Tournament: XX | Round: 1 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
Hey - I'm Jaya Nayar. You can email me at jnayar1@hwemail.com.

Tournament: Newark | Round: 1 | Opponent: I forgot sorry | Judge: I forgot sorry
Rhetoric propagating free speech as the answer to social ills directly trades off with our ability to fight injustice. Free speech is a tool that courts wield in colorblind ways against people. Delgado and Stefancic ‘92
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. “IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?” Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN

Free speech assumes a level playing field but the voices of some are always used to marginalize those of others. Delgado 2k
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. “TOWARD A LEGAL REALIST VIEW OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT.” Harvard Law Review. January 2000. JJN 

Turns the case – hate speech does real violence to people of color and necessarily locks in relationships of domination. Delgado and Stefacic ‘09
Richard Delgado - University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. Jean Stefancic – Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989, University of San Francisco. “FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH.” WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW. 2009. http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Delgado_LawReview_01.09.pdf

The alternative is to embrace the demand of abolitionism – we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements.  Oparah 14

Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).

The role of the ballot is to interrogate the AFF’s scholarship using the lens of critical race theory. This makes the passage of the plan irrelevant. 

First, their refusal of minority voices is a conscious choice. Delgado 84

Delgado, Richard. "The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132.3 (1984): 561-578.

Second, a focus on political action assumes a kind of democratic liberalism that is inaccessible to marginalized voices. Refuse their demand for concrete state action. Lopez 03

López, Gerardo R. University of Utah, Salt Lake City "The (racially neutral) politics of education: A critical race theory perspective." Educational Administration Quarterly 39.1 (2003): 68-94.

Third, Debate is a space in which racial identity can be understood—This dynamic is key to confronting racial domination and questioning the underlying aspects of negative racial identities. Reid-Brinkley 08
Shanara Rose. PhD in Philosophy from the University of Georgia. The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance And Style. https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf  pgs 2-3. 7/5

Tournament: Newark | Round: 2 | Opponent: Lexington KL | Judge: Boussayoud, Imen
DA Only
Title IX investigations are increasing. Kingiade 16.
Tyler Kingkade. “There Are Far More Title IX Investigations Of Colleges Than Most People Know”. Huffington Post. June 16, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d AGM

And, increased investigations are a crucial way to hold schools accountable. Bricker 12.
Nora Caplan Bricker. “How Title IX Became Our Best Tool Against Sexual Harassment”. The New Republic. June 21, 2012. https://newrepublic.com/article/104237/how-title-ix-became-our-best-tool-against-sexual-harassment. AGM

AFF guts effectiveness of Title IX – it causes first amendment opportunism. Schauer 04
Schauer, Frederick David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law. "The boundaries of the First Amendment: A preliminary exploration of constitutional salience." Harvard Law Review (2004): 1765-1809.

Sexual harassment in the classroom is a result of patriarchal violence that invades academia. Sexual harassment represents an oppressive use of power by professors and kills the participation and success of the harassed. Benson and Thomson 82

Benson, Donna J., and Gregg E. Thomson. "Sexual harassment on a university campus: The confluence of authority relations, sexual interest and gender stratification." Social problems 29.3 (1982): 236-251.

Empirically proven with graduation rates – Aff kills diversity. Bricker 12.
Nora Caplan Bricker. “How Title IX Became Our Best Tool Against Sexual Harassment”. The New Republic. June 21, 2012. https://newrepublic.com/article/104237/how-title-ix-became-our-best-tool-against-sexual-harassment. AGM

Diversity key to competitiveness. Hyman and Jacobs ‘09
Jeremy S. Hyman – US News Contributor. Lynn F. Jacobs – US News Contributor. “Why Does Diversity Matter at College Anyway?” US News. August 12, 2009. http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/professors-guide/2009/08/12/why-does-diversity-matter-at-college-anyway JJN

Loss of US competitiveness affects countries all around the world – causes widespread poverty. Porter and Rivkin ‘12
Michael E. Porter is a University Professor at Harvard, based at Harvard Business School in Boston. Jan W. Rivkin is the Bruce V. Rauner Professor at Harvard Business School. “The Looming Challenge to U.S. Competitiveness.” Harvard Business Review. March 2012. https://hbr.org/2012/03/the-looming-challenge-to-us-competitiveness JJN

Tournament: TOC | Round: 1 | Opponent: Any | Judge: Any
Interp: The affirmative must disclose the plan text and advantage area if they break new at the toc when pairings are released. Or at coin flip

Standard – 

1. Clash
   2. Discourages cheap shot affs

Tournament: USC | Round: 6 | Opponent: Loyola LA | Judge: Cooper, Devan
Reforming the university with speech is not possible – the present day academy is built on colonial violence that either assimilates dissent within an existing power structure or eradicate the dissenter through other means. The problem is not a lack of free speech, but the academic life is structured by colonial violence. Chatterjee and Maira 14

Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. "The imperial university: Race, war, and the nation-state." The imperial university: Academic repression and scholarly dissent (2014): 1-50.

State warfare and militarism have shored up deeply powerful notions of patriotism, intertwined with a politics of race, class, gender, sexuality, and religion, through the culture wars that have embroiled the U.S. academy. The fronts of “hot” and “cold” wars—military, cultural, and academic—have rested on an ideological framework that has defined the “enemy” as a threat to U.S. freedom and democracy. This enemy produced and propped up in the shifting culture wars—earlier the Communist, now the (Muslim) terrorist— has always been both external and internal. The overt policing of knowledge production, exemplified by right-wing groups such as ACTA, reveals an ideo- logical battle cry in the “culture wars” that have burgeoned in the wake of the civil rights movement—and the containment and policing demanded within the academy. Defending the civilizational integrity of the nation requires producing a national subject and citizen by regulating the boundaries of what is permissible and desirable to express in national culture—and in the university. As Readings observed, “In modernity, the University becomes the model of the social bond that ties individuals in a common relation to the idea of the nation-state.”46 Belonging is figured through the metaphor of patriotic citizenship, in the nation and in the academy, through displays of what Henry Giroux has also called “patriotic correctness”: “an ideology that privileges conformity over critical learning and that represents dissent as something akin to a terrorist act.”47¶ This is where the recent culture wars have shaped the politics of what we call academic containment. For right-wing activists, the nation must be fortified by an educational foundation that upholds, at its core, the singular superiority of Western civilization. A nation-state construed as being under attack is in a state of cultural crisis where any sign of disloyalty to the nation is an act of treachery, including acts perceived as intellectual betrayal. The culture wars have worked to uphold a powerful mythology about American democracy and the American Dream and a potent fiction about freedom of expression that in actuality contains academic dissent. This exceptionalist mythology has historically represented the U.S. nation as a beacon of indi- vidual liberty and a bulwark against the Evil Empire or Communist bloc; Third Worldist and left insurgent movements, including uprisings within the United States in the 1960s and 1970s and in Central America in the 1980s; Islamist militancy and anti-imperial movements since the 1980s; and the threat posed by all of these to the American “way of life.” The battle against Communism, anti-imperial Third Worldism, and so-called Islamofascism entailed regulating and containing movements sympathetic to these forces at home, including intellectuals with left-leaning tendencies and radical schol- ars or students—all those likely to contaminate young minds and indoctri- nate students in “subversive” or “anti-American” ideologies.¶ What does it mean, then, to contain scholars who “cross the line” in their academic work or public engagement? Academic containment can take on many modalities: stigmatizing an academic as too “political,” devaluing and marginalizing scholarship, unleashing an FBI investigation, blacklist- ing, or not granting scholars the final passport into elite citizenship in the academic nation—that is, tenure. These various modalities of containment, which are discussed by Thomas Abowd, Laura Pulido, and Steven Salaita, among others, narrow the universe of discourse around what is really per- missible, acceptable, and tolerable for scholars in the imperial university. All these modes are at work in the three important moments of ideological policing that we touch on here: World War I and the McCarthy era of the 1940s–1950s, the COINTELPRO era from the late 1950s to early 1970s, and the post-9/11 era or “new Cold War,” which is the major focus of this book.¶ Moments of social stress and open dissent about class politics in the United States during World War I and the first decades of the twentieth cen- tury make clear that containment worked in tandem with emerging defi- nitions of “academic freedom.” As the U.S. professoriate began to build its ranks at the end of the nineteenth century and a few scholars48 challenged the status quo, “academic freedom” emerged as a way to deal with these dis- senters as well as the “relative insecurity” felt by many in this new profes- sion.49 Indeed, the tumult of the turn of the century led to a pattern within the academy that has persisted—the exclusion of ideas as well as behavior that the majority did not like and an increasingly internalized notion that “advocacy for social change” was a professional risk for academics.¶ The AAUP’s Seligman Report of 1915 reveals that the notion of academic freedom was, in fact, “deeply enmeshed” with the “overall status, security, and prestige of the academic profession.”50 Setting up procedural safeguards was important, but its language regarding “appropriate scholarly behavior” and cautiousness about responding to controversial matters in the academy (by ensuring that all sides of the case were presented) suggested the limits of dissent. Academic freedom, then, is a notion that is deeply bound up with academic containment—a paradox suggested in our earlier discussion of protest and inclusion/incorporation in the academy and one that has become increasingly institutionalized since the formation of the AAUP.¶ The academic repression of the McCarthy era received its impetus from President Truman’s March 22, 1947, executive order that “established a new loyalty secrecy program for federal employees.” However, the roots of insti- tutional capitulation—by both administrators and faculty—when the state targeted academics who were communists or viewed as “sympathizers” are much deeper. It is also significant that the notion of “appropriate behavior” for faculty rested on a majoritarian academic “consensus” about “civil” and “collegial” comportment. For example, Ellen Schechter notes cases prior to the Cold War where scholars were fired not necessarily for their political affiliations per se but due to “their outspoken-ness.”51 This repression from within—not just beyond—the academy reveals the cultures of academic con- tainment where, as Pulido, Gumbs, and Rojas remind us, certain kinds of “unruliness” must be managed or excised.¶ The logic of academic containment was dramatically staged during the civil rights and antiwar struggles, when the FBI surveilled and arrested Black Power, anti-imperialist, and radical scholar-activists during the era of COINTELPRO (1956–1971). Angela Davis, most famously, was fired from UCLA by then California governor Ronald Reagan for being a member of the Communist Party. Some of these radical intellectuals went on to develop and establish programs in ethnic studies, critical race studies, and women’s studies, fields that later became embroiled in the conservative attacks that unfolded in the 1980s and 1990s against the specter of an “un-American” and “divisive” multiculturalism. Works such as Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind, Roger Kimball’s Tenured Radicals: How Politics has Corrupted Our Higher Education, and in some ways also David Hollinger’s Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism generated anxieties about the presumed failure of university education to transmit an essential set of knowledges and a contentious debate about the divisiveness of multicultur- alism and movements for group rights.52¶ Right-wing hysteria and neoconservative moral panics in the culture wars were accompanied by liberal concerns that ethnic studies, and to some extent women’s studies and queer studies, were devolving into “identity politics.” Liberal-left intellectuals, such as Todd Gitlin, worried that ethnic and racial studies asserted an identitarianism that was an abandonment of a “proper” left politics. Salaita points out that Gitlin also criticized as irrespon- sible scholars who challenged the policies of the Israeli state, as have other progressive scholars open to critiques of militarism or colonialism—except in the case of Israel. In other words, the culture wars were fought not just between the right and left but within the liberal-progressive left as well.¶ In her painful—and politically revealing—experience with Chicana/o studies in California public institutions over the past twenty years, Rojas offers a glimpse “of the ways imperial projects order gender/sexual/racial politics at the public university” and the “resulting devastating violence deployed on subjects deemed dangerous to the colonial imaginary of a colo- nial, heteropatriarchal Chicano studies.” The difficult question that Rojas’s “testimonio” addresses is how to connect this hetero-masculinist logic and violence—what she calls heteropatriracialities—to the “incorporation” of ostensibly liberatory, decolonizing projects such as Chicano/a studies that were birthed through the antiwar and antiracist movements of the 1960s. We view this perverse “incorporation” of ethnic studies as the result of a dangerous “internalization” of the imperial project of the university and also as meshing well with the hetero-masculinist and classed cultures that shape the dominant, everyday practices of the imperial academy. Contain- ment is not abstract at all—it is marked decisively, and often violently, on specific kinds of bodies whose presence is definitively marked as “Other,” as evident in Abowd’s and Godrej’s chapters. If one speaks from already dan- gerous embodiments, structured historically, then that speech risks always being seen as a threat. The “natives” within the academy must be most care- ful and most civilized in their speech, as Rojas and Abowd suggest. Their queer/sexed/raced bodies mark always-possible threats. There are enough natives who perform the terms of civilization and capitulation and con- tain themselves: that is how empires have always ruled—through tokenism, exceptionalism, and divide-and-rule. When it comes from “within,” contain- ment and silencing—as Rojas shows us—can be the most devastating of all.¶ These stories of academic containment must be situated within the cul- ture wars and also within the context of what Christopher Newfield, among other critics, calls a “long counterrevolution” against the gains of the civil rights and left movements of previous decades.53 Newfield argues that right- wing movements waged a cultural offensive that targeted “progressive trends in the public universities” as an important front of “roundabout wars” on the middle class, waged through the “culture wars on higher education”: “The culture wars were economic wars” against the new, increasingly racially integrated middle class, “discrediting the cultural framework that had been empowering that group.”54 In other words, the culture wars were also class wars staged on a racial battlefield, for the corporatization and privatization of the public university, as in California, occurred as it was becoming more racially integrated.55¶ Several chapters illustrate the ways in which academic containment emerges with and though the containment of economic, racial, and cultural struggles. In Gumbs’s chapter, the class wars are situated in the racial man- agement of student of color and immigrant populations in the CUNY sys- tem in the post–civil rights era of open admissions and campus occupations by students; violent policing to enforce “law and order” accompanied rising incarceration rates of people of color. Similarly, Godrej’s chapter illuminates the ways in which protests of university privatization and nonviolent civil disobedience by students and faculty during the current budget crisis in the University of California have been met with police brutality by increas- ingly militarized campuses; casting these movements as a threat evades the structural violence of tuition hikes, exclusion, impoverishment, home fore- closures, and the “neoliberal disinvestment in the concept of education as a public good.”¶ In effect, the neoliberal structuring of the university is also a racial strat- egy of management of an increasingly diverse student population, as increas- ing numbers of minority and immigrant students have entered public higher education. Well-funded, neoconservative organizations and partisan groups, such as ACTA, David Horowitz’s Freedom Center, and Campus Watch, have placed ethnic studies, feminist and queer studies, and critical cultural studies in their bull’s-eye as the political project of leftist professors running amok in the academy and teaching biased curricula. In addition, campaigns such as Horowitz’s Academic Bill of Rights and Student Bill of Rights constructed the figure of a new victim in the culture wars: the “American student” whose freedom to challenge these partisan faculty had been suppressed.56 Accord- ing to these right-wing campaigns, “radical” scholars were force-feeding U.S. college students with anti-American views, and right-wing students were being marginalized and “discriminated” against due to their political ideol- ogy and affirmative action programs. Thus the language of marginalization and exclusion was turned on its head, as the discourse of right-wing vic- timhood and ideological discrimination was unleashed against the political movements and intellectual projects that opposed racial and class inequality.¶ In addition, the right appropriated the language of “diversity,” a key point of contradiction in the academic culture wars. For example, the “Students for Academic Freedom” campaign launched by Horowitz used the notion of “intellectual pluralism” to mask its well-orchestrated attack on the left.57 The cultural right manufactured a portrait of itself as the true advocate of intel- lectual pluralism and freedom, remaking diversity through a “free market” model based on the right to choice in the marketplace of ideas.58 The notion of choice, central to models of flexible accumulation and global economic competitiveness for proponents of neoliberal capitalism, underlies the tenet of intellectual choice. A “weak” multiculturalism and liberal notion of toler- ance thus served the right well, for they used it to argue that the problem was not simply that of “diversity,” which they apparently embraced, but that there wasn’t enough “intellectual diversity” on college campuses. Teaching, and also research, was becoming one-sided, to the detriment of those upholding “true” American values, who were increasingly marginalized in hotbeds of left indoctrination into anti-Americanism on college campuses. In addition, as Pulido’s case study demonstrates, as faculty and administrators of color— not to mention women—have made their way into the ranks of university management, academic institutions can hide behind the language of racial (and gender) representativeness and tokenist inclusion to deflect critiques of systemic problems with faculty governance.¶ The strategic co-optation of the language of pluralism for academic con- tainment is nowhere more evident than in the assault on progressive schol- arship in Middle East studies and postcolonial studies and in the intense culture wars over Islam, the War on Terror, and Israel-Palestine. The 9/11 attacks and the heightened Islamophobia they generated allowed Zionist and neoconservative groups to intensify accusations that progressive Middle East studies scholars and scholars critical of U.S. foreign policy were guilty of bias and “one-sided” partisanship, as observed in accounts of censure, suspicion, and vilification by Abowd, De Genova, and Salaita. The post-9/11 culture wars conjured up new and not-so-new phantoms of enemies—in particular, the racialized specter of the “terrorist.” This figure, and the racial panic associated with it, has been sedimented in the national imaginary as synonymous with the “Muslim” and the “Arab” since the Iranian Revo- lution of 1978–1979 and the First Intifada against Israeli occupation in the late 1980s. The War on Terror consolidated Orientalist caricatures of Mus- lim fanatics and Arab militants, but it is important to note that these also dredged up avatars of a historical logic of containment and annihilation of indigenous others.59 The native, the barbarian, and the foreigner converge in this cultural imaginary that legitimizes violence against anti-Western, unciv- ilized regions incapable of democratic self-governance and that is produced by expert knowledge of other peoples and regions. The wars in Iraq and “Af- Pak” and the global hunt for terrorists entailed an intensified suspicion and scrutiny of ideologies that supported militant resistance or “anti-American” sentiments and necessitated academic research on communities that were supposedly “breeding grounds” for terrorism.

