far from alone in feeling that it’s typically not worth it to engage, given the risks.” Goldberg wrote recently about people “who feel emotionally savaged by their involvement in online feminism — not because of sexist trolls, but because of the slashing righteousness of other feminists.” Former Feministing editor Samhita Mukhopadhyay told her, “Everyone is so scared to speak right now.” That the new political correctness has bludgeoned even many of its own supporters into despondent silence is a triumph, but one of limited us Politics in a democracy is still based on getting people to agree with you, not making them afraid to disagree. 

Rule util mandates a free space of discussion- this is key to maintaining dignity by allowing multiple perspectives to be considered without favoritism.
Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism. Princeton University Press, 1994.
Dignity is associated less with any particular understanding of the good life, such that someone’s departure from this would detract from his or her own dignity, than with the power to consider and espouse for oneself some view or other. We are not respecting this power equally in all subjects, it is claimed, if we raise the outcome of some people’s deliberations officially over that of others. A liberal society must remain neutral on the good life, and restrict itself to ensuring that however they see things, citizens deal fairly with each other and the state deals equally with all. The popularity of this view of the human agent as primarily a subject of self-determining or self-expressive choice helps to explain why this model of liberalism is so strong. But we must also consider that it has been urged with great force and intelligence by liberal thinkers in the United States, 57 C H A R L E S T A Y L O R and precisely in the context of constitutional doctrines of judicial review.33 Thus it is not surprising that the idea has become widespread, well beyond those who might subscribe to a specific Kantian philosophy, that a liberal society cannot accommodate publicly espoused notions of the good. This is the conception, as Michael Sandel has noted, of the “procedural republic,” which has a very strong hold on the political agenda in the United States, and which has helped to place increasing emphasis on judicial review on the basis of constitutional texts at the expense of the ordinary political process of building majorities with a view to legislative action.34 But a society with collective goals like Quebec’s violates this model. It is axiomatic for Quebec governments that the survival and flourishing of French culture in Quebec is a good. Political society is not neutral between those who value remaining true to the culture of our ancestors and those who might want to cut loose in the name of some individual goal of self-development. It might be argued that one could after all capture a goal like survivance for a proceduralist liberal society. One could consider the French language, for instance, as a collective resource that individuals might want to make use of, and act for its preservation, just as one does for clean air or green spaces. But this can’t capture the full thrust of policies designed for cultural survival. It is not just a matter of having the French language available for those who might choose it. 

Affirming endorses a rule that prevents authoritarianism
Global Internet Liberty Campaign, What is Censorship? http://gilc.org/speech/osistudy/censorship/
Censorship -- the control of the information and ideas circulated within a society -- has been a hallmark of dictatorships throughout history. In the 20th Century, censorship was achieved through the examination of books, plays, films, television and radio programs, news reports, and other forms of communication for the purpose of altering or suppressing ideas found to be objectionable or offensive. The rationales for censorship have varied, with some censors targeting material deemed to be indecent or obscene; heretical or blasphemous; or seditious or treasonous. Thus, ideas have been suppressed under the guise of protecting three basic social institutions: the family, the church, and the state. Not all censorship is equal, nor does all arise from government or external force. People self-censor all the time; such restraint can be part of the price of rational dialogue. The artist Ben Shahn's poster illustration reads: "You have not converted a man because you have silenced him." Silence can indicate a forced assent, or conversely, it can be contemplative, a necessary part of dialogue that rises above the din of quotidian life. To understand censorship, and the impulse to censor, it is necessary to strip away the shock epithet value that is attached to the word at first utterance. One must recognize that censorship and the ideology supporting it go back to ancient times, and that every society has had customs, taboos, or laws by which speech, dress, religious observance, and sexual expression were regulated. In Athens, where democracy first emerged, censorship was well known as a means of enforcing the prevailing orthodoxy. Indeed, Plato was the first recorded thinker to formulate a rationale for intellectual, religious, and artistic censorship. In his ideal state outlined in The Republic, official censors would prohibit mothers and nurses from relating tales deemed bad or evil. Plato also proposed that unorthodox notions about God or the hereafter be treated as crimes and that formal procedures be established to suppress heresy. Freedom of speech in Ancient Rome was reserved for those in positions of authority. The poets Ovid and Juvenal were both banished, and authors of seditious writings were punished severely. The emperor Nero deported his critics and burned their books. The organized church soon joined the state as an active censor. The Biblical injunction, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord, thy God, in vain" is clearly an early attempt to set limits on what would be acceptable theological discourse. Likewise, "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image" is an attempt to set limits on how the Divine may or may not be represented. (And no one, in any land, should think this is anachronistic. Across the world today, appeals to divinity are common reasons for banning the dissemination of a broad range of materials). Censorship is no more acceptable for being practiced in the name of religion than for national security (which is certainly an acceptable secular substitute for religious rationales in the 20th Century). It only indicates that confronting censorship must always involve confronting some part of ourselves and our common history that is both painful and deep-seated. Unique historical considerations can also spawn censorship. Perhaps the best example is the "Haßsprache" (hate speech) law in Germany. It is illegal, under German law, to depict any kind of glorification of the Nazis or even to display the emblem of the swastika. The law is enforced to the point where even historical battle simulations may not use the actual emblems that were used during World War II (by the Waffen SS, for instance). Significantly, almost all of Germany's close neighbors and allies have similar laws. The questions in Germany and elsewhere in the European Union (EU) form a particularly hard case because of the historical background and because the situation in the EU is fast-moving. That is why this series of snapshots of conditions in various countries and regions will first deal with other areas and levels of censorship and access problems, and then return to the situation in the EU. In a global context, governments have used a powerful array of techniques and arguments to marshal support for their censorship efforts. One of the earliest, as noted, is the religious argument. Certain things are deemed to be offensive in the eyes of the Deity. These things vary from country to country, religion to religion, even sect to sect. They are mostly, though not always, sexual in nature. The commentaries on the nature of the impulse to be censorious towards sexual expression are too numerous even for a wide ranging project like this. The curious reader is urged to read far and wide in the classic texts to see that the problem of governments and citizens reacting in this way is not a new one. What is new are the potential global consequences. National security and defense runs a very close second to the religious impulse as a rationale for suppression. While nowhere near as old as the religious impulse to censor, in its more modern form it has been even more pervasive. And while the influence of religion on secular affairs is muted in certain parts of the world, the influence of governments usually is not. It is difficult to think of any government that would forego the power, in perceived extreme circumstances, to censor all media, not simply those that appear online. The question, asked in a real world scenario, is what could be considered extreme enough circumstances to justify such action? There are also forms of censorship that are not so obtrusive, and that have to be examined very carefully to define. "Censorship through intimidation" can be anything from threats against individuals to a government proposing to monitor all activities online (as in one proposal current at the 

Absent the aff, the only principle remaining is repression. The international community is moving away from this rule- they have recognized the aff as good.
Global Internet Liberty Campaign, What is Censorship? http://gilc.org/speech/osistudy/censorship/
The potential for expansion, or opening economic and political opportunities where there had been none before, is vast on a scale beyond imagination. So, too, is the potential for calamitous misuse, both by governments and by corporations. These essays and reports from the cyberfronts show that freedom from censorship is the exception in the world. The rule historically has been, and continues to be, repression and suppression of disfavored ideas. The one redeeming fact is that, in most parts of the world, the ideal of liberty is embraced at least theoretically, and no state openly claims a commitment to religious, intellectual, artistic, or political censorship. The universal philosophical embrace of free expression is reflected in the many covenants and declarations that have been passed in support of freedom and human rights; these include the UN Charter (1945), the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), the European Convention on Human Rights (1953), the Helsinki Final Act (1975), and the American (Western Hemisphere) Convention on Human Rights (1978). These documents form the basis of the hope that the Internet might yet succeed in realizing its promise of providing a free and unencumbered flow of information throughout the world.

The aff is a rule that is key to fighting oppression.
Koteskey Protecting Free Speech and Fighting Oppression Go Hand in Hand by Tyler Koteskey Nov 15 2015
ng free speech, our constitution for much of our national history promoted a culture more respectful than much of the rest of the world of a free society’s principles. Rather than leaving them behind, the First Amendment has been marginalized communities’ most important tool in making their voices heard in America. The bedrock of the civil rights movement rests on it. Thanks to the First Amendment, the Supreme Court protected protest marches, sit-ins, even NAACP meetings and court participation from unlawful disruption. The First Amendment was so important during this period because anti-racist speech was viscerally offensive to authorities who would otherwise have quashed it. Today, our commitment to free speech still protects marginalized groups from overzealous authorities as they work for change. That trend holds true whether we’re talking about black people in 2015, Muslim-Americans, the transgender community, or countless other groups. No matter how frustratingly some people exercise their speech, suggesting that it’s less important than we think to oppose selective censorship for “enlightened” purposes puts all of these groups at risk. 

