Tournament: Golden Desert | Round: 3 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
1NC – Must Defend Topic (Long)

Interpretation - The AFF may only garner offense from hypothetical enactment of the resolution 

This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge — only that the topic should determine the debate’s subject matter.  Solves their method good offense – they can read model minority as a framework argument to justify a topical plan, there’s no reason voting off it is key.

Public colleges and universities is defined as: Legal Dictionary
Legal Dictionary. “Colleges and Universities.” http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Colleges+and+Universities LM
U.S. colleges and universities fall into two general categories: private and public. Private institutions are usually corporations operating under state charters. Although tuition and private gifts and endowments provide much of their financial support, most private colleges and universities also receive some degree of government support. Many of the 2,000-plus private colleges and universities in the United States claim a religious affiliation. Public institutions are established either by state constitution or by statute, and they receive funding from state appropriations as well as tuition and endowments. Although the federal government operates several institutions of higher learning, such as the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy, it is prohibited by statute from exercising direct control over other educational institutions.

Freedom of speech: US Courts
US Courts. “What Does Free Speech Mean?.” http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/what-does LM
Freedom of speech includes the right: Not to speak (specifically, the right not to salute the flag). West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Of students to wear black armbands to school to protest a war (“Students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.”). Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). To use certain offensive words and phrases to convey political messages. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). To contribute money (under certain circumstances) to political campaigns. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). To advertise commercial products and professional services (with some restrictions). Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). To engage in symbolic speech, (e.g., burning the flag in protest). Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).

Restrict:
Oxford Dictionary. “Restrict.” https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/restrict LM
restrict VERB WITH OBJECT Put a limit on; keep under control:

Violation: 

They defend the process of conscientization as a method of interrogating and engaging in the resolution which isn’t the topic.  

Standards:  

1.  Engagement – there are infinite non topical AFFs - a precise and predictable point of difference is key to effective dialogue.  Steinberg and Freeley 13

Steinberg and Freeley 13, * David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And  Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, Argumentation and Debate, Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 121-4.  NS from file

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state¬ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec¬tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci¬sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam¬ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise¬ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi¬ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis¬course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta¬tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro¬vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden¬tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca¬demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri¬ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some¬thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca¬demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu¬nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless¬ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen¬tation. If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effec¬tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web¬site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo¬cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided

Outweighs:
A. Even if their method is good, it isn’t valuable if it’s not procedurally debatable – they don’t get access to any of their offense
B.  The best solutions are formed with critical contestation from multiple sides – it’s more likely we make a good liberation strategy if both debaters can engage and test it
C.  Debate is about process not content – we inevitably switch sides, even if it’s arguing against one method with another.  The individual ideas we learn, like , aren’t as valuable as learning how to effectively apply those ideas outside of round by engaging in precise discussions instead of just asserting opinions.
D.  They force the NEG to extremist generics – this is why cap and anthro are such common responses to their position  - which causes more evasion than if we had a substantive debate about free speech in the topic.
E.  It’s key to long term activism which turns case and outweighs because of existential threats. Lundberg 10

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world. 

2.  Procedural Fairness  - Non topical advocacies mean they can defend anything outside the resolution which is unpredictable, and also defend uncontestable offense like _.  This kills NEG ground and thus equal access to the ballot.

This is an independent voting issue which outweighs:

A.  Evaluation – even if their arguments seem true, that’s only because they already had an advantage – fairness is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who best meets their ROB.
B.  Fairness is key to effective dialogue.  Galloway 07

Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

1. Fairness is a linear impact – even if there are inevitable skews, if fairness is good we should still maximize it.  That’s like saying “water is hard to access, so lets stop drinking water”

C.  Links best to the role of the judge to determine the winner as per the ballot – that’s impossible if the round’s unfair.  Even if their method is good for education there’s no reason you vote on it, just as even if exercise is good for soccer players you don’t vote for the team that ran most.

3.  We solve all their offense - 

A.  Arguments don’t injure people, but policies do—voting aff on this is censorship because it says we can’t even introduce ideas without harming them.  Anderson 06

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290 

Probyns piece is a mixture of affective fallacy, argument by authority, and bald ad hominem. There's a pattern here: precisely the tendency to personalize argument and to foreground what Wendy Brown has called "states of injury." Probyn says, for example, that she "felt ostracized by the books content and style." Ostracized? Argument here is seen as directly harming persons, and this is precisely the state of affairs to which I object. Argument is not injurious to persons. Policies are injurious to persons and institutionalized practices can alienate and exclude. But argument itself is not directly harmful; once one says it is, one is very close to a logic of censorship. The most productive thing to do in an open academic culture (and in societies that aspire to freedom and democracy) when you encounter a book or an argument that you disagree with is to produce a response or a book that states your disagreement. But to assert that the book itself directly harms you is tantamount to saying that you do not believe in argument or in the free exchange of ideas, that your claim to injury somehow damns your opponent's ideas. When Probyn isn't symptomatic, she's just downright sloppy. One could work to build up the substance of points that she throws out the car window as she screeches on to her next destination, but life is short, and those with considered objections to liberalism and proceduralism would not be particularly well served by the exercise. As far as I can tell, Probyn thinks my discussion of universalism is of limited relevance (though far more appealing when put, by others, in more comfortingly equivocating terms), but she's certain my critique of appeals to identity is simply not able to accommodate the importance of identity in social and political life. As I make clear throughout the book, and particularly in my discussion of the headscarf debate in France, identity is likely to be at the center of key arguments about life in plural democracies; my point is not that identity is not relevant, but simply that it should not be used to trump or stifle argument.  In closing, I'd like to speak briefly to the question of proceduralism's relevance to democratic vitality. One important way of extending the proceduralist arguments put forth by Habeimas is to work on how institutions and practices might better promote participation in democratic life. The apathy and nonparticipation plaguing democratic institutions in the United States is a serious problem, and can be separated from the more romantic theoretical investments in a refusal to accept the terms of what counts as argument, or in assertions of inassimilable difference. With respect to the latter, which is often glorified precisely as the moment when politics or democracy is truly occurring, I would say, on the contrary democracy is not happening then-rather, the limits or deficiencies of an actually existing democracy are making themselves felt. Acknowledging struggle, conflict, and exclusion is vital to democracy, but insisting that exclusion is not so much a persistent challenge for modern liberal democracies but rather inherent to the modern liberal-democratic political form as such seems to me precisely to remain stalled in a romantic critique of Enlightenment. It all comes down to a question of whether one wants to work with the ideals of democracy or see them as essentially normative in a negative sense: this has been the legacy of a certain critique of Enlightenment, and it is astonishingly persistent in the left quarters in the academy. One hears it clearly when Robbins makes confident reference to liberalisms tendency to ignore "the founding acts of violence on which a social order is based." One encounters it in the current vogue for the work of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt. Saying that a state of exception defines modernity or is internal to the law itself may help to sharpen your diagnoses of certain historical conditions, but if absolutized as it is in these accounts, it gives you nothing but a negative diagnostic and a compensatory flight to a realm entirely other-the kind of mystical, Utopian impulse that flees from these conditions rather than confronts and fights them on terms that derive from the settled-if constantly evolving-normative basis of democratic modernity. If one is outraged by the flagrant disregard of democratic procedures in the current U.S. political regime, then one needs to be able to coherently say why democratic procedures matter, what principles underwrite them, and what historical movements and institutions have helped us to secure and support them. Argument as a critical practice and as a key component of democratic institutions and public debate has a vital role to play in such a task.

B.  T version of the AFF: they could’ve read an aff about how free speech allows the Asians to break out and challenge stereotypes of the model minority and then all of the framing and reasons why this is so important.

C.  They can read these arguments on the NEG, there’s no reason affirming is key – switch side debate is key to tolerance instead of dogmatism.  Muir  93:
Department of Communications at George Mason (Star A., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4. Gale Academic Onefile)
Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values— tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. The willingness to recognize the existence of other views, and to grant alternative positions a degree of credibility, is a value fostered by switch-side debate: Alternately debating both sides of the same question inculcates a deep-seated attitude of tolerance toward differing points of view. To be forced to debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side. , . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .Promoting this kind of tolerance is perhaps one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer. 5' The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this fact who become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted.""* While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance.At a societal level, the value of tolerance is more conducive to a fair and open assessment of competing ideas. John Stuart Mill eloquently states the case this way: Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. . . . the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race. . . . If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth, produced by its collision with error."*' At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathic and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacity to engage in self-reflective questioning, to reason dialogically and dialectically, and to "reconstruct alien and opposing belief systems empathically."*- Our system of beliefs is, by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for rational reasons; that is, when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits, moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical thought and moral identity, he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of opposing views and the weaknesses of our own beliefs. Role playing, he reasons, is a central element of any effort to gain such insight.

Outweighs: unwillingness to listen to other viewpoints is the root cause of their harms since_.

Voter: Drop the debater on T – the round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded by ability to generate NC offense– letting them sever doesn’t solve any of the abuse

Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

Tournament: Berkeley | Round: 7 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
ACA repeal fails now – infighting in the GOP between the far right Freedom Caucus with the moderate Republicans/Trump prevents action. AOL 2-14
AOL News, GOP infighting could reportedly stall repeal of Obamacare, 2-14-17, https://www.aol.com/article/news/2017/02/14/gop-infighting-stall-repeal-obamacare/21714262/ VC
Republican lawmakers are reportedly divided over how to repeal the Affordable Care Act, also known as the ACA or Obamacare, notes Politico. This rift is believed to be significant enough that some outside observers are speculating that the drive to overturn the law could, in fact, stall. One of the major divisions within the GOP appears to be between the House Freedom Caucus, a more right-wing section of the party, and moderate Republicans. According to Business Insider, the caucus faction wants to push for a complete repeal that had been passed by Congress in 2015 but vetoed by President Obama. Meanwhile, party centrists reportedly prefer to take a more measured approach which includes having an alternate plan to offer before acting on the ACA. This dispute is likely welcome news to some Democrats who, according to The Hill, "are hoping the GOP divisions mean ObamaCare repeal will never pass." Meanwhile President Trump continues to slam Obamacare. He posted a tweet on Tuesday, "Obamacare continues to fail. Humana to pull out in 2018. Will repeal, replace and save healthcare for ALL Americans."

Universities wouldn’t all allow for free speech; they need to be regulated by the government – it’s either no solvency or a link to the disad. Lindsay 15
Thomas K. Lindsay, 8-25-2015, "Congress vs. Campus Speech Restrictions," No Publication, http://www.realclearpolicy.com/blog/2015/08/25/congress_vs_campus_speech_restrictions_1399.htm VC
With this strong move by the House committee, we witness the academic world turned upside down: Academic freedom has always been supported, and rightly, as a defense against anti-intellectual pressure brought on universities by the political branches. The deeper defense of academic freedom is its indispensability to the nonpartisan truth-seeking that defines higher education's mission. But what happens when those who would deprive students and faculty of their First Amendment freedoms are within the universities themselves? This, unfortunately, is the crisis in which many universities find themselves today. For the solution, Congress has taken it upon itself to educate the educators in what those who supervise our universities should already know, namely, that when intellectual oppression rises, scientific progress and democratic deliberation decline. Given the stakes involved, it is encouraging to see that there is growing bipartisan support for restoring freedom on our campuses. While Representative Goodlatte is a Republican, in the past year, two Democratic governors — Terry McAuliffe of Virginia and Jay Nixon of Missouri — have signed legislation banning "free-speech zones" at all public universities in their states. As I have argued previously, in America, under the First Amendment to the Constitution, everywhere should be a free-speech zone, not simply the restricted (and restrictive) spaces that the majority of universities today unconstitutionally deign to provide for students. Although legislative action might prove necessary in the event that universities decline the House committee's plea to follow the Constitution, it would be heartbreaking if these institutions had to be compelled by a political branch to jettison their political agendas and return to disinterested inquiry. It would mean that American higher education has so lost any sense of its defining — and ennobling — purpose that it now has to be guided by those outside it, rather than guiding them, as it ought.

Independently, Trump is sending messages to campus administrators – means he perceptually gets tied to the plan. Brown 2-3
Sarah Brown, 2-3-17, "Trump Can’t Cut Off Berkeley’s Funds by Himself. His Threat Still Raised Alarm.," Chronicle of Higher Education, http://www.chronicle.com/article/Trump-Can-t-Cut-Off/239100 VC
Back in October, when President Trump vowed to "end" political correctness on college campuses, it was unclear how the then-presidential candidate planned to go about doing that. On Thursday, he dropped a hint: He threatened to cut off federal funding to the University of California at Berkeley after violent protests there prompted campus leaders to call off a talk by a far-right provocateur. Milo Yiannopoulos is a Breitbart News editor and Trump supporter who has for months traveled to campuses to give talks that often draw protests and have sometimes resulted in violence. He was once permanently banned from Twitter for his role in a harassment campaign against the actress Leslie Jones, and he has drawn heavy fire for his insulting comments about feminists, Black Lives Matters protesters, Islam, and topics he considers part of leftist ideology. Mr. Yiannopoulos was scheduled to speak on Berkeley’s campus late Wednesday, as part of his "Dangerous Faggot" tour, and more than 1,500 students gathered outside the venue to peacefully protest. Then about 100 additional protesters — mostly nonstudents, Berkeley officials said — joined the fray and hurled smoke bombs, broke windows, and started fires. The violence forced the campus police to put Berkeley on lockdown and led university leaders to cancel the event. The following morning, a political commentator suggested on Fox and Friends First that President Trump should take away Berkeley’s federal funding. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Trump decided to weigh in. Not surprisingly, Mr. Yiannopoulos liked that idea. On Facebook Thursday, he linked to a Breitbart article about the federal money Berkeley receives, adding, "Cut the whole lot, Donald J. Trump." Others were quick to condemn the president’s threat. U.S. Rep. Barbara Lee, a California Democrat whose district includes the Berkeley campus, tweeted back: "President Trump doesn’t have a license to blackmail universities. He’s the president, not a dictator, and his empty threats are an abuse of power." Later, in a statement, Ms. Lee said Mr. Yiannopoulos "has made a career of inflaming racist, sexist and nativist sentiments." Meanwhile, she wrote, "Berkeley has a proud history of dissent and students were fully within their rights to protest peacefully." Could Mr. Trump take away a university’s federal funding for what he sees as a violation of the First Amendment? Not on his own, and not entirely, some scholars say, though there are ways he could advocate for cutting some of it. Regardless, Mr. Trump’s singling out of Berkeley is worth paying attention to, they say, because it serves as a message to other campus officials that they may soon be put in the position of responding to the president’s social-media whims.

The House Freedom Caucus is super pro-free speech – the plan is popular with them which gains Trump PC – statements from the chair proves. Jordan and Hardwood 16
John Harwood, 11-7-2016, "On election eve, House Freedom Caucus chair talks about misperceptions of the GOP," CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/07/on-election-eve-house-freedom-caucus-chair-talks-about-misperceptions-of-the-gop.html VC
HARWOOD: Does the Republican Party not have to adapt and change its message? JORDAN: The Republican Party needs to stand for the things we believe in. Stand for limited government, stand for protecting personal liberties like your religious liberty rights under the First Amendment, like your right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Defend those rights when this current administration attacked them with the IRS, defend equal treatment under the law when this administration's Justice Department is much more focused on politics than they are on justice. Defend the sanctity of human life, and defend working-class people, middle-class people who are tired of folks going to Washington and not fighting for them. Think about the guy who works a second shift at the local plant here, who's working his tail off. There are folks getting his tax dollars who are able to work, but don't work. We need to have a welfare system that says we're going to help you, but if you are able-bodied in order to get that help, you have to do some kind of work. HARWOOD: What do you make of the idea that millennial voters think the Republican Party and its way of thinking, especially on cultural issues, is just stuck in the past? JORDAN: Folks in the House Freedom Caucus understand civil liberties need to be protected from the government. That is the way we can appeal to millennials. We have some people in the House Freedom Caucus who have been champions of defending your Fourth Amendment rights, defending your First Amendment liberties, defending your Second Amendment. That is where you can connect as well.