Liberation is not possible without recognizing the structure of anti-blackness. It lays the ground work for social exclusion. Heitzeg 15

Heitzeg, Nancy A a Professor of Sociology and Director of the¶ interdisciplinary Critical Studies of Race/Ethnicity Program at St. Catherine¶ University, St. Paul, MN.. "On The Occasion Of The 50th Anniversary Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: Persistent White Supremacy, Relentless Anti-Blackness, And The Limits Of The Law." Hamline J. Pub. L. and Pol'y 36 (2015): 54.

While all communities of color suffer from racism in general¶ and its manifestation in criminal justice in particular, “Black” has¶ been the literal and figurative counterpart of “white”. Anti-black¶ racism is arguably at the very foundation of white supremacy; the¶ two constitute the foundational book-ends for the legal, political and¶ every day constructions of race in the United States.12¶ For this¶ reason, in combination with the excessive over-representation of¶ African Americans in the criminal justice system and the prison¶ industrial complex, this analysis will largely focus on the ways in¶ which the law has been a tool for the oppression of African¶ Americans via the furtherance of white supremacy and antiblackness¶ in both law and practice.¶ While race has never reflected any biological reality, it is¶ indeed a powerful social and political construct. In the U.S. and¶ elsewhere, it has served to delineate “whiteness” as the “unraced”¶ norm – the “unmarked marker” – while hierarchically devaluing¶ “other” racial/ethnic categories with Blackness always as the antithesis.13¶ The socio-political construction of race coincides with the¶ age of exploration, the rise of “scientific” classification schemes, and¶ perhaps most significantly capitalism. In the United States, the¶ solidification of racial hierarchies cannot be disentangled from the capitalist demands for “unfree” labor and expanded private property.¶ By the late 1600s, race had been a marker for either free citizens or¶ slave property, and colonial laws had reified this decades before the¶ Revolutionary War.14 The question of slavery was at the center of¶ debates in the creation of the United States and is referenced no less¶ than ten times.15 By the time of the Constitutional Convention of¶ 1787, the racial lines defining slave and free had already been rigidly¶ drawn – white was “free” and black was “slave” – and the result¶ according to Douglass was this: “assume the Constitution to be what¶ we have briefly attempted to prove it to be, radically and essentially¶ pro-slavery”.¶ 16 The Three-Fifths Clause, the restriction on future¶ bans of the slave trade and limits on the possibility of emancipation¶ through escape were all clear indications of the significance of¶ slavery to the Founders. The legal enouncement of slavery in the¶ Constitution is one of the first of many “racial sacrifice covenants”¶ to come, where the interests of Blacks were sacrificed for the nation.¶ 17¶ The social and constitutional construction of white as free and¶ Black as slave has on-going political and economic ramifications.¶ According to Harris, whiteness not only allows access to property,¶ may be conceived of per se as “whiteness as property”.¶ 18 These¶ property rights produce both tangible and intangible value to those¶ who possess it; whiteness as property includes the right to profit and¶ to exclude, even the perceived right to kill in defense of the borders¶ of whiteness.19 As Harris notes:¶ The concept of whiteness was premised on white¶ supremacy rather than mere difference. “White” was¶ defined and constructed in ways that increased its¶ value by reinforcing its exclusivity. Indeed, just as whiteness as property embraced the right to exclude,¶ whiteness as a theoretical construct evolved for the¶ very purpose of racial exclusion. Thus, the concept¶ of whiteness is built on both exclusion and racial¶ subjugation. This fact was particularly evident¶ during the period of the most rigid racial exclusion,¶ as whiteness signified racial privilege and took the¶ form of status property.20¶ Conversely, Blackness is defined as outside of the margins of¶ humanity as chattel rather than persons, and defined outside of the¶ margins of civil society. Frank Wilderson, in “The Prison Slave as¶ Hegemonys (Silent) Scandal,” describes it like this: “Blackness in¶ America generates no categories for the chromosome of history, and¶ no data for the categories of immigration or sovereignty. It is an¶ experience without analog — a past without a heritage.”¶ 21 Directly¶ condemned by the Constitution in ways that other once excluded¶ groups (American Indians, women, immigrants, LGBTQ) were not,¶ Blackness as marked by slavery– as property not person - creates an¶ outsider status that makes future inclusion a daunting challenge.22

Treating speech rights as unqualified good perpetuates a lack of access to those rights – the nazi’s academic freedom is the same as the queer activism. This ignores material disparities and perpetuates hierarchies. Chatterjee and Maira 14

Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. "The imperial university: Race, war, and the nation-state." The imperial university: Academic repression and scholarly dissent (2014): 1-50.

The answers lie, to a large extent, in the definition and utilization of aca- demic freedom as a liberal principle and in the paradoxes that this liberal politics generates in the academy and beyond. Prashad argues that the lib- eral precept of academic freedom draws on John Stuart Mills’s conception of the necessity of “contrary opinions” for providing checks and balances for social norms but not for enabling a “transformative political agenda.” A Eurocentric genealogy of academic freedom would trace it to notions of critical pedagogy in German universities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, intertwined with notions of economic and political liberalism embedded in Enlightenment modernity.¶ Cary Nelson, the renowned president of the American Association for University Professors (AAUP), who for many U.S. academics represents the face of institutionalized academic freedom, writes, “Academic freedom thus embodies Enlightenment commitments to the pursuit of knowledge and their adaption to different political and social realities.”78 The AAUP issued the Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Ten- ure in 1915,79 and for some scholars, such as Robert Post, this declaration is the “greatest articulation of the logic and structure of academic freedom.”80 According to Post, this is because it conceptualizes academic freedom as based on “compliance with professional norms” specific to academic labor and on the safeguarding of scholarly expertise that produces “professional self-regulation” and “professional autonomy” for faculty.81 Yet even Post acknowledges that there is a paradox inherent in this conceptualization based on academic labor, for these professional norms are not so easily defined and so academic freedom is “simultaneously limited by, and independent of, pro- fessional norms.”82 A critic of the AAUP’s unwillingness to protect scholars targeted by McCarthyism suggests the AAUP upholds procedural freedom without an understanding of the importance of expanding its understanding of political freedom: “Stripped of its rhetoric, academic freedom thus turns out to be an essentially corporate protection. And as we trace its develop- ment during the Cold War, we should not be surprised to find that it was involved more often to defend the well-being of an institution rather than the political rights of an individual.”83¶ Other scholars, such as Judith Butler, also point out that the AAUP’s formulation of academic freedom intended to “institutionalize a set of employer-employee relationships in an academic setting,” not to guarantee academic freedom as an individual right.84 While she agrees with Post that academic freedom should not be rooted in “individual freedom” or simply in First Amendment rights of freedom of expression, she goes further to point to the collusion between the university and the state in defining pro- fessional norms and professional freedom in scholarship and to emphasize that expectations of what is permissible for academics are always historically evolving and often politically motivated. So these professional constraints are contingent and contested, not fixed; Butler argues, “As faculty members, we are constrained to be free, and in the exercise of our freedom, we con- tinue to operate within the constraints that made our freedom possible in the first place.”85¶ We take these critiques of an individually based, constrained, and “weak” notion of academic freedom further, arguing that academic freedom is per- haps not tenable as a basis for a just struggle for “freedom,” if that struggle needs to be defined by affirmative principles rooted in progressive or left conceptions of freedom, justice, and equality, as suggested by Prashad. In other words, academic freedom is not, and should not be, the holy grail of dissent. Academic freedom is generally understood—and operationalized in the U.S. academy today—as an ideologically neutral principle of freedom of expression and First Amendment rights. It is thus a libertarian, not just liberal, notion of individual freedom, and it is framed as a core principle of Western modernity and democracy, serving both the liberal-left and the conservative-right. In this model, neo-Nazis or antiabortion advocates have the same rights to academic freedom in the university as do queer activists or antiwar proponents. There is no progressive ethos built into the principle of academic freedom, and this is what makes it easily available for recupera- tion and resort by the right as much as the left. Prashad makes the important observation that even the academic left often tends to take refuge in the “safe harbor” of academic freedom rather than engaging in a struggle for “genuine campus democracy” and labor rights for workers on campuses and for the right to education as a public good and for a “culture of solidarity,” as evoked by Dominguez.¶ Perhaps one of the most ironic examples of what could be described as the use of academic freedom as a smoke screen for larger struggles over other kinds of freedoms was the cancellation of the AAUP’s own conference on academic boycotts, slated to be held in 2006 at the Rockefeller Confer- ence Center in Bellagio, Italy. The conference featured a diverse group of scholars with a range of views on the strategy of academic boycott—some in favor, some opposed—within the context of the emerging, global debate about the Palestinian call for an academic boycott of Israeli academic institu- tions, inspired by the boycott of South African institutions in the apartheid era. However, under mounting pressure from Israeli and pro-Israel academ- ics, the meeting was cancelled.¶ The AAUP, instead, published online many of the papers intended for presentation at the conference, but it also issued a report strongly condemn- ing the academic boycott. Joan Scott and Harold Linder, who had helped organize the conference and later edited the online publication, expressed dismay that the conference was canceled, but they also concluded that the AAUP’s “principled opposition to academic boycott” was an expression of its commitment to academic freedom.86 While Joan Scott later revised her position in an eloquent essay,87 this seemingly contradictory position is an argument that is often used in opposition to the academic boycott, in the case of Israel, and it expresses a deeper paradox that illuminates the fault line at the core of academic freedom—as does the entire saga of the failed con- ference. Is it possible that closing off the possibility of a boycott of academic institutions—in the context of their complicity with military occupation and apartheid policies—is an expression of academic freedom, or is it a denial of that academic freedom? And whose academic freedom is being upheld?¶ Lisa Taraki, a sociologist at Birzeit University in the West Bank who was scheduled to present at Bellagio, noted in her paper, “I think that the abstract ideas of academic freedom and the free exchange of ideas cannot be the only norms influencing the political engagement of academics. Often, when oppression characterizes all social and political relations and structures, as in the case of apartheid South Africa or indeed Palestine, there are equally important and sometimes more important freedoms that must be fought for, even—or I would say especially—by academics and intellectuals.”88 Omar Barghouti, a Palestinian intellectual who is, like Tarakai, a cofounder of the Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), argued that the AAUP was “privileging academic freedom as above all other freedoms.” Citing Judith Butler, he argued that this position excluded the freedom of “academics in contexts of colonialism, military occupation, and other forms of national oppression where ‘material and institutional foreclosures . . . make it impossible for certain historical subjects to lay claim to the discourse of rights itself ’. . . . Academic freedom, from this angle, becomes the exclu- sive privilege of some academics but not others.”89

