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Tournament: Any | Round: Quads | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any Interpretation: The neg may not read a burden that is substantively necessary and insufficient for the off
Interpretation: The neg may not defend that public colleges and universities in the US ought not restrict any forms of constitutionally protected speech except one specific type of speech
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9/5/16
JANFEB- 1AC- Existentialism
Tournament: Harvard | Round: Doubles | Opponent: LHP AA | Judge: Panel 1AC- Death of God FW There are no a priori, universal values which can define our meaning and guide our actions, because humans don’t have any fundamental sense of “essence”—the only thing common to us is that we all exist—that means the starting point of ethics must be the human condition, because questions of what to do all stem from the question of what it means to exist Sartre 46: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Jean-Paul Sartre, lecture from 1946. Existentialism is a Humanism. Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufman, Meridian Publishing Company, 1989; https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm. RW Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human reality. What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing – as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism. And this is what people call its “subjectivity,” using the word as a reproach against us. But what do we mean to say by this, but that man is of a greater dignity than a stone or a table? For we mean to say that man primarily exists – that man is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so. Man is, indeed, a project which possesses a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be. Not, however, what he may wish to be. For what we usually understand by wishing or willing is a conscious decision taken – much more often than not – after we have made ourselves what we are. I may wish to join a party, to write a book or to marry – but in such a case what is usually called my will is probably a manifestation of a prior and more spontaneous decision. If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men. The word “subjectivism” is to be understood in two senses, and our adversaries play upon only one of them. Subjectivism means, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subject and, on the other, that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity. It is the latter which is the deeper meaning of existentialism. When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men. For in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be. To choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse. What we choose is always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all. If, moreover, existence precedes essence and we will to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the entire epoch in which we find ourselves. Our responsibility is thus much greater than we had supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole. If I am a worker, for instance, I may choose to join a Christian rather than a Communist trade union. And if, by that membership, I choose to signify that resignation is, after all, the attitude that best becomes a man, that man’s kingdom is not upon this earth, I do not commit myself alone to that view. Resignation is my will for everyone, and my action is, in consequence, a commitment on behalf of all mankind. Or if, to take a more personal case, I decide to marry and to have children, even though this decision proceeds simply from my situation, from my passion or my desire, I am thereby committing not only myself, but humanity as a whole, to the practice of monogamy. I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man.
The project of morality inevitably fails because ethics seek to prescribe “essence” without first answering the question of existence—only existentialism solves by epistemically prioritizing shared principles of existence SEP 4: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Existentialism”. August 23rd, 2004. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/. RW What makes this current of inquiry distinct is not its concern with “existence” in general, but rather its claim that thinking about human existence requires new categories not found in the conceptual repertoire of ancient or modern thought; human beings can be understood neither as substances with fixed properties, nor as subjects interacting with a world of objects. On the existential view, to understand what a human being is it is not enough to know all the truths that natural science—including the science of psychology—could tell us. The dualist who holds that human beings are composed of independent substances—“mind” and “body”—is no better off in this regard than is the physicalist, who holds that human existence can be adequately explained in terms of the fundamental physical constituents of the universe. Existentialism does not deny the validity of the basic categories of physics, biology, psychology, and the other sciences (categories such as matter, causality, force, function, organism, development, motivation, and so on). It claims only that human beings cannot be fully understood in terms of them. Nor can such an understanding be gained by supplementing our scientific picture with a moral one. Categories of moral theory such as intention, blame, responsibility, character, duty, virtue, and the like do capture important aspects of the human condition, but neither moral thinking (governed by the norms of the good and the right) nor scientific thinking (governed by the norm of truth) suffices. “Existentialism”, therefore, may be defined as the philosophical theory which holds that a further set of categories, governed by the norm of authenticity, is necessary to grasp human existence. To approach existentialism in this categorial way may seem to conceal what is often taken to be its “heart” (Kaufmann 1968: 12), namely, its character as a gesture of protest against academic philosophy, its anti-system sensibility, its flight from the “iron cage” of reason. But while it is true that the major existential philosophers wrote with a passion and urgency rather uncommon in our own time, and while the idea sthat philosophy cannot be practiced in the disinterested manner of an objective science is indeed central to existentialism, it is equally true that all the themes popularly associated with existentialism—dread, boredom, alienation, the absurd, freedom, commitment, nothingness, and so on—find their philosophical significance in the context of the search for a new categorial framework, together with its governing norm.
Outweighs— A. Analytic B. All moral questions collapse to existential ones because asking why we should perform a certain action presupposes that there is a reason to exist in the first place SEP 4: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Existentialism”. August 23rd, 2004. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/. RW By what standard are we to think our efforts “to be,” our manner of being a self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a particular thing instantiates—this hammer is a good one if it instantiates what a hammer is supposed to be—and if there is nothing that a human being is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at all be thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that philosophy can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify particular ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what I do “as” myself and as “anyone,” so in this sense existing is something at which I can succeed or fail. Authenticity—in German, Eigentlichkeit—names that attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen). What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral evaluations. In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it because it is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting for the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further evaluation to be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, I do so because that is what “one” does (what “moral people” do). But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own, something to which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly, doing the right thing from a fixed and stable character—which virtue ethics considers a condition of the good—is not beyond the reach of existential evaluation: such character may simply be a product of my tendency to “do what one does,” including feeling “the right way” about things and betaking myself in appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might also be a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a person of this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the latter case, however, have I succeeded in being myself.12 Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of “transparency” with regard to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be responsible for who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover myself from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous “one-self” that characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity thus indicates a certain kind of integrity—not that of a pre-given whole, an identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I can either commit myself (and thus “become” what it entails) or else simply occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various affairs. Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the measure of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be a self is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be the author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992). In contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity, one in which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it may, it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a formal one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is authentic by looking at the content of their lives.13 Authenticity defines a condition on self-making: do I succeed in making myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find myself in? Thus, to be authentic can also be thought as a way of being autonomous. In choosing “resolutely”—that is, in commiting myself to a certain course of action, a certain way of being in the world—I have given myself the rule that belongs to the role I come to adopt. The inauthentic person, in contrast, merely occupies such a role, and may do so “irresolutely,” without commitment. Being a father authentically does not necessarily make me a better father, but what it means to be a father has become explicitly my concern. It is here that existentialism locates the singularity of existence and identifies what is irreducible in the first-person stance. At the same time, authenticity does not hold out some specific way of life as a norm; that is, it does not distinguish between the projects that I might choose. Instead, it governs the manner in which I am engaged in such projects—either as “my own” or as “what one does,” transparently or opaquely. Thus existentialism's focus on authenticity leads to a distinctive stance toward ethics and value-theory generally. The possibility of authenticity is a mark of my freedom, and it is through freedom that existentialism approaches questions of value, leading to many of its most recognizable doctrines.
That yields the principle of existential freedom—we have an obligation to act in accordance with our common humanity, as this obligation to create our own meanings is something we all inevitably share and are bound to—actions are thus consistent with freedom insofar as they respect the condition of persons to define their own existence Manzi 13: Yvonne Manzi, January 23rd, 2013. Jean Paul Sartre: Existential Freedom and the Political. http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/23/jean-paul-sartre-existential-freedom-and-the-political/. RW Existentialist philosophers such as Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre were well-known in their time for being involved in resistance, unforgiving of collaborationism and conformity, and for having an active interest in revolutionary movements7. When coupled with the fact that freedom is one of the most significant themes that are examined by existentialist philosophers, one wonders why this branch of philosophy has not been more appropriately dealt with in political thought. Perhaps it is because existentialism indeed appears to be more of a life-philosophy than a tradition fit for the conception of political theory and policy. I argue that before political theories, policies and institutions can be conceived, one must first be able to appropriately situate the human condition. Existentialism provides a unique and compelling account of what it means to be ‘human’, which allows for Sartre’s conception of freedom to be reasonably developed. Existentialists maintain that we cannot know anything if not from our subjectivity. The first and only real thing we know is that we exist and that we experience everything subjectively. This leads us into questions of being. Hegel distinguished between the being of objects (being-in-itself), and human Being (or Geist) – this provided one of the bases for Sartre’s later distinction (Hegel 1807). Heidegger provided a second contribution, which in a sense defines the core of this philosophical tradition. He claimed that we cannot reflect on the meaning of being in relation to our existence, if we do not first understand it philosophically8 (Heidegger 1927). Heidegger especially critiqued the Cartesian question of existence, claiming that such a question arises from an ontologically inadequate beginning (Ibid, 83). He criticised the notion of substance, and he argued that individuals are Dasein, or ‘beings-in-the-world’. A last notion which is worth mentioning is primarily a Sartrean one; that of authenticity. “Existence is authentic to the extent that the existe has taken possession of himself and… has moulded himself in his own image” (Macquarrie 1972, 206). When the individual does not allow himself to be moulded and bound by outside rules and morals, when he “exercises freedom rather than being determined by the prevailing public tastes and standards”11 (Ibid, 207), then he and lives an authentic existence.
That outweighs normative obligations—existentialism means the subject is “condemned to be free” so our fw is inescapable Dastagir 7: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Dr. Md. Golam Dastagir. “Existentialist concepts of freedom and Morality: An Appraisal.” Published in Jibon Darshan – a Research Journal of Philosophy, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, vol. 1, 2007. RW The central thesis of Sartre’s view of existentialism lies in his famous statement ‘existence precedes essence,’ which means that man exists first and in that existence man defines himself and the world in his own subjectivity. Man is born as a single and unique being devoid of all nature, for ‘man is nothing,’ says Sartre. He says there are no essences that follow from the nature of the world, ‘for human reality essence comes after existence.’ Man creates his own character and his own personality from the time of conception, and in this way he builds up himself. He builds his own future, which is obviously uncertain from which his tension, in his words, anxiety flows. It is, thus, said that a man can still become what he is not, or he was not before, or has not become yet, by his own activity. So, the best way of defining a man is: ‘he is what he is not, he is not what he is.’ Man is free with an unrestricted possibility; he can even become God, as he puts it, ‘Being a man is equivalent to being engaged in becoming God’, for man is always incomplete. No one is complete until desath, when choosing ceases. And in choosing ‘man is alone’, as no one, not even God, can help him to choose, or intervene with his free choice. Sartre, actually, is of the opinion that individual man makes his existence and nature out of an endless world of possibility and innumerable problems for which he alone is responsible, since God or any other man cannot choose for a man on behalf of him. Man must blame himself, not others, for the consequences (desirable or undesirable) of his actions. So, I am responsible for only what I am and what I am not. From this point of view, Sartre seems to have said that we do not need God, even if He exists. He is, in Sartre’s words, de trop to human being. Otherwise Jean-Paul Sartre, the French existentialist playwright-philosopher, differs from Kierkegaard in terms of freedom and responsibility. Sartre, while defending his existentialism as humanism, mentioned that ‘...we can begin by saying that existentialism, in our sense of the word, is a doctrine that does render human life possible; a doctrine, also, which affirms that every truth and every action implies both an environment and a human subjectivity.’17 As an individual human being, we cannot claim our actions are determined by forces exterior to us; for man is ‘condemned to be free.’ So, freedom is a basic factor of human existence. Sartre says we are ‘doomed to freedom,’ just as Heidegger says we are ‘thrown into freedom’. Avoiding any action is also an action, a choice, chosen only by himself. ‘Man is free’ means he is a non-being, for man is born as having fully nothing (like tabula rasa of Locke) and he cannot have any universal nature of his own. Since non-being or nothing, he decides for doing something in this world, and his nature is made up from that moment. Man is completely alone and unaided when he makes his decision, and he himself is responsible for what he does and what he is today. Thus, man is nothing more or less than what he makes of himself. This leads Sartre to claim that there is no God, or ultimate reality, who can determine man’s destiny to be regarded as good or evil. In this sense, it is man who himself is responsible for the consequences of his choices. Impacts: Analytic Thus, the standard is consistency with existential freedom
Prefer additionally— All systems of ethics presuppose the existence of an autonomous will—otherwise culpability would be nonsensical Dastagir 7: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Dr. Md. Golam Dastagir. “Existentialist concepts of freedom and Morality: An Appraisal.” Published in Jibon Darshan – a Research Journal of Philosophy, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, vol. 1, 2007. RW Every individual man in this sense has to be regarded as determining his own criteria, for we have no universal, or a priori moral standard, in our consciousness. Thus, morality is created by only individual man. This is very much akin to the formation of art. But Sartre, as we have seen, never says that morality can be created by individual as ego-centric; rather, he applies it to the whole mankind since man’s duty is to consider before doing anything for himself whether it will be accepted to be good for all either. Man confronts anguish, because whenever I make a decision to be good, my sense of responsibility becomes conscious. In this sense, ‘choosing’ means to suffer from one kind of anguish and despair. Sartre’s view makes us believe that man bears his burden of freedom and responsibility until he has a chance of self-passing. If all desires of man are fulfilled, he will turn into an object like a cauliflower devoid of freedom of choice, responsibility, etc. Freedom, therefore, survives in the strife of ‘is’ and ‘is-not’ (being and non-being), and its end is only in death. But in fact, Sartre does not affirm death to be man’s free-choice, nevertheless, he claims that man is to be responsible for his life as well as his death.28 But, Sartre can be challenged. How can I be responsible for the action that is not chosen by me? In addition, if death is undetermined, uncertain, or undecided, we have to admit that death necessarily impairs our freedom. If I am responsible for my own freedom of choice, I must consciously determine my desires, because, if my willed-act is not determined by me, I can never be responsible for that action. Sartre holds that if anybody throws a part of burning cigarette unwillingly, or unconsciously, for which any fire can be occurred, then the man should not be regarded to be liable as his action is considered here to be undetermined. On the contrary, a man is fully liable for hurling a bomb anywhere as he wills to do it for which his act is undoubtedly considered to be free.29
Ideal Theory Ks don’t link—Existentialism doesn’t rely on the same justifications as traditional rationalist philosophies Dastagir 7: I don’t endorse any of the gendered language of the evidence Dr. Md. Golam Dastagir. “Existentialist concepts of freedom and Morality: An Appraisal.” Published in Jibon Darshan – a Research Journal of Philosophy, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, vol. 1, 2007. RW Existentialism is a movement or tendency against traditional philosophical system. But why is this movement? Generally speaking, a strong protest against idealist and rationalist philosophy on the one hand, and an attempt to build up a new phase of life by recovering freedom and individuality of man lost in a steady pace of scientific and technological exploration on the other, gave birth to this philosophy. “It is a revolt against authority—against the church and the many forms of religious authoritarianism that tend to destroy the inner spiritual development of the individual.” The realization of philosophers that individual man of flesh and blood is not merely an idea or concept, nor an abstract reality manipulated by a machine or an instrument, but an independent human being experiencing anxiety, dread, fear and despair was the first and probably the foremost principle for which they boldly declared that man’s real significance rested on his consciousness of own existence and freedom. It seems that non- existence is an essential content of existence, because the necessity of one’s own existence is realized from one’s suspicion and inquisitiveness about own existence. Classic forms of existentialism can be traced not only in philosophy, but also in literature, art, films, etc.5 Existentialism typically exposes a dismissal of abstract theories, emphasizing the subjective realities of individual existence, individual freedom, and individual choice. Thus, ‘man exists’ means he has an individual reality, freedom for which every individual man is a probable of potency. Since free, he makes his own personality by his own independent choice for which he is solely responsible. Even not choosing is a form of choice. The key themes are the individuals and systems, being and absurdity, the nature and significance of choice, the role of extreme experiences, and the nature of communication. Individuals rather than the universals, and more clearly inner existence of the human individual, as inwardly experienced, are the primary concepts with which existentialists are concerned.
Induction fails— A. Analytic B. Future predictions are indeterminate Jervis 97: Robert Jervis, professor of international affairs – Columbia, ’97 (Robert Jervis,"Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions," in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University). http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Complexity_Global.pdf. RW Because actions change the environment in which they operate, identical but later behavior does not produce identical results: history is about the changes produced by previous thought and action as people and organizations confront each other through time. The final crisis leading to World War II provides an illustration of some of these processes. Hitler had witnessed his adversaries give in to pressure; as he explained, "Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich." But the allies had changed because of Hitler’s behavior. So had Poland. As A.J.P. Taylor puts it, "Munich cast a long shadow. Hitler waited for it to happen again; Beck took warning from the fate of Benes." Hitler was not the only leader to fail to understand that his behavior would change his environment. Like good linear social scientists, many statesmen see that their actions can produce a desired outcome, all other things being equal, and project into the future the maintenance of the conditions that their behavior will in fact undermine. This in part explains the Argentine calculations preceding the seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas. Their leaders could see that Britain’s ability to protect its position was waning, as evinced by the declining naval presence, and that Argentina’s claim to the islands had received widespread international support. But what they neglected was the likelihood that the invasion would alter these facts, unifying British opinion against accepting humiliation and changing the issue for international audiences from the illegitimacy of colonialism to the illegitimacy of the use of force. A similar neglect of the transformative power of action may explain why Saddam Hussein thought he could conquer Kuwait. Even if America wanted to intervene, it could do so only with the support and cooperation of other Arab countries, which had sympathized with Iraq’s claims and urged American restraint. But the invasion of Kuwait drastically increased the Arabs’ perception of threat and so altered their stance. Furthermore, their willingness to give credence to Iraqi promises was destroyed by the deception that had enabled the invasion to take everyone by surprise. Germany’s miscalculation in 1917 was based on a related error: although unrestricted submarine warfare succeeded in sinking more British shipping than the Germans had estimated would be required to drive Britain from the war, the American entry (which Germany expected) led the British to tolerate shortages that otherwise would have broken their will because they knew that if they held out, the U.S. would rescue them. The failure to appreciate the fact that the behavior of the actors is in part responsible for the environment which then impinges on them can lead observers—and actors as well— to underestimate actors’ influence. Thus states caught in a conflict spiral believe that they have little choice but to respond in kind to the adversary’s hostility. This may be true, but it may have been the states’ earlier behavior that generated the situation that now is compelling. Robert McNamara complains about how he was mislead by faulty military reporting but similarly fails to consider whether his style and pressure might have contributed to what he was being told. Interaction can be so intense and transformative that we can no longer fruitfully distinguish between actors and their environments, let alone say much about any element in isolation. We are accustomed to referring to roads as safe or dangerous, but if the drivers understand the road conditions this formulation may be misleading: the knowledge that, driving habits held constant, one stretch is safe or dangerous will affect how people drive—they are likely to slow down and be more careful when they think the road is dangerous and speed up and let their attention wander when it is "safe." It is then the road-driver system that is the most meaningful unit of analysis. In the wake of the sinking of a roll-on roll-off ferry, an industry representative said: With roro’s, the basic problem is that you have a huge open car deck with doors at each end. But people are well aware of this, and it is taken into account in design and operation. You don’t mess around with them. There have not been too many accidents because they are operated with such care. Contention
First, the ability to communicate freely through speech is an essential part of existential freedom Hawa no date: Salam Hawa, Philosphy of Literature. “Language as freedom in Sartre’s philosophy.” http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Lite/LiteHawa.htm. RW In this paper I shall argue that Sartre posits language as a medium of communication that is capable of safeguarding subjectivity and freedom. Language does this in a two-fold manner: on the one hand it is an action which does not phenomenally alter being, but which has the capacity of altering consciousness; on the other hand, language, more particularly written text, is a mode of communication that is delayed, hence that occurs out with the present, i.e. in a different space and a deferred time, and as such it preserves the subjectivity of both writer and reader. I present this argument in the following manner: first, I present Sartre's definition of freedom and subjectivity in terms of his definition of consciousness of the For-itself and In-self in Being and Nothingness; second, I draw on examples from La Nausée to illustrate the link between language, consciousness and the expression of freedom and subjectivity; third, I refer to The Psychology of Imagination and What is Literature? to illustrate further the importance that Sartre places on writing and reading as means both to freedom and subjectivity. In Existentialism and Humanism (1946), Sartre states that "if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or as Heidegger has it the human reality." (1) Sartre believes that "existence comes before essence — or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjective." (2) This implies that each individual "cannot pass beyond human subjectivity," (3) i.e. that the recognition and constitution of one's subjectivity represent the highest point in the achievement of freedom, for there is no divine beyond, no transcendent Other whose Being can define the essence of humanity. (4) Human reality is characterized by 'contingency', and the identity of the self hinges upon the total sum and interpretation of the product of these 'accidents'. In his definition of subjectivity, Sartre makes a distinction between consciousness of the self and creation of the self. (5) Consciousness exists outside being, and is external to the phenomenon of existence; it appears in and through being, but does not constitute this being. (6) By contrast, self-creation lies in praxis, i.e. the action made by the individual according to a decision to commit such an act. The result of such an action constitutes the self in reality. This distinction appears in this (radical) form in the early philosophical essays and, more explicitly, in Being and Nothingness (1943). It also appears in Sartre's literary works: in La Nausée (1938), the author of the diary, Roquentin, recognizes that his essence is entirely distinct from his being. The freedom of his consciousness is displayed in its ability to become one with other existential beings, such as a tree-root or a gust of wind. Sartre's work expresses his desire to give rise to a knowledge of individual subjectivity that is 'authentic' — untainted, uninformed by social, religious or political pressures. Following from this radical separation between things and thought, freedom for Sartre is limited to the extent that I am able to remain as consciousness acting on the Other. However, the Other is not always a tree-root, or a gust of wind, but it is also, and more fundamental to my freedom, an-Other consciousness. My freedom is limited and runs the risk of disintegrating when faced with the Other's subjective world. (14) This falling apart of my universe occurs because in and through the Other's gaze I am an object in the Other's world, as much as the Other is an object in mine; to be looked at is to be annihilated in the gaze of the Other, thereby feeling myself transformed from a Subject to myself to an object for the Other. By being looked at I am transcended, my possibilities are transcended by those of the Other, and this because I am no longer the sole actor in the situation, nor the sole perceiver; my actions (intentions) are already perceived and observed by the Other, a situation which renders my possibilities (what I can and shall do) into probabilities (what I may and will do). The Other locates me in space, and posits me in time. This occurs because with the Other's presence I am forced to acknowledge the feeling and possibility of simultaneous existence. This feeling of simultaneity makes me also feel subject to the Other's actions, and therewith "I am his slave." (15) However, the Other's gaze does not endow me with ordinary knowledge, but is literally a "hole in my universe," and hence a new dimension which gives rise to specific reactions (shame, pride, alienation etc.) proving the Other's existence, as well as my 'being' as 'object' of these feelings. It then becomes my duty to myself to render manifest my will, hence 'act' according to a 'choice' that I have made, in order to alter this situation of 'objectivity'. It is up to me to become subject again, to free myself from this 'objectification'. This choice and its responsibility constitute my For-itself, i.e. my freedom, as well as my subjectivity. It is in the very nature of this choice and responsibility that lies my existential angst. According to Sartre, anguish is "far from being a screen which could separate us from action, it is a condition of action itself." (16) It is in this action that my reality is constituted, and lies the essence of my selfhood independent of any socially determined consciousness. This explains Sartre's demand that consciousness and actuality be distinct, for one may be conscious of many things, but it is only in action that one is able to ground this potential into reality. Therefore, it comes to appear that individuals need language — as distinct from simply disjointed words — to identify and define the content of their essence. The self is constituted in the totality of words defining its moments of 'becoming'. For Sartre, the self acquires a meaning in the very act of objectifying itself, albeit for simply the mere momentof this action. Its meaning is momentary, the time it takes to act, or utter a sentence, and then this self is altered by this act thereby becoming other to itself (i.e. the self before the act occurred). As such, the words uttered to express the first moment of an acted consciousness cannot be taken as final, and will have to wait until this self ceases to act, collects the essence of all previous actions in their totality, composes one last narrative that may be used to define it. Hence, words, although not defining the immediate empty self, do arise, and are indeed necessary, as Roquentin suggests, for the recognition, the knowledge of this lived life. Takes out hate speech DAs— Analytic Second, speech codes represent an unjust imposition of essence onto the subject Lambert 16 (Saber, writer @ being libertarian, "The Degradation of Free Speech and Personal Liberty," April 9, 2016, https:beinglibertarian.com/the-degradation-of-free-speech-and-personal-liberty). RW Many individuals in society claim that they live in a free nation full of individual liberties. North American constitutions such as the ones implemented in the United States and Canada allow for freedom of speech. However, it is evident that the government has implemented and enforced policies to the contrary. There are a plethora of entertainment programs that have strict censorship policies that go against freedom of speech as it disallows, for example, television producers and musicians to use words or phrases that may be offensive directly or indirectly to a person or group. Regardless, if it is possibly offensive to one or many, the U.S. and Canadian constitutions allow for individuals to say very controversial things. However, restricting one’s freedom of speech in the form of censorship greatly impacts the exchange of ideas that are said to contribute to the (possibly) improvement of society. It is not up to the government to decide what individuals choose to say, read, or hear, and it should not be up to the government to decide what is acceptable within society. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States controls all forms of television broadcasting and claims “it is a violation of federal law to air obscene programming at any time. It is also a violation of federal law to air indecent programming or profane language during certain hours.” It is quite clear that censorship by institutional power is a way to control a society in the sense that it determines what individuals in society can legally say, hear, or read. It is against the majoritarian virtues and values that are constitutionally instilled within a society, and is often paralleled to a form of dictatorship – no matter how miniscule.
2/20/17
JANFEB- 1AC- Kant
Tournament: Blake | Round: 1 | Opponent: Roseville Area YF | Judge: William Lai FW Humanity must be valued as an end in itself—two warrants: First, realism fails, prefer a constructivist approach to ethics—there are no mind-independent moral truths, instead those can only be derived through rational reflection—it follows that humanity is the source of all value Bagnoli 14 Bagnoli, Carla, "Constructivism in Metaethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/constructivism-metaethics/.
This is not to say that one is bound by requirements because one legislates them; otherwise, evil people would not be bound by the moral law (Korsgaard 1996a, 234–235; O'Neill 2003c; Reath 2006, 112–113, 92–170; Korsgaard 2008, 207–229). Rather, one can autonomously act on such requirements only if one legislates them. This is because universal principles guarantee that action is expressive of an agent's integrity, rather than merely in the service of satisfying preferences or desires. Like Plato and Kant, Korsgaard argues that some kind of integrity is necessary to be an agent and cannot be achieved without a commitment to morality, which is founded on reason (Korsgaard 2009, xii, Chapter 3; cf. Plato Republic 443d-e). A canonical objection against the attempt to ground morality on rationality is that it fails to account for the special bonds and ties we have with our loved ones and thus fails to capture the nature of integrity and morality (Williams 1981). To address these worries, Korsgaard introduces the notion of "practical identities", which specify roles as sources of special obligations. For instance, Adam values himself and finds his life worth living and his actions worth undertaking under the description of being a teacher of music, an American citizen, and Robert's friend (Korsgaard 1996a, 101, §3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009, 20). These practical identities govern Adam's choices, sustain his integrity, and are sources of specific obligations to his pupils, fellows, and friends (Korsgaard 1996a, §3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009, 22). However, we do not have obligations just because we occupy certain roles as teachers, citizens, or friends. Rather, such roles become practical identities, and sources of reasons, insofar as we rationally endorse them. Rational endorsement, in turn, requires that we test our loyalties and allegiances according to the principle of universality, which commits us to morality. In order to value ourselves under these specific descriptions, we ought to value humanity in ourselves and in others (Korsgaard 2008, Lecture 6, 25–26). Korsgaard offers what is called a ‘transcendental argument’ for this conclusion. A transcendental argument is an argument that identifies the conditions under which it is possible for something to be the case. Korsgaard argues that valuing humanity, understood as the capacity for rationality, is the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all (Korsgaard 1996a, 121–123; Korsgaard 1998, 60–62; Korsgaard 2009). Evaluators bestow value on objects on the basis of reasons, and thus in virtue of their rational capacity. The value of any object thus ultimately depends on the rational capacity of evaluators. ~thus~ valuing ‘Humanity’ is the name of a distinctive value, which is unconditional and counts as the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all. Since humanity is embodied in all rational beings, we should value humanity in ourselves as well as in others, on pain of incoherence. Special obligations and bonds that derive from local identities are insufficient to sustain our integrity when they are inconsistent with valuing humanity. For instance, the conduct of a Mafioso cannot be coherently justified on the basis of a universal principle. The Mafioso thus fails as a rational agent and leads a life that is not autonomous, since his life is not the product of reflective self-government. A systematic failure to be guided by universal principles of self-government amounts to a loss of agency. We cannot but be agents, and thus we are necessarily bound by the norms of rationality and morality. Korsgaard's strategy depends on establishing that the norms of rationality and morality can be derived from the constitutive features of agency and that agency is inescapable. Both these claims have been attacked on grounds that will be discussed in section §
Second is Practical Identity— other obligations are particulars, which depend on contingent conditions, while standing as persons is more fundamental.
Stephen Engstrom 08 ~professor of philosophy. Before coming to the University of Pittsburgh in 1990, he taught at the University of Chicago and at Harvard~, "Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge", 2008, BE In addition to the idea of universal legislation as the form of practical cognition, there’s a related idea guiding Kant’s thinking about the constraints of pure practical reason that needs to be borne in mind when we consider how they apply in choice and action. Since the exercise of practical reason proceeds from the universal to the particular, the application of the formula of universal law should proceed in this direction as well. Thus in attempting to determine what obligations to other persons this principle of universality might support, we should first consider its application in the most primitive, or fundamental, exercise of the will, and to do this we will need to consider the most basic practical self-conception of a particular human person.11 It would be inappropriate, for example, to begin with duties that presuppose particular relations between the persons involved, such as the ties between citizens, family members, or friends. Such obligations, important though they are, depend upon specific, contingent conditions of action, whereas the cases we should consider first are those of duties that attach to us most fundamentally, merely in virtue of our standing as human persons, or subjects with wills, sharing the power of practical reason.
Next, the categorical imperative must be the ultimate guide to action—it’s the only way to ground moral obligations—that means the maxims we act on must be universalizable
Among contemporary philosophers, Christine Korsgaard has developed the most ambitious, and controversial, version of Kantian constructivism. She defines Kantian constructivism as a form of "procedural realism"—the view that "there are answers to moral questions because there are correct procedures for arriving at them"; and she contrasts procedural realism with "substantive realism"—the view that "there are correct procedures for answering moral questions because there are moral truths or facts, which exist independently of those procedures, and which those procedures track" (Korsgaard 1996a, 36–37; see also Engstrom 2009, 119). Substantive realism holds that there are objective criteria of correctness for moral judgments only if such judgments represent matters of fact about the way the world is. By contrast, the constructivist view is that there are objective criteria of moral judgment insofar as there are objective criteria about how to reason on practical matters. There are objective reasons that prohibit deceiving and manipulating others, but such reasons are the result of practical reasoning, rather than discovered by empirical investigation, grasped by the intellect, or revealed by some god. What makes this view "Kantian" is that there is ultimately one criterion for reasoning on practical matters, which is the Categorical Imperative. By reasoning according to this criterion, we objectively ground moral obligation. This is to say, moral obligations are requirements of practical reason. Korsgaard's case for constructivism parallels Kant's as Rawls reconstructs it. It starts by objecting that substantive realism fails to respond to the skeptical challenge because it simply assumes the existence of objective standards for morality without offering a rational basis for them. As a consequence, the realist also fails to account for the authority of moral obligations—for why we really ought to do as morality says. (Korsgaard 1996a; Korsgaard 2008, 234, 30–31, 55–57, 67–68). Realists are misled by the presumption that, in order to fend off skepticism, one has to anchor practical reasons in facts that are in themselves normative. But no appeal to such "normative facts" can explain how they count as reasons and motivate rational agents. Suppose we agree that it is a normative fact that deception is morally wrong. How does awareness of this fact rationally ~doesn’t~ compel us to refrain from deceiving? This is not only a psychological question about the force that such a fact might exercise on our minds, but also, and most importantly, a normative question that concerns their authority. According to Korsgaard, "the normative question" arises for humans insofar as they are capable of reflecting on themselves and considering their thoughts and desires from a detached perspective. This reflective distance allows rational agents to call into question the legitimacy of particular thoughts and desires and to suspend their pull. Because they are reflective, rational agents have ideals about the sort of persons they want to be, and they can guide their minds and actions accordingly. That is, they are capable of self-governance. Like Kant, Korsgaard thinks that the appropriate form of self-governance is self-legislation (Korsgaard 1996a, 36, 91, 231–232; Korsgaard 2008, 3). According to Korsgaard, rational agents are guided by universal principles that they have legislated. The appeal to self-legislation does not make the moral law coincide with the arbitrary decisions of particular agents. The moral law is a principle of reasoning that binds all rational agents, not a decree of any one rational agent (Korsgaard 1996a, 36, 234–236; Korsgaard 2008, 207–229; Reath 2006, 112–113, 92–170). The constructivist claim is that the moral law obliges us only insofar as it is self-legislated.
Put away your Util NC—this notion of value precludes aggregation. Korsgaard 93 Korsgaard, Christine. Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. "The reasons we can share: An attack on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values." Cambridge University Press, 1993. Previously published in Social Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 1: 24-51. http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3196321/Korsgaard'ReasonsShare.pdf?sequence=2 The difference between these two interpretations of neutral value is naturally associated with two other differences. First, the two views will normally involve a different priority-ordering between subjective or relative and objective or neutral values. According to Objective Realism, subjective values are derived from objective ones: an individual comes to value something by perceiving that it has (objective) value. Our relation to values, on this account, is epistemological, a relation of discovery or perception. According to Intersubjectivism, objective values are derived or - better - constructed from subjective ones. Our individual, subjective interests become intersubjective values when, because of the attitude we take towards one another, we come to share each other’s ends. On this view, our relation to values is one of creation or construction. The second and related difference concerns the possibility of adding and subtracting value across the boundaries between persons. On an Intersubjectivist interpretation, neutral reasons are shared, but they are always initially subjective or agent-relative reasons. So on this view, everything that is good or bad is so because it is good or bad for someone. This makes it natural for an Intersubjectivist to deny that values can be added across the boundaries between people. My happiness is good for me and yours is good for you, but the sum of these two values is not good for anyone, and so the Intersubjectivist will deny that the sum, as such, is a value. But an Objective Realist, who thinks that the value is in the object rather than in its relation to the subject, may think that we can add. Two people’s happinesses, both good in themselves, will be better than one. Since consequentialism depends upon the possibility that values may be added, an Objective realist about value may be a consequentialist, while an Intersubjectivist will not ~be a consequentialist~. It follows that a system of equal freedom is key. Only a system of equal freedom respects the right of humans to set their own purposes. Ripstein 9 Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto). "Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy." 2009. The same right to be your own master within a system of equal freedom also generates what Kant calls an "internal duty" of rightful honor, which "consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying do not make yourself into a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them."14 Kant says that this duty can be "explained. as obligation from the right of humanity in our own person." Kant’s characterization of this as an "internal duty" may seem out of place, given his earlier characterization of the Universal Principle of Right in terms of restrictions on each person’s conduct in light of the freedom of others. But the duty of rightful honor is also relational: it is a duty because it is a limit on the exercise of a person’s freedom that is imposed by the Universal Principle of Right. Just as the rights of others restrict your freedom, so that you cannot acquire a right to anything by acting in ways inconsistent with the innate right of another person, so, too, the humanity in your own person restricts the ways in which you can exercise your freedom by entering into arrangements with others. Your innate right prevents you from being bound by others more than you can in turn bind them; your duty of rightful honor prevents you from making yourself bound by others in those ways. Rightful honor does not warn you away from some juridical possibility that would somehow be demeaning or unworthy. You do not wrong yourself if you enter into a binding arrangement inconsistent with the humanity in your own person. Instead, your duty of rightful honor says that no such arrangement can be binding, so no other person could be entitled to enforce a claim of right against you that presupposes that you have acted contrary to rightful honor. Rightful honor does not demand that you behave selfishly, or refrain from helping another person with some particular project, or make another person’s ends your own. To do any of these things is just to adopt some particular purpose, and so is an exercise of your freedom. In later chapters, we will see that rightful honor prevents you from giving up your capacity to set your own purposes, and so prevents others from asserting claims of right that assume that you did. In private right your rightful honor prevents you from entering into an enforceable contract of slavery, even if you were to believe the arrangement to be to your advantage. In public right, it prevents officials from making arrangements on your behalf that are inconsistent with your innate right. Rightful honor also provides the link from private right to public right by imposing a duty on each to leave the state of nature, which Kant characterizes as a condition in which everyone is subject to the choice of others.
The state of nature facilitates an infinite number of rights violations, so an omnilateral will is a necessary part of any ethical system
Kant: Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. John Ladd. 1797. Indianapolis: Hackett Publsihing, 1999. When I declare (by word or deed), "I will that an external thing shall be mine," I thereby declare it obligatory for everyone else to refrain from the object of my will. This is an obligation that no one would have apart from this juridical act of mine. Included in this claim, however, is an acknowledgement of being reciprocally bound to everyone else to a similar and equal restraint with respect to what is theirs. The obligation involved here comes from a universal rule of the external juridical relationship. Consequently, I am not bound to leave what is another’s untouched if everyone else does not in turn guarantee to me with regard to what is mine that ~t~he~y~ will act in accordance with exactly the same principle. This guarantee does not require a special juridical act, but is already contained in the concept of being externally bound to a duty on account of the universality, and hence also the reciprocity, of an obligation coming from a universal rule. Now, with respect to an external and contingent possession, a unilateral Will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone, since that would be a violation of freedom in accordance with universal laws. Therefore, only a Will binding everyone else—that is, a collective, universal (common), and powerful Will—is the kind of Will that can provide the guarantee required. The condition of being subject to general external (that is, public) legislation that is backed by power is the civil society. Accordingly, a thing can be externally yours or mine only in a civil society. Thus, the standard is consistency with a system of equal freedom Prefer additionally: Human equality mandates a system of equal freedom Ripstein 9 Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto). "Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy." 2009. Kant offers different formulations of innate right, each of which elaborates an aspect of the idea that one person must not be subject to the choice of another, which Kant glosses in terms of one person being a mere means for another. This familiar Kantian theme is explained in terms of the classic distinction, from Roman law, between persons and things. A person is a being capable of setting its own purposes. A thing is something that can be used in the pursuit of whatever purposes the person who has it might have. The classic example of a person being treated as a mere thing is the slave, for a slave is entirely at the disposal of his or her master. The slave’s problem is that he is subject to the master’s choice: the master gets to decide what to do with the slave and what the slave will do. The slave does not set his own ends, but is merely a means for ends set by someone else. To call it "the" problem is not too strong: if the other problems a slave has—low welfare, limited options, and so on—were addressed by a benevolent master, the relationship of slavery would perhaps be less bad, but it would not thereby be any less wrong. The right to be your own master is neither a right to have things go well for you nor a right to have a wide range of options. Instead, it is explicitly contrastive and interpersonal: to be your own master is to have no other master. It is not a claim about your relation to yourself, only about your relation to others. The right to equal freedom, then, is just the right that no person be the master of another. The idea of being your own master is also equivalent to an idea of equality, since none has, simply by birth, either the right to command others or the duty to obey them. So the right to equality does not, on its own, require that people be treated in the same way in some respect, such as welfare or resources, but only that no person is the master of another. Another person is not entitled to decide for you even if he knows better than you what would make your life go well, or has a pressing need that only you can satisfy. That controls the internal link to other frameworks—equality is a basic assumption of any moral system Gosepath 11 Gosepath, Stefan, "Equality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/. This fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and of the equal worth or equal dignity of all human beings (Vlastos 1962) is accepted as a minimal standard by all leading schools of modern Western political and moral culture. Any political theory abandoning this notion of equality will not be found plausible today. In a period in which metaphysical, religious and traditional views have lost their general plausibility (Habermas 1983, p. 53, 1992, pp. 39-44), it appears impossible to peacefully reach a general agreement on common political aims without accepting that persons must be treated as equals. As a result, moral equality constitutes the ‘egalitarian plateau’ for all contemporary political theories (Kymlicka 1990, p.5). Focus on rationality as the basis for rights is a good starting point for social justice—rejecting it denies agency Parker et al 8: Sonia Corea, Rosalind Petchesky, Richard Parker. 2008. Sexuality, Health and Human Rights. On the indispensability and insufficiency of human rights. http://silo-public.hunter.cuny.edu/a3e2748e5460a098c8c663a9ac3a4e5d42891043/Sexuality-Health-and-Human-Rights.pdf. RW Effective and genuinely democratic community participation – especially participation of women and economically, racially, and sexually marginalized groups – in monitoring sexual and reproductive health policies and services will happen neither as an accident of the market nor as a beneficent gift of charitable donors.2 Such participation can only come through the efforts of robust, politically conscious social movements. In turn, the logic of such movements arises out of radical oppositional ideologies and practices, not ‘consultations’ or ‘partnerships’ with the managing institutions of global capitalism. A human rights framework provides both the norms upon which movements can base social justice claims and systems of public regulation and accountability they can use as forums to publicize those claims and shame corporate and government violators – even when, in practice, enforcement is weak. Market-based and cost- effectiveness approaches fail in this regard because they are ethically closed systems; that is, they measure value only by private preferences or by price, with the lowest costs having the highest value (Schrecker 1998). Welfare state and philanthropic approaches fail as well, insofar as they treat the recipients of aid or services as passive victims or clients rather than as rights-bearing agents and equal participants in decision making. The language we use here matters. When we call the people who rely on reproductive and sexual health services ‘consumers’ or ‘users’, we reinforce the marketization of health care rather than challenging it. Individual health ‘consumers’ may be subjects of marketing research to find out about their product preferences or may be surveyed for their evaluation of provider practices. However, this is very different from a model of health provision that treats the recipient of services as a citizen with rights, that encourages her ‘to feel that she has "the right to have rights and to create rights" ~and~ to regard ~themself~ herself as the "agent and subject" of their own actions’ (Paiva 2003, p. 199). And it is not at all the same as communities mobilized on the basis of claims for social justice and human rights, and organized to participate directly in the design and evaluation of services and setting priorities for budgets and programmes. We agree with Pheng Cheah that, for contemporary social movements, rights are a necessary and irrepressible mode of expression and always, inevitably bound up in politics: ~T~he irreducible contamination of the subject of human rights indic- ates that we can no longer theorize the normativity of rights claims in terms of the rational universality of a pure, atemporal and context- 154 Promises and limits of sexual rights independent human dignity ... separated from economics or politics.... Yet, ~rights~ are the only way for the disenfranchised to mobilize. (Cheah 1997, p. 261) Of course, such participation has its costs; as Cheah observes, it ‘contami- nates’ civil society advocates with the stain of politics. For example, to become legitimate, effective actors within the UN system, transnational feminist, AIDS, and LGBTQ groups have had to learn, and in many ways internalize, the rules and procedures of that system. Whether in special ses- sions of the General Assembly or meetings of the Human Rights Council, they have had to rely on, and compete among themselves for, resources and recognition from various international donors, including not only gov- ernments and private foundations but also the World Bank and other intergovernmental agencies. Even counter-hegemonic movements asserting human rights demands in the streets – against the WTO or sexually repres- sive national laws; in favour of a moratorium on debt or treatment access for HIV and AIDS – do so in response to institutional frameworks and agendas set by those in power, including multinational corporations. But acknowledging that we act, and even achieve our identities as actors, within existing power regimes has a liberating dimension. Misnaming this process ‘co-optation’ reduces all power to a zero-sum game and misconstrues the nature of power, as well as underestimating the potential of even marginalized actors to effect change.
Contention
I contend that public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech.
First, restricting free speech in academic settings violates the system of equal freedom—It’s internally contradictory and denies basic rights
Surprenant 15: Chris W. Surprenant. Chris W. Surprenant is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Orleans, where he directs the Alexis de Tocqueville Project in Law, Liberty, and Morality. He is the author of Kant and the Cultivation of Virtue (Routledge 2014), co-editor of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary (Routledge 2012), and has published numerous journal articles in moral and political philosophy. Kant on the virtues of a free society. April 7, 2015. https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/kant-virtues-free-society. RW Kant claims that for this enlightenment to take place, "nothing is required but freedom…namely, freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters" (E 8:36). By "public use of one’s reason," he means "that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers" (E 8:37). More simply put: freedom of speech through the press. Kant’s defense of free speech is fairly consistent throughout his work, where, more often than not, it is linked to his support for the policies and practices of Frederick the Great. But in his "Theory and Practice" essay, he presents a defense of free speech more generally, commenting on the importance of free speech and its contribution to a free society. He writes: "~F~reedom of the pen…is the sole palladium of the people’s rights. For to want to deny them this freedom is not only tantamount to taking from them any claim to a right with respect to the supreme commander (according to Hobbes), but is also to withhold from the latter…all knowledge of matters that he himself would change if he knew about them and to put him in contradiction with himself" (TP 8:304). In this passage, Kant’s claim regarding the importance of free speech is two-fold. His first point, which is fairly straightforward, is that freedom of the press is the only right the people have against the sovereign. That is, they have the right to speak out against policies that they perceive to be unjust or otherwise defective. (It is important to note here that, for the most part, Kant does not believe that people have the right to disobey the law or take action against the sovereign. For more on this point, including how we might reconcile it with Kant’s emphasis on individual autonomy, see Surprenant, 2014, especially Chapter 3.) The second point is a bit less straightforward. His claim is that a sovereign that outlaws free speech creates a condition where his actions "put him in contradiction with himself." This language is remarkably similar to what he uses in his moral theory to describe principles that violate~s~ the categorical imperative, Kant’s supreme principle of morality. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that when a principle of action fails when tested against the categorical imperative, it fails because something about that principle is contradictory. It may be the case that it is not possible to conceive of the action that comes about as a result of universalizing the underlying principle connected to the action (i.e., a contradiction in conception), or the result of universalizing the principle is self-defeating in some way (i.e., a contradiction in the will). In the case of the sovereign restricting freedom of the press, the contradiction appears to be more practical. Elsewhere Kant argues what justifies sovereign authority is that his actions are supposed to represent the united will of the people (MM 6:313). But a sovereign that denies free speech and otherwise undermines the conditions necessary to maintain a free society has made it impossible to gather the information needed to represent the will of the people appropriately. In this way, Kant sees any attempt by the sovereign to limit or otherwise suppress the free exchange of ideas, and, in particular, the exchange of ideas among the educated members of society (e.g., ~especially~ academics), as ~is~ undermining his own authority. In addition to these two, practical, political benefits, and as discussed previously, free intellectual exchange also is a necessary condition for individual enlightenment. And so while Kant’s position on the function of juridical law differs from Aristotle, they share the belief that an individual can live well only if he is a member of civil society (cf. Pol 1278b 21-24). Living in a free society makes enlightenment possible. Therefore, while Kant’s "race of devils" passage suggests that the possibility of a free society does not depend on the presence of enlightened or virtuous citizens, an individual’s ability to become enlightened does depend on his living in a free society.
And, limiting free speech constitutes illegitimate state action because speech can never be a violation of freedom Varden 10 ~A Kantian Conception of Free Speech Helga Varden In Deidre Golash (ed.), Free Speech in a Diverse World. Springer (2010) philpapers.org/rec/VARAKC-5~ This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains that most ways in which a person uses words in his interactions with others cannot be seen as involv~e~ing wrongdoing from the point of view of right: "such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere" do not constitute wrongdoing because "it is entirely up to them ~the listeners~ whether they want to believe him or not" (6: 238). The utterance of words in space and time does not have the power to hinder anyone else’s external freedom, including depriving him of his means. Since words as such cannot exert physical power over people, ~thus~ it is impossible to use them as a means of coercion against another. For example, if you block my way, you coerce me by hindering my movements: you hinder my ~and~ external freedom. If, however, you simply tell me not to move, you have done nothing coercive, nothing to hinder my external freedom, as I can simply walk passed you. So, even though by means of your words, you attempt to influence my internal use of choice by providing me with possible reasons for acting, you accomplish nothing coercive. That is, you may wish that I take on your proposal for action, but you do nothing to force me to do so. Whether or not I choose to act on your suggestion is still entirely up to me. Therefore, you cannot choose for me. My choice to act on your words is beyond the reach of your words, as is any other means I might have. Indeed, even if what you suggest is the virtuous thing to do, your words are powerless with regard to making me act virtuously. Virtuous action requires not only that I act on the right maxims, but that I also do so because it is the right thing to do, or from duty. Because the choice of maxims (internal use of choice) and duty (internal freedom) are beyond the grasp of coercion, Kant holds that most uses of words, including immoral ones such as lying, cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right.
Systems of equal freedom mandate the right to noninterference—that entails free speech Dorn 14: James A. Dorn. Equality, Justice and Freedom: A constitutional Perspective. October 1, 2014. https://www.libertarianism.org/publications/essays/equality-justice-freedom-constitutional-perspective. RW Just as equality of rights and equality of outcome are inconsistent usages, so too are the twin usages of equal opportunity just noted. Extending equal opportunity to everyone violates no one’s rights when used in the sense of equal freedom. All individuals can jointly have rights to life, liberty, and property—in the sense that all are free to choose among competing alternatives in a world of scarcity. One person’s right to noninterference in the use of his property does not preclude others from having the same right to their property. Whether the property right in question is the right to freedom of contract or freedom of speech, those rights are fundamental natural rights belonging to each individual on an equal basis. Thus, in the absence of any positive welfare rights, the set of rights stemming from the basic right to noninterference (which entails only negative obligations) is a world of consistent and equal rights, "a world in which we can at all times enjoy whichever exemplifications of our right to noninterference we choose to enjoy, subject only to the restrictions we incur as a result of our own actions" (Pilon 1979a: 148). Having an equal right to noninterference or liberty, however, is not the same as having an equal power to exercise that right.~9~ Under the First Amendment, all individuals have the right to free speech, but the exercise of that right will be affected by relative endowments and, thus, by the scarcity of resources. The same is true in the exercise of economic liberties such as the right to use and dispose of private property and the right to negotiate contracts so long as third-party rights are not violated. In sum, extending the right of equal opportunity—in the sense of equal freedom and equal justice under a rule of law—to everyone as a natural right entails no opportunity cost in terms of forgoing other legitimate rights and liberties.~10~ As such, equal opportunity in this limited sense is a legitimate part of the constitutional perspective of equality. However, once equal opportunity is enlarged to mean equal endowments, the state necessarily moves from protecting property rights to redistributing them.