As a rule, its good for public institutions to follow their constitutional constraints
Constitutionality is key to constrain states- if they are bound to their agreements with the people they cannot perpetrate atrocities
Constitutionality is perceived positively by the people- a few implications
Increases civic engagement- political efficacy increases when people think they can trust their government, which leads to the ability to unify for social change movements.
Prevents disorganized violence from the far right- they gain increased legitimacy from viewing the left as non-compliant with the constitution, allowing violence and things like Trump
Constitutional higher edu is good because it discourages the current culture war where the right feels like the left isn’t receptive- this gets the right involved in education, legitimizing intelligence and fighting back against the alt right
As a general rule, its good for democracies to fulfill their function, otherwise all governments collapse into tyranny and violence, and they fail to furfill their constitutive duty as a democrocy. Polls affirm the aff as a general principle
Gallup, 2016 data gathered feb 29- march 15 with the Knight foundation, Free Expression on Campus: A Survey of U.S. College Students and U.S. Adults, http://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publication_pdfs/FreeSpeech_campus.pdf
Methodology This study includes a sample of U.S. college students, a sample of U.S. adults and a sample of U.S. Muslims. Results for the college student sample are based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 3,072 U.S. college students, aged 18 to 24, who are currently enrolled as full-time students at four-year colleges. Gallup selected a random sample of 240 U.S. four-year colleges, drawn from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), that were stratified by college enrollment size, public or private affiliation, and region of the country. Gallup then contacted each sampled college in an attempt to obtain a sample of their students. Thirty-two colleges agreed to participate. The participating colleges were University of California, Merced; Culver-Stockton College; Duke University; East Georgia State College; Georgia Institute of Technology; Green River College; Harrisburg University of Science and Technology; James Madison University; Keuka College; Kentucky State University; LaGrange College; University of Louisiana at Monroe; Lourdes University; Martin Luther College; Morehouse College; Minnesota State University Moorhead; University of North Alabama; University of North Carolina at Pembroke; Northwestern University; University of Oregon; University of the Ozarks; Pace University; Rocky Mountain College; Saint Francis University; The University of Scranton; Southeastern Baptist College; Southwest Minnesota State University; Spalding University; Tabor College; Texas Christian University; Trinity Baptist College; and Troy University. Gallup used random samples of 40 of each college’s student body, with one school providing a 32 sample, for its sample frame. The sample frame consisted of 54,806 college students from the 32 colleges. Gallup then emailed each sampled student to complete an Internet survey to confirm his or her eligibility for the study and to request a phone number where the student could be reached for a telephone interview. A total of 6,928 college students completed the Web survey, for a response rate of 13. Of these, 6,814 students were eligible and provided a working phone number. Telephone interviews were conducted Feb. 29-March 15, 2016. The response rate for the phone survey was 49 using the American Association for Public Opinion Research’s RR-III calculation. The combined response rate for the Web recruit and telephone surveys was 6. The college student sample was weighted to correct for unequal selection probability and nonresponse. It was also weighted to match the demographics of U.S. colleges on enrollment, public or private affiliation, and region of the country, based on statistics from the IPEDS database, to ensure the sample is nationally representative of U.S. college students. For results based on this sample of college students, the margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points at the 95 confidence level. Copyright © 2016 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved. 32 FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS Results for the U.S. adult sample are based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 2,031 U.S. adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. Interviews were conducted March 5-8, 2016, as part of the Gallup Daily tracking survey, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. The sample of U.S. adults included a minimum quota of 60 cellphone respondents and 40 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas by region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers were selected using random-digit-dial methods. Landline respondents were chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member has the next birthday. The response rate for the Gallup Daily tracking survey was 9. Samples were weighted to correct for unequal selection probability, nonresponse and double coverage of landline and cell users in the two sample frames. They were also weighted to match the national demographics of gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, population density and phone status (cellphone only, landline only, both, and cellphone mostly). Demographic weighting targets were based on the March 2015 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older U.S. population. Phone status targets were based on the January-June 2015 National Health Interview Survey. Population density targets were based on the 2010 census. For results based on this sample of U.S. adults, the margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points at the 95 confidence level. Results for the U.S. Muslim sample are based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 250 U.S. adults, aged 18 and older, who identified their religion as Muslim. All respondents had previously been interviewed for the Gallup Daily tracking survey in 2014 and 2015. Re-contact interviews were conducted March 4-10, 2016. The sample was weighted on region, gender and education to ensure it is representative of U.S. Muslims, based on Gallup Daily tracking estimates of the U.S. Muslim population. For results based on this sample of U.S. Muslims, the margin of sampling error is ±8 percentage points at the 95 confidence level. The response rate for the Muslim sample was 22. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls. The full questionnaire, topline results, detailed crosstabulations and raw data may be obtained upon request.
A key aspect of recent debate has been a perceived conflict between encouraging free expression and fostering a learning environment where students feel safe, respected and included. College students strongly believe that creating an open learning environment should take precedence over creating a positive learning environment that attempts to protect students from hearing offensive or biased speech. When asked to choose, 78 of college students believe colleges should strive to create an open learning environment that exposes students to all types of speech and viewpoints, even some that are biased or offensive toward certain groups of people. Just 22 believe colleges should create a positive learning environment for all students that would be achieved in part by prohibiting certain speech or the expression of views that are offensive or biased against certain groups of people. Large majorities of all college student subgroups say openness should take precedence, but certain student segments are more inclined to hold that view, including men, whites, Republicans and independents. Students at private (80) and public institutions (77) differ little in their preference for an open college environment.

Tournament: Sunvite | Round: 1 | Opponent: American Heritage KK | Judge: uh idk shes a FW judge
First, definitions
 ‘public colleges and universities’ is defined by  
Every Kind of College and University Defined, Published by Jessica Velasco, https://www.collegeraptor.com/college-guide/college-search/every-kind-of-college-and-university-defined/
Public colleges and universities are funded by local and state governments. They typically offer lower tuition rates to residents of the states in which they are located. Out-of-state students can also attend public institutions, but rates are usually higher than the resident tuition rate. There are two-year colleges, also know as community colleges, and four-year public universities. Every state in the U.S. has at least one public college or university within their borders. Private colleges and universities are funded by tuition, fees, and other private sources. Most private institutions have higher “sticker” prices than public institutions, although they also often offer significant discounts for almost all students. Student populations at private colleges and universities vary from a few hundred students to over 30,000.
College is defined by-
Merriam Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/college,
college noun, often attributive col·lege \ˈkä-lij\. Definition of college 1 : a body of clergy living together and supported by a foundation 2 : a building used for an educational or religious purpose 3 a : a self-governing constituent body of a university offering living quarters and sometimes instruction but not granting degrees Balliol and Magdalen Colleges at Oxford —called also residential college b : a preparatory or high school c : an independent institution of higher learning offering a course of general studies leading to a bachelor's degree; also : a university division offering this d : a part of a university offering a specialized group of courses e : an institution offering instruction usually in a professional, vocational, or technical field business college 4 : company, group; specifically : an organized body of persons engaged in a common pursuit or having common interests or duties 5 a : a group of persons considered by law to be a unit b : a body of electors — compare electoral college 6 : the faculty, students, or administration of a college

second, Framework
First, I value morality, derived of ought in the resolution, which is defined to mean a moral obligation. Any other value is nonsensical, as we could always ask why that value is important, causing infinite regress until we arrive at morality.
Second, Attempting to understand beings, communities, and ethics universal and free of difference will inevitably fail:
There is no possibility of understanding people in and of themselves. All identities are understood through the differentiation of social relations, which are by necessity constantly changing. Your political opponent’s identity is necessary to construct your own.
Butler 1, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
, on a broader sociality, and this dependency is the basis of our endurance and survivability. When we assert our “right,” as we do and we must, we are not carving out a place for our autonomy—if by autonomy we mean a state of individuation, taken as self-persisting prior to and apart from any relations of dependency on the world of others. We do not negotiate with norms or with Others subsequent to our coming into the world. We come into the world on the condition that the social world is already there, laying the groundwork for us. This implies that I cannot persist without norms of recognition that support my persistence: the sense of possibility pertaining to me must first be imagined from somewhere else before I can begin to imagine myself. My reflexivity is not only socially mediated, but socially constituted. I cannot be who I am without drawing upon the sociality of norms that precede and exceed me. In this sense, I am outside myself from the outset, and must be, in order to survive, and in order to enter into the realm of the possible. To assert sexual rights, then, takes on a specific meaning against this background. It means, for instance, that when we struggle for rights, we are not simply struggling for rights that attach to my person, but we are struggling to be conceived as persons. And there is a difference between the former and the latter. If we are struggling for rights that attach, or should attach, to my personhood, then we assume that personhood as already constituted. But if we are struggling not only to be conceived as persons, but to create a social transformation of 32 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 32 the very meaning of personhood, then the assertion of rights becomes a way of intervening into the social and political process by which the human is articulated. International human rights is always in the process of subjecting the human to redefinition and renegotiation. It mobilizes the human in the service of rights, but also rewrites the human and rearticulates the human when it comes up against the cultural limits of its working conception of the human, as it does and must. Lesbian and gay human rights takes sexuality, in some sense, to be its issue. Sexuality is not simply an attribute one has or a disposition or patterned set of inclinations. It is a mode of being disposed toward others, including in the mode of fantasy, and sometimes only in the mode of fantasy. If we are outside of ourselves as sexual beings, given over from the start, crafted in part through primary relations of dependency and attachment, then it would seem that our being beside ourselves, outside ourselves, is there as a function of sexuality itself, where sexuality is not this or that dimension of our existence, not the key or bedrock of our existence, but, rather, as coextensive with existence, as Merleau-Ponty once aptly suggested.6 I have tried here to argue that our very sense of personhood is linked to the desire for recognition, and that desire places us outside ourselves, in a realm of social norms that we do not fully choose, but that provides the horizon and the resource for any sense of choice that we have. This means that the ec-static character of our existence is essential to the possibility of persisting as human. In this sense, we can see how sexual rights brings together two related domains of ec-stasy, two connected ways of being outside of ourselves. As sexual, we are dependent on a world of others, vulnerable to need, violence, betrayal, compulsion, fantasy; we project desire, and we have it projected onto us. To be part of a sexual minority means, most emphatically, that we are also dependent on the protection of public and private spaces, on legal sanctions that protect us from violence, on safeguards of various institutional kinds against unwanted aggression imposed upon us, and the violent actions they sometimes instigate. In this sense, our very lives, and the persistence of our desire, depend on there being norms of recognition that produce and sustain our viability as human. Thus, when we speak about sexual rights, we are not merely talking about rights that pertain to our individual desires but to the norms on which our very individuality depends. That means that the discourse of rights Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 33 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 33 avows our dependency, the mode of our being in the hands of others, a mode of being with and for others without which we cannot be
2. Second, discrimination is constitutive of any moral theory because they all require a distinction between the ethical and anti-ethical. Differentiation becomes a condition for any decision, so justice is found in difference.
3. The only way to resolve the inevitable conflict that comes with pluralism in our agency and ethics is to embrace that it is in fact inevitable. The question of ethics is to deal with this inevitability. The most productive way to do this is with an agonistic commitment, which recognizes that conflict is inevitable, but frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy. All that agonism means is a free relationship- we must embrace every viewpoint and conflict, and not attempt to eliminate democratic clash
MOUFFE:
“The Democratic Paradox” by Chantal Mouffe 2000 DD
"A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility." (104)
And, Aiming toward consensus is a false goal because consensus is impossible, difference in inevitable. Contestation is key. Dividing people up and treating them as enemies is also a false goal because it denies that the existence of their opposing identity is what constructs yours. 

Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic democracy. To clarify, the standard is concerned with the procedures of agonistic pluralism, not ends. Prefer additionally:
, educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism because the teacher is telling the student what to think rather than how to think. Agonistic democracy is uniquely key for the debate space because it allows for contestation
 double bind – to act morally one must first know what is the right thing to do, which means any moral system has to be derivative of the procedures intrinsic to agonistic conflict:
A. If our moral belief changes after an agonistic conflict, then it shows that preserving the relationship based off of openness and disagreement is necessary to identity moral errors.  
B. If my moral belief remains the same, I have practiced commitment to my belief because defending it assumes values in the belief.
Advocacy
Thus, I affirm the the resolution as an agonistic commitment to free speech.
The AC doesn’t defend hate speech, as defined by individual colleges, as constitutionally protected-
Hate speech isn’t constitutionally protected anyway- multiple warrents
KENT GREENFIELD  MAR 13, 2015  , The Limits of Free Speech, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-limits-of-free-speech/387718/
No one with a frontal lobe would mistake this drunken anthem for part of an uninhibited and robust debate about race relations. The chant was a spew of hatred, a promise to discriminate, a celebration of privilege, and an assertion of the right to violence–all wrapped up in a catchy ditty. If the First Amendment has become so bloated, so ham-fisted, that it cannot distinguish between such filth and earnest public debate about race, then it is time we rethink what it means. The way we interpret the First Amendment need not be simplistic and empty of nuance, and was not always so. The Supreme Court unanimously held over eighty years ago that “those words which by their very utterance inflict injury … are no essential part of any exposition of ideas.” And in 1952 the Court upheld an Illinois statute punishing “false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups.” These rulings, while never officially reversed, have shrunk to historical trinkets. But they mark a range of the possible, where one can be a staunch defender of full-throated discourse but still recognize the difference between dialogue and vomitus.
Topicality is a constraint on my advocacy
Next, the offence- 

Contention 3- Democratic Agonsism mandates a free space of discussion- this is key to accessing multiple perspectives on the good life.
Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism. Princeton University Press, 1994.
Dignity is associated less with any particular understanding of the good life, such that someone’s departure from this would detract from his or her own dignity, than with the power to consider and espouse for oneself some view or other. We are not respecting this power equally in all subjects, it is claimed, if we raise the outcome of some people’s deliberations officially over that of others. A liberal society must remain neutral on the good life, and restrict itself to ensuring that however they see things, citizens deal fairly with each other and the state deals equally with all. The popularity of this view of the human agent as primarily a subject of self-determining or self-expressive choice helps to explain why this model of liberalism is so strong. But we must also consider that it has been urged with great force and intelligence by liberal thinkers in the United States, 57 C H A R L E S T A Y L O R and precisely in the context of constitutional doctrines of judicial review.33 Thus it is not surprising that the idea has become widespread, well beyond those who might subscribe to a specific Kantian philosophy, that a liberal society cannot accommodate publicly espoused notions of the good. This is the conception, as Michael Sandel has noted, of the “procedural republic,” which has a very strong hold on the political agenda in the United States, and which has helped to place increasing emphasis on judicial review on the basis of constitutional texts at the expense of the ordinary political process of building majorities with a view to legislative action.34 But a society with collective goals like Quebec’s violates this model. It is axiomatic for Quebec governments that the survival and flourishing of French culture in Quebec is a good. Political society is not neutral between those who value remaining true to the culture of our ancestors and those who might want to cut loose in the name of some individual goal of self-development. It might be argued that one could after all capture a goal like survivance for a proceduralist liberal society. One could consider the French language, for instance, as a collective resource that individuals might want to make use of, and act for its preservation, just as one does for clean air or green spaces. But this can’t capture the full thrust of policies designed for cultural survival. It is not just a matter of having the French language available for those who might choose it. 

Contention 2-And, if some objective good did exist- it would still be founded in democratic decision making (that’s Mouffee), and most students want free speech, so this affirms
Gallup, 2016 data gathered feb 29- march 15 with the Knight foundation, Free Expression on Campus: A Survey of U.S. College Students and U.S. Adults, http://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publication_pdfs/FreeSpeech_campus.pdf
Methodology This study includes a sample of U.S. college students, a sample of U.S. adults and a sample of U.S. Muslims. Results for the college student sample are based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 3,072 U.S. college students, aged 18 to 24, who are currently enrolled as full-time students at four-year colleges. Gallup selected a random sample of 240 U.S. four-year colleges, drawn from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), that were stratified by college enrollment size, public or private affiliation, and region of the country. Gallup then contacted each sampled college in an attempt to obtain a sample of their students. Thirty-two colleges agreed to participate. The participating colleges were University of California, Merced; Culver-Stockton College; Duke University; East Georgia State College; Georgia Institute of Technology; Green River College; Harrisburg University of Science and Technology; James Madison University; Keuka College; Kentucky State University; LaGrange College; University of Louisiana at Monroe; Lourdes University; Martin Luther College; Morehouse College; Minnesota State University Moorhead; University of North Alabama; University of North Carolina at Pembroke; Northwestern University; University of Oregon; University of the Ozarks; Pace University; Rocky Mountain College; Saint Francis University; The University of Scranton; Southeastern Baptist College; Southwest Minnesota State University; Spalding University; Tabor College; Texas Christian University; Trinity Baptist College; and Troy University. Gallup used random samples of 40 of each college’s student body, with one school providing a 32 sample, for its sample frame. The sample frame consisted of 54,806 college students from the 32 colleges. Gallup then emailed each sampled student to complete an Internet survey to confirm his or her eligibility for the study and to request a phone number where the student could be reached for a telephone interview. A total of 6,928 college students completed the Web survey, for a response rate of 13. Of these, 6,814 students were eligible and provided a working phone number. Telephone interviews were conducted Feb. 29-March 15, 2016. The response rate for the phone survey was 49 using the American Association for Public Opinion Research’s RR-III calculation. The combined response rate for the Web recruit and telephone surveys was 6. The college student sample was weighted to correct for unequal selection probability and nonresponse. It was also weighted to match the demographics of U.S. colleges on enrollment, public or private affiliation, and region of the country, based on statistics from the IPEDS database, to ensure the sample is nationally representative of U.S. college students. For results based on this sample of college students, the margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points at the 95 confidence level. Copyright © 2016 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved. 32 FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS Results for the U.S. adult sample are based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 2,031 U.S. adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. Interviews were conducted March 5-8, 2016, as part of the Gallup Daily tracking survey, with interviews conducted in Spanish for respondents who are primarily Spanish-speaking. The sample of U.S. adults included a minimum quota of 60 cellphone respondents and 40 landline respondents, with additional minimum quotas by region. Landline and cellular telephone numbers were selected using random-digit-dial methods. Landline respondents were chosen at random within each household on the basis of which member has the next birthday. The response rate for the Gallup Daily tracking survey was 9. Samples were weighted to correct for unequal selection probability, nonresponse and double coverage of landline and cell users in the two sample frames. They were also weighted to match the national demographics of gender, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, population density and phone status (cellphone only, landline only, both, and cellphone mostly). Demographic weighting targets were based on the March 2015 Current Population Survey figures for the aged 18 and older U.S. population. Phone status targets were based on the January-June 2015 National Health Interview Survey. Population density targets were based on the 2010 census. For results based on this sample of U.S. adults, the margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points at the 95 confidence level. Results for the U.S. Muslim sample are based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 250 U.S. adults, aged 18 and older, who identified their religion as Muslim. All respondents had previously been interviewed for the Gallup Daily tracking survey in 2014 and 2015. Re-contact interviews were conducted March 4-10, 2016. The sample was weighted on region, gender and education to ensure it is representative of U.S. Muslims, based on Gallup Daily tracking estimates of the U.S. Muslim population. For results based on this sample of U.S. Muslims, the margin of sampling error is ±8 percentage points at the 95 confidence level. The response rate for the Muslim sample was 22. All reported margins of sampling error include the computed design effects for weighting. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls. The full questionnaire, topline results, detailed crosstabulations and raw data may be obtained upon request.
A key aspect of recent debate has been a perceived conflict between encouraging free expression and fostering a learning environment where students feel safe, respected and included. College students strongly believe that creating an open learning environment should take precedence over creating a positive learning environment that attempts to protect students from hearing offensive or biased speech. When asked to choose, 78 of college students believe colleges should strive to create an open learning environment that exposes students to all types of speech and viewpoints, even some that are biased or offensive toward certain groups of people. Just 22 believe colleges should create a positive learning environment for all students that would be achieved in part by prohibiting certain speech or the expression of views that are offensive or biased against certain groups of people. Large majorities of all college student subgroups say openness should take precedence, but certain student segments are more inclined to hold that view, including men, whites, Republicans and independents. Students at private (80) and public institutions (77) differ little in their preference for an open college environment.
Contention 3- Censorship is inherently exclusionary
Rosenberg 91, David Rosenberg, Racist Speech the First Amendment and Public Universities: Taking a Stand on Neutrality , 76 Cornell L. Rev. 549. (1991).
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol76/iss2/6
Certainly, the presence of one-sided racist speech harms the goal of inclusion. But the underlying philosophy that compels the university to allow racist speech is one whose primary values are tolerance and inclusion. While the immediate message the outsider student receives is one of hate, the overall message is one in which he should take comfort: that he too has the opportunity to think and to say whatever he wants with absolutely no fear of official condemnation. The university’s value of inclusion is truly all-encompassing. Matsuda’s proposal, although it means to protect racism’s victims, is actually one of exclusion. Contrary to Matsuda’s assertion, allowing racist speech does not ultimately hinder the development of ethics. Even if we argue that racist speech has no discernible content, we cannot deny that it exists and that it will not disappear in the near future.212 When the Supreme Court in Sweezy argued that free speech must reign at universities in order to allow students to “gain new maturity and understanding,” 213 it had difficult questions of ethics in mind. To ignore the ethical problem of the existence of racism by suppressing its expression hides from the real problem.

underview- it existed, util is bad, counterspeech good, presume aff, all analytic

Tournament: Collyville | Round: 1 | Opponent: Westwood RS I think | Judge: William Ponder
Yay debate! AC

Trigger warning for description of sexual harrassment
First, framing-
Every time we debate, we discuss inclusion. Sometimes these discussions are explicit, other times these discussions are the lack of these discussions- when our practices exclude gender and racial minorities, bodies are consigned to a comment on a ballot, at best, destroying the ethical subjectivity of the very debaters we try to educate and mold. Instead, we become a space so privileged, we silence attempts at community change with calls to abstract ethics, fairness claims, root cause claims, and even moral skepticism- these responses allow us to replicate the systems of oppression in our space with impunity, preventing us from accessing normative judgments as we never genuinely encounter the other that we speak about. We prefer to discuss ‘safe’ interpretations of the topic, abstract ethics, or policy positions. However, these discussions are unsafe for the oppressed because they never include the non-subject.
Leonardo and Porter 10. Zeus and Ronald K. Ronald K. Pedagogy of fear: toward a Fanonian theory of 'safety' in race dialogu. Race Ethnicity and Education, 13: 2, 139 — 157. July 9, 2010. AKB.
In other words, There is the category of people who are neither self nor others. They are no-one. The dialectics of recognition is disrupted, and the struggle of such people becomes one of achieving such a dialectics. Put differently, they are not fighting against being others. They are fighting to become others and, in so doing, entering ethical relationships. This argument results in a peculiar critique of liberal political theory. Such theory presupposes ethical foundations of political life. What Fanon has shown is that political work needs to be done to make ethical life possible. That is because racism and colonialism derail ethical life. (italics added) A Pedagogical approach that avoids safety in the interest of image and personal management makes such an ethical relationship possible. ¶ If we are truly interested in racial pedagogy, then we must become comfortable with the idea that For marginalized and oppressed minorities, there is no safe space. As implied above, mainstream race dialogue in education is arguably already hostile and unsafe for many students of color whose perspectives and experiences are consistently minimized. Violence is already there. In other words, like Fanon’s understanding of colonialism, safe space enacts violence. Those who are interested in engaging in Racial pedagogy must be prepared to (1) undo the violence that is inherent to safe-space dialogue, and (2) enact a form of liberatory violence within race discussions to allow for a creativity that shifts the standards of humanity. In other words, anger, hostility, frustration, and pain are characteristics that are not to be avoided under the banner of safety, which only produces Freire’s (1993) ‘culture of silence’. They are attributes that are to be recognized on the part of both whites and people of color in order to engage in a process that is creative enough to establish new forms of social existence, where both parties are transformed. This is not a form of in violence that is life threatening and narcissistic, but one that is life affirming through its ability to promote mutual recognition. 