Trump plan is ready to roll and hurts low income families – makes it harder to get health care and exacerbates poverty. Levey 2-15
Noam N. Levey, 2-15-2017, "While Congress struggles to replace Obamacare, the Trump administration is moving to reshape health insurance on its own," latimes, http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-obamacare-stabilization-20170215-story.html VC
With congressional Republicans struggling to develop an Obamacare alternative, the Trump administration is taking steps on its own to loosen government regulation of the nation’s health insurance markets, a longtime conservative goal. But the Trump administration’s moves to relax rules on insurers appear likely to shift additional medical costs onto patients by promoting higher-deductible health plans. The proposed regulations also set the stage for potential reductions in government aid to low- and moderate-income consumers, another policy favored by GOP leaders, including Trump’s new Health and Human Services secretary, Tom Price, a fierce advocate for reduced federal healthcare spending. The moves drew criticism from many consumer and patient advocates worried that the Trump administration is undermining key protections established by the Affordable Care Act. Chris Hansen, president of the American Cancer Society’s advocacy arm, warned that the new rules could make essential medical care harder to find for many needy patients. Amid Obamacare uncertainty, insurance giant Humana plans to leave marketplaces in 2018 “While American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network appreciates efforts to strengthen the marketplace, those efforts need not weaken access to meaningful health insurance for cancer patients and survivors,” he said. The Trump administration has proposed, among other things, to loosen rules that set minimum standards for the size of health plans’ provider networks and for how much of patients’ medical bills must be covered. Price, who took over the Health and Human Services Department last week, called the new regulations “initial steps in advance of a broader effort to better serve the American people.” Insurance industry groups cautiously praised the proposal, which the Blue Cross Blue Shield Assn. said “would help stabilize the current individual market and are a good start toward improving the functioning of the marketplace.” The Trump administration began working on the new regulations soon after the inauguration amid rising anxiety about the future of insurance marketplaces established by the 2010 healthcare law. The state-based marketplaces, a centerpiece of the law, allow Americans who don’t get coverage through an employer to shop for plans that must meet basic standards. Insurers cannot turn away patients who are sick. And low- and moderate-income consumers can qualify for government subsidies to offset the cost of their premiums. About 11 million people current rely on the marketplaces. And surveys suggest that most consumers are happy with their coverage, even though some face very high premiums. But the high number of costly, sick customers who enrolled in coverage surprised many insurers, prompting some to dramatically raise premiums this year or exit the marketplaces altogether. That has prompted calls from industry officials for new rules to stabilize the marketplaces. The Obama administration was considering some, and Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton indicated that she too wanted to take steps to get more young, healthy people to enroll in the marketplaces. Some of the Trump administration’s proposals — outlined in a highly technical, 71-page proposed regulation — reflect ideas that have been under discussion since before the November election. These include tightening the rules for when people can sign up for coverage. Insurers have complained for years that too many consumers have been gaming the system and signing up for coverage only after they get sick. Under the proposed new rules, people will be allowed to sign up outside the annual enrollment period only if they can prove they qualify because of a life-changing event, such as a move or the loss of a job. Similar standards exist in most employer-provided health plans. The administration is also proposing to cut next year’s open-enrollment period from three months to six weeks. The Trump administration is pushing other proposals, many favored by the insurance industry, that loosen key standards that health plans must now meet. For example, under current regulations, insurers must offer plans that cover a minimum share of patients’ medical expenses. A silver plan — one of four categories of plans available on marketplaces — must currently cover between 68 and 72 of patients’ anticipated medical costs. But the Trump administration is proposing that these plans could cover as little as 66 of patients’ expenses. The administration said this change would allow insurers to design more affordable health plans. “We anticipate that this flexibility could encourage healthier consumers to enroll,” the proposed regulation states. But this change, though seemingly small, could allow larger deductibles that leave patients with a bigger share of their medical bills. The Trump administration acknowledged the looser rules could make patients pay more. “The proposed change … could reduce the value of coverage for consumers, which could lead to more consumers facing increases in out-of-pocket expenses,” the rule notes. Loosening regulations has been a key goal of Price and other Republicans, who have argued that doing so will lead to lower premiums and more choices for consumers. Lower-cost health plans that cover less also could affect the value of government aid that is available to low- and moderate-income shoppers. That is because subsidies are pegged to the cost of less expensive plans available on the marketplaces. If those plans drop even further, the subsidies would be reduced as well. That prompted analysts at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a left-leaning Washington think tank, to warn Tuesday that many consumers could soon face a difficult dilemma. “The rule would force millions of families to choose between higher premiums and worse coverage,” analysts concluded. Administration officials said the moves — which were detailed in proposed regulations released Wednesday — are necessary to stabilize Obamacare marketplaces that have been shaken over the last year by rising premiums and insurer exits.

Poverty causes massive violence racism against marginalized groups.  Social Watch 13

Social Watch (International network of citizens’ organizations in the struggle to eradicate poverty) , POVERTY AND RACISM INEXTRICABLY LINKED, SAYS UN EXPERT, 2013.  NS

In a report to the UN General Assembly, a UN rights expert has emphasised that poverty is closely associated with racism and contributes to the persistence of racist attitudes and practices which in turn generate more poverty. Racial or ethnic minorities are disproportionately affected by poverty; and the lack of education, adequate housing and health care transmits poverty from generation to generation, a United Nations rights expert has said. According to Ruteere, poverty does not result only from an unequal sharing of resources. 'Discrimination against groups and persons based on their ethnicity, race, religion or other characteristics or factors has been known to encourage exclusion and impoverish certain groups of the population who suffer from unequal access to basic needs and services.' In his report to the UN General Assembly last November, the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Mutuma Ruteere, was of the opinion that the issues of poverty and racism are inextricably linked. As has been emphasised in the Durban Declaration, he said, 'poverty... is closely associated with racism... and contributes to the persistence of racist attitudes and practices which in turn generate more poverty' (paragraph 18). Ruteere said that as the previous Special Rapporteur on racism underlined in his report to the General Assembly in 2009, 'racial or ethnic minorities are disproportionately affected by poverty, and the lack of education, adequate housing and health care transmits poverty from generation to generation and perpetuates racial prejudices and stereotypes in their regard'. In his report, the Special Rapporteur welcomed the efforts and initiatives undertaken by various states to prohibit discrimination and segregation and to ensure full enjoyment of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights for all individuals and groups. He noted that certain groups and individuals, including people of African descent, indigenous peoples, minorities, Roma, Dalits and migrants, are still confronted with poverty and discrimination, especially in the enjoyment of their economic and social rights. 'The persistence of discrimination against those groups and individuals remains a challenge to the construction of a tolerant and inclusive society, and only the guarantee of equality and non-discrimination policies can redress that imbalance and prevent those groups that are discriminated against from falling into or being trapped in poverty,' Ruteere emphasised. Poverty and discrimination In his report, the Special Rapporteur discusses the manifestations of poverty and racism in the areas of economic and social rights such as education, adequate housing and health care, and other rights affected in the link between racism and poverty, including the right to work in just conditions, social security, food and water. According to Ruteere, poverty does not result only from an unequal sharing of resources. 'Discrimination against groups and persons based on their ethnicity, race, religion or other characteristics or factors has been known to encourage exclusion and impoverish certain groups of the population who suffer from unequal access to basic needs and services.'  Groups that are discriminated against, such as Afro-descendants, minorities, indigenous peoples, migrants and refugees, are disproportionately affected by poverty in all regions of the world. 'The complex relationship between racism and discrimination suggests that only the guarantee of equality and non-discrimination can redress that imbalance and protect such groups from falling into or being trapped in poverty,' the Special Rapporteur stressed.  According to the report, a history of discrimination has left a large number of racial and ethnic groups in various parts of the world trapped in conditions of 'chronic deprivation of resources' with limited choices and vulnerable to multiple violations of their rights.

Outweighs and turns case – poverty is the worst form of structural violence and magnifies other impacts.  Pogge 02
Thomas Pogge, Poverty and Human Rights. 2002.
Human rights would be fully realized, if all human beings had secure access to the objects of these rights. Our world is today very far from this ideal. Piecing together the current global record, we find that most of the current massive underfulfillment of human rights is more or less directly connected to poverty. The connection is direct in the case of basic social and economic human rights, such as the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of oneself and one’s family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care. The connection is more indirect in the case of civil and political human rights associated with democratic government and the rule of law. Desperately poor people, often stunted, illiterate, and heavily preoccupied with the struggle to survive, typically lack effective means for resisting or rewarding their rulers, who are therefore likely to rule them oppressively while catering to the interests of other, often foreign, agents (governments and corporations, for instance) who are more capable of reciprocation.  The statistics are appalling. Out of a total of 6575 million human beings, 830 million are reportedly chronically undernourished, 1100 million lack access to safe water and 2600 million lack access to basic sanitation (UNDP 2006: 174, 33). About 2000 million lack access to essential drugs  (www.fic.nih.gov/about/summary.html). Some 1000 million have no adequate shelter and 2000 million lack electricity (UNDP 1998: 49). Some 799 million adults are illiterate (www.uis.unesco.org). Some 250 million children between 5 and 14 do wage work outside their household with 170.5 million of them involved in hazardous work and 8.4 million in the “unconditionally worst” forms of child labor, which involve slavery, forced or bonded labor, forced recruitment for use in armed conflict, forced prostitution or pornography, or the production or trafficking of illegal drugs (ILO 2002: 9, 11, 17, 18). People of colour and females (UNDP 2003: 310-330; UNRISD 2005; Social Watch 2005) bear greatly disproportionate shares of these deprivations.  Roughly one third of all human deaths, some 18 million annually, are due to poverty-related causes, easily preventable through better nutrition, safe drinking water, mosquito nets, re-hydration packs, vaccines and other medicines.  This sums up to 300 million deaths in 17 years since the end of the cold war - many more than were caused by all the wars, civil wars, and government repression of the entire 20th century.

Tournament: CPS | Round: 5 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
Links

Rhetoric propagating free speech as the answer to social ills directly trades off with our ability to fight injustice. Free speech is a tool that courts wield in colorblind ways against people. Delgado and Stefancic ‘92
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. “IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?” Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN

III. How THE SYSTEM OF... lofty, romantic-and wrong.

And, more speech is not better – speech tends to reinscribe power relations rather than break them down.  Delgado and Yun ‘94
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974, University of California, Berkeley. David H. Yun – Member of the Colorado Bar. J.D. 1993, University of Colorado. “Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation.” California Law Review. 1994. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1712andcontext=californialawreview JJN

D. "More Speech"-Talking Back... for educating others? 

Their focus on precise legal analysis obscures marginalized voices who are intentionally left out of law reviews and court arguments. Downing 99
John Downing John T. Jones Jr Centennial Professor of Communication at the¶ University of Texas at Austin. “‘Hate speech’ and ‘First Amendment absolutism’ discourses in the US” Discourse and Society 99 Vol 10(2): 175–189

In the first... a seamless tissue.

Their philosophy preaches that everyone is equal – this colorblind ideology perpetuates anti blackness under the myth of American liberalism.  Curry 13
Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013.  NS

Despite the rhetorical... integrated into society.

Impacts

Turns the case – hate speech does real violence to people of color and necessarily locks in relationships of domination. Delgado and Stefacic ‘09
Richard Delgado - University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. Jean Stefancic – Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989, University of San Francisco. “FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH.” WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW. 2009. http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Delgado_LawReview_01.09.pdf

II. OBSERVATION NUMBER TWO:... of free expression.111

Anti-Blackness is the root cause of white supremacy and social oppression. It outweighs the case. Heitzeg 15
Heitzeg, Nancy A a Professor of Sociology and Director of the¶ interdisciplinary Critical Studies of Race/Ethnicity Program at St. Catherine¶ University, St. Paul, MN.. "On The Occasion Of The 50th Anniversary Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: Persistent White Supremacy, Relentless Anti-Blackness, And The Limits Of The Law." Hamline J. Pub. L. and Pol'y 36 (2015): 54.

While all communities... a daunting challenge.22

Alt

The alternative is to embrace the demand of abolitionism – we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements.  Oparah 14
Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).

¶ In my earlier... by academic-MPIC abolition.

Framing

The role of the ballot is to interrogate the AFF’s scholarship using the lens of critical race theory. This makes the passage of the plan irrelevant. 

First, their refusal of minority voices is a conscious choice. Delgado 84
Delgado, Richard. "The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132.3 (1984): 561-578.

It does not... no such tradition.23

Second, Debate is a space in which racial identity can be understood—This dynamic is key to confronting racial domination and questioning the underlying aspects of negative racial identities. Reid-Brinkley 08
Shanara Rose. PhD in Philosophy from the University of Georgia. The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance And Style. https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf  pgs 2-3. 7/5

The attempts at... end racial domination.

Tournament: CPS | Round: 3 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
Neoliberalism structures academic freedom in the status quo. It sets limits on what is acceptable behavior to quell dissent and any facult truly radical enough to challenge corporate hegemony are tossed out before they can pose a real threat. Chatterjee and Maira 14
Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. "The Imperial University: race, war, and the nation-state." The imperial university: Academic repression and scholarly dissent (2014): 1-50.
Our geopolitical positions—of our immediate workplaces as well as trans- national work circuits—underscore the complex contradictions of our locations within the U.S. academy. These paradoxes of positionality and employment have seeded this project in important ways. We have both taught at the University of California for many years—in addition to other U.S. universities—and have been members of the privileged upper caste of U.S. higher education: the tenured professoriate. We have each used these privileges of class, education, and cultural capital to live and work transna- tionally and have organized around and written about issues of warfare, colo- nialism, occupation, immigration, racism, gender rights, youth culture, and labor politics, within and outside the United States. In fact, we first began working together when we collaborated in 2008 on a collective statement of feminist solidarity with women suffering from the violence of U.S. wars and occupation, during the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Israeli siege of Gaza.7 Yet our privileges of entry, of inclusion, and of outside-ness are also always marked by the “dangerous complicities” of imperial privi- lege and neoliberal capital, as the chapters by Julia Oparah; Sylvanna Falcón, Sharmila Lodhia, Molly Talcott, and Dana Collins; Vijay Prashad; and Laura Pulido powerfully remind us. Even as we have recognized the institutional privileges and complicities through which we can do this work, we have experienced at various moments and in different ways—as the chapters by Alexis Gumbs, Clarissa Rojas, Thomas Abowd, and Nicholas De Genova suggest—a keen sense of being “outsiders” within—in the university, in aca- demic disciplines, in different nations.8¶ As scholars and teachers located within “critical ethnic studies” and “women and gender studies,” we are also well aware of a certain politics of value, legitimacy, and marginality at play, especially as the dismantling of the public higher education system and attacks on ethnic studies around the nation accelerate. The struggles to build ethnic studies and women/gen- der/sexuality studies as legitimate scholarly endeavors within the academy, emerging from several strands of the civil rights and antiwar movements, are well chronicled and keenly debated. The precarious positions as well as increasing professionalization and policing of these interdisciplinary fields within the current restructuring of the university is a matter of deep con- cern; for example, in the wake of the assault on ethnic studies in Arizona, the dismantling of women’s studies programs, and in a climate of policing and criminalizing immigrant “others” across the nation.¶ The pressure on academics to fund one’s own research—following the dominant grant-writing models of science and technology—is now even more explicit in a time of fiscal crisis and deepening fissures between faculty in the humanities, social sciences, physical sciences, education, and business who occupy very different positions in an increasingly privatized university.9 Prashad reminds us in his chapter of the consequences of the fiscal crisis for college students who bear a massive and growing burden of debt. We recognize these pressures on faculty and students as stemming from neolib- eral capitalism and the university’s capitulation to a global “structural adjust- ment” policy that is now coming “home” to roost in the United States, as astutely argued by Farah Godrej in her analysis linking the neoliberal uni- versity to militarism and violence. The academy has also tried to market the notion of “public scholarship,” transforming activist scholarship into a commodifiable form of knowledge production and dissemination that can affirm the university’s civic engagement—confined by the parameters of per- missible politics, as incisively critiqued by Salaita, Rojas, and Abowd. If we cannot—or choose not to—market our scholarship and pedagogies through these programs of funding and institutionalization, we find our work further devalued within the dominant terms of privatization in the academy. Given that neoliberal market ideologies now underwrite the “value” of our research and intellectual work, what happens to scholars whose writing directly tack- les the questions of U.S. state violence, logics of settler colonialism, and global political and economic dominance?¶ We know from stories about campaigns related to tenure or defamation of scholars, often shared in hallways during conferences and sometimes through e-mail listservs and the media, that there are serious costs to writing and speaking about these matters. For far too many colleagues who confront the most taboo of topics, such as indigenous critiques of genocide and settler colonialism or especially the question of Palestine, the price paid has been extraordinarily high. It has included the denial of promotion to tenure, being de-tenured, not having employment contracts renewed, or never being hired and being blacklisted, as this book poignantly illustrates. Coupled with the loss of livelihood or exile from the U.S. academy, many scholars have been stigmatized, harassed, and penalized in overt and covert ways. There are numerous such cases, sadly way too many to recount here—most famously those of Ward Churchill, Norman Finkelstein, David Graeber, Joel Kovel, Terri Ginsberg, Marc Ellis, Margo Nanlal-Rankoe, Wadie Said, and Sami Al- Arian—but it is generally only the handful that generate public campaigns that receive attention while many others remain unknown, not to mention innumerable cases of students who have been surveilled or harassed, such as Syed Fahad Hashmi from Brooklyn College, while again there are countless other untold stories.10 These are the scandals and open secrets, we argue, that need to be revealed and placed in broader frames of analysis of labor and survival within the U.S. university system.11

