Harvard Westlake Nayar Neg
| Tournament | Round | Opponent | Judge | Cites | Round Report | Open Source | Edit/Delete |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Damus | 1 | Loyola AB | Smith, Calen |
|
|
| |
| Damus | Quarters | Immaculate Heart DD | Adam Torson, Zane Dille, Ryan Powell |
|
|
| |
| Damus | 1 | Loyola AB | Smith, Calen |
|
| ||
| Damus | 1 | Loyola AB | Smith, Calen |
|
| ||
| Damus | 1 | Loyola AB | Smith, Calen |
|
|
| |
| Damus | 4 | Marlborough SD | Scott Wheeler |
|
|
| |
| Damus | 1 | Loyola AB | Smith, Calen |
|
|
| |
| Glenbrooks | 1 | New Trier BS | Yerneni, Neel |
|
|
| |
| Glenbrooks | 1 | New Trier BS | Yerneni, Neel |
|
|
| |
| Golden Desert | 2 | Harker EM | Matthew Leuvano |
|
|
| |
| Golden Desert | 1 | Chaminade JB | Kathy Bond |
|
|
| |
| Holy Cross | 3 | Newark Science BA |
|
| |||
| Loyola | 1 | San Marino KWu | Adam Bistagne |
|
| ||
| Loyola | 3 | Palo Alto BH | Kris Kaya |
|
| ||
| Loyola | Doubles | Brentwood EL |
|
| |||
| Newark | 1 | I forgot sorry | I forgot sorry |
|
| ||
| Newark | 2 | Lexington KL | Boussayoud, Imen |
|
|
| |
| Newark Round Robin | 1 | Newark Science TA | Chetan Hertzig, Abdul Beretay |
|
|
| |
| Newark Round Robin | 1 | Newark Science TA | Chetan Hertzig, Abdul Beretay |
|
|
| |
| SEPT-OCT - Yale NC r1 - Warming, Elections, Case turn, SSD | 1 | Westford VA |
|
| |||
| USC | 6 | Loyola LA | Cooper, Devan |
|
|
| |
| XX | 1 | XX | XX |
|
| ||
| XX | 1 | XX | XX |
|
| ||
| Yale | 1 | Westford VA |
|
| |||
| Yale | 6 | Mountain View DZ | John Staunton |
|
| ||
| Yale | 3 | Hunter MS | Christian Quinoz |
|
| ||
| any | 1 | any | any |
|
|
| Tournament | Round | Report |
|---|---|---|
| Damus | 1 | Opponent: Loyola AB | Judge: Smith, Calen 1AC Cap |
| Damus | Quarters | Opponent: Immaculate Heart DD | Judge: Adam Torson, Zane Dille, Ryan Powell 1AC structural violence AC |
| Damus | 1 | Opponent: Loyola AB | Judge: Smith, Calen 1AC - Cap AC |
| Damus | 4 | Opponent: Marlborough SD | Judge: Scott Wheeler 1AC Police brutality - minority and LGBTQ Advantage |
| Damus | 1 | Opponent: Loyola AB | Judge: Smith, Calen 1AC - Cap AC |
| Glenbrooks | 1 | Opponent: New Trier BS | Judge: Yerneni, Neel 1AC Police Brutality |
| Glenbrooks | 1 | Opponent: New Trier BS | Judge: Yerneni, Neel 1AC police brutality |
| Golden Desert | 2 | Opponent: Harker EM | Judge: Matthew Leuvano AC - Chronicle |
| Golden Desert | 1 | Opponent: Chaminade JB | Judge: Kathy Bond AC - Racism marketplace ideas |
| Newark | 2 | Opponent: Lexington KL | Judge: Boussayoud, Imen AC - Cap |
| Newark Round Robin | 1 | Opponent: Newark Science TA | Judge: Chetan Hertzig, Abdul Beretay AC Black and Brown Americans Get Free Speech |
| Newark Round Robin | 1 | Opponent: Newark Science TA | Judge: Chetan Hertzig, Abdul Beretay AC Black and Brown Americans Get Free Speech |
| USC | 6 | Opponent: Loyola LA | Judge: Cooper, Devan AC - Metanarratives |
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
| Entry | Date |
|---|---|
0 - Contact InfoTournament: XX | Round: 1 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX | 10/2/16 |
JAN-FEB - CRT KTournament: Newark | Round: 1 | Opponent: I forgot sorry | Judge: I forgot sorry Free speech assumes a level playing field but the voices of some are always used to marginalize those of others. Delgado 2k Turns the case – hate speech does real violence to people of color and necessarily locks in relationships of domination. Delgado and Stefacic ‘09 The alternative is to embrace the demand of abolitionism – we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements. Oparah 14 Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014). The role of the ballot is to interrogate the AFF’s scholarship using the lens of critical race theory. This makes the passage of the plan irrelevant. First, their refusal of minority voices is a conscious choice. Delgado 84 Delgado, Richard. "The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132.3 (1984): 561-578. Second, a focus on political action assumes a kind of democratic liberalism that is inaccessible to marginalized voices. Refuse their demand for concrete state action. Lopez 03 López, Gerardo R. University of Utah, Salt Lake City "The (racially neutral) politics of education: A critical race theory perspective." Educational Administration Quarterly 39.1 (2003): 68-94. Third, Debate is a space in which racial identity can be understood—This dynamic is key to confronting racial domination and questioning the underlying aspects of negative racial identities. Reid-Brinkley 08 | 2/6/17 |
JAN-FEB - Harrassment DATournament: Newark | Round: 2 | Opponent: Lexington KL | Judge: Boussayoud, Imen And, increased investigations are a crucial way to hold schools accountable. Bricker 12. AFF guts effectiveness of Title IX – it causes first amendment opportunism. Schauer 04 Sexual harassment in the classroom is a result of patriarchal violence that invades academia. Sexual harassment represents an oppressive use of power by professors and kills the participation and success of the harassed. Benson and Thomson 82 Benson, Donna J., and Gregg E. Thomson. "Sexual harassment on a university campus: The confluence of authority relations, sexual interest and gender stratification." Social problems 29.3 (1982): 236-251. Empirically proven with graduation rates – Aff kills diversity. Bricker 12. Diversity key to competitiveness. Hyman and Jacobs ‘09 Loss of US competitiveness affects countries all around the world – causes widespread poverty. Porter and Rivkin ‘12 | 2/6/17 |
JAN-FEB - T AnyTournament: Newark Round Robin | Round: 1 | Opponent: Newark Science TA | Judge: Chetan Hertzig, Abdul Beretay Counterplans that restrict only certain forms of speech are theoretically illegitimate. The term “any” is the res is the weak form of “any” - “not any” statements refer to “all”. Cambridge Dictionary Cambridge Dictionary, Any, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/grammar/british-grammar/quantifiers/any. NS A. It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it. B. Grammar is the most objective since it doesn’t rely on arbitrary determinants of what constitutes the best type of debate – it’s the only impact you can evaluate. C. The AFF isn’t topical regardless of fairness or education since it doesn’t affirm the text - we wouldn’t debate rehab again just because it was a good topic.. Violation: Standards:
2. Legal precision – multiple court rulings agree with our interp. Elder 91 Legal precision determines topic literature and pre round prep – it’s a legal topic about first amendment jurisprudence. This is key to predictability and giving the neg a fair research burden to engage the affirmative. Vote on substantive engagement: otherwise we’re speaking without debating and there’s nothing to separate us from dueling oratory. It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics. Drop the debater on T: A. Hold them accountable for their interp – a topical advocacy frames the debate - drop the arg lets them jump ship to a new layer killing NEG ground. B. Drop the arg on T is the same thing as drop the debater since T indicts their advocacy Competing interps since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation. No RVIs: A. They incentivize debaters to go all in in theory and bait it with abusive practices, killing substantive clash on other flows. B. They can run theory on me too if I’m unfair so 1) theory is reciprocal because we’re both able to check abuse and 2) also cures time skew because they can collapse in the 2ar to their shell. | 1/6/17 |