Restrictions in specific circumstances are incoherent and can’t be universalized ACLU 16: American Civil Liberties Union. "Hate Speech on Campus", 2016. https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus. RW
Free speech rights are indivisible. Restricting the speech of one group or individual jeopardizes everyone's rights because the same laws or regulations used to silence bigots can be used to silence you. Conversely, laws that defend free speech for bigots can be used to defend the rights of civil rights workers, anti-war protesters, lesbian and gay activists and others fighting for justice. For example, in the 1949 case of Terminiello v. Chicago, the ACLU successfully defended an ex-Catholic priest who had delivered a racist and anti-semitic speech. The precedent set in that case became the basis for the ACLU's successful defense of civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s and '70s. The indivisibility principle was also illustrated in the case of Neo-Nazis whose right to march in Skokie, Illinois in 1979 was successfully defended by the ACLU. At the time, then ACLU Executive Director Aryeh Neier, whose relatives died in Hitler's concentration camps during World War II, commented: "Keeping a few Nazis off the streets of Skokie will serve Jews poorly if it means that the freedoms to speak, publish or assemble any place in the United States are thereby weakened."
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JANFEB- 1AC- Kant v2
Tournament: Harvard | Round: 2 | Opponent: Pine View TA | Judge: Lucas Bailey 1AC Constructivism is true—moral facts aren't "out there" to be found but linguistic categories created by humans for humans—that implies unconditional human worth Bagnoli 14 Bagnoli, Carla, "Constructivism in Metaethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/constructivism-metaethics/. This is not to say that one is bound by requirements because one legislates them; otherwise, evil people would not be bound by the moral law (Korsgaard 1996a, 234–235; O'Neill 2003c; Reath 2006, 112–113, 92–170; Korsgaard 2008, 207–229). Rather, one can autonomously act on such requirements only if one legislates them. This is because universal principles guarantee that action is expressive of an agent's integrity, rather than merely in the service of satisfying preferences or desires. Like Plato and Kant, Korsgaard argues that some kind of integrity is necessary to be an agent and cannot be achieved without a commitment to morality, which is founded on reason (Korsgaard 2009, xii, Chapter 3; cf. Plato Republic 443d-e). A canonical objection against the attempt to ground morality on rationality is that it fails to account for the special bonds and ties we have with our loved ones and thus fails to capture the nature of integrity and morality (Williams 1981). To address these worries, Korsgaard introduces the notion of “practical identities”, which specify roles as sources of special obligations. For instance, Adam values himself and finds his life worth living and his actions worth undertaking under the description of being a teacher of music, an American citizen, and Robert's friend (Korsgaard 1996a, 101, §3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009, 20). These practical identities govern Adam's choices, sustain his integrity, and are sources of specific obligations to his pupils, fellows, and friends (Korsgaard 1996a, §3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009, 22). However, we do not have obligations just because we occupy certain roles as teachers, citizens, or friends. Rather, such roles become practical identities, and sources of reasons, insofar as we rationally endorse them. Rational endorsement, in turn, requires that we test our loyalties and allegiances according to the principle of universality, which commits us to morality. In order to value ourselves under these specific descriptions, we ought to value humanity in ourselves and in others (Korsgaard 2008, Lecture 6, 25–26). Korsgaard offers what is called a ‘transcendental argument’ for this conclusion. A transcendental argument is an argument that identifies the conditions under which it is possible for something to be the case. Korsgaard argues that valuing humanity, understood as the capacity for rationality, is the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all (Korsgaard 1996a, 121–123; Korsgaard 1998, 60–62; Korsgaard 2009). Evaluators bestow value on objects on the basis of reasons, and thus in virtue of their rational capacity. The value of any object thus ultimately depends on the rational capacity of evaluators. thus valuing ‘Humanity’ is the name of a distinctive value, which is unconditional and counts as the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all. Since humanity is embodied in all rational beings, we should value humanity in ourselves as well as in others, on pain of incoherence. Special obligations and bonds that derive from local identities are insufficient to sustain our integrity when they are inconsistent with valuing humanity. For instance, the conduct of a Mafioso cannot be coherently justified on the basis of a universal principle. The Mafioso thus fails as a rational agent and leads a life that is not autonomous, since his life is not the product of reflective self-government. A systematic failure to be guided by universal principles of self-government amounts to a loss of agency. We cannot but be agents, and thus we are necessarily bound by the norms of rationality and morality. Korsgaard's strategy depends on establishing that the norms of rationality and morality can be derived from the constitutive features of agency and that agency is inescapable. Both these claims have been attacked on grounds that will be discussed in section § That means denying my framework is contradictory—analytic Constructivism outweighs—other obligations are particulars, which depend on contingent conditions, while standing as persons is most fundamental Stephen Engstrom 08 professor of philosophy. Before coming to the University of Pittsburgh in 1990, he taught at the University of Chicago and at Harvard, “Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge”, 2008. In addition to the idea of universal legislation as the form of practical cognition, there’s a related idea guiding Kant’s thinking about the constraints of pure practical reason that needs to be borne in mind when we consider how they apply in choice and action. Since the exercise of practical reason proceeds from the universal to the particular, the application of the formula of universal law should proceed in this direction as well. Thus in attempting to determine what obligations to other persons this principle of universality might support, we should first consider its application in the most primitive, or fundamental, exercise of the will, and to do this we will need to consider the most basic practical self-conception of a particular human person.11 It would be inappropriate, for example, to begin with duties that presuppose particular relations between the persons involved, such as the ties between citizens, family members, or friends. Such obligations, important though they are, depend upon specific, contingent conditions of action, whereas the cases we should consider first are those of duties that attach to us most fundamentally, merely in virtue of our standing as human persons, or subjects with wills, sharing the power of practical reason. Next, the categorical imperative must be the ultimate guide to action—it’s the only way to ground moral obligations Bagnoli 2 Bagnoli, Carla, "Constructivism in Metaethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/constructivism-metaethics/. Among contemporary philosophers, Christine Korsgaard has developed the most ambitious, and controversial, version of Kantian constructivism. She defines Kantian constructivism as a form of “procedural realism”—the view that “there are answers to moral questions because there are correct procedures for arriving at them”; and she contrasts procedural realism with “substantive realism”—the view that “there are correct procedures for answering moral questions because there are moral truths or facts, which exist independently of those procedures, and which those procedures track” (Korsgaard 1996a, 36–37; see also Engstrom 2009, 119). Substantive realism holds that there are objective criteria of correctness for moral judgments only if such judgments represent matters of fact about the way the world is. By contrast, the constructivist view is that there are objective criteria of moral judgment insofar as there are objective criteria about how to reason on practical matters. There are objective reasons that prohibit deceiving and manipulating others, but such reasons are the result of practical reasoning, rather than discovered by empirical investigation, grasped by the intellect, or revealed by some god. What makes this view “Kantian” is that there is ultimately one criterion for reasoning on practical matters, which is the Categorical Imperative. By reasoning according to this criterion, we objectively ground moral obligation. This is to say, moral obligations are requirements of practical reason. Korsgaard's case for constructivism parallels Kant's as Rawls reconstructs it. It starts by objecting that substantive realism fails to respond to the skeptical challenge because it simply assumes the existence of objective standards for morality without offering a rational basis for them. As a consequence, the realist also fails to account for the authority of moral obligations—for why we really ought to do as morality says. (Korsgaard 1996a; Korsgaard 2008, 234, 30–31, 55–57, 67–68). Realists are misled by the presumption that, in order to fend off skepticism, o
Human worth necessitates a system of equal freedom, or the principle of respecting the right of humans to set their own purposes. Ripstein 9 Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto). “Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy.” 2009. The same right to be your own master within a system of equal freedom also generates what Kant calls an “internal duty” of rightful honor, which “consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying do not make yourself into a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them.”14 Kant says that this duty can be “explained. as obligation from the right of humanity in our own person.” Kant’s characterization of this as an “internal duty” may seem out of place, given his earlier characterization of the Universal Principle of Right in terms of restrictions on each person’s conduct in light of the freedom of others. But the duty of rightful honor is also relational: it is a duty because it is a limit on the exercise of a person’s freedom that is imposed by the Universal Principle of Right. Just as the rights of others restrict your freedom, so that you cannot acquire a right to anything by acting in ways inconsistent with the innate right of another person, so, too, the humanity in your own person restricts the ways in which you can exercise your freedom by entering into arrangements with others. Your innate right prevents you from being bound by others more than you can in turn bind them; your duty of rightful honor prevents you from making yourself bound by others in those ways. Rightful honor does not warn you away from some juridical possibility that would somehow be demeaning or unworthy. You do not wrong yourself if you enter into a binding arrangement inconsistent with the humanity in your own person. Instead, your duty of rightful honor sayss that no such arrangement can be binding, so no other person could be entitled to enforce a claim of right against you that presupposes that you have acted contrary to rightful honor. Rightful honor does not demand that you behave selfishly, or refrain from helping another person with some particular project, or make another person’s ends your own. To do any of these things is just to adopt some particular purpose, and so is an exercise of your freedom. In later chapters, we will see that rightful honor prevents you from giving up your capacity to set your own purposes, and so prevents others from asserting claims of right that assume that you did. In private right your rightful honor prevents you from entering into an enforceable contract of slavery, even if you were to believe the arrangement to be to your advantage. In public right, it prevents officials from making arrangements on your behalf that are inconsistent with your innate right. Rightful honor also provides the link from private right to public right by imposing a duty on each to leave the state of nature, which Kant characterizes as a condition in which everyone is subject to the choice of others. Moreover, ethics requires the existence of the autonomous will, because otherwise culpability is nonsensical—analytic
Thus, the standard is consistency with a system of equal freedom. Prefer additionally: Consequentialism fails—
a. analytic b. future predictions are indeterminate Jervis 97: Robert Jervis, professor of international affairs – Columbia, ’97 (Robert Jervis,"Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions," in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University). http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Complexity_Global.pdf. RW Because actions change the environment in which they operate, identical but later behavior does not produce identical results: history is about the changes produced by previous thought and action as people and organizations confront each other through time. The final crisis leading to World War II provides an illustration of some of these processes. Hitler had witnessed his adversaries give in to pressure; as he explained, "Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich." But the allies had changed because of Hitler’s behavior. So had Poland. As A.J.P. Taylor puts it, "Munich cast a long shadow. Hitler waited for it to happen again; Beck took warning from the fate of Benes." Hitler was not the only leader to fail to understand that his behavior would change his environment. Like good linear social scientists, many statesmen see that their actions can produce a desired outcome, all other things being equal, and project into the future the maintenance of the conditions that their behavior will in fact undermine. This in part explains the Argentine calculations preceding the seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas. Their leaders could see that Britain’s ability to protect its position was waning, as evinced by the declining naval presence, and that Argentina’s claim to the islands had received widespread international support. But what they neglected was the likelihood that the invasion would alter these facts, unifying British opinion against accepting humiliation and changing the issue for international audiences from the illegitimacy of colonialism to the illegitimacy of the use of force. A similar neglect of the transformative power of action may explain why Saddam Hussein thought he could conquer Kuwait. Even if America wanted to intervene, it could do so only with the support and cooperation of other Arab countries, which had sympathized with Iraq’s claims and urged American restraint. But the invasion of Kuwait drastically increased the Arabs’ perception of threat and so altered their stance. Furthermore, their willingness to give credence to Iraqi promises was destroyed by the deception that had enabled the invasion to take everyone by surprise. Germany’s miscalculation in 1917 was based on a related error: although unrestricted submarine warfare succeeded in sinking more British shipping than the Germans had estimated would be required to drive Britain from the war, the American entry (which Germany expected) led the British to tolerate shortages that otherwise would have broken their will because they knew that if they held out, the U.S. would rescue them. The failure to appreciate the fact that the behavior of the actors is in part responsible for the environment which then impinges on them can lead observers—and actors as well— to underestimate actors’ influence. Thus states caught in a conflict spiral believe that they have little choice but to respond in kind to the adversary’s hostility. This may be true, but it may have been the states’ earlier behavior that generated the situation that now is compelling. Robert McNamara complains about how he was mislead by faulty military reporting but similarly fails to consider whether his style and pressure might have contributed to what he was being told. Interaction can be so intense and transformative that we can no longer fruitfully distinguish between actors and their environments, let alone say much about any element in isolation. We are accustomed to referring to roads as safe or dangerous, but if the drivers understand the road conditions this formulation may be misleading: the knowledge that, driving habits held constant, one stretch is safe or dangerous will affect how people drive—they are likely to slow down and be more careful when they think the road is dangerous and speed up and let their attention wander when it is "safe." It is then the road-driver system that is the most meaningful unit of analysis. In the wake of the sinking of a roll-on roll-off ferry, an industry representative said: With roro’s, the basic problem is that you have a huge open car deck with doors at each end. But people are well aware of this, and it is taken into account in design and operation. You don’t mess around with them. There have not been too many accidents because they are operated with such care. c. analytic
2. Deontology provides a fixed starting point for correcting social injustices—claims of abstraction are just uniqueness for us Swift 12: (Adam Swift, British Poliicla Philosopher, Oxford University "Ideal and Nonideal Theory" Oxford Handbooks Online. June 2012.). https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/swift/publications/the_value_of_philosophy_in_nonideal_circumstances.pdf. RW The issues to which this special issue is devoted are particularly salient to those, like me, who are attracted to two positions that stand in apparent tension with each other. One is luck egalitarianism. Despite some effective (qualified) defenses,1 luck egalitarianism is still widely criticized for implications that simply do not follow if one is clear about the kind of view that it is. There is a crucial gap between the core luck egalitarian claim—which is about what it means for a distribution to possess the kind of comparative justice I would call fairness—and implications, either for policy or for what justice demands of us as individuals, in the unjust, far-from-ideal circumstances in which we actually operate. To hold that there is a kind of distributive injustice where people are better or worse off than one another because of factors for which they are not responsible, or that inequalities are fully just where they reflect people’s responsible choices (but not otherwise), is to say little about who should be held distributively responsible for what in the real world, or about how best to go about realizing justice in it. My paper has the following structure. First, distinguishing between “epistemological” and “practical” conceptions of the role of political philosophy, I discuss different ways in which political philosophy might be urged to be “practical.” Those wanting it to guide political action here and now are making a judgment about the importance of that particular purpose, not a claim about the fundamental character of the discipline. Second, endorsing that judgment, I present a way of conceiving the contribution that political philosophy can make to the practical task. Distinguishing between questions of evaluation and those of feasibility, I suggest that it is for social science to tell us which states of affairs are feasible and how to achieve them but that we need philosophy for to evaluate and rank options—which include the actions that produce states of affairs— within the feasible set. Judging what we should actually do, in the circumstances that actually confront us, requires input from both. To claim a crucial practical-evaluative role for philosophy is to defend neither “ideal theory” nor the formulation of philosophical claims in terms of “ideals” as those are conventionally conceived. The next section of the paper illustrates these points through investigation of arguments that, though sometimes taken to deny the value of “pure” or “abstract” philosophical thinking, turn out, on careful inspection, to be arguments for it. Amartya Sen is right to observe that a full specification of “spot- less justice” is neither necessary nor sufficient for us to make the comparative evaluations needed to guide action in the circumstances that actually confront us.3 Robert Goodin is right in saying that “focusing upon ideals ... can ... mislead us in thinking about second-best worlds.”4 But as long as philosophers can tell us why the ideal would be ideal, and not simply that it is, much of what they actually do when they do “ideal theory” is likely to help with the evaluation of options within the feasible set. Contention Restricting speech in academic settings violates freedom in two ways Surprenant 15: Chris W. Surprenant. Chris W. Surprenant is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Orleans, where he directs the Alexis de Tocqueville Project in Law, Liberty, and Morality. He is the author of Kant and the Cultivation of Virtue (Routledge 2014), co-editor of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary (Routledge 2012), and has published numerous journal articles in moral and political philosophy. Kant on the virtues of a free society. April 7, 2015. https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/kant-virtues-free-society. RW Kant claims that for this enlightenment to take place, “nothing is required but freedom…namely, freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters” (E 8:36). By “public use of one’s reason,” he means “that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers” (E 8:37). More simply put: freedom of speech through the press. Kant’s defense of free speech is fairly consistent throughout his work, where, more often than not, it is linked to his support for the policies and practices of Frederick the Great. But in his “Theory and Practice” essay, he presents a defense of free speech more generally, commenting on the importance of free speech and its contribution to a free society. He writes: “Freedom of the pen…is the sole palladium of the people’s rights. For to want to deny them this freedom is not only tantamount to taking from them any claim to a right with respect to the supreme commander (according to Hobbes), but is also to withhold from the latter…all knowledge of matters that he himself would change if he knew about them and to put him in contradiction with himself” (TP 8:304). In this passage, Kant’s claim regarding the importance of free speech is two-fold. His first point, which is fairly straightforward, is that freedom of the press is the only right the people have against the sovereign. That is, they have the right to speak out against policies that they perceive to be unjust or otherwise defective. (It is important to note here that, for the most part, Kant does not believe that people have the right to disobey the law or take action against the sovereign. For more on this point, including how we might reconcile it with Kant’s emphasis on individual autonomy, see Surprenant, 2014, especially Chapter 3.) The second point is a bit less straightforward. His claim is that a sovereign that outlaws free speech creates a condition where his actions “put him in contradiction with himself.” This language is remarkably similar to what he uses in his moral theory to describe principles that violates the categorical imperative, Kant’s supreme principle of morality. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that when a principle of action fails when tested against the categorical imperative, it fails because something about that principle is contradictory. It may be the case that it is not possible to conceive of the action that comes about as a result of universalizing the underlying principle connected to the action (i.e., a contradiction in conception), or the result of universalizing the principle is self-defeating in some way (i.e., a contradiction in the will). In the case of the sovereign restricting freedom of the press, the contradiction appears to be more practical. Elsewhere Kant argues what justifies sovereign authority is that his actions are supposed to represent the united will of the people (MM 6:313). But a sovereign that denies free speech and otherwise undermines the conditions necessary to maintain a free society has made it impossible to gather the information needed to represent the will of the people appropriately. In this way, Kant sees any attempt by the sovereign to limit or otherwise suppress the free exchange of ideas, and, in particular, the exchange of ideas among the educated members of society (e.g., especially academics), as is undermining his own authority. In addition to these two, practical, political benefits, and as discussed previously, free intellectual exchange also is a necessary condition for individual enlightenment. And so while Kant’s position on the function of juridical law differs from Aristotle, they share the belief that an individual can live well only if he is a member of civil society (cf. Pol 1278b 21-24). Living in a free society makes enlightenment possible. Therefore, while Kant’s “race of devils” passage suggests that the possibility of a free society does not depend on the presence of enlightened or virtuous citizens, an individual’s ability to become enlightened does depend on his living in a free society. That outweighs—analytic And, Censorship is illegitimate— It’s a contradiction of the will—analytic Speech can never be a hindrance on freedom Varden 10 A Kantian Conception of Free Speech Helga Varden In Deidre Golash (ed.), Free Speech in a Diverse World. Springer (2010) philpapers.org/rec/VARAKC-5 This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains that most ways in which a person uses words in his interactions with others cannot be seen as involveing wrongdoing from the point of view of right: “such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere” do not constitute wrongdoing because “it is entirely up to them the listeners whether they want to believe him or not” (6: 238). The utterance of words in space and time does not have the power to hinder anyone else’s external freedom, including depriving him of his means. Since words as such cannot exert physical power over people, thus it is impossible to use them as a means of coercion against another. For example, if you block my way, you coerce me by hindering my movements: you hinder my and external freedom. If, however, you simply tell me not to move, you have done nothing coercive, nothing to hinder my external freedom, as I can simply walk passed you. So, even though by means of your words, you attempt to influence my internal use of choice by providing me with possible reasons for acting, you accomplish nothing coercive. That is, you may wish that I take on your proposal for action, but you do nothing to force me to do so. Whether or not I choose to act on your suggestion is still entirely up to me. Therefore, you cannot choose for me. My choice to act on your words is beyond the reach of your words, as is any other means I might have. Indeed, even if what you suggest is the virtuous thing to do, your words are powerless with regard to making me act virtuously. Virtuous action requires not only that I act on the right maxims, but that I also do so because it is the right thing to do, or from duty. Because the choice of maxims (internal use of choice) and duty (internal freedom) are beyond the grasp of coercion, Kant holds that most uses of words, including immoral ones such as lying, cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right. Free speech is indivisible—specific restrictions fail ACLU 16: American Civil Liberties Union. “Hate Speech on Campus”, 2016. https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus. RW
Free speech rights are indivisible. Restricting the speech of one group or individual jeopardizes everyone's rights because the same laws or regulations used to silence bigots can be used to silence you. Conversely, laws that defend free speech for bigots can be used to defend the rights of civil rights workers, anti-war protesters, lesbian and gay activists and others fighting for justice. For example, in the 1949 case of Terminiello v. Chicago, the ACLU successfully defended an ex-Catholic priest who had delivered a racist and anti-semitic speech. The precedent set in that case became the basis for the ACLU's successful defense of civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s and '70s. The indivisibility principle was also illustrated in the case of Neo-Nazis whose right to march in Skokie, Illinois in 1979 was successfully defended by the ACLU. At the time, then ACLU Executive Director Aryeh Neier, whose relatives died in Hitler's concentration camps during World War II, commented: "Keeping a few Nazis off the streets of Skokie will serve Jews poorly if it means that the freedoms to speak, publish or assemble any place in the United States are thereby weakened." Hindering a hindrance isn’t how freedom works anyway Dorn 14: James A. Dorn. Equality, Justice and Freedom: A constitutional Perspective. October 1, 2014. https://www.libertarianism.org/publications/essays/equality-justice-freedom-constitutional-perspective. RW Just as equality of rights and equality of outcome are inconsistent usages, so too are the twin usages of equal opportunity just noted. Extending equal opportunity to everyone violates no one’s rights when used in the sense of equal freedom. All individuals can jointly have rights to life, liberty, and property—in the sense that all are free to choose among competing alternatives in a world of scarcity. One person’s right to noninterference in the use of his property does not preclude others from having the same right to their property. Whether the property right in question is the right to freedom of contract or freedom of speech, those rights are fundamental natural rights belonging to each individual on an vequal basis. Thus, in the absence of any positive welfare rights, the set of rights stemming from the basic right to noninterference (which entails only negative obligations) is a world of consistent and equal rights, “a world in which we can at all times enjoy whichever exemplifications of our right to noninterference we choose to enjoy, subject only to the restrictions we incur as a result of our own actions” (Pilon 1979a: 148). Having an equal right to noninterference or liberty, however, is not the same as having an equal power to exercise that right.9 Under the First Amendment, all individuals have the right to free speech, but the exercise of that right will be affected by relative endowments and, thus, by the scarcity of resources. The same is true in the exercise of economic liberties such as the right to use and dispose of private property and the right to negotiate contracts so long as third-party rights are not violated. In sum, extending the right of equal opportunity—in the sense of equal freedom and equal justice under a rule of law—to everyone as a natural right entails no opportunity cost in terms of forgoing other legitimate rights and liberties.10 As such, equal opportunity in this limited sense is a legitimate part of the constitutional perspective of equality. However, once equal opportunity is enlarged to mean equal endowments, the state necessarily moves from protecting property rights to redistributing them.
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Tournament: TOC | Round: 1 | Opponent: St Andrews IB | Judge: Shania Hunt 1AC Action theory precedes ethics. we need a basic account of what an action is before ethics can be coherent. Anscombe 58: G.E.M. Anscombe. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 124 (Jan., 1958), pp. 1-19 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy. That I owe the grocer such-and-such a sum would be one of a set of facts which would be "brute" in relation to the description "I am a bilker." "Bilking" is of course a species of "dishonesty" or "injustice." (Naturally the consideration will not have any effect on my actions unless I want to commit or avoid acts of injustice.) So far, in spite of their strong associations, I conceive "bilking," "injustice" and "dishonesty" in a merely "factual" way. That I can do this for "bilking" is obvious enough; "justice" I have no idea how to define, except that its sphere is that of actions which relate to someone else, but "injustice," its defect, can for the moment be offered as a generic name covering various species. E.g.: "bilking," "theft" (which is relative to whatever property institutions exist), "slander," "adultery," "punishment of the innocent." In present-day philosophy an explanation is required how an unjust man is a bad man, or an unjust action a bad one; to give such an explanation belongs to ethics; but it cannot even be begun until we are equipped with a sound philosophy of psychology. For the proof that an unjust man is a bad man would require a positive account of justice as a "virtue." This part of the subject-matter of ethics is, however, completely closed to us until we have an account of what type of characteristic a virtue is-a problem, not of ethics, but of conceptual analysis-and how it relates to the actions in which it is instanced: a matter which I think Aristotle did not succed in really making clear. For this we certainly need an account at least of what a human action is at all, and how its description as "doing such-and-such" is affected by its motive and by the intention or intentions in it; and for this an account of such concepts is required. This justifies practical reason. Unity of action can only be explained by reason, not desire. Rodl 2k Rödl, Sebastian. Self-Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 2000 Calculation from desire does not yield a premise for instrumental reasoning because its conclusion represents a changeable state, while an instrumental reasoning proceeds from a thought that represents something with the temporality of a movement. But the instrumental syllogism is a necessary form of practical reasoning, for practical reasoning arrives at a thought on which a movement may rest. And if a movement rests on thought, then the unity of its phases, which constitutes it as a movement, must rest on thought. So it does if I reason that from the same thought now, “I want to do B. So let me do X”, and then, “I want to do B. So let me do Y”, and so on. As “I want to do B” expresses the same thought all the while that I am doing B and until I have done it, the unity of the phases of my doing B consists in the fact that they all hang on that thought. By contrast, if “I want to do B” represented a changeable state I would not reason from the same thought, now to doing A1, and then to doing A2. In consequence, my doing A1 and my doing A2 would bear no unity. These would not be phases of a movement, and I would not, in doing A1 and A2, be doing B. Only practical reason solves regress—it’s impossible to deny reasons authority Velleman 5: David J. Velleman. “Self to Self”. 2005, Cambridge University Press. Velleman was professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and is now professor of philosophy at New York University. He is the author of Practical Reflection and The Possibil- ity of Practical Reason, and he co-edits the online journal Philosophers’ Imprint. His articles have appeared in The Philosophical Review, Ethics, and Mind, among other publications. RW As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source of authority turn out to be escapable because the authority behind them can be questioned. We can ask, “Why should I act on this desire?” or “Why should I obey the U.S. Government?” or even “Why should I obey God ?” And as we observed in the case of the desire to punch someone in the nose, this question demands a reason for acting. The authority we are questioning would be vindicated, in each case, by the production of a sufficient reason. What this observation suggests is that any purported source of practical authority depends on reasons for obeying it – and hence on the authority of reasons. Suppose, then, that we attempted to question the authority of reasons themselves, as we earlier questioned other authorities. Where we previously asked “Why should I act on my desire?” let us now ask “Why should I act for reasons?” Shouldn’t this question open up a route of escape from all requirements? As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, however, we can hear something odd in our question. To ask “Why should I?” is to demand a reason; and so to ask “Why should I act for reasons?” is to demand a reason for acting for reasons. This demand implicitly concedes the very authority that it purports to question – namely, the authority of reasons. Why would we demand a reason if we didn’t envision acting for it? If we really didn’t feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so certainly wouldn’t help. So there is something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons. The foregoing argument doesn’t show that the requirement to act for reasons is inescapable. All it shows is that this requirement cannot be escaped in a particular way: we cannot escape the requirement to act for reasons by insisting on reasons for obeying it. For all that, we still may not be required to act for reasons. Yet the argument does more than close off one avenue of escape from the requirement to act for reasons. It shows that we are subject to this requirement if we are subject to any requirements at all. The requirement to act for reasons is the fundamental requirement, from which the authority of all other requirements is derived, since the authority of other requirements just consists in there being reasons for us to obey them. There may be nothing that is required of us; but if anything is required of us, then acting for reasons is required. Hence the foregoing argument, though possibly unable to foreclose escape from the requirement to act for reasons, does succeed in raising the stakes. It shows that we cannot escape the requirement to act for reasons without escaping the force of requirements altogether. That yields a basic freedom principle—we ought to respect the right of humans to set their own purposes. Ripstein 9 Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto). “Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy.” 2009. The same right to be your own master within a system of equal freedom also generates what Kant calls an “internal duty” of rightful honor, which “consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying do not make yourself into a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them.”14 Kant says that this duty can be “explained. as obligation from the right of humanity in our own person.” Kant’s characterization of this as an “internal duty” may seem out of place, given his earlier characterization of the Universal Principle of Right in terms of restrictions on each person’s conduct in light of the freedom of others. But the duty of rightful honor is also relational: it is a duty because it is a limit on the exercise of a person’s freedom that is imposed by the Universal Principle of Right. Just as the rights of others restrict your freedom, so that you cannot acquire a right to anything by acting in ways inconsistent with the innate right of another person, so, too, the humanity in your own person restricts the ways in which you can exercise your freedom by entering into arrangements with others. Your innate right prevents you from being bound by others more than you can in turn bind them; your duty of rightful honor prevents you from making yourself bound by others in those ways. Rightful honor does not warn you away from some juridical possibility that would somehow be demeaning or unworthy. You do not wrong yourself if you enter into a binding arrangement inconsistent with the humanity in your own person. Instead, your duty of rightful honor sayss that no such arrangement can be binding, so no other person could be entitled to enforce a claim of right against you that presupposes that you have acted contrary to rightful honor. Rightful honor does not demand that you behave selfishly, or refrain from helping another person with some particular project, or make another person’s ends your own. To do any of these things is just to adopt some particular purpose, and so is an exercise of your freedom. In later chapters, we will see that rightful honor prevents you from giving up your capacity to set your own purposes, and so prevents others from asserting claims of right that assume that you did. In private right your rightful honor prevents you from entering into an enforceable contract of slavery, even if you were to believe the arrangement to be to your advantage. In public right, it prevents officials from making arrangements on your behalf that are inconsistent with your innate right. Rightful honor also provides the link from private right to public right by imposing a duty on each to leave the state of nature, which Kant characterizes as a condition in which everyone is subject to the choice of others. Respecting freedom is constitutive of all human action—the will relies on it to be coherent Bagnoli 14 Bagnoli, Carla, "Constructivism in Metaethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/constructivism-metaethics/. RW This is not to say that one is bound by requirements because one legislates them; otherwise, evil people would not be bound by the moral law (Korsgaard 1996a, 234–235; O'Neill 2003c; Reath 2006, 112–113, 92–170; Korsgaard 2008, 207–229). Rather, one can autonomously act on such requirements only if one legislates them. This is because universal principles guarantee that action is expressive of an agent's integrity, rather than merely in the service of satisfying preferences or desires. Like Plato and Kant, Korsgaard argues that some kind of integrity is necessary to be an agent and cannot be achieved without a commitment to morality, which is founded on reason (Korsgaard 2009, xii, Chapter 3; cf. Plato Republic 443d-e). A canonical objection against the attempt to ground morality on rationality is that it fails to account for the special bonds and ties we have with our loved ones and thus fails to capture the nature of integrity and morality (Williams 1981). To address these worries, Korsgaard introduces the notion of “practical identities”, which specify roles as sources of special obligations. For instance, Adam values himself and finds his life worth living and his actions worth undertaking under the description of being a teacher of music, an American citizen, and Robert's friend (Korsgaard 1996a, 101, §3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009, 20). These practical identities govern Adam's choices, sustain his integrity, and are sources of specific obligations to his pupils, fellows, and friends (Korsgaard 1996a, §3.3.1; Korsgaard 2009, 22). However, we do not have obligations just because we occupy certain roles as teachers, citizens, or friends. Rather, such roles become practical identities, and sources of reasons, insofar as we rationally endorse them. Rational endorsement, in turn, requires that we test our loyalties and allegiances according to the principle of universality, which commits us to morality. In order to value ourselves under these specific descriptions, we ought to value humanity in ourselves and in others (Korsgaard 2008, Lecture 6, 25–26). Korsgaard offers what is called a ‘transcendental argument’ for this conclusion. A transcendental argument is an argument that identifies the conditions under which it is possible for something to be the case. Korsgaard argues that valuing humanity, understood as the capacity for rationality, is the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all (Korsgaard 1996a, 121–123; Korsgaard 1998, 60–62; Korsgaard 2009). Evaluators bestow value on objects on the basis of reasons, and thus in virtue of their rational capacity. The value of any object thus ultimately depends on the rational capacity of evaluators. thus valuing ‘Humanity’ is the name of a distinctive value, which is unconditional and counts as the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all. Since humanity is embodied in all rational beings, we should value humanity in ourselves as well as in others, on pain of incoherence. Special obligations and bonds that derive from local identities are insufficient to sustain our integrity when they are inconsistent with valuing humanity. For instance, the conduct of a Mafioso cannot be coherently justified on the basis of a universal principle. The Mafioso thus fails as a rational agent and leads a life that is not autonomous, since his life is not the product of reflective self-government. A systematic failure to be guided by universal principles of self-government amounts to a loss of agency. We cannot but be agents, and thus we are necessarily bound by the norms of rationality and morality. Korsgaard's strategy depends on establishing that the norms of rationality and morality can be derived from the constitutive features of agency and that agency is inescapable.
And, ethics requires the existence of an autonomous will because otherwise culpability is nonsensical However, we must enter into a political society, otherwise rights would be in a state of constant violation—that necessitates an omnilateral will to coercively enforce rights claims Korsgaard 8: (Christine, "Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to RevoluGtion," in The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology). RW Kant also believes that there is a sense in which we have rights in the state of nature. We have a natural right to our freedom (MPJ 6:237), and, Kant thinks, the Universal Principle of Justice allows us to claim rights in land and, more generally, in external objects, in property. Kant argues that it would be inconsistent with freedom to deny the possibility of property rights, on the grounds that unless we can claim rights to objects, those objects cannot be used (MPJ 6:246).7 This would be a restriction on freedom not based in freedom itself, wehich we should therefore reject, and this leads us to postulate that objects may be owned. But unlike Locke, Kant argues that in the state of nature these rights are only ‘‘provisional’’ (MPJ 6:256). In this, Kant is partly following Rousseau. In contrast to Locke, Rousseau argues thef eat rights are created by the social contract, and, in a sense, relative to it. My possessions become my property, so far as you and I are concerned, when you and I have given each other certain reciprocal guarantees: I will keep my hands off your possessions if you will keep your hands off mine.8 Rights are not acquired by the metaphysical act of mixing one’s labor with the land, but instead are constructed from the human relations among people who have made such agreements.9 Kant adopts this idea, at least as far as the executive authority mother goat when they were born. However, one of them escaped, and you found it wandering around apparently unowned in the state of nature, took possession of it, fed it and cared for it for many years. Now we have discovered the matter, and each of us thinks she has a right to this particular goat. Since I think I have a right, I also think I may prosecute my right by coercive action. And you think the same. associated with a property right is concerned. I may indeed coercively enforce my rights. But if my doing so is to be consistent with the Universal Principle of Justice, it cannot be an act of unilateral coercion. To claim a right to a piece of property is to make a kind of law; for it is to lay it down that all others must refrain from using the object or land in question without my permission. But to view my claim as a law I must view it as the object of a contract between us, a contract in which we reciprocally commit ourselves to guaranteeing each other’s rights. It is this fact that leads us to enter—or, more precisely, to view ourselves as already having entered—political society. In making this argument, Kant evokes Rousseau’s concept of the general will. He argues that a general will to the coercive enforcement of the rights of all concerned is implicitly involved in every property claim. Now, with respect to an external and contingent possession, a unilateral Will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone, since that would be a violation of freedom in accordance with universal laws. Therefore, only a Will binding everyone else—that is, a collective, universal (common), and powerful Will—is the kind of Will that can provide the guarantee required. The condition of being subject to general external n(that is, public) legislation that is backed by power is the civil society. Accordingly, a thing can be externally yours or mine that is, can be property only in a civil society. (MPJ 6:256) It is because the idea of the general will to the reciprocal enforcement of rights is implicit in any claim of right that Kant argues that rights in the state of nature are only provisional. They are provisional because this general will has not yet been instituted by setting up a common authority to enforce everyone’s rights. The act that institutes the general will is the social contract. Kant concludes from this argument that when the time comes to enforce your rights coercively, in the state of nature, the only legitimate way to do that is by joining in political society with those with whom you are in dispute. In fact, you enforce your right by first forcing Thus, the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will. This is not consequentialist: Future predictions are indeterminate Jervis 97: Robert Jervis, professor of international affairs – Columbia, ’97 (Robert Jervis,"Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions," in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University). http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Complexity_Global.pdf. RW Because actions change the environment in which they operate, identical but later behavior does not produce identical results: history is about the changes produced by previous thought and action as people and organizations confront each other through time. The final crisis leading to World War II provides an illustration of some of these processes. Hitler had witnessed his adversaries give in to pressure; as he explained, "Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich." But the allies had changed because of Hitler’s behavior. So had Poland. As A.J.P. Taylor puts it, "Munich cast a long shadow. Hitler waited for it to happen again; Beck took warning from the fate of Benes." Hitler was not the only leader to fail to understand that his behavior would change his environment. Like good linear social scientists, many statesmen see that their actions can produce a desired outcome, all other things being equal, and project into the future the maintenance of the conditions that their behavior will in fact undermine. This in part explains the Argentine calculations preceding the seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas. Their leaders could see that Britain’s ability to protect its position was waning, as evinced by the declining naval presence, and that Argentina’s claim to the islands had received widespread international support. But what they neglected was the likelihood that the invasion would alter these facts, unifying British opinion against accepting humiliation and changing the issue for international audiences from the illegitimacy of colonialism to the illegitimacy of the use of force. A similar neglect of the transformative power of action may explain why Saddam Hussein thought he could conquer Kuwait. Even if America wanted to intervene, it could do so only with the support and cooperation of other Arab countries, which had sympathized with Iraq’s claims and urged American restraint. But the invasion of Kuwait drastically increased the Arabs’ perception of threat and so altered their stance. Furthermore, their willingness to give credence to Iraqi promises was destroyed by the deception that had enabled the invasion to take everyone by surprise. Germany’s miscalculation in 1917 was based on a related error: although unrestricted submarine warfare succeeded in sinking more British shipping than the Germans had estimated would be required to drive Britain from the war, the American entry (which Germany expected) led the British to tolerate shortages that otherwise would have broken their will because they knew that if they held out, the U.S. would rescue them. The failure to appreciate the fact that the behavior of the actors is in part responsible for the environment which then impinges on them can lead observers—and actors as well— to underestimate actors’ influence. Thus states caught in a conflict spiral believe that they have little choice but to respond in kind to the adversary’s hostility. This may be true, but it may have been the states’ earlier behavior that generated the situation that now is compelling. Robert McNamara complains about how he was mislead by faulty military reporting but similarly fails to consider whether his style and pressure might have contributed to what he was being told. Interaction can be so intense and transformative that we can no longer fruitfully distinguish between actors and their environments, let alone say much about any element in isolation. We are accustomed to referring to roads as safe or dangerous, but if the drivers understand the road conditions this formulation may be misleading: the knowledge that, driving habits held constant, one stretch is safe or dangerous will affect how people drive—they are likely to slow down and be more careful when they think the road is dangerous and speed up and let their attention wander when it is "safe." It is then the road-driver system that is the most meaningful unit of analysis. In the wake of the sinking of a roll-on roll-off ferry, an industry representative said: With roro’s, the basic problem is that you have a huge open car deck with doors at each end. But people are well aware of this, and it is taken into account in design and operation. Youdon’t mess around with them. There have not been too many accidents because they are operated with such care. Contention Speech restrictions destroy the omnilateral authority of the sovereign, which makes freedom impossible Surprenant 15: Chris W. Surprenant. Chris W. Surprenant is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Orleans, where he directs the Alexis de Tocqueville Project in Law, Liberty, and Morality. He is the author of Kant and the Cultivation of Virtue (Routledge 2014), co-editor of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary (Routledge 2012), and has published numerous journal articles in moral and political philosophy. Kant on the virtues of a free society. April 7, 2015. https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/kant-virtues-free-society. RW Kant claims that for this enlightenment to take place, “nothing is required but freedom…namely, freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters” (E 8:36). By “public use of one’s reason,” he means “that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers” (E 8:37). More simply put: freedom of speech through the press. Kant’s defense of free speech is fairly consistent throughout his work, where, more often than not, it is linked to his support for the policies and practices of Frederick the Great. But in his “Theory and Practice” essay, he presents a defense of free speech more generally, commenting on the importance of free speech and its contribution to a free society. He writes: “Freedom of the pen…is the sole palladium of the people’s rights. For to want to deny them this freedom is not only tantamount to taking from them any claim to a right with respect to the supreme commander (according to Hobbes), but is also to withhold from the latter…all knowledge of matters that he himself would change if he knew about them and to put him in contradiction with himself” (TP 8:304). In this passage, Kant’s claim regarding the importance of free speech is two-fold. His first point, which is fairly straightforward, is that freedom of the press is the only right the people have against the sovereign. That is, they have the right to speak out against policies that they perceive to be unjust or otherwise defective. (It is important to note here that, for the most part, Kant does not believe that people have the right to disobey the law or take action against the sovereign. For more on this point, including how we might reconcile it with Kant’s emphasis on individual autonomy, see Surprenant, 2014, especially Chapter 3.) The second point is a bit less straightforward. His claim is that a sovereign that outlaws free speech creates a condition where his actions “put him in contradiction with himself.” This language is remarkably similar to what he uses in his moral theory to describe principles that violates the categorical imperative, Kant’s supreme principle of morality. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that when a principle of action fails when tested against the categorical imperative, it fails because something about that principle is contradictory. It may be the case that it is not possible to conceive of the action that comes about as a result of universalizing the underlying principle connected to the action (i.e., a contradiction in conception), or the result of universalizing the principle is self-defeating in some way (i.e., a contradiction in the will). In the case of the sovereign restricting freedom of the press, the contradiction appears to be more practical. Elsewhere Kant argues what justifies sovereign authority is that his actions are supposed to represent the united will of the people (MM 6:313). But a sovereign that denies free speech and otherwise undermines the conditions necessary to maintain a free society has made it impossible to gather the information needed to represent the will of the people appropriately. In this way, Kant sees any attempt by the sovereign to limit or otherwise suppress the free exchange of ideas, and, in particular, the exchange of ideas among the educated members of society (e.g., especially academics), as is undermining his own authority. In addition to these two, practical, political benefits, and as discussed previously, free intellectual exchange also is a necessary condition for individual enlightenment. And so while Kant’s position on the function of juridical law differs from Aristotle, they share the belief that an individual can live well only if he is a member of civil society (cf. Pol 1278b 21-24). Living in a free society makes enlightenment possible. Therefore, while Kant’s “race of devils” passage suggests that the possibility of a free society does not depend on the presence of enlightened or virtuous citizens, an individual’s ability to become enlightened does depend on his living in a free society. My offense is specific to political philosophy, so it outweighs their offense about individual freedoms Varden 10 A Kantian Conception of Free Speech Helga Varden In Deidre Golash (ed.), Free Speech in a Diverse World. Springer (2010) philpapers.org/rec/VARAKC-5 It would be tempting, but wrong, to conclude from the above that a full liberal critique of free of speech rights found in liberal states can be established by means of an account derived, ultimately, from private persons’ rights against one another. For then Kant would be seen as arguing that constitutional protection of free speech is merely about ensuring that people are not punished when speech does not involve private wrongdoing. But Kant’s defense of free speech is much stronger than this. On his view, crucially, the right to free speech also protects the possibility of criticism of the public authority, since the right to speak out against the state is necessary for the public authority to be representative in nature. Therefore, this right to free speech is constitutive of the legitimacy of the political authority, namely constitutive of the political relation itself – a relation that does not exist in the state of nature. The right to political speech therefore does not rely on the justification provided by the private right argument that words cannot coerce. This aspect of the right to free speech is rather seen as following from how the public authority must protect and facilitate its citizens’ direct, critical engagement with public, normative standards and practices as they pertain to right. There are no a priori solutions or knowledge with regard to the actual formulation of the wisest laws and policies to enable rightful interaction. It is only through public discussion protected byE free speech that the public authority can reach enlightenment about how and whether its own laws and institutions really do enable reciprocal external freedom under law for all. That is to say, only by protecting the citizens’ right freely to express their often controversial and critical responses to the public authority’s operations can the public authority possibly take its decisions to represent the common, unified perspective of all its citizens. Without knowledge of how the decisions affect the citizens, it is simply impossible to function as a representative authority. Therefore, the state has the right and duty constitutionally to protect its citizens’ right to free speech; the right to free speech is constitutive of the rightful relation between citizens and their state. Speech can never be a hindrance on freedom Varden 10 A Kantian Conception of Free Speech Helga Varden In Deidre Golash (ed.), Free Speech in a Diverse World. Springer (2010) philpapers.org/rec/VARAKC-5 This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains that most ways in which a person uses words in his interactions with others cannot be seen as involveing wrongdoing from the point of view of right: “such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere” do not constitute wrongdoing because “it is entirely up to them the listeners whether they want to believe him or not” (6: 238). The utterance of words in space and time does not have the power to hinder anyone else’s external freedom, including depriving him of his means. Since words as such cannot exert physical power over people, thus it is impossible to use them as a means of coercion against another. For example, if you block my way, you coerce me by hindering my movements: you hinder my and external freedom. If, however, you simply tell me not to move, you have done nothing coercive, nothing to hinder my external freedom, as I can simply walk passed you. So, even though by means of your words, you attempt to influence my internal use of choice by providing me with possible reasons for acting, you accomplish nothing coercive. That is, you may wish that I take on your proposal for action, but you do nothing to force me to do so. Whether or not I choose to act on your suggestion is still entirely up to me. Therefore, you cannot choose for me. My choice to act on your words is beyond the reach of your words, as is any other means I might have. Indeed, even if what you suggest is the virtuous thing to do, your words are powerless with regard to making me act virtuously. Virtuous action requires not only that I act on the right maxims, but that I also do so because it is the right thing to do, or from duty. Because the choice of maxims (internal use of choice) and duty (internal freedom) are beyond the grasp of coercion, Kant holds that most uses of words, including immoral ones such as lying, cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right. Free speech is indivisible—it can only be coherent when applied universally ACLU 16: American Civil Liberties Union. “Hate Speech on Campus”, 2016. https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus. RW Free speech rights are indivisible. Restricting the speech of one group or individual jeopardizes everyone's rights because the same laws or regulations used to silence bigots can be used to silence you. Conversely, laws that defend free speech for bigots can be used to defend the rights of civil rights workers, anti-war protesters, lesbian and gay activists and others fighting for justice. For example, in the 1949 case of Terminiello v. Chicago, the ACLU successfully defended an ex-Catholic priest who had delivered a racist and anti-semitic speech. The precedent set in that case became the basis for the ACLU's successful defense of civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s and '70s. The indivisibility principle was also illustrated in the case of Neo-Nazis whose right to march in Skokie, Illinois in 1979 was successfully defended by the ACLU. At the time, then ACLU Executive Director Aryeh Neier, whose relatives died in Hitler's concentration camps during World War II, commented: "Keeping a few Nazis off the streets of Skokie will serve Jews poorly if it means that the freedoms to speak, publish or assemble any place in the United States are thereby weakened."
4/29/17
JANFEB- 1AC- Util
Tournament: Emory | Round: 2 | Opponent: Woodlands College Park JZ | Judge: Akhil Gandra 1AC Plan Public colleges and universities in the United States should adopt policies on freedom of speech modeled on Yale University’s Woodward Report of 1974.