Free speech is an illusion propagated by corporatists – their model of rights assumes an equal playing field analogous to free market economists view of capital. The promotion of free speech perpetuates the idea that speech is a commodity, which strengthens neoliberalism’s hold on the academy. Brown 15
Brown, Wendy. Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism's stealth revolution. MIT Press, 2015.
At times, kennedy raises the pitch in Citizens United to depict limits on corporate funding of PAC ads as “an outright ban on speech”;19 at other times, he casts them merely as inappropriate government inter- vention and bureaucratic weightiness.20 But beneath all the hyperbole about government’s chilling of corporate speech is a crucial rhetorical move: the figuring of speech as analogous to capital in “the political marketplace.” on the one hand, government intervention is featured throughout the opinion as harmful to the marketplace of ideas that speech generates.21 Government restrictions damage freedom of speech just as they damage all freedoms. on the other hand, the unfettered accumulation and circulation of speech is cast as an unqual- ified good, essential to “the right of citizens to inquire...hear... speak...and use information to reach consensus itself a precondi- tion to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”22 not merely corporate rights, then, but democracy as a whole is at stake in the move to deregulate speech. Importantly, however, democ- racy is here conceived as a marketplace whose goods—ideas, opinions, and ultimately, votes—are generated by speech, just as the economic market features goods generated by capital. In other words, at the very moment that Justice kennedy deems disproportionate wealth irrele- vant to the equal rights exercised in this marketplace and the utili- tarian maximization these rights generate, speech itself acquires the status of capital, and a premium is placed on its unrestricted sources and unimpeded flow.¶ What is significant about rendering speech as capital? economiza- tion of the political occurs not through the mere application of market principles to nonmarket fields, but through the conversion of political processes, subjects, categories, and principles to economic ones. This is the conversion that occurs on every page of the kennedy opinion. If everything in the world is a market, and neoliberal markets con- sist only of competing capitals large and small, and speech is the capital of the electoral market, then speech will necessarily share cap- ital’s attributes: it appreciates through calculated investment, and it advances the position of its bearer or owner. Put the other way around, once speech is rendered as the capital of the electoral marketplace, it is appropriately unrestricted and unregulated, fungible across actors and venues, and existing solely for the advancement or enhancement of its bearer’s interests. The classic associations of political speech with freedom, conscience, deliberation, and persuasion are nowhere in sight.¶ How, precisely, is speech capital in the kennedy opinion? How does it come to be figured in economic terms where its regulation or restriction appears as bad for its particular marketplace and where its monopolization by corporations appears as that which is good for all? The transmogrification of speech into capital occurs on a number of levels in kennedy’s account. First, speech is like capital in its tendency to proliferate and circu- late, to push past barriers, to circumvent laws and other restrictions, indeed, to spite efforts at intervention or suppression.23 speech is thus rendered as a force both natural and good, one that can be wrongly impeded and encumbered, but never quashed.¶ second, persons are not merely producers, but consumers of speech, and government interference is a menace—wrong in prin- ciple and harmful in effect—at both ends. The marketplace of ideas, kennedy repeats tirelessly, is what decides the value of speech claims. every citizen must judge the content of speech for himself or herself; it cannot be a matter for government determination, just as govern- ment should not usurp other consumer choices.24 In this discussion, kennedy makes no mention of shared deliberation or judgment in politics or of voices that are unfunded and relatively powerless. He is focused on the wrong of government “commanding where a per- son may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, using censorship to control thought.”25 If speech generates goods consumed according to individual choice, govern- ment distorts this market by “banning the political speech of millions of associations of citizens” (that is, corporations) and by paternal- istically limiting what consumers may know or consider. Again, if speech is the capital of the political marketplace, then we are polit- ically free when it circulates freely. And it circulates freely only when corporations are not restricted in what speech they may fund or promulgate.¶ Third, kennedy casts speech not as a medium for expression or dialogue, but rather as innovative and productive, just as capital is. There is “a creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expres- sion” that intersects in a lively way with “rapid changes in technol- ogy” to generate the public good.26 This aspect of speech, kennedy argues, specifically “counsels against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”27 Again, the dynamism, innovativeness, and generativity of speech, like that of all capital, is dampened by government intervention.¶ Fourth, and perhaps most important in establishing speech as the capital of the electoral marketplace, kennedy sets the power of speech and the power of government in direct and zero-sum-game opposition to one another. Repeatedly across the lengthy opinion for the majority, he identifies speech with freedom and government with control, cen- sorship, paternalism, and repression.28 When free speech and govern- ment meet, it is to contest one another: the right of speech enshrined in the First Amendment, he argues, is “premised on mistrust of gov- ernmental power” and is “an essential mechanism of democracy because it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”29 Here are other variations on this theme in the opinion:¶ The First Amendment was certainly not understood by the framers to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media. It was understood as a response to the repression of speech.30¶ When Government seeks to use its full power, including criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.... The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.31 This reading of the First Amendment and of the purpose of political speech positions government and speech as warring forces parallel to those of government and capital in a neoliberal economy.

This turns the case – the commodification of speech reflects the capitalist illusion of freedom. It makes speech meaningless and kills value to life. Smith ‘14
R.C. Smith April 24, 2014 “POWER, CAPITAL and THE RISE OF THE MASS SURVEILLANCE STATE: ON THE ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY, ETHICS, DISENCHANTMENT and CRITICAL THEORY” Heathwood Institute and Press http://www.heathwoodpress.com/power-capital-the-rise-of-the-mass-surveillance-state-on-the-absence-of-democracy-ethics-disenchantment-critical-theory/ JJN from file
One pressing issue, moreover, is that majority of the popular movements that have emerged in response to the Snowden leaks appear to be reformist in character. As a result, the discourse isn’t so much about fundamental system change; rather it becomes crafted into making mass surveillance less repulsive and more socially acceptable, even marketable. (Consider, for instance, the latest reforms proposed by President Barack Obama). For Adorno, this reformist inclination can be explained in part through an analysis of the logic of the system of capital. We read in Adorno how under modernity – i.e., capitalism – human beings are treated as commodities4 and the political-economy, which is principled on concentrations of power (i.e., ‘contradictory recognition’5), goes over the head of the individual, particularly as ‘coercive society’ aims to ‘shape people’ on behalf of the economic, social and political status quo.6 The system of capital, along with the instrumental use of Enlightenment ideals to promote a rational, efficient system7 have laid a foundation for society wherein the political-economy influences individuals and manufactures consent.8 Accordingly, people are seen as “substitutable entities valued merely for their instrumental uses or ability to command market resources,” and even where “commodification is resisted, the overriding pull of society is toward the status quo and those forms that are valued by society”. 9 As Kate Schick writes: The mind thus shapes itself into socially acceptable, marketable forms and freedom becomes an illusion, made all the more dangerous and difficult to resist because of the appearance of freedom. This is not the fault of Enlightenment ideals as such, but the instrumental use of these ideals in the promotion of a rational, efficient system: ‘The network of the whole is drawn ever tighter, modelled after the act of exchange’ (Adorno 1981: 21).10 Present in the logic of the system of capital itself is not an ‘emancipatory reason’ that aims toward universal guiding principles of an actually egalitarian democracy – i.e., Equality, Egalitarianism, Justice, Rights, etc. Rather, in modern capitalism, with its instrumental reason and positivist logic, such concepts lose their meaning.11 The social narrative no longer accommodates these fundamental principles or judges them to be delusions, because all concepts must be strictly functional in order to be considered “reasonable”.12 In turn, the ideals of a ‘good’ society, for example ideals toward an actual egalitarian democracy, become dependent on the “interests” of the dominant and governing system, which produces and reproduces the epistemic context of its own validity.13

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return. 

The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Sculos and Walsh 16
Sculos, Bryant William a¶ Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University , and Sean Noah Walsh Department of Political Science and Economics, Capital University. "The Counterrevolutionary Campus: Herbert Marcuse and the Suppression of Student Protest Movements." New Political Science (2016): 1-17.
¶ The recognition of repressive tolerance as a tool of counterrevolution calls for a careful¶ examination of leftist strategy. For example, so-called ‘microaggressions’, or ‘trigger warnings’,¶ should be taken seriously.65 However, we should and need to ask ourselves: in a world of¶ pervasive macroaggressions and trigger-pulling in a world of wretched poverty, torture and¶ disappeared dissidents—if these concerns should take center stage. We ought to reflect and¶ ask if identity concerns are more important than class or economic concerns. Marcuse would¶ surely argue that class remains a crucial component alongside other dimensions of identity¶ and oppression (for example, race, gender, sexuality, sexual orientation, religion et cetera).¶ He would demand that we act locally but organize globally, and that we refuse the lure of¶ divisive identity politics, without eschewing the central importance of criticizing racialized,¶ gendered dimensions to capitalist oppressions. We must principally and aggressively resist¶ the demand that we tolerate the expressions or enactments of these oppressions under the¶ guise of liberal toleration. In response to this revolting, nauseating, murderous demand, we¶ must revolt in all the ways we can, and that is precisely what #BlackLivesMatter, the Black¶ Liberation Collective (a nascent, more radical national student organization, distinct but¶ related to BLM and includes many of the campus protesters from around the United States),¶ and the broader student movements are aiming and struggling for (even if right now what¶ they are struggling for is precisely that focused vision).¶ The claim that free speech is under assault is often deployed as a tool of repressive toleration¶ by the Right. Perhaps we need some more hashtags: #BlackVoicesMatter or¶ #BlackProtestsMatter (though the label ‘black’ here, as it is with BLM, is meant to be inclusive,¶ not exclusive. There are numbers of white and non-black allies of the organization, as can¶ be seen in any cursory examination of these various protests. This is explicitly laid out in the¶ official platform of the BLM organization. This is the case for BDS as well; it is not about identity so much as it is about defending the humanity of all).66 We need more than just¶ hashtags though. Much more. We have seen the foundations of more. BLM’s platform does¶ not, however, include any mention of capitalism or economic exploitation, despite the fact¶ that the leadership of the organization has spoken out against racialized capitalism.67 The¶ Black Liberation Collective already includes a critique of capitalism alongside other forms¶ of oppression in their platform.68 These are the early and precarious stages of a potentially¶ emergent cohesive Left for the twenty-first century. Through Marcuse’s critical gaze, we can¶ observe what these students and activists have already realized, what is truly intolerable:¶ the demand that we all tolerate the intolerable. Today, the path to liberating tolerance¶ requires the refusal to accept such silencing.¶ Importantly, we must not limit ourselves to merely critiquing existing oppressions, or just¶ suggest principled radical reforms that could move us towards an emancipated, just (global)¶ society. As many on the Left have attempted, though sadly without much wider recognition,¶ we need to start building these alternative futures in the counterrevolutionary present wherever¶ and whenever possible. This means first building racially, sexually and gender inclusive¶ communicative and organizational bridges between both nascent and longer established¶ social movements and class-based organizations, including the too often forgotten Left¶ political parties.69 Liberating tolerance could tear open avenues for the development of the¶ ‘new sensibility’ Marcuse heralds in his late work. We see this as crucial for the possibility of¶ a new society, a free, just, and rational society antipodal and antithetical to the unfree, unjust,¶ and irrational confines of neoliberal capitalism. College campuses have, since Marcuse’s time¶ been a potentially key environment for the cultivation of this ‘new sensibility’—a sensibility,¶ a mentality, oriented towards care, compassion, love, justice, cooperation and indeed active¶ disgust at their inverses.70 BLM and BDS and other less well-known organized movements¶ offer us a new hope and opportunity to revitalize a youthful emancipatory disposition with¶ sustainability.¶ Liberating tolerance against repressive tolerance has the potential to open up the material¶ and ideological space for precisely these developments, against every wish of the counterrevolutionary¶ forces that militate against progress through the silencing of the exuberant¶ dissent we are witnessing across college campuses in the United States and around the¶ world. We write in support of these students and their rejection of white supremacy, racial¶ injustice (on campus and beyond), police brutality as standard practice, especially against¶ minorities, and their calls for an egalitarian educational experience, including the extension¶ of that experience for all people in the United States and around the world. Beyond Herbert¶ Marcuse’s words, we have his emancipatory democratic impetus—we hope to have embodied¶ that impetus here and shown it to be more relevant than ever.

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. 

First, neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file
RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. A. Prescription: More Politics The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor, 137 many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s marginalization. B. Prescription: More Normativity Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a number of pitfalls. The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the “distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the societal pie and redistribution is about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain of discourse or ideology. Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like Hayek’s theory, “law and economics is full of stories about how liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it instead folds them into one another: “The Law and Economics movement is rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive communitarian ideal will win.150 Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by her capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for her own needs and service her own ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152 If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as “undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be countered differently. More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. C. Prescription: Acceptance The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in “taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be “self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce the momentum to move forward. VII CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate the practice of critique within the legal academy. A. Why Critique Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: critique. Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies them. Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no alternative.

Tournament: Berkeley | Round: 2 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
The political ontology of liberalism is violent – Rawls assumes a neutral liberal subject which forces marginalized groups to assimilate to and endorse a coded white male identity.  Heyes 02

Cressida Heyes, Identity Politics, SEP, 2002.  NS

A key condition of possibility for contemporary identity politics was institutionalized liberal democracy (Brown 1995). The citizen mobilizations that made democracy real also shaped and unified groups previously marginal to the polity, while extensions of formal rights invited expectations of material and symbolic equality. The perceived paucity of rewards offered by liberal capitalism, however, spurred forms of radical critique that sought to explain the persistence of oppression. At the most basic philosophical level, critics of liberalism suggested that liberal social ontology—the model of the nature of and relationship between subjects and collectives—was misguided. The social ontology of most liberal political theories consists of citizens conceptualized as essentially similar individuals, as for example in John Rawls' famous thought experiment using the “original position,” in which representatives of the citizenry are conceptually divested of all specific identities or affiliations in order to make rational decisions about the social contract (Rawls 1970). To the extent that group interests are represented in liberal polities, they tend to be understood as associational, forms of interest group pluralism whereby those sharing particular interests voluntarily join together to create a political lobby. Citizens are free to register their individual preferences (through voting, for example), or to aggregate themselves for the opportunity to lobby more systematically (e.g. by forming an association such as a neighborhood community league). These lobbies, however, are not defined by the identity of their members so much as by specific shared interests and goals, and when pressing their case the marginalized subjectivity of the group members is not itself called into question. Finally, political parties, the other primary organs of liberal democratic government, critics suggest, have few moments of inclusivity, being organized around party discipline, responsiveness to lobby groups, and broad-based electoral popularity. Ultimately conventional liberal democracy, diverse radical critics claim, cannot effectively address the ongoing structural marginalization that persists in late capitalist liberal states, and may even be complicit with it (Young 1990; P. Williams 1991; Brown 1995; M. Williams 1998).   – Continues -- On a philosophical level, these understandings of the political subject and its relationship to collectivity came to seem inadequate to ensuring representation for women, gays and lesbians, or racial-ethnic groups (M. Williams 1998). Critics charged that the neutral citizen of liberal theory was in fact the bearer of an identity coded white, male, bourgeois, able-bodied, and heterosexual (Pateman 1988; Young 1990; Di Stefano 1991; Mills 1997; Pateman and Mills 2007). This implicit ontology in part explained the persistent historical failure of liberal democracies to achieve anything more than token inclusion in power structures for members of marginalized groups. A richer understanding of political subjects as constituted through and by their social location was required. In particular, the history and experience of oppression brought with it certain perspectives and needs that could not be assimilated through existing liberal structures. Individuals are oppressed by virtue of their membership in a particular social group—that is, a collective whose members have relatively little mobility into or out of the collective, who usually experience their membership as involuntary, who are generally identified as members by others, and whose opportunities are deeply shaped by the relation of their group to corollary groups through privilege and oppression (Cudd 2006). Oppression, then, is the systematic limiting of opportunity or constraints on self-determination because of such membership: for example, Frantz Fanon eloquently describes the experience of being always constrained by the white gaze as a Black man: “I already knew that there were legends, stories, history, and above all historicity… I was responsible at the same time for my body, my race, for my ancestors” (Fanon 1968, 112). Conversely, members of dominant groups are privileged—systematically advantaged by the deprivations imposed on the oppressed. For example, in a widely cited article Peggy McIntosh identifies whiteness as a dominant identity, and lists 47 ways in which she is advantaged by being white compared with her colleagues of color. These range from being able to buy “flesh-colored” Band-Aids that will match her skin tone, to knowing that she can be rude without provoking negative judgments of her racial group, to being able to buy a house in a middle-class community without risking neighbors' disapproval (1993).