This is especially damming considering the current meta-game in LD- we tell our students to read structural violence impacts for easy wins but never train them to actually give a shit about the oppressed. A pre-requisate for debate to be a useful site of discourse is a relentless self-critique
There are no sources in the current document.
 “What’s left is a community of very ‘woke’ students who thrive on a set of, honestly, quite bizarre community norms framed by espousals of a community ethic of academic progressivism. As we’ve started speaking faster and spending more time with our faces buried in academic literature studying the root conditions of social inequity, I think we’ve lost sight of the intersection between the now ever-present discussions of the oppressed in rounds and the real marginalized students who aren’t given the opportunity to speak in the debate space that we’ve carved out around their social image. Debate, with the apparent tenure of role of the ballot-style arguments, is evolving into it’s potential as a micropolitical space that would be incredibly valuable for oppressed voices who are all too often placed in educational settings that, fatally, do not give them the skills to question their own situations. We must go forth with unwavering self-critique of our tendency to fall into internalist tunnel vision if we are to reclaim authenticity in an increasingly obfuscated debate climate. I debated locally on the New Orleans, Louisiana LD circuit for Benjamin Franklin High School all four years of high school. My sophomore year I became cognizant of the national (or TOC) circuit of debate and knew I wanted to be part of it. I looked up to the national circuit debaters I watched, they seamlessly could control a round and think fast on their feet. But those debaters generally came from big programs with funding for coaches and travel, which made their presence on the national circuit of little controversy. I never felt the same comfort. Coming from a small charter school in education budget-stripped Louisiana, my school was unable to monetarily assist me in the, frankly, enormous costs to travel nationally and could only give me the ability to use the school name. My family isn’t rich, but we get by, and I was lucky enough to have a father invested enough in debate to travel with me to tournaments across the country out of our pocket. I traveled nationally my junior and senior years and qualified to the Tournament of Champions both years and saw, first hand, the ways that debate excludes those who need it most. During my time debating, one thing always tore at my connection to the activity: the hands-on disparities I felt as an independent (or “lone wolf”) debater and, much larger than my own struggle, the unspoken truth of the barrier to entry faced by countless racially and economically disenfranchised students across the country. The national circuit rests on a set of paradoxes: we speak rapidly in an intense lexicon of jargon indecipherable by those outside of our nerd commune, but read cases that tout frameworks about establishing social conditions for participatory and moral inclusion; tournament directors homogenize independent debaters as anarchic forces that threaten the stability of established program hegemony, but if a debater defends any long-standing institution of power they are likely to be critiqued as a degenerate peddling the ideology of absolute evil; programs would rather hire a new coach to turn debaters into perfect social justice allies for ballots, instead of dedicating funds to scholarships to allow low-income students in middle school debate leagues to access the established, well-funded programs that win rounds off of recycled images of these students very real social position. Sadly, the inconsistencies go on and, upon examination of this quiet hypocrisy, our supposed devotion to the radical restructuring of powerful systems in favor of the oppressed looks more like soft-boiled, self-moralizing liberalism. It seems to be the case that it’s time to put our intellectual money where are mouths are and for the prevailing in-and-out of round discussion to shift from, ‘What can debate do for the marginalized?’ to ‘How can we incorporate the marginalized into high levels of debate?’ Talking to local circuit debaters coming from a background in national circuit debate was always incredibly humbling because I had no greater claim to my ability to travel than the less privileged debaters I spoke to. They would speak longingly about the ability to travel and see the regional spectrums of the national circuit, be privy to experienced judges, and have the ground to read new philosophy. These students often dealt with various combinations of undedicated and/or inexperienced coaches, lack of school funding, and personally unstable financial situations. These students have all the passion and curiosity (if not more) of the greatest national circuit debaters and the barrier they face is unacceptable in a community that espouses mass, unabashed openness. Some tournaments and debate camps have begun to feature open table discussions about community issues of exclusion surrounding race, gender, sexuality, etc. These discussions are incredibly valuable and I have been a part of many of them, but they are ultimately not encompassing of those who have no voice in those discussions at all. They are part of a privileged form of liberalism that has proliferated national circuit debate. It hails anyone’s inclusion into discursive spaces…as long as you can pay for your plane tickets to the Glenbrooks. We must understand discrimination in debate as multi-leveled. The type of discrimination we are generally concerned about is the institutional disparities between social groups within debate. This is only the surface and it overlooks the web of structural violence and exclusion that keeps debate, and many sites of political discourse, defined by class lines and prejudice. It is the lived reality of these forgotten, yet never introduced students that show us exactly whom debate’s “critical pedagogy” is not made for. “Critical pedagogy” is a term often thrown around in debate rounds without much inquiry as to what it constitutes, it has just become another assumption in our jargon and a buzzword. Paulo Freire, one of the first to write extensively on the subject, explains these forgotten, yet defining features of critical pedagogy in Pedagogy of the Oppressed: “Authentic education is not carried on by “A” for “B” or by “A” about “B,” but rather by “A” with “B,” mediated by the world—a world which impresses and challenges both parties, giving rise to views or opinions about it. These views, impregnated with anxieties, doubts, hopes, or hopelessness, imply significant themes on the basis of which the program content of education can be built. In its desire to create an ideal model of the “good human,” a naively conceived humanism often overlooks the concrete, existential, present situation of real people. … For the truly humanist educator and the authentic revolutionary, the object of action is the reality to be transformed by them together with other people—not other men and women themselves… The revolutionary’s role is to liberate, and be liberated, with the people—not to win them over.” Critical arguments and identity politics attempt to create a model of good human conduct towards the Other, but currently do very little materially to include many of those that they claim to liberate with their words. Critical pedagogy is defined by the egalitarian academic relationship between the marginalized student, educators, and academic spheres, such that they can come together to draft authentic liberatory strategies for the historically marginalized. These arguments may exist as cathartic and crucial academic avenues for traditionally societally marginalized students who are fortunately allowed to debate, but the proliferation of these arguments has not lead to the proliferation of attempts to bridge the socially deprived and the national circuit – these arguments can only benefit those who have already been integrated, which seems odd from a community that treats Wynter and Leighton like one of the 10 Commandments. Impersonal appeals to roles of ballots and judges are ultimately what Freire characterizes as revolutionary’s appealing to the marginalized in an attempt to ‘win them over.’ This is problematic because it imagines the marginalized solely as an object of suffering and not as a concrete, political subject with potential for creating positive, material change. Debate heroism drains the marginalized of agency through false representation and, like any self-serving palliative in the economy of white supremacy, tells us that our dues have been paid to the marginalized without having to actually interact with them. Sure, the education that current debaters gain now is important, but are well-off students the ones who are really lacking an academic source of the critical thinking skills that debate fosters in comparison to students whose classroom setting are cyclically underfunded and present a façade of learning. Freire’s model of critical pedagogy critiqued the “banking model” of teaching that runs supreme in these destitute classrooms. Banking is characterized by the teaching of ‘objective’ facts to be memorized and repeated, but never critically examined – this is the demand of a society that mixes quality of academia and capital. The crucial issue with this model of education is that marginalized students never learn how to question the terms and conditions of their social location from this system because their social position is taught to them as fact to be internalized for regurgitation. Absent an educational site for marginalized students to relate their quotidian experiences with oppression to larger systems of social division’s historical construction, authentic and informed social and policy changes will never come because the voice of the marginalized is not its foundation. National circuit debate often only produces the privileged conjecture of what world the oppressed must desire if they think like the rest of us, and that approach disguises itself as a humanist gesture from elites to cover up their conscious use of narratives of real suffering to fulfill self-interested ends, which constitutes the total commodification of the suffering of the Other. Which is to say, the suffering of the Other is used as a strong persuasive tool to breed fear-based politics around a narrative of moral absolution to Western liberalism. In a society structured heavily by class lines, we continually consume images of the suffering to relieve deep-seated anxieties about our own social locations through displacement. This is why people watch mindless reality television and shows like Narcos or Orange is the New Black, which serve as disaster porn for an increasingly numbed audience. When heteronormative, sexist, and racist violence is what average people watch before they go to bed, how do we actually process impacts of structural violence and social death against groups of people who are largely not even present? In The Illusion of the End, sociologist Jean Baudrillard examines this frenzied devouring of suffering: “We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the ‘other half of the world’ ‘autre monde. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty – charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution, which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. … material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives.” Without an authentic attempt to place the exploited in the center of our discussions, we commodify their real, lived experiences to moralistic ballot appeals that quarantine potentially liberatory discussion to a 45-minute discursive proxy wars where the only real goal is the accumulation of communal prestige. Fiat fuels our politics of exaggeration by establishing an undue assumption of reality behind the advocacies of debaters. This allows debaters to make claims like voting aff is a “try-or-die” situation for the marginalized people the aff speaks about, but after the round the aff doesn’t happen, no one is saved and those people may still ‘or-die’, but the judge and debater leave and feel like they’re done the ‘right’ thing. Here we see exactly why the subjectivities of the marginalized are absolutely essential when deconstructing historical lines of oppression. The marginalized are the sole interlocutor between perspectives defined by survival and subversion against prevailing paradigms of total antagonism, and the revolutionary energy stored within the silenced for reclamation of a stolen humanity. It is critical education that allows the marginalized to synthesize these two conditions into real change that defies our scheduled demands for suffering. An example familiar to a fair amount of debaters who have, inadvertently or not, read this argument is Damien Schnyder, UC President’s Postdoctoral Fellow, when he writes about the importance of including ‘black thought’ in light of it’s historic exclusion by virtue of it’s ability to imagine alternatives to our major systems of economy. It is this hegemonic fear of possibility that explains both the debate community’s flocking to Blackness studies as the new, cool outlook, and it’s simultaneous disavowal of personal narrativity through a culture that worships academic evidence: “Black bodies, through their collective experiences of subjugated Blackness, become a threat to the very function of civil society. Blackness has to be contained and managed in order to protect white supremacy. … It is at this moment – when Blackness becomes identified as antithetical to the notions of work –that white supremacy is able to unleash it’s fury upon the Black body. For it is within this space that the Black body can have anything and everything done to protect the order of civil society.46 Thus in order to contain the threat of Blackness, the Herculean managers of the hydra-like attack upon society are teachers (Linebaugh and Rediker, 2000).47 Within the development of civil society, the function of teachers is to both categorize states of being and enclose Blackness. … Students are prevented from interjecting alternative versions of economic systems within the framework of the discussion. Students must perform the perfunctory duty of work (basic memorization and recitation skills) not to only to be awarded with a passing grade, but not to be penalized. The result is a silencing of Black voices whose life experiences are in direct contradiction with hegemonic constructions of economy (i.e. supply and demand) that was taught by Mr. Keynes. There was no space to analyze the racial structure that frames economic modes of relation, nor was there opportunity to engage in dialogue with regards to the economics of why many of the students had to work to support their families.” If we are to create true critical pedagogy, centrally interested in the marginalized student’s liberation, the community must devote itself to actually doing the ‘right’ thing after these rounds and confirming that direction with those we intend to recover full humanity with. If we legitimately care about the community principle of fighting structural violence, we must start with those who understand that violence as quotidian. Hegemonic systems privilege established factions because the marginalized have very purposefully never been given an active voice in social construction. We are beginning to face a challenge to the extent of our progressivism and it increasingly seems like we’re only willing to draw attention to the marginalized when it posits us as discursive Robin Hoods and fills our ego with ballots. This orientation risks inculcating bad dispositions towards life and political agency outside of debate. When judges aren’t there to drool over social justice parlor tricks, debaters have no incentive to do anything more than change their Facebook profile pictures in line with social events to get the same self-moralism through ‘likes’ and validation. Therefore, if we are to earnestly reverse this trend, the role of the debate community is to give marginalized students a new and encompassing means by which they can speak in the supposed ‘space of inclusion’ we’ve built, 