Free speech gives racists a free pass – it directly tradesoff with issues of material violence and props up white supremacy. We should act against the law, not ask for its permission. Delgado and Stefancic ‘92
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. “IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?” Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN
III. How THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION SOMETIMES MAKES MATTERS WORSE Speech and free expression are not only poorly adapted to remedy racism, they often make matters worse-far from being stalwart friends, they can impede the cause of racial reform. First, they encourage writers, filmmakers, and other creative people to feel amoral, nonresponsible in what they do. 18 8 Because there is a marketplace of ideas, the rationalization goes, another film-maker is free to make an antiracist movie that will cancel out any minor stereotyping in the one I am making. My movie may have other redeeming qualities; besides, it is good entertainment and everyone in the industry uses stock characters like the black maid or the bumbling Asian tourist. How can one create film without stock characters? 18 9 Second, when insurgent groups attempt to use speech as an instrument of reform, courts almost invariably construe First Amendment doctrine against them.1 90 As Charles Lawrence pointed out, civil rights activists in the sixties made the greatest strides when they acted in defiance of the First Amendment as then understood. 191 They marched, were arrested and convicted; sat in, were arrested and convicted; distributed leaflets, were arrested and convicted. Many years later, after much gallant lawyering and the expenditure of untold hours of effort, the conviction might be reversed on appeal if the original action had been sufficiently prayerful, mannerly, and not too interlaced with an action component. This history of the civil rights movement does not bear out the usual assumption that the First Amendment is of great value for racial reformers. 19 2 Current First Amendment law is similarly skewed. Examination of the many "exceptions" to First Amendment protection discloses that the large majority favor the interests of the powerful. 19 3 If one says something disparaging of a wealthy and well-regarded individual, one discovers that one's words were not free after all; the wealthy individual has a type of property interest in his or her community image, damage to which is compensable even though words were the sole instrument of the harm. 194 Similarly, if one infringes the copyright or trademark of a well-known writer or industrialist, again it turns out that one's action is punishable. 19 5 Further, if one disseminates an official secret valuable to a powerful branch of the military or defense contractor, that speech is punishable. 19 If one speaks disrespectfully to a judge, police officer, teacher, military official, or other powerful authority figure, again one discovers that one's words were not free;1 9 7 and so with words used to defraud, 198 form a conspiracy, 1 99 breach the peace, 200 or untruthful words given under oath during a civil or criminal proceeding.20 1 Yet the suggestion that we create new exception to protect lowly and vulnerable members of our society, such as isolated, young black undergraduates attending dominantly white campuses, is often met with consternation: the First Amendment must be a seamless web; minorities, if they knew their own self-interest, should appreciate this even more than others. 20 2 This one-sidedness of free-speech doctrine makes the First Amendment much more valuable to the majority than to the minority. The system of free expression also has a powerful after-the-fact apologetic function. Elite groups use the supposed existence of a marketplace of ideas to justify their own superior position. 203 Imagine a society in which all As were rich and happy, all Bs were moderately comfortable, and all Cs were poor, stigmatized, and reviled. Imagine also that this society scrupulously believes in a free marketplace of ideas. Might not the As benefit greatly from such a system? On looking about them and observing the inequality in the distribution of wealth, longevity, happiness, and safety between themselves and the others, they might feel guilt. Perhaps their own superior position is undeserved, or at least requires explanation. But the existence of an ostensibly free marketplace of ideas renders that effort unnecessary. Rationalization is easy: our ideas, our culture competed with their more easygoing ones and won. 20 4 It was a fair fight. Our position must be deserved; the distribution of social goods must be roughly what fairness, merit, and equity call for.20 5 It is up to them to change, not us. A free market of racial depiction resists change for two final reasons. First, the dominant pictures, images, narratives, plots, roles, and stories ascribed to, and constituting the public perception of minorities, are always dominantly negative. 20 6 Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of the sort described in Part I (as well as today's versions) inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. 20 7 Minorities internalize the stories they read, see, and hear every day. Persons of color can easily become demoralized, blame themselves, and not speak up vigorously.208 The expense of speech also precludes the stigmatized from participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas. 20 9 They are often poor-indeed, one theory of racism holds that maintenance of economic inequality is its prime function2 0 -and hence unlikely to command the means to bring countervailing messages to the eyes and ears of others. Second, even when minorities do speak they have little credibility. Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her deserved share? Our very imagery of the outsider shows that, contrary to the usual view, society does not really want them to speak out effectively in their own behalf and, in fact, cannot visualize them doing so. Ask yourself: How do outsiders speak in the dominant narratives? Poorly, inarticulately, with broken syntax, short sentences, grunts, and unsophisticated ideas.21' Try to recall a single popular narrative of an eloquent, self-assured black (for example) orator or speaker. In the real world, of course, they exist in profusion. But when we stumble upon them, we are surprised: "What a welcome 'exception'!" Words, then, can wound. But the fine thing about the current situation is that one gets to enjoy a superior position and feel virtuous at the same time. By supporting the system of free expression no matter what the cost, one is upholding principle. One can belong to impeccably liberal organizations and believe one is doing the right thing, even while taking actions that are demonstrably injurious to the least privileged, most defenseless segments of our society.21 2 In time, one's actions will seem wrong and will be condemned as such, but paradigms change slowly.2 1 3 The world one helps to create-a world in which denigrating depiction is good or at least acceptable, in which minorities are buffoons, clowns, maids, or Willie Hortons, and only rarely fully individuated human beings with sensitivities, talents, personalities, and frailties-will survive into the future. One gets to create culture at outsiders' expense. And, one gets to sleep well at night, too. Racism is not a mistake, not a matter of episodic, irrational behavior carried out by vicious-willed individuals, not a throwback to a long-gone era. It is ritual assertion of supremacy, 214 like animals sneering and posturing to maintain their places in the hierarchy of the colony. It is performed largely unconsciously, just as the animals' behavior is. 2 15 Racism seems right, customary, and inoffensive to those engaged in it, while bringing psychic and pecuniary advantages.21 6 The notion that more speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing can counter this system of oppression is appealing, lofty, romantic-and wrong.

The alternative is to recognize the university as a site of imperial violence and embrace the demand of abolitionism - we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements.  Oparah 14

Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).

¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets. Andrea Smith, in her discussion of native studies, has argued that politi- cally progressive educators often adopt normative, colonial practices in the classroom, using pedagogical strategies and grading practices that rein- scribe the racialized and gendered regulation, policing, and disciplining that PIC abolitionists seek to end.53 In this sense, there could be no “postcarceral” academy. Certainly, sanctions for undergraduate and graduate students and faculty who challenge the university’s regular practices—from failing grades and expulsions to tenure denials and deportation—are systemically distrib- uted, along with rewards for those who can be usefully incorporated. Yet uni- versities and colleges also hold the seeds of a very different possible future, evoked, for example, by the universal admissions movement or by student strikes in Britain and Canada that demand higher education as a right, not a privilege of the wealthy. Rather than seeking to eradicate or replace higher educational institutions altogether, I suggest that we demand the popular and antiracist democratization of higher education.¶ The first step toward this radical transformation is the liberation of aca- demia from the machinery of empire: prisons, militarism, and corporations. Speaking of abolishing the white race, Noel Ignatiev argues that it is neces- sary for white people to make whiteness impossible by refusing the invisible benefits of membership in the “white club.”54 Progressive academics are also members of a privileged “club,” one that confers benefits in the form of a pay- check, health care, and other fringe benefits; social status; and the freedom to pursue intellectual work that we are passionate about. But we can also put our privilege to work by unmasking and then unsettling the invisible, symbi- otic, and toxic relationships that constitute the academic-MPIC.¶ Decoupling academia from its velvet-gloved master would begin the pro- cess of fundamental transformation. Without unfettered streams of income from corporations, wealthy philanthropists, and the military, universities and colleges would be forced to develop alternative fund-raising strategies, relationships, and accountabilities. Can we imagine a college administration aligned with local Occupy organizers to protest the state’s massive spend- ing on prisons and policing and demand more tax money for housing, edu- cation, and health care? Can we imagine a massive investment of time and resources by university personnel to solve the problem of how to decarcerate the nation’s prisons or end the detention of undocumented immigrants in order to fund universal access to higher education? Can we imagine a uni- versity run by and for its constituents, including students, kitchen and gar- den staff, and tenure-track and adjunct faculty? These are the possibilities opened up by academic-MPIC abolition.

The demand for concrete political action serves white-supremacy and perpetuates symbolic violence. Lopez 03

López, Gerardo R. University of Utah, Salt Lake City "The (racially neutral) politics of education: A critical race theory perspective." Educational Administration Quarterly 39.1 (2003): 68-94.

Unfortunately, the vast majority of tactics and mechanisms privileged in¶ the field emerge from a strong belief in the democratic process—providing a¶ somewhat optimistic take on the efficacy of political and civic participation.¶ Such strategies not only ignore the political fact that power and influence¶ largely remain the dominion of White, middle-class men (Marshall, 1997a),¶ but they also disregard the fact that the vast majority of underrepresented¶ groups do not largely participate in these kinds of political activity (Arax,¶ 1986; Bush, 1984; Flores and Benmayor, 1997; Gaventa, 1980; Preston,¶ Henderson, and Puryear, 1987). In other words, although these theories support¶ and strengthen our collective beliefs in democracy, political action, representational politics, influence, accountability, and the importance of a¶ whole host of input factors in the decision-making process, they nevertheless¶ fail to address why certain individuals fail to participate in the political process¶ altogether and/or how and why the “democratic” process itself¶ marginalizes and silences diverse peoples, their actions, and their perspectives¶ (Marshall, 1993a; Marshall et al., 1989).¶ Willis Hawley (1977) recognized the limitations of the field almost three¶ decades ago when he stated:¶ Whether one accepts Lasswell’s definition of “who gets what when and how”¶ or other such widely held and related conceptions that politics involves the authoritative¶ allocation of resources and values, my point is the same—political¶ scientists have been more interested in studying the political processes than¶ they have been in studying who receives what benefits from the political process.¶ (p. 319)¶ As Hawley suggested, scholars in the field are more concerned with “input”¶ and “process” factors, and not necessarily with the outcomes and effects of¶ the political process. The focus on one aspect, to the detriment of the other,¶ certainly has been a shortcoming in the field.¶ This is a critically important point, because the outcome of policy can be¶ tangible and identifiable (such as the effects of a public policy on a particular¶ group) or intangible and anomalous (such as people’s perceptions of the¶ political system). As Schram (1995) contended, the field disproportionately¶ suffers from an “overly instrumental view of rationality that masks its latent¶ biases” (p. 375). Certainly, the relentless belief in the effectiveness of political¶ and civic participation is itself a type of bias that is often taken for granted¶ by most scholars in the field.¶ Within the politics of education, we assume that all (legal) citizens of this¶ society have certain inalienable rights—including the right to vote to ensure¶ that government and policies work in their best interest. The field also¶ assumes that all individuals act in politically rational ways and, when necessary,¶ will assert their rights as citizens—through influence, power, conflict,¶ political pressure, voting, or some other mechanism—to minimize real and¶ opportunity costs.¶ Unfortunately, for the vast majority of people of color, the working poor,¶ women, gays/lesbians/bisexuals, and other marginalized groups—who are¶ constantly reminded on a daily basis that they are second-class citizens in this¶ country—the concept of rights is elusive. Their treatment, in historical and¶ contemporary times, attests to the fact that they have never been afforded¶ their full rights as citizens of this country (Delgado, 1997; Flores and¶ Benmayor, 1997; Guinier, 1991; Preston et al., 1987; Spann, 1995; Williams, 1995b). For people of color, their subordination has not only been socially¶ sanctioned but legally sanctioned as well:¶ As the “Other,” racial minorities have often been neither thought of nor treated¶ as Americans. Historically they have by a number of legal and informal means¶ been excluded from buying property in certain areas, prohibited from voting,¶ and restricted as to whom they could marry. In practice, full American citizenship¶ has been restricted to Whites. Over many years of struggle, rights have¶ been extended and the concept of who belongs to America has expanded. Even¶ so, racial and gender discrimination continue to create real differences in opportunities¶ and in people’s perception of their treatment. (Rosaldo and Flores,¶ 1997, p. 58)¶ If having rights is part of being an American citizen (Flores, 1997), then¶ clearly, racial minorities in the United States are far from full incorporation in¶ this regard. They may be equal members of society under the law—but socially,¶ politically, and economically, they are rendered one down by a racist¶ political and legal system that marginalizes them on an everyday basis. As¶ Slater and Boyd (1999) suggested, individuals can be members of the larger¶ polity but may not necessarily be afforded equal status in the larger polity.¶ Therefore, to suggest that all individuals have equal rights under the law¶ and have equal ability and potential to exercise those rights via political¶ action and/or influence—in other words, to suggest that all individuals, irrespective¶ of race or power, act in politically rational ways—is not only shortsighted¶ but disingenuous. It suggests the public space is racially neutral and¶ that contextual factors do not matter in the larger social and political arena.