JAN-FEB Cap KTournament: Golden Desert | Round: 1 | Opponent: Chaminade JB | Judge: Kathy Bond Gus Bagakis retired philosophy instructor at San Francisco State University and author of "Seeing Through The System: The Invisible Class Struggle in America," October 15, 2016 “Neoliberalism's Decades-Long Attack on Public Universities” Free speech is an illusion propagated by corporatists – their model of rights assumes an equal playing field analogous to free market economists view of capital. The promotion of free speech perpetuates the idea that speech is a commodity, which strengthens neoliberalism’s hold on the academy. Brown 15 This turns the case – the commodification of speech reflects the capitalist illusion of freedom. It makes speech meaningless and kills value to life. Smith ‘14 Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15 The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Oparah 14 The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. First, neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015 Second, the knowledge claims of the AC are the jumping off point for the debate – our framework provides a more reasonable neg burden. When a student turns in an F paper, no teacher has an obligation to write an entirely new paper to show it was bad – pointing out major academic deficiencies would justify failing the paper – the ballot asks who did the better debating, so if their analysis is wrong, they haven’t. Third, neoliberalism is a conceptual framework that has to be challenged at the level of scholarship. Godrej 14 | 2/5/17 |
JAN-FEB Hate Speech PICTournament: USC | Round: 6 | Opponent: Loyola LA | Judge: Cooper, Devan Byrne, J. Peter. Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. "Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University." Geo. LJ 79 (1990): 399. This article examines the constitutionality of university prohibitions of¶ public expression that insults members of the academic community by directing¶ hatred or contempt toward them on account of their race. I Several¶ thoughtful scholars have examined generally whether the government can¶ penalize citizens for racist slurs under the first amendment, but to the limited¶ extent that they have discussed university disciplinary codes they have assumed¶ that the state university is merely a government instrumentality subject¶ to the same constitutional limitations as, for example, the legislature or¶ the police. 2 In contrast, I argue that the university has a fundamentally dif ferent relationship to the speech of its members than does the state to the speech of its citizens. On campus, general rights of free speech should be qualified by the intellectual values of academic discourse. I conclude that the protection of these academic values, which themselves enjoy constitutional protection, permits state universities lawfully to bar racially abusive speech, even if the state legislature could not constitutionally prohibit such speech throughout society at large. At the same time, however, I assert that the first amendment renders state universities powerless to punish speakers for advocating any idea in a reasoned manner. It is necessary at the outset to choose a working definition of a racial insult. This definition, however, is necessarily provisional; any such definition implies the writer's views on the boundaries of constitutionally protected offensive speech, and the reader cannot be expected to swallow the definition until she has had the opportunity to inspect the writer's constitutional premises. Having offered such a caution, I define a racial insult as a verbal or symbolic expression by a member of one ethnic group that describes another ethnic group or an individual member of another group in terms conventionally derogatory, that offends members of the target group, and that a reasonable and unbiased observer, who understands the meaning of the words and the context of their use, would conclude was purposefully or recklessly abusive. Excluded from this definition are expressions that convey rational but offensive propositions that can be disputed by argument and evidence. An insult, so conceived, refers to a manner of speech that seeks to demean rather than to criticize, and to appeal to irrational fears and prejudices rather than to respect for others and informed judgment. 3 The counterplan establishes checks on reverse enforcement, chilling effect, and slippery slope. Byrne, J. Peter. Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. "Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University." Geo. LJ 79 (1990): 399. Disciplinary rules are the least effective way that a university can enhance¶ the quality of speech or foster racial tolerance among its members. The educational¶ program must celebrate and instruct its students in the beauty and¶ usefulness of graceful and accurate speech and writing; a liberal education¶ should leave students intolerant of propaganda and commercial manipulation,¶ and competent to directly and forcefully express coherent views as citizens.¶ Such teaching is not amoral; the graduate ought freely to prefer the¶ exercise of skill, reflective perception, and an abiding curiosity to desires for acquisition, consumption, and domination. Without the university's consistent¶ action on a commitment to reasoned discourse as central to its mission,¶ the university's attempt to prohibit insulting or lewd speech may seem a hypocritical¶ denial of its own failings.¶ Similarly, prohibiting racial insults will advance racial harmony on a campus¶ only when the university has effectively committed itself to educate lovingly¶ the members of every ethnic group. Although nearly every university¶ admits minority students using criteria that aspire in good faith to be fair,¶ many have failed to transform themselves into truly multi-ethnic institutions.¶ Not to have succeeded at this daunting task does not merit reproach; the¶ university's origins and traditions are explicitly European, growth and accommodation¶ to the extent required to create a multi-ethnic community¶ must take time and witness false steps. However, not to have made plain¶ that blacks, hispanics, Asians, Indians, and others who have been excluded in¶ the past are not only now welcome, but are requested to collaborate in shaping¶ new university structures and mores so that the benefits of advanced education¶ will be available without regard to birth and so that the university can¶ continue to spawn for a changing society a cosmopolitan culture based on¶ reason and reflection standing above tribal fears and blind desires, not to¶ have begun this work in earnest merits regret and will provoke anger. Universities¶ that pass rules against racial insults which are not part of a comprehensive¶ commitment to ethnic integration will serve only to exacerbate racial¶ tensions.¶ Schools that adopt prohibitions on racially offensive speech ought to enforce¶ them with restraint. Certainly, when students have sought to intimidate¶ or frighten other students with racial insults, the school should treat this¶ behavior as a fundamental breach of university standards meriting the¶ strongest punitive measures. But often insulting expressions will result from¶ insensitivity or ignorance; complaints about such behavior should be seen as¶ opportunities for teaching, and creative informal measures that make the offenders¶ aware of the harmful consequences and injustice of their behavior¶ should be pursued. The school should also provide succor to the victim¶ whose hurt and anger must be acknowledged and meliorated. But severely¶ punishing ignorant young people for expressions inherited from their parents¶ or neighborhoods may serve to harden. and focus their sense of grievance,¶ create martyrs, and prolong racial animosity. Deans who administer such¶ rules must overcome their personal repugnance at racist speech and enforce¶ the rules for the benefit of the entire community. Controversial interpretative¶ application of the rules should be placed in the hands of faculty and¶ students representative of the entire institution, and the accused, the victim,¶ and the dean should have an opportunity to express their perspectives.