And, the discursive performance of the ac is a prior question to the inclusion of the marginalized
Butler 5, Judith, badass MoFo and mother of modern feminism in her text “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy”
 or that violence might be said to realize or apply this discourse. Violence against those who are already not quite lives, who are living in a state of suspension between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark. If there is a discourse, it is a silent and melancholic writing in which there have been no lives, and no losses, there has been no common physical condition, no vulnerability that serves as the basis for an apprehension of our commonality, and there has been no sundering of that commonality. None of this takes place on the order of the event. None of this takes place. How many lives have been lost from AIDS in Africa in the last few years? Where are the media representations of this loss, the discursive elaborations of what these losses mean for communities there? I began this chapter with a suggestion that perhaps the interrelated movements and modes of inquiry that collect here might need to consider autonomy as one dimension of their normative aspirations, one value to realize when we ask ourselves, in what direction ought we to proceed, and what kinds of values ought we to be realizing? I suggested as well that the way in which the body figures in gender and sexuality studies, and in the struggles for a less oppressive social world for the otherwise gendered and for sexual minorities of all kinds, is precisely to underscore the value of being beside oneself, of being a porous boundary, given over to others, finding oneself in a trajectory of desire in which one is taken out of oneself, and resituated irreversibly in a field of others in which one is not the presumptive center. The particular sociality that belongs to bodily life, to sexual life, and to becoming gendered (which is always, to a certain extent, becoming gendered for others) establishes a field of ethical enmeshment with others and a sense of disorientation for the first-person, that is, the perspective of the ego. As bodies, we are always for something more than, and other than, ourselves. To articulate this as an entitlement is not always easy, but perhaps not impossible. It suggests, for instance, that “association” Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy 25 RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 25 is not a luxury, but one of the very conditions and prerogatives of freedom. Indeed, the kinds of associations we maintain importantly take many forms. It will not do to extol the marriage norm as the new ideal for this movement, as the Human Rights Campaign has erroneously done.1 No doubt, marriage and same-sex domestic partnerships should certainly be available as options, but to install either as a model for sexual legitimacy is precisely to constrain the sociality of the body in acceptable ways. In light of seriously damaging judicial decisions against second parent adoptions in recent years, it is crucial to expand our notions of kinship beyond the heterosexual frame. It would be a mistake, however, to reduce kinship to family, or to assume that all sustaining community and friendship ties are extrapolations of kin relations. I make the argument in “Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual” in this volume that kinship ties that bind persons to one another may well be no more or less than the intensification of community ties, may or may not be based on enduring or exclusive sexual relations, may well consist of ex-lovers, nonlovers, friends, and community members. The relations of kinship cross the boundaries between community and family and sometimes redefine the meaning of friendship as well. When these modes of intimate association produce sustaining webs of relationships, they constitute a “breakdown” of traditional kinship that displaces the presumption that biological and sexual relations structure kinship centrally. In addition, the incest taboo that governs kinship ties, producing a necessary exogamy, does not necessarily operate among friends in the same way or, for that matter, in networks of communities. Within these frames, sexuality is no longer exclusively regulated by the rules of kinship at the same time that the durable tie can be situated outside of the conjugal frame. Sexuality becomes open to a number of social articulations that do not always imply binding relations or conjugal ties. That not all of our relations last or are meant to, however, does not mean that we are immune to grief. On the contrary, sexuality outside the field of monogamy well may open us to a different sense of community, intensifying the question of where one finds enduring ties, and so become the condition for an attunement to losses that exceed a discretely private realm. Nevertheless, those who live outside the conjugal frame or maintain modes of social organization for sexuality that are neither monogamous nor quasi-marital are more and more considered unreal, and their loves 26 Undoing Gender RT9239_C01.qxd 6/25/04 12:51 PM Page 26 and losses less than “true” loves and “true” losses. 

Thus the advocacy; debate rounds within public colleges and universities should not restrict any speech protected by the current Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) constitution.
Advantage 1- performance debate
First, the CEDA constitution protects all styles of debate, including ‘performance’ debate- it both positively and negatively protects speech that creates minority participation
CEDA constitution . "Section 1: The Nature of the Academic Debate Community." CONSTITUTION OF THE CROSS EXAMINATION DEBATE ASSOCIATION ARTICLE I: THE ORGANIZATION (n.d.): n. pag. Mar. 2016. Web.
Preamble: The Cross Examination Debate Association is dedicated to the principle of free expression and exploration of ideas in an atmosphere of civility and mutual respect. Related to this principle is the belief that all members of this community will have access to CEDA debate activities without regard to race, creed, age, sex, national origin, sexual or affectional preference, or non-disqualifying handicap. These principles should guide the behavior of the organization's members and participants. Section 1: The Nature of the Academic Debate Community It is the nature of the academic debate community to provide a forum for the robust expression, criticism and discussion (and for the tolerance) of the widest range of opinions.
And, CEDA protects against censoring certain styles of debate
CEDA constitution . " CONSTITUTION OF THE CROSS EXAMINATION DEBATE ASSOCIATION ARTICLE I: THE ORGANIZATION (n.d.): n. pag. Mar. 2016. Web.
Judges are important to the debate activity. In addition to supplying decisions as judges, they educate the student participants through their reasons for decision and suggestions for improvement. CEDA recognizes the inherent tension and potential conflict between these two roles. In an attempt to facilitate both functions, CEDA encourages judge-educators to acknowledge their two-fold responsibility and act with competence, integrity, fairness and courtesy before, during and after each debate round. Debate seeks to be a full, free testing of ideas. Yet as educators, some feel a responsibility to discourage student behavior they find to be counterproductive. Often judges must delicately balance these two considerations: the need for rigorous examination of any and all views, however unpopular or unrealistic and the guidance and direction of student behavior. If undesirable behavior is discouraged in a positive, fair and courteous manner, the judge/educator roles can be simultaneously satisfied. Ethical principles for judges participating in CEDA include: A. Judges should strive at all times to render impartial decisions. Judges should excuse themselves from rounds they do not feel they could judge fairly. B. Judges should be willing to inform debaters, either through a statement of philosophy or through response to student questions, of strongly held beliefs or standards that could affect the outcome of the debate round. C. Judges should evaluate debate rounds on the arguments as they are presented by the debaters, rather than on personal knowledge of or opinion about particular substantive arguments. Judges need not be "tabula rasa" but do need to be fair. D. Judges should provide detailed and constructive criticism of any and all rounds of debate they evaluate. Reasons for decision should be in accordance with any beliefs or standards announced at the outset of the round. Judges are expected to provide written comments on the ballots provided by the tournament, even if they also provide an oral critique. These written comments should be made available to all the debaters a judge has heard by the conclusion of the tournament. E. Judges have an ethical obligation to uphold without exception the tournament rules. Judges should inform the tournament director of any conflicts which could prevent them from carrying out this duty. F. Judges who have the misfortune of witnessing fraudulent behavior on the part of Current as of March, 2016 (questions, contact jeffrey.jarman@wichita.edu) 45 competitors they are judging should: 1. conform to tournament rules (if any), and 2. act in accordance with their consciences in assessing appropriate sanctions.

And, sqo debate has judges that automatically reject non-T affs or affs without plans- both are important
Here’s some of Maggie’s Berthiaume’s Paradigm. I picked them at random as an example of how some forms of debate are rejected in the squo
https://www.tabroom.com/index/tourn/paradigms.mhtml?tourn_id=4745andcategory_id=11881
Do I have to be topical?
Yes. Affirmatives are certainly welcome to defend the resolution in interesting and creative ways, but that defense should be tied to a topical plan to ensure that both sides are prepared for the debate. Affirmatives do not need to “role play” or “pretend to be the USFG” to suggest that the USFG should change a policy.
And, Performance debate empowers black and minority students by eliminating the forced choice between assimilation and exiting the activity- we don’t need every debate to be performative, but it HAS TO BE AN OPTION.
Polson 12 (Dana Roe Polson, PhD in Language Literacy and Culture, UMBC, Baltimore city public and public charter schools high school teacher, “’Longing for Theory:’ Performance Debate in Action” Dissertain directed by Dr. Christine Mallinson, Assistant Professor,  Language, Literacy, and Culture pp. 142)CEFS
Further, I would argue that the policy debate world is in some ways hyper-white:  it rewards and represents white cultural and epistemological norms to a degree many  students might not experience in public schools, even majority-white ones. But again: this rejection of whiteness does not necessarily equate with rejection of academic success.  While I will look at this issue of cultural authenticity more specifically in chapters  4 and 5, I will mention here that I think performance debate finds away around this bind  for African American debaters. The style gives them a practice that is race-based and  conscious, within the policy debate community. There is no forced choice to assimilate or  to leave the activity. As coach participant Jason Burton put it,  And so like the question was, what motivates students to participate in the  activity? And for, for us, that was the style component of the activity... when we  brought the hip hop music into it and changed the style of it, that we saw had an  effect on the way it motivated students to use their life experiences, their personal  narrative, you know um being able to see how things within the arguments that  they were making about social policy actually could affect the communities and  the lives around them. (Jason Burton, group interview I, p. 4)  Burton’s team at the time was working out stylistic choices that felt to them more  culturally familiar. As he points out, these culturally familiar styles led them to bring  their own experience into debate, and to understand how the theory they were using in  debate related to their communities. Performance debate thus does what I think Ogbu’s  schools should do: instead of blaming involuntary minorities’ culture for lack of  achievement, they should recognize the full historical and cultural depths of the problem.  A mismatch between white ways of schooling and the culture of African American  children, a mismatch that devalues the children and their culture, is a profound problem  not to be explained away by the existence of often successful voluntary minorities. While  I do reject what I see as Ogbu’s overgeneralization, if it were true that even some African American students reject schooling (or debate) as white spaces, perhaps we should  consider this situation carefully rather than reject it as unlike the often-effective  instrumental responses of voluntary minorities. Instead of idealizing dominant white  ways of being in schools, we could investigate some African American students’  responses to those white ways as critique, as critical resistance, rather than as an  automatic and counterproductive reactivity. Indeed, Yosso suggests that resistant capital  is a feature of African American cultural wealth: “Resistant capital refers to those  knowledges and skills fostered through oppositional behavior that challenges inequality”  (Yosso, 2005, p. 80). Ogbu sometimes seemed to write as if the problems faced by  involuntary minority students in schools were all in their or their parents’ heads; what if  they were, instead, contemporary examples of structural racism?