Role-playing assumes a level of detachment that is oppressive. Reid Brinkley 08

- psychic violence to black who can’t defend usfg even if contingent
- serial policy failure – detachment = objectivity justifies imperialist policies where u make others conform to your values

Reid-Brinkley ‘8 (Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department of Communications, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” 2008,)

And participation does not result in the majority of the debate community engaging in activism around the issues they research. Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates.  Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).  The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

Tournament: Newark Round Robin | Round: 1 | Opponent: Newark Science TA | Judge: Chetan Hertzig, Abdul Beretay
Interpretation: The aff must defend that no constitutionally protected speech may be restricted by public colleges or universities. To clarify, they can’t defend a restriction on only a kind, setting, or timing of speech.

Counterplans that restrict only certain forms of speech are theoretically illegitimate.

The term “any” is the res is the weak form of “any”  -  “not any” statements refer to “all”.  Cambridge Dictionary

Cambridge Dictionary, Any, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/grammar/british-grammar/quantifiers/any.  NS

Outweighs -  it takes into account AFF definitions which assume a strong form of “any” that justifies singular cases.
Determining semantics comes before other standards:

A.  It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.

B.  Grammar is the most objective since it doesn’t rely on arbitrary determinants of what constitutes the best type of debate – it’s the only impact you can evaluate. 

C.  The AFF isn’t topical regardless of fairness or education since it doesn’t affirm the text - we wouldn’t debate rehab again just because it was a good topic..  

Violation: 

Standards: 

1. Limits: They allow way too many affs, newpapers, protests, specific races, sexual orientations, and places on campuses. That explodes neg prep burden and predictability that explodes the NEG prep burden and predictability which kills fairness and engagement.  Procedurally, if I can’t access their education it doesn’t matter.  T version of the AFF solves their offense – they can read advantages in any topic area which ensures NEG responses.

2. Legal precision – multiple court rulings agree with our interp. Elder 91
Elder ‘91(David S. Elder, October 1991, "Any and All": To Use Or Not To Use?” "Plain Language' is a regular feature of the Michigan Bar Journal, edited by Joseph Kimble for the State Bar Plain English Committee. Assistant editor is George H. Hathaway. Through this column the Committee hopes to promote the use of plain English in the law. Want to contribute a plain English article? Contact Prof. Kimble at Thomas Cooley Law School, P.O. Box 13038, Lansing, MI 48901, http://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/plainenglish/pdfs/91_oct.pdf | SP)

Legal precision determines topic literature and pre round prep – it’s a legal topic about first amendment jurisprudence. This is key to predictability and giving the neg a fair research burden to engage the affirmative. 

Vote on substantive engagement:  otherwise we’re speaking without debating and there’s nothing to separate us from dueling oratory.   It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics.

Drop the debater on T:

A. Hold them accountable for their interp – a topical advocacy frames the debate - drop the arg lets them jump ship to a new layer killing NEG ground.

B. Drop the arg on T is the same thing as drop the debater since T indicts their advocacy 

Competing interps since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

No RVIs:

 A. They incentivize debaters to go all in in theory and bait it with abusive practices, killing substantive clash on other flows. B. They can run theory on me too if I’m unfair so 1) theory is reciprocal because we’re both able to check abuse and 2) also cures time skew because they can collapse in the 2ar to their shell.

Tournament: Golden Desert | Round: 1 | Opponent: Chaminade JB | Judge: Kathy Bond
Neoliberalism is a mafia protection racket – it defunds schools of private funding and makes them come to corporations for funding. This logic structures what speech and knowledge are free in the first place. The aff misdiagnoses the problem and lets neoliberalism slip through the cracks. Bagakis 11/15/16

Gus Bagakis retired philosophy instructor at San Francisco State University and author of "Seeing Through The System: The Invisible Class Struggle in America,"  October 15, 2016 “Neoliberalism's Decades-Long Attack on Public Universities”

Free speech is an illusion propagated by corporatists – their model of rights assumes an equal playing field analogous to free market economists view of capital. The promotion of free speech perpetuates the idea that speech is a commodity, which strengthens neoliberalism’s hold on the academy. Brown 15
Brown, Wendy. Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism's stealth revolution. MIT Press, 2015.

This turns the case – the commodification of speech reflects the capitalist illusion of freedom. It makes speech meaningless and kills value to life. Smith ‘14
R.C. Smith April 24, 2014 “POWER, CAPITAL and THE RISE OF THE MASS SURVEILLANCE STATE: ON THE ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY, ETHICS, DISENCHANTMENT and CRITICAL THEORY” Heathwood Institute and Press http://www.heathwoodpress.com/power-capital-the-rise-of-the-mass-surveillance-state-on-the-absence-of-democracy-ethics-disenchantment-critical-theory/ JJN from file

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Oparah 14
Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. 

First, neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file

Second, the knowledge claims of the AC are the jumping off point for the debate – our framework provides a more reasonable neg burden. When a student turns in an F paper, no teacher has an obligation to write an entirely new paper to show it was bad – pointing out major academic deficiencies would justify failing the paper – the ballot asks who did the better debating, so if their analysis is wrong, they haven’t. 

Third, neoliberalism is a conceptual framework that has to be challenged at the level of scholarship. Godrej 14
Farah Godrej Department of Political Science¶ University of California-Riverside “neoliberalism, Militarization, and the Price of dissent¶ Policing Protest at the University of California¶ “Edited by Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. The Imperial University. University of Minnesota Press, 2014.

Tournament: USC | Round: 6 | Opponent: Loyola LA | Judge: Cooper, Devan
Public Universities and colleges should establish restrictions on hate speech consistent with Byrne’s proposal. This includes restrictions on otherwise protected free speech. They will remove all other restrictions on protected free speech.  Byrne 91

Byrne, J. Peter. Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. "Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University." Geo. LJ 79 (1990): 399.

This article examines the constitutionality of university prohibitions of¶ public expression that insults members of the academic community by directing¶ hatred or contempt toward them on account of their race. I Several¶ thoughtful scholars have examined generally whether the government can¶ penalize citizens for racist slurs under the first amendment, but to the limited¶ extent that they have discussed university disciplinary codes they have assumed¶ that the state university is merely a government instrumentality subject¶ to the same constitutional limitations as, for example, the legislature or¶ the police. 2 In contrast, I argue that the university has a fundamentally dif ferent relationship to the speech of its members than does the state to the speech of its citizens. On campus, general rights of free speech should be qualified by the intellectual values of academic discourse. I conclude that the protection of these academic values, which themselves enjoy constitutional protection, permits state universities lawfully to bar racially abusive speech, even if the state legislature could not constitutionally prohibit such speech throughout society at large. At the same time, however, I assert that the first amendment renders state universities powerless to punish speakers for advocating any idea in a reasoned manner. It is necessary at the outset to choose a working definition of a racial insult. This definition, however, is necessarily provisional; any such definition implies the writer's views on the boundaries of constitutionally protected offensive speech, and the reader cannot be expected to swallow the definition until she has had the opportunity to inspect the writer's constitutional premises. Having offered such a caution, I define a racial insult as a verbal or symbolic expression by a member of one ethnic group that describes another ethnic group or an individual member of another group in terms conventionally derogatory, that offends members of the target group, and that a reasonable and unbiased observer, who understands the meaning of the words and the context of their use, would conclude was purposefully or recklessly abusive. Excluded from this definition are expressions that convey rational but offensive propositions that can be disputed by argument and evidence. An insult, so conceived, refers to a manner of speech that seeks to demean rather than to criticize, and to appeal to irrational fears and prejudices rather than to respect for others and informed judgment. 3

The counterplan establishes checks on reverse enforcement, chilling effect, and slippery slope. 

Byrne, J. Peter. Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. "Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University." Geo. LJ 79 (1990): 399.

Disciplinary rules are the least effective way that a university can enhance¶ the quality of speech or foster racial tolerance among its members. The educational¶ program must celebrate and instruct its students in the beauty and¶ usefulness of graceful and accurate speech and writing; a liberal education¶ should leave students intolerant of propaganda and commercial manipulation,¶ and competent to directly and forcefully express coherent views as citizens.¶ Such teaching is not amoral; the graduate ought freely to prefer the¶ exercise of skill, reflective perception, and an abiding curiosity to desires for acquisition, consumption, and domination. Without the university's consistent¶ action on a commitment to reasoned discourse as central to its mission,¶ the university's attempt to prohibit insulting or lewd speech may seem a hypocritical¶ denial of its own failings.¶ Similarly, prohibiting racial insults will advance racial harmony on a campus¶ only when the university has effectively committed itself to educate lovingly¶ the members of every ethnic group. Although nearly every university¶ admits minority students using criteria that aspire in good faith to be fair,¶ many have failed to transform themselves into truly multi-ethnic institutions.¶ Not to have succeeded at this daunting task does not merit reproach; the¶ university's origins and traditions are explicitly European, growth and accommodation¶ to the extent required to create a multi-ethnic community¶ must take time and witness false steps. However, not to have made plain¶ that blacks, hispanics, Asians, Indians, and others who have been excluded in¶ the past are not only now welcome, but are requested to collaborate in shaping¶ new university structures and mores so that the benefits of advanced education¶ will be available without regard to birth and so that the university can¶ continue to spawn for a changing society a cosmopolitan culture based on¶ reason and reflection standing above tribal fears and blind desires, not to¶ have begun this work in earnest merits regret and will provoke anger. Universities¶ that pass rules against racial insults which are not part of a comprehensive¶ commitment to ethnic integration will serve only to exacerbate racial¶ tensions.¶ Schools that adopt prohibitions on racially offensive speech ought to enforce¶ them with restraint. Certainly, when students have sought to intimidate¶ or frighten other students with racial insults, the school should treat this¶ behavior as a fundamental breach of university standards meriting the¶ strongest punitive measures. But often insulting expressions will result from¶ insensitivity or ignorance; complaints about such behavior should be seen as¶ opportunities for teaching, and creative informal measures that make the offenders¶ aware of the harmful consequences and injustice of their behavior¶ should be pursued. The school should also provide succor to the victim¶ whose hurt and anger must be acknowledged and meliorated. But severely¶ punishing ignorant young people for expressions inherited from their parents¶ or neighborhoods may serve to harden. and focus their sense of grievance,¶ create martyrs, and prolong racial animosity. Deans who administer such¶ rules must overcome their personal repugnance at racist speech and enforce¶ the rules for the benefit of the entire community. Controversial interpretative¶ application of the rules should be placed in the hands of faculty and¶ students representative of the entire institution, and the accused, the victim,¶ and the dean should have an opportunity to express their perspectives.¶ A recurrent concern regarding rules against racial insults is their vague-ness and overbreadth. These, of course, were the bases upon which the University¶ of Michigan's policy was declared unconstitutional, although the¶ demonstrated propensity of the school to apply the policy to presumptively¶ protected speech appears to have steered the Court's conclusions on these¶ issues.17 6 In general, university disciplinary rules rarely are struck down for¶ vagueness; courts usually permit universities to regulate student conduct on¶ the basis of generally stated norms, so long as they give fair notice of the¶ behavior proscribed. 177 Courts generally are more strict regarding vagueness¶ in rules that affect speech, in no small part because of the distrust of the¶ competence and motives of the government censor.178¶ A central argument of this article has been that the university can be¶ trusted to administer rules prohibiting racial insults because it has the proper¶ moral basis and adequate expertise to do so. It is not surprising, therefore,¶ that I believe that vagueness concerns about such university rules are largely¶ misplaced. This is not to deny that a university should adopt safeguards to¶ protect accused students from the concerns that the courts have highlighted.¶ First, the rules should state explicitly that no one may be disciplined for the¶ good faith statement of any proposition susceptible to reasoned response, no¶ matter how offensive. The possibility that punishment is precluded by this¶ limitation should be addressed at every stage of the disciplinary process. Second,¶ some response between punishment and acquittal should be available¶ when the university concludes that the speaker was subjectively unaware of¶ the offensive character of his speech; these cases seem to present mainly educational¶ concerns. Third, all controversial issues of interpretation of the¶ rules should be entrusted to a panel of faculty and students who are representative¶ of the institution. Rules furthering primarily academic concerns about¶ the quality of speech and the development of students should be given meaning¶ by those most directly concerned with the academic enterprise rather¶ than by administrators who may register more precisely external political¶ pressures on the university. Given these safeguards and a comprehensible¶ definition of an unacceptable insult, such as the one ventured in the introduction¶ to this article,179 a court which accepts the underlying proposition that a¶ university has the constitutional authority to regulate racial insults should¶ not be troubled independently by vagueness.¶ A difficult prudential consideration is whether a university should decline¶ to regulate insults because of public criticism that censorship demeans the very intellectual virtues towards which the university strives, such as the superiority¶ of persuasion over compulsion. Obviously, the adoption of such¶ regulation has brought forth sincere and bitter criticism from many friends of¶ higher education-the Economist, for example, went so far as to call such¶ regulations "disgraceful."'' 80 To some extent these criticisms stem from misunderstanding¶ about the character of academic speech and the goals of¶ prohibitions on racial insult, but universities should admit that turning to¶ regulation marks a sad failure in civility. A failure already has occurred,¶ however, when students scurrilously demean other students because of their¶ race. The university at this point can only choose among evils. It would not¶ be true to its traditions if it did not come down on the side of protecting the¶ educational environment for blameless students against wanton and hurtful¶ ranting.
Hate speech codes are effective they create legal recognition which is key to challenge a culture of racism.
Michel Rosenfeld* Justice Sydney L. Robins Professor of Human Rights, Benjamin N. Cardozo School¶ of Law. 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 2002-2003