Rawlsian theory forces black people into a conceptual abstraction where they must imagine the potentiality of white people to be ethical and impartially choose moral norms that benefit all of society.  Curry 13

Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013.  NS

The potentiality of whiteness—the proleptic call of white anti-racist consciousness— is nothing more than the fiat of an ahistorical dream. A command ushered before thought engages racism, before awareness of the world becomes aware of what is actual. This is forced upon accounts of racism where whiteness is morally obscured from being seen as is.  Whiteness as is partly determined by what could be, since what is was a past potentiality—a could be. The appeal to the sentimentality, morality, the moral abstraction/distraction of equality—both as a political command and its anthropological requisite—complicate the most obvious consequence of anti-Black racism, namely violence. This moral apriorism urges the Black thinker to conceptualize racism as an activist project rooted in the potential of a world filled with non-racists, a world where the white racist is transformed by Black activity into the white anti-racist.  But this project supposes an erroneous view of the white racist which occludes the reality of white supremacy and anti-Black racism. As Robert F. Williams argues in Negroes with Guns, “the racist is a man crazed by hysteria at the idea of coming into equal contact with Negroes. And this mass mental illness called racism is very much a part of the ‘American way of Life.’” The white racist is not seen as the delusional individual ostracized from society as a result of their abhorrent social pathologies of racist hate. Rather the white racist is normal—the extended family, the spouse, the sibling, the friend of the white individual—the very same entities upon which the inter/intrasubjectivity nexus of the white self is founded. The white he experiences no punishment for his longing for Black servitude and his need to exploit and divest the Black worker here and then of his wealth. The white she has no uneasiness about her raping of—the destruction of generations of Black selves—mothers, children, and men—and today usurps the historical imagery of “the nigger,” to politically vacate Blackness and demonize niggers as beyond political consideration. She rewrites history, pens morality, and embodies the post-racial civil rights subject. As such, racism, the milieu of the white racist is not the exposed pathological existence of the white race, but rather valorized in white individuality, the individuality that conceptualizes their racism as a normative aspiration of what the world should look like, and even more damning, an aspiration that can be supported and propagated in the world. The white racist recognizes the deliberateness of the structures, relations, and systems in a white supremacist society and seeks like their colonial foreparents to claim them as their own. 

The alternative is anti ethics –a rupture of ideal theory, western conceptions of man and moral abstraction.  Curry 13

Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013.  NS

Anti-ethics; the call to demystify the present concept of man as illusion, as delusion, and as stratagem, is the axiomatic rupture of white existence and the multiple global oppressions like capitalism, militarism, genocide, and globalization, that formed the evaluative nexus which allows whites to claim they are the civilized guardians of the world’s darker races. It is the rejection of white virtue, the white’s axiomatic claim to humanity that allows the Black, the darker world to sow the seeds of consciousness towards liberation from oppression. When white (in)humanity is no longer an obstacle weighed against the means for liberation from racism, the oppressed are free to overthrow the principles that suggest their paths to liberation are immoral and hence not possible. To accept the oppressor as is, the white made manifest in empire, is to transform white western (hu)man from semi-deitous sovereign citizen to contingent, mortal, and un-otherable. Exposing the inhumanity of white humanity is the destruction/refusal of the disciplinary imperative for liberal reformism and dialogue as well as a rejection of the social conventions that dictate speaking as if this white person, the white person and her white people before you are in fact not racist white people, but tolerable—not like the racist white people abstracted from reality, but really spoken of in conversations about racism. The revelatory call, the coercively silenced but intuitive yearning to describe the actual reality set before Black people in an anti-Black society, is to simply say there is no negotiating the boundaries of anti-Blackness or the horizons of white supremacy. Racism, the debasement of melaninated bodies and nigger-souls, is totalizing. 

This is a prior question:

1. Their args beg the question of who gets access to philosophical principles – they’re not relevant if marginalized groups are excluded from using them

2. Standpoint epistemology of the oppressed is key to assessing their truth claims.  Mills 05

Edited for ableist language
Charles Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005.  NS

The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading. Think of the original challenge Marxist models of capitalism posed to liberalism’s social ontology: the claim that to focus on relations of aparently equal exchange, free and fair, among equal individuals was illusory, since at the level of the relations of production, the real ontology of worker and capitalist manifested a deep structure of constraint that limited proletarian freedom. Think of the innovation of using patriarchy to force people to recognize, and condemn as political and oppressive, rather than natural, apolitical, and unproblematic, male domination of women. Think of the recent resurrection of the concept of white supremacy to map the reality of a white domination that has continued in more subtle forms past the ending of de jure segregation. These are all global, high-level concepts, undeniable abstractions. But they map accurately (at least arguably) crucial realities that differentiate the statuses of the human beings within the systems they describe; so while they abstract, they do not idealize. Or consider conceptual innovation at the more local level: the challenge to the traditional way the public/private distinction was drawn, the concept of sexual harassment. In the first case, a seemingly neutral and innocuous conceptual divide turned out, once it was viewed from the perspective of gender subordination, as contributing to the reproduction of the gender system by its relegation of “women’s issues” to a seemingly apolitical and naturalized space. In the case of sexual harassment, a familiar reality—a staple of cartoons in men’s magazines for years (bosses chasing secretaries around the desk and so on)—was reconceptualized as negative (not something funny, but something morally wrong) and a contributor to making the workplace hostile for women. These realizations, these recognitions, did not spontaneously crystallize out of nowhere; they required conceptual labor, a different map of social reality, a valorization of the distinctive experience of women. As a result of having these concepts as visual aids, we can now see better: our perceptions are no longer ignorant blinded to realities to which we were previously obtuse. In some sense, an ideal observer should have been able to see them—yet they did not, as shown by the nonappearance of these realities in male-dominated philosophical literature.

Tournament: Berkeley | Round: 6 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
Title IX investigations are increasing. Kingiade 16.
Tyler Kingkade. “There Are Far More Title IX Investigations Of Colleges Than Most People Know”. Huffington Post. June 16, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d AGM
The growing backlog of federal Title IX investigations into colleges and universities has now topped 300, but many people, including students at the schools under scrutiny, aren’t aware of those reviews. As of Wednesday, there were 246 ongoing investigations by the U.S. Department of Education into how 195 colleges and universities handle sexual assault reports under the gender equity law. A Freedom of Information Act request by The Huffington Post revealed another 68 Title IX investigations into how 61 colleges handle sexual harassment cases. This puts the total number of Title IX investigations officially dealing with sexual harassment at 315. (Under civil rights statutes, sexual assault is defined as an extreme form of sexual harassment.) But dozens of those Title IX reviews receive no publicity because they don’t specifically deal with sexual assault. If a school is being investigated for allegedly mishandling harassment cases, but not reports of assault, it doesn’t appear on the list regularly given to reporters by the Education Department. Major educational institutions — including New York University, the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, Georgia State University, Florida AandM University, Rutgers University, Howard University, the University of Oklahoma, Kent State University and the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse — have escaped public scrutiny because Title IX investigations into their actions haven’t been highlighted by the government or the schools themselves.SUNY Broome Community College is under three investigations that haven’t been previously disclosed.  The Education Department has no plans to regularly issue a list of cases involving sexual harassment only, an official told HuffPost.

AFF guts effectiveness of Title IX – it causes first amendment opportunism. Schauer 04
Schauer, Frederick David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law. "The boundaries of the First Amendment: A preliminary exploration of constitutional salience." Harvard Law Review (2004): 1765-1809.
In addition to the properties of First Amendment claims that may¶ make them less likely to appear legally frivolous, the First Amend-¶ ment's magnetism may assist in ensuring that those claims will not¶ arise in isolation. There will often be multiple lawyers, multiple liti-¶ gants, and multiple public actors who perceive the virtues of the same¶ opportunistic strategy at roughly the same time, or who even may be¶ in active coordination with each other - as with the multiple chal-¶ lenges to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the proliferation of First¶ Amendment rhetoric surrounding legal arguments regarding computer¶ source code, and the panoply of parallel claims about First Amend-¶ ment limitations on copyright. When this is the case, the multiplicity¶ of individually tenuous claims may produce a cascade effect160 such¶ that the claims no longer appear tenuous. The combination of, say,¶ four scarcely plausible but simultaneous court challenges and twenty¶ scarcely plausible public claims of a First Amendment problem could make all these individually implausible claims seem more credible¶ than they actually are.161 From the standpoint of an interest group¶ seeking to achieve change and to mobilize public support or the sup-¶ port of other interest groups,162 winning is better than losing publicly,¶ but losing publicly is perhaps still preferable to being ignored.¶ Once the claim or argument achieves a critical mass of plausibility,¶ the game may be over. Even if individual courts reject the claim, the¶ multiplicity of now-plausible claims may give the issue what is re-¶ ferred to in inside-the-Beltway political jargon as "traction" and in¶ newsroom jargon as "legs." Interestingly, this phenomenon sometimes¶ survives even authoritative rejection of the claim. With respect to the¶ argument that hostile-environment sexual harassment enforcement has¶ serious First Amendment implications, for example, neither the Su-¶ preme Court's rejection of this argument in dicta in R.A. V v. City of¶ St. Paul163 nor the Court's silent dismissal of the same claim in Harris¶ v. Forklift Systems, Inc.164 has slowed the momentum of those who¶ would wage serious First Amendment battle against hostile-¶ environment sexual harassment law.'65 Similarly, decades of judicial¶ rejection of the argument that copyright law must be substantially re-¶ stricted by the commands of the First Amendment have scarcely dis-¶ couraged those who urge otherwise; and in some respects the Supreme¶ Court's recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroftl66 can be considered not a¶ defeat, but rather one further step toward the entry of copyright into¶ the domain of the First Amendment: the Supreme Court did grant cer-¶ tiorari, in part to determine "whether ... the extension of existing and¶ future copyrights violates the First Amendment;"'67 and the seven-¶ Justice majority, as well as Justice Breyer in dissent,'68 acknowledged¶ that the First Amendment was not totally irrelevant.
Title IX is currently effective against harassment – this dramatically increases access to higher education.  Musil 07

Caryn Musil, Scaling the Ivory Towers, MS Magazine Fall 2007: The Triumphs of Title IX, http://www.feminist.org/education/TriumphsOfTitleIX.pdf.  NS

The contrast between her academic landscape and mine could not be more dramatic. And Title IX is the primary cause for the seismic shifts. The law’s impact has been elemental. Not only has it helped eliminate blatant discriminatory practices across educational institutions, but it has helped root out subtler methods of holding women back by closing the gap between men’s and women’s financial aid packages, improving housing opportunities for women students (a lack of women’s dorms was once used to restrict women’s admissions) and combating sexual harassment. Just before Title IX was signed into law, women were underrepresented as undergraduates, at just over 40 percent of all students. And it wasn’t that easy for them to get into those ivied halls. Young women typically had to make higher grades and SAT scores than young men to gain college admission, and often faced quotas limiting the number of women admitted. Once they got on campus, there were few women role models—less than one in five faculty members were women, and a mere 3 percent of college presidents. In some fields, even the women students were barely visible: About 1 percent of master’s degrees in engineering, 1 percent of doctoral dental degrees, and under 2 percent of master’s degrees in mathematics were awarded to women in 1970. The barriers were formidable, and sex discrimination unashamedly open and normative. In the years since Title IX, however, all of those numbers have risen tremendously. Take college enrollment, for starters: By 2005, women students comprised almost three out of five undergraduates, with some of this growth due to increased access for women of color (who have more than doubled their share of degrees since 1977, when they earned just over 10 per- cent). Women have not simply in- creased their numbers in academia, though: They have also moved into fields formerly dominated by men, particularly business and the sciences (see chart on page 45). These are the sorts of fields that lead women into higher-paying jobs after graduation. Bucking the rising trend, however, are computer and information sci- ence, where numbers peaked in 1984 before declining, and engineering and engineering technologies, in which the numbers of women grew and then leveled off. Certain fields have continued to be women-dominant from 1980 until 2005—health professions other than physicians and related inical sciences (currently more than 86 percent women) and education (about 79 percent women), but this isn’t the best news for economic equity, since wages tend to stay low in fields with few men. In graduate and professional schools, too, young women have enjoyed far greater access thanks to Title IX. In 1970, women earned only 14 percent of doctoral degrees, but today earn nearly half. Yet women’s doctorates are still not distributed evenly across disciplines: They range from a low of about 19 percent in engineering and engineering technologies to a high of about 71 per- cent in psychology. The most dramatic gains are in the professional schools. In 1971, just about 1 of 100 dental school graduates were women, while in 2005 that number grew nearly fortyfold. In medical schools the numbers jumped from less than 10 percent to nearly 50 percent, and law school numbers from about 7 percent to nearly 49 percent. There’s been quite a psychological benefit, too. As my older daughter, Rebecca, says of her experience at New York University Law School, “Women were more than half of the students, so sex discrimination was not something we ever worried about. ... It’s not that we don’t think about equality, but that we don’t have to think about it as much because of what’s already been done.” Armed with their professional degrees in medicine and law, women have entered those professions at steadily increasing rates. Yet their numbers—and in law firms, their advancement—still lag behind. In 2006, women made up 33 percent of lawyers but just 16 percent of partners in law firms. Similarly, in medicine only 27 percent of doctors are women, and they’re unevenly spread across specialties, the top three choices being internal medicine, pediatrics and general family medicine. The news is also mixed about women in academic leadership. By 1986 the number of women college presidents had tripled from 1970 to almost 10 percent, and by 2006 reached 23 percent, with a large proportion serving as presi- dents of community colleges. But most of the progress occurred between 1986 and 2001 and now has slowed considerably. Furthermore, today’s presidents re- main much less diverse by race, gender and ethnicity than the students, faculty or administrators who report to them: Only 4 percent of the respondents in a recent survey of college presidents identified as “minority women.” Women also tend to be more qualified and make more sacrifices than men in order to gain leadership; they’re far less likely than men presidents to be married and have children, and significantly more likely to hold an advanced degree. On faculties, women have increased across every rank but continue to move up more slowly than men. In 2006 they accounted for nearly 40 percent of full- time faculty and nearly 50 percent of part-timers. Young women benefit extraordinarily from all these women role models. As my daughter Emily says, “Women professors looked out for me the whole time ... and that is where I got my career counseling.” But women professors are not employed equally across institutional types—they’re just over half the faculty at institutions offering associate degrees, but only 34 percent at doctoral institutions. While women are increasing their numbers in tenure-track positions (nearly 45 percent), they still face the accumulated disad-vantages of sex discrimination over time and represent only about 31 per- cent of currently tenured faculty. “People change faster and more easily than institutions,” explains Yolanda T. Moses, associate vice chancellor for diversity at the University of California, Riverside. While the most blatant violations have been eliminated, Moses argues that the next level of work is even more complicated: “Systems can undermine progress ... and we need to unearth those behaviors that sabotage even our best intentions.” A search committee in physics or engineering, for example, may profess to be seeking more women, but make no efforts to break out of all-men, frequently all- white, networks to identify strong women candidates. These are the sorts of challenges that still remain, yet Title IX has gone a long way toward making campuses more hospitable. By offering legal protection from hostile work and learning environments, it helped draw attention to sexism in the classroom and opened the door for change. The fields of science, tech- nology, engineering and math were among the most chilly toward women, so Title IX helped usher in a period of serious self-study that has led to the adoption of more women-friendly teaching practices and programs, and thus a rise in women taking courses formerly dominated by men.

Sexual harassment in the classroom is a result of patriarchal violence that invades academia. Sexual harassment represents an oppressive use of power by professors and kills the participation and success of the harassed. Benson and Thomson 82

Benson, Donna J., and Gregg E. Thomson. "Sexual harassment on a university campus: The confluence of authority relations, sexual interest and gender stratification." Social problems 29.3 (1982): 236-251.