¶ A recurrent concern regarding rules against racial insults is their vague-ness and overbreadth. These, of course, were the bases upon which the University¶ of Michigan's policy was declared unconstitutional, although the¶ demonstrated propensity of the school to apply the policy to presumptively¶ protected speech appears to have steered the Court's conclusions on these¶ issues.17 6 In general, university disciplinary rules rarely are struck down for¶ vagueness; courts usually permit universities to regulate student conduct on¶ the basis of generally stated norms, so long as they give fair notice of the¶ behavior proscribed. 177 Courts generally are more strict regarding vagueness¶ in rules that affect speech, in no small part because of the distrust of the¶ competence and motives of the government censor.178¶ A central argument of this article has been that the university can be¶ trusted to administer rules prohibiting racial insults because it has the proper¶ moral basis and adequate expertise to do so. It is not surprising, therefore,¶ that I believe that vagueness concerns about such university rules are largely¶ misplaced. This is not to deny that a university should adopt safeguards to¶ protect accused students from the concerns that the courts have highlighted.¶ First, the rules should state explicitly that no one may be disciplined for the¶ good faith statement of any proposition susceptible to reasoned response, no¶ matter how offensive. The possibility that punishment is precluded by this¶ limitation should be addressed at every stage of the disciplinary process. Second,¶ some response between punishment and acquittal should be available¶ when the university concludes that the speaker was subjectively unaware of¶ the offensive character of his speech; these cases seem to present mainly educational¶ concerns. Third, all controversial issues of interpretation of the¶ rules should be entrusted to a panel of faculty and students who are representative¶ of the institution. Rules furthering primarily academic concerns about¶ the quality of speech and the development of students should be given meaning¶ by those most directly concerned with the academic enterprise rather¶ than by administrators who may register more precisely external political¶ pressures on the university. Given these safeguards and a comprehensible¶ definition of an unacceptable insult, such as the one ventured in the introduction¶ to this article,179 a court which accepts the underlying proposition that a¶ university has the constitutional authority to regulate racial insults should¶ not be troubled independently by vagueness.¶ A difficult prudential consideration is whether a university should decline¶ to regulate insults because of public criticism that censorship demeans the very intellectual virtues towards which the university strives, such as the superiority¶ of persuasion over compulsion. Obviously, the adoption of such¶ regulation has brought forth sincere and bitter criticism from many friends of¶ higher education-the Economist, for example, went so far as to call such¶ regulations "disgraceful."'' 80 To some extent these criticisms stem from misunderstanding¶ about the character of academic speech and the goals of¶ prohibitions on racial insult, but universities should admit that turning to¶ regulation marks a sad failure in civility. A failure already has occurred,¶ however, when students scurrilously demean other students because of their¶ race. The university at this point can only choose among evils. It would not¶ be true to its traditions if it did not come down on the side of protecting the¶ educational environment for blameless students against wanton and hurtful¶ ranting. -Article surveyed hate speech laws across US, UK, Canada, Germany The principal disadvantages to the approach to hate speech¶ under consideration, on the other hand, are: that it inevitably has¶ to confront difficult line drawing problems, such as that between¶ fact and opinion in the context of the German scheme of¶ regulation; that when prosecution of perpetrators of hate speech¶ fails, such as in the British Southern News case discussed above,'30¶ regulation may unwittingly do more to legitimate and to¶ disseminate the hate propaganda at issue than a complete absence¶ of regulation would have;' that prosecutions may be too selective¶ or too indiscriminate owing to (often unconscious) biases¶ prevalent among law enforcement officials, as appears to have¶ been the case in the prosecutions of certain black activists under¶ the British Race Relations Act;'32 and, that since not all that may¶ appear to be hate speech actually is hate speech-such as the¶ documentary report involved in Jersild33 or a play in which a racist¶ character engages in hate speech, but the dramatist intends to¶ convey an anti-hate message-regulation of that speech may¶ unwisely bestow powers of censorship over legitimate political,¶ literary and artistic expression to government officials and judges.¶ In the last analysis, none of the existing approaches to hate¶ speech are ideal, but on balance the American seems less¶ satisfactory than its alternatives. Above all, the American¶ approach seems significantly flawed in some of its assumptions, in¶ its impact and in the message it conveys concerning the evils¶ surrounding hate speech. In terms of assumptions, the American¶ approach either underestimates the potential for harm of hate¶ speech that is short of incitement to violence, or it overestimates¶ the potential of rational deliberation as a means to neutralize calls¶ to hate. In terms of impact, given its long history of racial¶ tensions, it is surprising that the United States does not exhibit¶ greater concern for the injuries to security, dignity, autonomy and¶ well being which officially tolerated hate speech causes to its black¶ minority. Likewise, America's hate speech approach seems to¶ unduly discount the pernicious impact that racist hate speech may have on lingering or dormant racist sentiments still harbored by a¶ non-negligible segment of the white population.'34 Furthermore,¶ even if we discount the domestic impact of hate speech, given the¶ worldwide spread of locally produced hate speech, such as in the¶ case of American manufactured Neo-Nazi propaganda¶ disseminated through the worldwide web, a strong argument can¶ be made that American courts should factor in the obvious and¶ serious foreign impact of certain domestic hate speech in¶ determining whether such speech should be entitled to¶ constitutional protection. Finally, in terms of the message¶ conveyed by refusing to curb most hate speech, the American¶ approach looms as a double-edged sword. On the one hand,¶ tolerance of hate speech in a country in which democracy has been¶ solidly entrenched since independence over two hundred years ago¶ conveys a message of confidence against both the message and the¶ prospects of those who endeavor to spread hate.'35 On the other¶ hand, tolerance of hate speech in a country with serious and¶ enduring race relations problems may reinforce racism and¶ hamper full integration of the victims of racism within the broader¶ community.'36¶ The argument in favor of opting for greater regulation of hate¶ speech than that provided in the United States rests on several¶ important considerations, some related to the place and function¶ of free speech in contemporary constitutional democracies, and¶ others to the dangers and problems surrounding hate speech.