 Advantage 2- harassment
Debate is patriarchal- womyn quit, causing performance gaps that create a cycle of marginalization.
New Evidence on Gender Disparities in Competitive High School Lincoln-Douglas Debate BY DANIEL TARTAKOVSKY, http://vbriefly.com/2016/05/15/new-evidence-on-gender-disparities-in-competitive-high-school-lincoln-douglas-debate/
Table 1 reports summary statistics for men and women separately. There are three key take-aways. First, men comprise about 60 of the competitors and an even higher fraction of total observations. On average men in the database compete in 42 preliminary rounds while women compete in about 35. Second, men win a higher fraction of debates: There is a 3.7 percentage point male-female win gap in preliminary rounds. Finally, the performance gap in elimination rounds is even larger. Men are 12 percentage points more likely to win an elimination round than women. These differences are all statistically significant (see Table 1). Table 1. Summary Statistics: Performance of National Circuit Lincoln Douglas Debaters by Gender DT Table 1 Note: Table 1 reports summary statistics for high school Lincoln Douglas debate tournament results on Tabroom.com. The unit of observation is an individual. a The total number of identifiable unique competitors (those whose genders are either labeled or can be inferred using Census data) is 4,666. b Restricted to National Circuit tournaments with 6 preliminary rounds. c Speaker points are generally awarded on a scale of 0-30; in practice, the scale is about 25-30, with 27.5-28 being an average varsity debater. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: Tabroom.com National Circuit Lincoln Douglas Debate competition results for a sample of 89 tournaments spanning the 2011-12 to 2015-16 seasons. See Appendix C for list of tournaments. Are Women Leaving the Activity? One explanation for differential performance may be that women are less likely to continue debating for all four years of high school. If male debaters are more likely than female debaters to persist in the activity, all else being equal they will accumulate more experience and perform better. Two data points suggest that this is the case. First, the average graduation year for men is about 2 months earlier than than for women. Moreover, 46 of current high school freshmen are female compared to only 33 of those who graduated high school in 2015. However, this statistic could be misleading: If more women have begun competing in Lincoln-Douglas debate over the last few years, we would expect there to be relatively more young female debaters even absent differential attrition. To resolve this issue, I restrict the sample to the cohort of debaters graduating from high school in 2016. I then calculate a “participation gap,” defined as the difference between fraction of male and female debaters who, conditional on having debated as sophomores, also debate as juniors and as seniors. Table 2 shows that women who debated in at least one tournament as sophomores are about 2.5 percentage points less likely than men to debate as juniors. However, the participation gap does not seem to grow from junior to senior year. There is thus some evidence that women are more likely to quit National Circuit Lincoln-Douglas debate than men
why does this happen? Sexual harassment is a huge part of the problem- we all know this happens. Its underreported and exclusionary practices are almost never checked.  Here’s a narrative explaining the problem-
Allison Pickett, SAID, SHE SAID, GENDER ISSUES IN LINCOLN DOUGLAS DEBATE, https://debate.uvm.edu/NFL/rostrumlib/ldPickett20and20Scott0202.pdf
In the fall of 1994, my debate career nearly ended as quickly as it had begun. Lord knows I was already nervous enough as I stood outside the classroom, waiting for my very first debate round to begin. Never mind the fact that I had three  more to do before I could go home and cry, the only thing I could imagine doing after what promised to be one of the most mortifying days of my life. (Yes, ladies and gentlemen, I think I may have had a self-confidence problem.) I was on the brink of emotional meltdown—and then, it happened… Whew! Hey baby, what’s your name? I need your number. And so it went. For twenty minutes outside the room and then throughout the entire round. No, you can’t be a freshman, you’ve gotta be a junior—or even my judge…where did you get those eyes? Aw, honey, don’t be scared, I’m just going to ask you a few easy questions. Could I really cross-examine someone with such beautiful eyes as yours? Did I mention the starring, perhaps better termed leering? I’m not kidding; I was ready to quit debate forever after round one. Luckily, I didn’t, and I learned a few things along the way: Gender in debate rounds was usually subtle, but often important. A seemingly clear concept became anything but in assessing what to wear, how to talk, what to say, whom to imitate… For some people, the choice of a skirt versus pants in the morning was decided on a whim; for me, and for many of my fellow female debaters, what to wear was inevitably a decision about my image as a young woman as well. Makeup or not and how much became more of an issue than I had ever thought it could be. And there was always that question in the back of my head: Am I a debater who happens to be a girl, or am I a girl who happens to be a debater?
Thus-Use the aff to reject this-our advocacy protects  the positive ability for womyn to speak in the space, and recognizes that this entails prohibiting harassment. The  
CEDA constitution . "Section 1: The Nature of the Academic Debate Community." CONSTITUTION OF THE CROSS EXAMINATION DEBATE ASSOCIATION ARTICLE I: THE ORGANIZATION (n.d.): n. pag. Mar. 2016. Web.
It does not provide a license for bigotry in the form of demeaning, discriminatory speech actions and it does not tolerate sexual harassment. Any member of this community who is threatened by discrimination or harassment is liable to be harmed in mind, body or performance and is denied the guarantee of an equal opportunity to work, learn and grow inherent in the above principles. In the debate community, the presentation of a reasoned or evidenced claim about a societal group that offends members of that group is to be distinguished from a gratuitous denigrating claim about, or addressed to, an individual or group such as those enumerated above. The former is bona fide academic behavior while the latter may demean, degrade or victimize in a discriminatory manner and, if so, undermines the above principles. Sexual harassment is a form of discrimination and consists of verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, that has the effect of denying or limiting one's right to participate in the activity, or creates a hostile, intimidating or offensive environment that places the victim in an untenable situation and/or diminishes the victim's opportunity to participate fairly. Sexual conduct can become discriminatory and harassing when the nature of the interaction is unwelcome, or when a pattern of behavior that is offensive to a "reasonable woman" exists. Discrimination or harassment by one person against another is particularly abhorrent when the first person is in a position of power with respect to the second. 

Advantage 3- attire
1st- Cross apply the second CEDA card- arbitrary, non-argumentative factors like dress is a protected speech that is granted by the CEDA constitution
2nd- formal and informal dress codes function as a method of oppression within debate- female debaters are harmed. Additionally, they create a fucked up environments where dressing in accordance to ones identity risks backlash from conservative judges, while not doing so opens one up to an increase in micro-aggressions.
ZHOU The Sexism of School Dress Codes These policies can perpetuate discrimination against female students, as well as LGBT students. Alfaguarilla / Shutterstock LI ZHOU OCT 20, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/school-dress-codes-are-problematic/410962/
Maggie Sunseri was a middle-school student in Versailles, Kentucky, when she first noticed a major difference in the way her school’s dress code treated males and females. Girls arewere disciplined disproportionately, she says, a trend she’s seen continue over the years. At first Sunseri simply found this disparity unfair, but upon realizing administrators’ troubling rationale behind the dress code—that certain articles of girls’ attire should be prohibited because they “distract” boys—she decided to take action. “I’ve never seen a boy called out for his attire even though they also break the rules,” says Sunseri, who last summer produced Shame: A Documentary on School Dress Code, a film featuring interviews with dozens of her classmates and her school principal, that explores the negative impact biased rules can have on girls’ confidence and sense of self. The documentary now has tens of thousands of YouTube views, while a post about the dress-code policy at her high school—Woodford County High—has been circulated more than 45,000 times on the Internet. Although dress codes have long been a subject of contention, the growth of platforms like Facebook and Instagram, along with a resurgence of student activism, has prompted a major uptick in protests against attire rules, including popular campaigns similar to the one championed by Sunseri. Conflict over these policies has also spawned hundreds of Change.org petitions and numerous school walkouts. Many of these protests have criticized the dress codes as sexist in that they unfairly target girls by body-shaming and blaming them for promoting sexual harassment. Documented cases show female students being chastised by school officials, sent home, or barred from attending events like prom. Meanwhile, gender non-conforming and transgender students have also clashed with such policies on the grounds that they rigidly dictate how kids express their identities. Transgender students have been sent home for wearing clothing different than what’s expected of their legal sex, while others have been excluded from yearbooks. Male students, using traditionally female accessories that fell within the bounds of standard dress code rules, and vice versa, have been nonetheless disciplined for their fashion choices. These cases are prompting their own backlash. Dress codes—given the power they entrust school authorities to regulate student identity—can, according to students, ultimately establish discriminatory standards as the norm. The prevalence and convergence of today’s protests suggest that schools not only need to update their policies—they also have to recognize and address the latent biases that go into creating them. * * * At Woodford County High, the dress code bans skirts and shorts that fall higher than the knee and shirts that extend below the collarbone. Recently, a photo of a female student at the school who was sent home after wearing a seemingly appropriate outfit that nonetheless showed collarbone—went viral on Reddit and Twitter. Posted by Stacie Dunn on Thursday, August 13, 2015 The restrictions and severity of dress codes vary widely across states, 22 of which have some form of law granting local districts the power to establish these rules, according to the Education Commission of the States. In the U.S., over half of public schools have a dress code, which frequently outline gender-specific policies. Some administrators see these distinctions as necessary because of the different ways in which girls and boys dress. In many cases, however, female-specific policies account for a disproportionate number of the attire rules included in school handbooks. Certain parts of ​Arkansas’s statewide dress code, for example, exclusively applies to females.* Passed in 2011, the law “requires districts to prohibit the wearing of clothing that exposes underwear, buttocks, or the breast of a female student.” (The provision prohibiting exposure of the "underwear and buttocks" applies to all students.) Depending on administrators and school boards, some places are more relaxed, while others take a hard line. Policies also tend to fluctuate, according to the University of Maryland American-studies professor and fashion historian Jo Paoletti, who described dress-code adaptations as very “reactionary” to whatever happens to be popular at the time—whether it’s white go-go boots or yoga pants. Jere Hochman, the superintendent of New York’s Bedford Central School District echoes Paoletti in explaining that officials revisit his district’s policy, which has been in place “for years and years and years,” “on an informal basis.” “It’s likely an annual conversation, he notes, “based on the times and what’s changed and fads.” While research on dress codes remains inconclusive regarding the correlation between their implementation with students’ academic outcomes, many educators agree that they can serve an important purpose: helping insure a safe and comfortable learning environment, banning T-shirts with offensive racial epithets, for example. When students break the rules by wearing something deemed inappropriate, administrators must, of course, enforce school policies. The process of defining what’s considered “offensive” and “inappropriate,” however, can get quite murky. Schools may promote prejudiced policies, even if those biases are unintentional. For students who attend schools with particularly harsh rules like that at Woodford, one of the key concerns is the implication that women should be hypercognizant about their physical identity and how the world responds to it. “The dress code makes girls feel self-conscious, ashamed, and uncomfortable in their own bodies,” says Sunseri. Yet Sunseri emphasizes that this isn’t where she and other students take the most issue. “It's not really the formal dress code by itself that is so discriminatory, it’s the message behind the dress code,” she says, “My principal constantly says that the main reason for it is to create a ‘distraction-free learning zone’ for our male counterparts.” Woodford County is one of many districts across the country to justify female-specific rules with that logic, and effectively, to place the onus on girls to prevent inappropriate reactions from their male classmates. (Woodford County High has not responded to multiple requests for comment.) “These are not girls who are battling for the right to come to school in their bikinis—it’s a principle.” “To me, that’s not a girl’s problem, that’s a guy’s problem,” says Anna Huffman, who recently graduated from Western Alamance High School in Elon, North Carolina, and helped organize a protest involving hundreds of participants. Further north, a group of high-school girls from South Orange, New Jersey, similarly launched a campaign last fall, #IAmMoreThanADistraction, which exploded into a trending topic on Twitter and gleaned thousands of responses from girls sharing their own experiences. Educators and sociologists, too, have argued that dress codes grounded in such logic amplify a broader societal expectation: that women are the ones who need to protect themselves from unwanted attention and that those wearing what could be considered sexy clothing are “asking for” a response. “Often they report hearing phrases like, ‘boys will be boys,’ from teachers,” says Laura Bates, a co-founder of The Everyday Sexism Project. “There’s a real culture being built up through some of these dress codes where girls are receiving very clear messages that male behavior, male entitlement to your body in public space is socially acceptable, but you will be punished.  
Since yall aren’t gonna engage the aff, heres the underview