The plan effectively restores free speech and intellectual freedom on campuses Kurtz 15 Stanley Kurtz (graduated from Haverford College and holds a Ph.D. in social anthropology from Harvard University. He did his field work in India and taught at Harvard and the University of Chicago). “A Plan to Restore Free Speech on Campus.” National Review. December 7th, 2015. http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/428122/plan-restore-free-speech-campus-stanley-kurtz Many of the proposals listed below can be mandated for public universities by state legislatures. These proposals can also galvanize student activism on campuses across the country, as well as activism by faculty, parents, alumni, administrators, trustees, and citizens. Alumni can press their alma maters to adopt these proposals, on pain of losing donations. Citizens can press their state legislators to adopt these proposals, on pain of losing votes. Here is the program: First: Colleges and universities ought to adopt a policy on freedom of expression modeled on Yale’s Woodward Report of 1974, which identifies ensuring intellectual freedom in the pursuit of knowledge as the primary obligation of a university. While the Woodward Report forthrightly acknowledges the importance of solidarity, harmony, civility, and mutual respect to campus life, it unmistakably marks these values as subordinate in priority to freedom of expression. In accordance with this, the Woodward Report rejects the proposition that members of an academic community are entitled to suppress speech they regard as offensive. Of course, within a university, the need for intellectual freedom is in the service of the pursuit of knowledge. Freedom of expression is a critical consideration, yet does not in itself fully resolve issues like the structure of the college curriculum. That said, the Woodward Report can and should serve as a model for statements on free expression at our colleges and universities. Once adopted, new statements on freedom of expression would supersede and replace any pre-existing speech codes. Second: Colleges and universities need to systematically educate members of their community in the principles of free expression. The central theme of freshman orientation, for example, ought to turn around the primacy of free speech. Many colleges and universities now assign incoming freshman a “common reading” to complete over the summer before entering school. During freshman year, colleges organize seminars and guest-lectures around that reading. The National Association of Scholars has reported on the thin and tendentious nature of many common reading selections, and I have commented on their politicization. As an antidote to such problems, colleges should consider assigning John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty as a common reading for entering freshmen. Responding to threats to intellectual freedom at Princeton, a student group, the Princeton Open Campus Coalition, recently called for bringing more representatives of seldom-heard viewpoints to campus. Inviting outside speakers to address John Stuart Mill’s argument for liberty of thought and discussion during freshman orientation would be an easy way to draw unconventional voices to campus. At every level of the university, efforts should be made to invite both outsiders and insiders to study, discuss, and debate the scope and meaning of free speech. Political philosopher Peter Berkowitz recently floated the idea of establishing university centers for the study and practice of free speech. These centers would “foster an understanding of free speech and its indissoluble connection with liberal education.” The founding of such centers on our campuses should become a priority. Third: “A university administration’s responsibility for assuring free expression imposes further obligations: it must act firmly when a speech is disrupted or when disruption is attempted; it must undertake to identify disruptors, and it must make known its intentions to do so beforehand.” The above passage is from Yale’s Woodward Report. Although the Woodward Report is official university policy at Yale, some of its central recommendations are apparently not being taken seriously. Consider the recent controversy over freedom of speech at Yale, where a student had to be dragged out of a lecture hall by a police officer after disrupting the William F. Buckley, Jr. Program’s conference on free speech (video here). The conduct of this student would appear to be a violation of Yale’s Undergraduate Regulations on “peaceful dissent, protests, and demonstrations” (derived from the Woodward Report), which bar any member of the University community from preventing “the orderly conduct of a University function or activity, such as a lecture, meeting…or other public event,” on pain of potential suspension or expulsion. If Yale’s regulations were being properly enforced, this student would have faced a disciplinary hearing. Ultimately, if the facts turned out to be as they appear from the video and published reports, some sort of discipline would result — at minimum, a warning that any further such actions would bring certain suspension or expulsion. To all appearances, no such discipline has taken place. And appearances are important, because a core recommendation of the Woodward Report is that in order to serve as effective deterrents to further violations, sanctions for disruption of speech must be publicized. (I have submitted a series of questions to Yale’s administration on disciplinary proceedings related to the disruption at the Buckley Program conference on free speech, and will report when I receive a reply.) We take it for granted nowadays that conduct like this student’s disruption of the Yale free-speech conference — and conduct far worse — entails no consequences for students. If we are to restore free speech to our campuses, that needs to change. In the absence of a deeper understanding of the principles of free expression, discipline alone will not be effective. Yet in combination with broader education in the principles of intellectual freedom, discipline for interference with campus speech can be very effective indeed. We will not see freedom of speech on our campuses until disruptors face discipline for silencing, or attempting to silence, others. Fourth: College and university trustees must monitor administrators to ensure that they promote and defend freedom of expression. Thomas D. Klingenstein, chairman of the board of the Claremont Institute, recently suggested that college and university trustees establish a board-level standing committee on free expression (COFE), and provide that committee with staff and considerable independence. A university COFE could act as a check on the reluctance of college administrators to court student displeasure by enforcing rules against disruption of speech. For public universities, state legislatures could receive and act on reports from a system-wide COFE. The public should also take an interest in COFE reports. Fifth: Colleges and universities ought to adopt policies on institutional political neutrality based on the University of Chicago’s Kalven Committee Report of 1967. The Kalven Report explains that the ability of a university to foster political dissent and criticism by faculty and students actually depends upon the political neutrality of the institution itself. The principles of academic freedom and institutional neutrality embodied in the Kalven Report are the surest antidote to demands that universities divest themselves of stock in fossil-fuel providers, Israeli companies, and other political targets. Advocates who attempt to inject universities into the political process by means of their endowments substantially inhibit the intellectual freedom of faculty and students who wish to explore contrary points of view. The National Association of Scholars’ recent reports on campus sustainability and fossil-fuel divestment detail the illiberal implications of these movements. The American Council of Trustees and Alumni includes the text of the Kalven Report and an excellent commentary by civil libertarian attorney Harvey Silverglate in its guide to academic freedom. Trustees should take note. * Designing a program to restore free speech to our campuses is not difficult. The steps outlined above — most of them drawn from widely respected reports issued by major universities — would go a long way toward solving the problem. The difficulty is finding the political will and the levers of influence to take these steps
Campus speech restrictions are increasing now—the plan is key Friedersdorf 16: Conor Friedersdorf, March 4th, 2016. The Glaring Evidence that Free Speech is Threatened on Campus. The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-glaring-evidence-that-free-speech-is-threatened-on-campus/471825/. RW At a recent Intelligence Squared debate, an audience filled an auditorium at Yale University to weigh the timely proposition, “Free speech is threatened on campus.” The debate concerned higher education generally, not just the host institution. And at the event’s conclusion, having heard arguments on both sides of the question, 66 percent of the crowd agreed: free speech is threatened. That represented a 17-point shift from a poll taken as the event began. The evidence is that persuasive. One of the losers in the debate was Professor Shaun Harper of the University of Pennsylvania, who heads its Center for the Study of Race and Equity in Education. He began by noting that “there has been a significant increase in the demand for our campus climate work” since last semester’s protests. In fact, he added, “this past December, we brought together 8,000 college presidents and other senior leaders who came to us for guidance on how to respond to racism on their campuses With that background, I expected Professor Harper to have a broad sense of how common speech restrictions are at American colleges and universities. And I assumed that he would offer arguments for the position that they do not threaten free speech. I was wrong on both counts. Late in the event, he declared, “I don't want anyone's speech to be suppressed in any setting.” The root of the disagreement was his belief that little speech is restricted. And earlier in his remarks, Harper declared that while colleges may ask students to voluntarily limit their speech in various ways, like not wearing offensive costumes, “I invite our opponents to present us more than a handful of written, institutional policies––where it's been put in writing that you can't say certain things. You can't wear certain costumes. Sure, students would be encouraged to do or not do something. But I, as a higher-education scholar who studied thousands of colleges and universities, have never seen a written institutional policy.” That statement is baffling. The Foundation of Individual Rights in Education keeps track of colleges that have speech restrictions, rating each institution green, yellow, or red. To receive the worst rating, a college must have at least one policy “that both clearly and substantially restricts freedom of speech.” That threshold is met only when a policy “unambiguously infringes on what is or should be protected expression” in a way that is “obvious on the face of the policy and does not depend on how the policy is applied.” Read "Follow-up Notes" END "Follow-up Notes" The University of Pennsylvania, where Harper teaches, earns the best rating from FIRE, green, for having policies that “normally protect free speech.” Institutions with “red light” ratings for policies that unambiguously impinge upon expression include the following: That is only the beginning. I trust that I needn’t run through D, E, an F colleges to hammer home the ubiquity of written rules that limit what one can express. Even if Professor Harper were to defend some of those rules, it beggars belief to think that he could run through colleges beginning with G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, and P and still fall short of his “handful of written, institutional policies” threshold, let alone his claim to have “never seen” one. READ FOLLOW-UP NOTES Tell us: Is your speech policed in your dorm? What’s more, a written policy doesn’t determine if free expression is protected or violated in practice. And one needn’t search long to find widespread examples of free speech being threatened or assaulted outright. To cite just one example, since Harper brought up the matter of costume controversies: UCLA is a public institution that is bound by the First Amendment; as such, it has no written policy banning students from wearing offensive costumes. Nevertheless, administrators at the campus suspended a fraternity for holding a “Kanye Western” theme party, where attendees dressed like the famous rapper and his celebrity wife, Kim Kardashian. Later in the debate, during a back and forth with Wendy Kaminer, who was arguing that free speech is threatened on campus, Harper said: But I fail to understand how any scholar who takes the campus climate and last semester’s protests as a core focus of their research could miss student demands to punish speech. The Wall Street Journal reported on a survey of 800 college students that found 51 percent favored speech codes. Yale protestors formally demanded the removal of two professors from their jobs in residential life because they were upset by an email one of them wrote. Missouri law students passed a speech code that Above the Law called Orwellian. Amherst students called for a speech code so broad that it would’ve sanctioned students for making an “All Lives Matter” poster. At Duke, student activists demanded disciplinary sanctions for students who attend “culturally insensitive” parties, mandatory implicit-bias training for all professors, and loss of the possibility of tenure if a faculty member engages in speech “if the discriminatory attitudes behind the speech,” as determined by an unnamed adjudicator, “could potentially harm the academic achievements of students of color.” At Emory, student activists demanded that student evaluations include a field to report a faculty member’s micro aggressions to help ensure that there are repercussions or sanctions, and that the social network Yik Yak be banished from campus. Activists at Wesleyan trashed their student newspaper then pushed to get it defunded because they disagreed with an op-ed that criticized Black Lives Matter. Dartmouth University students demanded the expulsion of fraternities that throw parties deemed racist and the forced a student newspaper to change its name. Need I go on? Harper’s ally in the debate, the Yale philosophy Professor Jason Stanley, didn’t perform any better. During portions the event, he claimed that folks on the other side, who say free speech is under threat, aren’t really engaged in a debate about free speech––he said the real debate is about racism and anti-racism and about leftism. In this telling, free speech is being invoked as a cover, in service of less-sympathetic agendas. That grossly distorted the positions taken by his opponents at the Intelligence Squared debate. And the broader claim about free-speech defenders—which is lamentably common in public discourse on the subject—can be refuted a dozen different ways. Here’s one: Many college newspapers are struggling with free-speech issues that have nothing to do with race or leftism, as David Wheeler reported. Or consider another narrow area of campus expression that is under threat: the formal speech, delivered to a broad audience. We’ll restrict our “threat survey” to a single year. In 2015 alone, Robin Steinberg was disinvited from Harvard Law School, the rapper Common was disinvited from Kean University, and Suzanne Venker was disinvited from Williams College. Asra Nomani addressed Duke University only after student attempts to cancel her speech were overturned. UC Berkeley Chancellor Nicholas Dirks participated in an event on his own campus that student protestors shut down. Speakers at USC needed police to intervene to continue an event. Angela Davis was subject to a petition that attempted to prevent her from speaking at Texas Tech. The rapper Big Sean faced a student effort to get him disinvited from Princeton. Bob McCulloch faced a student effort to disinvite him from speaking at St. Louis University. William Ayers was subject to an effort to disinvite him from Dickinson School of Law. Harold Koh faced a student effort to oust him as a visiting professor at New York University Law School. That list includes speakers from the right and the left. It involves several controversies that have nothing to do with antiracism. How many examples are needed to persuade Stanley that there is a problem? Because I only stopped listing them to avoid being tedious. Those examples are a mere subset of 2015 efforts to censor speakers based on their viewpoints. There are still more from 2014. Further roundups could be written about 2013, 2012, and beyond. Speech is frequently threatened. Speeches are regularly disrupted. Some are cancelled every year. To perceive no threat is to ignore reality. Or forget big speeches and look to another example of left-leaning speech that is threatened. As Glenn Greenwald wrote at The Intercept, “One of the most dangerous threats to campus free speech has been emerging at the highest levels of the University of California system, the sprawling collection of 10 campuses that includes UCLA and UC Berkeley. The university’s governing Board of Regents, with the support of University President Janet Napolitano and egged on by the state’s legislature, has been attempting to adopt new speech codes that—in the name of combating ‘anti-Semitism’—would formally ban various forms of Israel criticism.” He continued: There are still more examples. Here is a Marquette professor whose tenure was threatened over a blog post. Two years ago, I wrote about the NYPD’s efforts to spy on Muslim students using undercover agents for no reason other than their religion, an effort that spanned months and produced zero leads. Anyone who doubts that this abhorrent profiling chilled the speech of an ethnic-minority group should inform themselves about their understandable reaction to discovering that government spies were in their midst. To sum up: free speech on campus is threatened from a dozen directions. It is threatened by police spies, overzealous administrators, and students who are intolerant of dissent. It is threatened by activists agitating for speech codes and sanctions for professors or classmates who disagree with them. It is threatened by people who push to disinvite speakers because of their viewpoints and those who shut down events to prevent people from speaking. Harper and Stanley were unpersuaded that free speech is under threat not because they defend speech codes or sanctions––both say outright at different times that they are for untrammeled speech––but because they are blind to the number and degree of threats to speech. And this whole discussion has been restricted to documented, overt threats to speech. Chilling effects are harder to quantify or cite, but they are real. Professors and students see those around them being punished for their viewpoints and decide to hold their tongues rather than speak their minds. Stanley denies that this is a significant problem. And yet, last semester, without looking very hard, I found and spoke to tenured and non-tenured professors and students at Yale, his own institution, who told me that their speech was chilled. They feared that their place at the school would be jeopardized if they opined honestly about campus controversies; or did not want to be targets of intolerant activists like the ones who spat on lecture attendees because the activists disagreed with words spoken at the lecture. The evidence that free speech is threatened on college campuses is overwhelming. Doubters who can’t accurately characterize the evidence should study the relevant material more thoroughly before dismissing free-speech concerns and impugning the motives of the people who raise them––especially if, like Harper and Stanley, they earnestly believe that free speech should be protected. I urge them to look again at the evidence and to join other liberals already engaged in this fight. The marginalized college students of the future will thank them.
Advantage 1- Growth Restrictions on campus speech undermine the free exchange of ideas—that kills economic growth and competitiveness Millsap 16 Adam Millsap (research fellow for the State and Local Policy Project with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University). “Free Speech Is Good for the Economy.” U.S. News and World Report. May 23rd, 2016. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-23/free-speech-is-good-for-the-economy Commencement season is now underway, and President Barack Obama recently had the honor of speaking at Howard University. His speech touched on a variety of topics, including the troubling trend of colleges canceling speakers that some students and faculty find offensive. The president is right that people should engage with one another on the battlefield of ideas rather than try to silence those with whom they disagree. As many people have pointed out, this engagement is important for a well-functioning democracy. But what people may not realize is that it's critical for a well-functioning economy as well. New ideas and innovation are necessary for sustaining economic growth, and there's a large body of evidence that emphasizes the exchange of ideas as an important component of an innovative economy. The United States has been especially successful at fostering innovation and growth in the technology sector. Facebook's market capitalization alone is twice the size of all the large European tech giants combined. There's good reason to believe that America's economic prosperity in this rapidly changing sector is due to its commitment to the free exchange of ideas. The theory that ideas and innovation are crucial to economic growth is an old one. Joseph Schumpeter's "creative destruction" is perhaps the best known explanation of the role that innovation plays in the economy. Schumpeter explained that competition requires firms to constantly innovate, since those that don't will quickly be replaced by those that do. Ultimately micro-level creative destruction helps drive macro-level economic growth. But not all countries have to be innovators in order to grow. From the 1950s until the mid-'80s the Solow growth model was the primary tool of economists who studied economic growth. One of its main predictions was that poorer countries would eventually catch up to, or converge with, rich countries. The intuitive reasoning behind the theory of convergence is that poor countries could simply imitate the technological innovation of rich countries and grow accordingly. Instead of spending time and resources reinventing the internal combustion engine, the airplane, antibiotics or the assembly line, all countries like China and India had to do was start using them. But while imitation is a viable method of generating economic growth when a country is lagging behind, it can't go on forever. Once a country reaches the economic frontier – where there are no longer any countries to imitate – only innovation and technological progress can generate additional growth. The United States has been on the frontier for at least a century and our economic growth is primarily powered by our ability to innovate. Innovation itself is often described as an output of a country – e.g. the United States "leads the world in innovation" – but this language obscures where innovation actually takes place. It happens locally; individuals, not countries, innovate. Engineers and scientists working for companies, laboratories and universities and people tinkering in their garage, shed or basement are the real drivers of innovation, and most of this innovation occurs in cities. The large amount of specialized knowledge in cities, along with the rapid dissemination of information, is what fosters innovation. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that a city's success is proportional to the ability of its residents to innovate and generate new ideas. Cities devoid of entrepreneurs who routinely generate new ideas will stagnate and decay. And stagnation at the local level inevitably leads to stagnation at the national level. Researchers routinely point out that the proximity of people in cities is one of the primary reasons most innovation occurs there, but the exact mechanism through which the transfer of knowledge and ideas takes place is often omitted. The assumption seems to be that simply putting a bunch of people together on the same city block will create innovation. But the actual communication part is a crucial input into the production of innovation. As economists Curtis Simon and Clark Nardinelli note in their study of the growth of English cities in the 19th and 20th centuries: "The creativity of the market economy – the increasing returns so important in modern growth theory – in large part arises from what happens when people with information get together and talk. The talk is necessary to turn information into productive knowledge." Since spreading ideas and information requires communication – people talking to one another, attending lectures and presentations, watching videos, etc. – it's likely that limiting speech, either formally or informally, would have pernicious effects on innovation and harm economic growth in the United States. Despite the robust protections of the First Amendment and Americans' long history of exercising their right to free speech, there are signs that a significant portion of society is questioning how far this right should extend. College students around the country are increasingly calling for limits on speech. Several colleges have cancelled speakers due to the vocal opposition of students and faculty, and some college administrations are beginning to favor safety and inclusivity over the free exchange of ideas. Even high schools are getting on board; after students at a Bronx high school recently threatened to walk out on former presidential candidate Ted Cruz, his appearance was cancelled. The combination of these incidents reveals that many of the next generation of teachers, politicians, government administrators and business people are comfortable with suppressing speech they personally don't like. While it's true that speech that offends a large portion of the population, or that criticizes a specific group, is unlikely to be the type of speech that leads to innovation, this criticism in large part misses the point. What matters is not whether restrictions on offensive, hurtful or "hate" speech harm innovation directly, but whether such restrictions significantly reduce the likelihood of engaging in conversation in general. It's hard to predict where a conversation will end up. While civilized people should try to be sensitive to others, the subjectivity of offensive speech makes it difficult to always say the "right" thing. If the penalty for saying the "wrong" thing is large enough, even a small probability of digressing to a sensitive topic can be enough to discourage conversation. Currently the United States is one of the most economically competitive countries in the world as well as the most supportive of free expression. I don't think this is a coincidence: America's unique commitment to free speech and the open exchange of ideas has given entrepreneurs in the United States a competitive advantage. Efforts to clamp down on speech at the local level for the sake of safety and inclusivity may seem largely benign at first. But over time a climate that is hostile to certain forms of speech can have a chilling effect on all speech. As an economic leader, we rely on the free exchange of ideas and information for the serendipitous discoveries that increase our standard of living, and because of this, the long-term costs of stifling speech are larger than commonly recognized.
Noting liberal despair over the government's inability to combat economic depression, and conservative skepticism that traditional tools will be effective, John Judis of The New Republic argues that a global depression far longer and more severe than anyone expected now seems nearly impossible to avoid. Judis believes that the coming "depression" will be accompanied by geopolitical upheaval and institutional collapse. "As the experience of the 1930s testified, a prolonged global downturn can have profound political and geopolitical repercussions. In the U.S. and Europe, the downturn has already inspired unsavory, right-wing populist movements. It could also bring about trade wars and intense competition over natural resources, and the eventual breakdown of important institutions like European Union and the World Trade Organization. Even a shooting war is possible." Daniel Knowles of the Telegraph has noticed a similar trend. In a post titled, "This Really Is Beginning To Look Like 1931," Knowles argues that we could be witnessing the transition from recession to global depression that last occurred two years after the 1929 market collapse, and eight years before Germany invaded Poland, triggering the Second World War: "The difference today is that so far, the chain reaction of a default has been avoided by bailouts. Countries are not closing down their borders or arming their soldiers – they can agree on some solution, if not a good solution. But the fundamental problem – the spiral downwards caused by confidence crises and ever rising interest rates – is exactly the same now as it was in 1931. And as Italy and Spain come under attack, we are reaching the limit of how much that sticking plaster can heal. Tensions between European countries unseen in decades are emerging." Knowles wrote that post three days ago. Since then it has become abundantly obvious that Europe will soon become unwilling or unable to continue bailing out every country with a debt problem. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy continues to chug along, to the extent it is chugging at all, on the false security offered by a collective distaste for one ratings agency and its poor mathematics.
That goes nuclear and causes extinction Kemp 10 Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, “The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East”, p. 233-4
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.
Advantage 2- NSA Campus censorship spills over and perpetuates serious invasions of freedom—that includes NSA surveillance Silverglate 13 Harvey Silverglate (I practice law -- criminal defense, civil liberties, and academic freedom/student rights cases. I'm a four-decade columnist and contributor to the Boston Phoenix, an alternative weekly, as well as an occasional contributor to The National Law Journal, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, The Wall Street Journal, The Boston Globe, and elsewhere). “Campus Censorship Breeds Societal Dysfunction.” Forbes. January 16th, 2013. http://www.forbes.com/sites/harveysilverglate/2013/01/16/campus-censorship-breeds-societal-dysfunction/#51f21f847d1c
Lukianoff posits that the pervasive trend of campus censorship has had a wider effect on our society as a whole. He persuasively argues that, in short, we are entering an era of our own creation where the anti-liberty culture in Harvard Yard (part of the university) is dictating a similarly unfree culture in Harvard Square (part of the City of Cambridge). After all, we educate the next generation of leaders on these campuses. From this perspective, contemporary campuses can be seen essentially as incubators for a future society governed by censorship of iconoclastic ideas and kangaroo courts that enforce those prohibitions. As Lukianoff’s title suggests, “campus censorship” produces, as students are sent out into the real world, an “end of American debate” that disrupts the gears and self-correcting mechanisms so essential for the functioning of our free society. This set off a little light bulb in my head. As regular readers of “Injustice Department” know, I wrote a book of my own in 2009 titled Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent, in which I describe how the U.S. Department of Justice prosecutes an alarming number of innocent people, using statutes so vague they are essentially incomprehensible. In Three Felonies, as in “Injustice Department,” I describe the “what” but do not much attempt to explain the “why.” Unlearning Liberty gave me surprising insight into how it could be that such a large number of graduates of some of the nation’s leading colleges and law schools wind up as U.S. Department of Justice prosecutors doing so many awful things to so many often innocent people. I likewise gained insight into how some of the sharper legal minds now sitting on the federal bench do not blanch when innocent citizens are convicted of violating statutes and regulations that no normal person could possibly understand. Students, who get accustomed to the administrative tyranny that marks the vast majority of colleges, universities and graduate schools today, don’t have much adjusting to do when they gain, and abuse, real power of their own in the nation at large, including in its legislative chambers, executive offices, and courts. An understanding of campus speech codes elucidates why undefined federal “mail fraud” statutes (the use of the mails to facilitate the commission of fraudulent activity, which is often undefined itself) do not strike either legislators or judges as unconstitutionally vague (that is, they do not give adequately clear warning as to what conduct is criminal). Legislators and judges have, after all, been to college. And those who have more recently graduated are more likely than their predecessors to buy into the notion that real and legitimate violations are stated in such codes. “Harassment” on campus is the equivalent of “mail fraud” out in the real world. And Unlearning Liberty helps explain the insufficient concern out in the real world at the increasingly invasive investigatory practices carried out on American citizens by such agencies as the FBI and the CIA. For instance, we have seen few, if any, credible primary challenges of senators and congressmen (on both sides of the aisle) who vote every year to reauthorize the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), despite its provisions authorizing the indefinite detention of American citizens. Nor have there been any repercussions whatsoever stemming from the National Security Administration’s warrantless wiretapping program that began under the Bush administration—an extension of which was signed into law by President Obama last month. The law, as one friend of mine puts it, has become “silly putty,” and few have noticed the implications for both education and freedom. Lukianoff makes the point persuasively and in great detail that our institutions of higher learning are destroying our students’ sense of critical thinking and devotion to liberty—a phenomenon that translates into dysfunction in our society at large. NSA surveillance undermines Internet security and global trust in the Internet Zetter 14 Kim Zetter (award-winning, senior staff reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, and security). “Personal Privacy Is Only One of the Costs of NSA Surveillance.” Wired. July 29th, 2014. https://www.wired.com/2014/07/the-big-costs-of-nsa-surveillance-that-no-ones-talking-about/
Deterioration of Cybersecurity Out of all the revelations to come to light in the past year, the most shocking may well be the NSA’s persistent campaign to undermine encryption, install backdoors in hardware and software and amass a stockpile of zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits. “For the past decade, N.S.A. has led an aggressive, multipronged effort to break widely used Internet encryption technologies,” according to a 2010 memo from Government Communications Headquarters, the NSA’s counterpart in the UK, leaked by Edward Snowden. Furthermore, a story from Pro Publica noted, the NSA “actively engages the US and foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial products’ designs” to make them more amenable to the NSA’s data collection programs and more susceptible to exploitation by the spy agency. The NSA, with help from the CIA and FBI, also has intercepted network routers from US manufacturers like Cisco to install spy tools before they’re shipped to overseas buyers, further undermining customer trust in US companies. Cisco senior vice president Mark Chandler wrote in a company blog post that his and other companies ought to be able to count on the government not interfering “with the lawful delivery of our products in the form in which we have manufactured them. To do otherwise, and to violate legitimate privacy rights of individuals and institutions around the world, undermines confidence in our industry.” All of these activities are at direct odds with the Obama administration’s stated goal of securing the internet and critical infrastructure and undermine global trust in the internet and the safety of communications. The actions are particularly troubling because the insertion of backdoors and vulnerabilities in systems doesn’t just undermine them for exploitation by the NSA but makes them more susceptible for exploitation by other governments as well as by criminal hackers. “The existence of these programs, in addition to undermining confidence in the internet industry, creates real security concerns,” the authors of the report note. Destruction of the Internet causes extinction Eagleman 10 David Eagleman (neuroscientist at Baylor College of Medicine, where he directs the Laboratory for Perception and Action and the Initiative on Neuroscience and Law and author of Sum (Canongate)). “Six ways the internet will save civilization.” Wired. Nov. 9, 2010. http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2010/12/start/apocalypse-no
Many great civilisations have fallen, leaving nothing but cracked ruins and scattered genetics. Usually this results from: natural disasters, resource depletion, economic meltdown, disease, poor information flow and corruption. But we’re luckier than our predecessors because we command a technology that no one else possessed: a rapid communication network that finds its highest expression in the internet. I propose that there are six ways in which the net has vastly reduced the threat of societal collapse. Epidemics can be deflected by telepresence One of our more dire prospects for collapse is an infectious-disease epidemic. Viral and bacterial epidemics precipitated the fall of the Golden Age of Athens, the Roman Empire and most of the empires of the Native Americans. The internet can be our key to survival because the ability to work telepresently can inhibit microbial transmission by reducing human-to-human contact. In the face of an otherwise devastating epidemic, businesses can keep supply chains running with the maximum number of employees working from home. This can reduce host density below the tipping point required for an epidemic. If we are well prepared when an epidemic arrives, we can fluidly shift into a self-quarantined society in which microbes fail due to host scarcity. Whatever the social ills of isolation, they are worse for the microbes than for us. The internet will predict natural disasters We are witnessing the downfall of slow central control in the media: news stories are increasingly becoming user-generated nets of up-to-the-minute information. During the recent California wildfires, locals went to the TV stations to learn whether their neighbourhoods were in danger. But the news stations appeared most concerned with the fate of celebrity mansions, so Californians changed their tack: they uploaded geotagged mobile-phone pictures, updated Facebook statuses and tweeted. The balance tipped: the internet carried news about the fire more quickly and accurately than any news station could. In this grass-roots, decentralised scheme, there were embedded reporters on every block, and the news shockwave kept ahead of the fire. This head start could provide the extra hours that save us. If the Pompeiians had had the internet in 79AD, they could have easily marched 10km to safety, well ahead of the pyroclastic flow from Mount Vesuvius. If the Indian Ocean had the Pacific’s networked tsunami-warning system, South-East Asia would look quite different today. Discoveries are retained and shared Historically, critical information has required constant rediscovery. Collections of learning -- from the library at Alexandria to the entire Minoan civilisation -- have fallen to the bonfires of invaders or the wrecking ball of natural disaster. Knowledge is hard won but easily lost. And information that survives often does not spread. Consider smallpox inoculation: this was under way in India, China and Africa centuries before it made its way to Europe. By the time the idea reached North America, native civilisations who needed it had already collapsed. The net solved the problem. New discoveries catch on immediately; information spreads widely. In this way, societies can optimally ratchet up, using the latest bricks of knowledge in their fortification against risk. Tyranny is mitigated Censorship of ideas was a familiar spectre in the last century, with state-approved news outlets ruling the press, airwaves and copying machines in the USSR, Romania, Cuba, China, Iraq and elsewhere. In many cases, such as Lysenko’s agricultural despotism in the USSR, it directly contributed to the collapse of the nation. Historically, a more successful strategy has been to confront free speech with free speech -- and the internet allows this in a natural way. It democratises the flow of information by offering access to the newspapers of the world, the photographers of every nation, the bloggers of every political stripe. Some posts are full of doctoring and dishonesty whereas others strive for independence and impartiality -- but all are available to us to sift through. Given the attempts by some governments to build firewalls, it’s clear that this benefit of the net requires constant vigilance. Human capital is vastly increased Crowdsourcing brings people together to solve problems. Yet far fewer than one per cent of the world’s population is involved. We need expand human capital. Most of the world not have access to the education afforded a small minority. For every Albert Einstein, Yo-Yo Ma or Barack Obama who has educational opportunities, uncountable others do not. This squandering of talent translates into reduced economic output and a smaller pool of problem solvers. The net opens the gates education to anyone with a computer. A motivated teen anywhere on the planet can walk through the world’s knowledge -- from the webs of Wikipedia to the curriculum of MIT’s OpenCourseWare. The new human capital will serve us well when we confront existential threats we’ve never imagined before. Energy expenditure is reduced Societal collapse can often be understood in terms of an energy budget: when energy spend outweighs energy return, collapse ensues. This has taken the form of deforestation or soil erosion; currently, the worry involves fossil-fuel depletion. The internet addresses the energy problem with a natural ease. Consider the massive energy savings inherent in the shift from paper to electrons -- as seen in the transition from the post to email. Ecommerce reduces the need to drive long distances to purchase products. Delivery trucks are more eco-friendly than individuals driving around, not least because of tight packaging and optimisation algorithms for driving routes. Of course, there are energy costs to the banks of computers that underpin the internet -- but these costs are less than the wood, coal and oil that would be expended for the same quantity of information flow. The tangle of events that triggers societal collapse can be complex, and there are several threats the net does not address. But vast, networked communication can be an antidote to several of the most deadly diseases threatening civilisation. The next time your coworker laments internet addiction, the banality of tweeting or the decline of face-to-face conversation, you may want to suggest that the net may just be the technology that saves us. NSA surveillance also kills US leadership on Internet freedom Zetter 14 Kim Zetter (award-winning, senior staff reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, and security). “Personal Privacy Is Only One of the Costs of NSA Surveillance.” Wired. July 29th, 2014. https://www.wired.com/2014/07/the-big-costs-of-nsa-surveillance-that-no-ones-talking-about/
Undermining U.S. Support for Internet Freedom Finally, the NSA’s spying activities have greatly undermined the government’s policies in support of internet freedom around the world and its work in advocating for freedom of expression and combating censorship and oppression. “As the birthplace for so many of these technologies, including the internet itself, we have a responsibility to see them used for good,” then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a 2010 speech launching a campaign in support of internet freedom. But while “the US government promotes free expression abroad and aims to prevent repressive governments from monitoring and censoring their citizens,” the New American report notes, it is “simultaneously supporting domestic laws that authorize surveillance and bulk data collection.” The widespread collection of data, which has a chilling effect on freedom of expression, is precisely the kind of activity for which the U.S. condemns other countries. This hypocrisy has opened a door for repressive regimes to question the US role in internet governance bodies and has allowed them to argue in favor of their own governments having greater control over the internet. At the UN Human Rights Council in September 2013, the report notes, a representative from Pakistan—speaking on behalf of Cuba, Iran, China and other countries—said the surveillance programs highlighted the need for their nations to have a greater role in governing the internet.
US promotion of Internet freedom is key to human rights Posner 11 Michael Posner (assistant secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor). “Internet Freedom and Human Rights: The Obama Administration’s Perspective.” U.S. Department of State. July 13th, 2011. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/168475.htm
But this is not just about technology. Secretary Clinton has put Internet freedom on the map as a key diplomatic priority, in our bilateral relationships and in multilateral institutions, including the UN Human Rights Council, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which just held a ministerial on these issues a few weeks ago, and others. Many of you here today have urged us to not view Internet freedom in isolation, but to wrestle with the challenge of integrating Internet freedom with national security, combating cyber crime, protecting intellectual property, and other vital interests. This is what we’ve done in President Obama’s International Strategy for Cyberspace, which incorporates all of these legitimate interests. This is the hard part – it’s where Americans disagree not only with repressive governments but amongst ourselves. But we all agree on the importance of getting it right. By now, every government understands the power of ordinary citizens to harness the Internet and social media to organize and express themselves. Some have embraced these new technologies as a way to connect with and serve their citizens. Others are redoubling their attempts to control them. We are seeing the development of more sophisticated tools for cyber-repression, including filtering, surveillance, anti-circumvention, and network-disabling technologies by government security forces in closed societies. We’re also witnessing the rise of cyber attacks on the computers of independent media, Distributed Denial of Service attacks on the sites of watchdog groups, and other attempts to thwart the work of civil society. Before I joined this administration, I spent 30 years working on human rights issues from the low-tech NGO side. So today I want to refocus attention not on the technologies to fight Internet repression, but on the psychology of the repressors. What causes a regime to perceive the Internet as such a profound threat that it is willing to damage its country’s economy by choking bandwidth, blocking content or even shutting down the network entirely? These are the acts of governments that fear their own people. In cracking down on the Internet, they expose their own lack of legitimacy. But these crackdowns also indicate a basic lack of understanding that free speech – whether it’s supportive speech or subversive speech – is harder than ever to suppress in the Digital Age. And the young people who have taken to the streets across the Arab world this year understand that it isn’t pornography or pirating that is being suppressed. It’s people. It’s their demands for dignity and a say in the political and economic future of their countries. After all, Facebook does not foment dissent; people do. Twitter only amplifies those voices that have the most resonance, those ideas that people find most powerful. As President Obama said in a speech in Cairo in June 2009 -- 19 months before the protests in Tahrir Square -- “Suppressing ideas never succeeds in making them go away.” Two billion people now have access to the Internet. That’s a lot of speech to try to suppress. In the next 20 years, nearly 5 billion more people will come online. Will they be joining a true global conversation over a single, unified global network? Or will they be entering a stilted alternative reality of government-approved content on controlled national intranets? This is the vision of the “halal” Internet being advocated by some in Iran, a course that would only deepen the country’s isolation and the Iranian authorities’ estrangement from their own citizens. So let’s be honest: Governments that respect the rights of their citizens have no reason to fear a free Internet. The Internet didn’t topple the governments of Tunisia or Egypt; their people did. But smart governments are using social media tools to better communicate with and understand their own people -- and to deliver services in a more open and accountable fashion. And they are recognizing that free access to tech tools spurs both social and economic progress. If you really want to address popular discontent, you don’t need an army of censors deleting posts on social media sites. You need a cadre of government officials reading those posts and figuring out how to identify and address the legitimate grievances that are being expressed there. So don’t shoot the instant messenger! Instead, address the underlying grievances -- the corruption, the abuse of power, the environmental degradation, the lack of political and economic opportunity, the daily affronts to dignity by indifferent authorities. More than anything else, it is this quest for dignity that has prompted so many young people to walk away from their keyboards and into the streets to demand a chance to build a better future. And it is their vision of the future that matters. This administration is working to support them. Our work on Internet freedom is not about messaging; it’s about empowerment. It is up to all the people of each country to build societies in which governments respect not some rights part of the time, but all of the rights of the governed, every day. The role of the international community is to offer support -- technological and institutional. Your generation – the digital natives -- has developed new tools with unprecedented potential to empower people around the world to participate in a truly democratic process. The world is eager to see what you will invent next. But we’re equally eager for your help in forging international consensus and setting the expectations needed to support Internet freedom. It will be up to your generation to make this vision a reality for the 5 billion users – by setting the rules of the road on the Internet for the 21st century. The human challenge of Internet freedom is to use technological tools to build a different kind of relationship between citizens, civil society and their governments -- a relationship based not merely upon the consent of the governed, but upon broad participation in governance by all citizens. With your help, we will continue to put U.S. diplomatic power behind that vision of a more inclusive, peaceful and democratic world. Promoting human rights norms solves war and nuclear proliferation Burke-White 4 William W. Burke-White (Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge). “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation.” The Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, Lexis. 2004.
This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period *250 indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues. Prolif causes extinction Kroenig 15 Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council, “THE HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION OPTIMISM: DOES IT HAVE A FUTURE?” http://www.npolicy.org/books/Moving_Beyond_Pretense/Ch3_Kroenig.pdf
WHY NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS A PROBLEM The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace and U.S. national security, including nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. This section explores each of these threats in turn. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in human extinction, and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors. 71 To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus year tradition of nuclear nonuse as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dotcom bubble bursting in the late-1990s and the Great Recession of late-2000s.53 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in my lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure second-strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike 72 to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel “use ‘em or loose ‘em” pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.54 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. In a future Israel-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews and who could one day ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. 73 One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As discussed previously, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest, and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: How can you credibly threaten to attack a nuclear-armed opponent? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated earlier, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.55 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, given NATO’s conventional inferiority. As Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. Finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed earlier, leaders can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”56 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. Scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.57 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.
Framework The standard is maximizing Expected Wellbeing. First, revisionary intuitionism is most reliable Yudkowsky 8 Eliezer Yudkowsky (research fellow of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute; he also writes Harry Potter fan fiction). “The ‘Intuitions’ Behind ‘Utilitarianism.’” 28 January 2008. LessWrong. http://lesswrong.com/lw/n9/the_intuitions_behind_utilitarianism/
I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless. And this appears to be a general syndrome - people do much better when discussing whether torture is good or bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level wherever I possibly can. Occasionally people object to any discussion of morality on the grounds that morality doesn't exist, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that "exist" is not the right term to use here, I generally say, "But what do you do anyway?" and take the discussion back down to the object level. Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. I see the project of morality as a project of renormalizing intuition. We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. Delete all the intuitions, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, you're left with a rock. Keep all your specific intuitions and refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, you're left with a grunting caveperson running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. Even modus ponens is an "intuition" in this sense - it's just that modus ponens still seems like a good idea after being formalized, reflected on, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". That means util—non-utilitarian intuitions are scope insensitive, making them cognitively biased Yudkowsky 8 Eliezer Yudkowsky (research fellow of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute; he also writes Harry Potter fan fiction). “The ‘Intuitions’ Behind ‘Utilitarianism.’” 28 January 2008. LessWrong. http://lesswrong.com/lw/n9/the_intuitions_behind_utilitarianism/ However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50 probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, if you try to violate "utilitarianism", you run into paradoxes, contradictions, circular preferences, and other things that aren't symptoms of moral wrongness so much as moral incoherence. After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. After the two hundred and eighty-seventh research study showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity - people will pay only 28 more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, you could look at this intuition, and think it was revealing some kind of incredibly deep moral truth which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? Or you could look at that and say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't successfully multiply by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. But it ought to, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. When you've read enough heuristics and biases research, and enough coherence and uniqueness proofs for Bayesian probabilities and expected utility, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, then you don't see the preference reversals in the Allais Paradox as revealing some incredibly deep moral truth about the intrinsic value of certainty. It just goes to show that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of symbols standing for small quantities - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001 probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. When you've reflected on enough intuitions, and corrected enough absurdities, you start to see a common denominator, a meta-principle at work, which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply." Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. And that's why I'm a utilitarian - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone. Outweighs— A. The inescapability of our intuitions means being utilitarians is our most fundamental practical identity
B. Deontology fails; it can’t weigh conflicts of duty. Only util solves by valuing the objective end of all rational beings. Cummiskey 90 David Cummiskey (professor of philosophy at Bates College, Ph.D., M.A., University of Michigan; B.A., Washington College). “Kantian Consequentialism.” 1990. http://www.bates.edu/Prebuilt/kantian.pdf
Now, according to Kant, the formula of the end-in-itself generates both negative and positive duties (GMM, p. 430; MEJ, p. 221; DV, pp. 448-51). In the negative sense we treat persons as ends when we do not interfere with their pursuit of their (legitimate) ends. In the positive sense we treat persons as ends when we endeavor to help them realize their (legitimate) ends. Kant describes the positive interpretation of the second formulation of the categorical imperative as a duty to make others’ ends my own. Since, it one wills an end, one wills the necessary means (GMM, p. 417), it follows that the positive interpretation requires that we do those acts which are necessary to further the permissible ends of others. Since Kant also maintains that “to be happy is necessarily the desire of every rational but finite being” (CPR, p. 25; GMM, p. 415), we have a positive duty to promote the happiness of others. Thus, in addition to any constraints on action which Kant’s principle might generate, it also provides a rationale for a moral goal that we are obligated to pursue (GMM, pp. 398, 423, 430; DV, pp. 384-387). Since Kant’s principle generates both positive and negative duties, and since there are many situations which involve, at least, prima facie conflicts of these duties, we need a rationale for giving priority to one duty rather than the other. Of course, according to Kant, there cannot be unresolvable conflicts of duty. The concept of duty involves the objective practical necessity of an action and since two conflicting actions cannot both be necessary, a conflict of duties is conceptually impossible. Kant, however, does not grant that “grounds of obligation” can conflict, even if obligations cannot. He is thus left with the priority problem at this level. Kant argues that in cases of conflict “the stronger ground of obligation prevails” (MEJ, p. 224). Although such a response is intuitively plausible, without an account of how one ground of obligation can be stronger than another, it does not provide any practical guidance. In addition to the conceptual impossibility of conflicting duties, Kant’s confidence that there are no unresolvable conflicts of duty is rooted in his larger moral and metaphysical system; specifically, his conception of the Kingdom of Ends, his teleology of nature, and his division of reality into sensible and intelligible realms. According to Kant, the ends of fully rational beings will not conflict but will form a harmonious Kingdom of Ends. It is part of the very idea of lawful ends and rational beings that they coexist in a state of harmony, because as fully rational beings they would all will the same thing. Of course, as finite, imperfect, rational beings (beings guided by both reason and natural inclination) we need some guide to the proper ends of rational beings. Kant often maintains that the teleological ends of natural law are our guide in identifying the proper and legitimate ends of a rational being. As imperfectly rational beings, existing in the sensible rather than the intelligible realm, we can act in accordance with the teleological laws of nature to assure that our ends are rational and thus worthy of being realized. As Bruce Aune explains, “If by treating an imperfectly rational being in a certain way, we promote a kingdom of nature, we can infer, by analogy, that we are acting in accordance with the requirements of the pure moral law, which directly applies to an inaccessible domain of purely rational, intelligible beings.” Essentially, Kant argues that a kingdom of nature represents a Kingdom of Ends and natural law represents a universal practical law. Natural law is, according to Kant, our analogue for universal practical law. Most neo-Kantians do not defend these parts of Kant’s theory. If we reject (as I assume we do) the view of nature as a system of teleological laws which prescribes the natural and lawful ends to rational beings, then we must rely on the concept of rational nature as an end-in-itself to determine the shared ends of all rational beings. The telos of rational action must replace the telos of nature. Thus, to discover which ground of obligation is stronger, and thereby resolve prima facie conflicts of duty, we must appeal directly to the objective end of rational action.
Any risk of moral uncertainty means we default to preventing extinction Bostrom 13 Nick Bostrom (Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford). “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy, Vol. 4, Issue 1. 2013. http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this we must prevent any existential catastrophe.