-Article surveyed hate speech laws across US, UK, Canada, Germany

The principal disadvantages to the approach to hate speech¶ under consideration, on the other hand, are: that it inevitably has¶ to confront difficult line drawing problems, such as that between¶ fact and opinion in the context of the German scheme of¶ regulation; that when prosecution of perpetrators of hate speech¶ fails, such as in the British Southern News case discussed above,'30¶ regulation may unwittingly do more to legitimate and to¶ disseminate the hate propaganda at issue than a complete absence¶ of regulation would have;' that prosecutions may be too selective¶ or too indiscriminate owing to (often unconscious) biases¶ prevalent among law enforcement officials, as appears to have¶ been the case in the prosecutions of certain black activists under¶ the British Race Relations Act;'32 and, that since not all that may¶ appear to be hate speech actually is hate speech-such as the¶ documentary report involved in Jersild33 or a play in which a racist¶ character engages in hate speech, but the dramatist intends to¶ convey an anti-hate message-regulation of that speech may¶ unwisely bestow powers of censorship over legitimate political,¶ literary and artistic expression to government officials and judges.¶ In the last analysis, none of the existing approaches to hate¶ speech are ideal, but on balance the American seems less¶ satisfactory than its alternatives. Above all, the American¶ approach seems significantly flawed in some of its assumptions, in¶ its impact and in the message it conveys concerning the evils¶ surrounding hate speech. In terms of assumptions, the American¶ approach either underestimates the potential for harm of hate¶ speech that is short of incitement to violence, or it overestimates¶ the potential of rational deliberation as a means to neutralize calls¶ to hate. In terms of impact, given its long history of racial¶ tensions, it is surprising that the United States does not exhibit¶ greater concern for the injuries to security, dignity, autonomy and¶ well being which officially tolerated hate speech causes to its black¶ minority. Likewise, America's hate speech approach seems to¶ unduly discount the pernicious impact that racist hate speech may have on lingering or dormant racist sentiments still harbored by a¶ non-negligible segment of the white population.'34 Furthermore,¶ even if we discount the domestic impact of hate speech, given the¶ worldwide spread of locally produced hate speech, such as in the¶ case of American manufactured Neo-Nazi propaganda¶ disseminated through the worldwide web, a strong argument can¶ be made that American courts should factor in the obvious and¶ serious foreign impact of certain domestic hate speech in¶ determining whether such speech should be entitled to¶ constitutional protection. Finally, in terms of the message¶ conveyed by refusing to curb most hate speech, the American¶ approach looms as a double-edged sword. On the one hand,¶ tolerance of hate speech in a country in which democracy has been¶ solidly entrenched since independence over two hundred years ago¶ conveys a message of confidence against both the message and the¶ prospects of those who endeavor to spread hate.'35 On the other¶ hand, tolerance of hate speech in a country with serious and¶ enduring race relations problems may reinforce racism and¶ hamper full integration of the victims of racism within the broader¶ community.'36¶ The argument in favor of opting for greater regulation of hate¶ speech than that provided in the United States rests on several¶ important considerations, some related to the place and function¶ of free speech in contemporary constitutional democracies, and¶ others to the dangers and problems surrounding hate speech.¶ Typically, contemporary constitutional democracies are¶ increasingly diverse, multiracial, multicultural, multireligious and¶ multilingual. Because of this and because of increased migration,¶ a commitment to pluralism and to respect of diversity seem¶ inextricably linked to vindication of the most fundamental¶ individual and collective rights. Increased diversity is prone to¶ making social cohesion more precarious, thus, if anything,¶ exacerbating the potential evils of hate speech. Contemporary¶ democratic states, on the other hand, are less prone to curtailing free speech rights than their predecessors either because of deeper¶ implantation of the democratic ethos or because respect of¶ supranational norms has become inextricably linked to continued¶ membership in supranational alliances that further vital national¶ interests.¶ In these circumstances, contemporary democracies are more¶ likely to find themselves in a situation like stage four in the context¶ of the American experience with free speech rather than in one¶ that more closely approximates a stage one experience.'37 In other¶ words, to drown out minority discourse seems a much greater¶ threat than government prompted censorship in contemporary¶ constitutional democracies that are pluralistic. Actually, viewed¶ more closely, contemporary pluralistic democracies tend to be in a¶ situation that combines the main features of stage two and stage¶ four. Thus, the main threats to full fledged freedom of expression¶ would seem to come primarily from the "tyranny of the majority"¶ as reflected both within the government and without, and from the¶ dominance of majority discourses at the expense of minority ones.¶ If it is true that majority conformity and the dominance of its¶ discourse pose the greatest threat to uninhibited self-expression¶ and unconstrained political debate in a contemporary pluralist¶ polity, then significant regulation of hate speech seems justified.¶ This is not only because hate speech obviously inhibits the selfexpression¶ and oopportunity of inclusion of its victims, but also,¶ less obviously, because hate speech tends to bear closer links to¶ majority views than might initially appear. Indeed, in a¶ multicultural society, while crude insults uttered by a member of¶ the majority directed against a minority may be unequivocally¶ rejected by almost all other members of the majority culture, the¶ concerns that led to the hate message may be widely shared by the¶ majority culture who regard of other cultures as threats to their¶ way of life. In those circumstances, hate speech might best be¶ characterized as a pathological extension of majority feelings or¶ beliefs.¶ So long as the pluralist contemporary state is committed to¶ maintaining diversity, it cannot simply embrace a value neutral¶ mindset, and consequently it cannot legitimately avoid engaging in¶ some minimum of viewpoint discrimination. This is made clear by¶ the German example, and although the German experience has¶ been unique, it is hard to imagine that any pluralist constitutional¶ democracy would not be committed to a similar position, albeit to¶ a lesser degree.'38 Accordingly, without adopting German free speech jurisprudence, at a minimum contemporary pluralist¶ democracy ought to institutionalize viewpoint discrimination¶ against the crudest and most offensive expressions of racism,¶ religious bigotry and virulent bias on the basis of ethnic or national¶ origin

Hate speech kills the market place of ideas, fosters self-hatred and primes society for real violence. Johnsons 2000
Catherine B. Johnson JD Candidate Fordham Law School “STOPPING HATE WITHOUT STIFLING SPEECH: RE-EXAMINING THE MERITS OF HATE SPEECH CODES ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES” August, 2000 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1821