Tournament: Grandview | Round: 1 | Opponent: IDK | Judge: IDK
Part one is framework-
First, I value morality derived of ought in the resolution- any other value is infinitely regressive as we can always ask why that value matters
Second, In a democratic society our principles of justice must be based on the idea that all citizens are free and equal moral persons because basic equality is a necessary condition for democratic citizenship. Thus, only what citizens would rationally will from a shared point of view, called the original position, can be just because it is the only mechanism that respects citizens as free and equal.

Samuel Freeman Avalon Professor in the Humanities at The University of Pennsylvania. Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy. Oxford University Press. New York, NY. 2007. 40-42

Agreement from the original position serves this role; it is a procedural interpretation of practical reason in matters of justice (CP, 345–46; TJ, 256/226 rev.) or, more exactly, of a conception of persons as both reasonable and rational. Since this procedure is designed to model the moral powers,51 the content of the principles chosen from that point of view will be determined by these reasoning capacities and the conception of the person to which they give rise (CP, 303, 306).52 In this sense, moral principles are constructed on the basis of reason.¶ The objectivity that Rawls ascribes to his of these principles rests on his claim that they would be willed and agreed to from a shared point of view, which is objective in that everyone abstracts from their particular (subjective) aims, beliefs, and perspectives to view society on an equal footing (TJ, 516–19/452–55 rev.). This conception of objectivity is practical, as opposed to theoretical, in the following sense: Rawls's claim is not that, being impartially situated, we all have a clear, undistorted view that allows us to make true judgments about a prior and independent moral order. In constructivism, Rawls says, there is no order of moral facts, prior to human reasoning, for our moral judgments to be true of (CP, 354). This does not mean that Rawls one must deny that a prior order of moral facts or principles can exist rather, for that metaphysical commitment would conflict with his the practical aim. Rather, it means that if there is such an order, it is not because certain principles are true of it that we are bound, as democratic citizens, to follow them. What commits us, as citizens, to these principles is that they are most reasonable for us (CP, 340), in that they best accord with our capacities for practical reasoning in the circumstances of a democratic society. The conception of objectivity that informs this claim is practical, since the shared point of view from which we would agree to these principles is designed not to give us privileged access to a prior moral order but to represent our powers of practical reasoning in a way appropriate to our democratic conception of ourselves as free and equal.53

 
And, The shared point-of-view necessary for rational agreement is represented by the original position, the idea that citizens can imagine themselves behind a veil of ignorance. This is a thought experiment that lets us understand equality- behind the veil citizens would not know whether they were rich or poor, their gender, their race, or any other contingent fact about their place in society, and so would be represented purely as free and equal. And, that also means it is the only system that has no risk of bias and so is not arbitrary decision-making. Preventing arbitrariness is a prerequisite to any framework because morality serves to guide action so it must prevent arbitrariness that contradicts rationally adopted rules and undermines any moral code.

And, behind the veil, citizens would design a system that benefitted the least advantaged because 1) diminishing marginal utility dictates that helping the most advantaged provides less utility than the least advantaged. This is why giving a dollar to a homeless person would probably make them happier than giving a dollar to a billionaire; already having goods makes each additional good less valuable. 2) People are risk-averse, meaning that they would avoid risks of occupying the worst social position, but this would ensure reasonable treatment regardless.

 
Therefore, in order to rectify the arbitrary disadvantages of the natural lottery, we must adopt a principle of equality of opportunity.  

Danny Scoccia prof of phil, NM State. " Rawls, The Difference Principle, and Equality of Opportunity." http://web.nmsu.edu/~dscoccia/320web/320RawlsDP.pdf

The basic motivation behind the equality of opportunity (EO) principle is this: if you can walk into a nursery and correctly make statistical predictions like “this baby because of his skin color and/or his family’s socioeconomic status is likely to make $20,000 per year less when he grows up than that baby over there,” then the society in which such predictions can be made is unjust and ought to be changed so that such  predictions are no longer true of it. Equality of opportunity attempts to mitigates the effects of social caste. It requires a legal ban on racist/sexist hiring and promotion practices in the private sector, as well as state efforts to improve the educational opportunities of the poor by providing free public education, Head Start programs, etc. Equality of opportunity and does not forbid inequalities in wealth and power that are due to people's free choices. Suppose that I’m poor because I've chosen not to make the sacrifices necessary to develop highly marketable labor skills (I dropped out of the public high school because it bored me), or because I frittered away my inheritance from my grandmother playing Internet blackjack. You, on the other hand, have a large stock portfolio and a high paying job because you've saved and made sacrifices. EO as usually understood implies that there is no injustice in the inequality between us. I deserve my poverty and you your wealth, because they are due entirely to our choices. It is only some inequalities of outcome that equality of opportunity condemns, namely, the undeserved ones that are due to unequal opportunity. 

 
Thus, the standard is ensuring equality of opportunity. This implies that our primary moral consideration should be the less well off, namely, the global poor, as we don’t choose where we are born, thus we have equivalent obligations to all.
Prefer the standard for 2 additional reasons:

First, people are moral equals unless a morally relevant distinction exists because no characteristics exist to differentiate them, so the results of the natural lottery shouldn’t arbitrarily disadvantage some people over others, which requires equality of opportunity.

Second, people born with disadvantages are subject to external pressures that affect the choices they have, which destroys their autonomy because they don’t have free reign over their own lives, which outweighs any individual violation on magnitude. And, autonomy is a prerequisite to moral theorizing because free will is responsible for the judgment of principles and commitment to a certain action.

Part two is the contention
Contention one is trade bias- globalization will always help the poor more than the wealthy, ensuring a more equal society. This evidence is really good, its recent and takes into account all statistical outliers, the authors literally created new statistical methodologies to answer the question of who is helped most by globalization.  Be highly skeptical of any evidence opposing it, especially if theirs comes from a newspaper.

Fajgelbaum, Pablo D., and Amit K. Khandelwal. "Measuring the unequal gains from trade." The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2015): qjw013. https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/akhandelwal/papers/mugft_FINAL.pdf

Understanding the distributional impact of international trade is one of the central tasks pursued by international economists. A vast body of research has examined this question through the effect of trade on the distribution of earnings across workers (e.g., Stolper and Samuelson 1941). A second channel operates through the cost of living. It is well known that the consumption baskets of high- and low-income consumers look very different (e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer 1980b). International trade therefore has a distributional impact whenever it affects the relative price of goods that are consumed at different intensities by rich and poor consumers. For example, a trade-induced increase in the price of food has a stronger negative effect on low-income consumers, who typically have larger food expenditure shares than richer consumers. How important are the distributional effects of international trade through this expenditure channel? How do they vary across countries? Do they typically favor high- or low- income consumers? In this paper we develop a methodology to answer these questions. The approach is based on aggregate statistics and model parameters that can be estimated from readily available bilateral trade and production data. It can therefore be implemented across many countries and over time (…..) This paper develops a methodology to measure the distribution of welfare changes across hetero- geneous consumers through the expenditure channel for many countries over time. The approach has broad applicability as it is based on aggregate statistics and model parameters that can be estimated from readily available bilateral trade and production data. This is possible by using the AIDS demand structure which allows for non-homotheticities and has convenient aggregation properties. We estimate a non-homothetic gravity equation generated by the model to obtain the key parameters required by the approach, and identify the effect of trade on the distribution of welfare changes through counterfactual changes in trade costs. The estimated parameters suggest large differences in how trade affects individuals along the income distribution in different countries. The multi-sector analysis reveals that the gains from trade are typically biased towards the poor. This is because the poor tend to concentrate expenditures in sectors that are more traded, and because these sectors have lower price elasticities. Heterogeneity in the pro-poor bias of trade is driven, in part, by a country’s pattern of specialization relative to its trading partners. While our goal in this paper is to demonstrate the importance of demand heterogeneity across consumers for the distributional effects of trade, we believe that a promising avenue lies in integrat- ing this approach with a richer supply-side structure to measure jointly the impact of trade through both the expenditure and income channels across consumers. We leave this for future work.