It is precisely this widespread confluence of authority relations, sexual interest and gender¶ stratification which defines the problem of sexual harassment. There is, in other words, a nexus¶ of power and sexualprerogative often enjoyed by men with formal authority over women. Men¶ in such positions can engage in (or "get away with") overt sexual behaviors that would be rebuffed¶ or avoided were the relationship not one of superior and subordinate. They can also discharge selectively the power and rewards of their positions as a means to obligate women sexualy (Blau,¶ 1964).¶ As well as reward and punish women directly, men can manipulate and obscure their sexual in-¶ tentions toward female subordinates. Women learn that the "official" attention of a male¶ superior is often but a vehicle through which he can "press his pursuits" (Goffman, 1977). In¶ turn, what is often mistakenly perceived by men as an unfounded distrust or suspicion of motives¶ has its basis in previous experience with male "helpfulness." Therefore, as Thorne5 suggests, there¶ is an intrinsic ambiguity between the formal definition of the male superior/female subordinate¶ relationship and a sexual one, in which the gender of the woman can be made salient at the in-¶ itiative of the man.¶ Male Authority and Sexual Interest on the University Campus¶ At major universities, student access to individual instructors can be a scarce resource. Faculty¶ members serve as gatekeepers to the professions, yet an institutional priority on research severely¶ constrains the time and energy that they devote to instruction and interaction with under-¶ graduates (Blau, 1973). Moreover, though students are supposedly evaluated according to merit,¶ the teacher's role permits a wide latitude in the degree of interaction and helpfulness granted to¶ individual students. An instructor enjoys considerable discretionary power to provide or¶ withhold academic rewards (grades, recommendations) and related resources (help, psychological¶ support).6¶ As in the workplace, it is usually men who exercise this discretionary power over female univer-¶ sity students. While women now comprise more than half of all college students,¶ faculty-especially within higher ranks and at major universities-are overwhelmingly male.¶ About 95 percent of university full professors are men (Patterson and Engelberg, 1978). Nor-¶ mative requirements for career advancement at competitive universities are based on traditional,¶ male life-cycle patterns and work schedules that are not convenient to many women (Hochschild,¶ 1975).¶ In the past, it has been difficult for women to successfully enter any prestigious and male-¶ dominated - hence, "non-traditional" - field (Epstein, 1970). Social psychological analyses (Med-¶ nick et. al., 1975) have identified some of the barriers still faced by college women seeking such¶ careers. Yet a recent compendium of student responses to a University of California ad-¶ ministrative query about sex discrimination on campus is replete with testimony from male¶ students that female students' sexuality now gives them an unfair advantage in this competition¶ (University of California, Berkeley, 1977). While women allude to numerous sexist remarks and¶ behaviors by faculty which derogate the abilities of women as a group, the male respondents¶ claim that individual women profit from their sexual attributes because male instructors go out of¶ their way to be "extra friendly" and helpful to them. According to the male perception, then, the¶ latitude permitted in the faculty-student relationship works - at the initiative of either instructor¶ or student - to the advantage of attractive women.¶ Some sociologists of higher education view faculty-student sexual exchanges only as women at-¶ tempting to use their sexuality to compensate for a lack of academic accomplishment:¶ Innumerable girls have found that a pretty face and a tight sweater were an adequate substitute for diligence and cleverness when dealing with a male teacher. Some, having been frustrated in efforts to get¶ by on this basis, have pushed matters further and ended up in bed-though not necessarily with an A¶ (Jencks and Riesman, 1968:427n).¶ Similarly, Singer's (1964:148) empirical study of the relationship between personal attrac-¶ tiveness and university grades relies on unsupported conjecture about female manipulativeness to¶ conclude that ". . . the poor college professor is . . . enticed by the female students ... as he goes¶ about his academic and personal responsibilities." In both studies we find the unquestioned¶ assumption that women (unfairly) capitalize on their sexuality in an otherwise meritocratic and¶ asexual relationship.7¶ Our analysis of sexual harassment as the nexus of power and sexual prerogative implies that,¶ from the woman's perspective, the situation is more complex and decidedly less sanguine. Rather¶ than having a unilateral "sex advantage," female students face the possibility that male instruc-¶ tors may manipulate sexual interest and authority in ways which ultimately undermine the posi-¶ tion of women in academia. Because women can no longer be openly denied access to educational¶ and professional training legally, sexual harassment may remain an especially critical factor of¶ more covert discrimination.

Gender equality in higher education and the workforce is key to climate science and innovation.  Gender Summit 13

Gender Summit 3 — North America, Diversity Fueling Excellence in Research and Innovation:
Conference Report, 11/13/13, https://www.nsf.gov/od/oia/activities/gendersummit/GS3-ConfReport.pdf.  NS

Ms. Jarrett noted that gender equality in STEM is not just a women's issue, but one that affects all scientists and researchers. The incorporation of the gender dimension into research and innovation benefits everyone. Diversity in STEM brings innovation; it drives science forward and benefits society as a whole. She pointed out that GS3 is more than just about women: it is about our societies and tapping into the power of women to unlock the full potential of global communities. If we truly want to champion innovation and expand the capacity for discovery, everyone has to be involved. President Obama’s administration is committed to ensuring that our women and girls are in a position to lead in the future. The President has been quoted as saying, "When women succeed, nations are safer, more secure and more prosperous.”  Ralph Cicerone, PhD President, US National Academy of Sciences and Chair, National Research Council, USA emphasized (a) the importance of utilizing the full capacity of creative, talented and dedicated people; (b) the collective responsibility for ensuring that women scientists and engineers flourish and that they are supported and encouraged; and (c) the need to confront existing obstacles along their career paths. He stated that the Academy remains committed to enhancing gender inclusion by supporting the creation of networks around the world, including Africa, Latin America and Europe. Establishing these networks and collaborations promotes the creation of goals and strategies for implementation and an awareness of the efforts of others that can bring value to our own. To underscore the importance of gender incorporation within global research and development, former NSF Director Subra Suresh, PhD President, Carnegie Mellon University, USA stated that diversity in education and the workplace accelerates innovation because people have different life experiences that allow them to address the same issue from different vantage points. Diversity fostering global research is becoming more popular. In May 2012 the Global Research Council was established at NSF as a virtual organization to collectively engage in the development of principles governing scientific merit review, research integrity, pathways for open access to publications and data and mobility of researchers. Nearly 100 countries participated in the most recent meeting where the topics included the mobility of researchers, as well as a discussion of strategic planning for collective action in the near future. Wanda E. Ward, PhD Head, Office of International and Integrative Activities, National Science Foundation, USA posited that North America stood ready to further integrate and leverage the gender dimension in forging new and transformative discoveries and in fostering a diverse and inclusive scientific community. Importantly, the greater inclusion of biological sex and gender considerations in disciplinary and interdisciplinary frameworks is significant as all nations increase their investments in science and technology. Working collaboratively to ensure that scientific research is beneficial to women and men is a transformative moment for the shifting landscape of the scientific enterprise. This time of collective commitment for gender considerations in science and engineering will be beneficial to society at large as North America embraces the new opportunities of the shifting landscape of science innovation marked by emerging fields of science and the demographic changes of the scientific workforce. Attention was given to the fact that the more than 650 registrants comprised a diverse group of women and men interested in women’s issues, as well as diversity within the group of women who represent every stage of STEM workforce development, advancement and success. Dr. Ward’s presentation highlighted the NSF’s gender considerations in research design and analysis, as well as the Foundation’s emphasis on gender equity in the STEM workforce. This Summit was considered exemplary for engaging women of all backgrounds in imagining future work at the frontiers of science and in realizing their full potential in the scientific enterprise. Additionally, pending the availability of funding, NSF is pursuing four major areas for multinational collaboration: o discovery/frontier research for knowledge generation and translation, o human capacity/talent development and advancement, o institutional transformation in higher education systems and practices and o equity in stewardship activities, such as the merit review process, evaluation and assessment. Across the participating partners, there are compelling examples of individual contributions of women in basic research, as well as in the advancement of applied research within a gender- focused context. There are also success stories of policy changes and transformative practices emanating from the leadership, mentoring and advocacy roles of well-known women scientists and engineers. The shared commitment for framing a multi-national strategy was continued with input from the European Commission, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the National Council on Science and Technology of Mexico, and the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa. Europe is working aggressively to change the workforce environment by encouraging more females to study science and engineering and to go on to research careers.  MarieGeoghegan-Quinn Commissioner of Research, Innovation and Science, European Commission stressed that because gender issues are not unique to Europe, it is important to tackle issues jointly. She stated that we need all of our talented scientists working toward research and innovative efforts and that there is no tradeoff between promoting gender equity and excellence in science. She expressed much interest in collaborating with North America. She stressed that it is logical, for both scientific and economic reasons, to work collaboratively to tackle common challenges. She also highlighted Horizon 2020, Europe’s new research funding program, which will champion gender equality in three ways: integrating the gender dimension into funded programs, encouraging balanced participation of men and women on funded research teams and ensuring gender balance in advisory groups and in teams that evaluate applications for funding.  Oldřich Vlasák Vice-President of the European Parliament stressed the importance of (a) research and development in future economic growth and (b) investing effectively, given the frequent scarcity of financial and human resources to support research. He stated that both the US and Europe need to invest more and do a better job with regard to human capital: “we can’t afford to waste research talent, which means we should not discourage any part of the population from participating in research and innovation.” Quoting U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, he said that “no team can ever win if half of its players are on the bench.” Measures to ensure gender equality should be considered an investment in future economic growth, rather than a cost. He stated that “what we pay today will generate returns for the economy as a whole in the medium- and long-term by reducing the ineffectiveness associated with inequality.” The gender imbalances are not a self-correcting phenomenon, and Vlasák encouraged discussions during the third Gender Summit to view these issues as a matter of research potential and social justice. Remarks by Dominique Ristori Director General, European Commission Directorate General Joint Research Council focused on the importance of science and society, the latest developments in Europe’s gender equality policy and the European interest in a gender focused multi-national collaboration. He described the motivation and challenges for global research and innovation in the context of climate change, clean energy and the improved health and well-being of all citizens. Ensuring gender balance is a necessary condition for the achievement of the objective of Europe’s 2020 strategy for 75 employment, an objective that cannot be reached without strong commitment to gender equality, he stated.

And, diversity outweighs and turns the case – Chang 02

Chang, Mitchell J. "Perservation or Transformation: Where's the Real Educational Discourse on Diversity?." The Review of Higher Education 25.2 (2002): 125-140.

Historically, postsecondary institutions did not willingly embrace, let¶ alone collectively defend, diversity-related efforts. It took heavy-handed¶ intervention by the federal government to open wider the doors of higher¶ education to students of color. This change and subsequent institutional¶ alterations now considered under the rubric of diversity varied in the ease¶ with which different campuses implemented them; but it is fair to say that¶ much ongoing administrative resistance (Altbach, 1991; Olivas, 1993; Trent,¶ 1991a) and prolonged acrimonious debate (Levine, 1996) characterized the¶ typical campus dealing with diversity issues. Institutional conflicts typically¶ occurred because, as Hurtado (1996) observed, “These diversity issues¶ often required fundamental changes in premises and practices at many levels”¶ (p. 27), which, according to Chan (1989), threatened the very structure¶ of power both within and outside the university.¶ Because the diversity agenda and its related efforts seek to effect change¶ at almost all levels of higher education, it has been described as a “transformative¶ enterprise” (Nakanishi and Leong, 1978; Wei, 1993). In this view, diversity¶ initiatives are not simply innocuous extensions of preexisting¶ institutional interests but are instead efforts that challenge and seek to¶ transform traditional institutional practices and arrangements toward making¶ education more equitable, diverse, and inclusive, as well as more open¶ to alternative perspectives (Hirabayashi, 1997). Perhaps because the transformative¶ aims associated with diversity tend to challenge existing arrangements,¶ colleges and universities have not done all that they must do to¶ maximize the educational benefits associated with diversity (Allen, 1992;¶ Chang, 1999b). Hurtado (1996) held that “both resistance and change are¶ inevitable parts of the major transformation that is under way in the mission¶ of postsecondary institutions—a mission that includes diversity as a¶ key component” (p. 29). Therefore, she maintained, some tension and conflict¶ are likely at the level of deep institutional change in the history of individual¶ campus diversity efforts. In an educational setting, however, tension¶ and conflict are not necessarily problematic for learning (Gurin, 1999), unless¶ they prevent campuses from successfully implementing a multifaceted¶ approach to diversity.¶ Given that the transformative aims often clash with deep-seated institutional¶ assumptions and values, the educational benefits associated with diversity¶ emerge, more often than not, out of institutional transformation¶ and not out of preexisting ways of operating and behaving. In other words,¶ educational benefits for students emanate from changes that challenge prevailing¶ educational sensibilities and that enhance educational participation. Accordingly, retired Harvard professor Charles Willie pointed out in an interview¶ that the educational significance of diversity is best observed when¶ viewed as “the foundation for institutional change and self-correction” (qtd.¶ in Buchbinder, 1998) and not as an uncritical manifestation of preexisting¶ institutional values and ideals. As such, diversity calls into question not only¶ how learning is viewed and what is valued, but also how learning should be¶ assessed. In the next section, I will discuss further how the diversity agenda¶ seeks to transform higher education’s understanding of and impact on learning.

Climate innovations are the primary key to solve warming.  Moniz 15

Ernest Moniz (U.S. Secretary of Energy), Interviewed by David Biello, Accelerated Innovation Is the Ultimate Solution to Climate Change, Scientific American, 12/11/15, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/accelerated-innovation-is-the-ultimate-solution-to-climate-change/.  NS

PARIS—From "clean coal" evangelists to solar power enthusiasts, most experts at the U.N. climate talks here agree that solving climate change means transforming how the world produces and uses energy—and as quickly as possible. Such a transformation would be unprecedented. It would require enormous investments. To help make it happen, the U.S. Department of Energy, which for decades has spent billions of dollars to develop and deploy advanced energy technologies (not always clean), will play a major role in the new "Mission Innovation." The initiative is an effort announced by 20 major countries at the COP 21 negotiations here to significantly accelerate clean-energy improvements. On December 9, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz sat down with Scientific American to explain how innovation and transformation might be sped up to meet the climate challenge, which requires a world without carbon dioxide pollution, soon. An edited transcript of the interview follows. How do we get to 80 percent cuts in CO2 emissions in 35 years, the Obama administration's long-term goal? And beyond that, to meet a Paris deal that might even require "zero carbon" by then. Obviously, innovation is going to be central. We're very pleased that our French hosts put innovation on the front burner: having Innovation Day, following Energy Day. And of course, the announcement on the very first day by 20 countries, including Pres. Obama, French Pres. Hollande, India Prime Minister Modi and others, of Mission Innovation. Then the Bill Gates announcement on the parallel Breakthrough Energy Coalition initiative. There is no question that the world now understands that innovation is the core to meet the INDCs national climate action plans, known as "intended nationally determined contributions". We've had a lot of cost reduction and innovation and deployment increases. That virtuous cycle has put us in a pretty good spot to meet a 10-year horizon, maybe a 15-year horizon. For sure, as we go to the longer time periods and extraordinarily low levels of greenhouse gas emissions being discussed, we're going to have to keep that going. I just came from a meeting of the Mission Innovation countries. There is a tremendous amount of enthusiasm. The resonance of the Mission Innovation agenda was so great because it largely fits with the directions that so many countries were going in. It's crystallized that—given that a very explicit framework. We are the dog that caught the car. And now we're laughs figuring out what to do with the car. Some people argue that we can meet the goal with the technology we already have, whether it be CO2 capture and storage for fossil fuels and nuclear power or more renewables or all of the above, to use a phrase. Others say we really need a breakthrough. You're on the breakthrough side? In some sense, the answer is yes. What we're talking about is this cycle of innovation, deployment, cost reduction. They all go hand in hand. We have seen that explicitly in the last six years. Continued cost reduction in clean technologies is going to be important. And new enabling technologies are going to be important. So, for example, with wind and solar, we still are not at the point where we can have a large scale-up of energy storage. We are still not at the stage where we really have incorporated information technology, like computers and the Internet extensively into the energy infrastructure in the way we're going to need. We also have qualitatively new directions to go in. One is the Makani flying wind turbines. Or now the Google X flying wind turbine; it’s so novel that we don't understand exactly how it could have a big, major transformative impact. But it sure looks like it would if it became a widespread technology.

Warming leads to extinction – multiple scenarios prove. Roberts ‘13
David Roberts - staff writer for Grist. “If you aren’t alarmed about climate, you aren’t paying attention.” Grist. January 10, 2013. http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal/ JJN
There was recently another one of those (numbingly familiar) internet tizzies wherein someone trolls environmentalists for being “alarmist” and environmentalists get mad and the troll says “why are you being so defensive?” and everybody clicks, clicks, clicks. I have no desire to dance that dismal do-si-do again. But it is worth noting that I find the notion of “alarmism” in regard to climate change almost surreal. I barely know what to make of it. So in the name of getting our bearings, let’s review a few things we know. We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent World Bank review of the science reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially exceed the adaptive capacities of many societies and natural systems. my emphasis Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The combination of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by 2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries — regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events: Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a 4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human security and economic and trade systems.” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6 degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a burned, chaotic, denuded world, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade. Take all that in, sit with it for a while, and then tell me what it could mean to be an “alarmist” in this context. What level of alarm is adequate?

Tournament: Berkeley | Round: Triples | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
CP Text: Public Universities and colleges should establish restrictions on hate speech consistent with Byrne’s proposal. This includes restrictions on otherwise protected free speech. They will remove all other restrictions on protected free speech. Byrne 91

Byrne, J. Peter. Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. "Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University." Geo. LJ 79 (1990): 399.