Additionally: Analytic Analytic
1/28/17
JANFEB- 1AC- Zizek
Tournament: Emory | Round: 6 | Opponent: Cypress Woods LC | Judge: Chris Castillo 1AC Zizek Colleges and universities have significantly repressed constitutionally protected speech—as political correctness defines the milieu of campuses, limits on speech have all but disappeared with the rise of Trump Burleigh 16: Nina Burleigh (Newsweek's National Politics Correspondent. She is an award-winning journalist and the author of five books. Her last book, The Fatal Gift of Beauty: The Trials of Amanda Knox, was a New York Times bestseller. In the last several years, she has covered a wide array of subjects, from American politics to the Arab Spring). “The Battle Against ‘Hate Speech’ on College Campuses Gives Rise to a Generation that Hates Speech.” Newsweek. May 26th, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/03/college-campus-free-speech-thought-police-463536.html More than half of America’s colleges and universities now have restrictive speech codes. And, according to a censorship watchdog group, 217 American colleges and universities—including some of the most prestigious—have speech codes that “unambiguously impinge upon free speech.” Judges have interpreted the First Amendment broadly, giving Americans some of the most expansive rights of speech in the world. But over the past two decades, and especially the past few years, American college administrators and many students have sought to confine speech to special zones and agitated for restrictions on language in classrooms as well. To protect undergrads from the discomfort of having to hear disagreeable ideas and opinions, administrators and students—and the U.S. Department of Education—have been reframing speech as “verbal conduct” that potentially violates the civil rights of minorities and women. American college campuses are starting to resemble George Orwell’s Oceania with its Thought Police, or East Germany under the Stasi. College newspapers have been muzzled and trashed, and students are disciplined or suspended for “hate speech,” while exponentially more are being shamed and silenced on social media by their peers. Professors quake at the possibility of accidentally offending any student and are rethinking syllabi and restricting class discussions to only the most anodyne topics. A Brandeis professor endured a secret administrative investigatiuman on for racial harassment after using the word wetback in classs while explaining its use as a pejorative. As college campuses have become bastions of rigorously enforced political correctness, the limits on speech have come crashing down in the real world, with the presumptive Republican nominee for president dishing out macroaggressions on a daily basis. Donald Trump’s comments about the alleged criminality of Hispanics and Muslims, and about how fat or ugly his female enemies are, need no restating here, but many of his words would aflmost certainly be prohibited speech on most college campuses. Trump is an example of how public vulgarity has returned to the political, disintegrating the ethical substance of public life—at the same time, restrictions which mandate politically correct speech contribute to the same destruction by normalizing state violence Zizek 16 Slavoj Zizek (cultural critic). “The Return of Public Vulgarity.” Newsweek. February 12th, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/return-public-vulgarity-425691 We should be under no illusions about the meaning of statements like those of Netanyahu: They are a clear sign of the regression of our public sphere. Accusations and ideas that were till now confined to the obscure underworld of racist obscenity are now gaining a foothold in official discourse. The problem here is what Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel called Sittlichkeit: mores, the thick background of (unwritten) rules of social life, the thick and impenetrable ethical substance that tells us what we can and cannot do. These rules are disintegrating today: What was a couple of decades ago simply unsayable in a public debate can now be pronounced with impunity. It may appear that this disintegration is counteracted by the growth of political correctness, which prescribes exactly what cannot be said; however, a closer look immediately makes it clear how the "politically correct" regulation participates in the same process of the disintegration of the ethical substance. To prove this point, it suffices to recall the deadlock of political correctness: The need for PC rules arises when unwritten mores are no longer able to regulate effectively everyday interactions—instead of spontaneous customs followed in a nonreflexive way, we get explicit rules, such as when “torture” becomes an “enhanced interrogation technique.” The crucial point is that torture—brutal violence practiced by the state—was made publicly acceptable at the very moment when public language was rendered politically correct in order to protect victims from symbolic violence. These two phenomena are two sides of the same coin. We can discern a similar phenomenon in other domains of public life. When it was announced that, from July till September 2015, “Jade Helm 15”—a large U.S. military exercise—would take place in the Southwest, the news immediately gave rise to a suspicion that the exercises were part of a federal plot to place Texas under martial law in a direct violation of the Constitution. We find all the usual suspects participating in this conspiracy paranoia, up to Chuck Norris; the craziest among them is the website All News Pipeline, which linked these exercises to the closure of several Wal-Mart megastores in Texas: “Will these massive stores soon be used as 'food distribution centers' and to house the headquarters of invading troops from China, here to disarm Americans one by one as promised by Michelle Obama to the Chinese prior to Obama leaving the White House?” What makes the affair ominous is the ambiguous reaction of the leading Texas Republicans: Governor Greg Abbott ordered the State Guard to monitor the exercise, while Ted Cruz demanded details from the Pentagon. Trump is the purest expression of this tendency toward debasement of our public life. What does he do in order to “steal the show” at public debates and in interviews? He offers a mixture of “politically incorrect” vulgarities: racist stabs (against Mexican immigrants), suspicions on Obama’s birthplace and university diploma, bad-taste attacks on women and offenses to war heroes like John McCain. Such tasteless quips are meant to indicate that Trump doesn’t care about false manners and “says openly what he (and many ordinary people) think.” In short, he makes it clear that, in spite of his billions, he is an ordinary vulgar guy like all of us common people. However, these vulgarities should not deceive us: Whatever Trump is, he is not a dangerous outsider. If anything, his program is even relatively moderate (he acknowledges many Democratic achievements, and his stance toward gay marriage is ambiguous). The function of his “refreshing” provocations and vulgar outbursts is precisely to mask the ordinariness of his program. His true secret is that if, by a miracle, he wins, nothing will change—in contrast to Bernie Sanders, the leftist Democrat whose key advantage over the academic politically correct liberal left is that he understands and respects the problems and fears of ordinary workers and farmers. The really interesting electoral duel would have been the one between Trump as the Republican candidate and Sanders as the Democratic candidate. But why talk about politeness and public manners today when we are facing what appears to be much more pressing “real” problems? Because manners do matter—in tense situations, they are a matter of life and death, a thin line that separates barbarism from civilization. There is one surprising fact about the latest outbursts of public vulgarities that deserves to be noted. Back in the 1960s, occasional vulgarities were associated with the political left: Student revolutionaries often used common language to emphasize their contrast to official politics with its polished jargon. Today, vulgar language is an almost exclusive prerogative of the radical right, so that the left finds itself in a surprising position as the defender of decency and public manners. That’s why the moderate “rational” Republican right is in a panic: After the decline of the fortunes of Jeb Bush, it is desperately looking for a new face, toying even with the idea of mobilizing Bloomberg. But the true problem resides in the weakness of the moderate “rational” position itself. The fact that the majority cannot be convinced by the “rational” capitalist discourse and is much more prone to endorse a populist anti-elitist stance is not to be discounted as a case of lower-class primitivism: Populists correctly detect the irrationality of this rational approach; their rage directed at faceless institutions that regulate their lives in a nontransparent way is fully justified. This seeming paradox at the heart of speech restrictions proves the undecidability at the heart of our symbolic order—political correctness guarantees that offensiveness will appear in a worse form that is masked by benevolence--we must understand the power relations at the heart of language Zizek 99 Slavoj Zizek. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. Pgs. 332-333, 1999. Google Books. In all these domains, the différend seems to be irreducible—that is to say, sooner or later we find ourselves in a grey zone whose mist cannot be dispelled by the application of some single universal rule. Here we encounter a kind of counterpoint to the ‘uncertainty principle’ of quantum physics; there is, for example, a structural difficulty in determining whether some comment was actually a case of sexual harassment or one of racist hate speech. Confronted with such a dubious statement, a ‘politically correct’ radical a priori tends to believe the complaining victim (if the victim experienced it as harassment, then harassment is was…), while a diehard orthodox liberal tends to believe the accused (if he sincerely did not mean it as harassment, then he should be acquitted…). The point, of course, is that this undecidability is structural and unavoidable, since it is the big Other (the symbolic network in which victim and offender are both embedded) which ultimately ‘decides’ on meaning, and the order of the big Other is, by definition, open; nobody can dominate and regulate its effects. That is the problem with replacing aggressive with ‘politically correct’ expressions: when one replaces ‘short-sighted’ with ‘visually challenged’, one can never be sure that this replacement itself will not generate new effects of patronizing and/or ironic offensiveness, all the more humiliating inasmuch as it is masked as benevolence. The mistake of this ‘politically correct’ strategy is that it underestimates the resistance of the language we actually speak to the conscious regulation of its effects, especially effects that involve power relations. So to resolve the deadlock, one convenes a committee to formulate, in an ultimately arbitrary way, the precise rules of conduct….It is the same with medicine and biogenetics (at what point does an acceptable and even desirable genetic experiment or intervention turn into unacceptable manipulation?), in the application of universal human rights (at what point does the protection of the victim’s rights turn into an imposition of Western values?), in sexual mores (what is the proper, non-patriarchal procedure of seduction?), not to mention the obvious case of cyberspace (what is the status of sexual harassment in a virtual community? How does one distinguish here between ‘mere words’ and ‘deeds’?) The work of these committees is caught in a symptomal vicious cycle: on the one hand, they try to legitimate their decisions by reference to the most advanced scientific knowledge (which, in the case of abortion, tells us that a foetus does not yet possess self-awareness and experience pain; which, in the case of a mortally ill person, defines the threshold beyond which euthanasia is the only meaningful solution); on the other hand, they have to evoke some non-scientific ethical criterion in order to direct and posit a limitation to inherent scientific drive. The culture of political correctness and the biopolitics of the university are two sides of the same coin—individual subjects are reduced to bare life, and attempts at transgression have failed because of our narcissistic subjectivities Huang 11: Han-yu Huang (Department of English, National Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan). “Risk, Fear and Immunity: Reinventing the Political in the Age of Biopolitics.” Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies 37.1 March 2011: 43-71 From his very early work onwards, Žižek has been preoccupied with how the bureaucratic machine or technocratic system directly dominates over the subject’s essence of life; it is a concern that is exemplified by his reading of Kafka, and of Nazi and Stalinist regimes and, more recently, by his analysis of cyberspace and The Matrix trilogy.5 From the late 1990s onwards, his critique of contemporary postpolitics, a task that brings him closer to Rancière and Badiou than he would admit, targets a variety of objects that include multiculturalist identity politics, the culture of political correctness and risk society on the common ground of their disavowal of fundamental social antagonism and lumps them together into the theme of the totally administered society in the interest of global capitalism. More recently still, his take on Levinasian ethics and critical dialogue with Judith Butler as well as his sophisticated conceptualization of the Neighbor-Thing, as is most thoroughly exemplified in “Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence,” are concerned above all with the Other beyond symbolic and imaginary identification and, more fundamentally, the passive, undead, and inhuman kernel that constitutes humanity, or humanity of zero degree; such an orientation places him on a par with biopolitical theorists proper like Foucault, Agamben, Hardt and Negri. Put in a simplified but accurate way, Žižek characterizes the contemporary postpolitical era in terms of its refusal of higher Causes than life purely immanent to itself. Two ideologico-political constellations, as the two sides of the same coin, perfectly fit in this milieu: that of the biopolitical administration that reduces humans to bare life and that of “the multiculturalist respect for the vulnerable Other brought to an extreme, of the attitude of narcissistic subjectivity that experiences itself as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential ‘harassments’” (“From Politics to Biopolitics” 509, also see The Parallax View 297). For Žižek, contemporary biopolitics depends on the narcissistic personality that is bent on self-realization or happiness qua supreme commodity; it is subjects that make themselves objects of biopolitical administration of life: hence, from Žižek’s perspective, the expansion of Foucauldian “care of the self” to almost every aspect of everyday life. This also explains away the proliferation of ethics and dominance of experts of life. These experts, in Žižekian terms, enunciate the University discourse from the position of neutral knowledge or, in Lacan’s own terms, “the fantasy of a totality-knowledge” (Seminar XVII 33), while the discourse in question aims to calculate and totalize surplus jouissance (Seminar XVII 177) and “addresses the remainder of the real . . . turning it into the subject ($)” (Žižek, “From Politics to Biopolitics” 505-06). For both Lacan and Žižek, all these biopolitical techniques involve the new capitalist master that has replaced the classical master and has dominated, in the context of this paper, the biopolitical field in the place of knowledge. 6 The upper level of the University discourse (notated as S2→a) condenses Foucauldian and Agambenian biopolitics, where expert knowledge dominates and reduces individuals to bare life; the lower level (S1—$) represents the impossibility of the subject to assume its symbolic mandate, namely, the subject’s life in the state of excess. Such excess or surplus, as is further reinforced by the Hysterical discourse which legitimates permanent self-questioning of desire, has been well integrated into today’s capitalist system as the driving force of its social production. Transgressions turn out to be immanent to today’s capitalist-bureaucratic biopolitics. And their outcome amounts to nothing but “the postmetaphysical survivalist stance of the Last Man” (“From Politics to Biopolitics” 506), which ends up, again, disavowing the fundamental social antagonism. Political correctness prevents us from truly overcoming inequalities—we choose to soften our language in place of challenging structures—only a method of shared obscene solidarity places ourselves and the Other on equal footing Merelli 15 Annalisa Merelli (holds a master's degree in semiotics and a bachelor's degree in mass communication from the University of Bologna). “Slavoj Žižek thinks political correctness is exactly what perpetuates prejudice and racism.” Quartz. May 8th, 2015. http://qz.com/398723/slavoj-zizek-thinks-political-correctness-is-exactly-what-perpetuates-prejudice-and-racism/ “I’m well aware that we should not just walk around and humiliate each other,” says the philosopher. And yet he finds that “there is something so fake about political correctness”—something that, according to him, prevents a true overcoming of prejudice and racism. Žižek explains: That’s my problem with political correctness. It’s just a form of self discipline which doesn’t really allow you too overcome racism. It’s just oppressed, controlled racism. Žižek’s words might be blunt, but his point is valid. Political correctness stems from the understanding that racism and inequality exist, and that in lieu of fixing those problems, prettier language will do the trick—as if by using inoffensive words and avoiding crass jokes we are to paint over the filth of reality. Politically correct expressions, to Žižek, become patronizing because they actually highlight inequalities. As the philosopher notes, “one needs to be very precise not to fight racism in a way which ultimately reproduces, if not racism itself, at least the conditions of racism.” The subtext of every carefully chosen, politically correct, expression is that there are still people in a position so privileged that they need to refer to “others” in a way that is not offensive—that doesn’t, for instance, make reference to their origin, or skin color. The implication is that there is nothing possibly offensive in the speaker’s skin tone or their origin. Jokes and blunt words can’t scratch their confidence—no, it’s only the rest of the population who needs the protection of politically correct language. Beyond the offensive jokes, avoiding politically correct language is also about calling things by their name. Just like a family friend’s three-year-old nephew who, back from his first day of kindergarten, excitedly told his parents: “I have a new friend! He’s all brown!” And it is not just race, of course, that Žižek talks about. Gender, disability–anything that diverges from norms presented in society or media–are all coated with neutral words and behaviors, by the very people who claim to be accepting of it. This special language, despite its intentions, serves to reinforce certain conditions as special, fragile, and weak. Can we dare to see differences for what they are—nothing else than differences? And can we ever safely name them, perhaps even with the occasional offensive joke? Perhaps adopting a little of Žižek’s attitude would indeed result in what he refers to as a “wonderful sense of shared obscene solidarity.” It might generate misunderstanding, but if a more light-hearted approach is adopted in a genuine way, that would reflect a profound belief that the other isn’t weaker, doesn’t need anyone’s protection, and is at our level—hence can openly be made fun of, just as we do of ourselves. Only embracing the obscenities of language can foster intellectual freedom—language must be a conduit for venting our aggressiveness—however censorship forces us to repress our desires, making physical violence inevitable Schwartz 86 Joel Schwartz (University of Toronto). “Freud and Freedom of Speech.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1227-1248. JSTOR. These statements suggest that Freud defends intellectual freedom for reasons similar to some of those motivating earlier figures such as John Stuart Mill. Freud, like Mill, appears to advocate freedom of speech and thought in order to facilitate the intellectual progress of the individual and the human race-in order to foster personal growth or development toward "the psychological ideal, the primacy of intelligence." Nevertheless, one senses a significant difference in tone between Freud and Mill: underlying Freud's praise of honest speech is an apparent hostility or aggressiveness directed against conven- tional "society," the "fainthearted" home of shamefacedlyy" hypocritical or dishonest speech. Freud evidently prides himself on his honesty, which leads him both to express his anger at society and consequently to anger society. For Freud, intellectual freedom in some way appears to connote not only the search for truth but also the willingness to give vent to one's own aggressiveness and to brave the aggressiveness of others. I believe this is significant, for we will see that aggres- sion, both as manifested by Freud and as understood by him, is central to what is original and psychoanalytic in the Freud- ian defense of freedom of speech and emo- tion (which differs in important ways from the traditional and intellectual "Millian" defense of freedom of speech and thought). In order to understand Freud's specifically psychoanalytic grounds for defending freedom of speech, it is useful to begin with two statements in which he and his one-time collaborator Breuer ex- plain the reason for the importance of speech in psychoanalytic therapy. In the first, they write that "language serves as a substitute Surrogat for action; by its help, an affect can be 'abreacted' i.e., a disturbing emotion can be discharged almost as effectively as it can by an action" (Freud and Breuer, 1893a, p. 8). Developing this point in the second state- ment, Breuer adds that "telling things is a relief" (Freud and Breuer, 1895d, chap. 3, sec. 3, p. 211). However, these statements are primar- ily of interest not because of what they tell us about the function of speech within psychoanalytic therapy but because Freud's view of the social function of ordi- nary speech in some ways resembles his view of the function of the speech directed by a patient to his or her analyst. In society, as in therapy, Freud believes that "language serves as a substitute for action"-that "telling things is a relief." These beliefs lead Freud to construct his psychoanalytic argument suggesting both the advantages and, secondarily, the lim- itations of freedom of speech. Freud has been described as "the great liberator . . . of speech" (Marcus, 1975, p. 294); by assessing Freud's psychoanalytic argu- ment in comparison with more traditional arguments, my intention is to elucidate this description of Freud and to evaluate its adequacy. I do so hoping to increase not only our understanding of Freud but also our understanding of hte more tradi- tional liberal defense of freedom of speech. Cursing and Censorship Freud himself suggests the analogy that I have proposed between the function of speech in therapeutic situations specifi- cally and in social situations generally:3 The most adequate reaction by which height- ened emotion can be lessened is always a deed. But, as an English writer has wittily remarked, the man who first flung a word of abuse at an enemy instead of a spear was the founder of civilization. Thus the word is the substitute Ersatz for the deed, and in some circumstances (e.g., in Confession) the only substitute. Accord- ingly, alongside the adequate reaction there is one that is less adequate. (Freud, 1893h, p. 36; I have made the translation more literal.) What is crucially important about this statement is Freud's assumption that the first word (or at least the first relevant word in the civilizing process) was a word "of abuse." In saying this, Freud here im- plies something he states explicitly elsewhere: that social relations are inherently conflictual.4 One crucial function of speech is, therefore, to provide an outlet for our aggressiveness that is safer, both for us and for others, than physical violence. In an important sense (for which Freud elsewhere provides a theoretical justification) conflict is prior to and more fundamental than cooperation.5 Because this is already implicit in Freud's state- ment about the "word of abuse," one can say that Freud's understanding of lan- guage in some measure resembles Caliban's in Shakespeare's Tempest, for Caliban remarks to Prospero, "You taught me language, and my profit on't / Is, I know how to curse" (act 1, scene 2, lines 363-64). Language makes it possible for us to curse and profits us by enabling us to work out our hostility to others in a reasonably harmless manner. However, it is to some extent unfortunate, in Freud's view, that we are often unwilling to employ the linguistic vehicle for the exor- cism of our aggression because we are unwilling to admit our aggressiveness (and more generally, our egoism) to ourselves. Thus, the aggressiveness displayed by Freud vis-a-vis society and those whom he derisively calls "the masses stems in part from his impa- tience at their failure to acknowledge and to act out their aggressiveness.6 Insofar as we are reluctant to acknowledge our aggressiveness, Freud contends that we curtail the freedom of our own speech excessively and harm ourselves by repressing our aggressiveness instead of expressing it in our speech. Free speech should profit us Calibans by enabling us to curse. It does not always do so, however; we suppress our desire to curse because to a great extent-too great-we are Calibans with a bad conscience. Our bad conscience is apparent in a phenomenon whose very name suggests its relevance to the question of freedom of speech-the phenomenon Freud calls censorship. Freud employs the concept of censorship most prominently in his discussions of dreaming: censorship ac- counts for the fact that dreams must be interpreted for the fact that a dream is less "the fulfilment of a wish" than it is "a (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish" (Freud, 1900a, ch. 2, p. 121, and chap. 4, p. 160, respectively). To explain why dreams are censored would take me well beyond the scope of my argument; for my purposes here, it is sufficient to note what is censored in dreams. Dream censorship is directed against things that are invariably of a reprehensible nature, repulsive from the ethical, aesthetic and social point of view-matters of which one does not venture to think at all or thinks only with dis- gust. These wishes, which are censored and given a distorted expression in dreams, are first and foremost manifestations of an unbridled and ruthless egoism. (Freud, 1916-17, lecture 9, p. 142)
Thus, I affirm that public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech.
Violence is not always given rational articulation—that makes it impossible to comprehend simply through moral philosophy—only psychoanalysis enables us to understand the symbolic violence at the heart of political correctness Valentic 16 Tonci Valentic (University of Zagreb). “Symbolic Violence and Global Capitalism.” International Journal of Zizek Studies, vol. 2, no. 2. 2016. http://www.zizekstudies.org/index.php/IJZS/article/viewFile/108/108 The major task of philosophical analysis of violence in contemporary world should be developing a theory of political violence. Obviously, there are numerous theories on the respective issue, but very few of them reflect properly today's global socio-political constellation. For example, authors like Weber or Arendt provided noteworthy insight, but they cannot fully cope with issues we are dealing today in the beginning of 21st century. The main problem with violence is that it doesn't have always a deep-lying cause based on rational articulation, which means it is impossible to understand it only using arguments of classical political theory or moral philosophy: one had to incorporate psychoanalysis and semiotic or symbolic interpretation as well. Wherein should we search for relationship between violence and politics in today's world? Since violence is a complex phenomenon, several things have to be taken into account: first of all, it is always primarily a "structural" problem, an "objective" feature of today's capitalist societies. Second, as I mentioned before, structural (or objective) violence is placed in the very heart of capitalism itself (this is the idea that Slavoj Žižek advocates - relying on the idea which came from Balibar and is even earlier extracted out of Marxism). Third, violence does not necessarily refer to activity or any deeds: passivity can also be violent. The major point here is, as Žižek would put it, that violence presented in media (such as suicidal bombings, humanitarian crisis, terrorist attack, and so on) actually blinds us to the objective violence in the world where we become "perpetrators and not just innocent victims". As Žižek would argue, we consistently overlook the objective or "symbolic" violence embodied in language and its forms, i.e. democratic state's monopoly on legitimate violence. He asserts that "subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of the non-violent zero-level, as a perturbation of the “normal” peaceful state of things; however, objective violence is precisely the violence sustaining this “normal” state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as visible violence – in order to perceive it, one has to perform a kind of parallax shift". The horror of violent acts and empathy for the victims inexorably function as a lure which prevents us from thinking, for example when we are forced to act urgently, or when confronted with "humanitarian politics" of human rights that serves as the ideology of military interventionism for specific economic-political purposes, which utterly prevents any radical socio-political transformation (i.e. charity becomes the humanitarian mask hiding the face of economic exploitation). Having that in mind, there are four possible theoretical tasks one should undertake in order to clearly articulate a theory of political violence: 1) to point out that "structural" violence is in the heart of global capitalism, 2) to deconstruct media's coverage of crime, terrorism as well as humanitarian crisis, 3) to unravel true motives of terrorists, 4) to expose racism and racial violence as fear which is deeply rooted in the liberal and tolerant multicultural societies obsessed with political correctness. Therefore, as Žižek has pointed out, subjective violence we see (the one with a clear identifiable agent) is only the tip of an iceberg made up of "systemic" violence. The role of the ballot and judge is to investigate violence through psychoanalytic phenomenology—this is uniquely key to understanding political correctness and fostering meaningful dialogue Schwartz 16 Howard Schwartz. Political Correctness and the Destruction of Social Order: Chronicling the Rise of the Pristine Self. Palgrave Macmillan, pg. 4, 2016. Google Books. The occasion for this has been what I call the rise, or the establishment, or the normalization, of the pristine self. This is a self that is touched by nothing but love. The problem is that nobody is touched by nothing but love, and so if a person has this as an expectation, if they have built their sense of themselves around this premise, the inevitable appearance of something other than love, indeed the appearance even of any other human being, blows this structure apart. That is where we are today. Where the idea of the pristine self has come from, how it and its decomposition have become manifest, and what the effects of this are likely to be, are the subjects of this book. I cannot offer a happy prognosis here, except to say that nothing lasts forever. This, too, shall pass and when it does those who are left will need to know how what happened to them happened. So I am writing a chronicle now. Hopefully, when the time comes, it will be of use. This is a work of what I call psychoanalytic phenomenology. My subject matter is my own mind. I try to understand the minds of others by finding them within my own. As I have said, my theoretical framework for this is psychoanalytic, and that calls for a word of explanation. The credibility of psychoanalytic theory is, of course, not universally granted. It has, however, a unique suitability to the study of political correctness. There is clearly an element of irrationality in political correctness. It is a form of censorship without a censor; we impose it on ourselves. Yet, it keeps us away from the reasoned discussion of social issues which everybody can see are important, consequential, and desperately in need of wide-ranging analysis. It does so through an emotional power that is rarely gainsaid and which anyone can see is ultimately against everyone’s interest; yet it prevails nonetheless. If that is not irrationality playing itself out in the social domain, what is? Yet where does it get that power? This is a question that is rarely posed—it is, after all, politically incorrect to do so—but it is no less important than the totality of the issues that political correctness has obscured. And if we do not approach this question through psychoanalytic theory, what, exactly, shall we approach it through? The rational understanding of irrationality is what psychoanalysis was developed to accomplish. In fact, more than any specific theory that is what psychoanalysis is. It is in that spirit that we will undertake this inquiry. Self-reflexive interrogation of the psyche is essential to ushering in new patterns of symbolization Moon 13: Davis S. Moon. “Autonomy and alienated subjectivity: A re-reading of Castoriadis, through Zizek.” Subjectivity, 6 (4). pp. 424-244. 2013. http://opus.bath.ac.uk/36738/1/AaAS_Subjectivities_R_R_FINAL_DSM.pdf Alienation and Autonomy: Prerequisite, not Obstacle The key issue here is the psyche. For Castoriadis autonomy is predicated upon an ability to think ‘at a distance’ from the social-historical and this is made possible by the extrasocial matrix of meaning which exists in the monadic psyche, continuing across from the pre-socialised monadic state of the infans. On the other hand, autonomy in the Žižek-ian sense is made possible for exactly the opposite reason: It is the lack of any such monadic psyche which keeps open the possibility of traversing present sedimented modes of thinking. This is because the psyche, as lack, acts as ‘a hitch’ – that is, as ‘an impediment which gives rise to ever-new symbolizations by means of which one endeavours to integrate and domesticate it ... but which simultaneously condemns these endeavours to ultimate failure’ (Žižek, 1994b, 22). Indeed, to borrow a phrase from Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 8), the autonomous individual, it might be said, works (i.e. acts in a manner which can be deemed autonomous) ‘only when they break down, and by continually breaking down’. This is meant not in the Deleuzian sense – i.e. of a shattering, fragmenting or disintegrating subject – but instead as something akin to an irreparable perpetual-motion machine which, continual glitching and occasionally crashing, always subsequently re-boots with a modified programming: There is a ‘ghost’ in this machine, but this ghost is not the ‘mind’ as distinct from the ‘matter’ as understood in the normal Cartesian sense, but the catalytic tension created by the ineliminable ‘gap’ constitutive of subjectivity, be it 25 labelled ‘magma’ (following Castoriadis) or ‘lack’ (following Žižek). It is here that we find the space for a form of agential autonomy worthy of the name. As Fabio Vighi (2010, 133) writes in his own re-working of Žižek’s philosophy: ‘Žižek’s materialism is based on the groundbreaking insight that the gap constitutive of reality is nothing but the gap constitutive of subjectivity: we are the very impossibility that we ascribe to external reality, and that we must constantly disavow or displace if we are to connect with it.’ It is for this reason that ‘it is therefore crucial, politically, to conceive self-alienation not as a problem but as the key to the solution’ (ibid, 101). In seeking answers regarding the possibility of autonomy, the focus must therefore be upon the occurrence of this ‘short-circuiting’ (Johnston, 2007, xxiii) qua displacement from external reality, how it comes about and the possibilities for pro-active, positive agency attached to it. Since Žižek’s position is that this short-circuiting occurs by surprise, without agential intension (2000, 376), the notion of seeking out encounters with such a resultant effect might seem too self-authorial and thus quasi-existentialist from his perspective. Yet arguably active critical reflexivity allows exactly such an act(ion), even with the excision of the positively-charged psychic monad. It is this ability which, as noted, for Castoriadis underlies subjects’ capacity for autonomy – his ‘project of autonomy’ envisaging ‘the maximization of the possibilities of reflection, self-reflection and deliberation’ (Peter Osborne quoted in Castoriadis, 1996, 13). As Sharpe and Bouchner note, in his early works Žižek (1989-c.1995) arguably shared such a view: ‘the political ideal that animates this work is the modern notion of autonomy: rational self-determination by self-legislating individuals, in opposition to our dependent, heteronomous subjection to the socio-political Other’ (2010, 63). This, however, was in his ‘radical democratic’ 26 phase, before and the embracing of the ‘Leninist-Lacanian’ Act as the only true path to change. In judging how this can be actualised we can return to Castoriadis, or at least one of his primary interpreters, David Ames Curtis and his delineation of the concept of improvisation. As Curtis (1988, xvii) describes, ‘to “im-pro-vise” literally means not to “foresee,” not to anticipate’ (ibid, xvii). As a statement regarding action, this chimes in regards to the Act, as explained above. Discussing the concept via the metaphor of jazz improvisation, however, Curtis writes that: In “improvisation” as I conceive it, one does not act in an “immediate,” un-prepared way lacking all foresight ... The very process of “improvisation” ... involves planning, the making of choices (one of the most elementary being when to start “playing” and when to remain silent), and the creation of alternative forms of articulation (what to “play”); it also gives birth to that which was not contained in previous activities. (ibid, xix) Castoriadis (2010, 188) speaks of the need for an individual seeking ‘enlightenment’ to first ‘shake herself enough to be able to be enlightened’, the latter not being a passive state, but one sought: ‘You must want to be enlightened’ as ‘the reception of the Enlightenment is just as creative as its creation.’ Like a reader who selects a random article from Subjectivity on the judgement that its content may confront her with radical new ideas which are until the point of encounter unanticipated, individuals can elect to self-reflexively interrogate their own positions on different issues of their own determining in a manner whereby the end point reached is unknown. What do I believe? Why do I believe it? Upon what grounds have I made this judgement? All knowledge of the world being mediated through existing socialhistorical imaginary-symbolic institutions, themselves held ‘open’ by the limits of the 27 Real, all judgements regarding these questions are made based upon contingently founded foundations and as such can become ‘unstuck' (see: Marchart, 2007). It is in looking at seemingly foundational statements awry that this lack of objective finality is evident. In all of this, self-reflexivity is key; however, pace Castoriadis, in said reflecting there is no pre-historic matrix of meaning to buttress and mould new ideas from. Rather, it is the alienation fundamental to subjectivity, barring the closure of individual identity, that makes possible subjective short-circuiting and thus keeps open spaces ‘at a distance’ from pre-existing systems of social significations wherein new patterns of symbolisation can arise. Peeling away justifications one arrives at the empty space of a pure “because”, thus dislocating the pre-existing imaginary-symbolic institution and opening up the space for another more ’readable’ (re)articulation. Castoriadis (2011, 38) himself compared this process to the autonomy of the poet, explaining that ‘when you write a poem, you use the words of the language, but what you are doing is not a combination of these words. It’s a new form that you impose on them, through their linkage, through a sense esprit that pervades a poem.’ This form of creation, he argues, ‘is not a simple reprisal of elements that were in existence’ as ‘there is a new form created that is not limited to combination.’ As Kioupkiolis (2012, 188) echoes: ‘Original self-creation consists mainly in the sporadic emergence of new forms that cannot be fully reduced to antecedent conditions. But new figures make use of pre-existing materials and spring up within pre-established contexts.’ Such a conception of autonomous change viz. reflexive improvisation involves the rearticulation of pre-existing elements of the social-historical, such that a fundamentally new form of imaginary-symbolic representation is created ex nihlo. It thus offers a proactive conceptualisation of how radical agent-led change can occur which goes beyond, without rejecting, the Žižek-ian Act as (a) mode of autonomous revolution – but is not reliant upon Castoriadis’s problematic ontology of subjectivity based around concepts such as a monadic psyche containing a pre-social meaning which continues to exist post-socialisation. In an act of filtration, re-reading Castoriadis through Žižek as advocated here produces a new composite purer for being tainted.
1/30/17
JANFEB- 1AR- Hate Speech
Tournament: Emory | Round: 4 | Opponent: Oakwood AW | Judge: Greg Malis Empirics prove hate speech laws can’t be enforced and get targeted against minorities Ash 16 Timothy Garton Ash (Isaiah Berlin Professorial Fellow at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford; Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; prize-winning author of many books of political writing). Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World. Yale University Press. 2016.
Moreover, so much depends on the context. Harmless hate speech in Reykjavik is dangerous speech in Rwanda. In the argument that follows, I shall confine myself to mature democracies, having the rule of law, diverse media and a developed civil society. Here there is a compelling case that the advantages of hate speech laws, as they have actually worked over the last half century, are outweighed by the disadvantages, including their unintended consequences. There is scant evidence that mature democracies with extensive hate speech laws manifest any less racism, sexism or other kinds of prejudice than those with few or no such laws. Take France, which has a relatively high level of hate speech prosecutions. There were about 100 convictions per year in the five-year period from 1997 to 2001, and an annual average of 208 in 2005 to 2007. French courts have convicted Brigitte Bardot five times for incitement to racial hatred, on account of her fulminating attacks on Muslims in France, starting with the way they slaughter animals. The distinguished intellectual Edgar Morin was found guilty for a fierce attack on Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, and a member of parliament, Christian Vanneste, for expressing ‘homophobic views’, although both convictions were overturned on appeal. Yet France has endemic discrimination in its labour market against people of migrant origin and especially Muslims, racist monkey chants in its football stadiums and a xenophobic party, the Front National, which gains the support of a large number of French voters. Similarly, the British writer Kenan Malik has pointed out, recalling his own personal experience of racist attacks, that the decade after Britain passed legislation against incitement to racial hatred in 1965 was probably the country’s worst for racism. Plainly we can’t argue that the persistence of prejudice is a result of the laws, and some will say that, on the contrary, it shows how necessary they are. Indeed, the apparent ineffectiveness of Britain’s 1965 law was one reason it was strengthened in 1976, so that you did not even have to intend to stir up racial hatred; your words or actions just had to be ‘likely to’ stir it up. A causal connection cannot be proven either way. What is clear is that there is no correlation between the presence of extensive hate speech laws on the statute books and lower levels of abusively expressed prejudice about human difference. If, as Errera argues, the main purpose of such laws is to enforce civility, they have not succeeded. Interestingly, even two of the most outspoken American critics of racist hate speech, from the perspective of what they call ‘critical race theory’, Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado, found the efficacy of such laws to be ‘an open question’. The application of good laws is clear, predictable and proportionate. That of hate speech laws has been unpredictable and often disproportionate. In Canada, the uncertainty has been even greater because findings on hate speech have in part been delegated to Human Rights Commissions in each individual province. As a result, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal found in 2009 that section 13 of the Human Rights Act, which mandated controls over hate speech on the internet, violated the free speech clause of the country’s own Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 13 was repealed in 2013. What is more, laws intended to afford protection to ‘vulnerable minorities’ have often ended up being used against members of those minorities. There is a reason for this. Members of a secure majority, where it still exists, are less likely to express themselves in extreme terms. They don’t feel the need to scream to make themselves heard. The internet has brought an explosion of offensive, extreme expression, exacerbated by the online norm of anonymity. Reacting instantly, behind the mask of a pseudonym, people jerk out things online that they would never say when using their real name in a face-to-face encounter or public meeting. If we believe in openness and robust civility, we must address this challenge, and I shall say more about how this can be done by civil society, online communities and private powers. However, this new reality weakens rather than strengthens the case for hate speech laws. Given this explosion, the law struggles to identify and prosecute even those cases of online abuse which plainly do constitute incitement to violence against particular people, harassment and the online equivalent of ‘fighting words’. It does not catch many of them. If, beyond that, the state attempts to prosecute more general forms of rude and offensive speech, it will be bound to catch only a tiny fraction of what is out there. As the Hungarian scholar Peter Molnar notes, trying to stop extreme speech on the internet is ‘like jumping on a shadow’. The result will be even more legal uncertainty. Again and again, people will ask: ‘why me but not him—and him, and her, and him?’ The very principle of equality—specifically a claim for equal treatment by the state—which is one of the justifications for such laws will be undermined by their arbitrary application. Hate speech codes distract us from efforts to combat structural racism—there’s a direct tradeoff Wise 5 Tim Wise (American anti-racism activist and writer. Since 1995, he has given speeches at over 600 college campuses across the U.S.). “Hate Speech Codes Will Not End Racism and Hate Crimes.” Lip Magazine. December 23rd, 2005. http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/ViewpointsDetailsPage/ViewpointsDetailsWindow?zid=da108d69995a5a10a4718835fd943d2fandaction=2andcatId=anddocumentId=GALE7CEJ3010196217anduserGroupName=new11178andjsid=c0d42c9e3c09d9de7267a76c0f47bb22
Hate Speech Codes Are a Distraction In other words, by focusing on the overt and obvious forms of racism, hate speech codes distract us from the structural and institutional changes necessary to truly address racism and white supremacy as larger social phenomena. And while we could, in theory, both limit racist speech and respond to institutional racism, doing the former almost by definition takes so much energy (if for no other reason than the time it takes to defend the effort from Constitutional challenges), that getting around to the latter never seems to follow in practice. Not to mention, by passing hate speech codes, the dialogue about racism inevitably (as at Bellarmine) gets transformed into a discussion about free speech and censorship, thereby fundamentally altering the focus of our attentions, and making it all the less likely that our emphasis will be shifted back to the harder and more thoroughgoing work of addressing structural racial inequity. Perhaps most importantly, even to the extent we seek to focus on the overt manifestations of racism, putting our emphasis on ways to limit speech implies that there aren't other ways to respond to overt bias that might be more effective and more creative, and engage members of the institution in a more thoroughgoing and important discussion about individual responsibilities to challenge bigotry. Prohibitions on hate speech fail Baker 8 C. Edwin Baker. “Hate Speech.” Penn Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. March 10th, 2008.
Even more problematic, to be an effective place to intervene, adopted prohibitions must be efficacious in reducing the likelihood of serious racist evils. Most obviously, this result probably requires sufficient enforcement of the prohibitions against the relevant targets. Maybe, however, their mere adoption could help create a cultural climate where racist speech, and even more importantly, virulent racist practices, are unacceptable. The question of whether to expect effective enforcement is made more difficult because it is not clear at what stage enforcement would be meaningful in preventing the polity from devolving in an unacceptably racist direction or whether enforcement could be effective at reversing cultural directions. Active enforcement (against appropriate targets) is likely only if racist groups have not become too established. By the time Nazis were gaining power, or during the year immediately preceding the genocide in Rwanda, effective enforcement was unlikely. At the relevant time, enforcement would likely either be blocked, create a backlash against the enforcers and sympathy for the ‘suppressed’ racists, or as will be discussed below, enforced primarily against ‘unpatriotic’ or ‘racist’ speech of those most needing protection – Jews or Tutsis, for example, or against African-Americans in the United States or Algerians in France. Thus, the hope of those favoring hate speech prohibitions must be that enforcement will be meaningful and effective at a quite early stage. Pessimism about this speculative hope seems justified. First are generic doubts about the likelihood of effective legal enforcement. More important, however, is the likelihood that at this most relevant stage the speech that meaningfully contributes to developing or sustaining racism will be subtle, quotidian and, to many people, seemingly inoffensive or at least not ‘seriously’ offensive speech. This speech is likely to fly under the legal radar screen and, in any event, meaningful enforcement of prohibitions against this speech is even less likely. Thus, even given a belief that racist speech contributes significantly to virulent racism and genocidal practice, my hypothesis is that at earlier stages legal prohibitions will not cover or be effectively enforced against the most relevant speech and at later stages enforcement will not occur, will be counter-productive in creating martyrs for a racist cause, or will focus on the wrong targets.
Hate speech codes cause racist backlash—that weakens social protections against racism which are more effective Baker 8 C. Edwin Baker. “Hate Speech.” Penn Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. March 10th, 2008.
As an empirical hypothesis, I suggest that more active (and thus more effective) opposition to racist views is likely to come from social practices of not tolerating racist expression than from laws making it illegal. People in positions of power or authority do and should lose their influence, and often even their position of authority, for public or exposed private racist expression. Society should be and apparently is prepared to maintain strong social norms rejecting racist viewpoints. I fear, however, that such social practices would be weakened by, and even replaced by laws prohibiting racist expression. Legal prosecutions focus on the wrong issues – legal requirements, legal line drawing, propriety of prosecution of this rather than other cases. In any minimally decent society that legally permits hate speech, such expression of hate reflexively creates, for those who object to racism, a platform to explain and justify their objections. This expressive activity may provide the greatest safeguard against racist cultures and polities. In contrast, repression creates a platform for racists to claim victim-hood and to appeal to the many who value liberty to oppose the suppression of their freedom, shearing off the energy of a significant group from the chorus that condemns the racist views.
Laws against hate speech cause racist views to go underground—that makes resistance less effective Baker 8 C. Edwin Baker. “Hate Speech.” Penn Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. March 10th, 2008.
Second is a closely related point. By causing racism to (largely) go underground, speech prohibitions are likely to obscure the extent of the problem and the location or the human or social carriers of the problem, thereby reducing both the perceived necessity and the likely effectiveness of opposition to racism. My experience has been that among those people who are likely targets of hate speech but who still favor free speech, the reason most often given for favoring speech is the advantage of ‘knowing the enemy.’ Knowledge of the existence, views, and, importantly, the identity of those with racist attitudes increases the capacity of those potentially subject to racist harms to protect themselves and to make meaningful rhetorical, strategic, political and legal responses.
1/28/17
NOVDEC- 1AC- ADA
Tournament: Glenbrooks | Round: 1 | Opponent: North Allegheny Sr JF | Judge: Daniel Schatzkin
QI- Ableism 1AC
1AC-Standard
Framing
Structural violence necessitates the exclusion of certain groups—this renders ethical theories meaningless
Winter and Leighton 99: Winter and Leighton ‘99 Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana sC. Leighton. Winter "Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century."
Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like sOpotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social jus- tice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.
That’s a pre-requisite to other ethical theories; even if they win that their ethical theory is the most coherent or sound, resisting structural oppression is a prior concern since it prevents individuals from participating in that moral space to begin with.
Ableism operates as foundational tactic of oppression that must be resisted
Siebers 09 University of Michigan, Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism ¶ (Tobin, "The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification", Oct 28, Lecture, http://www.google.com/url?sa=tandrct=jandq=andesrc=sandsource=webandcd=1andved=0CCoQFjAAandurl=http3A2F2Fdisabilities.temple.edu2Fmedia2Fds2Flecture20091028siebersAesthetics'FULL.docandei=LWz4T6jyN8bHqAHLkY2LCQandusg=AFQjCNGdkDuSJkRXMHgbXqvuyyeDpldVcQandsig2=UCGDC4tHbeh2j7-Yce9lsA, accessed 7/7/12, sl) Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves "groups," and not "individuals," means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call "in-built" or "biological" inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. ¶ One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. "Racism" disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. "Sexism" disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. "Classism" disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. "Ableism" disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. ¶ As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful sexamples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority. Thus, the Role of the ballot is to endorse the strategy for resisting ableist oppression
Social constructions of disability are the root cause of other forms of oppression since the drive for normalization and the desire for aesthetic coherence forms the basis of our politics—thus, the Role of the judge is to facilitate disability scholarship.
Siebers10 ~Tobin, Professor of English at the University of Michigan, Disability Aesthetics, pg. 58-63~ These two episodes may seem worlds apart, their resemblance superficial. The first turns on questions of aesthetic taste. The second is about political inclusion. But they express with equal power the current struggles in the United States about the ideal of a common culture. Do certain kinds of bodies have greater civil rights than others? Which is more important, the baby's body or the mother's body? Who should bear the cost to make public buildings accessible to people with disabilities? Who gets to have sex with whom? Whose bloodlines will Americans claim as their birthright? These are political questions for the simple reason that they determine who gains membership, and who does not, in the body politic, but the apparent oddity of the culture wars consists in the fact that the debates over these questions have used aesthetic rather than political arguments. The flash points in the battle are not on the senate floor or in the chambers of the powerful but in classrooms, museums, theaters, concert halls, and other places of culture. Opposing sides tend not to debate political problems directly, focusing instead on the value of reading certain books, the decency of photographs, paintings, and statues, the offensiveness of performances and gestures, the bounds of pornography, the limits of good taste. The culture wars are supposed to be more about who gets into the culture than who has culture, and yet it is difficult to raise one issue without raising the other. Aesthetics tracks the emotions that some bodies feel in the presence of other bodies, but aesthetic feelings of pleasure and disgust are difficult to separate from political feelings of acceptance and rejection. The oppression of women, gays and lesbians, people with disabilities, blacks, and other ethnic groups often takes the form of an aesthetic judgment, though a warped one, about their bodies and the emotions elicited by them. Their actions are called sick, their appearance judged obscene or disgusting, their mind depraved, their influence likened to a cancer attacking the healthy body of society. Such metaphors not only bring the idea of the disabled body to mind but represent the rejected political body as disabled in some way. The culture wars appear to be as much about the mental competence to render judgment, the capacity to taste, and the physical ability to experience sensations as about a variety of controversial judgments, tastes, and feelings. They are as much about the shapes of the individual bodies accepted or rejected by the body politic as about the imagination of a common culture. The status of disability, then, is not just one controversy among others in the American culture wars. Disability is in one way or another the key concept by which the major controversies at the heart of the culture wars are presented to the public sphere, and through which the voting public will eventually render its decisions on matters both political and aesthetic. For to listen to opposing sides, the culture wars are about nothing more or less than the collective health of the United States. The culture wars not only represent minority groups as mentally and physically disabled-and demand their exclusion from the public sphere as a result-they reject works of art that present alternatives to the able body. Only by understanding that health is the underlying theme of the culture wars may we understand that thes,e two trends are related. The most scandalous artists in recent controversies about arts funding, for example, give their works an organic dimension that alludes to bodies gone awry, and these allusions are largely responsible for their shock value. They summon an aesthetic revulsion equivalent to the disgust felt by many persons in face-to-face encounters with people with disabilities, thereby challenging the ideal of a hygienic and homogeneous community.' Karen Finley's avant-garde performances confront the audience with a spectacle of errant body fluids: spermatozoaic alfalfa sprouts and excremental chocolate ooze over her body. In one performance, Lamb of God Hotel, she plays Aggie, a woman using a wheelchair having her diaper changed. Andres Serrano's notorious Piss Christ immerses a day-glow crucifix in a vat of the artist's urine, capturing the startling contradiction of Christianity's all-too-human son of God defiled by a mortal body and its waste fluids. Other photographs by Serrano present abstract expressionist patterns composed of blood and semen, stilllifes arranged with human and animal cadavers, and mug shots of the homeless, criminal, and aged. Robert Mapplethorpe's most memorable photographs capture the homoerotic body and serve it up to a largely heterosexual population. Perhaps his most outrageous work is a self-portrait revealing a bullwhip stuck up his rectum. It summons ideas of the devil as well as S/M practices, of course, but it also presents the image a man who has grown a tail, invoking a body whose deformed shape is less or more than human. These stunning works make a contribution to the history of art by assaulting aesthetic dictates that ally beauty to harmonious form, balance, hygiene, fluidity of expression, and genius. But their shock value owes less to their quibbling with certain aesthetic principles than to the bodies and organic materials presented by them. They represent flash points in the culture wars not only because they challenge how aesthetic culture should be defined but also because they attack the body images used to determine who has the right to live in society. People with disabilities elicit feelings of discomfort, confusion, and resentment because their bodies refuse cure, defy normalization, and threaten to contaminate the rest of society. We display bodies objectionable to the body politic, disrupting the longstanding association between instances of aesthetic form and what Fredric Jameson calls the political unconscious. The political unconscious, I want to argue, enforces a mutual identification between forms of appearance, whether organic, aesthetic, or architectural, and ideal images of the body politic. It accounts for the visceral and defensive response to any body found to disturb society's established image of itself. Jameson, of course, defines the political unconscious as a collective impulse that situates the experience of the human group as the absolute horizon of all interpretation. In fact, the existence of the group is for him so much a part of human experience that he considers the consciousness of individuality itself as a symptom of estrangement from collective life. Notice, however, that . To conceive social totality at the level of form envisions both objects of human production and bodies as symbols of wholeness. The political unconscious establishes the principle of totality as the methodological standard of all human interpretation. It installs the image of an unbroken community as the horizon of thought, requiring that ideas of incompetent, diseased, defective, or incomplete community be viewed as signs of alienation. This means that the very idea of disability signals the triumph of fallen or defective consciousness, despite the fact that there are no real, existing communities of human beings unaffected by the presence of injury, disease, defect, and incompleteness. In short, the political unconscious is a social imaginary designed to eradicate disability. The political unconscious upholds a delicious ideal of social perfection by insisting that any public body be flawless. It also displaces manifestations of disability from collective consciousness, we will see, through concealment, cosmetic action, motivated forgetting, and rituals of sympathy and pity. Advertisements, media images, buildings, and habitats work to assert the coherence and integrity of society, while public actions like telethons and media representations of heroic cripples mollify the influence of disability. Bodies that cannot be subsumed by ritual and other public action represent a blemish on the face of society, and they must be eliminated, apparently whatever the cost. Diane DeVries provides a familiar account, unfortunately, of the political unconscious at work, of the visceral disgust and accompanying violence often directed at people with disabilities. She reveals that observers of the disabled body often feel compelled to fly into action, to cure or kill the ungainly sight before their eyes. De Vries was born with short arms, no hands, and no legs: once when I was a kid, I was in a wagon and we were in this trailer park, and some kid came up to me with a knife. He said, "Aw, you ain't got no arms, you ain't got no legs, and now you're not gonna have no head." He held me right there, by the neck, and had a little knife. It was one of those bratty kids that do weird things. (Cited by Fine and Asch 48)
Offense
Plan Text: The United States federal government should overturn the decision made in San Francisco v Sheehan and rule that police officers found to have violated the Americans with Disabilities act (or ADA) should be denied qualified immunity. Contention 1- Accountability The court’s decision in San Fransico v. Sheehan ruled that officer’s actions need not comply with the ADA to be granted qualified immunity SCOTUS 15: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Syllabus CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v. SHEEHAN CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 13–1412. Argued March 23, 2015—Decided May 18, 2015 201. RW Respondent Sheehan lived in a group home for individuals with mental illness. After Sheehan began acting erratically and threatened to kill her social worker, the City and County of San Francisco (San Fran- cisco) dispatched police officers Reynolds and Holder to help escort Sheehan to a facility for temporary evaluation and treatment. When the officers first entered Sheehan’s room, she grabbed a knife and threatened to kill them. They retreated and closed the door. Concerned about what Sheehan might do behind the closed door, and without considering if they could accommodate her disability, the officers reentered her room. Sheehan, knife in hand, again confronted them. After pepper spray proved ineffective, the officers shot Sheehan multiple times. Sheehan later sued petitioner San Francisco for, among other things, violating Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) by arresting her without accommodating her disability. See 42 U. S. C. §12132. She also sued petitioners Reynolds and Holder in their personal capacities under 42 U. dS. C. §1983, claiming that they violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court granted summary judgment because it concluded that officers making an arrest are not required to determine whether their actions would comply with the Americans with Disabilites Act before protecting them- selves and others, and also that Reynolds and Holder did not violate the Constitution. Vacating in part, the Ninth Circuit held that the ADA applied and that a jury must decide whether San Francisco should have accommodated Sheehan. The court also held that Reynolds and Holder are not entitled to qualified immunity because it is clearly established that, absent an objective need for immediate entry, officers cannot forcibly enter the home of an armed, mentally ill person who has been acting irrationally and has threatened anyone who enters.
That makes legal recourse for disabled people impossible, weakens ADA protections and justifies police atrocities—training doesn’t solve
Çevik 15: Mrs. Kerima Çevik is curently a blogger for disabilty rights, autistic inclusion, accommodation, communication rights, and representation. A parent activist, editor and contributing writer who consults on Autism and Ethnicity, she blogs on topics of critical race, intersectionality, autism and social justice. An independent researcher, she focuses on shining a light on disparities in qualify of life for marginalized intersected disabled populations and their families through grassroots community building activities and pay it forward activism models. She is a married mother of two children, and world traveler currently homeschooling her adventurous son Mustafa, who is intensely Autistic and nonspeaking.. Standing at the intersectino of adolescence, race, and disability. The Autism Wars. June 9, 2015. http://theautismwars.blogspot.com/2015/06/standing-at-intersection-of-adolescence.html. RW
When I realized that roughly 70 of people with disabilities encountered law enforcement more than once in their lifetimes, learned how many were victims of abuse and crime, and how many disabled males of color died in such encounters, I went to Annapolis to ask for an autism training bill for first responders. I later came to the realization that the training concept is inherently flawed and limited in its success. For police officers, in particular, Particularly for autistic and other neurodivergent males of color, police training in other states did not deter or reduce catastrophic encounters. Understand that Freddie Gray was diagnosed with disabilities resulting from lifetime exposure to lead paint poisoning common to the low-income housing in West Baltimore. Freddie Gray was neurodivergent. His death is not counted as a Black disabled catastrophic encounter death but it should be. I have recently realized I must accept the idea that just about the only way to ensure our nonspeaking autistic son isn't harmed is instilling in him that he must avoid the police as much as possible. The only legislative goal that will reduce catastrophic encounters with law enforcement for neurodivergent males in general and neurodivergent Black and brown males, in particular, is legislation aimed at not placing them in the path of police, to begin with. I never thought I would have to consider how to teach my son to avoid police. But there is no denying that recent events demonstrate race relations in this area of modern society have reversed 50 years, and we are now living in a dangerously polarized country. So here we are with our sweet son, standing at the intersection of racism, ableism, and disability. We are looking for breadcrumbs we can leave to aid him in preserving his own life and the thought is frightening. So frightening that I can say the only thing that frightens me more is the rising number of autistic school children being arrested for school infractions and forced into the criminal justice system . How do we teach him that the safest way to deal with law enforcement is to avoid engaging them at all? Even if he needs help. Even if they seem kind and appear to understand he is unable to speak. Despite what he's been presented by well-meaning people who don't know what it means to be a Black man in America. Because if he meets a good cop one day, he may meet the one that hates him the next, and that could end his life. Too many others have died because they could not speak and were not provided with the means to respond when police ordered them to do so. One of my main goals for the remainder of my life is lowering the odds that my only son will die by pushing our community to rethink what the role of law enforcement should be in our lives and to support efforts to remove law enforcement from inappropriate roles in the lives of autism families so we are able to avoid police engagement as much as humanly possible. I am tired of watching our people die. We are traumatized and tired of being helpless witnesses to the lives destroyed and lost in such encounters. Freddie Gray, Matthew Ajibade, Tario Anderson, Rekia Boyd, Tamir Rice, Aiyana Stanley-Jones. It is the list of the dead and injured that just keeps getting longer by the month while the criminal justice system keeps failing them and our entire race, first by allowing them to come to harm, second by allowing those who harmed them to not be made responsible for their actions, and third, by blaming the victims in order to absolve the perpetrators. I continue to repeat that even someone who is suspected of committing a crime has the right to be safely arrested and tried by a jury of his peers. Police are never supposed to be executioners. Knowing police officers who sully the uniform will not be held accountable for any wrongdoing, regardless of how much evidence of their guilt is apparent is soul destroying. We've been swallowing this bitter bill for my entire life. It is a spiritual struggle to continue to defiantly declare one's right to exist and human right to humane treatment knowing this is true. Here is one of many examples of justice denied. Cleveland police officer Michael Brelo mounted a car that 5 other police officers had riddled with bullets after "confusing the car backfiring with a gunshot" and continued shooting down into the windshield of said car until the two already wounded victims, Malissa Williams and Timothy Russell, where dead. Officer Brelo was acquitted of any wrongdoing. 137 bullets were not, in a judge's opinion, excessive use of force. If you believe that compliance of a traffic stop would have changed the conclusion of this encounter, then you are deceiving yourselves. If the moment the car backfired, the knee-jerk reaction was to shoot with impunity, this act was driven by the presumption that Black suspects are dangerous criminals who should be shot. That is racial profiling. Which makes this a hate crime. This was never going to be an arrest. It was an execution. Understand why we fear for our son. If you don't understand and don't act to help everyone fighting to change this deadly sequence of events, more will die. This week the Supreme Court ruled in favor of San Francisco in the case of City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, overturning the decisions of all lower courts and placing all disabled people at risk. Specifically, they ruled that police who forcibly enter the premises and shoot a mental health patient have qualified immunity from litigation. This sets a legal precedent that weakens ADA protections despite the court's attempt to bypass the impact on ADA issue and enables further cases of excessive use of force when dealing with neurodivergent people in general and mental health consumers in particular. I have already pointed out that both Paul Childs and Stephon Watts were shot dead by police officers who had autism training, knew them, and had even helped them in the past. A police officer being familiar with your son's autism, knowing your son doesn't use verbal speech, being trained to approach and manage neurodivergent people doesn't protect them from being shot by those very police officers later on. If I seem pessimistic about what is happening it is because even in cases where video evidence of wrongdoing supports witness accounts, and even in cases where convictions are handed down, inevitably, as in the Supreme Court decision in San Francisco v Sheehan, justice eludes the victim. The conviction of the New Orleans police officers who shot among others 40-year-old autistic Ronald Madison and his brother Lonnie, who was trying to walk him over the bridge and out of New Orleans after Katrina, was overturned and they have now been granted a new trial. We all know these men will never see prison. Ronald Madison was a gentle person, loved by his family and neighbors. His brother refused to leave New Orleans without him and remained behind to help lead Ronald out after the storm because he didn't understand why he had to leave his home. It seems now that no one will ever answer for the innocent lives taken that day either.