¶ Typically, contemporary constitutional democracies are¶ increasingly diverse, multiracial, multicultural, multireligious and¶ multilingual. Because of this and because of increased migration,¶ a commitment to pluralism and to respect of diversity seem¶ inextricably linked to vindication of the most fundamental¶ individual and collective rights. Increased diversity is prone to¶ making social cohesion more precarious, thus, if anything,¶ exacerbating the potential evils of hate speech. Contemporary¶ democratic states, on the other hand, are less prone to curtailing free speech rights than their predecessors either because of deeper¶ implantation of the democratic ethos or because respect of¶ supranational norms has become inextricably linked to continued¶ membership in supranational alliances that further vital national¶ interests.¶ In these circumstances, contemporary democracies are more¶ likely to find themselves in a situation like stage four in the context¶ of the American experience with free speech rather than in one¶ that more closely approximates a stage one experience.'37 In other¶ words, to drown out minority discourse seems a much greater¶ threat than government prompted censorship in contemporary¶ constitutional democracies that are pluralistic. Actually, viewed¶ more closely, contemporary pluralistic democracies tend to be in a¶ situation that combines the main features of stage two and stage¶ four. Thus, the main threats to full fledged freedom of expression¶ would seem to come primarily from the "tyranny of the majority"¶ as reflected both within the government and without, and from the¶ dominance of majority discourses at the expense of minority ones.¶ If it is true that majority conformity and the dominance of its¶ discourse pose the greatest threat to uninhibited self-expression¶ and unconstrained political debate in a contemporary pluralist¶ polity, then significant regulation of hate speech seems justified.¶ This is not only because hate speech obviously inhibits the selfexpression¶ and oopportunity of inclusion of its victims, but also,¶ less obviously, because hate speech tends to bear closer links to¶ majority views than might initially appear. Indeed, in a¶ multicultural society, while crude insults uttered by a member of¶ the majority directed against a minority may be unequivocally¶ rejected by almost all other members of the majority culture, the¶ concerns that led to the hate message may be widely shared by the¶ majority culture who regard of other cultures as threats to their¶ way of life. In those circumstances, hate speech might best be¶ characterized as a pathological extension of majority feelings or¶ beliefs.¶ So long as the pluralist contemporary state is committed to¶ maintaining diversity, it cannot simply embrace a value neutral¶ mindset, and consequently it cannot legitimately avoid engaging in¶ some minimum of viewpoint discrimination. This is made clear by¶ the German example, and although the German experience has¶ been unique, it is hard to imagine that any pluralist constitutional¶ democracy would not be committed to a similar position, albeit to¶ a lesser degree.'38 Accordingly, without adopting German free speech jurisprudence, at a minimum contemporary pluralist¶ democracy ought to institutionalize viewpoint discrimination¶ against the crudest and most offensive expressions of racism,¶ religious bigotry and virulent bias on the basis of ethnic or national¶ origin Hate speech kills the market place of ideas, fosters self-hatred and primes society for real violence. Johnsons 2000 The ubiquity and incessancy of harmful racial depiction are thus the source of its virulence. Like water dripping on sandstone, it is a pervasive harm which only the most hardy can resist. Yet the prevailing first amendment paradigm predisposes us to treat racist speech as an individual harm, as though we only had to evaluate the effect of a single drop of water. This approach ... systematically misperceives the experience of racism for both victim and perpetrator. 157¶ ¶ Mari Matsuda, a professor at the School of Law and at the Center for Asian American Studies at UCLA, was one of the first to look at the hate speech issue from the point of view that it actually harms its victims. She is often accredited for bringing an "outsider jurisprudence" to the forefront of this debate. 158 Matsuda explains that victims of hate speech suffer irreparable harm, both psychologically and physically. 159 Victims of racist speech internalize the feelings of inferior self-worth and self-hatred. This in turn affects their relationships with others, their job performance, educational endeavors, and ultimately their ability to effectively communicate. 160 *1845 The harm of hate speech, as proponents of codes contend, is real.¶ a. Assaultive Speech Lands a BlisteringBlow¶ ¶ Those in favor of hate speech regulations argue that the harm of such speech is the equivalent of a punch - an actual assault on one's sense of person, essentially having the same effect as physical violence. 161 Like violence, words may land a sharp and insidious blow to those at whom they are hurled: "The experience of being called a 'nigger,' 'spic,' 'Jap,' or 'kike' is like receiving a slap in the face." 162 Regulating such speech is a "pragmatic response to the urgent needs of students of color and other victims of hate speech who are daily silenced, intimidated, and subjected to severe psychological and physical trauma by racist assailants who employ words and symbols as part of an arsenal of weapons of oppression and subordination." 163¶ As if repeated blows to one's psychological well-being by language of this sort is not enough, the victim is then further injured by the "government response of tolerance." 164 The blows of the racists, the homophobes or the sexists is then compounded by a final shot from the government or the university that stands idly by and accepts the intolerant messages. 165¶ Those involved in the outsider jurisprudence movement contend that a message of hate "inflicts wounds" 166 that do not just injure the intended victim but rather "hit the gut of all those in the target group." 167 This message - you are different, you are inferior, you do not belong, you will never amount to anything - is then *1846 "conveyed on the street, in school yards, in popular culture, and in the propaganda of hate widely distributed in this country." 168¶ b. Tolerance of Hate Speech Perpetuates a Social Reality ofSubordination¶ ¶ Those who call for regulation of hate speech further contend that in allowing such messages to be conveyed and spread, the government is arguably constructing and even perpetuating a damaging social reality about the affected groups "so that members of that group are always one down." 169 All members are harmed, because "at some level, no matter how much both victims and well-meaning dominant-group members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in our minds as an idea that may hold some truth." 170¶ This dominant social reality harms victims of hate speech in two ways: (1) externally, in society's perception of such groups; and (2) internally, in the victim's own perception of himself. The former is known as the "those people" effect - when one repeatedly hears that "those people are lazy, dirty, sexualized, money-grubbing, dishonest, inscrutable ... we reject the idea, but the next time we sit next to one of 'those people' the dirt message, the sex message, is triggered." 171¶ By "permitting one social group to speak disrespectfully of another habituates and encourages speakers to continue speaking that way in the future," 172 thereby making laws regulating such speech imperative to ensure that such groups may no longer find themselves "one down." 173 As this way of speaking becomes "normalized" by society, it then becomes "inscribed in hundreds of plots, narratives, and scripts; it becomes part of culture, what everyone knows." 