Tournament: Greenhill | Round: 1 | Opponent: Lexington | Judge: idk
Uniqueness/Brink
Japanese pacifism in on the brink now -- Abe’s coalition has enough members to change Japan’s constitution after the latest election but lack of intracoalition consensus prevents it
Adelstein, Jake, “Japan's ruling coalition wins election, opening door to constitutional change”, Los Angeles Times, July 10, 2016.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partner won a majority of contested seats in Japan's parliamentary election Sunday, opening a path for them to amend Japan's postwar pacifist constitution.
The results were also an endorsement of Abe’s plans to revive Japan’s flagging economy, the issue that he built his campaign around. Abe has been trying for four years to get the political support to fully implement “Abenomics,” a plan for structural reform of the economy through fiscal stimulus and monetary easing.
“In the near term, the most pressing question will be finalizing a stimulus package, which will occupy the ruling coalition for the next several months,” said Tobias Harris, a Japan analyst at the political risk advisory firm Teneo Intelligence.
Half of the seats in the upper house of parliament were up for grabs in Sunday’s election. Although the lower house is considered more powerful, the election was significant because it appeared to give Abe’s Liberal Democrats and their allies a two-thirds majority in both houses. Previously, they had a two-thirds majority in the lower house, but only a simple majority in the upper chamber.
With two-thirds majorities in both houses, Abe could initiate a constitutional amendment – if his parliamentary allies are on board. Harris said it seemed likely that the Komeito party, Abe’s coalition partner, would block a constitutional amendment, though Abe indicated after the vote that he would push for debate in parliament.
The political situation right now is critical -- Abe will never have a better chance at constitutional revision but it depends on his perception of it as a worthwhile investment of political capital
Kimberley, Neal, “Abe may never have a better chance of pushing through constitutional change”, South China Morning Post, July 26, 2016.
None of this is inevitable and indeed, given the strength of Japanese popular opposition to the abandonment of Article 9, the Abe government might well decide that their efforts are better focused on revitalising Japan’s economy rather than getting bogged down in controversial constitutional reform.
Nevertheless, the parliamentary mathematics suggests Abe may never have a better chance of pushing through constitutional change than now. The question is whether he will seek to expend political capital on the issue.
Link – Energy Security
Absent nuclear power, Japan’s increased reliance on imported energy sources, the bulk of which pass through the South China Sea, makes freedom of navigation critical to Japan’s security
Kimberley, Neal, “South China Sea headbutting of nations is about energy security”, South China Morning Post, May 20, 2016.
As the US Energy Information Authority (EIA) wrote, in 2013: “The South China Sea is one of the most important energy trade routes in the world” with “almost a third of global crude oil and over half of global liquefied natural gas (LNG)” passing through it each year.
In Japan’s case, given its own lack of natural energy resources and with the vast majority of its nuclear power plants offline since the March, 2011 earthquake and tsunami that resulted in very serious damage to and leakage from the reactors at the Fukushima plant, ensuring free navigation through the South China Sea is critical.
As the EIA pointed out in January, Japan is now the world’s largest LNG importer, second-largest coal importer and third-largest net importer of crude oil and oil products. And the vast bulk of those energy imports are sea-borne.
At the time of the Fukushima disaster Japan generated some 27 per cent of its energy from nuclear power and that has had to be replaced by even larger hydrocarbon imports, such as crude oil.
“Japan is primarily dependent on the Middle East for its crude oil imports,” the EIA said, noting that “roughly 84 per cent of Japanese crude oil imports originated from this region in 2014, up from 70 per cent in the mid-1980s.”
All those shipments pass through the South China Sea as they wend their way to Japan.
As for LNG, 84 per cent of Japan’s imports in 2013 came from eight sources, Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
All of that too has to pass through the South China Sea.
Energy security concerns are central to both official strategic thinking and the perception of the general public in Japan
Holter, Dominik thesis for MA in International Relations from Webster University Vienna, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Implications for Japanese Foreign and Security Policy, 2007.
Japan is an oil and gas importing country almost completely dependent on imports for its energy. In 2003, fifty percent of Japan's energy needs were met by oil, twenty percent by coal, fourteen percent by natural gas and nine percent by nuclear energy. These sources together covered 93 percent of Japanese energy demands. All of these sources are almost completely imported. It is against this backdrop that Karin Kneissel assesses that Japan cannot become energy self-sufficient, i.e. producing its energy domestically and thus become independent of energy imports, even in the long-run. Securing access to energy, including oil and gas, will by necessity be of importance to Japan in the coming decades, because of the strategic nature of energy due to the importance both to the economy and the armed forces. The effects of trying to ensure access to these commodities on foreign policy is often underestimated. General texts on Japanese foreign policy usually overlook the topic of energy, which is startling, given the centrality the issue of energy security holds in Japanese official strategic thinking and general public perception, including with respect to international relations.