Qualified immunity as a defense legitimizes ableist stigmas and enables police killings—that’s a state-sanctioned form of structural violence that normalize genocidal practices—accountability is at the heart of this problem Mack 16: Tracy Mack. January 6, 2016. International Socialists. Legitmizing police violence: Sanism, ableism, and racism. http://www.socialist.ca/node/2978. RW Even when damning evidence exists against Toronto police officers, they have not been held accountable for their rights-depriving, violent and lethal actions toward racialized people with disabilities, and in particular, racialized Mad people. The videotape recording in Otto Vass’ case (killed in the year 2000), revealed that officers threw the unarmed Hungarian immigrant to the ground, then one officer held him down while three others beat him to death. The four officers were charged with manslaughter, but claimed their use of force to subdue him was justified based on their convincing appeal to the stereotype of Mad people as violent. Despite viewing the officers mercilessly beating Vass, the jury found all four officers not guilty of manslaughter. In Christopher-Reid’s case, a 26-year-old Black man who was experiencing mental distress in 2004, the officers were also cleared of any wrongdoing despite the evidence against them. Officers accounts were inconsistent with the forensic evidence, which revealed that Christopher-Reid, who had not committed any crime, was running away from the officers when he was shot; not lunging towards the officers as they claimed. Instead of officers provoking a fearful response by shouting commands with their guns drawn, de-escalation techniques and non-lethal force tactics could have alerted and informed the officers that Christopher-Reid was experiencing mental distress and signaled that this was not a criminal justice issue. The role of race in the killing of Christopher-Reid was addressed briefly at his inquest but was dismissed as a contributing factor to his death. In Byron Debassige’s case, a 28-year-old homeless First Nations man, a contributing factor in his death was not dismissed during the inquest; a complete omission occurred instead. On the evening of February 16, 2008, Debassige stole a couple of lemons from a convenience store. Officers responded to the call with their guns drawn and shouting commands. Debassige refused to drop his 3-inch blade and police fatally shot him four times. The SIU report did not include the non-police witness statements that were inconsistent with those of the police, while also lacking crucial contextual information, such as Debassige’s psychiatric history. The omission of these crucial pieces of information justified the excessive force used by the officers who were cleared of any wrongdoing. Normalizing violence In the name of "security," police violence is normalized. This violence—especially when the victim is racialized, socially disadvantaged, disabled and/or Mad—is perceived as legitimate, necessary, and justified from the perspective of the state, rather than being viewed as excessive. In all the cases mentioned above, a decontextualized narrative emerges whereby officers state they had no other option but to kill the victim. Police excuses—they were protecting the public, they thought they saw a weapon, they were threatened by the 3-inch blade or were feeling threatened by an unarmed person—have negated accountability and due process and legitimatized police violence. This legitimacy is ingrained into the foundation of our social structure, evident by jury members repeatedly and consistently deeming officers not guilty, even after they have been confronted with evidence that clearly demonstrates the inconsistencies within the officer’s statements. These police killings are not an error or an unfortunate outcome; they are an element of police power, a legitimized practice of the state and of the social order that authorizes it.
Plan solves—Overturning San Fransisco v. Sheehan is key to stop ableist police violence by holding police accountable for their actions—it also enables more effective policing
Twenty-five years after the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), people with disabilities are regularly dying at the hands of police officers across the country. In just the last few weeks, four such deaths have made national news: Kristiana Coignard in Texas, Antonio Zambrano-Montes in Washington, Lavall Hall in Florida and Charley Robinet in California. According to the American Psychological Association, some officers spend more time "responding to calls involving mental illnesses than they do investigating burglaries or felony assaults." Too often, these encounters turn violent. Our best guess is that about 50 percent of killings by police involve psychiatric disability of some sort. On March 23, the Supreme Court will have a chance to address this national crisis. The case of Sheehan v. San Francisco offers the justices the chance to clarify how the ADA applies to law enforcement — an important step that could strengthen the broader movement for police reform. This case will determine to what extent police can be held accountable to the best practices of their profession. The case In August 2008, Teresa Sheehan, a resident of a group home for people with psychiatric disabilities, threatened a social worker with a kitchen knife. The social worker called the police. Two officers arrived and entered Sheehan’s room but retreated when she threatened them as well. They called for backup. Instead of waiting, they re-entered the room. Sheehan came at them with the knife, and they shot her repeatedly. Luckily, she survived. A hung jury resulted in a partial acquittal of assault charges against her. The lawsuit focuses on the legality of the second entry into Sheehan’s room. She sued the officers under Title II of the ADA, arguing that by not waiting for backup, the officers did not reasonably accommodate her disability. Furthermore, her attorneys argue that Threat of litigation specifically in ADA cases incentivizes better policing and catalyzes reform necessary for inclusion Auner 16: Thomas J. Auner. "For the Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable, the ADA Should Apply to Arrests." Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 49.1 (2016). RW When courts deem the ADA applicable to specific situations, public and private entities typically respond by making the necessary changes to comply with the law. For example, in 1986, prior to the passage of the ADA, 51 percent of employers made efforts to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities. In 1995, after Congress enacted the ADA, this figure rose to 81 percent. Yet, some entities have resisted complying with the ADA until they are sued. For example, disabled transportation users sued the paratransit program in Los Angeles County for failing to reasonably accommodate riders by frequently arriving late. The litigation provided the paratransit system with the necessary incentive to change, which resulted in substantial improvements. Similarly, police departments located within jurisdictions that apply the ADA to arrest situations will be forced to substantially improve training, or face potential liability under the ADA. Programs that train police officers to respond appropriately to mentally ill persons allow police departments to comply with the ADA, but more importantly, will tangibly improve the safety of the mentally ill. ADA lawsuits are a crucial check on state power—reforming qualified immunity is a good first step to transform the criminal justice landscape to better suit the needs of disabled people Perry 2: David M. Perry. Aljazeera America. A chance to reduce police killings of the disabled. March 23, 2015. http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/3/a-chance-to-reduce-police-killings-of-the-disabled.html. RW
tthe violation of the ADA ~should~ exempts the officers from qualified immunity, a doctrine intended to protect police from lawsuits unless it’s clearly established that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure. At issue is not whether the police were wrong to enter the room the second time but whether it’s allowable for Sheehan’s lawyers to argue that they were wrong before a civil jury. A federal judge initially dismissed Sheehan’s claim, but the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, allowing the civil lawsuit to go forward. Now the Supreme Court will hear the case. The arguments Deputy City Attorney Christine Van Aken argues that the case is very narrow. She agrees that law enforcement must consider the ADA but that there’s a direct threat exemption that makes the officers’ second entry to the room lawful. Police had to enter because Sheehan could have had weapons or hostages or could have escaped via a window or fire escape. None of these things were true, but one legal position is that if an officer might reasonably have been concerned about these possibilities, Sheehan would have no claim.his chain of hypothetical possibilities, though, is not the only way of looking at this case. Here’s something we know for sure: The officers were fully aware that Sheehan had psychiatric disabilities, was in crisis and needed help. Their decision to charge back in without support made the ensuing violence inevitable. Furthermore, Ben Nisenbaum, an attorney for Sheehan, denies that she posed any kind of threat after the officers left the room the first time. He raises questions about the decision-making process that led the officers to re-enter the room. Why didn’t they wait for that backup? Shouldn’t the officers have tried to access some of the city’s mental health crisis resources? Shouldn’t the officers have followed the city’s policy on barricaded suspects and waited Sheehan out? These are questions Nisenbaum wants to take to a jury. Susan Mizner, a disability counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, which has filed an amicus brief in the case, worries about the precedent that a decision against Sheehan could set. As it is, she said, the deck is so stacked for police that most lawyers won’t even take this kind of case. That’s a problem, because civil lawsuits offer a crucial check on the power of the state. She points out that the court isn’t deciding whether Sheehan should win her lawsuit but whether she gets to sue at all. A precedent denying her that right would further swing the balance of power. Seth Stoughton, an expert on policing and the law at the University of South Carolina, raises another question. Circuit courts differ on what time frame to consider in qualified immunity cases. Should courts consider the tactics that lead up to a violent incident or just the moment when the trigger is pulled? If the Supreme Court takes the broad view, Sheehan will likely get her day in court, and police departments will have an incentive to emphasize de-escalation and tactical restraint. Conversely, a ruling for the city might make it impossible to promote tactical restraint through the Fourth Amendment.The Supreme Court has the unique power to take a case like this and use it however they see fit. The justices could wholly exempt arrest from ADA Title II protections, or they could reinforce the power of the Fourth Amendment and change the face of modern policing. They are likely to do something more modest, though even a more restrained ruling against Sheehan could gut key protections of this landmark piece of legislation and undermine the movement against police violence. Meanwhile, people like Teresa Sheehan keep being shot, and far too many are dying. We know how to reduce the rate of such killings, but we need legal reform to convince law enforcement of that on a national level. Qualified immunity blocks larger social movements by fragmenting systemic problems into individual cases—the aff is key Hassel 99 ~Hassel, Diana. "Living a Lie: The cost of Qualified Immunity" Winter 1999. Volume 64. Missouri law Review. Available at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9 ~ NB The problem with qualified immunity is not so much that the outcomes are sometimes unfair but the fact that qualified immunity blocks a clear view of the real limitations that exist in civil rights law. Civil rights law is, in effect, being designed in the dark. Distinctions are being made about the types of cases that will receive compensation and the types that will not. These distinctions are not articulated as such; instead, the results are understood to be the result of the qualified immunity defense. As we have seen, for example, a procedural complaint in the context ofan employment dispute is more likely to survive the qualified immunity defense than is a complaint about whether a police officer used excessive force in the arrest of a dangerous suspect. Rather than organizing civil rights law in these categorical ways, however, qualified immunity makes the civil rights remedial system appear to be about individual cases and the reasonableness of individual defendants. Current qualified immunity doctrine serves as a means to diffuse conflict. Without a clear rule that some kinds of civil rights harms will not be redressed, there is minimal pressure for change. This "hiding of the ball" quality of qualified immunity is why, in spite of many expressions of dissatisfaction with the system,there had been little effective rallying for change. There as on the discontent of the participants in this system has not led to a significant change is that the terms of the debate are defined by the immunity system rather than by the fundamental question of the extent of rights and liabilities in civil rights actions. The civil rights remedial scheme organized around qualified immunity thus has an inherently self-preserving or stabilizing quality. It allows for tinkering at the margins, but fundamental recasting of the terms of the debate is unlikely. My assertion that qualified immunity has a camouflaging effect on civil rights law is supported by a large body of scholarship that explores legal regimes that define reality in a way that limits the ability of the participants in the system to change it.'27 These scholars argue that when a legal system is accepted as being the only available way to organize an activity and thus seems inevitable, the legal system encourages acceptance of the status quo. 2 8 The insights gained by scholars working in this area are helpful to apply to the qualified immunity standard in order to explore its hold on the civil rights imagination. This analysis maps out the way a doctrine such as qualified immunity can develop into an obstacle to the very aims it professes to accomplish. Particularly apposite to an analysis of civil rights law is the work that has been done on the change-inhibiting impact of the development of antidiscrimination law.129 In commenting onthe effect ofthe adoption ofequal rights rhetoric on the struggle to end racial inequality, Kimberle Crenshaw has concluded that "~s~ociety's adoption of the ambivalent rhetoric of equal opportunity law ha~s~ made it that much more difficult for Black people to name their reality. While equal employment opportunity law has been adopted, the material reality of most Black people has not improved."'30 In fact, improvement may be hindered by the existence of the equal opportunity law since it may undermine the political consensus necessary for change.' 3' Another commentator has suggested that "the language of rights undermines efforts to change things by absorbing real demands, experiences, and concerns into a vacuous and indeterminate discourse. The discourse abstracts real experience and clouds the ability ofthose who invoke rights rhetoric to think concretely about real confrontations and real circumstances.' 32 The existence of antidiscrimination law can thus create the appearance of improvements in racial equality while at the same time not encouraging fundamental change. 33 The focus on the intent of the actor in equal protection claims rather than the impact on the person experiencing the discrimination has also been criticized as an inhibitor to the elimination of racial inequality.3 By paying exclusive attention to the blameworthiness of the defendant, an examination of the impact of the challenged practice on those complaining about it is lost. Fairness to the defendant, rather than eliminating discriminatory effect, is the central concern. These commentators suggest that the economic and social reality of race inequality is obscured by the existence of antidiscrimination law and by the success of a small exceptional group. As Derrick Bell has stated, "Discrimination claims when they are dramatic enough and do not threaten majority concerns, are given a sympathetic hearing, but there is a pervasive sense that definite limits have been set on the weight that minority claims receive when balanced against majority interests."'35 While it is unclear what the alternative to antidiscrimination law is, these critiques strongly argue that antidiscrimination law does not do what it suggests it will do and may, in fact, make a better system more difficult to imagine and thus to create. This current critique of antidiscrmination law can be used to understand how the qualified immunity standard affects the system of compensation for constitutional wrongs. One major similarity is the way in which the existence of Section 1983 siphons off pressure to create some other system of redress. The open-ended language of the Section 1983 statute seems to promise a powerful remedy against governmental abuse. As we have seen, qualified immunity severely limits that remedy, but on a case-by-case basis. There is no general prohibition against certain types of civil rights claims, only the seemingly individualized application of the qualified immunity defense. The fact that some types of claims are destined to fail because of the type of claim they are, not because ofthe particularized behavior ofthe defendant, is hidden. Adding to the illusion of a generally available remedy is the spectacular success of a few high profile cases. A few large recoveries in cases that present particularly compelling facts obscure the reality of the fruitlessness of most 36 claims. On the other side of the lawsuit, qualified immunity promises much more to the defendant than it delivers. The defense is supposed to protect government actors not only from liability but also from entanglement with litigation. The promise is often not kept because the qualified immunity defense presents a combination of fact and law questions that cannot be quickly disposed of prior to trial. However, the theoretical protection offered by the defense and the low incidence of actual judgments against government actors lulls government employees into acquiescence to the system. The emphasis that qualified immunity places on the reasonableness of the defendant's actions rather than on whether a constitutional right was violated is another way in which qualified immunity distorts civil rights law. Qualified immunity makes the essential issue of a civil rights claim the question of whether it would be too much of an inhibitor of government action to require a particular defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff. The focus is not, at least initially, on whether the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated. This emphasis also makes it difficult to discern and consider which rights are or should be protected and which we are content not to protect with monetary compensation. Qualified immunity's harm is that it makes it difficult to see the policy choices made by courts in civil rights actions. Cloaking these policy choices in the qualified immunity doctrine avoids the possibility of an open debate concerning which civil rights should be protected and how. Given its obvious flaws, the continuation of qualified immunity as the key legal issue in civil rights cases can only be explained by the hidden purpose it serves; it avoids the divisive and perhaps unresolvable conflicts among participants in civil rights litigation. Qualified immunity accomplishes this conflict-avoiding function by giving judges wide latitude in making determinations about its application and by couching the outcomes of civil rights litigation in terms that make the substantive results difficult to perceive. These qualities account for the faithful adherence to a doctrine that is regarded as so unsatisfactory to so many. The problem with this conflict avoidance mechanism is that it allows unarticulated decisions to be made about the extent of liability for civil rights violations. Civil rights litigation does have limitations to it; every case is not given an opportunity to succeed. These determinations are being made; they are just not described as such. Using qualified immunity as a shield from the truth may buy us peace, but it keeps from us the tools required for reform. Contention 2- Competence Qualified immunity cases are decided based on a standard of "reasonable competence"—letting good officers off the hook and punishing the incompetent ones Blum 13: Karen M. Blum. Suffolk University Law School. February 1, 2013. Qualified immunity: Update on absolute immunity. http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/Section1983QualifiedImmunity.pdf. RW Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244-51 (2012) ("The validity of the warrant is not before us. The question instead is whether Messerschmidt and Lawrence are entitled to immunity from damages, even assuming that the warrant should not have been issued. . . . Under these circumstances—set forth in the warrant—it would not have been unreasonable for an officer to conclude that there was a ‘fair probability’ that the sawed-off shotgun was not the only firearm Bowen owned. . . And it certainly would have been reasonable for an officer to assume that Bowen’s sawed-off shotgun was illegal. . . Evidence of one crime is not always evidence of several, but given Bowen’s possession of one illegal gun, his gang membership, his willingness to use the gun to kill someone, and his concern about the police, a reasonable officer could conclude that there would be additional illegal guns among others that Bowen owned. ~footnote omitted~ . . . .Given the foregoing, it would not have been ‘entirely unreasonable’ for an officer to believe, in the particular circumstances of this case, that there was probable cause to search for all firearms and firearm-related materials. . . . It would . . . not have been unreasonable—based on the facts set out in the affidavit—for an officer to believe that evidence regarding Bowen’s gang affiliation would prove helpful in prosecuting him for the attack on Kelly. . . . Not only would such evidence help to establish motive, either apart from or in addition to any domestic dispute, it would also support the bringing of additional, related charges against Bowen for the assault. . . . Moreover, even if this were merely a domestic dispute, a reasonable officer could still conclude that gang paraphernalia found at the Millenders’ residence would aid in the prosecution of Bowen by, for example, demonstrating Bowen’s connection to other evidence found there. . . . Whatever the use to which evidence of Bowen’s gang involvement might ultimately have been put, it would not have been ‘entirely unreasonable’ for an officer to believe that the facts set out in the affidavit established a fair probability that such evidence would aid the prosecution of Bowen for the criminal acts at issue. . . . Whether any of these facts, standing alone or taken together, actually establish probable cause is a question we need not decide. Qualified immunity ‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments.’ al-Kidd, 563 U.S., at –––– (slip op., at 12). The officers’ judgment that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause may have been mistaken, but it was not ‘plainly incompetent.’. . . On top of all this, the fact that the officers sought and obtained approval of the warrant application from a superior and a deputy district attorney before submitting it to the magistrate provides further support for the conclusion that an officer could reasonably have believed that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause. . . . In light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that ‘no officer of reasonable competence would have requested the warrant.’. . Indeed, a contrary conclusion would mean not only that Messerschmidt and Lawrence were ‘plainly incompetent,’. . . but that their supervisor, the deputy district attorney, and the magistrate were as well. . . . ~B~y holding in Malley that a magistrate’s approval does not automatically render an officer’s conduct reasonable, we did not suggest that approval by a magistrate or review by others is irrelevant to the objective reasonableness of the officers’ determination that the warrant was valid. . . . The fact that the officers secured these approvals is certainly pertinent in assessing whether they could have held a reasonable belief that the warrant was supported by probable cause. . . . In contrast to Groh, any defect here would not have been obvious from the face of the warrant. Rather, any arguable defect would have become apparent only upon a close parsing of the warrant application, and a comparison of the affidavit to the terms of the warrant to determine whether the affidavit established probable cause to search for all the items listed in the warrant. This is not an error that ‘just a simple glance’ would have revealed. . . Indeed, unlike in Groh, the officers here did not merely submit their application to a magistrate. They also presented it for review by a superior officer, and a deputy district attorney, before submitting it to the magistrate. The fact that none of the officials who reviewed the application expressed concern about its validity demonstrates that any error was not obvious. Groh plainly does not control the result here. . . . The question in this case is not whether the magistrate erred in believing there was sufficient probable cause to support the scope of the warrant he issued. It is instead whether the magistrate so obviously erred that any reasonable officer would have recognized the error. The occasions on which this standard will be met may be rare, but so too are the circumstances in which it will be appropriate to impose personal liability on a lay officer in the face of judicial approval of his actions. Even if the warrant in this case were invalid, it was not so obviously lacking in probable cause that the officers can be considered ‘plainly incompetent’ for concluding otherwise. . . The judgment of the Court of Appeals denying the officers qualified immunity must therefore be reversed.") See also Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 334 (3d Cir. 2011) ("One thing that Van de Kamp does not change is our characterization of the conduct in question as the nonperformance of a constitutional duty to advise the court of a significant change in the circumstances surrounding the detention of a material witness. We also continue to think that this duty is, broadly speaking, administrative rather than advocative. After Van de Kamp, we must ask the further question whether this is the sort of administrative duty the performance or nonperformance of which is protected by prosecutorial immunity. We hold that it is not. . . . After the continuance, the Overby case was a long way off, and it simply is not the prosecutor’s prerogative to decide how long to keep a material witness detained. Declining to reveal the change in Overby’s status was an abdication of Smith’s responsibility to provide the court with information sufficient for it to decide an issue within its sole competence. As the sole government official in possession of the relevant information, Smith had a duty of disclosure that was neither discretionary nor advocative, but was instead a purely administrative act not entitled to the shield of immunity, even after Van de Kamp."). The law enforcement and justice system’s perpetuation of competent/incompetent binaries institutionalize ableist violence and marginalization—rejecting them is a key form of resistance Brown 13: Lydia X.Z. Brown. Organizer, Editor, Writer, Speaker. Interrogation of competency in the mentally disabled subject. May 25, 2013. http://www.autistichoya.com/2013/05/interrogating-competency-in-mentally.html. RW Those of us who live with psychiatric, developmental, and neurological disabilities know intimately that our ~the~ ability to be regarded as competent, reliable, or trustworthy hinges closely on whether we are read as disabled or non-disabled, as mentally divergent or neurotypical, as mentally crippled or able-minded. Our perceptions, our ideas, our knowledge, our beliefs—these are routinely ascribed to feeble, addled minds presumed incapable of reasoned thought or objective belief. Just as marginalized bodies and minds are marked as abnormal, the ideas emanating from marginalized people are marked as incredible and dubious. There's an episode of Law and Order: Special Victims Unit ("Educated Guess") that surprisingly did quite well in addressing the lived consequences of this reality—not once, but twice. Educated Guess opens with Detectives Fin and Rollins from the main cast waiting in a park to catch a man who's been groping women. When they see him, he strips naked in front of passerby and then collapses, stating that his girlfriend is physically present and mocking him although the detectives do not see her. The suspect, Darren Bickford, is taken to the psychiatric ward at LaGuardia for assessment, where it is suspected he has been under the influence of drugs. When Darren is left unguarded for a few minutes, he accidentally witnesses someone raping a woman on the ward and calls for help. During Darren's arraignment, which is held at the hospital, he describes the rape that he witnessed the night before only for Fin and Rollins to immediately disbelieve him and dismiss his story as unlikely and imaginary. The judge instructs them to investigate anyway. After questioning Darren further about the rape he witnessed, Detectives Benson and Rollins eventually identify the victim, Gia Eskas, who is a patient on the psychiatric ward. Over the course of most of the rest of the episode, they learn that Gia (who is initially reticent to disclose any information or admit to the rape having happened) has been raped repeatedly by her uncle George for ten years since she was fourteen. When she first told her mother, she was dismissed as simply crazy because of her psychiatric disabilities and she recanted. She is dismissed repeatedly over the episode as unbelievable, manipulative, and lying, and presented as having a history of making false rape accusations. At one point when Benson assures Gia that George will go to prison, Gia replies that that's not how things work in the real world. In the real world, she says, he's sane and I'm not. Even when the detectives arrest George in front of Gia's mother and aunt, all three of them insist that Gia is crazy and lying. The entire episode is predicated on the notion that there is something fundamentally wrong with the presumption of incompetence so frequently hung onto the mentally disabled. The sad truth is that many in law enforcement and throughout the criminal justice system are all too prone to latch onto these insidious notions of (in)competency, thereby exculpating those responsible for violence against the disabled at the micro-level and reinforcing institutionalized violence against us at the macro-level. Law and Order SVU doesn't always do particularly well with representing disability. I've heard the show uncritically describe disabled adults as mentally toddlers and seen it frequently portray disabled people as using their disabilities as "excuses" for committing crime; in other places, I've seen the show portray disabled subjects in strictly stereotypical, flat roles useful as plot devices and not as subjects worthy of the same consideration in character development as abled subjects. But I was pleasantly surprised by the show's engagement with this question, with the question of competency for those of us who are mentally disabled. Perhaps that means a broader societal reconsideration of what it means to be competent and what the ramifications are of presuming incompetence, as well as the underlying causes of the phenomenon. After all, understanding the socio-cultural framework that informs the presumption of incompetence attached to disability, and to mental disability in particular, is critically important to any meaningful interrogation of the concept. There's an excellent book called Presumed Incompetent: The Intersections of Race and Class for Women in Academia that examines the same phenomenon as experience by those whose bodies and subjectivities have been racialized, gendered, and classed. Along those lines, Joanna Kadi's paper "Stupidity Deconstructed" turns discourse on competency toward the usage of disability-rhetoric to enforces dominant class narratives that oppress the poor and working class. Yet there is the commonplace assertions of competency and independent agency by disabled people without intellectual or psychiatric disabilities who simultaneously state that they are neither "stupid" nor "mentally ill" in a direct move to sever themselves from a distinct part of the disability community while perpetuating another form of ableism. Works like James Trent's Inventing the Feeble Mind: A History of Mental Retardation in the United States and Michel Foucault's History of Madness seek to respond to such derisive contentions with explicit criticism of the categories of "mental retardation" and "madness" within the context of structural systems of cultural and political power. The core contention that all people ought to be presumed competent is itself dismissed as untenable by the very same cyclical arguments that posit that disability alone precludes reasoned or self-cognizant thought. Faced with this barrier, impenetrable within its necessitating framework, it is no wonder we encounter those who harp repeatedly that we are out of touch with reality, unaware of ourselves or those around us, incapable of expressing meaningful thought, and unable to make choices for ourselves, much less that we can or ought to be taken seriously or treated as subjective equals. Given this reality, it should hardly be surprising that disabled survivors of violence and abuse are so reticent to seek redress in a system that routinely assigns blame to the victims, dismisses them as incompetent to recognize what actually happened to them, and enacts further violence and brutality against them. After all, those are only the natural consequences of such ~and~ systemic ableism.
The Law is inevitable, and changing it is a step in the right direction—alternatives cede the political to keep the left in check
Gilreath 14 Shannon Gilreath - Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Wake Forest University. "THE INTERNET AND INEQUALITY: A COMMENT ON THE NSA SPYING SCANDAL" - This Essay is an expanded version of remarks prepared for two live events, "Regulating Privacy on the Internet," held at Wake Forest University, from which this symposium issue of the Wake Forest Law Review emerged, and "Being Social: The Effects of Social Media on Our Lives," held at the University of Quebec at Montreal. 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 525 – 2014 – available via google scholar and lexis. I have criticized obedience to the rule of law as a convenient cover for excessive use of power. Certainly, I believe this to be true in many cases. But the law is also-perhaps unfortunately-the best shot we have at dealing with immediate problems. I echo the late Ann Scales, who once said that "my heart need~s~ the world to change in more immediate and more enforceable ways than ~are~ observable from nonlegal political activism." 175 I certainly do not advocate abandoning the law as an instrument of change. Such is the work of postmodern theory, mostly the luxury of academics, and also, generally, a university-subsidized collection of "familiar if fancier reasons for doing nothing."176 As lawyers, we have to continue to use the law, as we know it, and as we invent it, to respond to governmental anti-equality intrusions into the everyday lives of citizens. One grassroots possibility would be to pressure Congress to change the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which, as written, requires telecommunications companies to build their networks in ways that make government surveillance of Internet activity possible, including the interception of e-mail and web traffic.177 Many of the contributions to this Symposium provide a range of other possibilities. 178 CONCLUSION Part of the problem of doing anything about the problem of the Internet and inequality is not only that we are dealing with power perpetuating itself-and power is a serious thing-but also that we are dealing with notions of reality with which people have become comfortable or, at least, in which they have largely surrendered in their protest. In this sense, technology itself is a panopticon. Its ubiquity is transforming society in its image, as well as the rule of law.179 At stake, now, in our new-or at least newly revealed-"United States of Surveillance" is nothing less than a democratic ideal, that is to say how a free society (however arbitrary that meaning may be) makes decisions about governing itself and dealing with the rest of the world. Any intelligent response must include the ingredients sketched in these remarks: a seriousness about the problem; a knowledge of history; a healthy skepticism regarding "national security" justifications for increasing governmental power; and a determination to change the present situation for the better. Beyond these, I leave you with an exhortation. In 1995, my heroine, the late Andrea Dworkin, gave a speech that she entitled "Remember, Resist, Do Not Comply."180 That is exactly what I am asking you to do with regard to the technologization of oppression and the NSA Internet surveillance program as an extension of that historical process: remember, resist, do not comply.
11/19/16
SEPTOCT- 1AC- Belgium
Tournament: Valley | Round: 1 | Opponent: Oakwood JW | Judge: Tom Evnen
1AC- Belgium
Plan
Plan: The federal government of The Republic of Belgium should prohibit the production of nuclear power through immediate decommissioning of all currently operating nuclear plants IEA 16: International Energy Agency. May 19, 2016, Brussels. IEA urges Belgium to take a long-term approach to energy policy. https://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2016/may/iea-urges-belgium-to-take-a-long-term-approach-to-energy-policy-.html. RW Belgium should adopt a national long-term energy strategy without delay, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said today, stressing that such a plan was required to respond to the challenge of decarbonising the economy while ensuring security of supply and affordability of energy. Speaking at the launch of an IEA review of Belgium’s energy policies, IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol encouraged Belgium’s federal and regional governments to work decisively together. "Our review rings alarm bells due to the lack of private-sector investment in the electricity sector," Dr. Birol commented. "Government efforts to mobilise investment should include an electricity market design that ensures a viable business model for power generation. And to avoid a lack of generation capacity in the medium term, Belgium could consider operating their nuclear power plants as long as they are certified to be safe by the regulator." The new IEA report, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Belgium 2016 Review, acknowledges Belgium’s recent progress in several areas of energy policy. Competition has increased in the electricity and natural gas markets. The use of fossil fuels has declined and the supply of renewable energy has grown. The country’s economy is becoming less energy-intensive, and its energy-related carbon emissions are declining. A major issue to be addressed, however, is the country’s nuclear phase-out policy. Nuclear energy accounts for around half of Belgium’s electricity generation, but the current policy is to close its nuclear power plants between 2022 and 2025. The report cautions that this would seriously challenge Belgium’s efforts to ensure electricity security and provide affordable low-carbon electricity. Allowing the plants to run as long as they are considered safe by the regulator would ease electricity security pressures, would reduce the costs of electricity generation in the medium term, would likely reduce the costs of the phase-out itself and would create time for investments in alternative generation options. "It is of the utmost importance that Belgium’s policy on nuclear power is consistent with its objectives regarding electricity security and climate change mitigation," Dr. Birol stressed. The report highlights the potential energy efficiency offers to help Belgium meet its energy policy goals. It welcomes the decision to implement nationwide road pricing for heavy-duty vehicles. The report also recommends further support to renovating the building stock and switching away from oil in space heating. In addition, it suggests abolishing direct and indirect subsidies on energy use and replacing them with more targeted measures on citizens and companies in need. Under any scenario, Belgium’s energy supply needs to be further diversified and energy demand further limited. Transport and buildings hold a large potential for efficiency and climate gains, and fiscal incentives and price signals could be used more frequently in order to reap them. The IEA Executive Director applauded Belgium for its excellent gas transport infrastructure and the high level of cross-border integration of its gas market. Referring to the eventual phase-out of imports of low-calorific gas from the Netherlands, he encouraged the government to give a higher priority to this matter, in case production of the Groningen gas field declines faster than currently expected. Dr. Birol also congratulated Belgium for holding large emergency stocks of oil.
Decommissioning will be issued through four steps
Schmittem 16 ~Schmittem, Marc (Analyst for EU-Japan Energy Cooperation ). "Nuclear Decomissioning in Japan- Opportunities for European Companies". EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation. Tokyo, March 2016. http://www.eu-japan.eu/sites/default/files/publications/docs/2016-03-nuclear-decommissioning-japan-schmittem-min'0.pdf~~ NB Decommissioning is the responsibility of the operator of a nuclear facility. The NRA defines the decommissioning of NPPs in Japan by the following four activities: Dismantling of the relevant reactor ~includes~ (1), transfer of nuclear fuel (2), removal of irradiated material (3), and the disposal of radioactive waste (4)19. Within these boundaries, nuclear operators can design their own decommissioning strategies. The 1currently preferred approach for commercial NPPsin Japan combines immediate dismantling with deferred dismantling. Immediate dismantling is a strategy where dismantling begins immediately after the approval of the project, whereas in deferred dismantling, the reactor is first placed in safe storage for a number of years to reduce the radioactive inventory. The operators of commercial power reactors in Japan have opted for such safe storage periods, but the dismantling of secondary facilities will begin as soon as possible. Like the decommissioning strategies of many other countries, the basic decommissioning strategy in Japan consists of sequential stages: Site preparation (including site characterisation, defueling and decontamination), safe storage, and deconstruction and dismantling (DandD) (see Figure 1). Waste management and disposal is also a part of the decommissioning process. The basic strategy envisions this as only becoming an issue during the DandD stage, but in practice waste from decommissioning also needs to be handled at earlier stages. While this is acknowledged in the individual decommissioning plans for Japanese reactors, lingering problems with waste management have led to delays in some ongoing decommissioning projects (see the description of the individual decommissioning projects in Part II and the discussion of waste management later in this chapter). The newest decommissioning plans also show a tendency for more prolonged safe storage periods.¶ In the first stage of the decommissioning project, the fuel in the reactor core and the spent fuel¶ pool (SFP) is retrieved and transported to either a temporary storage site21 or a reprocessing¶ plant22¶ . After a survey and characterisation of the radioactive inventory of the facility, systems¶ and facilities are decontaminated to reduce the radioactive dose rates in the work spaces and to¶ prepare the site for dismantling. In the second stage, the reactor core is placed in safe storage, during which basic safety, monitoring and cooling systems are maintained. This stage is meant to reduce the radioactive inventory in the reactor through natural decay processes. The duration of this phase is usually around 10 years for physicochemical reasons, but a certain period of relative inactivity in the decommissioning process might also be necessary for some utilities to recover the financial losses from the premature or long-term shut-down of the reactor after the Fukushima accidents (see part I.6). The dismantling of non-essential and redundant systems and peripheral facilities also begins at this point. The safe storage stage is followed by the DandD stage. During this phase, again in a number of sequential steps, the various components of the reactor are dismantled. This stage sees the highest demand for specialised equipment, particularly during the dismantling of the highly radioactive reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and its internals, where remote-controlled, submersible equipment is required for safety reasons. After the reactor has been dismantled, the reactor building and the remaining facilities are dismantled. Large quantities of waste, both radioactive and non-radioactive (see section I.4), are generated in this stage. The Japanese strategy envisions the implementation of strategies to reduce the amount of waste, through means such as a clearance system and the recycling of non-radioactive waste. At the end of the decommissioning process an application for verification of completion is submitted to the NRA, which then assesses the final state of the site. If the measurable radioactive dose rates are within the legal limits and all targets of the decommissioning plan have been reached, the NRA formally terminates the licence of the operator and releases the site from regulatory control. The site of the former reactor can then be reused for new purposes. The current plan is to build new reactors on the sites of decommissioned reactors, due to difficulties in acquiring sites for new reactors and an expected unwillingness of the local population to develop the land of the former NPP for agricultural or residential purposes23. However, in light of strengthened safety regulations, stricter licensing criteria and growing opposition to the operation of NPPs in the surrounding communities and local governments, it is not yet known if this strategy will be economically and politically feasible. Belgium’s renewables could completely replace nuclear power—EU-wide shift has started and is driving global renewable development KOS 11: Daily KOS News. An outlet for American political blogging. It functions as a discussion forum and group blog for a variety of netroots activists whose efforts are primarily directed toward influencing and strengthening progressive policies and candidates. October 31, 2011. Belgium to phase out Nuclear Power Completely by 2025. Daily KOS. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/10/31/1031722/-. RW In 2003, the government of Belgium had decided to phase out nuclear power. With the so-called Nuclear Renaissance, however, by 2009 there were plans to extend the running times of the nuclear power plants by ten years. Then came the Fukushima disaster, public opinion shifted strongly against nuclear power, and Belgium is now set to phase out nuclear power by the year 2025, 3 years after the scheduled complete phase-out of nukes in Germany. The Reuters article goes on to express "concern" about the intermittency of renewables, ignores the fact that the planned North Sea Supergrid will be providing virtual baseload power There is some concern about the price of electricity, with nuclear being phased out. That concern, however, also is overblown, since wind power is less expensive than new nuclear:While the concern about the intermittency and price of renewables is overblown, Belgians will have their work cut out for them in replacing the 50 of their electricity that is produced by nuclear power plants with renewables. Belgium is a small, densely populated, highly industrialized country. While they have excellent offshore wind resources and are one of the lead countries in regards to offshore wind electricity production, their coastline is quite small, and they will have to utilize both their offshore and onshore wind resources efficiently in order to replace the electricity generated by the seven nuclear reactors that are currently running. Official govt. estimates for the potential of Belgian offshore power are at about 18 TwH/year, which would cover 25 of Belgian electricity needs. With technological advances over the next 15 years, my educated guess would be that the combination of offshore and onshore wind power could replace their nuclear power completely, with the addition of solar and biomass power cutting into their use of fossil fuels. In order to attain the European goal of 80 or more renewable power by 2050, Belgium will have to efficiently and intelligently maximize the use of wind, solar, biomass, and the newer forms of renewable energy, such as wind and wave power, while continually increasing conservation and efficiency efforts. One thing is becoming increasingly clear, as Belgium joins Germany, Greece, Denmark, and Austria in their stated quest for a nuclear free Europe: in the post-Fukushima world, the will of the people is driving European nations towards a massive revolution in energy production, with the primary focus being on the implementation of renewable energy technology. This will likely lead to a huge burst of innovation that will not only drive the implementation of renewables in Europe, but also throughout the world. The Vox Populi is increasingly being heard on European energy matters. And that's a good thing Belgium’s current phase-out plan allows major plants to operate for another 10+ years before decommissioning starts—that poses extremely high security risks—also undermines renewable development Green 15: Jim Green. Nuclear Monitor Editor. March 19, 2015. World Information Service on Energy. https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/800/belgium-and-end-nuclear-power. RW Belgium's seven reactors − all pressurized water reactors − are all operated by Electrabel, a GDF Suez subsidiary. Electrabel owns 100 of two reactors, 89.8 of four reactors and 50 of one reactor. EDF and SPE are the other companies with ownership stakes. When all seven reactors were operating, they supplied about half of Belgium's electricity. All aare due to be shut down by the end of 2025. Belgium's nuclear phase-out law mandates the shut down of six reactors when they have operated for 40 years − with the exception of Tihange 1, which is due to be shut down in 2025 when it has operated for 50 years. All seven reactors have been in the news over the past year: Doel 1: Shut down when its 40-year licence expired in February 2015. Doel 2: Now operating but due to be shut down in December 2015. GDF Suez / Electrabel is negotiating a possible licence extension for Doel 1 and 2 to operate for another 10 years, and seeking regulatory approval. Doel 3 and Tihange 2: Offline since March 2014 due to concerns about the integrity of reactor pressure vessels; future uncertain. Doel 4: Offline for more than four months in 2014 due to suspected sabotage of the high-pressure turbine. Now operating. Tihange 1: Now in its fortieth year of operation but licensed to operate for another 10 years. Greenpeace has initiated a legal challenge against the licence extension, because of the failure to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment and cross-boundary consultation in line with Belgium's obligations under the Espoo Convention (the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context). Court hearings are scheduled for March 24 and the judge is expected to present his verdict soon after. Tihange 3: Briefly shut down following a fire in December 2014. Now operating. Policies and politics Nuclear power policies and laws have been in flux over the past two decades:3 In 1999, the government announced that reactor lifetimes would be limited to 40 years, and banned further reprocessing. In 2003, the Belgian Parliament passed legislation banning the building of new power reactors and limited the operating lives of existing reactors to 40 years. In 2009, the government decided to postpone the phase-out by 10 years, so that it would not begin before 2025. This would allow the licensing of reactor life extensions. Reactor operators agreed to pay a special tax of €215−245 million (US$227−259m) per year from 2010−14, and more thereafter. GDF Suez also agreed to subsidise renewables and demand-side management by paying at least €500 million (US$528m) for both, and it maintaining 13,000 jobs in energy efficiency and recycling. However, an election in April 2010 occurred before the agreed proposals were passed by parliament and thus the nuclear phase-out law remains in place. In July 2012 Belgium's Council of Ministers announced that Doel 1 and 2 were to close in 2015 after 40 years of operation, but Tihange 1 would be permitted to operate to 2025. This was written into law in December 2013. The government said that it had rewritten the 2003 law so that its current stance could not be changed by decree, and therefore the timing of the phase-out "is now final."3,4 In December 2014 the Council of Ministers from the new ruling coalition government agreed that Doel 1 and 2 could continue operating for a further 10 years, to 2025. Energy minister Marie-Christine Marghem said that it was an "unconditional prerequisite" that the Belgian nuclear regulator − the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) − approve licence extensions for the two reactors. She noted that Belgium's planned nuclear phase-out by the end of 2025 remains in place.4 The government decision to allow Doel 1 and 2 to continue to operate for a further 10 years was partly a result of problems with other reactors − in particular the outages of Tihange 2 and Doel 3 and uncertainty about their future. GDF Suez / Electrabel is in negotiation with the Belgian government over the Doel 1 and 2 licence extensions but an agreement has not yet been reached − hence the shutdown of Doel 1 in February in accordance with the nuclear phase-out law. Further, the regulator FANC has not yet approved licence extensions for Doel 1 and 2.4 GDF Suez / Electrabel is unwilling to invest up to €600−700 million (US$634−740m) in necessary upgrades to Doel 1 and 2 unless the government provides a "clear legal and economic framework" to justify the investment. Negotiations include removal of the nuclear generation tax introduced by a previous government − according to the World Nuclear Association, that tax cost the company €397 million (US$419m) in 2014.5 As Rianne Teule, campaign director for Greenpeace Belgium, put it: "In order to agree to such a large investment, Electrabel demands 'a clear legal and economic framework'. Read: 'a good deal to reduce the investment risks'. It's the Belgian people who will pay the price, one way or another. If not through increased taxes, when Electrabel's payments to the state decrease, then through increased electricity prices when Electrabel passes on their investments to their clients."6 In 2012 the government passed laws increasing the tax on nuclear operators. The government set a total contribution from nuclear operators for 2012 of €550 million (US$581m), of which Electrabel had to pay €479 million (US$506m). In June 2013 Electrabel filed an appeal to Belgium's Constitutional Court, claiming the tax violated a protocol signed by the company and the federal government in 2009, which included a lower tax, and took no account of declining revenue from nuclear power generation. In April 2014 the Court of First Instance in Brussels rejected Electrabel's claim. The company appealed, but the appeal was rejected in July 2014. Electrabel said it would continue "to examine all potential legal means in order to defend its interests" and "examine all options concerning the future of its nuclear activities in Belgium."3,7 According to Greenpeace, nuclear power is part of the energy security problem, not part of the solution: "The reason for the potential electricity supply problem is Belgium's excessive dependency (55) on unreliable nuclear power. A political decision to extend the lifetime of two old reactors will not mitigate this acute supply problem. It will take at least a year to implement the necessary safety upgrades, and to order and fabricate new fuel for them. Extending the legally fixed phase-out calendar will undermine investment in real climate solutions such as energy efficiency and renewables."8 Tihange 2 and Doel 3 − compromised reactor pressure vessels Doel 3 and Tihange 2 were taken offline in 2012 when ultrasound testing suggested the presence of cracks in their reactor vessels. Further investigations indicated that the defects are so-called hydrogen 'flakes'. FANC allowed Electrabel to restart the reactors in May 2013. However the reactors were again taken offline in March 2014 after Electrabel reported that tests to investigate the mechanical strength of irradiated specimens of similar material "did not deliver results in line with experts' expectations".9 FANC said that "a fracture toughness test revealed unexpected results, which suggested that the mechanical properties of the material were more strongly influenced by radiation than experts had expected."10 In January 2015, FANC said the process to restart the reactors had been extended from April to July so that Electrabel could answer further questions. In February, FANC announced that additional inspections revealed more extensive flaking within the pressure vessels of the two reactors than previously identified. FANC said 13,047 flaw indications have now been found in the vessel of Doel 3 and 3,149 in that of Tihange 2. Further test results are expected by April.1,9 FANC Director General Jans Bens said: "This may be a global problem for the entire nuclear industry. The solution is to implement worldwide, accurate inspections of all 430 nuclear power plants."11 Shortly after approving the restart of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 in May 2013 − a decision that was contested at the time and seems unwise in hindsight − Bens was seriously downplaying nuclear risks: "The harbour of Antwerp is being filled with windmills, and the chemical industry is next to it. If there is an accident like a break in one of the wings, that is a guillotine. If that goes through a chloride pipe somewhere, it will be a problem of a bigger magnitude than what can happen at Doel. Windmills are more dangerous than nuclear power plants."12 Two materials scientists have said the unexpected flaws in Doel 3 and Tihange 2 could be related to corrosion from normal operation, with potential implications for reactors worldwide. Prof. Digby MacDonald said: "The consequences could be very severe ... like fracturing the pressure vessel. Loss of coolant accident. This would be a leak before break scenario. ... My advice is that all reactor operators, under the guidance of the regulatory commissions should be required to do an ultrasonic survey of the pressure vessels. All of them." Prof. Walter Bogaerts said: "If I had to estimate, I would really be surprised if it ... had occurred nowhere else.13,14 Electrabel reacted to the latest news by saying that it may be willing to "sacrifice" one of the two reactors to allow destructive testing to learn more about the problem.15 Doel 3 and 4: Fire and sabotage On 1 December 2014 at 10:30am, a fire began in the electrical substation transformer building at Doel and led to an emergency shutdown of reactor ~#3. The fire was put out by the local fire service and the reactor was restarted at 5am the following day.16 Fires at nuclear power plants pose significant risks to reactor safety due to the potential disruption of the electrical supply to vital reactor safety functions. The risks in Belgium are all the greater because of the high population density and the concentration of seven reactors at just two sites.17 Sabotage at Doel 4 The Belgium nuclear industry was shaken on 5 August 2014 when it was revealed that sabotage had caused, in Electrabel's words, "significant damage" at Doel 4. Lubricant had been discharged from the high-pressure turbine through a valve which had probably been opened deliberately by a worker. Some 6,000 professionals from 15 companies participated in the repair of the turbine. The repair involved the manufacture of 2500 blades at four plants in China, Croatia, Italy and Switzerland.18 The reactor was restarted on December 19.19 The END of nuclear power When the last reactor is shut down in 2025, that won't be the end of Belgium's nuclear program but the beginning of the END − the Era of Nuclear Decommissioning. In addition to the decommissioning of seven reactors, Belgians will somehow have to manage: high-level nuclear waste currently stored at Dessel and at reactor plants; larger volumes of low- and intermediate-level waste; and other nuclear facilities now in various stages of decommissioning including a MOX fuel fabrication plant and the Eurochemic reprocessing plant at Dessel
Only decommissioning puts the necessary pressure on renewables
Mez 16 Lutz Mez, Berlin Centre for Caspian Region Studies, Freie Universität Berlin "The experts on nuclear power and climate change" the Bulletin asked top energy and environmental experts to comment on the role they think nuclear energy should (or should not) play in efforts to implement the climate plans that countries around the world 18 FEBRUARY 2016 http://thebulletin.org/experts-nuclear-power-and-climate-change8996 The electrical power production sector accounts for about 28 percent of global anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions and constitutes by far the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions. That is why supposedly carbon dioxide-free nuclear power plants have frequently been praised as a panacea for addressing climate change. However, in 2013 nuclear electricity contributed just 10.6 percent of global electricity generation, and because electricity represents only 18 percent of total global final energy consumption, the nuclear share is just 1.7 percent of global final energy consumption. Even if generation in nuclear power plants could be increased significantly, nuclear power will remain a marginal energy source. Therefore, the turnaround in energy systems has to prioritize energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy technologies and cogeneration plants, which do not cause any more carbon dioxide emissions than nuclear power plants. From a systemic perspective, nuclear power plants are by no means free of carbon dioxide emissions. Today, they produce up to one third of the greenhouse gases that large modern gas power plants produce. Carbon dioxide emissions connected to production of nuclear energy amounts to (depending on where the uranium used in a reactor is mined and enriched) between 7 and 126 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilowatt hour, according to an analysis by International Institute for Sustainability Analysis and Strategy co-founder Uwe Fritsche. For a typical nuclear power plant in Germany, the specific emission estimate of 28 grams has been calculated. An initial estimate of global carbon dioxide emissions through the generation of nuclear electricity in 2014 registered at about 110,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent—or roughly as much as the carbon dioxide emissions of a country like the Czech Republic. And this data does not even include the emissions caused by storage of nuclear waste. In the coming decades, indirect carbon dioxide emissions from nuclear power plants will increase considerably, because high-grade resources of uranium are exhausted and much more fossil energy will have to be used to mine uranium. In view of this trend, nuclear power plants will no longer have an emissions advantage over modern gas-fired power plants, let alone in comparison to the advantages offered by increased energy efficiency or greater use of renewable energies. Nuclear power plants may also contribute to climate change by emitting radioactive isotopes such as tritium or carbon 14 and the radioactive noble gas krypton 85. Krypton 85 is produced in nuclear power plants and released on a massive scale in the reprocessing of spent fuel. The concentration of krypton 85 in Earth's atmosphere has soared over the last few years as a result of nuclear fission, reaching a new record. Krypton 85 increases the natural, radiation-induced ionization of the air. Thus the electrical balance of the Earth's atmosphere changes, which poses a significant threat to weather patterns and climate. Even though krypton 85 is "one of the most toxic agents for climate," according to German physicist and political figure Klaus Buchner, these emissions have not received any attention in international climate-protection negotiations down to the present. As for the assertion that nuclear power is needed to promote climate protection, exactly the opposite would appear to be the case: Nuclear power plants must be closed down quickly to exert pressure on operators and the power plant industry to redouble efforts at innovation in the development of sustainable and socially compatible energy technologies and especially the use of smart
Adv- Terror
Belgium reactors at high vulnerability to terrorism now—attacks are likely and acquisition is ridiculously easy—this tanks the economy Bunn 16: Matthew Bunn. Matthew Bunn is a Professor of Practice at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. His research interests include nuclear theft and terrorism; nuclear proliferation and measures to control it; the future of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle; and policies to promote innovation in energy technologies.March 29, 2016. Huffington Worldpost. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-bunn/belgium-nuclear-terrorism'b'9559006.html. RW As world leaders gather for the fourth nuclear security summit this week, in the aftermath of the horrifying terrorist attacks in Brussels, it seems likely that Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel will have more to say than anyone else — both about real nuclear terrorist dangers and about real steps taken to improve nuclear security. Since the 2014 summit, Belgium has suffered a number of suspicious and alarming activities at its nuclear sites and against some of its nuclear technicians. In Aug. 2014, for example, someone with inside access at the Doel-4 nuclear reactor drained the lubricant for the reactor turbine, causing it to overheat and resulting in an estimated $100-$200 million in damage. The perpetrator and the motive remain unknown. In Nov. 2015, Belgian police discovered that the terror cell that carried out the Paris attacks used a secret video camera to monitor an official at nuclear research sites with a wide range of nuclear and radiological materials, including enough highly enriched uranium for several nuclear bombs. In response to what seemed to be a growing terrorist threat to the country’s nuclear infrastructure, the authorities beefed up protection against insider threats, toughened access control, deployed armed troops to protect reactors and, following the airport and subway attacks, removed all non-essential personnel from nuclear sites in order to reduce the number of potential insiders. With a variety of different takes on these events swirling in recent news stories (see here and here), it’s worth clarifying what we know and what is still unknown about the scale of this threat and how best Belgium — and the rest of Europe — can protect itself. (A just-released Harvard study also has details up through February.) What was the video monitoring of a nuclear official about? The short answer is that we don’t know yet — though sustained monitoring of a nuclear expert may be the most troubling indicator yet of nuclear intent from the so-called Islamic State. Belgian terrorists recorded about 10 hours of video of a nuclear official at Belgium’s SCK-CEN research facility, near the town of Mol. As the Times story reports, Belgian authorities believe the hidden video camera was picked up by Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui, brothers who are believed to have later been suicide bombers in the Brussels attacks. They reportedly delivered it to Mohammed Bakkali, now under arrest, who is accused of helping with logistics for the Paris attacks. Several media accounts have suggested the terrorists might have been after radiological material for a "dirty bomb" from SCK-CEN. This seems unlikely (unless they were confused, as is certainly possible) — radiological materials are available in many locations where they would be much easier to steal, like in hospitals and industrial sites. (The Nuclear Threat Initiative has a very good new report on the dirty bomb threat and steps to address it.) The Times story quotes me as seemingly worrying about Cs-137 from SCK-CEN; what I was actually saying is that Cs-137 is a big concern, and in many places it is much less well protected than at SCK-CEN. The Times story largely dismissed — wrongly, in my view — the idea that the HEU at SCK-CEN might have been the terrorists’ ultimate objective, saying that the idea that terrorists could get such material and make a crude nuclear bomb "seems far-fetched to many experts." Unfortunately, as we document in detail in our recent report, repeated government studies, in the United States and elsewhere, have concluded that this is not far-fetched — that it is quite plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a nuclear bomb if they got the needed nuclear material. As a 1977 Office of Technology Assessment study put it: Of course, just because the terrorists could find and monitor a nuclear official’s home does not mean they could have broken in to SCK-CEN and gotten HEU or anything else. What did they think they could accomplish with this monitoring? One obvious possibility is that they envisioned either kidnapping the official or kidnapping his family to coerce him into helping them carry out whatever plot they had in mind. Such coercion is a frequent criminal and terrorist tactic. Breaking into a nuclear facility is not as simple as kidnapping someone. But a kidnapping might well contribute to a more complex plot. Did the Belgian bombers first plan to attack nuclear facilities? If the Belgian suicide bombers were the ones monitoring the nuclear official, it’s possible they first planned to attack the country’s nuclear infrastructure. They may have shifted to the airport when their plans were accelerated by the arrests of co-conspirators, or because of Belgium’s deployment of armed troops to guard its nuclear facilities. But a spokesman at the Belgian Federal Agency for Nuclear Control told the Washington Post that they "knew nothing" of any such a plot, and Belgian federal prosecutors have not confirmed any such plot. Press accounts of the possibility the terrorists were planning some kind of an attack on nuclear facilities have unduly played down the potential dangers of reactor sabotage. A story in The New York Times, for example, quotes an argument that the TATP explosive the terrorists were using would not get through the steel pressure vessel of a nuclear reactor. It is certainly true that to cause a major radioactive release, terrorists would have to understand how to overcome a number of different safety and security systems. Getting into a power plant with a suicide vest of explosives would not be enough. But as Fukushima made clear, cutting off a reactor’s electricity and cooling water can cause a disaster that can provoke widespread panic and cause devastating disruption and economic losses. Sabotage at Doel-4 The sabotage at Doel-4 in 2014 also remains a mystery. By sabotaging the turbine (in a non-nuclear part of the plant), the perpetrator caused serious economic damage — but there was never any chance of a radioactive release. Was this a terrorist incident? A disgruntled worker? Something else? The bare facts are these. In August 2014, an insider at the plant opened a locked valve and allowed all the lubricant for the reactor turbine to drain out, causing the turbine to overheat and destroy itself. The reactor was down for months. Total damage was in the range of $100-$200 million, making it one of the biggest economic sabotage incidents of all time. Investigators have yet to find the culprit — who may still be on staff. A radical extremist in vital areas As investigators were looking into the 2014 sabotage, they found that almost two years before, a contractor employee at the plant named Ilyass Boughalab had left to go fight for terrorists in Syria. He was later convicted in absentia of participating in the Sharia4Belgium terrorist group. He had passed a security investigation in 2009 to get clearance for access to the "vital areas" of the reactor — the places where equipment whose sabotage could cause a major disaster is located. His main job was inspecting the quality of welds. His family reportedly asserts that he was radicalized after the background check — but the police chief in the town he grew up in has been quoted as saying he had an extensive criminal record (including assault and battery charges) before getting the clearance, raising questions about how careful the investigation was. One interesting element of the Times story is that it refers to two jihadists having been employed at this facility. The other was likely Elias Taketloune, accused of having been the person who radicalized Boughalab and who was also tried in the Sharia4Belgium trial. I have not yet seen any public confirmation that he worked at Doel-4 with Boughalab. Belgium beefs up protection In December 2014, after the August sabotage, Belgium’s Federal Agency for Nuclear Control imposed new regulations substantially strengthening protection against insider threats. Then, after the Brussels airport and subway attacks, Belgium withdrew non-essential personnel from its nuclear facilities. This significantly reduced the number of personnel at these sites, reducing the chance that there might be a malevolent insider among them. They also added new rules on security cameras and use of two-person rule in sensitive areas. Moreover, Belgian authorities reportedly withdrew access passes for at least four workers at nuclear facilities in the days after the attacks. Following the Paris attacks, the revelation of terrorist rings in Brussels and the monitoring of the Belgian nuclear official, Belgium decided to deploy armed troops to guard its nuclear facilities. (A specialized guard force will be trained and deployed in the coming months.) Two days after the airport and subway terrorist attacks, with armed guards newly deployed at Belgium’s nuclear facilities, a security guard at one site was murdered. The dead man worked at a radioactive materials facility, not a power reactor. Prosecutors have denied early reports that the guard’s security pass had been stolen, and are playing down any militant link. Still, in a country with one of the world’s lowest murder rates — only about 200 murders occur in Belgium each year — it is a surprising coincidence. Previously, Belgium had no armed guards at all at its nuclear facilities, relying instead on response forces a few minutes away. U.S. officials had long criticized Belgium on this and other aspects of nuclear security; the Center for Public Integrity reported on an incident in the mid-2000s in which the United States became so concerned that it threatened to cut off further nuclear supply to Belgium. While there are important unanswered questions about each of these incidents, all told they offer troubling suggestions that ISIS is pursuing nuclear or radiological attacks. Ultimately, the group envisions a total war between the "crusader forces" and itself; winning a total war with a nuclear-armed superpower would presumably require very powerful weapons. Fortunately, as Belgium has shown, there are clear actions that can drastically reduce the risk. At this week’s summit, the assembled leaders must take action to ensure that all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide are effectively and sustainably secured against the full spectrum of threats terrorists and criminals might pose. Major nuclear facilities, similarly, must be protected from sabotage. And radiological sources must be protected, tracked throughout their life and, where possible, replaced with less dangerous technologies. The world needs to act to ensure that ISIS can never get its hands on the ingredients of nuclear terror.