174¶ Not only do such messages cause external or reputational harm to the group as perceived by society, such ideas often become an internal reality for victims. Repeated messages of this sort eventually *1847 cause victims to believe that perhaps they do not deserve to be treated as everyone else. 175 "Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of this sort ... inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. Minorities internalize the stories they read, see and hear every day." 176¶ The effect of such internalization silences victims, ingraining them with the notion that their voice is not valuable or credible in society's discourse. 177 "Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her adequate share?" 178 The result of such silencing is that victims of hate speech have no effective voice in the marketplace of ideas, 179 leaving them little opportunity to counter-attack the assaultive speech. 180¶ c. Hate Speech Denies Equal EducationalOpportunity¶ ¶ ¶ Our educational institutions are idealized as a refuge for the calm, impartial, and unimpeded pursuit of knowledge and truth. Here we hope to escape the bigotry, cruelty and injustice outside. But universities and colleges are no longer, if they ever were, tranquil havens in a prejudiced world. Instead, for people of color, women, gays and lesbians, religious minorities, and members of other arbitrarily disadvantaged groups, institutions of higher education have become, increasingly, places of physical and psychological danger. 181 | 3/5/17 |
NOV-DEC - CP - LOPRBTournament: Damus | Round: 1 | Opponent: Loyola AB | Judge: Smith, Calen CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change The CP Solves the Case
2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations 3. The CRB doesn’t have to work- it creates a deterrent effect 4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action The net benefit is Tech Shift B. Civil rights focus fails- it takes a black and white approach to police conduct that ensures resistance | 11/9/16 |
NOV-DEC - DA - Hollow HopeTournament: Damus | Round: 1 | Opponent: Loyola AB | Judge: Smith, Calen Court civil rights victories act as fly paper drawing other social movements into the court to focus on litigation strategies Courts wreck movements The court system destroys crucial parts of the LGBTQ movement and works to further marginalize people. Leachman ‘14 LGBTQ Rights are crucial to avoid extinction Tatchell ’89 | 11/9/16 |
NOV-DEC - DA - TPPTournament: Damus | Round: 4 | Opponent: Marlborough SD | Judge: Scott Wheeler TPP is top of Obama’s priorities, PC is key. Creighton ‘10/27 The plan sparks congressional debate. Orenstein ‘16 Solves multiple extinction scenarios. Morimoto ‘15 Regional hegemony is key to stop nuke war. Rudd 11 | 11/9/16 |
NOV-DEC - K - CapTournament: Glenbrooks | Round: 1 | Opponent: New Trier BS | Judge: Yerneni, Neel Blaming violence on ‘bad individual’s through civil suits replicates neoliberalism – it deflects blame on to individuals whose actions are predetermined by neoliberalism. Smith 15 Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15 The alternative is an embrace of class-consciousness as a method of critiquing neoliberalism’s grip on policing. LaVenia 15 The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. First, neoliberalism sustains itself by operating by propagating a narrow lens of what it means to be ‘political.’ We situate the judge as a critical educator who steps back to evaluate the frames through which we view policy first. Blalock, JD, 2015 Second, the knowledge claims of the AC are the jumping off point for the debate – our framework provides a more reasonable neg burden. When a student turns in an F paper, no teacher has an obligation to write an entirely new paper to show it was bad – pointing out major academic deficiencies would justify failing the paper – the ballot asks who did the better debating, so if their analysis is wrong, they haven’t. Third, serial policy failure – policing is about culture. A refusal to stop and recognize the cultural underpinnings of the AFF dooms repeating the same failed policies that created the problem. . Smith 15 | 11/19/16 |
NOV-DEC - PIC - Structural ViolenceTournament: Damus | Round: Quarters | Opponent: Immaculate Heart DD | Judge: Adam Torson, Zane Dille, Ryan Powell Counterplan Text: We advocate the entirety of the aff plan without the use of the words “structural violence”. The counterplan is inherently competitive. Since we defend the entirety of the aff advocacy aside from a change in certain rhetoric a perm would be severance out of both the reps and the language of the 1AC. Definition They misunderstand the meaning of the term “structural violence”. It is a specific term of art used in the sociological field of peace research that has been widely discredited by both critics and the terms creator. Structural violence” is a term coined by Johan Galtung, it refers to violence where no single decision maker is responsible- like poverty which results from the global economy. Gatlung 12 Theories of structural violence explore how political, economic and cultural structures result in the occurrence of avoidable violence, most commonly seen as the deprivation of basic human needs (will be discussed later). Structural theorists attempt to link personal suffering with political, social and cultural choices. Johan Galtung’s original definition included a lack of human agency; that is the violence is not a direct act of any decision or action made by a particular person but a result of an unequal distribution of resources.Here, we must also understand “institutional violence”. “Institutional violence” is often mistaken for structural violence, but this is not the case. “Institutional violence” should be used to refer to violence perpetrated by institutions like companies, universities, corporations, organisations as opposed to individuals. The fact that women are paid less at an establishment than men is an act of direct violence by that specific establishment. It is true that there is a relationship with structural violence as there is between interpersonal violence and structural violence. And Structural violence is the most problematic area to be addressed for conflict transformation. Net Benefits Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of ’structural violence’ and ’positive peace’. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is ’like’ a thug beating up the victim and taking his money away from him in the street, -or it is ’like’ a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modem world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galtung’s metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a ’threshold’ phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent ’breaks’ in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the ’strain’ on a system is too great for its ‘strength’. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficulty to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is the increase in the strength of the system, the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these things, which enable a system to stand Increasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflict of interest are only part of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people to know their interests, and misperceptions of interests take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people’s behavior, not the ’real’ interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined by one unkind commentator as anything that Galltung doesn’t like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, an that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all the problems off poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to the structures which, produce violence. This is not to say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are culture of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out off ’it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a ’service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer. 2. Galtung’s theory of structural violence perpetuates the status quo of dominant states by offering an overly vague criticism of oppression. Lawler 89 In the late 1960's Galtung's foundational model of peace research was subjected to considerable criticism as part of a general upheaval within the peace research community. A group of young, mostly Scandinavian, radicals employed a neo-Marxist perspective to attack the assumptions of symmetry and ideological neutrality that formed the core of Galtung's argument (Schmid 1968, 1970; Olsen and Jarvad 1969; Eckhardt 1971; Dencik 1982). Though their primary target was American conflict research and its contribution to the analysis of the Vietnam War, they questioned also Galtung's assumption that the path to peace lay in the principles of integration and cooperation. For the radicals, Galtung's approach neglected the political-economy of relations between the developed and underdeveloped worlds and in its attempt to preserve a sym- metrical approach to violent conflict was guilty of 'idealistic universal- ism'. From the perspective of the oppressed, an argument for the further integration of the international system was tantamount to defending a status quo which reflected the interests of the dominant states and the beneficiaries of the world capitalist economy. Against this, the radicals called for a peace research that openly sided with the exploited and advocated the 'sharpening' of the various latent conflicts of interests that characterised global politics. 3. Resolving “structural violence” requires action by international powers, as they are the only bodies capable of amending existing “structures”. This reliance on current institutions preserves existing structures of dominance. Schmid 68 Peace research is an applied or 'oriented' science. An applied science has to be applied by somebody who has the power to apply it. In the case of peace research, this means there must be some kind of institutionalized link between peace re- searchers and decision-makers on the supranational level. Thus, the universalist ethos of peace research becomes operationalized into identification with the interests of the existing international system, that is the interests of those who have power 229 in the international system. So peace research becomes a factor supporting the status quo of the international power structure, providing the decision-makers of the system with knowledge for control, manipulation and integration of the system. That is the institutional aspect of peace research. The theoretical frame of reference dominating peace research closely cor- responds to the institutional needs: the peace researcher/specialist is trained in an ideology of internationalism; he has learned how to solve conflicts, how to integrate a system, how to avoid manifest organized violence, how to prevent major uprisings against the system; and he believes that what is good for the system is in the long run also good for its elements. His concept of peace is essentially a negative one, stressing the need for stable peace,38 and the 'common interest' he will have to fall back on is the avoidance of catastrophe. His positive concept of peace is not sui generis but a negation of his negative peace concept. The essence of peace research is concentrated in the concepts of control of the international sys- tem to prevent major breakdowns, and integration of the international system to make it more stable. That is the ideological aspect of peace research. The institutional and the ideological aspects presuppose and condition each other. To become applied, peace research must meet the needs of the decision- makers. To satisfy their concern about stable peace, peace researchers must ally themselves with the decision-makers of the international system. Given this situation, change of the system can not be advocated by peace research. Structural change would be a threat to the power-holders of the international system. Only adaptive change within the system is possible. 4. Theories of structural violence offer a one-sided mechanism of achieving equality in which instead of aiding the poor we focus primarily on bringing down the rich, resulting in a system that is technically equal but objectively destitute. Boulding 77 Because of his passion for equality, his hatred of hierarchy, dominance, top dogs, and anything which looks like oppression (much of which is praiseworthy), Galtung identifies entropy as a symbol of goodness and regards negentropy, that is, structure, improbability, and potential, as evil. Galt- ung is all for the increase of social entropy so far as that means destruction of organi- zation and hierarchy, the dissipation of wealth, 'and the reduction of everything to a dead level. It would almost seem as if Galtung would regard the last ultimate whimper of the universe, according to the second law of thermodynamics, in which all things are at an equal temperature and equally distributed throughout space so that nothing more can 'conceivably happen, as the ultimate heaven, or perhaps one should say Nirvana, towards which all this uncom- fortable and unequal structure of stars and planets, life and society, will eventually move. Here we see the profound difference be- tween the structural and the evolutionary points of view. The structural point of view turns out to be inimical to the ideal of struc- ture itself, and sees structure as the enemy of equality - which it is. The evolutionary point of view sees the whole evolutionary process as the segregation of entropy, the building up of little castles of order in the crystal, in DNA, in life, in humans, and in their innumerable artifacts both personal, material and organizational, always at the cost, according to the second law, of increas- ing thermodynamic disorder elsewhere, in our case of course nicely segregated in the sun about which we don't have to worry. The structuralist sees pollution in the struc- ture whether it is smoke, slums or vice and says 'away with it. The evolutionist sees pollution as part of the price of evolution itself. Gal'tung's misunderstandings about entro- py derive, one suspects, from the cardinal principle of his normative system, the over- whelmingly strong value which he gives to equality as such. One almost suspect's that Galtung would prefer a society in which everybody were equally destitute rather than one in which some were destitute and 'some were rich. A passion for equality as such, however, can easily lead into the hatred of the rich without any love for the poor. One can put a very strong negative value on poverty and believe it should be abolished wi'thout believing in equality at all. This would lead to a society with a floor below which nobody were allowed to fall, but above which a high degree of inequality would be tolerable. Galtung nowhere spells out what his ideal society would be, and in- deed if any of us did this we would probably decide that we did not like it af'ter all! But the drive for equality as such is extremely strong in all his writings. Subpoint B: Attempts to resolve “structural violence” inevitably result in the perpetuation of physical violence that shuts off democratic channels for minority representation.