Threats to Japanese energy security strengthen and justify the drive to amend the constitution and jettison pacifism
Kimberley, Neal, “Abe may never have a better chance of pushing through constitutional change”, South China Morning Post, July 26, 2016.
Fresh from his electoral triumph on 10 July, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will likely seek a national debate on reforming the Japanese constitution.
Ironically, though China is opposed to any changes to Japan’s constitutional commitment to pacifism, rhetoric from China may bolster Abe’s case to a Japanese people currently divided on the issue.
China will view its assertive rejection of the 12 July South China Sea ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague as justified but the language used could easily be co-opted by Tokyo to push the case for the very constitutional reform that Beijing wishes to avoid seeing implemented.
“Japan is not a state directly involved in the South China Sea issue, and thus should exercise caution in its own words and deeds, and stop hyping up and interfering,” Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said on 15 July, according to Xinhua, in response to Tokyo urging China to respect the PCA decision.
That’s a diplomatic way of saying butt out.
But Japan does have a direct interest because the bulk of its imported energy reaches it via the South China Sea.
Japan cannot afford to see territorial disputes in the South China Sea escalate to a point where freedom of navigation becomes impaired and puts at risk Japan’s seaborne energy supply lines.
And even if Japan has no territorial claims in the South China Sea, it does have them in the East China Sea where its assertion of sovereignty over the Diaoyu islands, known in Japan as the Senkakus, is rejected by Beijing.
Those in favour of dropping Japan’s commitment to pacifism, embodied in Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, could easily spin a narrative that employs China’s own stand on existing territorial disputes to support the arguments for constitutional reform in Japan itself.
Link – Political Capital
Abe is spending political capital to restart the reactors in order to ensure energy security for Japan
Mitchell, Scott, “Someone Flew a Drone Carrying Radioactive Material on to the Japanese PM’s Office”, Vice News, April 22, 2015.
Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party have long believed in restarting the country's reactors, having labeled nuclear power a fundamental "base-load power" for the country. Now after winning a snap election in December, the government has the political capital to push through the unpopular policy.
A poll conducted on the eve of the election by public broadcaster NHK showed 40 percent of Japanese people opposed the restarts, while only 24 percent supported them. Public doubt over safety standards and the ability of the country's nuclear watchdog has been stoked by errors made during the Fukushima disaster and restarting the reactors has become a sensitive political issue.
But without the reactors, Japan faces an unstable energy future. The country is now dependent on imports for 96 percent of its primary energy needs, a figure that would be reduced by 16 percent if the existing reactors were switched back on.
Impacts – Human Rights and Democracy
The danger posed by revision to Japan’s constitution cannot be understated -- Abe and his government believe in Emperor-worship and a rejection of human rights
Adelstein, Jake and Mari Yamamoto, “The Religious Cult Secretly Running Japan”, The Daily Beast, July 9, 2016.
The influence of Nippon Kaigi may be hard for an American to understand on a gut level. But try this: Imagine if “future World President” Donald Trump belonged to a right-wing evangelical group, let’s call it “USA Conference,” that advocated a return to monarchy, the expulsion of immigrants, the revoking of equal rights for women, restrictions on freedom of speech—and most of his pre-selected political appointees were from the same group.
Sounds incredible… In any case, this would worry people.
That is the American equivalent of what has already taken place in Japan with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his cabinet.
Impact – Pacifism/War
Japan’s pacifist constitution is the cornerstone of peace, collective security, and nonproliferation in East Asia
Hein, Patrick, How the Japanese Became Foreign to Themselves, 2009.
Article 9 has acted as a restraint on the militarization of Japan, which has maintained what it calls and “exclusively defense-oriented policy” and limited Japan’s Self-Defense Forces(SDF) capability to the “minimum necessary level.” In addition, Article 9 prohibits dispatching SDF to foreign territories to engage of participate in military combat overseas. Japan has also interpreted Article 9 as prohibiting the country from exporting arms, thus preventing the resurgence of Japan’s pre-war military industry complex. Furthermore, Article 9 prevents develop ent of an arms race and nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
Article 9 was born out of the direct experience of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. The devastation and immense suffering that followed these attacks led Japan to commit to the three non-nuclear principles which prohibit the country from possessing, producing, or permitting the introduction off nuclear weapons into its territory. The spirit of Article 9 rejects dependence on nuclear weapons in security policies and promotes Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones worldwide – an idea long advocated by the victims of the atomic bombings.