Contention two is global poverty rate- Free trade is great for the global poor, history proves
 Worstall, OCT 1, 2015 @ 07:06 AM 3,009 VIEWS Peek Inside The Billionaire Portfolio Of Trump’s Key Advisor If You're Anti-Poverty You Should Be Pro- Free Trade And Globalization Tim Worstall , CONTRIBUTOR, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/10/01/if-youre-anti-poverty-you-should-be-pro-free-trade-and-globalisation/2/#352c5b4460d6
The Minneapolis Fed has a little piece out making an argument that I’ve been stating for some time now. If you’re pro-poor, then you really should be vehemently pro- free trade and globalization. Because those are the two things that have led to the greatest reduction in poverty in the history of our species. Meaning, obviously, that they have been the two most effective things at reducing poverty across history. As to why this is it’s really very simply derived from the economics of Smith and Ricardo. The division and specialization of labor, along with the resultant trade in production, just is what economic growth consists of. Sure, there’s other things as well, but that’s still a very good description of what economic growth actually consists of. So, the more of this we do and the more people we do it with then the more economic growth there is. And given that someone gets to consume that greater production then obviously the less poverty there is. As they point out about recent historical experience: According to a World Bank Study, in the three decades between 1981 and 2010, the rate of extreme poverty in the developing world (subsisting on less than $1.25 per day) has gone down from more than one out of every two citizens to roughly one out of every five, all while the population of the developing world increased by 59 percent.8 This reduction in extreme poverty represents the single greatest decrease in material human deprivation in history. That’s a pretty good outcome from an economic policy and it’s why I support the process of globalization quite as much as I do. Absolute poverty, that peasant destitution, is something I regard as an abhorrence. Killing it off through economic growth I thus regard as not just desirable but a moral duty. OK, but there’s a problem with this, as the paper points out. For some policies will be good for one set of poor people, those absolutely poor out in the Great Big World, yet bad for another set of the poor, those who are the poor in the already rich societies. And this globalization and free trade mixture is exactly one of those policies that has this effect. Rising inequality in the rich nations is a logical result of adding those couple of billion low wage workers to the global economy. We could predict it would happen, theory tells us it should happen and it has happened: no one should be surprised about that. I’ve made clear around here a number of times that I both understand this point and also think that it’s a perfectly fair price to be paying. Yes, of course, that’s easy enough for me to say as I’ve not got to pay it. Although that’s not actually true either. Online writing is one of those things that does indeed face very high and hard competition from other parts of the world. Wages in this field have been falling substantially over these decades. No, not a complaint, it’s still well paid, thank you. But that the relatively lowly paid in the rich countries stand still for a bit while the absolutely poor of the world climb the economic ladder to the joys of three squares a day, yes, I think that a price well worth us all paying. For as the Fed says: A typical American in the lowest 5 percent of income (for America) has a higher income than 95 percent of Indians, 80 percent of Chinese and 50 percent of Brazilians. Another such statistic is that if you’re getting just that average SNAP or food stamps payment of $29 a week then you’re in the top 20 of all incomes world wide. Our poor, the rich world poor, are only relatively poor by our standards, they’re both absolutely and relatively rich by global and historical standards. Of course this justification only works if the two results are indeed from the same policy. And they are: Recommended by Forbes Facebook's Billion User Day And The Strange Death Of Globalisation We Can Think Of Globalisation As A Sort Of Keynesianism For The World IBMVoice: How Blockchain Could Help To Make The Food We Eat Safer... Around The World Increased Globalisation Explains Some Of The Increase In The US Profit Sha... US Inequality Not Caused By Soaring CEO Pay; Globalisation Instead MOST POPULAR Photos: The Richest Person In Every State +222,466 VIEWS iPhone 8 Leak Reveals Apple's Expensive Secrets MOST POPULAR Photos: The World's Highest-Paid Models 2016 MOST POPULAR Stan Lee Introduces Augmented Reality For His Kids Universe One possible cause of both trends has been the increase in international trade, which lessens the market value of less-skilled labor in developed countries while increasing its value in developing countries.9 If one uses a behind-the-veil criterion focused only on developed countries, then the increase in trade has made things worse. If instead one considers the entire world, then the trade increase has made the world phenomenally better. All of which is what I have myself been arguing. Where the Fed goes further is in the next step. Which is this: Consider the following highly stylized example: In a world with just two countries, one developed and the other poor, output is produced in each by a combination of skilled workers and unskilled workers. When they’re young, unskilled workers have the opportunity to become skilled by working with older, skilled workers. But imagine that young, unskilled workers can work with older, skilled workers from either country. In particular, assume that skilled, older workers (such as plant managers) from developed countries can train young, unskilled workers from developing countries. (Alternatively, imagine that young, unskilled workers from developing countries travel to developed countries to become educated and then return home as skilled workers.) When these young workers age, they in turn train future generations of young workers at home. Suppose further that in each country only some young workers are born with an innate ability to acquire skills, while others are born without that ability. Suppose also that young workers who have this ability must exert effort to acquire skills and therefore must be provided with appropriate incentives to do so. A rich-country policy to tax high incomes will redistribute income (within that country) from those with high innate abilities (and, by assumption, with the ability to become highly skilled) to those with lower innate abilities. In so doing, that policy will reduce inequality within the rich country, but it will also create disincentives there to becoming highly skilled and thereby reduce the global supply of skilled workers. This reduced supply of skilled workers from the developed country then reduces opportunities for young workers in the poor country to become skilled. Yes, it is highly stylized but that’s just to illustrate the point that they want to get across. It’s entirely possible that we could have some policy or other that makes our own, rich world , poor better off. But which at the same time makes the absolutely poor of the world worse off. And if we did have such a policy, and we were also concerned about the poor, then we shouldn’t have that policy. Even though it benefits our poor they’re not in fact all of the poor. And given where our poor are in the global income distribution then they’re almost certainly not the poor that we should be worrying about. There’s an obvious example of such a policy too: the US sugar regime deliberately keeps sugar grown by poor people in poor countries out of the US. To the benefit of some very small number of cane and beet farmers in the US and to the disbenefit of those poor farmers elsewhere. And, of course, to the cost of all US consumers. It would actually be a pro-poor policy simply to abolish this entire regime and throw the sugar market open to free trade. I would make the same argument about any import restriction upon trade in fact. For buying things made by poor people in poor countries is a remarkably, see above for proof, method of making poor people less poor. So, a pro-poor policy is one of free trade.

And, globalization is a pre-requisate for the economic development of less wealthy nations.
Vitez, Small BusinessFinances and TaxesFree Trade The Benefits of Free Trade for Developing Countries by Osmond Vitez, Chron, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/benefits-trade-developing-countries-3834.html
Free trade is an economic practice whereby countries can import and export goods without fear of government intervention. Government intervention includes tariffs and import/export bans or limitations. Free trade offers several benefits to countries, especially those in the developing stage. "Developing countries" is a broad term. According to a widely used definition, a developing country is a nation with low levels of economic resources and/or low standard of living. Developing countries can often advance their economy through strategic free trade agreements. Ads by Google Top Franchises for 2017 Find Franchises for Sale. Be Your Own Boss - Connect Today! franchise.com Increased Resources Developing countries can benefit from free trade by increasing their amount of or access to economic resources. Nations usually have limited economic resources. Economic resources include land, labor and capital. Land represents the natural resources found within a nationandrsquo;s borders. Small developing nations often have the lowest amounts of natural resources in the economic marketplace. Free trade agreements ensure small nations can obtain the economic resources needed to produce consumer goods or services. Improved Quality of Life Free trade usually improves the quality of life for a nationandrsquo;s citizens. Nations can import goods that are not readily available within their borders. Importing goods may be cheaper for a developing country than attempting to produce consumer goods or services within their borders. Many developing nations do not have the production processes available for converting raw materials into valuable consumer goods. Developing countries with friendly neighbors may also be able to import goods more often. Importing from neighboring countries ensures a constant flow of goods that are readily available for consumption. Better Foreign Relations Better foreign relations is usually an unintended result of free trade. Developing nations are often subject to international threats. Developing strategic free trade relations with more powerful countries can help ensure a developing nation has additional protection from international threats. Developing countries can also use free trade agreements to improve their military strength and their internal infrastructure, as well as to improve politically. This unintended benefit allows developing countries to learn how they should govern their economy and what types of government policies can best benefit their people. Production Efficiency Developing countries can use free trade to improve their production efficiency. Most nations are capable of producing some type of goods or service. However, a lack of knowledge or proper resources can make production inefficient or ineffective. Free trade allows developing countries to fill in the gaps regarding their production processes. Individual citizens may also visit foreign countries to increase education or experience in specific production or business methods. These individuals can then bring back crucial information about improving the nationandrsquo;s production processes.
Contention three is existence- globalization key to promoting peace that is needed for poor countries to exist in the first place.
Vitez, Small BusinessFinances and TaxesFree Trade The Benefits of Free Trade for Developing Countries by Osmond Vitez, Chron, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/benefits-trade-developing-countries-3834.html
Many developing nations do not have the production processes available for converting raw materials into valuable consumer goods. Developing countries with friendly neighbors may also be able to import goods more often. Importing from neighboring countries ensures a constant flow of goods that are readily available for consumption. Better Foreign Relations Better foreign relations is usually an unintended result of free trade. Developing nations are often subject to international threats. Developing strategic free trade relations with more powerful countries can help ensure a developing nation has additional protection from international threats. Developing countries can also use free trade agreements to improve their military strength and their internal infrastructure, as well as to improve politically. This unintended benefit allows developing countries to learn how they should govern their economy and what types of government policies can best benefit their people. Production Efficiency Developing countries can use free trade to improve their production efficiency. Most nations are capable of producing some type of goods or service. However, a lack of knowledge or proper resources can make production inefficient or ineffective. Free trade allows developing countries to fill in the gaps regarding their production processes. Individual citizens may also visit foreign countries to increase education or experience in specific production or business methods. These individuals can then bring back crucial information about improving the nationandrsquo;s production processes.

Part three is observations-

1. the resolution sets up a clear burden structure; the affirmative must advocate that we should prefer globalization over protectionism. This means that the neg has the inverse burden; they must prove that we should value protectionism over globalization. Just proving that globalization is bad is insufficient, because it may still be better than protectionism.  

2. Protectionism is really bad- it promotes fascist tendencies, leading to a collapse into genocide and world war
Williams BERENBERG: Politics right now 'evokes memories of the dreadful 1930s' Oscar Williams-Grut Nov. 14, 2016, 5:57 AM 6,967, http://www.businessinsider.com/berenberg-similarities-trump-brexit-1930s-protectionism-populism-nationalism-2016-1
The private German bank Berenberg believes that "some aspects of Donald Trump's successful election campaign evoke memories of the dreadful 1930s." The bank's chief economist, Holger Schmieding, said in a note sent out on Monday, "After the Brexit vote and the triumph of Trump, the echo of the early 1930s sounds a little less faint than it did before." Schmieding highlights populism, rising protectionism and nationalism, isolationism, and the erosion of the political middle ground as key features of both the current political climate and the 1930s. "Populist" leaders — including the dictators Hitler and Mussolini — came to power across Europe in the 1930s with promises to restore glory and honour to their countries, often blaming individual races

Tournament: UT | Round: 1 | Opponent: All | Judge: All
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