The ubiquity and incessancy of harmful racial depiction are thus the source of its virulence. Like water dripping on sandstone, it is a pervasive harm which only the most hardy can resist. Yet the prevailing first amendment paradigm predisposes us to treat racist speech as an individual harm, as though we only had to evaluate the effect of a single drop of water. This approach ... systematically misperceives the experience of racism for both victim and perpetrator. 157¶ ¶ Mari Matsuda, a professor at the School of Law and at the Center for Asian American Studies at UCLA, was one of the first to look at the hate speech issue from the point of view that it actually harms its victims. She is often accredited for bringing an "outsider jurisprudence" to the forefront of this debate. 158 Matsuda explains that victims of hate speech suffer irreparable harm, both psychologically and physically. 159 Victims of racist speech internalize the feelings of inferior self-worth and self-hatred. This in turn affects their relationships with others, their job performance, educational endeavors, and ultimately their ability to effectively communicate. 160 *1845 The harm of hate speech, as proponents of codes contend, is real.¶ a. Assaultive Speech Lands a BlisteringBlow¶ ¶ Those in favor of hate speech regulations argue that the harm of such speech is the equivalent of a punch - an actual assault on one's sense of person, essentially having the same effect as physical violence. 161 Like violence, words may land a sharp and insidious blow to those at whom they are hurled: "The experience of being called a 'nigger,' 'spic,' 'Jap,' or 'kike' is like receiving a slap in the face." 162 Regulating such speech is a "pragmatic response to the urgent needs of students of color and other victims of hate speech who are daily silenced, intimidated, and subjected to severe psychological and physical trauma by racist assailants who employ words and symbols as part of an arsenal of weapons of oppression and subordination." 163¶ As if repeated blows to one's psychological well-being by language of this sort is not enough, the victim is then further injured by the "government response of tolerance." 164 The blows of the racists, the homophobes or the sexists is then compounded by a final shot from the government or the university that stands idly by and accepts the intolerant messages. 165¶ Those involved in the outsider jurisprudence movement contend that a message of hate "inflicts wounds" 166 that do not just injure the intended victim but rather "hit the gut of all those in the target group." 167 This message - you are different, you are inferior, you do not belong, you will never amount to anything - is then *1846 "conveyed on the street, in school yards, in popular culture, and in the propaganda of hate widely distributed in this country." 168¶ b. Tolerance of Hate Speech Perpetuates a Social Reality ofSubordination¶ ¶ Those who call for regulation of hate speech further contend that in allowing such messages to be conveyed and spread, the government is arguably constructing and even perpetuating a damaging social reality about the affected groups "so that members of that group are always one down." 169 All members are harmed, because "at some level, no matter how much both victims and well-meaning dominant-group members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in our minds as an idea that may hold some truth." 170¶ This dominant social reality harms victims of hate speech in two ways: (1) externally, in society's perception of such groups; and (2) internally, in the victim's own perception of himself. The former is known as the "those people" effect - when one repeatedly hears that "those people are lazy, dirty, sexualized, money-grubbing, dishonest, inscrutable ... we reject the idea, but the next time we sit next to one of 'those people' the dirt message, the sex message, is triggered." 171¶ By "permitting one social group to speak disrespectfully of another habituates and encourages speakers to continue speaking that way in the future," 172 thereby making laws regulating such speech imperative to ensure that such groups may no longer find themselves "one down." 173 As this way of speaking becomes "normalized" by society, it then becomes "inscribed in hundreds of plots, narratives, and scripts; it becomes part of culture, what everyone knows." 174¶ Not only do such messages cause external or reputational harm to the group as perceived by society, such ideas often become an internal reality for victims. Repeated messages of this sort eventually *1847 cause victims to believe that perhaps they do not deserve to be treated as everyone else. 175 "Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of this sort ... inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. Minorities internalize the stories they read, see and hear every day." 176¶ The effect of such internalization silences victims, ingraining them with the notion that their voice is not valuable or credible in society's discourse. 177 "Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her adequate share?" 178 The result of such silencing is that victims of hate speech have no effective voice in the marketplace of ideas, 179 leaving them little opportunity to counter-attack the assaultive speech. 180¶ c. Hate Speech Denies Equal EducationalOpportunity¶ ¶ ¶ Our educational institutions are idealized as a refuge for the calm, impartial, and unimpeded pursuit of knowledge and truth. Here we hope to escape the bigotry, cruelty and injustice outside. But universities and colleges are no longer, if they ever were, tranquil havens in a prejudiced world. Instead, for people of color, women, gays and lesbians, religious minorities, and members of other arbitrarily disadvantaged groups, institutions of higher education have become, increasingly, places of physical and psychological danger. 181
And hate speech primes society for genocide – multiple empirical examples prove. Tsesis 09
Tsesis, Alexander Loyola University Chicago School of Law. "Dignity and speech: The regulation of hate speech in a democracy." (2009).
Permitting persons or organizations to spread ideology touting a¶ system of discriminatory laws or enlisting vigilante group violence¶ erodes democracy. So it was in the Weimar Republic, where the¶ repeated anti-Semitic propaganda of vulgar ideologues like Julius¶ Streicher, who published perverse attacks against Jews in Der¶ Stiirmer, chipped away at the post-World War I German democratic¶ experiment.6¶ ' Avowedly influenced by nineteenth century antiSemitism,¶ his weekly stories of Jewish ritual murder and sexual¶ exploitation were a crude way of antagonizing the victims and¶ gaining support for widespread prejudice against Jews." It is truly¶ eerie, now, looking at photographs relating the effectiveness of Nazi¶ propaganda: respectable looking adults in suits and dresses¶ listening to long lectures on Jewish inferiority; children, barely able¶ to stand on their two feet, raising their right arm in a Nazi salute.¶ Nazi propaganda incorporated numerous well-known¶ nineteenth century slogans. To take one example, Streicher, who¶ was later sentenced to death by the Nuremberg War Crimes¶ Tribunal, 64 used an inflammatory slogan, "The Jews are our misfortune!" on his newspaper masthead.and At one point over¶ 130,000 copies of his publication were sold and displayed on public¶ message boards throughout the country.66 The phrase also became¶ prominently featured on posters throughout the Third Reich.67¶ This slogan was taken verbatim from an 1879 article by¶ Professor Heinrich von Treitschke, arguably the greatest German¶ historian of the nineteenth century.68 Its visibility in pre-World War¶ II German society helped legitimize anti-Semitism there in¶ intellectual circles.69¶ A gradual process of incitement also occurred elsewhere. In¶ many American colonies, authors and legal institutions had been¶ degrading blacks since the seventeenth century.70 By national¶ independence, in 1776, the colonies of South Carolina and Georgia¶ had long-standing commitments to retaining slavery despite the oftrepeated¶ mantra of universal natural rights. In 1787, those two states refused to endorse the proposed Constitution without¶ provisions protecting that undemocratic institution."72¶ Senator John Calhoun, Congressman Henry Wise, and other¶ powerful racist orators misled the public about the supposedly¶ benevolent slave owner, feeding his slaves and treating them like¶ his own children. 3 The repeated inculcation of supremacism proved¶ effective in misrepresenting blacks as moveable property.¶ Abolitionists like Theodore Weld, Angelina and Sarah Grimk6,¶ Frederick Douglass, and William Lloyd Garrison were unable to win¶ over the country to their abolitionist views.74 To the contrary,¶ proslavery thought monopolized the Southern marketplace of¶ ideas.' Slavery came to an end after a bloody Civil War, not¶ through articulate or even heated debate.6¶ Because intimidating hate speech has so often inflamed¶ dangerous attitudes, the value of such expression should be¶ balanced against the likelihood that it will cause harm. The risks¶ are greater when hate propaganda incorporates symbolism, like¶ swastikas, that demagogues have historically displayed to rally¶ supporters to action. Robert Post is undoubtedly correct that speech¶ is valuable because it provides a breeding ground for "collective selfdetermination."7¶ 7 The more difficult question is how self-expression¶ should be treated when it conflicts with the safety of its target.¶ As much as self-expression is fundamental to democratic¶ institutions, it can, nevertheless, be balanced against the social¶ interest in safeguarding a pluralistic culture by preventing the¶ instigation of demagogic threats. Placing no limits on speech-not¶ even on expressions blatantly intended to make life miserable for¶ minorities-preserves the rights of speakers at the expense of¶ targeted groups. Defamation statutes, zoning regulations, and¶ obscenity laws indicate that the freedom of speech is not shielded¶ where it undermines other individuals' legitimate interests. 7 Hate speech regulation undoubtedly inhibits some opportunities for selfexpression;¶ more importantly, it prevents instigative communication¶ from undermining its targets' ability to live unaccosted by¶ harassment.¶ In the many historic examples when destructive messages¶ proved to be effective in instigating violence, they caused enormous¶ social turmoil. Just like shouting "fire" in a crowded movie theater,¶ which can be prohibited without violating the First Amendment,79¶ hate speech can cause a stampede. Take Spain, for instance, which¶ expelled its Jewish population in 1492.80 The expulsion came after¶ years of Inquisition propaganda and hurt both the exiled Jews and¶ the remaining Spanish population. 1 Teachings by zealous¶ preachers like Vincent Ferrer, a later-canonized Dominican monk,¶ in the late fifteenth century brought on a nationwide anti-Jewish¶ hysteria that opposed the free practice of Judaism while decrying¶ overt violence.82 Pursuant to his instigation, a Castilian decree¶ discriminated against Jews in employment, dress, and criminal¶ punishments.83 Historian Heinrich Graetz explained the connection¶ between anti-Jewish preaching and draconian edicts: the populace¶ was "inflamed by the passionate eloquence of the preacher and¶ emphasized his teaching by violent assaults on the Jews." 4 Another¶ historian explained that:¶ For centuries, Christians had been encouraged to hate the¶ Jews. With preachers telling them, Sunday after Sunday, that¶ Jews were perverted and guilty of complicity in the death of¶ Christ, the faithful ended up by detesting them with a hatred 815 that was bound one day to express itself in violence .¶ Once unleashed, the expulsion of Jews from Spain followed¶ naturally from the verbal spread of hatred during the Inquisition.8 6¶ The economic consequences were grave. Many commercial enterprises in Seville and Barcelona, for instance, were ruined .¶ "Spain lost an incalculable treasure by the exodus of Jewish...¶ merchants, craftsmen, scholars, physicians, and scientists," wrote¶ the encyclopedic Will Durant, "and the nations that received them¶ benefitted economically and intellectually."88 Anti-Jewish preaching¶ in parts of Spain influenced a wide social segment of the population,¶ and the result was devastating both for the Jews who fled and for¶ the country that renounced them on dogmatic grounds. Elsewhere¶ in the ancient world, as historian Ben Kiernan has compellingly¶ documented, periodic mass massacres perpetrated against segments¶ of the native populations in Ireland, North and South America, and¶ Australia were likewise influenced by widely disseminated¶ dehumanizing statements. 9¶ The spread of ethnic and racial hatred continues to elicit¶ violence throughout the modern world. The dissemination of¶ ethnically incitable messages has precipitated tribal clashes in¶ Kenya.90 In Rwanda, ethnic stereotyping and repeated media calls¶ for the extermination of Tutsi led to a massive genocide perpetrated¶ against that group.9¶ '¶ Arab racial hate propaganda in the Sudan has catalyzed a¶ government-sponsored attempt to "cleanse" black Africans in¶ Darfur, Sudan." Likewise, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo¶ the government has relied on the incitement of ethnic hatred,¶ creating a culture where ethnic murder is a routine militia¶ practice. In the Arab world, terror organizations like Hamas and¶ Hizballah spread hatred against Jews without any interference from several governments, including Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi¶ Arabia. 94 School texts that are "written and produced by Saudi¶ government" teach children to kill Jews and to hate Christians and¶ Jews.95¶ Hate propaganda in these countries is far more virulent than it¶ is in the United States; nevertheless, a democracy committed to the¶ protection of individual rights does not run afoul of free speech¶ principles by criminalizing group incitement that has so globally¶ proven to influence harmful social movements.¶ A First Amendment theory, as the Supreme Court made clear in¶ Virginia v. Black, must examine whether there are historical¶ reasons to believe that offensive expression against an identifiable¶ group is likely to intimidate reasonable audiences. Robert Post's¶ argument about the undemocratic nature of hate speech regulation¶ regards "the function of public discourse" to be the reconciliation of¶ "the will of individuals with the general will. Public discourse is¶ thus ultimately grounded upon a respect for individuals seen as 'free¶ and equal persons."'97 He emphasizes democracy's central obligation¶ to protect private "autonomous wills."9" His insightful¶ characterization, however, captures only part of the raison d'etre of¶ democracy; on a more community-oriented level, that system of¶ governance serves to protect the overall well-being of the polity¶ against the wanton call for discriminatory conduct or violence. And¶ Black explicitly sanctions states' use of historical records to identify¶ symbolism that is likely to terrorize the populace and, therefore,¶ detract from the common good.99 This development in First¶ Amendment jurisprudence indicates that there is more to democracy¶ than self-determination.¶ Post's most recent statement on hate speech does not address¶ Black, even though the chapter was written after the Court¶ rendered its decision. 100 He connects the expression of hate to¶ "'extreme' intolerance and 'extreme' dislike."' °¶ ' This description,¶ while correct, does not account for the connection between hate¶ speech and extreme conduct. While the Constitution does not¶ authorize laws against negative emotions, speech that is¶ substantially likely to cause discriminatory harm, especially violence, can be regulated without infringing on the fundamental¶ principles of democracy.

Tournament: Damus | Round: 1 | Opponent: Loyola AB | Judge: Smith, Calen
Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)

The CP Solves the Case 

1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
   Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis) 

2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029) 

3. The CRB doesn’t have to work- it creates a deterrent effect
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029) 

4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306) 

The net benefit is Tech Shift
A. Absent established, oppositional civilian review police harassment will shift to technology based surveillance which avoids rights protections
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029) 

B. Civil rights focus fails- it takes a black and white approach to police conduct that ensures resistance
Schlanger, 15 – Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan (Margo, “Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 6, pg. 112, 2015, Lexis)

Tournament: Damus | Round: 1 | Opponent: Loyola AB | Judge: Smith, Calen
The new generation LGBTQ movement is working with community-based solutions, moving away from the flare of courts. Lazare ‘10/13
Sarah Lazare is a staff writer for AlterNet, A former staff writer for Common Dreams. “Meet 5 Movement Leaders Across the U.S. Fighting for LGTBQ Issues on the Ground.” Alternet. October 13, 2016. http://www.alternet.org/lgbtq/meet-5-movement-leaders-across-us-fighting-lgtbq-issues-ground JJN

Court civil rights victories act as fly paper drawing other social movements into the court to focus on litigation strategies
Rosenberg 8 (Gerald N., University of Chicago political science and law professor, Ph.D. from Yale University, member of the Washington, D.C. bar, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?, p. 427) 

Courts wreck movements
Becker 93 (Mary, Prof of Law @ University of Chicago Law School; 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 975 ln)

The court system destroys crucial parts of the LGBTQ movement and works to further marginalize people. Leachman ‘14
Gwendolyn M. Leachman - Gwendolyn M. Leachman. Sears Law Fellow, Williams Institute on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, UCLA School of Law; J.D.; Ph.D. Candidate, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, UC Berkeley. “From Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT Movement’s Agenda.” University of California, Davis. 2014. http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/47/5/Articles/47-5_Leachman.pdf JJN *bracketed for offensive language

LGBTQ Rights are crucial to avoid extinction Tatchell ’89
Peter Tatchell - is a British human rights campaignerbest known for his work with LGBT social movements, was selected as Labour Party Parliamentary candidate for Bermondsey. “Gay Liberation is Central to Human Emancipation.” Peter Tatchell.net. However, note at the bottom: “An edited version of this article was published in "Labour Briefing", 1989. See also "Beyond lesbian and gay rights", Interlink. May /June 1989.” http://www.petertatchell.net/masculinity/gay_liberation.htm JJN *bracketed for offensive language

Tournament: Damus | Round: 4 | Opponent: Marlborough SD | Judge: Scott Wheeler
TPP is predicted to pass, but there’s no time to waste. Mitchell ‘11/2
Peter Mitchell - AAP US Correspondent, Australian Associated Press. “US: White House bullish on TPP passing.” News.com.au. November 2, 2016. http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/us-white-house-bullish-on-tpp-passing/news-story/66aaccb30c94f3301f95fa652040190f JJN

TPP is top of Obama’s priorities, PC is key. Creighton ‘10/27
Adam Creighton – economics correspondent Washington. “Hope for TPP as Obama administration works the phones.” The Australian Business Review. October 27, 2016. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/economics/hope-for-tpp-as-obama-administration-works-the-phones/news-story/8ce5e112900eb06ca2bb0711d3aa16ce JJN

The plan sparks congressional debate. Orenstein ‘16
WALKER ORENSTEIN. “Reform advocates upset over pushback over changing malice law.” The News Tribune. July 29, 2016. http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article92684372.html JJN

Solves multiple extinction scenarios. Morimoto ‘15
Andy Morimoto is a research associate at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “The Strategic Costs of TPP Failure.” The Diplomat. August 22, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-strategic-costs-of-tpp-failure/ JJN

Regional hegemony is key to stop nuke war.  Rudd 11
Rudd 11 – Kevin Rudd, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “The Case for American Engagement in Asia: The Australian Perspective”, 9-15, http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2011/kr_sp_110915.aspx?ministerid=2

Tournament: Glenbrooks | Round: 1 | Opponent: New Trier BS | Judge: Yerneni, Neel
Shell
Generic
Capitalism is at a crisis point – Trump in the white house has put American society on a collision course and the political has already been ceded to the far right. The only solution is an unflinching critique of neoliberalism. Hedges 11/11
Chris Hedges Chris Hedges, whose column is published weekly on Truthdig, has written 11 books, including the New York Times best seller “Days of Destruction 11/11/16 It’s Worse Than You Think http://www.truthdig.com/report/page2/its_worse_than_you_think_20161111

The affirmative’s legalistic approach to police violence brings us further away from recognizing the economic forces at work that makes police violence inevitable. Lane 7/21.
ALYCEE LANE JULY 21, 2016 “Violence, Death and Our Neoliberal Police”  http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/07/21/violence-death-and-our-neoliberal-police/

Blaming violence on ‘bad individual’s through civil suits replicates neoliberalism – it deflects blame on to individuals whose actions are predetermined by neoliberalism. Smith 15
Robert C. Smith The author of several books and over 100 academic articles, Robert is a Teaching-Scholar at the Cooperative Institute of Transnational Studies. He is also the founder of Heathwood Institute and PressHeathwood Institute and Press¶ AN INSTITUTION OF OPPRESSION OR FOR PUBLIC WELL-BEING AND CIVIL RIGHTS? REFLECTIONS ON THE INSTITUTION OF POLICE AND A RADICAL ALTERNATIVE May 4, 2015¶  http://www.heathwoodpress.com/an-institution-of-oppression-or-for-public-well-being-and-civil-rights-reflections-on-the-institution-of-police-and-a-radical-alternative-r-c-smith/

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

The alternative is an embrace of class-consciousness as a method of critiquing neoliberalism’s grip on policing. LaVenia 15
Peter A. LaVenia PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, SUNY. He is the Secretary of the NY State Green Party and manages Matt Funiciello’s campaign for Congress. JANUARY 16, 2015 “Police Behavior and Neoliberalism” http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/01/16/police-behavior-and-neoliberalism/

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. 