A terror attack on Belgium’s nuclear plants is going to happen within the next five years—cyber-attacks take out generic defense
Newton 16: Jennifer Newton. March 26, 2016. Two Belgian nuclear power plant workers have joined ISIS leading to fears the jihadis have the intelligence to cause a meltdown disaster. Follow us: @MailOnline on Twitter | DailyMail on Facebook Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3510384/Belgian-nuclear-plant-guard-murdered-security-pass-stolen-two-days-Brussels-attacks.html. RW Nuclear power plants are known to be targets for the terror network behind the Brussels bombings and the Paris attacks in November. According to the New York Times, several employees working in the Belgian nuclear industry have had their security clearances revoked over potential ISIS plots. Following last November's terror attack in Paris, Belgian police recovered surveillance footage of a senior nuclear official in the home of ISIS ringleader Mohamed Bakkali, who was arrested and is currently facing terrorism charges. In a nation on high alert following this week's attacks, the report stokes fears about the possibility militants are seeking to get hold of nuclear material or planning to attack a nuclear site. Such is the level of fear within the Belgian nuclear power industry, all non-essential staff at the Doel and Tihange power plants have been sent home. A spokeswoman said: 'Only those who are really needed are staying, the other people were sent home.' She said that for the foreseeable future Belgium's nuclear plants will continue operating with staffing levels similar to weekend service to ensure that no unauthorised personnel could gain access to the plants. UN WARNS TERRORIST COULD CREATE A NUCLEAR BOMB Terrorists have the 'means, knowledge and information' to create a nuclear bomb, the head of the UN atomic watchdog has warned in the wake of the Brussels attacks. The warnings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Yukiya Amano come just days before world leaders meet for an important summit against 'nuclear terrorism'. 'Terrorism is spreading and the possibility of using nuclear material cannot be excluded,' Mr Amano told AFP. 'Member states need to have sustained interest in strengthening nuclear security. 'The countries which do not recognise the danger of nuclear terrorism are the biggest problem.' According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium still exists to make 20,000 weapons of the magnitude that levelled Hiroshima in 1945. A grapefruit-sized amount of plutonium can be fashioned into a nuclear weapon, and according to Mr Amano it is 'not impossible' that extremists could manage to make a 'primitive' device - if they got hold of the material. 'It is now an old technology and nowadays terrorists have the means, the knowledge and the information,' he said. 'Some 1,000 people work on sites like these. Their backgrounds are all checked thoroughly, but better safe than sorry.' On Thursday, Derniere Heure newspaper had reported the suicide bombers who blew themselves up on Tuesday originally considered targeting a nuclear site, but a series of arrests of suspect militants forced them to speed up their plans and instead switch focus to the Belgian capital. However, Charleroi prosecutors has reportedly played down reports of a connection between the murder and a planned terror attack, according to the Belga news agency. Belga also said that the prosecutor had also denied media reports that the guard's access badge had gone missing. There was no immediate independent confirmation from the prosecutor's office in Charleroi, about an hour's drive south of Brussels. Late last year, investigators found a video tracking the movements of a man linked to the country's nuclear industry during a search of a flat as part of investigations into the Islamist militant attack on Paris on November 13 that killed 130 people. The video, lasting several hours, showed footage of the entrance to a home in northern Belgium and the arrival and departure of the director of Belgium's nuclear research programme. Interior minister Jan Jambon previously told Belgium's Parliament there was not a threat to the country's nuclear facilities last month Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3510384/Belgian-nuclear-plant-guard-murdered-security-pass-stolen-two-days-Brussels-attacks.html~~#ixzz4KfAUOzmt Follow us: @MailOnline on Twitter | DailyMail on Facebook At the time, the interior minister said that while there was a threat 'to the person in question,' there was not one to the country's nuclear facilities. He added: 'To date, we have no indication that there is a specific threat to the Belgian nuclear sites. The nuclear industry is one of the best protected areas.' However, the European Union's counter-terrorism chief warned today that Belgium's network of nuclear power plants and other major infrastructure face the threat of a cyber-attack over the next five years. 'I would not be surprised if there was an attempt in the next five years to use the Internet to commit an attack,' Gilles de Kerchove told daily La Libre Belgique. 'It would take the form of entering the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), which is the nerve centre of a nuclear power plant, a dam, air traffic control centre or railroad switching station,' he added. It comes as the head of the UN atomic watchdog also warned that terrorists have the 'means, knowledge and information' to create a nuclear bomb. The warnings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Yukiya Amano come just days before world leaders meet for an important summit against 'nuclear terrorism'.
Even small-scale attacks are devastating Toon 7: Owen B. Toon 7 , chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, "Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism," online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp- 7-1973-2007.pdf. RW To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals . At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million . Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences . Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear "counterforce" exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes
EU is vulnerable now—nuclear terror causes total collapse
This week’s bombings in Brussels shattered the peace, and the sense of self-confidence, in the heart of the European Union. The Islamic State militants who carried them out may yet achieve a much larger goal: speeding the breakup of the 28-country bloc that is the grandest geopolitical project since the Second World War. Even before the massacre, the EU – based on lofty ideals about the free movement of people, money and ideas – was reeling from a seemingly endless series of body blows. There was the refugee crisis, the spectre of Britain voting to leave and the rise of parties of extreme right and left, movements united only by their anti-EU positions. All these problems were exacerbated by Tuesday’s bloodshed. Throw in the continent’s lingering economic malaise – symbolized by shocking jobless rates in Mediterranean countries – and an institution that was lauded just four years ago with a Nobel Peace Prize for its role in maintaining stability in Europe seems at genuine risk of falling apart. That reality is just starting to sink into the institutional, clubby atmosphere of Brussels, a world of expense accounts, black BMWs and cushy high-paying jobs. Samir Benelcaid, a Belgian radio talk-show host who broadcasts in French and Arabic, said "people in Brussels didn’t really worry about the future of the EU" even though they were involved in shaping it. The mentality is starting to change since this week’s bombings. "My own view is that Europe is falling down," Mr. Benelcaid said. "The EU is facing so many issues with no responses, like migration, terrorism, unemployment. They give billions and billions of euros to young people for jobs formation and there are no results." The questions facing the EU post-Brussels are whether the bloc is just one, or perhaps two, more blows away from shattering – and whether the threat of disintegration will persuade the EU’s leaders and citizens that their union is worth saving. The attacks highlighted yet another crisis for the bloc, this one institutional, by providing fresh and gruesome evidence of the inadequacies of the EU’s security and intelligence apparatuses Tuesday’s assault on the city’s airport and metro system killed at least 31 people and injured almost 300, many gravely. It came just four months after the attacks on Paris nightlife that killed another 130. The EU has been on the precipice before. In 2012, at the height of the euro crisis, Greece was on the verge of bolting from the euro zone and reprinting its pre-euro currency, the drachma, until the European Central Bank (ECB) went into firefighting mode and kept the monetary union intact. A greater firefighting mission is required now, but who will lead it and how it will be done are open questions. The euro zone has, at points, slipped into deflation (falling prices), prompting the ECB to introduce negative interest rates in an effort to lift prices. The largely Mediterranean countries on the "periphery" are becoming increasingly critical of the economic and refugee policies imposed on them by Brussels and Berlin. Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi is now leading the anti-EU charge in his country, though he is not yet advocating Italy’s withdrawal from the EU or the euro zone. The EU’s economic woes, while intensifying, are nothing new. What is new is the number of problems the continent is having to simultaneously confront. It is one thing to have a euro crisis; it is quite another to have a euro crisis in a time of regular terrorism, mass refugee arrivals, right-wing populism and a key member contemplating leaving the bloc. "I think the fact that euro-zone crisis is a distant memory shows that the political and economic governance – and now security governance – of the EU is in shambles," said Mr. Spiro. "How much more evidence do you need to prove that the EU project is in disarray? It really is facing an existential crisis."
Euro collapse causes global economic downturn—not even the US is resilient enough
THE world economy is not in good shape. The news from America and Britain has been reasonably positive, but Japan’s economy is struggling and China’s growth is now slower than at any time since 2009. Unpredictable dangers abound, particularly from the Ebola epidemic, which has killed thousands in West Africa and jangled nerves far beyond. But the biggest economic threat, by far, comes from continental Europe. Now that German growth has stumbled, the euro area is on the verge of tipping into its third recession in six years. Its leaders have squandered two years of respite, granted by the pledge of Mario Draghi, the European Central Bank’s president, to do "whatever it takes" to save the single currency. The French and the Italians have dodged structural reforms, while the Germans have insisted on too much austerity. Prices are falling in eight European countries. The zone’s overall inflation rate has slipped to 0.3 and may well go into outright decline next year. A region that makes up almost a fifth of world output is marching towards stagnation and deflation. Optimists, both inside and outside Europe, often cite the example of Japan. It fell into deflation in the late-1990s, with unpleasant but not apocalyptic consequences for both itself and the world economy. But the euro zone poses far greater risks. Unlike Japan, the euro zone is not an isolated case: from China to America inflation is worryingly low, and slipping. And, unlike Japan, which has a homogenous, stoic society, the euro area cannot hang together through years of economic sclerosis and falling prices. As debt burdens soar from Italy to Greece, investors will take fright, populist politicians will gain ground, and—sooner rather than later—the euro will collapse. This parrot has ceased to be Although many Europeans, especially the Germans, have been brought up to fear inflation, deflation can be still more savage (see article). If people and firms expect prices to fall, they stop spending, and as demand sinks, loan defaults rise. That was what happened in the Great Depression, with especially dire consequences in Germany in the early 1930s. So it is worrying that, of the 46 countries whose central banks target inflation, 30 are below their target. Some price falls are welcome. Tumbling oil prices, in particular, have given consumers’ incomes a boost (see article). But slowing prices and stagnant wages owe more to weak demand in the economy and roughly 45m workers are jobless in the rich OECD countries. Investors are starting to expect lower inflation even in economies, such as America’s, that are growing at reasonable rates. Worse, short-term interest rates are close to zero in many economies, so central banks cannot cut them to boost spending. The only ammunition comes from quantitative easing and other forms of printing money.
Economic downturn causes resource competition and regional instability – co-opts all other causes of conflict.
Harris and Burrows 09: ~Mathew Harris, PhD European History @ Cambridge and Counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Jennifer Burrows, Member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit. "Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis" http://www.ciaonet.org/~~. (2009)~ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups'inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks'and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
Causes extinction
Freeman 14: ~Chas W. Freehamn, served in the United States Foreign Service, the State and Defense Departments in many different capacities over the course of thirty years, past president of the Middle East Policy Council, co-chair of the U.S. China Policy Foundation and a Lifetime Director of the Atlantic Council, 9/13/14, "A New Set of Great Power Relationships" (2014)~ We live in a time of great strategic fluidity. Borders are shifting. Lines of control are blurring. Long-established spheres of influence are fading away. Some states are decaying and dissolving as others germinate and take root. The global economic order is precarious. New economic and geopolitical fault lines are emerging. The great powers of North and South America are barely on speaking terms. Europe is again driven by geopolitical antagonisms. Ukraine should be a prosperous, independent borderland between the European Union and Russia. It has instead become a cockpit of strategic contention. The United States and Russia have relapsed into hostility. The post-Ottoman borders of West Asia and North Africa are being erased. Neither Europeans, nor Russians, nor Americans can now protect or direct their longstanding clients in the Middle East. Brazil, China, and India are peacefully competing for the favor of Africa. But, in the Indo-Pacific, China and Japan are at daggers drawn and striving to ostracize each other. Sino-American relations seem to be following US-Russian relations into mutual exasperation and intransigence. No one surveying this scene could disagree that the world would benefit from recrafting the relationships between its great powers. As President Xi Jinping has proposed, new types of relations might enable the great powers to manage their interactions to the common advantage while lowering the risk of armed conflict. This is, after all, the nuclear age. A war could end in the annihilation of all who take part in it. Short of that, unbridled animosity and contention between great powers and their allies and friends have high opportunity costs and foster the tensions inherent in military posturing, arms races, instability, and impoverishment. Decommissioning is key to US presence in Europe’s energy markets—Belgium is a test market for new technologies Spersaud et al 16: Felicia Spersaud and Curt Cultice, US Department of Commerce. New opportunities for US companies in Belgium’s civil nuclear energy industry. June 20, 2016. Power Engineering. http://www.power-eng.com/articles/npi/print/volume-9/issue-3/nucleus/new-opportunities-for-u-s-companies-in-belgium-s-civil-nuclear-energy-industry.html. RW Generally speaking, the country’s central location in one of the wealthiest regions of Europe provides an ideal gateway for selling to the EU. If located in Belgium, U.S. companies can reach 60 percent of Europe’s purchasing power in less than 24 hours by road. This is an important advantage. Second, Belgium’s diversity makes it an excellent test market. The country contains a few distinctly separate socio-demographic groups, such as the Germanic Flemings and the Latin Walloons, who speak French. Although they are separate demographic groups, they are governed by the same legal system. Because of this diversity, the Belgian economy reflects the overall European economy and consumer base like a mini-Europe. It is easier to enter the market in Belgium than to start with larger European markets. In a nutshell, if you succeed in Belgium, you are likely to succeed anywhere in Europe. More specific to the U.S. civil nuclear industry, Belgium’s Westinghouse-designed fleet of reactors is supported by dozens of companies in the U.S. civil nuclear supply chain, so U.S. firms have a history of successfully exporting to Belgium’s civil nuclear market, and there is room for additional U.S. companies to enter the market. Q: Could you provide some background on Belgium’s legislation for decommissioning its nuclear reactors? Croigny: The Belgian federal government passed a law in 2003 barring the construction of any new nuclear plants in Belgium and establishing a limit of 40 years for the operating lives of existing reactors. The law was revised in 2014, allowing an additional ten years of operation for the three oldest reactors. The revised law does not provide guidance for the remaining four reactors, but it is expected that their life will also be extended for an additional ten years once they have reached the end of their 40-year period. This means that, under the current law, the two oldest reactors will be decommissioned in 2025, with the remaining ones gradually phasing out by 2035. Therefore, significant opportunities for U.S. companies able to support decommissioning activities and lifetime extension will arise in the future. Q: How significant are the decommissioning opportunities in Belgium for U.S. firms? Croigny: Well, in terms of decommissioning, any U.S. company that has experience or can offer innovative processes in terms of decommissioning nuclear plants is encouraged to consider the Belgian market. This is going to be a great business opportunity for U.S. companies in the upcoming years as plants across Europe are gradually decommissioned. Until the sector is completely phased out, utilities will continue to invest in and upgrade their plants. Electrabel, the largest Belgium utility, has announced investments in equipment upgrades worth $700 million over a period of 10 years for three reactors. Since liberalization of the energy market in 1999, three different utilities - Electrabel, EDF Belgium and EDF Luminus - have operated Belgium’s seven nuclear reactors. My advice would be for U.S. companies to partner with local companies. One local company that is active in decommissioning is Tractebel, a Belgian engineering company that has built some of the nuclear power plants with Westinghouse and was also active in building the SCK-CEN research center. The companies who were originally active in building and designing the power plants would logically be active in decommissioning the same plants. The U.S. Commercial Service in Belgium can help U.S. companies identify potential local partners. Q: Is there any demand in Belgium for new civil nuclear technology? Croigny: There are no new builds planned for now, but given that the phasing out law has been amended, demand for new technologies is possible. I believe there may be interest in smaller and more flexible technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs), and Belgium is very much involved in fusion technologies with the http://www.iter.org/"ITER project. Interest in Gen III+ or Gen IV advanced reactors s lower though. If the phasing law is not further amended or is cancelled, the future of Belgium will be one without nuclear technology, at least for energy production. There will always be a strong focus on nuclear medicine and RandD in general. U.S. companies can definitely play an active role in those fields in the future. Safeguards don’t check Barret et al 13: Anthony M. Barret, Seth D. Baum, and Kelly R. Hostetler. Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University, Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, and Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia. June 28, 2013. http://sethbaum.com/ac/2013'NuclearWar.pdf. RW War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of humanity. Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches.) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter- attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 1 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions, with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks
10/6/16
SEPTOCT- 1AC- Japan
Tournament: Valley | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Lake Highland Prep MC | Judge: Nick Smith, Tom Mayes, Salim Damerdji
Japan 1AC
Plan
Plan Text: The federal government of Japan should prohibit the production of nuclear power
Decommissioning will be issued through four steps
Schmittem 16 ~Schmittem, Marc (Analyst for EU-Japan Energy Cooperation ). "Nuclear Decomissioning in Japan- Opportunities for European Companies". EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation. Tokyo, March 2016. http://www.eu-japan.eu/sites/default/files/publications/docs/2016-03-nuclear-decommissioning-japan-schmittem-min'0.pdf~~ NB Decommissioning is the responsibility of the operator of a nuclear facility. The NRA defines the decommissioning of NPPs in Japan by the following four activities: Dismantling of the relevant reactor ~includes~ (1), transfer of nuclear fuel (2), removal of irradiated material (3), and the disposal of radioactive waste (4)19. Within these boundaries, nuclear operators can design their own decommissioning strategies. The 1currently preferred approach for commercial NPPsin Japan combines immediate dismantling with deferred dismantling. Immediate dismantling is a strategy where dismantling begins immediately after the approval of the project, whereas in deferred dismantling, the reactor is first placed in safe storage for a number of years to reduce the radioactive inventory. The operators of commercial power reactors in Japan have opted for such safe storage periods, but the dismantling of secondary facilities will begin as soon as possible. Like the decommissioning strategies of many other countries, the basic decommissioning strategy in Japan consists of sequential stages: Site preparation (including site characterisation, defueling and decontamination), safe storage, and deconstruction and dismantling (DandD) (see Figure 1). Waste management and disposal is also a part of the decommissioning process. The basic strategy envisions this as only becoming an issue during the DandD stage, but in practice waste from decommissioning also needs to be handled at earlier stages. While this is acknowledged in the individual decommissioning plans for Japanese reactors, lingering problems with waste management have led to delays in some ongoing decommissioning projects (see the description of the individual decommissioning projects in Part II and the discussion of waste management later in this chapter). The newest decommissioning plans also show a tendency for more prolonged safe storage periods.¶ In the first stage of the decommissioning project, the fuel in the reactor core and the spent fuel¶ pool (SFP) is retrieved and transported to either a temporary storage site21 or a reprocessing¶ plant22¶ . After a survey and characterisation of the radioactive inventory of the facility, systems¶ and facilities are decontaminated to reduce the radioactive dose rates in the work spaces and to¶ prepare the site for dismantling. In the second stage, the reactor core is placed in safe storage, during which basic safety, monitoring and cooling systems are maintained. This stage is meant to reduce the radioactive inventory in the reactor through natural decay processes. The duration of this phase is usually around 10 years for physicochemical reasons, but a certain period of relative inactivity in the decommissioning process might also be necessary for some utilities to recover the financial losses from the premature or long-term shut-down of the reactor after the Fukushima accidents (see part I.6). The dismantling of non-essential and redundant systems and speripheral facilities also begins at this point. The safe storage stage is followed by the DandD stage. During this phase, again in a number of sequential steps, the various components of the reactor are dismantled. aThis stage sees the highest demand for specialised equipment, particularly during the dismantling of the highly radioactive reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and its internals, where remote-controlled, submersible equipment is required for safety reasons. After the reactor has been dismantled, the reactor building and the remaining facilities are dismantled. Large quantities of waste, both radioactive and non-radioactive (see section I.4), are generated in this stage. The Japanese strategy envisions the implementation of strategies to reduce the amount of waste, through means such as a clearance system and the recycling of non-radioactive waste. At the end of the decommissioning process an application for verification of completion is submitted to the NRA, which then assesses the final state of the site. If the measurable radioactive dose rates are within the legal limits and all targets of the decommissioning plan have been reached, the NRA formally terminates the licence of the operator and releases the site from regulatory control. The site of the former reactor can then be reused for new purposes. The current plan is to build new reactors on the sites of decommissioned reactors, due to difficulties in acquiring sites for new reactors and an expected unwillingness of the local population to develop the land of the former NPP for agricultural or residential purposes23. However, in light of strengthened safety regulations, stricter licensing criteria and growing opposition to the operation of NPPs in the surrounding communities and local governments, it is not yet known if this strategy will be economically and politically feasible.
Plan would shift into complete renewable energy system—computer models prove and outweigh other sources
Esteban 14~Esteban, Miguel. Portugal-Pereira, Joana. "Post-disaster resilience of a 100 renewable energy system in Japan". 1. Gradutate Program of Sustainability Science- Global Leadership Initiative (GPSS-GLI), Graduate School of Frontier Sciences.The University of Tokyo. Kashiwanoha, Kashiwa City, Japan. 2. Energy Planning Program, Graduate School of Engineering, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Centro de Tecnologia, Bloco C, Sala 211, Cidade Universitária, Ilha do Fundão, Rio de Janeiro RJ21941-972, Brazil. Accepted February 13, 2014~ NB Proposed future 100 renewable energy system. The present paper modifies the methodology proposed by Esteban et al. ~22,38~ to take into account electricity demand for each hour of the year to calculate the reliability of an expanded renewable energy system. The method uses historical meteoro- logical data from AMeDAS (Automated Meteorological Data Acquisition System of the Japan Meteorological Agency) ~50~ for 2001 to estimate the hourly production of electricity. The method simulates the production of wind farms and PV panels distributed throughout Japan using equations that takes into account climatic conditions at each point (see Esteban et al. ~22,38~, for more de- tails). The software is EXCEL based, with the climate data for each point pasted and processed directly in the spreadsheet. The resulting file, at over 100 MB, was run using an Intel i7 processor laptop, taking up to 1 min to compute a given scenario. Using an EXCEL spreadsheet allowed the authors to observe directly all data manipulation, and was thus thought to be more intuitive than building the model using a computer language (such as Fortran or Cþþ). ¶ Solar panels were considered to be installed in major population centres. For the sake of simplicity, and due to computational limi- tations, the population of Japan was grouped into 15 different regions, with the weather station in each regional capital being used to determine the amount of solar electricity that can be produced in each hour of the year. Conversion efficiency was only assumed as 20, not much higher than that at present, with a list of the assumed characteristics of the solar cells given in Table 3 (for a more detailed discussion on conversion efficiency see Ref. ~38~). Regarding wind farms (Table 4) the authors considered only 24 of the largest wind farms. Future increases in turbine numbers are assumed to be located around the areas were these farms are currently situated, and the future proportional distribution of wind turbines is hence kept identical to their present spatial distribution. The maximum rated capacity of wind turbines was kept at 10 MW, which is probably easily achieved in the future (see Ref. ~38~). The ratio of solar wind installed capacity was kept at 31, as Esteban et al. ~22~ calculate this to be the most advantageous for the overall system stability of the country. ¶ If solar and wind power cannot meet electricity demand, the simulation will start to use other types of energy to balance the system. First it will resort to hydropower, then to biomass, and finally to hydro pumped-storage. In this case, the simulation fol- lows ~23~, and assumes that the installed capacity will be 19.4 GW and that the maximum storage capacity would be 1.2 PJ. Conven- tional hydropower would stay constant, with no new dams built. ¶ Finally, if the system cannot balance, the electricity from electric cars is used. In this sense it will be assumed that there are 35 million electric vehicles by 2030, and that each car has a battery with a 50-kWh storage capacity, they will represent a total storage capacity of 1750 GWh (see Ref. ~25~). The transmission capacity from batteries to grid was assumed to be high, at around 100 GW, as in many cases the batteries would only be used to directly power appliances within a house. ¶ A total of six different scenarios were analysed, combining different installed capacities of wind and solar power, but keeping all other renewables constant, in order to better visualise the re- sults (see Table 5). The electricity production due to solar and wind was worked out using meteorological data, while the production of hydropower, biomass and geothermal plants was assumed to be always available (the capacity factor of these plants is given in Table 6). Three different scenarios of energy consumption (see Fig. 2) were considered. Scenario A describes a Business as Usual scenario, Scenario B represents 10 saving in electricity consump- tion during the summer, and Scenario C corresponds to 20 sum- mer savings. In total this provides a matrix of 18 different scenarios of energy production and consumption. Reliability of a 100 renewable energy system ¶ Current electricity producing systems use basically two types of plants, base load plants that meet the constant electricity demands and other load-following, or "cyclical" plants, that can quickly be switched on and off to meet cyclical variations in demand ~54~. The challenge of a 100 renewable system would thus be to demon- strate that it can reliably meet electricity demand. However, the difference between a centralised and decentralised system resides in that the partial failure of the system would not necessarily result in blackouts for the entire population. Hence, essentially the grid could be re-built in a way in which large industries and power operators would be guaranteed energy supply, but housing would be given a lower priority, as they could supplement their energy needs from batteries and solar power. Such a system would auto- matically switch off air-conditioning units once batteries fell below a certain level, to guarantee that food and other perishable good did not get wasted. As such, even if the system could not supply the overall demand 100 of the time in one year, large blackouts would not take place. Furthermore, such a system would be more resilient the effect of large-scale natural disasters. ¶ As Ref. ~38~ points out, peaks in both solar and wind electricity production occur during the peak periods of electricity usage (during the afternoon), and this trend is generally repeated throughout the year in most locations. In fact, due to the smooth- ening effect of renewable energy installation in a country the size of Japan, a combination of solar and wind technologies will always yield some electric power ~22~. Fig. 3 shows the total electricity production and consumption for each of the scenarios considered. The amount of electricity wasted (such as extra wind during the night hours that cannot be stored) is also indicated. In this sense, scenario A1, B1 and C1 represent the greatest electricity wastage, due to a high level of redundancy in the system (wind or solar capacity that is not used most of the year, but that is needed only for the summer months). However, these scenarios though result in the lower levels of system stress (defined as the of hours in the year when demand is over 80 of the available capacity), and a completely reliable grid (i.e. when the installed capacity can meet 100 of electricity demand). Other scenarios represent progres- sively lower electricity wastage, though at the expense of system stress and reliability, as the chances of electricity shortage during the summer months increases In this sense scenario C6 is quite interesting, as it results in very little electricity wastage, despite reaching over 98.4 reliability. Obviously, in this case the system achieves higher stability by curtailing electricity consumption during the summer months, resulting in a reduced necessity for extra generation capacity for these months (that would be idle during most of the year). Thus, scenario C6 appears to be the best option, and means that attempting energy reduction policies dur- ing the summer months should go hand-in-hand with the devel- opment of a 100 renewable energy system. Finally, Fig. 4 also shows the system reliability without batteries (i.e. the of hours that the system can meet demand without having to resort to the energy stored in batteries). ¶ One of the problems often cited about the inclusion of tech- nologies such as wind in the electricity mix is that they can increase the ramping rate, or the speed at which load-following units must increase and decrease output ~54~. However, the current system does not suffer from this problem as wind and solar form the basis of the system and only a limited number of other energy sources are considered (biomass, hydro, pumped storage and batteries). All of these can be switched on or off relatively quickly, in comparison to other types of plants such as nuclear. Furthermore, "the combina- tion of multiple wind sites tends to smooth out the aggregated wind generation in a system, which reduces the per-unit size of ramps and mitigates the range of flexibility required" ~54~. The inclusion of more technologies, such as ocean or geothermal en- ergy, could also further enhance the smoothening effect and lower the ramping rate. ¶ Japan is a country that is particularly threatened by natural di- sasters. These events can have important consequences for the generation and distribution of electric power, and thus future government policy should attempt to make electricity supply more resilient and de-centralized, so that failure in one part of the system does not deprive large sectors of the population or industry of electricity. Prior to 2011, energy policy in Japan was dictated by the large power companies, which convinced the public of nuclear power trustworthiness. However, nuclear energy has also shown how it is unreliable in an earthquake-prone country, and the gov- ernment should try to curtail the power of the monopolised pro- duction and promote small-scale electricity generation. The present paper, therefore, attempts to assess the feasibility of a 100 renewable energy electricity system in Japan by the year 2030 in order to achieve a higher level electricity resilience. To this end, a model that simulates future electricity production based on hourly wind and solar data was developed, using estimated future hourly electricity demand in Japan for the year 2030. ¶ Through the analysis carried out, the authors showed that a large-scale 100 renewable PV-wind-hydro-biomass energy sys- tem in Japan can be reliable. Such as system would use pump-up storage and electric batteries to balance the daily fluctuations in supply and demand. The system is generally very stable during the winter, spring and autumn periods in Japan, with occasional small amounts of battery storage needed for the system to be able to successfully meet the electricity demand during these periods. The most important challenge of the system would be providing suffi- cient electricity to meet the summer demand peak. Scenarios A1e B1eC1 reveal the most optimised performance, as they guarantee stable and reliable supply. However, these scenarios have almost 93 higher installed capacity than scenarios A6eB6eC6, and most of this extra capacity would stand idle throughout the year. On the other hand, scenarios A6eB6eC6 reduce the idle installed capacity, though at the cost of decreasing system reliability. However, sce- nario C6 shows that if electricity consumption during summer months can be curtailed by 20, then the system appears to be very stable (98.4 reliability). Government support for nuclear is blocking shift to renewables now—cost competitive and subsidies trade off Mainichi 15 ~Japan’s National Daily. March, 8-12-2015, "Editorial: Japan should not depend on nuclear power," Mainichi, http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20150812/p2a/00m/0na/008000c~~ NB However, the government's basic stance toward nuclear power has remained unchanged since the outbreak of the disaster, and lessons learned from the catastrophic accident have not been sufficiently put to good use. The restart of the Sendai plant's reactor must not be a step toward reviving the pre-disaster myth of nuclear plants' infallible safety. Lessons learned from the disaster include: Nuclear accidents can happen even if countermeasures are taken and that damage caused by nuclear accidents to people, the environment and society differ markedly from that triggered by other accidents in terms of quality and scale. Moreover, Japan is a volcanic country prone to earthquakes. Such being the case, it is highly risky to continue operating atomic power stations in this country. Nuclear energy is far from being a sustainable energy source when considering how to dispose of radioactive waste. Therefore, the Mainichi Shimbun has insisted that Japan should stop using nuclear plants as early as possible. At the same time, the Mainichi Shimbun has said there could be occasions where Japan must approve of the minimum necessary operation of atomic power plants under certain conditions, taking into account economic and social risks that would be caused by an immediate halt to all nuclear plants. However, the latest reactivation of the Sendai plant's No. 1 reactor does not meet such conditions and should not have been approved. In the first place, the government has not clearly characterized the restart as part of the process of phasing out nuclear power. The basic energy plan approved by the Cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe last year states that Japan's reliance on atomic power will be reduced to the minimum possible level. As such, it is the national government's duty to draw up a road map toward steadily phasing out nuclear power in line with this policy. However, the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry has set the ratio of nuclear power to total electric power to be generated in Japan in 2030 at 20-to-22 percent. To achieve this, it would be necessary to rebuild or extend the use of aging nuclear reactors beyond the 40-year limit, and construct new reactors. This indicates the government intends to return to a society dependent on atomic power. The essential condition of minimizing damage that would be caused by a nuclear accident to local residents has not been met. It is true that the new regulatory standards require nuclear plant operators to implement stricter safety measures, assuming serious accidents that had not been assumed under the previous standards. The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) that examines whether nuclear reactors meet the regulatory standards has become more independent of the government. However, these measures to beef up safety measures are necessary conditions but are not sufficient. In the Fukushima nuclear crisis, confusion in the chain of command worsened the situation. Information on the spread of radioactive substances was not provided to local residents, causing some of them to flee to areas where radiation levels were higher. The evacuation of hospitalized patients and residents of nursing care facilities was greatly confused and many people died while evacuating or at evacuationn shelters. Following the accident, the zone where local bodies are required to work out evacuation plans for local residents was expanded from 8-10 kilometers from nuclear plants to 30 kilometers. Evacuation plans have been worked out for residents near the Sendai plant, but evacuation drills have not been conducted to secure the effectiveness of the plan. The national government has tolerated the local body's failure. The attitude to hastily restart the Sendai nuclear reactor without taking sufficient safety measures for local residents is apparently based on the myth of nuclear plants' infallible safety. To ensure the safety of local residents, the local government should conduct evacuation drills, clarify problems involving the evacuation plan and even suspend operations at the plant depending on the results of the drills. A lack of clarity for responsibility over reactivating nuclear plants has not changed since before the March 2011 outbreak of the nuclear plant crisis. Since nuclear plants are operated by private companies as business activities, power companies are primarily responsible for restarting atomic power stations and ensuring safety at the plants. However, nuclear plants are operated as part of the government's policy. The government intends to approve reactivation of nuclear reactors as long as the reactors meet the regulatory standards, while the NRA is of the view that meeting the standards does not necessarily mean the plants are absolutely safe. This has raised concerns that nobody would be held responsible if another nuclear accident were to take place, just as was the case with the Fukushima crisis. There are more fundamental problems. The government has failed to show its determination to promote a nuclear and energy policy while gaining public understanding. In most opinion polls conducted by various news organizations, those who are opposed to restarting nuclear plants have outnumbered those in favor since the March 2011 accident. In an Aug. 8-9 survey conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun, 57 percent of the respondents expressed opposition to resuming operations at the No. 1 reactor at the Sendai power station. Still, no means have been secured to reflect public opinion in the country's energy policy even following the nuclear accident that has had such a huge impact on local residents. The process of using an advisory panel to the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry to determine the direction of the nation's energy policy has remained unchanged since before the crisis. The previous government led by the Democratic Party of Japan, which is now the largest opposition party, at least attempted to conduct a deliberative poll and took other measures to reflect public opinion in the energy policy. However, the current administration has not even shown such a stance. The fact that radioactive waste will only accumulate as long as atomic power plants are operated poses a serious challenge. It is necessary to consider final disposal of radioactive waste on the assumption that it will take 100,000 years before such waste becomes harmless, but Japan has no prospects for working out any feasible disposal plan. Even if a nuclear accident were not to occur again, atomic power stations can not be maintained over a long period as long as no solution is found to problems involving the final disposal of radioactive waste. First and foremost, the government should draw up a specific road map toward scrapping nuclear power. It is also necessary to create a system under which the NRA would evaluate local governments' evacuation plans and drills in advance. The restart of the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant should not be used as a springboard to revive Japan's dependence on atomic power.
Fiscal changes in Japan indicate a transition to renewables has started
Dewit 15 ~Andrew Dewit (Andrew DeWit is Professor in Rikkyo University’s School of Policy Studies and an editor of The Asia-Pacific Journal. His recent publications include "Climate Change and the Military Role in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response," in Paul Bacon and Christopher Hobson (eds) Human Security and Japan’s Triple Disaster (Routledge, 2014), "Japan’s renewable power prospects," in Jeff Kingston (ed) Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan (Routledge 2013), and (with Kaneko Masaru and Iida Tetsunari) "Fukushima and the Political Economy of Power Policy in Japan" in Jeff Kingston (ed) Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan: Response and Recovery after Japan’s 3/11 (Routledge, 2012). He is lead researcher for a five-year (2010-2015) Japanese-Government funded project on the political economy of the Feed-in Tariff.), 10-7-2015, "Japan’s Bid to Become a World Leader in Renewable Energy," Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/japans-bid-to-become-a-world-leader-in-renewable-energy/5480274. Asia Pacific Journal, Global Resaerch~ NB Some of the most uersuasive evidence of the LDP’s expanding commitment to renewable energy and efficiency is found in the central government’s budget, particularly the central agencies’ requests for the coming fiscal year (April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017). During the summer of 2015, Japan’s fiscal process was notable for energy-related requests that mushroomed over the previous year. One standout example is the Ministry of Environment’s (MoE) submission for renewable energy and efficiency projects, which is fully 62 higher than its fiscal year 2015 spending.5 We shall explore these and related requests in greater detail presently, comparing them with budgets under the DPJ. But first, it is important to point out that these budget outlines are preliminary. In Japan’s fiscal process, central agencies submit their initial budget requests to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) by the end of August, which is followed by negotiations among MOF’s budget examiners and the various ministries and agencies. These negotiations generally last until about December, and result in a draft budget. It is likely that about YEN 5 trillion will be trimmed from the YEN 102 trillion budget request. But according to an analysis in the September 5, 2015 Asahi Shimbun these cuts are likely to be centred on social security.6 It is highly unlikely that the Abe cabinet did not approve the dramatic increases in proposed spending on renewable energy and efficiency, and thus they are probably not going to be sacrificed.¶ In addition, the expanded energy-related project requests are in part to be funded by extra revenues gleaned by increased "green" taxation of fossil fuels. This gives the spending programmes additional protection, because one rationale for the taxes is to increase incentives for the development and deployment of alternative energy. In spite of continuing steel-industry pressure to have such taxes axed,7 the LDP did not roll back the carbon taxes that were introduced in October of 2012, and have since been raised in stages. The taxes are set to reach YEN 289/ton of CO2 with the scheduled April 1, 2016 increase.8 As described above, the MoE’s energy-related fiscal request for 2016 was 62 higher than its fiscal 2015 initial budget. The MoE’s total request for 2016 was YEN 1.68 trillion, a 33 increase over the fiscal 2015 appropriation. One of the factors driving this overall increase is the Japanese government’s commitment to reducing its carbon emissions by 26 by 2030 versus 2013 levels. As a major part of this overall aim, the MoE’s renewable and efficiency-related spending requests for 2016 amount to just under YEN 176 billion.¶ The MoE is, of course, not the only central agency with a prominent role in directing public finance at renewable energy and efficiency projects undertaken by Japan’s local governments, private firms, NPOs and other actors. The METI is another major supplier of subsidies for such projects. In the energy field, the METI’s requests for 2016 total just under YEN 976 billion. This figure is a significant increase on the YEN 796.5 billion in the fiscal 2015 initial budget, and efficiency and renewables receive striking increases. To be sure, one of Japan’s leading journalists on energy-related matters, Ishida Masaya, criticizes the METI’s fiscal 2016 request for including about YEN 200 billion in spending on nuclear (including YEN 133 billion in support to local sites of nuclear reactors). This figure is roughly the same as the nuclear spending in fiscal 2015, which totals YEN 185 billion. Ishida regards maintaining this level of support for nuclear as being inconsistent with the new (from 2014) energy basic plan’s explicit commitment to maximize renewables and minimize nuclear.¶ But Ishida devotes considerably more attention to the METI’s aim to nearly double its support of efficiency and conservation, raising its fiscal 2015 YEN 127.7 billion spending in this category to YEN 242.9 billion. He adds that this spending to cut greenhouse gas emissions and reduce power consumption is largely targeted at factories, which are the most costly venues for achieving gains in energy efficiency and conservation. The METI’s spending on this category will thus nearly triple, from YEN 50 billion in 2015 to YEN 135.6 billion in 2016. Ishida rightly focuses on this initiative, as the METI itself describes the current need for efficiency and conservation as comparable to the period in the immediate wake of the 1970s oil shocks.9¶ METI is generally seen as powerfully influenced by vested energy interests, including the nuclear village and those focused on fossil fuels. So it is also telling that METI plans to more than double its spending in support of renewable-energy projects, from YEN 35.8 billion in 2015 to YEN 81.8 billion in 2016. METI will also raise its RandD on efficiency from YEN 50.7 to YEN 63.2 billion and its RandD on renewables from YEN 49.3 to YEN 53.7. METI is also asking for a tripling in its funding on hydrogen-related deployment (fuel cells and hydrogen stations) and research (including renewable power to gas10), from fiscal 2015’s YEN 11.9 billion to YEN 37.1 billion.11¶ Another central agency with a strong role in fostering the diffusion of renewables and efficiency is the Ministry of Infrastructure, Land, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). Since 2011, it has been undertaking one of the most interesting of Japan’s waste-heat related initiatives, through its "B-DASH" (Breakthrough by Dynamic Approach in Sewage High Technology) Project.12 Japan’s potential for waste-heat capture in its sewerage systems has been assessed at 15 million households’ worth of heat-energy use.13 The fiscal 2016 request for the B-DASH project aimed at exploiting this energy potential is YEN 3.6 billion, and via the initial fiscal 2015 budget the MLIT already has a YEN 901.2 billion fund for waste-heat recovery and other renewable-energy (e.g. methane) from Japan’s 460,000 kilometres of sewers, via the MLIT social infrastructure development disbursements.14 This project has already led to such initiatives as Toyota City’s "Future Challenge City" partnership, announced on August 26, 2015, with Sekisui Chemical on heat-recovery in the city’s sewers.15¶ Moreover, one of the increased efficiency-related fiscal requests by the MLIT is for housing and building stock. The MLIT fiscal 2015 budget for this category totals YEN 116 million, but the request for 2016 is YEN 32.2 billion, or well over 300 times more. This prodigious increase apparently reflects a powerful commitment to raise efficiency in the country’s building stock after new, but non-obligatory, efficiency standards introduced in 2013 had little effect.16¶ Other central agencies with a direct interest in the diffusion of renewable energy and efficiency include the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) as well as the Ministry of Agriculture, Farms and Forestry (MAFF). Their roles in fostering the deployment of renewable energy focus less on the technology per se than on the coordination of local governments (MIC) as well as primary-sector producers, such as forestry firms in biomass (MAFF). Their proposed spending on energy projects generally did not leap as noticeably as the cases surveyed above, save for the MIC’s special programme of fostering the deployment of largely biomass-fired district heating and cooling systems in local areas. This programme is the "Distributed energy infrastructure project." It received YEN 240 million in fiscal 2015, but is slated to more than triple to YEN 700 million in fiscal 2016. The bulk of MIC’s large-scale spending increases are centred on the ICT infrastructure that is one of the core network technologies in Japan’s nationwide rollout of the smart community, internet of things, and related projects that cross multiple agency jurisdictions.17 The MIC spending on ICT in the fiscal 2015 initial budget is YEN 115.3 billion but is slated to increase to YEN 137.8 in fiscal 2016.18The above projects are in themselves good reasons to pay close attention to the MIC. But in addition, the current MIC Minister, Takaichi Sanae, has been a very strong proponent of renewable energy for several years. Under her leadership, the MIC bureaucracy have continued with their significant organizational initiatives to put local governments in charge of energy. We shall examine these initiatives in the subsequent section on institutional changes the LDP has made to foster the accelerated diffusion of renewables and efficiency. But for the present, note that the MIC collated the distributed and renewable-energy project spending – by the MIC itself as well as METI, MoE, and MAFF – relevant to local government. Takaichi presented the results of the MIC survey on these matters at a September 4, 2015 press conference. She pointed out that there are 31 subsidy programs, worth a total of YEN 102.7 billion in fiscal 2015 as well as an additional YEN 126 billion via the 2014 fiscal year’s supplementary budget.19 Govt is moving away from nuclear focus slowly, towards renewables but it isn’t happening quick enough—aff fiats they ban nuclear power, which causes them to shift money towards renewables because they are already moving towards that now but nuclear allocation trades off currently—companies are shifting now so the shift WILL happen—japans nuclear program is also uniquely insufficient so renewables are best
Their DAs are non-unique—Japan already relies a ton on coal and import dependence and nuclear is insufficient
Dewit 2 ~Andrew Dewit (Andrew DeWit is Professor in Rikkyo University’s School of Policy Studies and an editor of The Asia-Pacific Journal. His recent publications include "Climate Change and the Military Role in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response," in Paul Bacon and Christopher Hobson (eds) Human Security and Japan’s Triple Disaster (Routledge, 2014), "Japan’s renewable power prospects," in Jeff Kingston (ed) Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan (Routledge 2013), and (with Kaneko Masaru and Iida Tetsunari) "Fukushima and the Political Economy of Power Policy in Japan" in Jeff Kingston (ed) Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan: Response and Recovery after Japan’s 3/11 (Routledge, 2012). He is lead researcher for a five-year (2010-2015) Japanese-Government funded project on the political economy of the Feed-in Tariff.), 10-7-2015, "Japan’s Bid to Become a World Leader in Renewable Energy," Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/japans-bid-to-become-a-world-leader-in-renewable-energy/5480274. Asia Pacific Journal, Global Resaerch~ NB So consider where Japan is. The country has just adopted mid-term energy targets that few find credible. It has also done this in the midst of enormous uncertainty on conventional energy supplies, prices, geopolitics and other factors. It bears keeping in mind that Japan is not just the world’s fifth-largest power market, but also the world’s largest importer of LNG, the second largest importer of coal, and the third-largest net importer of oil and oil products.32 Figure 2 on "Changes in Japan’s Power Mix" shows that the country’s import dependence on conventional fuels to produce power greatly increased between 2010 to 2013, when nuclear’s share shrank and LNG’s role ballooned from 29.3 percent of power to 43.2 percent, coal increased from 25 percent to 30.3 percent, and oil and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) more than doubled from 6.6 to 13.7 percent. Virtually all of these fuels are imported, so Japan’s import dependence increased dramatically, from 62 percent in 2010 to 88 percent in 2013. The comparison with the average EU power mix in 2011 is striking, as the EU’s overall dependence on imports is 49 percent.¶ Figure 2 shows that Japan in 2013 was even more import dependent than it was in 1973. That was the year of the first oil shock, which is still such a benchmark for vulnerability among Japanese policymakers that – as noted earlier – the METI emphasizes it in its fiscal and regulatory planning for efficiency and conservation and indeed uses when it produces figures (figure 2 is a direct translation of METI’s work). Admittedly Japan’s power mix in 2013 was less dependent on a single energy source, in contrast to the over 70 percent dependence on oil and LPG in 1973. At the same time, the geopolitical, climate and other risks of using fossil fuels in the present far exceed those of 1973.¶ Indeed, it is hard to exaggerate the scale of contemporary risks. For example, the September 21, 2015 Financial Times warns that current low prices for oil have put as much as USD 1.5 trillion of investment in energy projects in question. This constriction in the infrastructure of supply brings profound risks of dramatic price escalations as early as 2017.33 And in spite of continuing optimism concerning unconventional oil and gas reserves, especially the US "shale revolution," a growing number of objective and rigorously empirical studies of the actual resource base and costs of production suggest that shale’s important addition to the global supply portfolio is better measured in years than decades.34 Indeed, the shale boom was in large measure driven by a doubling of US high-yield "junk bond" debt to USD 2 trillion, a bubble that appears to be imploding.35 Meanwhile, demand for energy continues to grow: China’s gasoline consumption in July of 2015 was up 17 percent over the previous year.36 One respected expert’s extrapolation of present trends in oil warns that just China and India alone will be "theoretically consuming 100 of global net exports around the year 2032."37¶ In short, 3-11 and all that has happened since has reduced nuclear to at best a minor role in Japan’s power mix. Certainly nuclear appears incapable of displacing much of Japan’s environmentally damaging, expensive and geopolitically risky reliance on fossil fuels in the power mix. So the real question for LDP policymakers is whether they will allow vested energy interests to dominate investment decisions and income streams in the country’s power economy, its most critical infrastructure. The energy vested interests’ performance during the 2030 "best mix" debate showed that unchecked, their self-interest would turn Japan into an energy- and climate-technology Galapagos while the rest of the world embraces renewable energy and efficiency. This argument is not wishful thinking: on October 2, 2015, the International Energy Agency (IEA) announced that "renewable energy will represent the largest single source of electricity growth over the next five years, driven by falling costs and aggressive expansion in emerging economies." The IEA believes the coming five years will see renewables provide two-thirds of net additions to global power systems, representing over 700 gigawatts or over twice Japan’s installed power capacity. This forecast suggests that by 2020 renewable power generation will be supplying a volume of electricity "higher than today’s combined electricity demand of China, India and Brazil."38¶ The budget numbers reviewed above suggest that the LDP’s renewable-energy supporters are determined not to allow vested interests and incrementalism to ruin the country’s fortunes. They are using the Abe regime’s explicit commitment to maximize the share of renewables as an opportunity to use state finance to accelerate the diffusion of renewable energy and efficiency. But they are not doing this willy-nilly. It would seem that the Abe regime and Japan’s energy bureaucracy have also learned important lessons from various experiences, including the Board of Audit of Japan survey noted above. The survey assessed the return on directly subsidized renewable project spending. It found that 63.7 of total spending was devoted to solar, producing only 38.6 of total installed capacity. By contrast, a mere 0.8 of total subsidies spent on geothermal has resulted in projects that (once in operation) will represent 19.5 of installed capacity. For biomass, the return was not as powerful as geothermal. But even then, 25.3 of subsidy spending resulted in 17.6 of total installed capacity. And with both geothermal and biomass, the power output does not depend on the time of day or the weather.39
Adv- Tech Leadership
Japan is determined to reduce greenhouse gas emissions post-Paris deal
Watanbe 3-15 Chisaki Watanbe (contributor). "Japan Signs Off on Climate Change Plan to Meet Paris Targets." Bloomberg News. March 15th, 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-15/japan-signs-off-on-climate-change-plan-to-meet-paris-targets Japan’s government signed off on a set of measures ranging from energy-saving steps to a broader use of hydrogen to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a bid to meet the country’s commitments made last year at the Paris climate meeting. The cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is expected to approve the plan in early May after public comment, Environment Minister Tamayo Marukawa said Tuesday. The goal is to cut emissions by 26 percent by 2030 using 2013 levels as a base. "The plan will map out the path to achieve the mid-term goal of a 26 percent reduction by 2030," Marukawa said at a news conference. "It also includes an 80 percent cut by 2050 as a long-term target." Japan will strengthen the development of innovative technologies, according to the plan, which also calls for local governments to compile their own measures. "It is very significant that we can show our determination to make contributions after the Paris Agreement," Marukawa said, referring to the international accord reached in December to tackle climate change.