The deployment of a notion of positive peace has been a far from innocuous development in peace research. A comprehensive theory of needs, where needs are not defined simply as necessary means to an agreed end, can be the basis for a suppression of both democratic and liberal aspirations. Democracy and Liberty are both concerned with personal desires, the former in the sphere of the polity, and the latter in the sphere of the individual. Needs theory subjugates both the individual and the polity to the abstract ideology of the needs theorist. When Maxim Litvinov remarked in Geneva in the 1930s that peace is indivisible, he was referring to the negative sense of the term. 'Negative peace' is one of the few social values in whose name crimes can be committed only at the cost of self-contradiction. However, if 'negative peace' must be associated with 'positive peace' to give rise to peace in totality, then peace is no longer indivisible —since direct violence may be defended as a means of eliminating `structural violence'. This defence is a familiar one, resembling the classic liberal justification for rebellion, and even in certain circumstances intervention. Christian Bay has argued that structural violence `may be so extreme that a limited war must be deemed a lesser evil, if there is no other way to end or mitigate the structural violence, and if the war is sure to remain limited and brief in duration.'" This blithe assumption — that there could ever be circumstances in which one could be absolutely sure that a war would remain limited and brief in duration — is a splendid illustration of Bay's detachment from the real world. Nonetheless, the greatest danger in his claim stems from the extraordinary elasticity of the notion of structural violence. This is best brought out by the Danish peace researcher Lars Dencik, although using slightly different terminology. He defines conflicts as `incompatible interests', and goes on to remark that 'incompatible interests are here defined objectively, i.e. by the observing scientist according to his theory and is sic independent of the actual subjective consciousness of the actors involved. This means that incompatible interests are conceived of as structural (actor indepen-dent), the structure defined according to the theory of the scientist.'" He draws the predictable conclusion that 'in certain situations "revolutionary violence" may be the necessary means to obtain conflict resolution proper'." This is irresistibly reminiscent of the conclusion of Georges Sorel's Reflections on Violence, that it is `to violence that Socialism owes those high ethical values by means of which it brings salvation to the modern world'20, and it is instructive, though for peace educators perhaps not very comforting, to recall that Sorel's ideas eventually were used in justification of Italian Fascism." (p. 30) 2. Democratic deliberation is key to avoid massive violence. Halperin 11 As the United States struggles to wind down two wars and recover from a humbling financial crisis, realism is enjoying a renaissance. Afghanistan and Iraq bear scant resemblance to the democracies we were promised. The Treasury is broke. And America has a president, Barack Obama, who once compared his foreign-policy philosophy to the realism of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr: "There's serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain," Obama said during his 2008 campaign. "And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things." But one can take such words of wisdom to the extreme-as realists like former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and writer Robert Kaplan sometimes do, arguing that the United States can't afford the risks inherent in supporting democracy and human rights around the world. Others, such as cultural historian Jacques Barzun, go even further, saying that America can't export democracy at all, "because it is not an ideology but a wayward historical development." Taken too far, such realist absolutism can be just as dangerous, and wrong, as neoconservative hubris. For there is one thing the neocons get right: As I argue in The Democracy Advantage, democratic governments are more likely than autocratic regimes to engage in conduct that advances U.S. interests and avoids situations that pose a threat to peace and security. Democratic states are more likely to develop and to avoid famines and economic collapse. They are also less likely to become failed states or suffer a civil war. Democratic states are also more likely to cooperate in dealing with security issues, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the bloody aftermath of the Iraq invasion painfully shows, democracy cannot be imposed from the outside by force or coercion. It must come from the people of a nation working to get on the path of democracy and then adopting the policies necessary to remain on that path. But we should be careful about overlearning the lessons of Iraq. In fact, the outside world can make an enormous difference in whether such efforts succeed. There are numerous examples-starting with Spain and Portugal and spreading to Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia-in which the struggle to establish democracy and advance human rights received critical support from multilateral bodies, including the United Nations, as well as from regional organizations, democratic governments, and private groups. It is very much in America's interest to provide such assistance now to new democracies, such as Indonesia, Liberia, and Nepal, and to stand with those advocating democracy in countries such as Belarus, Burma, and China. It will still be true that the United States will sometimes need to work with a nondemocratic regime to secure an immediate objective, such as use of a military base to support the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, or in the case of Russia, to sign an arms-control treaty. None of that, however, should come at the expense of speaking out in support of those struggling for their rights. Nor should we doubt that America would be more secure if they succeed. 3. Combatting “structural violence” justifies reactionary violence against a system that is poorly defined. This makes conflict inevitable and trades-off with peaceful reform. Quester Subpoint C: The term “structural violence” is insufficient for diagnosing the reality of oppression. It is not a method for liberation, just an ivory tower theory.
The critical element or link in the chain of this ‘causal flow’ (200 Galtung, 1996) is structural violence. It is the process that links cultural distinction to Direct Violence. Structural violence is an ostensive label that may be applied to a broad range of phenomena. What Galtung notes as definitive is that Structural violence is the process of deprivation of needs. Each part of the violence equation depends on the existence of the other two before the violent conflict become truly serious and sustained (197-200 Galtung, 1996). It need not be consistent or radical . Simply put, it is violence embodied by a structure, or violence that ‘operates regardless of intent’ (93 Galtung, 1996). It is characterized politically as repression, and economically by exploitation. However, Galtung notes that ‘blunt repression/exploitation is necessary but not sufficient’ (93 Galtung, 1996). In fact the nature of structural violence is somewhat vague in that it allows the quantity and the qualitative nature of aggression and dominance to be variable (201 Galtung, 1996). 2. John Galtung, the creator of the concept of “structural violence”, admitted that his theory couldn’t be applied objectively. We cannot even assess what “structural violence” is. Lawler 89 For Galtung sociology was undoubtedly a science. In contrast to the formal sciences of logic and mathematics, sociology was a 'factual' science, which in terms of scientific rigour occupied a middle position between physics and the 'humanistic sciences' (Galtung 1958d, p.88). His account of the virtues of applying science to the study of the social world was, nonetheless, ambiguous. Galtung (1958d) recognised that the object-domain of the social sciences made the application of scientific method difficult and perhaps impossible if overly high standards were applied. Consequently he argued that the primary purpose of social science was to generate descriptive empirical statements which would have to be sub-jected to some form of testing procedure (1958b). Theory-building could follow but was not essential to the claim for scientific status (Galtung1959b, p. 10). Galtung also admitted that significant problems existed regarding the scientific assessment of theoretical statements about the social world, but in a manner characteristic of his subsequent work appealed to the future development of suitable analytical tools. Though his discussion of the question of value-freedom was often ambiguous in his early sociological papers, Galtung informed his stu-dents that value-statements were not testable and therefore unscientific(1958d, p.92). Though Galtung recognised that values impinged upon the conduct of social science in a variety of ways — inter alia, the deter-mination of investigative focus, the exclusion of undesired results and the procurement of financial support — the problem was consistently presented as one of degree and not destructive of a genuinely scientific sociology (1958b). 