First, neoliberalism sustains itself by operating by propagating a narrow lens of what it means to be ‘political.’ We situate the judge as a critical educator who steps back to evaluate the frames through which we view policy first. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file

Second, the knowledge claims of the AC are the jumping off point for the debate – our framework provides a more reasonable neg burden. When a student turns in an F paper, no teacher has an obligation to write an entirely new paper to show it was bad – pointing out major academic deficiencies would justify failing the paper – the ballot asks who did the better debating, so if their analysis is wrong, they haven’t. 

Third, serial policy failure – policing is about culture. A refusal to stop and recognize the cultural underpinnings of the AFF dooms repeating the same failed policies that created the problem. . Smith 15
Robert C. Smith The author of several books and over 100 academic articles, Robert is a Teaching-Scholar at the Cooperative Institute of Transnational Studies. He is also the founder of Heathwood Institute and PressHeathwood Institute and Press¶ AN INSTITUTION OF OPPRESSION OR FOR PUBLIC WELL-BEING AND CIVIL RIGHTS? REFLECTIONS ON THE INSTITUTION OF POLICE AND A RADICAL ALTERNATIVE May 4, 2015¶  http://www.heathwoodpress.com/an-institution-of-oppression-or-for-public-well-being-and-civil-rights-reflections-on-the-institution-of-police-and-a-radical-alternative-r-c-smith/

Tournament: Damus | Round: Quarters | Opponent: Immaculate Heart DD | Judge: Adam Torson, Zane Dille, Ryan Powell
Plan

Counterplan Text: We advocate the entirety of the aff plan without the use of the words “structural violence”.

The counterplan is inherently competitive. Since we defend the entirety of the aff advocacy aside from a change in certain rhetoric a perm would be severance out of both the reps and the language of the 1AC.   

Definition

They misunderstand the meaning of the term “structural violence”. It is a specific term of art used in the sociological field of peace research that has been widely discredited by both critics and the terms creator.  

Structural violence” is a term coined by Johan Galtung, it refers to violence where no single decision maker is responsible- like poverty which results from the global economy. Gatlung 12
Galtung Institute 12
(https://www.galtung-institut.de/en/network/groups/anything-galtung/forum/topic/understanding-galtungs-violence-triangle-and-structural-violence/)

Theories of structural violence explore how political, economic and cultural structures result in the occurrence of avoidable violence, most commonly seen as the deprivation of basic human needs (will be discussed later). Structural theorists attempt to link personal suffering with political, social and cultural choices. Johan Galtung’s original definition included a lack of human agency; that is the violence is not a direct act of any decision or action made by a particular person but a result of an unequal distribution of resources.Here, we must also understand “institutional violence”. “Institutional violence” is often mistaken for structural violence, but this is not the case. “Institutional violence” should be used to refer to violence perpetrated by institutions like companies, universities, corporations, organisations as opposed to individuals. The fact that women are paid less at an establishment than men is an act of direct violence by that specific establishment. It is true that there is a relationship with structural violence as there is between interpersonal violence and structural violence. And Structural violence is the most problematic area to be addressed for conflict transformation.

Net Benefits
Reliance on the vague concept of “structural violence” recreates oppression.  
Subpoint A: Theories of “structural violence” distract solutions to material conditions in favor of vague criticism of poorly defined systems. Existing structures will co-opt your criticism and the process trades off with more effective reforms.
1.Structural violence obscures analysis necessary to reduce poverty and violence- this card is on fire. Boulding 77
Kenneth Boulding, Prof Univ. of Michigan and UC Boulder,  Journal of Peace Research 1977; 14; 75 p.  Boulding p.   83-4

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of ’structural violence’ and ’positive peace’. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is ’like’ a thug beating up the victim and taking his money away from him in the street, -or it is ’like’ a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modem world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galtung’s metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a ’threshold’ phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent ’breaks’ in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the ’strain’ on a system is too great for its ‘strength’. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficulty to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is the increase in the strength of the system, the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these things, which enable a system to stand Increasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflict of interest are only part of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people to know their interests, and misperceptions of interests take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people’s behavior, not the ’real’ interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined by one unkind commentator as anything that Galltung doesn’t like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, an that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all the problems off poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to the structures which, produce violence. This is not to say  that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are culture of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out off ’it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a ’service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

2. Galtung’s theory of structural violence perpetuates the status quo of dominant states by offering an overly vague criticism of oppression. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

In the late 1960's Galtung's foundational model of peace research was subjected to considerable criticism as part of a general upheaval within the peace research community. A group of young, mostly Scandinavian, radicals employed a neo-Marxist perspective to attack the assumptions of symmetry and ideological neutrality that formed the core of Galtung's argument (Schmid 1968, 1970; Olsen and Jarvad 1969; Eckhardt 1971; Dencik 1982). Though their primary target was American conflict research and its contribution to the analysis of the Vietnam War, they questioned also Galtung's assumption that the path to peace lay in the principles of integration and cooperation. For the radicals, Galtung's approach neglected the political-economy of relations between the developed and underdeveloped worlds and in its attempt to preserve a sym- metrical approach to violent conflict was guilty of 'idealistic universal- ism'. From the perspective of the oppressed, an argument for the further integration of the international system was tantamount to defending a status quo which reflected the interests of the dominant states and the beneficiaries of the world capitalist economy. Against this, the radicals called for a peace research that openly sided with the exploited and advocated the 'sharpening' of the various latent conflicts of interests that characterised global politics.

3. Resolving “structural violence” requires action by international powers, as they are the only bodies capable of amending existing “structures”. This reliance on current institutions preserves existing structures of dominance. Schmid 68
Peace Research and Politics; Herman Schmid; Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 217-232; 1968; Sage Publications; http://www.jstor.org/stable/423274

Peace research is an applied or 'oriented' science. An applied science has to be applied by somebody who has the power to apply it. In the case of peace research, this means there must be some kind of institutionalized link between peace re- searchers and decision-makers on the supranational level. Thus, the universalist ethos of peace research becomes operationalized into identification with the interests of the existing international system, that is the interests of those who have power 229 in the international system. So peace research becomes a factor supporting the status quo of the international power structure, providing the decision-makers of the system with knowledge for control, manipulation and integration of the system. That is the institutional aspect of peace research. The theoretical frame of reference dominating peace research closely cor- responds to the institutional needs: the peace researcher/specialist is trained in an ideology of internationalism; he has learned how to solve conflicts, how to integrate a system, how to avoid manifest organized violence, how to prevent major uprisings against the system; and he believes that what is good for the system is in the long run also good for its elements. His concept of peace is essentially a negative one, stressing the need for stable peace,38 and the 'common interest' he will have to fall back on is the avoidance of catastrophe. His positive concept of peace is not sui generis but a negation of his negative peace concept. The essence of peace research is concentrated in the concepts of control of the international sys- tem to prevent major breakdowns, and integration of the international system to make it more stable. That is the ideological aspect of peace research. The institutional and the ideological aspects presuppose and condition each other. To become applied, peace research must meet the needs of the decision- makers. To satisfy their concern about stable peace, peace researchers must ally themselves with the decision-makers of the international system. Given this situation, change of the system can not be advocated by peace research. Structural change would be a threat to the power-holders of the international system. Only adaptive change within the system is possible.

4. Theories of structural violence offer a one-sided mechanism of achieving equality in which instead of aiding the poor we focus primarily on bringing down the rich, resulting in a system that is technically equal but objectively destitute. Boulding 77
Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung; Kenneth E. Boulding; Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86; Sage Publications, Ltd; http://www.jstor.org/stable/423312

Because of his passion for equality, his hatred of hierarchy, dominance, top dogs, and anything which looks like oppression (much of which is praiseworthy), Galtung identifies entropy as a symbol of goodness and regards negentropy, that is, structure, improbability, and potential, as evil. Galt- ung is all for the increase of social entropy so far as that means destruction of organi- zation and hierarchy, the dissipation of wealth, 'and the reduction of everything to a dead level. It would almost seem as if Galtung would regard the last ultimate whimper of the universe, according to the second law of thermodynamics, in which all things are at an equal temperature and equally distributed throughout space so that nothing more can 'conceivably happen, as the ultimate heaven, or perhaps one should say Nirvana, towards which all this uncom- fortable and unequal structure of stars and planets, life and society, will eventually move. Here we see the profound difference be- tween the structural and the evolutionary points of view. The structural point of view turns out to be inimical to the ideal of struc- ture itself, and sees structure as the enemy of equality - which it is. The evolutionary point of view sees the whole evolutionary process as the segregation of entropy, the building up of little castles of order in the crystal, in DNA, in life, in humans, and in their innumerable artifacts both personal, material and organizational, always at the cost, according to the second law, of increas- ing thermodynamic disorder elsewhere, in our case of course nicely segregated in the sun about which we don't have to worry. The structuralist sees pollution in the struc- ture whether it is smoke, slums or vice and says 'away with it. The evolutionist sees pollution as part of the price of evolution itself. Gal'tung's misunderstandings about entro- py derive, one suspects, from the cardinal principle of his normative system, the over- whelmingly strong value which he gives to equality as such. One almost suspect's that Galtung would prefer a society in which everybody were equally destitute rather than one in which some were destitute and 'some were rich. A passion for equality as such, however, can easily lead into the hatred of the rich without any love for the poor. One can put a very strong negative value on poverty and believe it should be abolished wi'thout believing in equality at all. This would lead to a society with a floor below which nobody were allowed to fall, but above which a high degree of inequality would be tolerable. Galtung nowhere spells out what his ideal society would be, and in- deed if any of us did this we would probably decide that we did not like it af'ter all! But the drive for equality as such is extremely strong in all his writings.

Subpoint B: Attempts to resolve “structural violence” inevitably result in the perpetuation of physical violence that shuts off democratic channels for minority representation. 