But, Japan’s reliance on nuclear power undermines their global credibility on climate change efforts
McCurry 15 Justin McCurry (staff writer). "Can Japan's climate policy get back on track after Fukushima?" The Guardian. April 17th, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/apr/17/can-japans-climate-policy-get-back-on-track-after-fukushima Less than two decades ago, Japan positioned itself in the vanguard of the global fight against climate change when it helped broker the Kyoto protocol. Now, though, it is Fukushima, not Kyoto, that has come to define Japan’s energy policy, and with potentially grim consequences for its already stalled attempts to reduce CO2 emissions. It was telling that in the same week as a court blocked the restart of two nuclear reactors on the Japan Sea coast – citing concerns over their vulnerability to a major earthquake – the government released emissions data showing just how far Japan has regressed since the more hopeful days of the Kyoto summit in 1997. Environment ministry data showed that Japan’s CO2 emissions rose to the second-highest level on record in the year to March 2014. Local media reports said that Japan, the world’s fifth-largest greenhouse gas emitter, aims to reduce CO2 emissions by about 20 from 2013 levels by 2030 – a much lower target than other major developed economies. In earlier climate talks it pledged a more ambitious reduction of 25 by 2020 from 1990 levels. The new targets, if as unambitious as reported, are expected to draw criticism when Japan and other G7 countries meet in Germany in June, and at the UN climate conference in Paris in November. "The Fukushima disaster had a huge impact on Japan’s emissions reduction target, practically and politically," said Tetsunari Iida, director of the Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies in Tokyo. As Britain and other countries push for more ambitions reductions, Japan has been accused of reneging on its climate change commitments as it ramps up fossil-fuel use, with plans to build more coal-fired plants in the absence of the nuclear option. All of Japan’s 48 working reactors went offline after Fukushima, and attempts by the pro-nuclear prime minister, Shinzō Abe, to push for restarts risk being held up by months, perhaps years, by legal wrangling. "The Abe administration is very close to big industry and the power monopolies and they have very low ambitions in terms of climate change policy," Iida said. "I expect that the new mid-term target, which has to be announced by the time the G7 meets, will be rather low." The March 2011 Fukushima disaster shattered the public’s faith in the "safety myth" surrounding nuclear energy, which once accounted for almost 30 of Japan’s energy needs, with plans to raise its share to about half with the construction of more reactors. Keith Henry, an analyst and founder of Asia Strategy, a government policy consultancy in Tokyo, said sensible discussion of CO2 emissions was being lost amid a highly emotive debate over the future of nuclear power post-Fukushima. "Depending on which side you believe, nuclear power is the saviour that will return Japan to a stable, secure energy supply and reduce its balance of payments deficit, or will be the potential source of another nuclear meltdown," Henry said. "The threat of a nuclear meltdown overrides concerns about an increase in CO2 emissions." Before an earthquake and tsunami sent three of Fukushima Daiichi’s six reactors into meltdown, nuclear was at the core of Japan’s emissions strategy. But the turning of the popular tide against nuclear has sent policymakers back to the drawing board, and risks leaving Japan’s climate change efforts in tatters.
A renewable japan saves the economy, outcompetes oil markets, makes japan a global provider sparking a EU partnership, and counterbalances other Asian Tech.
Orlando et al 16: Danuta Slusarska, and Fabio Orlando. 5-9-2016. "Japan’S Energy Policy Shifts Five Years After Fukushima - Friends Of Europe". Friends of Europe. N. p., 2016. Web. 11 Aug. 2016. It is estimated that between 2007 and 2014, the country invested roughly €17bn in coal power plants and mines abroad, mainly in Asia, with funds from Japanese credit agencies paid as bilateral loans. A pivotal role has also been played by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), a state-owned credit bank providing resources for foreign investment. The JBIC backed the construction of coal plants and invested in several coal facilities in countries such as Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Amid criticism from the international community concerned about the impact of such investment on global climate change mitigation, the Japanese government defended its bilateral loans as climate finance, arguing that by building more efficient coal plants it was helping developing countries to emit less greenhouse gases. But Japan will soon have to modify its strategy, as the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reached a deal last November to curb subsidies used to export technology for coal-fired power plants. Japan led the fight to block the deal, but ultimately had to concede. Yet it does not seem that Japan is ready to change its pro-coal strategy at home. Around 41 new coal-fired power plants are planned to be built over the next ten years, and a new tax system will favour imports of coal over natural gas. These policies threaten to bind Japan even closer to coal for decades to come, leaving the country highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. World frontrunner in energy efficiency One energy ‘fuel’ that Japan has in abundance is energy efficiency. Ever since the oil crisis of the 1970s, the government has put a great deal of effort into energy saving as a way to compensate for its scarcity in resources. As a result, Japan now has one of the lowest energy-intensive economies and one of the most energy-conscious populations among developed countries. Energy efficiency was of particular importance in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, when electricity capacity dropped drastically, threatening power blackouts. Much of the electricity savings were driven by a popular movement known as ‘Setsuden’ (energy saving), aimed at encouraging people and companies to conserve energy and adopt more sustainable practices. Measures included replacing high-consumption lighting with low-power LED lights, ‘thinning’ lighting by removing some bulbs, limiting air-conditioning, shutting off appliances instead of putting them on standby, cutting exterior lighting, changing working shifts to avoid peaks, or slowing down public transport. All this allowed Japan to drastically reduce power demand almost overnight. Energy-efficiency standards for many electrical appliances and vehicles were created under the Top-Runner Programme in 1999, and further reinforced in recent years. The New National Energy Strategy and the Energy Conservation Frontrunner Plan to promote energy conservation were adopted in 2006, setting a target to improve the country’s energy efficiency by at least 30 by 2030 compared to 2003 levels. Various financial and fiscal incentives have been put in place to encourage energy conservation and efficiency in industry, including sectoral benchmarks, tax incentive schemes, depreciation rates and low-interest loans. Large industrial companies are obliged to appoint an energy manager responsible for implementing an energy-efficiency plan for the company. Japan is also actively promoting demand-side management technologies and smart grids deployment, and is the world’s largest investor in smart meters. In the transport sector, Japan has introduced one of the strictest fuel-efficiency standards for passenger cars, and light and heavy-duty trucks, and its main carmakers – Toyota, Nissan and Honda – enjoy a reputation of world-leading energy-efficient car manufacturers. Yet the reputation of the Japanese car industry is now under threat due to recent revelations that Mitsubishi’s employees falsified fuel economy tests data for more than 600,000 vehicles in order to cut corners, in a new scandal following the Volkswagen case. As a leader in energy-efficiency policies, RandD investment and innovation, Japan has also been actively contributing to international cooperation on advancing energy efficiency on a global scale and developing international standards through the International Energy Agency (IEA), International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO) and regional initiatives such as APEC, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. It has also developed bilateral partnerships with its neighbours and major economies such as the EU and the US to boost capacity building and joint policy research, and to disseminate know-how thanks to joint demonstration projects. Focus on energy RandD and innovation Japan gives very high priority to research, development and deployment (RDandD), and its public spending as percentage of GDP exceeds that of all other major economies. According to the IEA, Japan has one of the world’s largest budgets dedicated to RDandD in the fields of nuclear energy, energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, smart grids, clean coal, and carbon capture and storage. The country is also the world’s leader in climate-related technological innovation, as indicated by the number of patents it holds, mainly in renewable energies, energy-efficient buildings and lighting, and electric and hybrid vehicles. A big boost to clean energy technologies was given by the Cool Earth-Innovative Energy Technology Programme. Adopted in 2008, the initiative is the outcome of a study conducted by an investigative commission comprising key intellectual figures and promoted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The programme focuses on 21 key technologies whose deployment is expected to accelerate substantial global emissions reductions, and has allowed Japan to promote international and regional cooperation on RandD and innovative technology development, while maintaining its international competitiveness. On this basis, Japan and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2014 launched the ‘Asia Pacific Clean Air Partnership’, aimed at encouraging existing regional initiatives supporting common projects in order to curb air pollution in the area. But as a result of two decades of economic stagnation, Japan has now visibly decreased its share of energy RDandD from 23 in 1990 to 12 in 2014. China is now poised to lead the world in total RandD spending by 2019 due to a recent surge in public investment in renewable energy RDandD. Further efforts will be necessary if Japan wants to stay at the forefront of energy research and development at the global and regional scale. Regulatory overhaul of the power sector In an unprecedented step to boost the country’s sagging economy, modernise the energy sector, lower energy bills, and advance efficiency and innovation, the Abe government has decided to embark on a major reform to deregulate electricity and gas markets. If done properly and in a coordinated way, the move could raise Japan to the rank of the world’s largest deregulated electricity market in history and a worldwide model to follow. Japan has lagged behind the US and the EU on similar measures for more than 10 years, as its regional monopoly companies have wielded strong political influence preventing any progress on liberalising the sector. Yet increased losses in power companies’ revenues and persisting high energy prices have made evident the need to change Japan’s ‘business as usual’. Japan’s electricity retail market was fully liberalised on 1 April 2016, allowing Japanese households to choose their power suppliers and opening up a ¥10tn (€81bn) market to newcomers. The unbundling of the transmission sector is scheduled for April 2020 and foresees to separate power grids from power plants in an attempt to ensure equal access to the power transmission network by all power suppliers. A bill revising the Gas Business Law, which calls for full liberalisation of the gas retail market by 2017, mandates that major city gas companies in Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka separate their gas pipe management sections into new entities in April 2022. A new committee will be established to oversee transactions in the power and gas industries to ensure fair competition. The package of reforms is expected to bring much-needed competition to gas and electricity markets that have until now been monopolistically operated by local companies. The competition would allow the sectors – which have suffered from inefficiencies in the absence of economic incentives – to become more efficient, driving down costs. New players from a wide variety of industries have already lined up, bringing with them innovative services and new business models offering discount prices combining cell phone, Internet and electricity services. New entrants could also boost technological innovation and improvements in smart meters, energy efficiency and renewable energy, affecting the world’s technological landscape. Implications for Europe The 2011 earthquake and disaster at Fukushima sparked widespread public concern over the safety of nuclear power generation and led to a re-evaluation of energy policies in many parts of the world. The European Council decided to mandate a review of the safety features of European nuclear reactors. The so-called ‘stress tests’ were applied to all nuclear power plants in the EU and an Action Plan was published in 2012 containing further measures to improve the safety of nuclear power plants. Meanwhile, member states’ reactions differed, ranging from Germany deciding to phase out its nuclear power plants, to the UK giving the green light to boost its nuclear capacity with a new Hinckley Point C project. The similarities in environmental, political and economic situation offered fertile ground to build a close EU-Japan strategic partnership. Both like-minded partners face major challenges in view of improving energy efficiency, boosting competitiveness while addressing climate change and energy security issues, and dealing with growing competition from countries like China and India. Energy cooperation takes place as part of the EU-Japan Summit, EU-Japan Industrial Policy Dialogue, and Science and Technology Agreement. Yet a comprehensive focus on clean energy is still missing from existing cooperation structures. The new Strategic Partnership Agreement and Free Trade Agreement currently under negotiation could be the game changers, opening a new era in EU-Japan relations. For Japan, there is a clear interest in learning from the EU experiences about the best policies to incentivise and scale up renewable energy deployment, and solutions to accommodate large quantities of clean energy sources into its market. Meanwhile, Japan emerges as an attractive clean energy market for European companies, including SMEs and large utilities, in particular thanks to efforts to deregulate and liberalise Japan’s energy market.
Japan could become a lead renewables market, but only if they move beyond nuclear power—their tech will get exported and reduce climate change globally as they get modeled.
Pollock 15 ~Simon Pollock (Australia-based climate change writer and journalist. In addition to working on international climate change policy in Australia, he was a member of the start-up team that launched Al Jazeera English Television from its Asia Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur in 2006. Simon’s interest in development and environmental issues stemmed from observation of how the two don’t always mix during six years in Beijing as a Kyodo News reporter). "Japan’s Narrowing Nuclear Path to a Low-Carbon Future." Our World, brought to you by United Nations University. October 20th, 2015. https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/japans-narrowing-nuclear-path-to-a-low-carbon-future~~ KB Izadi-Najafabadi said Japan will eventually follow Europe and the United States in promoting the escalated use of renewables, but this is likely to take time and will probably require Japan’s industrial leaders, rather than its politicians, to show the way. Japanese industry is actually further developed in supporting advances in renewable technology than many outside the country realize. While China has stolen the limelight in terms of its huge move during recent years into the renewable energy market, it is less known that Japan represented the world’s second biggest solar photovoltaic (PV) market in 2013. It accounted for 10 percent of the global total, compared to 13 percent for China. This entailed an impressive doubling of PV capacity in Japan from the previous year. Japan’s technical edge The Climate Group recently reported how cutting-edge Japanese solar technology was behind the recent opening of one of the world’s largest floating solar panel plants in central Hyogo prefecture. Japanese ceramics company Kyocera, which has expanded globally, developed the water-based technology to get around Japan’s lack of land space and to help provide the necessary cooling for a solar plant’s operations. Some believe Japan possesses the technical edge to make inroads into the renewable energy market. Though perhaps not in the rapidly aggressive fashion by which it made gains in the automotive industry in the 1980s, leading it to overtake the United States as number one automobile maker. Llewelyn Hughes, an Australian National University lecturer and Japanese market consultant, told me that because the cost of production in China is much lower, Japanese companies are not doing as well as they used to in the solar market. "This picture, however, can be misleading as some renewable production in China actually represents outsourcing from Japan," said Hughes. "There is still a strong potential for Japan to apply its technological prowess and engineering expertise in renewable technology. Japan could become a lead renewables technology market, and then export this technology to developing countries to help them leapfrog over the more carbon-intensive steps adopted by the developed countries." Hughes pointed to a collaborative arrangement between Japan’s Panasonic and Tesla, a firm based in California perhaps best known for its electric cars among its array of high-tech products. As part of the collaboration, Panasonic’s innovation is helping to drive progress in battery storage, the "holy grail of renewables", said Hughes. There are also signs afoot that Panasonic may be about make a more concerted push into the global solar market by supplying batteries for homes, beginning in Europe. "Japan could become a lead renewables technology market, and then export this technology to developing countries to help them leapfrog over the more carbon-intensive steps adopted by the developed countries," says Llewelyn Hughes, an Australian National University lecturer and Japanese market consultant. Japanese companies’ collaboration with firms in China and the US to pave innovative paths to low-carbon development — based on high-tech cooperation and market force competition — calls into question the ongoing focus of state-based efforts to reduce climate change. While diplomats pore over obscure but highly politicised texts to broach an international agreement, companies are using the flow of ideas across national boundaries to find entrepreneurial ways to tackle climate change. Individual breakthroughs on new and innovative ways to seek profits across borders may help generate step changes leading to a low-carbon world, as has been the case with the Steve Jobs-led burgeoning communication revolution of tablets and smartphones. It is likely, however, that the positioning of nation states will continue to dominate news headlines about climate change — and this is an area where Japan’s climate reputation will likely continue to suffer. Japan’s increased use of coal brought by the sudden removal of nuclear power from its energy mix has made it far more difficult for the country to achieve domestic reduction targets considered credible by other nations. The sudden, tragic and disruptive nature of the 2011 earthquake helps to garner sympathy for Japan’s challenges in reducing its domestic emissions. Such considerations are likely, however, to be quickly forgotten when considering Japan’s ongoing support of coal mining and combustion in other countries. Japan funds overseas coal use A report by a consortium of environmental groups released in June found that Japan is now the planet’s top public financier of overseas coal plants, technology and mining. The report found that Japan provided more than US$20 billion to coal projects in other countries between 2007 and 2014 — roughly a quarter of total international support for coal-fired power. During the same period, according to the report, Japan contributed about US$5 billion to coal mining projects around the world. Japan’s decision to continue funding coal mining and combustion overseas sits uncomfortably with the World Bank’s announcement in 2013 that it would stop financing coal projects, except in rare cases. Japan’s support for overseas coal plants in Indonesia (US$1 billion in loans) and India and Bangladesh (US$630 million) as climate finance loans has raised the most ire among environmentalists. The Japanese government has portrayed its support in pragmatic terms, arguing that some countries can only afford to use coal for their energy generation. In this view, Japan’s financial assistance means developing countries can build high-tech coal combustion plants that cause less pollution than those that would be built without such help. Japanese support "is a very practical and realistic and effective way to reduce carbon dioxide", the Associated Press newswire quoted Takako Ito, a foreign ministry spokeswoman, as saying. As rising powers such as China and Brazil move to wind down their coal use, new coal plants in Japan are likely to face increased business risks. This issue has set off deliberations within the United Nations (UN) Green Climate Fund, the main international body channelling aid funds to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change. The UN body’s current stance — where the use of climate finance to support coal plants is not explicitly banned — is likened by Karen Orenstein, a campaigner for Friends of the Earth US, to a "torture convention that doesn’t forbid torture". Japan’s support for advancing coal in developing countries is likely to remain a weak spot in Japan’s diplomatic armour, opening it up to continuing overseas criticism. The power of the market, though, may ultimately play the biggest role in weaning Japan from its current support for coal projects in developing countries. As rising powers such as China and Brazil move to wind down their coal use, new coal plants in Japan are likely to face increased business risks. Conversely, current low demand for coal may allow Japanese utilities to seek lower prices. However, in the longer term, Japan’s current investments in coal at home and abroad could well prove to be a losing bet. Predicting future global trends is rarely straightforward, but judging by the perennial air pollution and high percentage of emissions caused by coal, it is unlikely this fossil fuel will be the energy source of choice for current and rising powers. The government’s faith in nuclear power is understandable considering it has served the country well prior to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster. Fears about nuclear energy are, however, unlikely to dissipate quickly — especially in the only country that has borne the brunt of nuclear weapons. It seems then that the government’s current bet in putting renewables just below coal, and on a par with nuclear energy, threatens to push Japan out of a global growth curve leading to a low-carbon world based on renewable energy.
Global warming definitively causes extinction
Sharp and Kennedy 14 – (Associate Professor Robert (Bob) A. Sharp is the UAE National Defense College Associate Dean for Academic Programs and College Quality Assurance Advisor. He previously served as Assistant Professor of Strategic Security Studies at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) in the U.S. National Defense University (NDU), Washington D.C. and then as Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, collocated with NDU. Most recently at NESA, he focused on security sector reform in Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported regional security engagement events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Palestine and Qatar; Edward Kennedy is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets; 8/22/14, "Climate Change and Implications for National Security," International Policy Digest, http://intpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/)** Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. The release of this carbon – however – is changing our climate at such a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth. It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. The implications of climate change is the single most significant threat to life on earth and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We know of the complex set of interrelated national and global security risks that are a result of global warming and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. It has already led to an increase in natural disasters including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms. Climate change affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating. As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature regulation because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is less reflection of the sun’s light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. The planet has already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed. It is human intervention that has accelerated the pace dramatically: An increased surface temperature, coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems and will foster and support the spread of insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. Rising sea levels will increasingly threaten our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – half the planet – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries as mentioned, but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security. Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of those available resources. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the Pentagon titled: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) – Institute of Public Research – convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The team found that climate change was a serious threat to national security and that it was: "most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism." The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. Europe would experience some fracturing because of border migration. Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the United States. The Middle East would experience a "loss of food and water security (which) will increase pressure to emigrate across borders." Asia would suffer from "threats to water and the spread of infectious disease. " In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. In May 2014, CNA again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report concludes that climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now and the authors appeal to the security community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to integrate climate change across all strategy and planning. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because "time and tide wait for no man." The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: Actions by the United States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only if improvements in resilience are accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of the Pentagon’s alleged report describes a coming climate Armageddon which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. Whole countries rendered uninhabitable. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons. The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant human impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development, which will ultimately foster conflict. Climate change is the quintessential "Tragedy of the Commons," where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely global. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!
FW
The standard is maximizing expected pleasure First, Moral realism is true and pain/pleasure are the only intrinsic values GRAY 09 Gray, James W. "An Argument for Moral Realism." Ethical Realism. N.p., 07 Oct. 2009. Web. 04 Sept. 2015. https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2009/10/07/an-argument-for-moral-realism/. MA in philosophy from San Jose State University (2008) If we have evidence that anything in particular has intrinsic value, then we also have evidence that moral realism is true. Our experiences of pleasure and pain are probably the most powerful evidence of intrinsic value because such experiences are tied to our belief that they have intrinsic value. My argument that pain has intrinsic disvalue is basically the following: We experience that pain is bad. We experience that pain is important. The disvalue of pain is irreducible. The disvalue of pain is real. If pain is bad in the sense of being important, irreducible, and real, then pain has intrinsic disvalue. Therefore, pain has intrinsic disvalue. I am not certain that the premises are true, but I currently find good reasons for accepting them. Therefore, we have reason for accepting the conclusion. The conclusion could be read saying, "We have reason to believe that pain has intrinsic disvalue." If we accept that pain has intrinsic disvalue, then we will simultaneously accept moral realism.1 In order to examine the plausibility of my argument, I will examine each of the premises: We experience that pain is bad. We know pain is bad because of our experience of it. If someone described their pain as extremely wonderful, we would doubt they are feeling pain. Either the person is lying or doesn’t know what the word "pain" means. When a child decides not to touch fire because it causes pain, we understand the justification. It would be strange to ask the child, "So what? What’s wrong with pain?" We experience that pain is important. If pain is important in the relevant sense, then it can provide us reason to do something without merely helping us fulfill our desires. In other words, we must accept the following: The badness of pain isn’t just an instrumental value. The badness of pain is a final end. Pain’s badness isn’t an instrumental value – Pain’s disvalue is not an instrumental disvalue because pain can be quite useful to us. Pain can tell us when we are unhealthy or injured. We evolved pain because it’s essential to our survival. Pain’s bad for a different kind of reason. Pain’s disvalue is found in our negative experience, and this is why pain is a candidate for having an intrinsic disvalue. Whenever someone claims that something has intrinsic value, we need to make sure that it’s not just good because it’s instrumentally valuable. If it’s merely useful at bringing about something else, then it’s not good in and of itself (as intrinsic values are). Pain is perhaps the perfect example of something that is useful but bad. If usefulness was the only kind of value, then pain would actually be good because it helps us in many ways. Pain’s badness isn’t just our dislike of pain – We dislike pain because it feels bad.2 If pain didn’t feel bad, then we wouldn’t have such a strong desire to avoid intense pain. Pain means "feels bad" and it is manifested in various experiences, such as touching fire. We have to know the meaning of "bad" in order to understand pain at all. We attain an understanding of "bad" just by feeling pain. If pain was only bad because we dislike it, then we couldn’t say that "pain really matters." Instead, the badness of pain would just be a matter of taste. However, we don’t just say pain is bad because we dislike it. We also say pain is bad because of how it feels. Avoiding pain is a final end – A final end is a goal people recognize as being worthy of being sought after for its own sake. Money is not a final end because it is only valuable when used to do something else. Pleasure and pain-avoidance are final ends because they are taken t be worthy of being avoided for their own sake. We know that avoiding pain makes sense even when it doesn’t lead to anything else of value, so avoiding pain is a final end.3 If I want to take an aspirin, someone could ask, "Why did you do that?" I could answer, "I have a headache." This should be the end of the story. We understand that avoiding pain makes sense. It would be absurd for someone to continue to question me and say, "What difference does having a headache make? That’s not a good reason to take an aspirin!"4 Both realists and anti-realists can agree that pain is bad, and they can both agree that pain is a final end. Our desire to avoid pain is non-instrumental and such a desire is experienced as justified. (However, the ant-realist might argue that it is only taken to be justified because of human psychology.) If pain is a final end, then we understand (a) that pain is important and (b) it makes sense to say that we ought to avoid pain. Pain’s disvalue is irreducible. If the badness of pain was reducible to nonmoral properties, then we should be able to describe what "bad" means through a non-moral description. However, we currently have no way of understanding pain’s badness as being something else. We can’t describe pain’s badness in non-moral terms. If someone needs to know what " bad" means, they need to experience something bad. To say that some moral states are irreducible is just like saying that some mental states are irreducible. Pain itself can’t be described through a non-mental description. If we told people the mental states involved with pain, they would still not know what pain is because they need to know what it feels like. Someone could argue that "bad" means the same thing as something like "pain," and then we would find out that the badness of pain could be reduced to something else. However, pain and the badness of pain are conceptually separable. For example, I could find out that something else is bad other than pain. They could then reply that "bad" means the same thing as a disjunction of various other bad things, such as "pain or malicious intent." But people who disagree about what constitutes what is "bad" aren’t just arguing about the meaning of the word "bad." They are arguing about what has the property "bad."5 Additionally, the word "bad" would no longer have any importance. If "bad" just means "pain or malicious intent," then why care about it? Why ought I refrain from causing pain or having a malicious intent? It could be that we can find out that "bad" and "pain" are identical, but then "bad" might not be entirely reducible to "pain" (or a disjunction of bad things). We might still think that there are two legitimate descriptions at work. The "pain" description and the "bad" description. (Some people think water is H2O through an identity relation similar to this.) This sort of irreducible identity relation require us to deny that pain is "important." (If the identity theory did require us to deny that pain is "important," then we would have a good reason to reject such an identity theory.) I have given reason to think the word "bad" is irreducible, but I haven’t proven it. If someone could prove that pain isn’t important, and we can reduce pain to something else, then I will be proven wrong. I just don’t see any reason to agree with that position at this time. I discuss the badness of pain as irreducible in more detail in my essays "Objection to Moral Realism Part 1: Is/Ought Gap" and "Objections to Moral Realism Part 3: Argument from Queerness." The badness of pain is real. If the badness of pain is real, then everyone’s pain is bad. Pain isn’t bad just for me, but not for you. It states that we don’t all merely share a subjective preference in avoiding pain, but that pain’s badness is something worthy of being avoided and helping others avoid it. Why does it seem reasonable to believe pain’s badness to be real? There are at least four reasons. One, I experience that my pain hurts and I know that other people do as well. Two, it’s not just people’s subjective preferences in question. People hate pain because of how it feels. Three, people’s pain exists (and if pain exists, then the badness of the pain exists). Four, I see no reason to deny that the badness of other people’s pain exists. I will discuss this final consideration in more detail when I discuss anti-realist objections. We have no good reason to deny that pain is bad. We experience that pain is bad for ourselves, and other people experience that pain is bad for themselves as well. Even though pain is subjective, there is nothing delusional about our belief that pain is bad. It’s not just a personal like or a dislike. We don’t just agree to treat other people’s pain as important as part of a social contract. The belief that the badness of pain is real and "pain is bad no matter who experiences it" will be rejected by anti-realists. If I gave food to the hungry, it would be absurd to question why I did it. Imagine someone who disagrees with my action and says, "Other people’s pain is irrelevant. You should only try to avoid pain for yourself, so feeding the hungry is stupid." This person’s position is counterintuitive to the point of absurdity. We have all accepted that other people’s pain matters. It makes sense to feed the hungry, it makes sense to give to charity, and it makes sense to give someone an aspirin who has a headache. We don’t have to benefit from helping other people. To deny that "pain is bad no matter who experiences it" isn’t a position that many people can find acceptable. (I suppose some sociopaths might find it acceptable.) If pain is bad, important, irreducible, and real, then pain has intrinsic disvalue. I want to suggest this premise to be justified in virtue of the very meaning of intrinsic value. If pain is bad, important (worthy of being desired), irreducible, and real; then I think we have already established that pain has intrinsic disvalue by definition. We have established moral facts that could give us what we ought to do, such as, "We ought to avoid pain." Such an ought judgment is not merely based on my personal belief or desire; it’s based on the fact that pain is important no matter who experiences it. Conclusion: Pain has intrinsic disvalue If my premises are true, then the conclusion follows. I have given reason for accepting the premises, so we have some reason for accepting the conclusion, and the conclusion entails the truth of moral realism. I will take all of my premises to be sufficiently justified, but I will consider why someone might decide that the badness of pain "isn’t real." An anti-realist could attempt to deny that "pain is bad no matter who experiences it." The strongest evidence that badness is real is the fact that denying it seems to require unjustified philosophical commitments. I will attempt to show that the alternatives are less justified in the next section.
Second, physicalism is true- moral facts must be physical
PAPINEAU 09
Papineau, David, "Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/.==== In the middle of the nineteenth century the conservation of kinetic plus potential energy came to be accepted as a basic principle of physics (Elkana 1974). In itself this does not rule out distinct mental or vital forces, for there is no reason why such forces should not be ‘conservative’, operating in such a way as to compensate losses of kinetic energy by gains in potential energy and vice versa. (The term ‘nervous energy’ is a relic of the widespread late nineteenth-century assumption that mental processes store up a species of potential energy that is then released in action.) However, the conservation of energy does imply~s~ that any such special forces must be governed by strict deterministic laws: if mental or vital forces arose spontaneously, then there would be nothing to ensure that they never led to energy increases. During the course of the twentieth century received scientific opinion became even more restrictive about possible causes of physical effects, and came to reject sui generis mental or vital causes, even of a law-governed and predictable kind. Detailed physiological research, especially into nerve cells, gave no indication of any physical effects that cannot be explained ~by~ in terms of basic physical forces that also occur outside living bodies. By the middle of the twentieth century, belief in sui generis mental or vital forces had become a minority view. This led to the widespread acceptance of the doctrine now known as the ‘causal closure’ or the ‘causal completeness’ of the physical realm, according to which all physical effects can be accounted for by basic physical causes (where ‘physical’ can be understood as referring to some list of fundamental forces) non-physical causes of physical effects. As a result, the default philosophical view was a non-naturalist interactive pluralism which recognized a wide range of such non-physical influences, including spontaneous mental influences (or ‘determinations of the soul’ as they would then have been called). The nineteenth-century discovery of the conservation of energy continued to allow that sui generis non-physical forces can interact with the physical world, but required that they be governed by strict force laws. This gave rise to an initial wave of naturalist doctrines around the beginning of the twentieth century. Sui generis mental forces were still widely accepted, but an extensive philosophical debate about the significance of the conservation of energy led to a widespread recognition that any such mental forces would need to be law-governed and thus amenable to scientific investigation along with more familiar physical forces.~5~ By the middle of the twentieth century, the acceptance of the casual closure of the physical realm led to even stronger naturalist views. The causal closure thesis implies that any mental and biological causes must themselves be physically constituted, if they are to produce physical effects. It thus gives rise to a particularly strong form of ontological naturalism, namely the physicalist doctrine that any state that has physical effects must itself be physical. From the 1950s onwards, philosophers began to formulate arguments for ontological physicalism. Some of these arguments appealed explicitly to the causal closure of the physical realm (Feigl 1958, Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). In other cases, the reliance on causal closure lay below the surface. However, it is not hard to see that even in these latter cases the causal closure thesis played a crucial role. Thus, for example, consider J.J.C. Smart's (1958) thought that we should identify mental states with brain states, for otherwise those mental states would be "nomological danglers" which play no role in the explanation of behaviour. Or take David Lewis's (1966) and David Armstrong's (1968) argument that, since mental states are picked out by their causal roles, and since we know that physical states play these roles, mental states must be identical with those physical states. Again, consider Donald Davidson's (1970) argument that, since the only laws governing behaviour are those connecting behaviour with physical antecedents, mental events can only be causes of behaviour if they are identical with those physical antecedents. At first sight, it may not be obvious that these arguments require the causal closure thesis. But a moment's thought will show that none of these arguments would remain cogent if the closure thesis were not true, and that some physical effects (the movement of matter in arms, perhaps, or the firings of the motor neurones which instigate those movements) were not determined by prior physical causes at all, but by sui generis mental causes. Sometimes it is suggested that the indeterminism of modern quantum mechanics creates room for sui generis non-physical causes to influence the physical world. However, even if quantum mechanics implies that some physical effects are themselves undetermined, it provides no reason to doubt a quantum version of the causal closure thesis, to the effect that the chances of those effects are fully fixed by prior physical circumstances. And this alone is enough to rule out sui generis non-physical causes. For such sui generis causes, if they are to be genuinely efficiacious, must presumably make an independent difference to the chances of physical effects, and this in itself would be inconsistent with the quantum causal closure claim that such chances are already fixed by prior physical circumstances. Once more, it seems that anything that makes a difference to the physical realm must itself be physical. Even if it is agreed that anything with physical effects must in some sense be physical, there is plenty of room to debate exactly what ontologically naturalist doctrines follow. The causal closure thesis says that (the chance of) every physical effect is fixed by a fully physical prior history. So, to avoid an unacceptable proliferation of causes, any prima facie non-physical cause of a physical effect will need to be included in that physical history. But what exactly does this require? The contemporary literature offers a wide range of answers to this question. In part the issue hinges on the ontological status of causes. Some philosophers think of causes as particular events, considered in abstraction from any properties they may possess (Davidson 1980). Given this view of causation, a mental or other apparently non-physical cause will be the same as some physical cause as long as it is constituted by the same particular (or ‘token’) event. For example, a given feeling and a given brain event will count as the same cause as long as they are constituted by the same token event. However, it is widely agreed that this kind of ‘token identity’ on its own fails to ensure that prima facie non-physical causes can make any real difference to physical effects. To see why, note that token identity is a very weak doctrine: it does not imply any relationship at all between the properties involved in the physical and non-physical cause; it is enough that the same particular entity should possess both these properties. Compare the way in which an apple's shape and colour are both possessed by the same particular thing, namely that apple. It seems wrong to conclude on this account that the apple's colour causes what its shape causes. Similarly, it seems unwarranted to conclude that someone's feelings cause what that person's neuronal discharges cause, simply on the grounds that these are both aspects of the same particular event. This could be true, and yet the mental property of the event could be entirely irrelevant to any subsequent physical effects. Token identity on its own thus seems to leave it open that the mental and other prima facie non-physical properties are ‘epiphenomenal’, exerting no real influence on effects that are already fixed by physical processes (Honderich 1982, Yalowitz 2006 Section 6, Robb and Heil 2005 Section 5). These considerations argue that causation depends on properties as well as particulars. There are various accounts of causation that respect this requirement, the differences between which do not matter for present purposes. The important point is that, if mental and other prima facie non-physical causes are to be equated with physical causes, ~any~ non-physical properties must somehow be constituted by physical properties. If your anger is to cause what your brain state causes, the property of being angry cannot be ontologically independent of the relevant brain properties. So much is agreed by nearly all contemporary naturalists. At this point, however, consensus ends. One school holds that epiphenomenalism can only be avoided by type-identity, the strict identity of the relevant prima facie non-physical properties with physical properties. On the other side stand ‘non-reductive’ physicalists, who hold that the causal efficacy of non-physical properties will be respected as long as they are ‘realized by’ physical properties, even if they are not reductively identified with them. Type-identity is the most obvious way to ensure that non-physical and physical causes coincide: if exactly the same particulars and properties comprise a non-physical and a physical cause, the two causes will certainly themselves be fully identical. Still, type-identity is a very strong doctrine. Type identity about thoughts, for example, would imply that the property of thinking about the square root of two is identical with some physical property. And this seems highly implausible. Even if all human beings with this thought must be distinguished by some common physical property of their brains—which itself seems highly unlikely—there remains the argument that other life-forms, or intelligent androids, will also be able to think about the square root of two, even though their brains may share no significant physical properties with ours (cf. Bickle 2006). This ‘variable realization’ argument has led many philosophers to seek an alternative way of reconciling the efficacy of non-physical causes with the causal closure thesis, one which does not require the strict identity of non-physical and physical properties. The general idea of this ‘non-reductive physicalism’ is to allow that a given non-physical property can be ‘realized’ by different physical properties in different cases. There are various ways of filling out this idea. A common feature is the requirement that non-physical properties should metaphysically supervene on physical properties, in the sense that any two beings who share all physical properties will necessarily share the same non-physical properties, even though the physical properties which so realize the non-physical ones can be different in different beings. This arguably ensures that nothing more is required for any specific instantiation of a non-physical property than its physical realization—even God could not have created your brain states without thereby creating your feelings—yet avoids any reductive identification of non-physical properties with physical ones. (This is a rough sketch of the supervenience formulation of physicalism. For more see Stoljar 2001 Sections 2 and 3.) Some philosophers object that non-reductive physicalism does not in fact satisfy the original motivation for physicalism, since it fails to reconcile the efficacy of non-physical causes with the causal closure thesis (Kim 1993. Robb and Heil 2005 Section 6). According to non-reductive physicalism, prima facie non-physical properties are not type-identical with any strictly physical properties, even though they supervene on them. However, if causes are in some way property-involving, this then seems to imply that any prima facie non-physical cause will be distinct from any physical cause. Opponents of non-reductive physicalism object that this gives us an unacceptable proliferation of causes for the physical effects of non-physical causes—both the physical cause implied by the causal closure thesis and the distinct non-physical cause. In response, advocates of non-reductive physicalism respond that there is nothing wrong with such an apparent duplication of causes if it is also specified that the latter metaphysically supervene on the former. The issue here hinges on the acceptability of different kinds of overdetermination (Bennett 2003). All can agree that it would be absurd if the physical effects of non-physical causes always had two completely independent causes. This much was assumed by the original causal argument for physicalism, which reasoned that no sui generis non-physical state of affairs can cause some effect that already has a full physical cause. However, even if ‘strong overdetermination’ by two ontologically independent causes is so ruled out, this does not necessarily preclude ‘weak overdetermination’ by both a physical cause and a metaphysically supervenient non-physical cause. Advocates of non-reductive physicalism argue that this kind of overdetermination is benign, on the grounds that the two causes are not ontologically distinct—the non-physical cause isn't genuinely additional to the physical cause (nothing more is needed for your feelings than your brain states). There is room to query whether non-reductive physicalism amounts to a substantial form of naturalism. After all, the requirement that some category of properties metaphysically supervenes on physical properties is not a strong one. A very wide range of properties would seem intuitively to satisfy this requirement, including moral and aesthetic properties, along with any mental, biological, and social properties. (Can two physically identical things be different with respect to wickedness or beauty?) Supervenience on the physical realm is thus a far weaker requirement than that some property should enter into natural laws, say, or be analysable by the methods of the natural sciences. Indeed some philosophers are explicitly anti-naturalist about categories that they allow to supervene on the physical—we need only think of G.E. Moore on moral properties, or Donald Davidson and his followers on mental properties (Moore 1903, Davidson 1980). In response, those of naturalist sympathies are likely to point out that any viable response to the argument from causal closure will require more than metaphysical supervenience alone (Horgan 1993, Wilson 1999). Supervenience is at least necessary, if non-reductive physicalists are to avoid the absurdity of strong overdetermination. But something more than mere supervenience is arguably needed if non-reductive physicalists are to make good their claim that non-physical states cause the physical effects that their realizers cause. Metaphysical supervenience alone does not ensure this. (Suppose ricketiness, in a car, is defined as the property of having some loose part. Then ricketiness will supervene on physical properties. In a given car, it may be realized by a disconnected wire between ignition and starter motor. This disconnected wire will cause this car not to start. But it doesn't follow that this car's then not starting will be caused by its property of ricketiness. Most rickety cars start perfectly well.) So it looks as if the causal closure argument requires not only that non-physical properties metaphysically supervene on physical properties, but that they be natural in some stronger sense, so as to qualify as causes of those properties' effects. It is a much-discussed issue how this demand can be satisfied. Some philosophers seek to meet it by offering a further account of the nature of the relevant non-physical properties, for example, that they are second-order role properties whose presence is constituted by some first-order property with a specified causal role (Levin 2004). Others suggest that the crucial feature is how these properties feature in certain laws (Fodor 1974) or alternatively the degree of their explanatory relevance to physical effects (Yablo 1992). And reductive physicalists will insist that the demand can only be met by type-identifying prima-facie non-physical properties with physical properties after all.~6~ There is no agreed view on the requirements for prima facie non-physical properties to have physical effects. This difficult issue hinges, inter alia, on the nature of the causal relation itself, and it would take us too far afield to pursue it further here. For the purpose of this entry, we need only note that the causal closure argument seems to require that properties with physical effects must be ‘natural’ in some sense that is stronger than metaphysical supervenience on physical properties. Beyond that, we can leave it open exactly what this extra strength requires. Some philosophers hold that mental states escape the causal argument, on the grounds that mental states cause actions rather than any physical effects. Actions are not part of the subject matter of the physical sciences, and so a fortiori not the kinds of effects guaranteed to have physical causes by any casual closure thesis. So there is no reason, according to this line of thought, to suppose that the status of mental states as causes of actions is threatened by physics, nor therefore any reason to think that mental states must in some sense be realized by physical states (Hornsby 1997, Sturgeon 1998). The obvious problem with this line of argument is that actions aren't the only effects of mental states. On occasion mental states also cause unequivocally physical effects. Fast Eddie Felsen's desire to move a pool ball in a certain direction will characteristically have just that effect. And now the causal closure argument bites once more. The snooker ball's motion has a purely physical cause, by the causal closure thesis. This will pre-empt Fast Eddie's desire as a cause of that motion, unless that desire is in some sense physically realized (Balog 1999, Witmer 2000). Other philosophers have a different reason for saying that mental states, or more particularly conscious mental states, don't have physical effects. They think that there are strong independent arguments to show that conscious states can't possibly supervene metaphysically on physical states. Putting this together with the closure claim that physical effects always have physical causes, and abjuring the idea that the physical effects of conscious causes are strongly overdetermined by both a physical cause and an ontologically independent conscious cause, they conclude that conscious states must be ‘epiphenomenal’, lacking any power to causally influence the physical realm (Jackson 1981; 1985. See also Chalmers 1995).~7~ The rejection of physicalism about conscious properties certainly has the backing of intuition. (Don't zombies—beings who are physically exactly like humans but have no conscious life—seem intuitively possible?) However, whether this intuition can be parlayed into a sound argument is a highly controversial issue, and one that lies beyond the scope of this entry. A majority of contemporary philosophers probably hold that physicalism can resist these arguments. But a significant minority take the other side.~8~ If the majority are right, and physicalism about conscious states is not ruled out by independent arguments, then physicalism seems clearly preferable to epiphenomenalism. In itself, epiphenomenalism is not an attractive position. It requires us to suppose that conscious states, even though they are caused by processes in the physical world, have no effects on that world. This is a very odd kind of causal structure. Nature displays no other examples of such one-way causal intercourse between realms. By contrast, a physicalist naturalism about conscious states will integrate~s~ the mental realm with the causal unfolding of the spatiotemporal world in an entirely familiar way. Given this, general principles of theory choice would seem to argue strongly for physicalism over epiphenomenalism.~9~ If we focus on this last point, we may start wondering why the causal closure thesis is so important. If general principles of theory choice can justify physicalism, why bring in all the complications associated with causal closure? The answer is that causal closure is needed to rule out interactionist dualism. General principles of theory choice may dismiss epiphenomenalism in favour of physicalism, but they do not similarly discredit interactionist dualism. As the brief historical sketch earlier will have made clear, interactionist dualism offers a perfectly straightforward theoretical option requiring no commitment to any bizarre causal structures. Certainly the historical norm has been to regard it as the default account of the causal role of the mental realm.~10~ Given this, arguments from theoretical simplicity cut no ice against interactionist dualism. Rather, the case against interactionist dualism hinges crucially on the empirical thesis that all physical effects already have physical causes. It is specifically this claim that makes it difficult to see how dualist states can make a causal difference to the physical world. It is sometimes suggested that physicalism about the mind can be vindicated by an ‘inference to the best explanation’. The thought here is that there are many well-established synchronic correlations between mental states and brain states, and that physicalism is a ‘better explanation’ of these correlations than epiphenomenalism (Hill 1991, Hill and McLaughlin 1999). From the perspective outlined here, this starts the argument in the middle rather than the beginning, by simply assuming the relevant mind-brain correlations. This assumption of pervasive synchronic mind-brain correlations is only plausible if interactionist dualism has already been ruled out. After all, if we believed interactionist dualism, then we wouldn't think dualist mental states needed any help from synchronic neural correlates to produce physical effects. And it is implausible to suppose that we have direct empirical evidence, prior to the rejection of interactive dualism, for pervasive mind-brain correlations, given the paucity of any explicit examples of well-established neural correlates for specific mental states. Rather our rationale for believing in such correlations must be that the causal closure of the physical realm eliminates interactive dualism, whence we infer that mental states can only systematically precede physical effects if they are correlated with the physical causes of those effects. G.E. Moore's famous ‘open question’ argument is designed to show that moral facts cannot possibly be identical to natural facts. Suppose the natural properties of some situation are completely specified. It will always remain an open question, argued Moore, whether that situation is morally good or bad. (Moore 1903.) Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can~‘t~ have any knowledge of them.