3. “Structural violence” rejects holding any specific group or class responsible for exploitation in favor of a vacuous criticism of a “system” that it never fully identifies. Lawler 89 Galtung also rejected the implication of the radical critique that specific groups or social classes were responsible for exploitation. The term 'exploitation' was refused by him on the grounds that it was politically and emotionally overloaded. The continuing influence of his sociological orientation was evident in the preference for offering a definition of violence as an abstract systemic property that can be comprehended without reference to specific historical conjunctures or agents. But Gal- tung's approach also reflected the influence of Gandhi, from whom was taken the view that a distinction should be made between status actions and status holders (1959c, 1980). It is the structure of social interaction within which agents of violence act that is to be attacked, rather than the agents themselves. To attack the agents is to meet one form of violence with another. True dedication to the doctrine of ahimsa required 'the return of good for evil' and a distinction between the doer and the deed (Galtung 1959c; Borman 1986). However Gandhian ethics arose out of a complex matrix of occidental and oriental philosophical principles never fully explicated by even Gandhi himself (Sharma 1965; Borman 1986). Galtung restricted his treatment of Gandhi's thought to the draw- ing out of some practical implications. Though he was to later complain of the failure of his critics to see the imprint of Gandhi on his work, this is hardly surprising since few clues were provided. The fundamental problem with the concept of structural violence was that it was vacuous without a substantiation of the value-system on which it depended. The denial of potentiality by structural violence, presupposed some notion of human potential. As one critic noted, without a clear analysis of the values underpinning it, the concept was reduced to a label to be applied to anything its author did not like (Eide 1971) 4. “Structural violence” cannot explain social changes or the exact origins of violence beyond the fact that it simply exists. Lawler 89 In his sociological writings Galtung provided no analysis or defence of any specific values, other than to claim that they were empirically held, or to assert that values should be revised in reflection of systemic changes. What was missing was a sense of the politics of social change. Even if consensus could be established as to the direction in which a social system is moving, it is a different matter to evaluate such change. Furth-ermore, how are we to choose between competing and non-commensurable understandings of systemic 'health'? The only answer implicit in Galtung's discussion was that empirical evidence must be produced to show which set of values accorded best with the social system under scrutiny. That brings us back full-circle to the value-contamination of observation and the impact of the political perspective that conditions our analysis of social systems. Functionalism can be wedded to any political ideology, but being a descriptive rather than analytical discourse it cannot provide that ideology. Though aware of the problem of defending values outside of a dis-tinctly normative discourse, Galtung was not apparently perturbed by it. In his discussion of functionalism (1959a) he claimed that there were' fairly inter-subjectively communicable and consensual standards' such as 'sane', 'healthy' or 'normal', against which social systems could be judged. For Galtung, to describe a system as 'healthy' was not a value-judgement, in contrast to the claim that 'healthy is good'. Leaving aside the question as to whether the distinction holds or if 'fairly consensual 'constitutes a scientific category, it became clear that when Galtung turned to peace research the evaluative standard of 'peace' was to be sim-ilarly derived and understood. In its Galtungian mould, peace research was differentiated from earlier forms of normative enquiry into global social relations by the absence of any distinctly normative discourse. Structural violence appears, for Galtung, when resources, or especially the power to allocate them, are unevenly distributed: when people are starving and this could be avoided; when life expectancy is much greater in the upper class; when a small elite control the entry into high status. Here, without any prior ethical analysis or normative preparation,110 Galtung makes his first intellectual broad jump from the analytical-empirical plane to the ethical, but in a most cavalier manner: "In order not to overwork the word violence we shall sometimes refer to the condition of structural violence as social injustice."111¶ Then Galtung presents his final two distinctions (dimensions) regarding violence: it may be intended or unintended, or manifest or latent. With these and the other distinctions mentioned, Galtung defines a "typology of violence" in which the personal-structural distinctions are basic. In focusing on the means of personal and structural violence Galtung makes his second broad jump, but now back from the ethical to the analytical-empirical plane--again without analysis and as offhanded: "If we accept that the general formula behind structural violence is inequality, above all in the distribution of power, then this can be measured."112¶ D. His Concept of "Positive Peace." The above serves as an introduction to six factors maintaining inequalitarian distributions--that is, "mechanisms of structural violence"113--which are of no concern here. Nor need we tarry over Galtung's discussion of the relationship between personal and structural violence, and the trade-offs in emphasizing a system that is higher on one than another. But what I should mention is his conclusion on the definition of peace: ¶ E. His Political Theory. Thus, structural violence = unactualized human potentials = social injustice = inequality. Therefore, positive peace = equality = social justice = realized human potentials = absence of structural violence. This equation is stipulated; analysis to support the critical relationships are lacking; and the definitional and substantive problems in the formulation are glaring. One should understand, however, that the critical relationships and definitions are entirely theoretical. Even violence, usually an easily measured empirical concept of physical harm and destruction, is converted into a construct meaning unactualized human potential, then equated in theory with injustice and, thence, equality--each of them constructs. | 11/8/16 |
SEPT-OCT - Holy Cross NC r3 - Cold Fusion, ITER DA, Warming DATournament: Holy Cross | Round: 3 | Opponent: Newark Science BA | Judge: | 10/1/16 |
SEPT-OCT - Loyola - Dubs - Curry K, T, FW answers, WarmingTournament: Loyola | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Brentwood EL | Judge: | 9/17/16 |
SEPT-OCT - Loyola NC r1 - international actor fiat theory, security K, MSR CP, turnTournament: Loyola | Round: 1 | Opponent: San Marino KWu | Judge: Adam Bistagne | 9/10/16 |
SEPT-OCT - Loyola NC r3 - Warming DA, Space col DA, MSR CP, Cap IT, Framing ext firstTournament: Loyola | Round: 3 | Opponent: Palo Alto BH | Judge: Kris Kaya | 9/11/16 |
SEPT-OCT - Yale NC r1 - Warming, Elections, Case turn, SSDTournament: SEPT-OCT - Yale NC r1 - Warming, Elections, Case turn, SSD | Round: 1 | Opponent: Westford VA | Judge: | 9/17/16 |
SEPT-OCT - Yale NC r3 - Consult CP, Warming, Case TurnsTournament: Yale | Round: 3 | Opponent: Hunter MS | Judge: Christian Quinoz | 9/18/16 |
SEPT-OCT - Yale NC r6 - Space DA, Elections, Framing, Epistemology, CaseTournament: Yale | Round: 6 | Opponent: Mountain View DZ | Judge: John Staunton | 9/18/16 |
Open Source
| Filename | Date | Uploaded By | Delete |
|---|---|---|---|
11/8/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
11/9/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
11/9/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
11/9/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
11/19/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
2/5/17 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
2/5/17 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
10/1/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
9/10/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
9/11/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
9/17/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
2/6/17 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
2/6/17 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
1/6/17 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
1/6/17 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
9/17/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
9/18/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
| |
9/18/16 | jnayar1@hwemailcom |
|