This article examines the constitutionality of university prohibitions of¶ public expression that insults members of the academic community by directing¶ hatred or contempt toward them on account of their race. I Several¶ thoughtful scholars have examined generally whether the government can¶ penalize citizens for racist slurs under the first amendment, but to the limited¶ extent that they have discussed university disciplinary codes they have assumed¶ that the state university is merely a government instrumentality subject¶ to the same constitutional limitations as, for example, the legislature or¶ the police. 2 In contrast, I argue that the university has a fundamentally dif ferent relationship to the speech of its members than does the state to the speech of its citizens. On campus, general rights of free speech should be qualified by the intellectual values of academic discourse. I conclude that the protection of these academic values, which themselves enjoy constitutional protection, permits state universities lawfully to bar racially abusive speech, even if the state legislature could not constitutionally prohibit such speech throughout society at large. At the same time, however, I assert that the first amendment renders state universities powerless to punish speakers for advocating any idea in a reasoned manner. It is necessary at the outset to choose a working definition of a racial insult. This definition, however, is necessarily provisional; any such definition implies the writer's views on the boundaries of constitutionally protected offensive speech, and the reader cannot be expected to swallow the definition until she has had the opportunity to inspect the writer's constitutional premises. Having offered such a caution, I define a racial insult as a verbal or symbolic expression by a member of one ethnic group that describes another ethnic group or an individual member of another group in terms conventionally derogatory, that offends members of the target group, and that a reasonable and unbiased observer, who understands the meaning of the words and the context of their use, would conclude was purposefully or recklessly abusive. Excluded from this definition are expressions that convey rational but offensive propositions that can be disputed by argument and evidence. An insult, so conceived, refers to a manner of speech that seeks to demean rather than to criticize, and to appeal to irrational fears and prejudices rather than to respect for others and informed judgment. 3

Hate speech degrades minorities, locking in the squo and ensuring their failure. Delgado 2k
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. “TOWARD A LEGAL REALIST VIEW OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT.” Harvard Law Review. January 2000. JJN
B. Hate Speech as a Concerted Harm Another realist observation concerns what some call the “social construction of reality” thesis. FN39 Hate speech never occurs in isolation; it picks as its target individuals who have been exposed to racist hate speech before and are likely to experience its sting again in the future. *788 Like salt rubbed into a wound, hate speech digs at its victims' sensibilities, reminding them that they are different and that the source of that difference causes others to regard them as beneath the speaker in standing and human worth. FN40 Like water dripping on stone, hate speech harms by virtue of its incessancy--victims hear it again and again throughout their entire lives. FN41 The messages conveyed in hate speech sink in, so that over time the victims of those damaging messages begin to doubt their self-worth. This aspect of hate speech is what proponents of regulation have in mind when they write that hate speech contributes to a social order that falls far short of our national ideals. FN42 But these messages also alter the environment for individuals of the majority race, including those who aspire to be nonracist and would never utter hate speech themselves. They hear others doing so and see images of minorities in demeaning or limited roles on television, in the movies, and in newspapers. FN43 Who would blame them if, after time, they began secretly to wonder whether the prevailing stereotypes of persons of color did not have a small grain of truth to them? And, an insidious form of reinforcement known as “stereotype threat” validates those suspicions, as test-takers from groups subject to demeaning stereotypes perform poorly precisely because they fear that their performance will confirm the stereotype. FN44 Claude Steele and a co-investigator coined this term when they found that black test-takers who were told that a fairly difficult paper-and-pencil test would measure their cognitive ability performed poorly compared to a control *789 group whose members were told that the test was aimed only at helping researchers to understand problem-solving behavior. FN45 Media and other messages broadcasting the inferiority of minorities may be a prime means of perpetuating stereotype threat. These broader consequences of hate speech can easily escape scholars. Seeing the harm of hate speech as affecting dignity only, they end up weighing short-term, individual consequences--wounded feelings--against the broad, systemic benefits that we derive as a society from our system of free expression. FN46 Even Shiffrin succumbs to this temptation at times, yet how fair is it to frame the problem in these terms? Suppose that a supporter of hate speech regulation urged that the legal system weigh the speaker's “momentary discomfort” in reining in his or her thoughts against the massive gains that society reaps from enforcing antidiscrimination norms. A realist approach would regard both individual and social costs and benefits as duly weighing in the balance. It would deal with both the effects of hate speech on the life of a single individual as well as its impact across large groups.

And hate speech primes society for genocide – multiple empirical examples prove. Tsesis 09
Tsesis, Alexander Loyola University Chicago School of Law. "Dignity and speech: The regulation of hate speech in a democracy." (2009).
Permitting persons or organizations to spread ideology touting a¶ system of discriminatory laws or enlisting vigilante group violence¶ erodes democracy. So it was in the Weimar Republic, where the¶ repeated anti-Semitic propaganda of vulgar ideologues like Julius¶ Streicher, who published perverse attacks against Jews in Der¶ Stiirmer, chipped away at the post-World War I German democratic¶ experiment.6¶ ' Avowedly influenced by nineteenth century antiSemitism,¶ his weekly stories of Jewish ritual murder and sexual¶ exploitation were a crude way of antagonizing the victims and¶ gaining support for widespread prejudice against Jews." It is truly¶ eerie, now, looking at photographs relating the effectiveness of Nazi¶ propaganda: respectable looking adults in suits and dresses¶ listening to long lectures on Jewish inferiority; children, barely able¶ to stand on their two feet, raising their right arm in a Nazi salute.¶ Nazi propaganda incorporated numerous well-known¶ nineteenth century slogans. To take one example, Streicher, who¶ was later sentenced to death by the Nuremberg War Crimes¶ Tribunal, 64 used an inflammatory slogan, "The Jews are our misfortune!" on his newspaper masthead.and At one point over¶ 130,000 copies of his publication were sold and displayed on public¶ message boards throughout the country.66 The phrase also became¶ prominently featured on posters throughout the Third Reich.67¶ This slogan was taken verbatim from an 1879 article by¶ Professor Heinrich von Treitschke, arguably the greatest German¶ historian of the nineteenth century.68 Its visibility in pre-World War¶ II German society helped legitimize anti-Semitism there in¶ intellectual circles.69¶ A gradual process of incitement also occurred elsewhere. In¶ many American colonies, authors and legal institutions had been¶ degrading blacks since the seventeenth century.70 By national¶ independence, in 1776, the colonies of South Carolina and Georgia¶ had long-standing commitments to retaining slavery despite the oftrepeated¶ mantra of universal natural rights. In 1787, those two states refused to endorse the proposed Constitution without¶ provisions protecting that undemocratic institution."72¶ Senator John Calhoun, Congressman Henry Wise, and other¶ powerful racist orators misled the public about the supposedly¶ benevolent slave owner, feeding his slaves and treating them like¶ his own children. 3 The repeated inculcation of supremacism proved¶ effective in misrepresenting blacks as moveable property.¶ Abolitionists like Theodore Weld, Angelina and Sarah Grimk6,¶ Frederick Douglass, and William Lloyd Garrison were unable to win¶ over the country to their abolitionist views.74 To the contrary,¶ proslavery thought monopolized the Southern marketplace of¶ ideas.' Slavery came to an end after a bloody Civil War, not¶ through articulate or even heated debate.6¶ Because intimidating hate speech has so often inflamed¶ dangerous attitudes, the value of such expression should be¶ balanced against the likelihood that it will cause harm. The risks¶ are greater when hate propaganda incorporates symbolism, like¶ swastikas, that demagogues have historically displayed to rally¶ supporters to action. Robert Post is undoubtedly correct that speech¶ is valuable because it provides a breeding ground for "collective selfdetermination."7¶ 7 The more difficult question is how self-expression¶ should be treated when it conflicts with the safety of its target.¶ As much as self-expression is fundamental to democratic¶ institutions, it can, nevertheless, be balanced against the social¶ interest in safeguarding a pluralistic culture by preventing the¶ instigation of demagogic threats. Placing no limits on speech-not¶ even on expressions blatantly intended to make life miserable for¶ minorities-preserves the rights of speakers at the expense of¶ targeted groups. Defamation statutes, zoning regulations, and¶ obscenity laws indicate that the freedom of speech is not shielded¶ where it undermines other individuals' legitimate interests. 7 Hate speech regulation undoubtedly inhibits some opportunities for selfexpression;¶ more importantly, it prevents instigative communication¶ from undermining its targets' ability to live unaccosted by¶ harassment.¶ In the many historic examples when destructive messages¶ proved to be effective in instigating violence, they caused enormous¶ social turmoil. Just like shouting "fire" in a crowded movie theater,¶ which can be prohibited without violating the First Amendment,79¶ hate speech can cause a stampede. Take Spain, for instance, which¶ expelled its Jewish population in 1492.80 The expulsion came after¶ years of Inquisition propaganda and hurt both the exiled Jews and¶ the remaining Spanish population. 1 Teachings by zealous¶ preachers like Vincent Ferrer, a later-canonized Dominican monk,¶ in the late fifteenth century brought on a nationwide anti-Jewish¶ hysteria that opposed the free practice of Judaism while decrying¶ overt violence.82 Pursuant to his instigation, a Castilian decree¶ discriminated against Jews in employment, dress, and criminal¶ punishments.83 Historian Heinrich Graetz explained the connection¶ between anti-Jewish preaching and draconian edicts: the populace¶ was "inflamed by the passionate eloquence of the preacher and¶ emphasized his teaching by violent assaults on the Jews." 4 Another¶ historian explained that:¶ For centuries, Christians had been encouraged to hate the¶ Jews. With preachers telling them, Sunday after Sunday, that¶ Jews were perverted and guilty of complicity in the death of¶ Christ, the faithful ended up by detesting them with a hatred 815 that was bound one day to express itself in violence .¶ Once unleashed, the expulsion of Jews from Spain followed¶ naturally from the verbal spread of hatred during the Inquisition.8 6¶ The economic consequences were grave. Many commercial enterprises in Seville and Barcelona, for instance, were ruined .¶ "Spain lost an incalculable treasure by the exodus of Jewish...¶ merchants, craftsmen, scholars, physicians, and scientists," wrote¶ the encyclopedic Will Durant, "and the nations that received them¶ benefitted economically and intellectually."88 Anti-Jewish preaching¶ in parts of Spain influenced a wide social segment of the population,¶ and the result was devastating both for the Jews who fled and for¶ the country that renounced them on dogmatic grounds. Elsewhere¶ in the ancient world, as historian Ben Kiernan has compellingly¶ documented, periodic mass massacres perpetrated against segments¶ of the native populations in Ireland, North and South America, and¶ Australia were likewise influenced by widely disseminated¶ dehumanizing statements. 9¶ The spread of ethnic and racial hatred continues to elicit¶ violence throughout the modern world. The dissemination of¶ ethnically incitable messages has precipitated tribal clashes in¶ Kenya.90 In Rwanda, ethnic stereotyping and repeated media calls¶ for the extermination of Tutsi led to a massive genocide perpetrated¶ against that group.9¶ '¶ Arab racial hate propaganda in the Sudan has catalyzed a¶ government-sponsored attempt to "cleanse" black Africans in¶ Darfur, Sudan." Likewise, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo¶ the government has relied on the incitement of ethnic hatred,¶ creating a culture where ethnic murder is a routine militia¶ practice. In the Arab world, terror organizations like Hamas and¶ Hizballah spread hatred against Jews without any interference from several governments, including Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi¶ Arabia. 94 School texts that are "written and produced by Saudi¶ government" teach children to kill Jews and to hate Christians and¶ Jews.95¶ Hate propaganda in these countries is far more virulent than it¶ is in the United States; nevertheless, a democracy committed to the¶ protection of individual rights does not run afoul of free speech¶ principles by criminalizing group incitement that has so globally¶ proven to influence harmful social movements.¶ A First Amendment theory, as the Supreme Court made clear in¶ Virginia v. Black, must examine whether there are historical¶ reasons to believe that offensive expression against an identifiable¶ group is likely to intimidate reasonable audiences. Robert Post's¶ argument about the undemocratic nature of hate speech regulation¶ regards "the function of public discourse" to be the reconciliation of¶ "the will of individuals with the general will. Public discourse is¶ thus ultimately grounded upon a respect for individuals seen as 'free¶ and equal persons."'97 He emphasizes democracy's central obligation¶ to protect private "autonomous wills."9" His insightful¶ characterization, however, captures only part of the raison d'etre of¶ democracy; on a more community-oriented level, that system of¶ governance serves to protect the overall well-being of the polity¶ against the wanton call for discriminatory conduct or violence. And¶ Black explicitly sanctions states' use of historical records to identify¶ symbolism that is likely to terrorize the populace and, therefore,¶ detract from the common good.99 This development in First¶ Amendment jurisprudence indicates that there is more to democracy¶ than self-determination.¶ Post's most recent statement on hate speech does not address¶ Black, even though the chapter was written after the Court¶ rendered its decision. 100 He connects the expression of hate to¶ "'extreme' intolerance and 'extreme' dislike."' °¶ ' This description,¶ while correct, does not account for the connection between hate¶ speech and extreme conduct. While the Constitution does not¶ authorize laws against negative emotions, speech that is¶ substantially likely to cause discriminatory harm, especially violence, can be regulated without infringing on the fundamental¶ principles of democracy.

The counterplan establishes checks on reverse enforcement, chilling effect, and slippery slope. Byrne 91
Byrne, J. Peter. Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. "Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University." Geo. LJ 79 (1990): 399.

Disciplinary rules are the least effective way that a university can enhance¶ the quality of speech or foster racial tolerance among its members. The educational¶ program must celebrate and instruct its students in the beauty and¶ usefulness of graceful and accurate speech and writing; a liberal education¶ should leave students intolerant of propaganda and commercial manipulation,¶ and competent to directly and forcefully express coherent views as citizens.¶ Such teaching is not amoral; the graduate ought freely to prefer the¶ exercise of skill, reflective perception, and an abiding curiosity to desires for acquisition, consumption, and domination. Without the university's consistent¶ action on a commitment to reasoned discourse as central to its mission,¶ the university's attempt to prohibit insulting or lewd speech may seem a hypocritical¶ denial of its own failings.¶ Similarly, prohibiting racial insults will advance racial harmony on a campus¶ only when the university has effectively committed itself to educate lovingly¶ the members of every ethnic group. Although nearly every university¶ admits minority students using criteria that aspire in good faith to be fair,¶ many have failed to transform themselves into truly multi-ethnic institutions.¶ Not to have succeeded at this daunting task does not merit reproach; the¶ university's origins and traditions are explicitly European, growth and accommodation¶ to the extent required to create a multi-ethnic community¶ must take time and witness false steps. However, not to have made plain¶ that blacks, hispanics, Asians, Indians, and others who have been excluded in¶ the past are not only now welcome, but are requested to collaborate in shaping¶ new university structures and mores so that the benefits of advanced education¶ will be available without regard to birth and so that the university can¶ continue to spawn for a changing society a cosmopolitan culture based on¶ reason and reflection standing above tribal fears and blind desires, not to¶ have begun this work in earnest merits regret and will provoke anger. Universities¶ that pass rules against racial insults which are not part of a comprehensive¶ commitment to ethnic integration will serve only to exacerbate racial¶ tensions.¶ Schools that adopt prohibitions on racially offensive speech ought to enforce¶ them with restraint. Certainly, when students have sought to intimidate¶ or frighten other students with racial insults, the school should treat this¶ behavior as a fundamental breach of university standards meriting the¶ strongest punitive measures. But often insulting expressions will result from¶ insensitivity or ignorance; complaints about such behavior should be seen as¶ opportunities for teaching, and creative informal measures that make the offenders¶ aware of the harmful consequences and injustice of their behavior¶ should be pursued. The school should also provide succor to the victim¶ whose hurt and anger must be acknowledged and meliorated. But severely¶ punishing ignorant young people for expressions inherited from their parents¶ or neighborhoods may serve to harden. and focus their sense of grievance,¶ create martyrs, and prolong racial animosity. Deans who administer such¶ rules must overcome their personal repugnance at racist speech and enforce¶ the rules for the benefit of the entire community. Controversial interpretative¶ application of the rules should be placed in the hands of faculty and¶ students representative of the entire institution, and the accused, the victim,¶ and the dean should have an opportunity to express their perspectives.¶ A recurrent concern regarding rules against racial insults is their vague-ness and overbreadth. These, of course, were the bases upon which the University¶ of Michigan's policy was declared unconstitutional, although the¶ demonstrated propensity of the school to apply the policy to presumptively¶ protected speech appears to have steered the Court's conclusions on these¶ issues.17 6 In general, university disciplinary rules rarely are struck down for¶ vagueness; courts usually permit universities to regulate student conduct on¶ the basis of generally stated norms, so long as they give fair notice of the¶ behavior proscribed. 177 Courts generally are more strict regarding vagueness¶ in rules that affect speech, in no small part because of the distrust of the¶ competence and motives of the government censor.178¶ A central argument of this article has been that the university can be¶ trusted to administer rules prohibiting racial insults because it has the proper¶ moral basis and adequate expertise to do so. It is not surprising, therefore,¶ that I believe that vagueness concerns about such university rules are largely¶ misplaced. This is not to deny that a university should adopt safeguards to¶ protect accused students from the concerns that the courts have highlighted.¶ First, the rules should state explicitly that no one may be disciplined for the¶ good faith statement of any proposition susceptible to reasoned response, no¶ matter how offensive. The possibility that punishment is precluded by this¶ limitation should be addressed at every stage of the disciplinary process. Second,¶ some response between punishment and acquittal should be available¶ when the university concludes that the speaker was subjectively unaware of¶ the offensive character of his speech; these cases seem to present mainly educational¶ concerns. Third, all controversial issues of interpretation of the¶ rules should be entrusted to a panel of faculty and students who are representative¶ of the institution. Rules furthering primarily academic concerns about¶ the quality of speech and the development of students should be given meaning¶ by those most directly concerned with the academic enterprise rather¶ than by administrators who may register more precisely external political¶ pressures on the university. Given these safeguards and a comprehensible¶ definition of an unacceptable insult, such as the one ventured in the introduction¶ to this article,179 a court which accepts the underlying proposition that a¶ university has the constitutional authority to regulate racial insults should¶ not be troubled independently by vagueness.¶ A difficult prudential consideration is whether a university should decline¶ to regulate insults because of public criticism that censorship demeans the very intellectual virtues towards which the university strives, such as the superiority¶ of persuasion over compulsion. Obviously, the adoption of such¶ regulation has brought forth sincere and bitter criticism from many friends of¶ higher education-the Economist, for example, went so far as to call such¶ regulations "disgraceful."'' 80 To some extent these criticisms stem from misunderstanding¶ about the character of academic speech and the goals of¶ prohibitions on racial insult, but universities should admit that turning to¶ regulation marks a sad failure in civility. A failure already has occurred,¶ however, when students scurrilously demean other students because of their¶ race. The university at this point can only choose among evils. It would not¶ be true to its traditions if it did not come down on the side of protecting the¶ educational environment for blameless students against wanton and hurtful¶ ranting.