Understanding the intrincacies of politics, the state, and the military is a PREREQUISITE to addressing oppression – means our ACADEMIC theorizing is methodologically valuable and a PREREQUISITE to the alternative Bryant 12 – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, "War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table," https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/) We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of "military logistics". We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target. What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say "this is horrible and unjust!" and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say "you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!" This misses the point that the entire point is to map the "supply lines" of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene. We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of "distribution". The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of "academese" which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both. I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you guys behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take. This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called "terraism". Terraism has three components: 1) "Cartography" or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) "Deconstruction" Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is "Terraformation". Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation
Extinction scenarios are key to genuine resistance to power- the state is inevitable but images of apocalypse are a useful tool for resistance
Schatz 12 ~JL, Binghamton U, "The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-‐Of-‐ The-‐World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism," The Journal of Ecocriticism: Vol 4, No 2 (2012)~ KB Any hesitancy to deploy images of apocalypse out of the risk of acting in a biopolitical manner ignores how any particular metaphor—apocalyptic or not—always risks getting co‐opted. It does not excuse inaction. Clearly hegemonic forces have already assumed control of determining environmental practices when one looks at the debates surrounding off—‐shore drilling, climate change, and biodiversity within the halls of Congress. "As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems … will go unsolved … only to fester more ominously into the future. … ~E~cological crisis … cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context … of internationalized markets, finance, and communications" (Boggs 774). If it weren’t for people such as Watson connecting things like whaling to the end of the world it wouldn’t get the needed coverage to enter into public discourse. It takes big news to make headlines and hold attention spans in the electronic age. Sometimes it even takes a reality TV show on Animal Planet. As Luke reminds us, "Those who dominate the world exploit their positions to their advantage by defining how the world is known. Unless they also face resistance, questioning, and challenge from those who are dominated, they certainly will remain the dominant forces" (2003: 413). Merely sitting back and theorizing over metaphorical deployments does a grave injustice to the gains activists are making on the ground. It also allows hegemonic institutions to continually define the debate over the environment by framing out any atftempt for significant change, whether it be radical or reformist. Only by jumping on every opportunity for resistance can ecocriticism have the hopes of combatting the current ecological reality. This means we must recognize that we cannot fully escape the master’s house since the surrounding environment always shapes any form of resistance. Therefore, we ought to act even if we may get co—opted. As Foucault himself reminds us, "instead of radial ruptures more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about~.~ … And it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships. It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power" (96—‐97). Here Foucault "asks us to think about resistance differently, as not anterior to power, but a component of it. If we take seriously these notions on the exercise and circulation of power, then we … open … up the field of possibility to talk about particular kinds of environmentalism" (Rutherford 296). This is not to say that all actions are resistant. Rather, the revolutionary actions that are truly resistant oftentimes appear mundane since it is more about altering the intelligibility that frames discussions around the environment than any specific policy change. Again, this is why people like Watson use one issue as a jumping off point to talk about wider politics of ecological awareness. Campaigns that look to the government or a single policy but for a moment, and then go on to challenge hegemonic interactions with the environment through other tactics, allows us to codify strategic points of resistance in numerous places at once. Again, this does not mean we must agree with every tactic. It does mean that even failed attempts are meaningful. For example, while PETA’s ad campaigns have drawn criticism for comparing factory farms to the Holocaust, and featuring naked women who’d rather go naked than wear fur, their importance extends beyond the ads alone6. By bringing the issues to the forefront they draw upon known metaphors and reframe the way people talk about animals despite their potentially anti—‐Semitic and misogynist underpinnings. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s theorization of the multitude serves as an excellent illustration of how utilizing the power of the master’s biopolitical tools can become powerful enough to deconstruct its house despite the risk of co—‐optation or backlash. For them, the multitude is defined by the growing global force of people around the world who are linked together by their common struggles without being formally organized in a hierarchal way. While Hardt and Negri mostly talk about the multitude in relation to global capitalism, their understanding of the commons and analysis of resistance is useful for any ecocritic. They explain, ~T~he multitude has matured to such an extent that it is becoming able, through its networks of communication and cooperation … ~and~ its production of the common, to sustain an alternative democratic society on its own. … Revolutionary politics must grasp, in the movement of the multitudes and through the accumulation of common and cooperative decisions, the moment of rupture … that can create a new world. In the face of the destructive state of exception of biopower, then, there is also a constituent state of exception of democratic biopolitics~,~ … creating … a new constitutive temporality. (357) Once one understands the world as interconnected—instead of constructed by different nation—‐states and single environments—conditions in one area of the globe couldn’t be conceptually severed from any other. In short, we’d all have a stake in the global commons. Ecocritics can then utilize biopolitics to shape discourse and fight against governmental biopower by waking people up to the pressing need to inaugurate a new future for there to be any future. Influencing other people through argument and end—‐of—‐the—‐world tactics is not the same biopower of the state so long as it doesn’t singularize itself but for temporary moments. Therefore, "it is not unreasonable to hope that in a biopolitical future (after the defeat of biopower) war will no longer be I’lpossible, and the intensity of the cooperation and communication among singularities … will destroy its ~very~ possibility" (Hardt and Negri 347). In The context of capitalism, when wealth fails to trickle down it would be seen as a problem for the top since it would stand testament to their failure to equitably distribute wealth. In the context of environmentalism, not—‐in—‐my—‐backyard reasoning that displaces ecological destruction elsewhere would be exposed for the failure that it is. There is no backyard that is not one’s own. Ultimately, images of planetary doom demonstrate how we are all interconnected and in doing so inaugurate a new world where multitudes, and not governments, guide the fate of the planet.
We need to embrace the state as a heuristic – passive activism fails
Zanotti 14, Dr. Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech. Her research and teaching include critical political theory as well as international organizations, UN peacekeeping, democratization and the role of NGOs in post-conflict governance."Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World" – Alternatives: Global, Local, Political – vol 38(4):p. 288-304,. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – The Stated "Version of Record" is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013. Obtained via Sage Database. By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ sromanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.’’84
Our discussions cannot be based on ideal theory—we must engage in policy discussions but policies mean nothing unless they change the values to the people they affect.
Curry 14 Dr. Tommy J. Curry The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century. 2014 Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In "Ideal Theory as Ideology," Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that "ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); ~s~ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, ~it is set~ against factual/descriptive issues."At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy "problem" by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one "necessarily has to abstract away from certain features" of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. This gap between what is actual(in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: "What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual," what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of "thought" is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our "theories" seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.
We must distance ourselves from traditional ethics and consider the oppressed—this includes the environment and how it affects minority groups.
Cone 7 July, 2007. JAMES H. CONE "Whose Earth Is It Anyway?" https://sojo.net/magazine/july-2007/whose-earth-it-anyway. RW. Do we have any reason to believe that the culture most respon- sible for the ecological crisis will also provide the moral and intellectual resources for the earths liberation? White ethicists and theologians ap- parently think so, since so much of their discourse about theology and the earth is just talk among themselves. But I have a deep suspicion about the theological and ethical values of white culture and religion. For five hun- dred years whites have acted as if they owned the world s resources and have forced people of color to accept their scientific and ethical values. People of color have studied dominant theologies and ethics because our physical and spiritual survival partly depended on it. Now that humanity has reached the possibility of extinction, one would think that a critical assessment of how we got to where we are would be the next step for sensitive and caring theologians of the earth. While there is some radical questioning along these lines, it has not been persistent or challenging enough to compel whites to look outside of their dominating culture for ethical and cultural resources for the earths salvation. One can still earn a doctorate degree in ethics and theology at American seminaries, even at Union Seminary in New York, and not seriously engage racism in this so- ciety and the world. If we save the planet and have a society of inequality, we wouldnt have saved much. According to Audre Lorde, "the master's tools will never dismantle the masters house."z4 They are too narrow and thus assume that people of color have nothing to say about race, gender, sexuality, and the earth - aH of which are interconnected. We need theologians and ethicists who are interested in mutual dialogue, honest conversation about justice for the earth and all of its inhabitants. We need whites who are eager to know something about the communities of people of color-our values, hopes, and dreams. .Whites know so little about om churches and communities that it is often too frustrating to even talk to them about anything that matters. Dialogue requires respect and knowledge of the other - their history, culture and religion. No one racial or national group has all the answers but all groups have something to contribute to the earth's healing. Many ecologists speak often of the need for humility and mutual dialogue. They tell us that we are all interrelated and interdependent, in- cluding human and otherkind. The earth is not a machine. It is an organism in which all things are a part of each other."Every entity in the universe," writes Catherine Keller, "can he described as a process of interconnection with every other being."25 If white ecologists really believe that, why do most still live in segregated communities? Why are their essays and books about the endangered earth so monological - that is, a conversation of a dominant group talking to itself? Why is there so much talk of love, humility, interrelatedness, and interdependence, and yet so little of these values reflected in white people's dealings with people of color?
Our Relation to the oppressed is the key for fixing destructive human behavior- just talking about immediate affects on minorities is never enough. We must also listen to their experiences and how they connect to their environments.
Cone 2 July, 2007. JAMES H. CONE "Whose Earth Is It Anyway?" https://sojo.net/magazine/july-2007/whose-earth-it-anyway. RW. The survival of the earth, therefore, is a moral issue for everybody. If we do not save the earth from destructive human behavior, no one will survive. That fact alone ought to be enough to inspire people of all colors to join hands in the fight for a just and sustainable planet. Eanding the Ecological Critique. We are indebted to ecologists in all fields and areas of human endeavor for sounding the alarm about the earth's distress. They have been so effective in raising ecological awareness that few people deny that our planet is in deep trouble. For the first time in history, humankind has the knowledge and power to destroy all life - either with a nuclear bang or a gradual poisoning of the land, air, and sea. Scientists have warned us of the dire consequences of what human beings are doing to the environment. Theologians and ethicists have raised the moral and religious issues. Grassroots activists in many com- munities are organizing to stop the killing of nature and its creatures. Politicians are paying attention to people's concern for a clean, safe envi- ronment. "It is not so much a question of whether the lion will one day lie down with the lamb," writes Alice Walker, "but whether human beings will ever be able to lie down with any creature or being at all."2o What is absent from much of the talk about the environment in First World countries is a truly radical critique of the culture most responsible for the ecological crisis. This is especially true among white ethicists and theologians in the U.S. In most of the essays and books I have read, there is hardly a hint that perhaps whites could learn something of how we got into this ecological mess from those who have been the victims of white world supremacy. White ethicists and theologians sometimes refer to the disproportionate impact of hazardous waste on blacks and other people of color in the U.S. and Third World and even cite an author or two, here and there throughout the development of their discourse on ecology. They often include a token black or Indian in anthologies on ecotheology ecojustice, and ecofeminism. It is "political correct" to dem- onstrate a knowledge of and concern for people of color in progressive theological circles. But people of color are not treated seriously that is, as if they have something essential to contribute to the conversation. Environmental justice concerns of poor people of color hardly ever merit serious attention, not to mention organized resistance. How can we cre- ate a genuinely mutual ecological dialogue between whites and people of color if one party acts as if they have all the power and knowledge? The Role of the Ballot is to affirm the best liberation strategy for the oppressed.
Contention 2- Environmental Racism
Nuclear power causes resource contamination which destroys minority communities and their environments—majority of mines and dumping sites are placed in communities of color Rozman 14: Izzati Rozman, 2014. ARGUMENTATIVE REPORT: SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT NUCLEAR POWER ENERGY BE BANNED GLOBALLY? https://www.academia.edu/10107346/. RW. The danger of uranium mining over the years deftly covers explicit issues which remain underneath the discussion partly because of the nature of the process itself and the precarious unease it bring upon the subject. The upshots of uranium mining blatantly destroys the livelihood of indigenous people, depleting precious potable water resources and bring hazardous effect towards human and environment. Firstly, whenever there is a talking about the uranium extraction, we have to bear in mind that about 70 per cent of the world's uranium reserves are located on lands owned by indigenous peoples. The acts of mining blatantly destroys the livelihood of indigenous people because of the obliteration of the village, pollution and contamination of the water source and deprivation of aborigine’s land and pastures. The government of Nigeria is among those proponents of the nuclear power’s advocates who granted 122 permits to foreign investors for the mining of uranium ore in Tuareg, one of the region in the country with the huge area that constitute the major northern part of the country with total disregard to the right of the people residing there (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2013). Those people reside nearby the uranium fields are also vulnerable to the threat of expropriation and deportation to other places like exactly happened in India in 1996. Supported by the local police force, the huts, barns and fields of people residing in Indian village of Chatijkocha are flattened without any warning by the company’s bulldozer to create additional space for the uranium mine (Ross, 2011). Secondly, the effect of uranium mining also depletes precious drinkable water sources. In order to separate the uranium from the ore, large amounts of water are needed during the process, yet many uranium mining areas suffer one common major setback, a water shortage problem (International Energy Association, 2005). The enormous water consumption of mining operations and uranium ore processing plants competes with the need of the people, livestock and agriculture that live nearby the mining plants. To illustrate the problem clearly, recent research conducted by the Namibian water utility or NamWater recently demonstrated that the country would be left with shortage of 54 million cubic metres of water annually, eleven times the resources available from the entire Omaruru river delta if the future projected proposal of uranium mines in Namibia were commissioned (Greenpeace, 2008). The third threats of uranium mining generally come from the contaminated sludge that potentially brings hazardous effect to people and environment. An exactly of 0.2 per cent of uranium proportion are needed to produce 998 kilograms of contaminated sludge which later likely to be deposited in hollows and artificial lakes (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2013). The dangerous tailing of the ore which contain 85 per cent of the initial radioactivity and other toxic substances such as arsenic bordering on contaminating both air and groundwater for thousands of years. To make it worse, any slight chance of dam failure or landslide would commence the biggest disastrous consequences that might affect all. The similar phenomenon happen on the tailings pond of the Atlas Mine in Moab, Utah, United States in which toxic and radioactive substances have been already leaking freely into the groundwater for about a decade already. This polluted groundwater then migrates into the nearby Colorado River, which provides drinking water to 18 million people. According to the United Nations, the radioactive dust of a dried-up tailing reservoir in Khazhastan poses a threat to Aktau, a city with 150,000 inhabitants and there are countless uranium sludge disposal sites located in narrow valleys in Kyrgyzstan as well that can potentially cause an international disaster to the human health (Maclellan, 2014).
Nuclear Energy dumps there because they profit from and reinforce racism globally. Prohibition takes a stance against that profit cycle.
South Africa is not alone, however. Conflicts over uranium mining, waste, and nuclear energy development have emerged across the Global South, including recently in Niger and South Asia. Jim Green of Friends of the Earth Australia noted that Australian aboriginal communities have resisted radioactive waste dumping on their lands in violation of their sovereignty and human rights. Globally, he said, "the nuclear industry profits from and reinforces racism. Backed by its political partners, the industry forces uranium mines, nuclear reactors, radioactive waste dumps and weapons tests on to the land of indigenous peoples." Although the specter of nuclear weaponry still looms in debates on North Korea and Iran, the core of today's nuclear crisis lies in the gears of global capitalism. After a long chill following the disasters in Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, governments have in recent years responded to climate change issues by rebranding nuclear as a fossil fuel alternative. We don't know if the fallout from Fukushima will brake the industry's renewed momentum in the U.S., but as long as truly clean energy sources like wind and solar remain starved of investment—and the public memory of past meltdowns fade—the temptations of nuclear power may continue to eclipse fears of its global consequences. Richard Falk, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, commented in Al Jazaeera on the link between the Cold War lust for nuclear weapons and the harnessing of nuclear power for "civilian" energy exploitation. To understand the lessons of Fukushima, he wrote: ~W~e must take account of the incredible Faustian bargain sold to the non-nuclear world: give up a nuclear weapons option and in exchange get an unlimited ''pass'' to the ''benefits'' of nuclear energy... And we know that governments will be under great pressure to renew the Faustian bargain despite what should have been clear from the moment the bombs fell in 1945: This technology is far too unforgiving and lethal to be managed safely over time by human institutions, even if they were operated responsibly, which they are not. If safety in the nuclear age can't be guaranteed for all, the industry and its friends in government can always try a more efficient method of managing risk: confine the danger
The Uranium Mining and purification process is uniquely terrible- bad mining conditions, unstable transport, and uranium floating in mills substantially increased the probability of radioactive inhalations.
Quandelacy 10: Talia Quandelacy Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health "NUCLEAR RACISM: URANIUM MINING ON THE LAGUNA AND NAvAjO RESERvATIONS" TuftScope 2010 http://s3.amazonaws.com/tuftscope'articles/documents/52/6.0'Nuclear'Racism'Uranium'Mining'on'the'Laguna.pdf The mining process extracted the ore from under- ground and open mines. Both open and underground mining required the use of explosives to loosen the ore from the earth; explosives were used to create shafts and "ball- rooms" for the underground mines and to clear away large debris and chunks of land for the open mines. At the Jack- pile site on the Laguna reservation, blasting was required three times a day for each type of mining.6 For both the open and underground mines, explosions occurred every eight hours. Blasts were periodic throughout the day and the workers were constantly entering into recently blasted areas to collect pieces of ore. One worker recalls, "When they did the blasting, they inhaled the smoke and dust...I fainted twice and they had to drag me out."4 The condi- tions around the explosions weres very dangerous above ground, but were far worse in the underground mines. Conditions inside of the mines were atrocious. Ventilation was poor and dust from the explosions was always present in the air. Those who worked underground were subjected to dimly lit tunnels: "It was not until 1963 that he ~Wilson Benally~ was given one of those masks...He was also given a helmet with a lamp. Before that, he used lamps that provided light from a slow-burning powder."4 Many, if not all, of the workers were not informed of the health hazards from working in the mines and around the milling facilities. In the mines, few workers wore masks to sprotect their air passageways and ended up inhaling the dust: "The dust stayed in the air a long time...you could smell the gunpowder. When you blew your nose, it was yellow dust."4 Many other dangers existed in the mines. There was a constant danger of debris falling from the ceil- ings and hitting the miners: "When he ~Dan Benally~ was in the mines, the rocks collapsed on him. One of the rocks tore the skin off his side and stomach, too. They had to do a skin graft. He lost part of his eyesight."4 The underground workers worked some of the lon- gest shifts, most often from seven in the morning to eight at night and were kept underground for the entire duration, except for an hour break for lunch.6 It was necessary to keep the uranium mines open constantly to nd as much ore as possible. Driving the pieces of uranium-ore from the mines to mills was also dangerous. The combination of poorly made roads and the poor conditions of the trucks made it very likely for accidents to occur. The trucks had no start- ers or brakes, and the workers had to start-roll them.4 The roads that connected the mines to the milling facilities were poorly made, and were often very rugged and bumpy. Some workers were paralyzed when the trucks ipped over and crushed drivers.4 Once at the mills the process was no so safer. The ore went through a re ning process once it was transported to the milling facilities. The milling separated the ura- nium-ore from other minerals and rocks. Giant grinders and crushing belts were used to break down the ore into a ner substance.6 The ground ore substance was bathed in sulfuric acid, which separated out the uranium. The end product of the milling process called yellowcake is ura- nium oxide (U3O8), a yellow-colored powder.2 Yellowcake was the beginning process of enriching the uranium to the desired uranium isotope, U235. In the mills, loading the ore onto the crushing belts was dangerous because workers had to manually shovel ore. Sometimes the shovels would get caught in the belts that exerted such force, that workers would be dragged into the belts themselves. Many workers lost arms as a result of this.6 The air in the mills was toxic, with powdery uranium everywhere in the buildings. When the workers had to clean up the dust, they only had dust scrubbers and vacuums, and without masks, often inhaled much of the dust: "We worked with acids, ammonia...this was all dusty. There were fumes in there. It really stunk. There was no ventilation. This was a danger, but no one ever told us at the time."4
After the process, waste dumping was also racist.
Alldred et al 9: Mary Alldred and Kristin Shrader-Frechette Doctoral student Alldred is in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, in Stony Brook, New York. Dr. Shrader-Frechette is O’Neill Fam- ily Endowed Professor, Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy, and Director of the Center for Envi- ronmental Justice and Children’s Health, all at the University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana. "Environmental Injustice in Siting Nuclear Plants" ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE Volume 2, Number 2, 2009 US nuclear-waste policies in stages (8)–(9), radioactive waste transport/storage, likewise have already caused EIJ (as serious contamination at Hanford, Maxey Flats, Sa- vannah River, and other cases have shown), and EIJ also is likely when future waste-containment canisters fail— long before the million years that (the US National Acad- emy of Sciences says) nuclear wastes must be completely secured.22 Because the US government has falsified and manipulated data on radioactive-waste risk22,23,24 (much of which will be borne by Appalachian, Latino, and Na- tive-American populations, who live in higher propor- tions near existing and proposed nuclear-waste-storage sites),3 United Nations and nuclear-industry studies warn that the US government may underestimate future waste- repository-radiation doses by 9–12 orders of magnitude.25 Yet even if proposed future US nuclear-waste standards are met, their leniency likely will impose EIJ on future generations. After 10,000 years, they would allow expo- sures of 100 millirems/year (limits 1,000 percent higher than current standards for US Department of Energy fa- cilities). They also use only mean or average dose to as- sess regulatory compliance. This means that, provided that the average person’s exposure is no more than 100 millirems, many other people would be allowed to receive higher, even fatal, doses.8,26
Thus, the Plan Text: The United States federal government ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power through decommissioning of all current nuclear facilities—the plan will be issued through four steps
Decommissioning is the responsibility of the operator of a nuclear facility. The NRA defines the decommissioning of NPPs in Japan by the following four activities: Dismantling of the relevant reactor ~includes~ (1), transfer of nuclear fuel (2), removal of irradiated material (3), and the disposal of radioactive waste (4)19. Within these boundaries, nuclear operators can design their own decommissioning strategies. The 1currently preferred approach for commercial NPPsin Japan combines immediate dismantling with deferred dismantling. Immediate dismantling is a strategy where dismantling begins immediately after the approval of the project, whereas in deferred dismantling, the reactor is first placed in safe storage for a number of years to reduce the radioactive inventory. The operators of commercial power reactors in Japan have opted for such safe storage periods, but the dismantling of secondary facilities will begin as soon as possible. Like the decommissioning strategies of many other countries, the basic decommissioning strategy in Japan consists of sequential stages: Site preparation (including site characterisation, defueling and decontamination), safe storage, and deconstruction and dismantling (DandD) (see Figure 1). Waste management and disposal is also a part of the decommissioning process. The basic strategy envisions this as only becoming an issue during the DandD stage, but in practice waste from decommissioning also needs to be handled at earlier stages. While this is acknowledged in the individual decommissioning plans for Japanese reactors, lingering problems with waste management have led to delays in some ongoing decommissioning projects (see the description of the individual decommissioning projects in Part II and the discussion of waste management later in this chapter). The newest decommissioning plans also show a tendency for more prolonged safe storage periods.¶ In the first stage of the decommissioning project, the fuel in the reactor core and the spent fuel¶ pool (SFP) is retrieved and transported to either a temporary storage site21 or a reprocessing¶ plant22¶ . After a survey and characterisation of the radioactive inventory of the facility, systems¶ and facilities are decontaminated to reduce the radioactive dose rates in the work spaces and to¶ prepare the site for dismantling. In the second stage, the reactor core is placed in safe storage, during which basic safety, monitoring and cooling systems are maintained. This stage is meant to reduce the radioactive inventory in the reactor through natural decay processes. The duration of this phase is usually around 10 years for physicochemical reasons, but a certain period of relative inactivity in the decommissioning process might also be necessary for some utilities to recover the financial losses from the premature or long-term shut-down of the reactor after the Fukushima accidents (see part I.6). The dismantling of non-essential and redundant systems and speripheral facilities also begins at this point. The safe storage stage is followed by the DandD stage. During this phase, again in a number of sequential steps, the various components of the reactor are dismantled. This stage sees the highest demand for specialised equipment, particularly during the dismantling of the highly radioactive reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and its internals, where remote-controlled, submersible equipment is required for safety reasons. After the reactor has been dismantled, the reactor building and the remaining facilities are dismantled. Large quantities of waste, both radioactive and non-radioactive (see section I.4), are generated in this stage. The Japanese strategy envisions the implementation of strategies to reduce the amount of waste, through means such as a clearance system and the recycling of non-radioactive waste. At the end of the decommissioning process an application for verification of completion is submitted to the NRA, which then assesses the final state of the site. If the measurable radioactive dose rates are within the legal limits and all targets of the decommissioning plan have been reached, the NRA formally terminates the licence of the operator and releases the site from regulatory control. The site of the former reactor can then be reused for new purposes. The current plan is to build new reactors on the sites of decommissioned reactors, due to difficulties in acquiring sites for new reactors and an expected unwillingness of the local population to develop the land of the former NPP for agricultural or residential purposes23. However, in light of strengthened safety regulations, stricter licensing criteria and growing opposition to the operation of NPPs in the surrounding communities and local governments, it is not yet known if this strategy will be economically and politically feasible.
Environmental racism is a continuation of the legacy of slavery, and institutionalizes other forms of oppression.
Bullard 7: Joseph Bullard ~Director of the Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University~, "POVERTY, POLLUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING HEALTHY AND SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES" March 1, 2007. http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:S0SkCJTUZKoJ:www.ejrc.cau.edu/PovpolEj.html+environmental+racism+impactandhl=enandct=clnkandcd=1andgl=us)==== People of color around the world must contend with dirty air and drinking water, and the location of noxious facilities such as municipal landfills, incinerators, hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities owned by private industry, ~and~ government, and even the military.~3~ These environmental problems are exacerbated by racism. Environmental racism refers to environmental policy, practice, or directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities based on race or color. Environmental racism is reinforced by government, legal, economic, political, and military institutions. Environmental racism combines with public policies and industry practices to provide benefits for the countries in the North while shifting costs to countries in the South. ~4~ Environmental racism ~it~ is a form of institutionalized discrimination. Institutional discrimination is defined as "actions or practices carried out by members of dominant (racial or ethnic) groups that have differential and negative impact on members of subordinate (racial and ethnic) groups." ~5~ The United States is grounded in white racism. The nation was founded on the principles of "free land" (stolen from Native Americans and Mexicans), "free labor" (African slaves brought to this land in chains), and "free men" (only white men with property had the right to vote). From the outset, racism shaped the economic, political and ecological landscape of this new nation. Environmental racism buttressed the exploitation of land, people, and the natural environment. It operates as an intra-nation power arrangement—especially where ethnic or racial groups form a political and or numerical minority. For example, blacks in the U.S. form both a political and numerical racial minority. On the other hand, blacks in South Africa, under apartheid, constituted a political minority and numerical majority. American and South African apartheid had devastating environmental impacts on blacks.
Disregard for native land justifies their disposability—only the aff recognizes the value of minority communities Green 7 ~Jim; "RADIOACTIVE RACISM IN AUSTRALIA"; Jim Green Friends of the Earth; Australia; February 2007; http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/racism. Accessed August 8 2016~ ~Premier~ In "Fallout – Hedley Marston and the British Bomb Tests in Australia" (Wakefield Press, 2001, p.32), Dr. Roger Cross writes: "Little mention was made of course about the effects the bomb tests might have on the Indigenous Australian inhabitants of the Maralinga area, a community that had experienced little contact with white Australia. In 1985 the McClelland Royal Commission would report how Alan Butement, Chief Scientist for the Department of Supply wrote to the native patrol officer for the area, rebuking him for the concerns he had expressed about the situation and chastising him for "apparently placing the affairs of a handful of natives above those of the British Commonwealth of Nations". When a member of staff at Hedley Marston's division queried the British Scientist Scott Russell on the fate of the Aborigines at Maralinga, the response was that they were a dying race and therefore dispensable." Ernest Titterton, a leading member of the so-called Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee and the main apologist for the British tests, told a 1984 hearing of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia that if the Aborigines objected to the tests, they could have voted the government out. Yet Aboriginal people did not gain voting rights until 1967. And they accounted for a very small minority of the Australian population.
The invention of nuclear power was the invention of the meltdown—nuclear accidents have caused massive amounts of death and destruction, yet they can never be avoided so long as nuclear power is produced
Nuclear Power Stations are Prohibitively Dangerous. There have now been four grave nuclear reactor accidents: Windscale in Britain in 1957 (the one that is never mentioned), Three Mile Island in the United States in 1979, Chernobyl in the Soviet Union in 1986 and now Fukushima. Each accident was unique, and each was supposed to have been impossible. A recent book, Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment, concludes that, based on records now available, some 985,000 people died between 1986 and 2004, mainly of cancer, as a result of the Chernobyl accident. Alice Slater, New York representative of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, comments: "The tragic news uncovered by comprehensive new research that almost one million people died in the toxic aftermath of Chernobyl should be a wake-up call to people all over the world to petition their governments to put a halt to the current industry-driven 'nuclear renaissance.' Aided by a corrupt IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), the world has been subjected to a massive coverup and deception about the true damages caused by Chernobyl." At Fukushima we have the worst industrial disaster ever. Three simultaneous ongoing complete meltdowns have proven impossible to stop or contain since they started almost two years ago. These meltdowns are still pouring radiation pollution across the Japanese landscape. International experts (e.g. Charles Perrow in Normal Accidents) agree that there will continue to be disastrous failures at nuclear power stations, and that this cannot be avoided. As Edward Teller, the great nuclear physicist, said, "If you ~try to~ construct something foolproof, there will always be a fool greater than the proof."
Progress and disaster are two sides of the same coin—accidents are inherent to the technological speed which underlies nuclear power plants
The gradual spread of catastrophic events considerably affects the reality of the moment and it causes anxiety and anguish for generations to come. Unexpected and catastrophic events, all accidents, from the most banal to the most tragic, from natural catastrophes to industrial and scientific disasters, make people powerless. As Aristotle said, the accident reveals the substance. If this statement is true, then invention of the substance is equally invention of the accident. The air crash is consequently the futurist invention of the supersonic airliner, just as the Chernobyl meltdown is the invention of the nuclear power station. When we take a look at recent history, the 20th century was the century of great exploits; some of the most significant ones are for example the moon landing, great discoveries in physics and chemistry, or computer science and genetics. However, the 21th century, in turn, reaps the harvest of this hidden production constituted by different disasters. The 20th century did in fact swamp us with mass-producted accidents one after the other. According to Valèry’s postulate, If consciousness only survives now as awareness of accidents, and if nothing functions except outside consciousness, the loss of consciousness about accidents as well as major disasters would not only amount to unconsciousness but to madness—the madness of deliberate blindness to ~ignorance of~ the fatal consequences of our actions and our inventions. (Virilio 2007, 6) In contrast to the natural accident, the artificial accident results from the innovation of a motor or of some substantial material. If the substance is absolute and essential to science and if the accident is relative and contingent, we can identify the substance at the beginning of specific fields of knowledge and the accident at the end of the philosophical intuition. "Creation or collapse, the accident is an unconscious oeuvre, an invention in the sense of uncovering what was hidden, just waiting to happen" (Virilio 2007, 9). Accident is inseparable from the speed (Armitage 2000, 38). Virtual speed of unexpected and catastrophic events should be studied instead of the actual speed of objects. As we try to protect ourselves from excess in real speed by means of breaks and automated safety systems, we have to try to protect ourselves from excess in virtual speed, from what unexpectedly happens to substance—meaning to what lies beneath engineer’s awareness as producer. In Aristotle’s Physics, it is indeed the passage of time, in other words, the speed which destroys and achieves the ruin of all things, and every substance becomes a victim of the accident in the traffic circulation of time. The production of accidents is connected with the sudden militarization of the sciences, most notably, the fatal invention of weapons of mass destruction and a thermonuclear bomb capable of extinguishing all life on the planet. The visible speed of the substance (that of the means of transport, of computing, of information) is only the tip of the iceberg of the invisible speed of the accident. The speed, with which accidents surge up, plunges humankind into mourning and powerlessness. We have to try as fast as possible to define the flagrant nature of disasters peculiar to new technologies. According to Hannah Arendt: "Progress and disaster are two sides of the same coin" (Virilio 2007, 15). Lately, the accident argument has become one of the mass media’s pet themes, the confusion between sabotage and breakdown on the one hand and between the suicide bombing mission and the industrial or other accident on the other hand. Since the start of the 20th century up to the present day, we can see the increase in the number of catastrophes. Artificial accidents have outstripped natural accidents. Suddenly, an accident is no longer unexpected event. It turns into a rumour. One of the cases of catastrophic events is one which emerges in terrorist dimension. There is the confusion between the genuine accident occurring unexpectedly to a substance and the strategy of a malicious act. Whence the gravity of the New York attack, which calls into question not only the United States’s status as a sanctuary, but also the boom in the major airlines and the liberalization of tourist flows, to say nothing of the catastrophic impact of the collapse of the Twin Towers on the comprehensive insurance market. (Virilio 2007, 16)
The Aristotelian notion that substance can be separated from its accidental qualities is bankrupt at its core—every technology produces accidents, which are necessitated by the rational imperatives of progress—we must expose the accident and challenge the teleology at the heart of technological imperatives
Crogan 99 Patrick Crogan. "The Tendency, the Accident, and the Untimely: Paul Virilio’s Engagement with the Future," Paul Virilio: From Modernism to Hypermodernism and Beyond, ed. John Armitage. Article from Theory, Culture and Society, 1999. Google Books, pp. 171-173.
Virilio recasts the relation between what is considered essential and what peripheral to technological ‘advance’ by punning on the buried relationship between the classical, philosophical notion of accident as an ‘inessential’ attribute or quality of a thing and the everyday sense of the term accident as an unexpected mishap. In doing so Virilio proposes not just to remove the censorship of positivism by acknowledging the ‘specific accident’ of a given technology. Instead he calls for a rethinking of technological development so as to address the substance/accident ‘inversion’ through which the accident is not only a regrettable contingency but becomes something ‘every technology produces, provokes, programs’. This is why war and military developments are so crucial for Virilio. ‘What are war machines?’, Virilio asks in an interview with Chris Dercon: ‘They are machines in reverse—they produce accidents’ (Dercon, 1986:36). This explains to a significant extent Virilio’s focus on theorizing war as a central aspect of modernity. War not only provides a major impetus for the development of new technologies of speed—it is, he says in the same text, the ‘laboratory of modernity’ (1986:36). The war machine, in its reversal of the commonsense notion that machinery is essentially productive, promotes this ‘negative side of technology’ which Virilio argues is a central aspect of all technologies. This negative side, he says in another interview (with Florian Rotzer), is always there, doubling the side of ‘productive reason’ (Rotzer, 1995: 100). In privileging the accident over the substance Virilio sees himself as a theorist of this hidden negativity, correcting, he says, the Western metaphysical tradition’s denial of ‘military intelligence’: ‘When Aristotle says there is no science of the accidental, he puts into motion the process of denying the negative’ (1995: 100). Virilio provides further insight into his privileging of the accident in ‘La Musee de l’accident’ (in Virilio, 1996). Taking the occasion of the opening of a museum of technology at the Parc de la Villette in Paris, he repeats his assertion of the ‘symmetry between the substance and the accident’ and speculates on the need for and the possible design of a ‘museum of accidents’ to counter the positivism of conventional museological practices (1996: 110). Describing the approach of such a museum as ‘postpositivist’, he argues that its goal—to ‘expose the accident’—would be to ‘expose the unlikely, the unusual yet inevitable’ (1996: 112). This would serve to expose to ‘us’ ‘that to which we are habitually exposed’ as a form of protection from it. To achieve this ‘preventative perspective’ the museum would need to comprehend the accident as: "…no longer identifiable simply with its deadly consequences, its actual results: ruins and scattered debris, but also with a dynamic and energetic process, a kinetic and cinematic sequence not bound to the relics of all kinds of destroyed objects and rubble." (1996: 114) This ‘kinetic and cinematic sequence’ is the inverse of the positivist conception of the dynamic process of historical progress. It is the double of progress in that it borrows the ‘progressive’ assumptions of linear temporality and teleological inevitability, as well as the notion that a visible image of the movement of progress is discernible across the passage of time. The revealing of this sequence that Virilio identifies with the accident would challenge the habitual understanding of the connection between historical and technical developments by ‘showing the advent of something in what seems to happen unexpectedly’ (1996: 115). What Virilio’s ‘meta-museography’ of the imaginary museum of accidents to is a characterization, in a typically rapid, evocative form, of his theoretical project. The kinetic sequence of the unexpected that doubles the narrative of historical/technological progress is another description, I would suggest, of the tendency. As seen in the relation between the ‘technical surprise’ of the First World War and the logistical tendency toward pure war, the accident plays a central role in the ‘vector-ization’ of the tendential sequence. Indeed, it is the ‘substance’ of the tendency’s change of level, the motor of its unexpected detouring of the rational course of progress. Virilio’s writing attempts to sketch out the tendency through a description of the accidents of technological (post)modernity. These descriptions are in effect critical reinscriptions of these adventitious yet somehow constitutive mishaps of techno-science. The tendency is, therefore, accidental—it arises and gains momentum in and through these unforeseen detours of techno-scientific ‘advances’ in civilization. But these unexpected events are, paradoxically, ‘substantial’; they link up to form the dynamic sequence that perturbs the march of forward progress by doubling and disfiguring its teleology. The tendency is made up of these enigmatic accidents that Virilio says ‘every technology produces, provokes, programs’.
Politics and the accident have become inseparable—the will to amass techno-scientific knowledge is self-defeating because it produces its own destruction
This example is just one among many. People confronted by this chain of media events, each one more catastrophic than the last, should ask question about the dramatization that has been taking place since the beginning of the 21th century. "With television, which allows hundreds of millions of people to see the same event at the same moment in time, we are finally living through the same kind of dramatic performance as at the theatre in days not long gone" (Virilio 2007, 19-20). The next example is from the field of politics. Nowadays, there is no difference between politics and show business anymore. It is the performance that persuades people that the candidate is sincere. If inventing the substance means indirectly inventing the accident, then, the more powerful and high-performance the invention is, the more dramatic the accident is. This statement was evidently confirmed for people throughout the 20th century with the invention of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons that are ultimately unusable. The accident presents in this case the panicstoking uselessness of this type of weaponry. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote in his book, The Birth of Tragedy: "A culture built on science must necessarily perish when it starts to become illogical, that is, to recoil before its own consequences. Our Art reflects this general crisis" (Virilio 2007, 32). The sudden militarization of science is considered to be necessary to the presumed victory in war. Human power then transforms itself into a cause of ruin, toppling the nations into destruction. This progress in knowledge, from progress in genetics and computer science to the atomic progress, of which Chernobyl is in the wake of Hiroshima, has revealed to us the atrocious truth. This statement perfectly sums up the paradox of the 20th century: "Today, at the very dawn of the 21th century, when much-vaunted globalization is nothing if not the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge—in other words, of the so-called information revolution—the exterminator takes over from the predator, just as terrorism takes over from the orifinal capitalism" (Virilio 2007, 33). Extermination becomes the illogical outcome of accumulation. In fact, we can say that this is the accident in knowledge that now rounds off the accident in substances deriving from technoscientific research. If matter has three dimensions, mass, energy, and information, then, after the series of accidents in materials and energy over the past century, the accident is upon us. We should ask ourselves these three questions: Should science reassure? On the contrary, should science frighten? Is science inhuman? Scientific and technical knowledge has many outcomes—radioactive fallout from Chernobyl, genetically modified organisms, reproductive human cloning following on from animal cloning, and this list goes on. "The accident in knowledge is impressive not so much in terms of the number of victims but in the very nature of the risk run" (Virilio 2007, 36). Nowadays, there are many threats to human life such as medically assisted procreation, the right to assisted death and euthanasia, not to mention biological weapons.
As technology and politics are inseparable, deliberative democracy has become undermined by technological speed—the public is largely excluded from important decisions about technology—this makes totalitarianism and the dehumanization of billions inevitable
Adams 3 Jason Adams (B.A., Evergreen State College). "Popular Defense in the Empire of Speed: Paul Virilio and the Phenomenology of the Political Body." Thesis submitted for a Masters in Political Science, Simon Fraser University. 2003.
Just as we have seen with his critique of the epistemology of science, so too does Virilio reject the ideology of objectivity in regard to technology, pointing out that far from being the product of equal input from all sectors of society, much less without value altogether, it too is always developed for someone and for some purpose, namely that of the military, the media, the state and other centers of power. It is through the convergence of these critiques that he develops his theory of technocracy as the totalitarian replacement of participatory politics in our time, which he says has come about because the instrumentalism that was born with what we call ‘technology’ has exceeded the machinic bounds of the term to encompass ever greater sectors of society, with the result that today it necessarily includes any standardized complex of procedures that transform nature, animals or humans into a means to an end, such that reflective and deliberatory decision-making are replaced, as seen for example in the way in which both the machinic technology of the nuclear bomb and the economic technology of neoliberalism involve the transformation of billions of living beings into either hostages or consumers rather than political actors in their own right. Thus, politics and technology can no longer be separated in a time when the latter forms the very framework within which the former takes place, to such an extent in fact, that deliberation is often subsumed by technique altogether; as John Street has argued, this occurs because "technology encompasses not just nuclear power stations and computers. It extends, for example, to hedgerows, trees and walls. The row of trees outside the American Embassy in London was not planted out of commitment to natural beauty, but to break up student demonstrations, just as the Paris streets were designed to frustrate revolutionary mobs". In this example we get a glimpse of why Virilio describes what are generally thought of as liberal ‘democracies’ as technocracies instead, since almost all of the most important decisions in regard to overall design are made not by the people directly affected by them, much less by their elected representatives in government, but rather by technicians who not only exclude the public from the decision of whether or not a particular form of technology should be introduced, but even design them from the state so as to preclude the very possibility from ever occurring at all. This argument has only become more relevant with the passing of time, as seen in phenomena recently whereby elected officials have taken to passionately defending the autonomy of the very technicians whom they have lost the ability to control, such as Clinton’s dismissive remark during the 1999 WTO Ministerial in Seattle that those concerned about the dangers of genetically modified foods had merely lost faith in the representative nature of liberal democracy; as he proclaimed at the time, "I say to the people of the world: we eat this food too and we eat more of it than you do".
Catastrophes like global warming are a result of techno-scientific progress—technology has fundamentally altered our perception of the world, making the aff an epistemic prerequisite
There are many who claim that global warming is catastrophic for the climate. Meteorology has become a very lucrative business for people. However, climatologists do not have a clue what is going to happen because the climate is unpredictable since there is no forecast model that works. There are also other sciences dealing with the issue of climate. One of them is geo-engineering trying to counteract global warming artificially, which involves extremist practices that aim to innovate in the future a universal air conditioning system able to cool down the planet. But for some other climatologists, it is hard to evaluate consequences of such largescale manipulation and they are pessimistic about the effectiveness of such measures. This issue of global warming is just one example of consequence among many other consequences resulting from the progress in science. The 20th century is considered to be the century when people have entered a period of consequences and they have to find effective solutions to save population. The progress in science and technology has resulted in acceleration of time and of everything around us. Nowadays, tendency of adolescents is to opt for chat rooms to maintain contact with others and to form relationships over the internet. The firms such as Google or Yahoo have made this kind of instant messaging service available to people. This proximity without promiscuity has become a market where proximity stops meaning "here" and turns it into the meaning "over there." Objectivity is transformed into the tele-audiovisual objectivity and face-to-face contact is via an interface, through the view of screens. Warning for people is the loss of sight. The gradual narrowing of the visual field to the frame of the screen can result in eye disease that reduces our lateral vision and that goes by the name of glaucoma. This disease is irreversible and most often painless; it causes a number of optical data to disappear one by one and it can even develop into total blindness. This disease achieves a sort of furtive iconoclasm not of pictorial imagery any more, but of objective ocular imagery and it thereby affects our mental imagery and so our subjectivity—to the instrumental, teleobjective imagery. According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, After all, the world is around me, not in front of me, I inhabit it. To suppress, as does the shutter of the screen of a so aptly named terminal, not only lateral vision, but also the countryside, the land around, is to deprive all customary reality of relief and to experience a disastrous reversibility of dimensions, in particular of the depth of perspective. There is no distance any more, we are so close to things, they no longer concern us at all. (Virilio 2010, 79) Our world has become a foreclosed world by the temporal compression of a realistic acceleration. This sudden reversal in our relationship to the world around us, a result of the acceleration of a real time that dominates, demands training, formation, and sort of tele-scopic education. This is required from the moment the child comes into the world, now accompanied not so much by his parents as by the screen relations that will surround him as an adolescent and as a grown-up in days to come. In 2006, the very first television channel for babies saw the light of day in Europe. Offering cartoons, nursery rhymes, games, and documentaries, this channel pushing desensitization to and embrace of the acceleration of reality trains the baby in the optically correct perception that will evolve into the aesthetics of his years as a grownup. It thereby promotes toddlers’ addiction to the small screen, at the same time as it claims to be protecting those toddlers by drawing the parents’ attention to the risks of their progeniture’s habituation to the specialized channel’s hypnotic effects. (Virilio 2010, 80) This is happening today even though parents are strongly advised not to leave their very young children in front of the TV. Camille Flammarion may be considered the prophet of this society of accelerating reality which was to lead to the on-line society of instantaneous telecommunications in the 20th century. As the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote, "Time is the cycle of light" (Virilio 2010, 87). However, this cyclical time of seasons and days is now doubled by the real time of an instantaneity that is the cycle of the speed of light waves which convey the information of image and sound. The phrase from Joseph Losey’s film The Damned, accurately illustrates contemporary world: "It is too late to have a private life" (Virilio 2010, 89). We live in the age of general interactivity where electronic cooperation and collective intelligence could turn humanity as a social corpus not into single people, but into a single mass media corpus.
I affirm that countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power.
Demanding a prohibition of nuclear power challenges the dominance of authoritarian technologies—it’s not that science and tech are always evil, but that they should serve the interests of the public—vote aff to endorse the 1AC’s politicization of speed
Adams 3 Jason Adams (B.A., Evergreen State College). "Popular Defense in the Empire of Speed: Paul Virilio and the Phenomenology of the Political Body." Thesis submitted for a Masters in Political Science, Simon Fraser University. 2003.
Thus we can see that for Virilio for as long as technology has been allowed to become ever more autonomous, the deliberative basis on which politics rests has been undermined since it has exempted what is arguably the most important element of public administration from consideration. In order for the political to prevail over the technical then, the metadesign of society that results from the introduction of technique must be subjected to open and sustained debate and decision-making processes which directly involve the populations affected by them. If this were to take place, he argues, the likely result would be the scaling back of large-scale authoritarian technologies such as nuclear power and the emergence of small-scale democratic technologies such as wind power, which is why it should not be taken from his pessimism about the present that he wants to turn back the clock to ‘Year Zero’, but rather that he would prefer to wait and see what might appear within the context of a society in which science and technology are transformed so as to serve the interest of the public rather than that of the elites who go to such great lengths to protect their autonomy. It is for this reason that it is rather difficult to place him within a particular tradition of technological thought since he is both negative about the short term future of technology and positive about its long term potentiality at one and the same time. While on the one hand he agrees with Ellul that the instrumental logic of technology as we know it today has become so pervasive that ours is more appropriately described as a ‘technological society’ than as a capitalist society, since even non-capitalist societies such as the Soviet Union held that ‘communism is socialism plus electricity’ and were thus in many way of a piece with our own, on the other hand he also takes from Heidegger that "we must take hold of the riddle of technology and lay it on the table as the ancient philosophers and scientists put the riddle of Nature out in the open…we must politicize speed, whether it be the metabolic speed (the speed of the living being, of reflexes) or technological speed. We must politicize speed, because we are both: we are moved, and we move. To drive is also to be driven." In order to accomplish this, his suggestion is that citizens should immediately demand meetings with the engineers and technicians in order to really discuss both the positive and the negative implications of what is being brought into existence today, just as the developers of the railway system throughout Europe got together in Bruseels in 1888 and came up with the ‘block system’ to prevent accidents as a result. What was unique in that instance, and what is unheard of today, as Virilio notes, is that "the starting point of the discussion in Brussels was on the negative, on what did not function. Contact switches and signals were devised, and these became the basis of a very sophisticated form of data management. But why are there no conferences nowadays on the damaging consequences of unemployment? On the wrong turns taken by urbanism? On the obverse side of technical progress?"
The 1AC is a form of anti-futurology which raises key questions about the accidents that result from progress—the role of the ballot is to engage in an anti-futurist analysis of technological progress
Crogan 99 Patrick Crogan. "The Tendency, the Accident, and the Untimely: Paul Virilio’s Engagement with the Future," Paul Virilio: From Modernism to Hypermodernism and Beyond, ed. John Armitage. Article from Theory, Culture and Society, 1999. Google Books, pp. 171-173.
The Untimely We are now in a position to articulate Virilio’s project in terms of the aporia of speed confronting critical work discussed in the first section of this article. It was stated there that the aporia of speed concerned the contradictory necessities for criticism in the era of techno-science to move quickly, in order to account for the rapidly transforming present, over against the need for careful consideration of the continuities between past and present. Finding the ‘right speed’ for critical interpretation is an aporetic task which must nevertheless be attempted, for it is the opportunity that presents itself to criticism even as the critical discourses of the humanities find themselves in crisis in the face of the techno-scientific transformation of culture. To recall, this task involves rethinking the relations between what Derrida calls ‘the invention that finds what was already there and the one that produces new mechanisms or new spaces’ (1984: 21). This is what Virilio’s tendential analyses attempt. They represent a profound meditation on the relation between traditional historical modes of interpretation and the new event that challenges the coherence of such historical interpretation. As we have seen, the tendency appears as a double of the discourse of progress in its mirroring of the structure of linear temporal development toward a future endpoint. For instance, the pure war tendency would culminate in the total merging of the military and non-military spheres and the complete dominance of logistics over all other considerations (economic, social, political, ethical) in the ordering of the social. In such a situation there would be no possibility of a criticality outside of logistical imperatives. In doubling the discourse of progress, his rapid analyses retain a link to the historical form of criticality. Virilio reaffirms the traditional mode of historical analysis even as he attempts to counter the more or less explicit positivism that pervades conventional accounts of techno-science. His efforts to bring the negative side of technological advance into focus by exposing the accidents that have contributed to the generally unnoticed, dynamic tendencies that shadow and transform ‘progress’ are, in this sense, efforts toward a corrective form of anti-futurology. This anti-futurology avoids the retroactive legitimation of techno-scientific developments and the increasingly tenuous prediction of the inevitable advance of (Western) world civilization. It raises crucial questions about the nature of techno-scientific development by proposing a perverted version of the dominant teleological narratives told about it.