1. The concept of structural violence shuts down democratic debate and justifies violent lash outs to combat inequality. Maley 88
   William Maley,  Professor and Director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at The Australian National University , Australian Journal of International Affairs 42, 1988

The deployment of a notion of positive peace has been a far from innocuous development in peace research. A comprehensive theory of needs, where needs are not defined simply as necessary means to an agreed end, can be the basis for a suppression of both democratic and liberal aspirations. Democracy and Liberty are both concerned with personal desires, the former in the sphere of the polity, and the latter in the sphere of the individual. Needs theory subjugates both the individual and the polity to the abstract ideology of the needs theorist. When Maxim Litvinov remarked in Geneva in the 1930s that peace is indivisible, he was referring to the negative sense of the term. 'Negative peace' is one of the few social values in whose name crimes can be committed only at the cost of self-contradiction. However, if 'negative peace' must be associated with 'positive peace' to give rise to peace in totality, then peace is no longer indivisible —since direct violence may be defended as a means of eliminating `structural violence'. This defence is a familiar one, resembling the classic liberal justification for rebellion, and even in certain circumstances intervention. Christian Bay has argued that structural violence `may be so extreme that a limited war must be deemed a lesser evil, if there is no other way to end or mitigate the structural violence, and if the war is sure to remain limited and brief in duration.'" This blithe assumption — that there could ever be circumstances in which one could be absolutely sure that a war would remain limited and brief in duration — is a splendid illustration of Bay's detachment from the real world. Nonetheless, the greatest danger in his claim stems from the extraordinary elasticity of the notion of structural violence. This is best brought out by the Danish peace researcher Lars Dencik, although using slightly different terminology. He defines conflicts as `incompatible interests', and goes on to remark that 'incompatible interests are here defined objectively, i.e. by the observing scientist according to his theory and is sic independent of the actual subjective consciousness of the actors involved. This means that incompatible interests are conceived of as structural (actor indepen-dent), the structure defined according to the theory of the scientist.'" He draws the predictable conclusion that 'in certain situations "revolutionary violence" may be the necessary means to obtain conflict resolution proper'." This is irresistibly reminiscent of the conclusion of Georges Sorel's Reflections on Violence, that it is `to violence that Socialism owes those high ethical values by means of which it brings salvation to the modern world'20, and it is instructive, though for peace educators perhaps not very comforting, to recall that Sorel's ideas eventually were used in justification of Italian Fascism." (p. 30)

2. Democratic deliberation is key to avoid massive violence. Halperin 11
(Morton H., Senior Advisor – Open Society Institute and Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress, “Unconventional Wisdom – Democracy is Still Worth Fighting For”, Foreign Policy, January / February, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional_wisdom?page=0,11)

As the United States struggles to wind down two wars and recover from a humbling financial crisis, realism is enjoying a renaissance. Afghanistan and Iraq bear scant resemblance to the democracies we were promised. The Treasury is broke. And America has a president, Barack Obama, who once compared his foreign-policy philosophy to the realism of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr: "There's serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain," Obama said during his 2008 campaign. "And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things." But one can take such words of wisdom to the extreme-as realists like former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and writer Robert Kaplan sometimes do, arguing that the United States can't afford the risks inherent in supporting democracy and human rights around the world. Others, such as cultural historian Jacques Barzun, go even further, saying that America can't export democracy at all, "because it is not an ideology but a wayward historical development." Taken too far, such realist absolutism can be just as dangerous, and wrong, as neoconservative hubris. For there is one thing the neocons get right: As I argue in The Democracy Advantage, democratic governments are more likely than autocratic regimes to engage in conduct that advances U.S. interests and avoids situations that pose a threat to peace and security. Democratic states are more likely to develop and to avoid famines and economic collapse. They are also less likely to become failed states or suffer a civil war. Democratic states are also more likely to cooperate in dealing with security issues, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the bloody aftermath of the Iraq invasion painfully shows, democracy cannot be imposed from the outside by force or coercion. It must come from the people of a nation working to get on the path of democracy and then adopting the policies necessary to remain on that path. But we should be careful about overlearning the lessons of Iraq. In fact, the outside world can make an enormous difference in whether such efforts succeed. There are numerous examples-starting with Spain and Portugal and spreading to Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia-in which the struggle to establish democracy and advance human rights received critical support from multilateral bodies, including the United Nations, as well as from regional organizations, democratic governments, and private groups. It is very much in America's interest to provide such assistance now to new democracies, such as Indonesia, Liberia, and Nepal, and to stand with those advocating democracy in countries such as Belarus, Burma, and China. It will still be true that the United States will sometimes need to work with a nondemocratic regime to secure an immediate objective, such as use of a military base to support the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, or in the case of Russia, to sign an arms-control treaty. None of that, however, should come at the expense of speaking out in support of those struggling for their rights. Nor should we doubt that America would be more secure if they succeed.

3. Combatting “structural violence” justifies reactionary violence against a system that is poorly defined. This makes conflict inevitable and trades-off with peaceful reform. Quester
George H. Quester is chair of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, ANNALS, AAPSS, 504, July 1989
A third major problem to be raised about some forms of peace research and peace studies, again related to what we have al- ready discussed, arises in the tendency to define peace as much more than an absence of the organized violence of warfare, to define it indeed as the elimination also of poverty and injustice and of prejudice and tyranny, and so on-namely, to define peace simply as a synonym for what is good, for what an economist would call utility. Sometimes we are thus told that an op- position to violence must include an oppo- sition to "structural violence,"7 with the latter phrase presumably meaning any or- ganizational or power relationships that vi- olate the moral standards of the beholder, or we are also told that we must be in favor of "positive peace," which will include all of these good things, accomplished some- how simultaneously, rather than being con- tent with a "negative peace," limited merely to an absence of warfare. Surely there is a great deal that is lost from all of these definitional innovations, but what is there to be gained? If someone assumed, as noted previously, that con- sciousnesses somehow have to be raised, then it may well seem important. as an educational and motivational vehicle, to insist that peace includes an end to poverty or racism. If one assumes that there can never be an avoidance of war unless one simultaneously has an avoidance of pov-erty or racism or other social evils, then this causal link will also suggest a definitional link. But, if there is indeed no such one-to- one link in causal relationships and if mo- tivation is not the entirety of the problem of war and peace, then we surely will have thrown away a great deal of clarity if we insist on calling everything bad "war" or "violence" and if we insist on referring to everything we favor as "peace." This would be a little like telling the American Cancer Society that every disease now has to be referred to as "cancer," including heart disease and cholera and meningitis. Can medicine make any progress at all if it is not allowed to use different words for different ailments? Is it really true that to use different words for war and dictator- ship and poverty is to weaken our motiva- tion or to accept the inevitability of some evils or actually to favor the existence of such evils? If one goes far enough in accepting the definitional innovations produced by some peace studies curricula, it becomes possi- ble then to define violent attacks as peace- ful, as long as they are intended to eliminate racism or injustice, because these attacks are to oppose "structural violence." At the worst, this kind of redefinition is deliberately misleading, as war and vio- lence are defined as being inappropriate for any cause except one's own. At a less du- plicitous level, we simply have some need- less confusion brought into the process, by some relatively honest and well-meaning people.

Subpoint C: The term “structural violence” is insufficient for diagnosing the reality of oppression. It is not a method for liberation, just an ivory tower theory. 

1. The term “structural violence” is incredibly vague. It can refer to any form of exploitation. Leech 12
   Galtung’s ‘Structural Violence’ and the Sierra Leone Civil War c.1985-1992; Dr. Philip JM Leech lecturer in International Relations at Plymouth University where he teaches International Relations of the Middle East; October 12, 2012;
   https://whereshouldthebirdsfly.wordpress.com/2012/10/12/galtungs-structural-violence-and-the-sierra-leone-civil-war-c-1985-1992/

The critical element or link in the chain of this ‘causal flow’ (200 Galtung, 1996) is structural violence. It is the process that links cultural distinction to Direct Violence. Structural violence is an ostensive label that may be applied to a broad range of phenomena. What Galtung notes as definitive is that Structural violence is the process of deprivation of needs. Each part of the violence equation depends on the existence of the other two before the violent conflict become truly serious and sustained  (197-200 Galtung, 1996). It need not be consistent or radical . Simply put, it is violence embodied by a structure, or violence that ‘operates regardless of intent’ (93 Galtung, 1996). It is characterized politically as repression, and economically by exploitation. However, Galtung notes that ‘blunt repression/exploitation is necessary but not sufficient’ (93 Galtung, 1996). In fact the nature of structural violence is somewhat vague in that it allows the quantity and the qualitative nature of aggression and dominance to be variable (201 Galtung, 1996).

2. John Galtung, the creator of the concept of “structural violence”, admitted that his theory couldn’t be applied objectively. We cannot even assess what “structural violence” is. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

For Galtung sociology was undoubtedly a science. In contrast to the formal sciences of logic and mathematics, sociology was a 'factual' science, which in terms of scientific rigour occupied a middle position between physics and the 'humanistic sciences' (Galtung 1958d, p.88). His account of the virtues of applying science to the study of the social world was, nonetheless, ambiguous. Galtung (1958d) recognised that the object-domain of the social sciences made the application of scientific method difficult and perhaps impossible if overly high standards were applied. Consequently he argued that the primary purpose of social science was to generate descriptive empirical statements which would have to be sub-jected to some form of testing procedure (1958b). Theory-building could follow but was not essential to the claim for scientific status (Galtung1959b, p. 10). Galtung also admitted that significant problems existed regarding the scientific assessment of theoretical statements about the social world, but in a manner characteristic of his subsequent work appealed to the future development of suitable analytical tools. Though his discussion of the question of value-freedom was often ambiguous in his early sociological papers, Galtung informed his stu-dents that value-statements were not testable and therefore unscientific(1958d, p.92). Though Galtung recognised that values impinged upon the conduct of social science in a variety of ways — inter alia, the deter-mination of investigative focus, the exclusion of undesired results and the procurement of financial support — the problem was consistently presented as one of degree and not destructive of a genuinely scientific sociology (1958b).

3. “Structural violence” rejects holding any specific group or class responsible for exploitation in favor of a vacuous criticism of a “system” that it never fully identifies. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

Galtung also rejected the implication of the radical critique that specific groups or social classes were responsible for exploitation. The term 'exploitation' was refused by him on the grounds that it was politically and emotionally overloaded. The continuing influence of his sociological orientation was evident in the preference for offering a definition of violence as an abstract systemic property that can be comprehended without reference to specific historical conjunctures or agents. But Gal- tung's approach also reflected the influence of Gandhi, from whom was taken the view that a distinction should be made between status actions and status holders (1959c, 1980). It is the structure of social interaction within which agents of violence act that is to be attacked, rather than the agents themselves. To attack the agents is to meet one form of violence with another. True dedication to the doctrine of ahimsa required 'the return of good for evil' and a distinction between the doer and the deed (Galtung 1959c; Borman 1986). However Gandhian ethics arose out of a complex matrix of occidental and oriental philosophical principles never fully explicated by even Gandhi himself (Sharma 1965; Borman 1986). Galtung restricted his treatment of Gandhi's thought to the draw- ing out of some practical implications. Though he was to later complain of the failure of his critics to see the imprint of Gandhi on his work, this is hardly surprising since few clues were provided. The fundamental problem with the concept of structural violence was that it was vacuous without a substantiation of the value-system on which it depended. The denial of potentiality by structural violence, presupposed some notion of human potential. As one critic noted, without a clear analysis of the values underpinning it, the concept was reduced to a label to be applied to anything its author did not like (Eide 1971)

4. “Structural violence” cannot explain social changes or the exact origins of violence beyond the fact that it simply exists. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

In his sociological writings Galtung provided no analysis or defence of any specific values, other than to claim that they were empirically held, or to assert that values should be revised in reflection of systemic changes. What was missing was a sense of the politics of social change. Even if consensus could be established as to the direction in which a social system is moving, it is a different matter to evaluate such change. Furth-ermore, how are we to choose between competing and non-commensurable understandings of systemic 'health'? The only answer implicit in Galtung's discussion was that empirical evidence must be produced to show which set of values accorded best with the social system under scrutiny. That brings us back full-circle to the value-contamination of observation and the impact of the political perspective that conditions our analysis of social systems. Functionalism can be wedded to any political ideology, but being a descriptive rather than analytical discourse it cannot provide that ideology. Though aware of the problem of defending values outside of a dis-tinctly normative discourse, Galtung was not apparently perturbed by it. In his discussion of functionalism (1959a) he claimed that there were' fairly inter-subjectively communicable and consensual standards' such as 'sane', 'healthy' or 'normal', against which social systems could be judged. For Galtung, to describe a system as 'healthy' was not a value-judgement, in contrast to the claim that 'healthy is good'. Leaving aside the question as to whether the distinction holds or if 'fairly consensual 'constitutes a scientific category, it became clear that when Galtung turned to peace research the evaluative standard of 'peace' was to be sim-ilarly derived and understood. In its Galtungian mould, peace research was differentiated from earlier forms of normative enquiry into global social relations by the absence of any distinctly normative discourse.

5. Galtung’s theory of structural violence is entirely theoretical. It makes massive leaps in logic and cannot even quantify the violence people suffer. Rummel
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR: VOL. 5: THE JUST PEACE, Chapter 3, Alternative Concepts Of Peace*; R.J. Rummel; https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/TJP.CHAP3.HTM

Structural violence appears, for Galtung, when resources, or especially the power to allocate them, are unevenly distributed: when people are starving and this could be avoided; when life expectancy is much greater in the upper class; when a small elite control the entry into high status. Here, without any prior ethical analysis or normative preparation,110 Galtung makes his first intellectual broad jump from the analytical-empirical plane to the ethical, but in a most cavalier manner: "In order not to overwork the word violence we shall sometimes refer to the condition of structural violence as social injustice."111¶ Then Galtung presents his final two distinctions (dimensions) regarding violence: it may be intended or unintended, or manifest or latent. With these and the other distinctions mentioned, Galtung defines a "typology of violence" in which the personal-structural distinctions are basic. In focusing on the means of personal and structural violence Galtung makes his second broad jump, but now back from the ethical to the analytical-empirical plane--again without analysis and as offhanded: "If we accept that the general formula behind structural violence is inequality, above all in the distribution of power, then this can be measured."112¶ D. His Concept of "Positive Peace." The above serves as an introduction to six factors maintaining inequalitarian distributions--that is, "mechanisms of structural violence"113--which are of no concern here. Nor need we tarry over Galtung's discussion of the relationship between personal and structural violence, and the trade-offs in emphasizing a system that is higher on one than another. But what I should mention is his conclusion on the definition of peace: ¶ E. His Political Theory. Thus, structural violence = unactualized human potentials = social injustice = inequality. Therefore, positive peace = equality = social justice = realized human potentials = absence of structural violence. This equation is stipulated; analysis to support the critical relationships are lacking; and the definitional and substantive problems in the formulation are glaring. One should understand, however, that the critical relationships and definitions are entirely theoretical. Even violence, usually an easily measured empirical concept of physical harm and destruction, is converted into a construct meaning unactualized human potential, then equated in theory with injustice and, thence, equality--each of them constructs.

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