Tournament: Alta | Round: 1 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
Shell
Generic
Capitalism is at a crisis point – Trump in the white house has put American society on a collision course and the political has already been ceded to the far right. The only solution is an unflinching critique of neoliberalism. Hedges 11/11
Chris Hedges Chris Hedges, whose column is published weekly on Truthdig, has written 11 books, including the New York Times best seller “Days of Destruction 11/11/16 It’s Worse Than You Think http://www.truthdig.com/report/page2/its_worse_than_you_think_20161111

The affirmative’s legalistic approach to police violence brings us further away from recognizing the economic forces at work that makes police violence inevitable. Lane 7/21.
ALYCEE LANE JULY 21, 2016 “Violence, Death and Our Neoliberal Police”  http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/07/21/violence-death-and-our-neoliberal-police/

Blaming violence on ‘bad individual’s through civil suits replicates neoliberalism – it deflects blame on to individuals whose actions are predetermined by neoliberalism. Smith 15
Robert C. Smith The author of several books and over 100 academic articles, Robert is a Teaching-Scholar at the Cooperative Institute of Transnational Studies. He is also the founder of Heathwood Institute and PressHeathwood Institute and Press¶ AN INSTITUTION OF OPPRESSION OR FOR PUBLIC WELL-BEING AND CIVIL RIGHTS? REFLECTIONS ON THE INSTITUTION OF POLICE AND A RADICAL ALTERNATIVE May 4, 2015¶  http://www.heathwoodpress.com/an-institution-of-oppression-or-for-public-well-being-and-civil-rights-reflections-on-the-institution-of-police-and-a-radical-alternative-r-c-smith/

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

The alternative is an embrace of class-consciousness as a method of critiquing neoliberalism’s grip on policing. LaVenia 15
Peter A. LaVenia PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, SUNY. He is the Secretary of the NY State Green Party and manages Matt Funiciello’s campaign for Congress. JANUARY 16, 2015 “Police Behavior and Neoliberalism” http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/01/16/police-behavior-and-neoliberalism/

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. 

First, neoliberalism sustains itself by operating by propagating a narrow lens of what it means to be ‘political.’ We situate the judge as a critical educator who steps back to evaluate the frames through which we view policy first. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file

Tournament: Damus | Round: 1 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
CP

Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)

The CP Solves the Case 

Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as  *906  Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work.
Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization.
Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched.
The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized?
For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing  *907  programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325
2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
First, even a highly effective LOPRB providing quality policy recommendations to a police department would likely encounter some department resistance to the civilian oversight. This resistance may be created because of police department views of a civilian entity "meddling" or just the potential perception of an adversarial relationship between the *1058 LOPRB and police department. n207 However, the structure of LOPRBs help overcome most of this resistance traditionally leveled against civilian oversight from police departments. The emphasis on policy review, rather than complaint review, means that LOPRBs will not directly regulate individual police officers but rather the department as a whole. This change in focus will likely reduce the intensity of any police department resistance because the potential adversarial relationship will be between the LOPRB and the police department instead of individual officers. n208 Furthermore, any resistance can be ameliorated by public pressure on police departments to enact the LOPRB's policy recommendations. The LOPRB's outreach will inform the local community of the use of data-collection technologies, potentially generating popular support behind LOPRB recommendations. LOPRBs can thus indirectly enforce their recommendations through utilizing that popular support and pressure on police departments. That indirect pressure on police departments will help reduce potential police department resistance because policy changes brought about through public pressure will be a reaction by the police department to the public at large, rather than directly reacting to the adversarial LOPRB. Thus, while police department resistance likely cannot be completely overcome, LOPRBs can ameliorate this traditional civilian oversight problem.
3. The CRB doesn’t have to work- it creates a deterrent effect
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
3. Individual Deterrence and Systemic Correction. - Finally, civilian oversight has some meaningful deterrence on individual actors while also providing a functioning mechanism to address local systemic issues. n163 Individual police officers are more likely to undertake regulation of their own behavior when the officer knows that they are being watched by an oversight body. n164 External civilian oversight can ensure greater accountability not only among rank-and-file officers, but also among command officers, and can also address systemic issues facing dys-functional departments. n165 Approximately two-thirds of civilian oversight entities undertake policy review in addition to complaint review, n166 allowing civilian oversight bodies to review general policies and advocate for systemic reform. n167 Samuel Walker, a scholar whose work focuses on police accountability, emphasized that successful civilian oversight bodies "take a proactive view of their role and actively seek out the underlying causes of police misconduct or problems in the complaint process." n168 If civilian oversight mechanisms continually provide policy recommendations to police departments, those recommendations as a whole can have a significant effect on police misconduct, while at the same time making the police department more "accustomed to input from outsiders." n169 Civilian oversight thus can have a transformative impact on entire police departments rather than only correcting the actions of a singular officer.

4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61

DA

The new generation LGBTQ movement is working with community-based solutions, moving away from the flare of courts. Lazare ‘10/13
Sarah Lazare is a staff writer for AlterNet, A former staff writer for Common Dreams. “Meet 5 Movement Leaders Across the U.S. Fighting for LGTBQ Issues on the Ground.” Alternet. October 13, 2016. http://www.alternet.org/lgbtq/meet-5-movement-leaders-across-us-fighting-lgtbq-issues-ground JJN
"We've gotten dragged into a national conversation where same-sex marriage is held up as the pinnacle of the LGBTQ struggle, but there are so many other things our communities struggle around, issues that have to do with life and death,” Paulina Helm-Hernandez, the co-director of the queer liberation group Southerners on New Ground (SONG), told AlterNet. “We’re dealing with issues like criminalization, health care access and core safety. We’re thinking about ways our people know a lot about violence and how to survive." Helm-Hernandez is one of countless movement leaders in rural communities and urban centers across the country bringing a queer lens to racial, social and economic justice activism. LGBTQ organizers are at the helm of the Movement for Black Lives, calling for an end to extrajudicial police killings, and on the frontlines of native resistance at Standing Rock, where indigenous earth defenders have erected a "two-spirit camp," for gay and lesbian indigenous people. They are demanding an stop to deportations and mass incarceration and devising concrete, community-safety alternatives to calling the police. While fending off the racist incitement of the 2016 election cycle, LGBTQ organizers are also going on the offensive, preparing to mobilize for demilitarization at home and abroad no matter who wins in November. AlterNet spoke with five U.S.-based organizers whose political and cultural work shows that LGBTQ movements go far beyond marriage equality, and are shaping the social movements that define our times. 1. Kym Anthoni, New Orleans “Second lining is very big in New Orleans culture,” said Anthoni, an organizer with the youth-led LGBTQ organization BreakOUT. “After someone passes away, people will do a dance celebrating resilience. Every year around the anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, we do a second line for the people who died to celebrate resilience, strength and moving forward.” “When a transgender woman has been killed, or you’ve gone through a bunch of bullshit, we embody the culture of second line, recognizing that we have a lot of pain and embracing resilience, saying let’s let go of the harsh shit that you’ve been through and celebrate the fact that you made it,” Anthoni continued. “Last year for the Trans March of resilience, we had a whole second line. We were uplifting the voices that are normally not uplifted in our culture.” New Orleans has been hit hard in recent years by a wave of killings targeting transgender women of color. Among them was BreakOUT community member Penny Proud, a 21-year-old black transgender woman murdered in 2015. This summer, the organization released a statement reading, “It is with heavy hearts that we share the news that another young, black trans/gender non-conforming person, Devin Diamond, has been murdered in New Orleans, just a few weeks after 24-year-old Erica ‘E’ Davis was shot in the Treme neighborhood on her way to work.” Key to BreakOUT’s organizing is the principle that “we deserve to walk down the street and not be attacked, we deserve to not be criminalized,” said Anthoni. This demand is aimed at curbing vigilante violence as well as law enforcement brutality. The organization’s first campaign was called We Deserve Better and took on rampant abuse by the New Orleans Police Department. According to a report released in 2014 by BreakOUT, police abuse is widespread. The survey found that “75 percent of people of color respondents feel they have been targeted by police for their sexual orientation or gender identity or gender expression compared with 24 percent of white respondents.” In addition, the report states that “43 percent of people of color respondents have been asked for a sexual favor by police compared with 11 percent of white respondents.” Anthoni emphasized that it is important for the broader public to understand that police brutality is also an LGBTQ issue. “Police always target trans women of color just for being trans,” Anthoni said. “They over-eroticize transgender bodies. The queer and transgender youth of color are most targeted by law enforcement. It’s a huge issue because it takes your power away, it makes you feel vulnerable. Our vulnerability can sometimes cost us our lives.” In addition to organizing, political education and youth work in local high schools, Anthoni said, “The main core of what we do is heart healing justice work. We focus on finding ways to heal as a community.”

B. Links- 

Court civil rights victories act as fly paper drawing other social movements into the court to focus on litigation strategies
Rosenberg 8 (Gerald N., University of Chicago political science and law professor, Ph.D. from Yale University, member of the Washington, D.C. bar, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?, p. 427)
If this is the case, then there is another important way in which courts affect social change. It is, to put it simply, that courts act as “fly-paper” for social reformers who succumb to the “lure of litigation.” If the constraints of the Constrained Court view are correct, then courts can seldom produce significant social reform. Yet if groups advocating such reform continue to look to the courts for aid, and spend precious resources in litigation, then the courts also limit change by deflecting claims from substantive political battles, where success is possible, to harmless legal ones where it is not. Even when major cases are won, the achievement is often more symbolic that real. Thus, courts may serve an ideological function of luring movements for social reform to an institution that is structurally constrained from serving their needs, providing only an illusion of change.
2. This is specifically true for LGBTQ movements
Jane S. Schacter* James E. and Ruth B. Doyle-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School; Edwin A. Heafey, Jr. Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, 2005-2006; A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1980; J.D., Harvard University, 1984. Drake Law Review Summer 06
There is an emerging view of the role of courts in the sexual orientation domain that echoes Professor Gerald Rosenberg's landmark book, The Hollow hope. n9 This view is distinctly skeptical about the prospects of courts accomplishing much reform in the area of gay rights. n10 *863 It should not be confused with normative critiques of "activist courts" made by those who object to same-sex marriage or other gay rights. n11 The skepticism inspired by The Hollow hope is empirical in nature and often made by those evincing no particular hostility to gay rights. n12 The thinking goes roughly like this: courts cannot produce significant change, only legislatures can. Legislators, who are politically accountable, will act in ways that are consistent with public opinion. By contrast, courts may get out too far in front of public opinion and, when they do, backlash is sure to follow. Against this background, count my Essay as a plea for caution and context. The question whether courts can, or do, produce social change on sexual orientation issues is a question that is, on closer analysis, too crude to be all that useful. I will suggest that rather than staking out broad claims or pursuing unbroken causal arrows, scholars ought to bring into focus the variability, contingency, and complexity that presents itself as we try to map the relationship between courts and social change in the area of gay rights. True, any romanticized picture of judges as countermajoritarian revolutionaries, single-handedly making public policy more progressive, is empirically unsustainable. But we should not replace one piece of mythology with another. The notion that the institutional properties of courts disable them from ever driving social change in a significant way has its own caricatured qualities.

C. Internal Link- Courts Wreck movements

Judicial review produces divide and conquer
Becker 93 (Mary, Prof of Law @ University of Chicago Law School; 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 975 ln)
Binding judicial review can impede political movements even when the Supreme Court does not actually block success. The relegation of high matters, such as sexual equality, to the courts saps political movements of their strength, particularly after ineffective victories. 76 At the same time, judicial review can mobilize the opposition, and the Court itself will be influenced by the resulting political climate, a climate it has helped create. When ineffective judicial victories weaken a movement, there may be less grass-roots pressure for change. Yet, real change in the relationship between the sexes is unlikely without change at the grass-roots level. Decisions from on high are unlikely to transform intimate relationships. Judicial victories protecting one or some outsider groups, but not all such groups, also interfere with the development of effective coalitions. This may be most harmful to the most vulnerable groups, such as lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. Real or perceived judicial protection of less marginal groups, such as straight women or racial minorities, may mean that these groups are less likely to form effective coalitions with the more marginal groups. Judicial review is, therefore, a "divide and conquer" strategy.
2. Perceived victories cause mass movement deflation
Rosenberg 8 (Gerald N., University of Chicago political science and law professor, Ph.D. from Yale University, member of the Washington, D.C. bar, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, p. 422-423)
In contrast to this conclusion, it might be suggested that throughout this book I have asked too much of courts.  After all, in all the cases examined, court decisions produced some change, however small.  Given that political action appeared impossible in many instances, such as with civil rights in the 1950s, same-sex marriage in the 1990s, and reform of the criminal justice system more generally, isn’t some positive change better than none?  In a world of unlimited resources, this would be the case.  In the world in which those seeking significant social reform live, however, strategic choices have costs, and a strategy that produces little or not change and induces backlash drains resources that could be more effectively employed in other strategies.  In addition, vindication of constitutional principles accompanied by small change may be mistaken for widespread significant social reform, inducing reformers to relax their efforts.

Tournament: Damus | Round: 4 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
Plan

Counterplan Text: We advocate the entirety of the aff plan without the use of the words “structural violence”.

The counterplan is inherently competitive. Since we defend the entirety of the aff advocacy aside from a change in certain rhetoric a perm would be severance out of both the reps and the language of the 1AC.   

Definition

They misunderstand the meaning of the term “structural violence”. It is a specific term of art used in the sociological field of peace research that has been widely discredited by both critics and the terms creator.  

Structural violence” is a term coined by Johan Galtung, it refers to violence where no single decision maker is responsible- like poverty which results from the global economy. Gatlung 12
Galtung Institute 12
(https://www.galtung-institut.de/en/network/groups/anything-galtung/forum/topic/understanding-galtungs-violence-triangle-and-structural-violence/)

Theories of structural violence explore how political, economic and cultural structures result in the occurrence of avoidable violence, most commonly seen as the deprivation of basic human needs (will be discussed later). Structural theorists attempt to link personal suffering with political, social and cultural choices. Johan Galtung’s original definition included a lack of human agency; that is the violence is not a direct act of any decision or action made by a particular person but a result of an unequal distribution of resources.Here, we must also understand “institutional violence”. “Institutional violence” is often mistaken for structural violence, but this is not the case. “Institutional violence” should be used to refer to violence perpetrated by institutions like companies, universities, corporations, organisations as opposed to individuals. The fact that women are paid less at an establishment than men is an act of direct violence by that specific establishment. It is true that there is a relationship with structural violence as there is between interpersonal violence and structural violence. And Structural violence is the most problematic area to be addressed for conflict transformation.

Net Benefits
Reliance on the vague concept of “structural violence” recreates oppression.  
Subpoint A: Theories of “structural violence” distract solutions to material conditions in favor of vague criticism of poorly defined systems. Existing structures will co-opt your criticism and the process trades off with more effective reforms.
1.Structural violence obscures analysis necessary to reduce poverty and violence- this card is on fire. Boulding 77
Kenneth Boulding, Prof Univ. of Michigan and UC Boulder,  Journal of Peace Research 1977; 14; 75 p.  Boulding p.   83-4

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of ’structural violence’ and ’positive peace’. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is ’like’ a thug beating up the victim and taking his money away from him in the street, -or it is ’like’ a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modem world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galtung’s metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a ’threshold’ phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent ’breaks’ in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the ’strain’ on a system is too great for its ‘strength’. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficulty to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is the increase in the strength of the system, the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these things, which enable a system to stand Increasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflict of interest are only part of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people to know their interests, and misperceptions of interests take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people’s behavior, not the ’real’ interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined by one unkind commentator as anything that Galltung doesn’t like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, an that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all the problems off poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to the structures which, produce violence. This is not to say  that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are culture of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out off ’it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a ’service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

2. Galtung’s theory of structural violence perpetuates the status quo of dominant states by offering an overly vague criticism of oppression. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

In the late 1960's Galtung's foundational model of peace research was subjected to considerable criticism as part of a general upheaval within the peace research community. A group of young, mostly Scandinavian, radicals employed a neo-Marxist perspective to attack the assumptions of symmetry and ideological neutrality that formed the core of Galtung's argument (Schmid 1968, 1970; Olsen and Jarvad 1969; Eckhardt 1971; Dencik 1982). Though their primary target was American conflict research and its contribution to the analysis of the Vietnam War, they questioned also Galtung's assumption that the path to peace lay in the principles of integration and cooperation. For the radicals, Galtung's approach neglected the political-economy of relations between the developed and underdeveloped worlds and in its attempt to preserve a sym- metrical approach to violent conflict was guilty of 'idealistic universal- ism'. From the perspective of the oppressed, an argument for the further integration of the international system was tantamount to defending a status quo which reflected the interests of the dominant states and the beneficiaries of the world capitalist economy. Against this, the radicals called for a peace research that openly sided with the exploited and advocated the 'sharpening' of the various latent conflicts of interests that characterised global politics.

3. Resolving “structural violence” requires action by international powers, as they are the only bodies capable of amending existing “structures”. This reliance on current institutions preserves existing structures of dominance. Schmid 68
Peace Research and Politics; Herman Schmid; Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 217-232; 1968; Sage Publications; http://www.jstor.org/stable/423274

Peace research is an applied or 'oriented' science. An applied science has to be applied by somebody who has the power to apply it. In the case of peace research, this means there must be some kind of institutionalized link between peace re- searchers and decision-makers on the supranational level. Thus, the universalist ethos of peace research becomes operationalized into identification with the interests of the existing international system, that is the interests of those who have power 229 in the international system. So peace research becomes a factor supporting the status quo of the international power structure, providing the decision-makers of the system with knowledge for control, manipulation and integration of the system. That is the institutional aspect of peace research. The theoretical frame of reference dominating peace research closely cor- responds to the institutional needs: the peace researcher/specialist is trained in an ideology of internationalism; he has learned how to solve conflicts, how to integrate a system, how to avoid manifest organized violence, how to prevent major uprisings against the system; and he believes that what is good for the system is in the long run also good for its elements. His concept of peace is essentially a negative one, stressing the need for stable peace,38 and the 'common interest' he will have to fall back on is the avoidance of catastrophe. His positive concept of peace is not sui generis but a negation of his negative peace concept. The essence of peace research is concentrated in the concepts of control of the international sys- tem to prevent major breakdowns, and integration of the international system to make it more stable. That is the ideological aspect of peace research. The institutional and the ideological aspects presuppose and condition each other. To become applied, peace research must meet the needs of the decision- makers. To satisfy their concern about stable peace, peace researchers must ally themselves with the decision-makers of the international system. Given this situation, change of the system can not be advocated by peace research. Structural change would be a threat to the power-holders of the international system. Only adaptive change within the system is possible.

4. Theories of structural violence offer a one-sided mechanism of achieving equality in which instead of aiding the poor we focus primarily on bringing down the rich, resulting in a system that is technically equal but objectively destitute. Boulding 77
Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung; Kenneth E. Boulding; Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86; Sage Publications, Ltd; http://www.jstor.org/stable/423312

Because of his passion for equality, his hatred of hierarchy, dominance, top dogs, and anything which looks like oppression (much of which is praiseworthy), Galtung identifies entropy as a symbol of goodness and regards negentropy, that is, structure, improbability, and potential, as evil. Galt- ung is all for the increase of social entropy so far as that means destruction of organi- zation and hierarchy, the dissipation of wealth, 'and the reduction of everything to a dead level. It would almost seem as if Galtung would regard the last ultimate whimper of the universe, according to the second law of thermodynamics, in which all things are at an equal temperature and equally distributed throughout space so that nothing more can 'conceivably happen, as the ultimate heaven, or perhaps one should say Nirvana, towards which all this uncom- fortable and unequal structure of stars and planets, life and society, will eventually move. Here we see the profound difference be- tween the structural and the evolutionary points of view. The structural point of view turns out to be inimical to the ideal of struc- ture itself, and sees structure as the enemy of equality - which it is. The evolutionary point of view sees the whole evolutionary process as the segregation of entropy, the building up of little castles of order in the crystal, in DNA, in life, in humans, and in their innumerable artifacts both personal, material and organizational, always at the cost, according to the second law, of increas- ing thermodynamic disorder elsewhere, in our case of course nicely segregated in the sun about which we don't have to worry. The structuralist sees pollution in the struc- ture whether it is smoke, slums or vice and says 'away with it. The evolutionist sees pollution as part of the price of evolution itself. Gal'tung's misunderstandings about entro- py derive, one suspects, from the cardinal principle of his normative system, the over- whelmingly strong value which he gives to equality as such. One almost suspect's that Galtung would prefer a society in which everybody were equally destitute rather than one in which some were destitute and 'some were rich. A passion for equality as such, however, can easily lead into the hatred of the rich without any love for the poor. One can put a very strong negative value on poverty and believe it should be abolished wi'thout believing in equality at all. This would lead to a society with a floor below which nobody were allowed to fall, but above which a high degree of inequality would be tolerable. Galtung nowhere spells out what his ideal society would be, and in- deed if any of us did this we would probably decide that we did not like it af'ter all! But the drive for equality as such is extremely strong in all his writings.

Subpoint B: Attempts to resolve “structural violence” inevitably result in the perpetuation of physical violence that shuts off democratic channels for minority representation. 

1. The concept of structural violence shuts down democratic debate and justifies violent lash outs to combat inequality. Maley 98
   William Maley,  Professor and Director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at The Australian National University , Australian Journal of International Affairs 42, 1988

The deployment of a notion of positive peace has been a far from innocuous development in peace research. A comprehensive theory of needs, where needs are not defined simply as necessary means to an agreed end, can be the basis for a suppression of both democratic and liberal aspirations. Democracy and Liberty are both concerned with personal desires, the former in the sphere of the polity, and the latter in the sphere of the individual. Needs theory subjugates both the individual and the polity to the abstract ideology of the needs theorist. When Maxim Litvinov remarked in Geneva in the 1930s that peace is indivisible, he was referring to the negative sense of the term. 'Negative peace' is one of the few social values in whose name crimes can be committed only at the cost of self-contradiction. However, if 'negative peace' must be associated with 'positive peace' to give rise to peace in totality, then peace is no longer indivisible —since direct violence may be defended as a means of eliminating `structural violence'. This defence is a familiar one, resembling the classic liberal justification for rebellion, and even in certain circumstances intervention. Christian Bay has argued that structural violence `may be so extreme that a limited war must be deemed a lesser evil, if there is no other way to end or mitigate the structural violence, and if the war is sure to remain limited and brief in duration.'" This blithe assumption — that there could ever be circumstances in which one could be absolutely sure that a war would remain limited and brief in duration — is a splendid illustration of Bay's detachment from the real world. Nonetheless, the greatest danger in his claim stems from the extraordinary elasticity of the notion of structural violence. This is best brought out by the Danish peace researcher Lars Dencik, although using slightly different terminology. He defines conflicts as `incompatible interests', and goes on to remark that 'incompatible interests are here defined objectively, i.e. by the observing scientist according to his theory and is sic independent of the actual subjective consciousness of the actors involved. This means that incompatible interests are conceived of as structural (actor indepen-dent), the structure defined according to the theory of the scientist.'" He draws the predictable conclusion that 'in certain situations "revolutionary violence" may be the necessary means to obtain conflict resolution proper'." This is irresistibly reminiscent of the conclusion of Georges Sorel's Reflections on Violence, that it is `to violence that Socialism owes those high ethical values by means of which it brings salvation to the modern world'20, and it is instructive, though for peace educators perhaps not very comforting, to recall that Sorel's ideas eventually were used in justification of Italian Fascism." (p. 30)

2. Democratic deliberation is key to avoid massive violence. Halperin 11
(Morton H., Senior Advisor – Open Society Institute and Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress, “Unconventional Wisdom – Democracy is Still Worth Fighting For”, Foreign Policy, January / February, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional_wisdom?page=0,11)

As the United States struggles to wind down two wars and recover from a humbling financial crisis, realism is enjoying a renaissance. Afghanistan and Iraq bear scant resemblance to the democracies we were promised. The Treasury is broke. And America has a president, Barack Obama, who once compared his foreign-policy philosophy to the realism of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr: "There's serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain," Obama said during his 2008 campaign. "And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things." But one can take such words of wisdom to the extreme-as realists like former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and writer Robert Kaplan sometimes do, arguing that the United States can't afford the risks inherent in supporting democracy and human rights around the world. Others, such as cultural historian Jacques Barzun, go even further, saying that America can't export democracy at all, "because it is not an ideology but a wayward historical development." Taken too far, such realist absolutism can be just as dangerous, and wrong, as neoconservative hubris. For there is one thing the neocons get right: As I argue in The Democracy Advantage, democratic governments are more likely than autocratic regimes to engage in conduct that advances U.S. interests and avoids situations that pose a threat to peace and security. Democratic states are more likely to develop and to avoid famines and economic collapse. They are also less likely to become failed states or suffer a civil war. Democratic states are also more likely to cooperate in dealing with security issues, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the bloody aftermath of the Iraq invasion painfully shows, democracy cannot be imposed from the outside by force or coercion. It must come from the people of a nation working to get on the path of democracy and then adopting the policies necessary to remain on that path. But we should be careful about overlearning the lessons of Iraq. In fact, the outside world can make an enormous difference in whether such efforts succeed. There are numerous examples-starting with Spain and Portugal and spreading to Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia-in which the struggle to establish democracy and advance human rights received critical support from multilateral bodies, including the United Nations, as well as from regional organizations, democratic governments, and private groups. It is very much in America's interest to provide such assistance now to new democracies, such as Indonesia, Liberia, and Nepal, and to stand with those advocating democracy in countries such as Belarus, Burma, and China. It will still be true that the United States will sometimes need to work with a nondemocratic regime to secure an immediate objective, such as use of a military base to support the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, or in the case of Russia, to sign an arms-control treaty. None of that, however, should come at the expense of speaking out in support of those struggling for their rights. Nor should we doubt that America would be more secure if they succeed.

3. Combatting “structural violence” justifies reactionary violence against a system that is poorly defined. This makes conflict inevitable and trades-off with peaceful reform. Quester
George H. Quester is chair of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, ANNALS, AAPSS, 504, July 1989
A third major problem to be raised about some forms of peace research and peace studies, again related to what we have al- ready discussed, arises in the tendency to define peace as much more than an absence of the organized violence of warfare, to define it indeed as the elimination also of poverty and injustice and of prejudice and tyranny, and so on-namely, to define peace simply as a synonym for what is good, for what an economist would call utility. Sometimes we are thus told that an op- position to violence must include an oppo- sition to "structural violence,"7 with the latter phrase presumably meaning any or- ganizational or power relationships that vi- olate the moral standards of the beholder, or we are also told that we must be in favor of "positive peace," which will include all of these good things, accomplished some- how simultaneously, rather than being con- tent with a "negative peace," limited merely to an absence of warfare. Surely there is a great deal that is lost from all of these definitional innovations, but what is there to be gained? If someone assumed, as noted previously, that con- sciousnesses somehow have to be raised, then it may well seem important. as an educational and motivational vehicle, to insist that peace includes an end to poverty or racism. If one assumes that there can never be an avoidance of war unless one simultaneously has an avoidance of pov-erty or racism or other social evils, then this causal link will also suggest a definitional link. But, if there is indeed no such one-to- one link in causal relationships and if mo- tivation is not the entirety of the problem of war and peace, then we surely will have thrown away a great deal of clarity if we insist on calling everything bad "war" or "violence" and if we insist on referring to everything we favor as "peace." This would be a little like telling the American Cancer Society that every disease now has to be referred to as "cancer," including heart disease and cholera and meningitis. Can medicine make any progress at all if it is not allowed to use different words for different ailments? Is it really true that to use different words for war and dictator- ship and poverty is to weaken our motiva- tion or to accept the inevitability of some evils or actually to favor the existence of such evils? If one goes far enough in accepting the definitional innovations produced by some peace studies curricula, it becomes possi- ble then to define violent attacks as peace- ful, as long as they are intended to eliminate racism or injustice, because these attacks are to oppose "structural violence." At the worst, this kind of redefinition is deliberately misleading, as war and vio- lence are defined as being inappropriate for any cause except one's own. At a less du- plicitous level, we simply have some need- less confusion brought into the process, by some relatively honest and well-meaning people.

Subpoint C: The term “structural violence” is insufficient for diagnosing the reality of oppression. It is not a method for liberation, just an ivory tower theory. 

1. The term “structural violence” is incredibly vague. It can refer to any form of exploitation. Leech 12
   Galtung’s ‘Structural Violence’ and the Sierra Leone Civil War c.1985-1992; Dr. Philip JM Leech lecturer in International Relations at Plymouth University where he teaches International Relations of the Middle East; October 12, 2012;
   https://whereshouldthebirdsfly.wordpress.com/2012/10/12/galtungs-structural-violence-and-the-sierra-leone-civil-war-c-1985-1992/

The critical element or link in the chain of this ‘causal flow’ (200 Galtung, 1996) is structural violence. It is the process that links cultural distinction to Direct Violence. Structural violence is an ostensive label that may be applied to a broad range of phenomena. What Galtung notes as definitive is that Structural violence is the process of deprivation of needs. Each part of the violence equation depends on the existence of the other two before the violent conflict become truly serious and sustained  (197-200 Galtung, 1996). It need not be consistent or radical . Simply put, it is violence embodied by a structure, or violence that ‘operates regardless of intent’ (93 Galtung, 1996). It is characterized politically as repression, and economically by exploitation. However, Galtung notes that ‘blunt repression/exploitation is necessary but not sufficient’ (93 Galtung, 1996). In fact the nature of structural violence is somewhat vague in that it allows the quantity and the qualitative nature of aggression and dominance to be variable (201 Galtung, 1996).

2. John Galtung, the creator of the concept of “structural violence”, admitted that his theory couldn’t be applied objectively. We cannot even assess what “structural violence” is. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

For Galtung sociology was undoubtedly a science. In contrast to the formal sciences of logic and mathematics, sociology was a 'factual' science, which in terms of scientific rigour occupied a middle position between physics and the 'humanistic sciences' (Galtung 1958d, p.88). His account of the virtues of applying science to the study of the social world was, nonetheless, ambiguous. Galtung (1958d) recognised that the object-domain of the social sciences made the application of scientific method difficult and perhaps impossible if overly high standards were applied. Consequently he argued that the primary purpose of social science was to generate descriptive empirical statements which would have to be sub-jected to some form of testing procedure (1958b). Theory-building could follow but was not essential to the claim for scientific status (Galtung1959b, p. 10). Galtung also admitted that significant problems existed regarding the scientific assessment of theoretical statements about the social world, but in a manner characteristic of his subsequent work appealed to the future development of suitable analytical tools. Though his discussion of the question of value-freedom was often ambiguous in his early sociological papers, Galtung informed his stu-dents that value-statements were not testable and therefore unscientific(1958d, p.92). Though Galtung recognised that values impinged upon the conduct of social science in a variety of ways — inter alia, the deter-mination of investigative focus, the exclusion of undesired results and the procurement of financial support — the problem was consistently presented as one of degree and not destructive of a genuinely scientific sociology (1958b).

3. “Structural violence” rejects holding any specific group or class responsible for exploitation in favor of a vacuous criticism of a “system” that it never fully identifies. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

Galtung also rejected the implication of the radical critique that specific groups or social classes were responsible for exploitation. The term 'exploitation' was refused by him on the grounds that it was politically and emotionally overloaded. The continuing influence of his sociological orientation was evident in the preference for offering a definition of violence as an abstract systemic property that can be comprehended without reference to specific historical conjunctures or agents. But Gal- tung's approach also reflected the influence of Gandhi, from whom was taken the view that a distinction should be made between status actions and status holders (1959c, 1980). It is the structure of social interaction within which agents of violence act that is to be attacked, rather than the agents themselves. To attack the agents is to meet one form of violence with another. True dedication to the doctrine of ahimsa required 'the return of good for evil' and a distinction between the doer and the deed (Galtung 1959c; Borman 1986). However Gandhian ethics arose out of a complex matrix of occidental and oriental philosophical principles never fully explicated by even Gandhi himself (Sharma 1965; Borman 1986). Galtung restricted his treatment of Gandhi's thought to the draw- ing out of some practical implications. Though he was to later complain of the failure of his critics to see the imprint of Gandhi on his work, this is hardly surprising since few clues were provided. The fundamental problem with the concept of structural violence was that it was vacuous without a substantiation of the value-system on which it depended. The denial of potentiality by structural violence, presupposed some notion of human potential. As one critic noted, without a clear analysis of the values underpinning it, the concept was reduced to a label to be applied to anything its author did not like (Eide 1971)

4. “Structural violence” cannot explain social changes or the exact origins of violence beyond the fact that it simply exists. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

In his sociological writings Galtung provided no analysis or defence of any specific values, other than to claim that they were empirically held, or to assert that values should be revised in reflection of systemic changes. What was missing was a sense of the politics of social change. Even if consensus could be established as to the direction in which a social system is moving, it is a different matter to evaluate such change. Furth-ermore, how are we to choose between competing and non-commensurable understandings of systemic 'health'? The only answer implicit in Galtung's discussion was that empirical evidence must be produced to show which set of values accorded best with the social system under scrutiny. That brings us back full-circle to the value-contamination of observation and the impact of the political perspective that conditions our analysis of social systems. Functionalism can be wedded to any political ideology, but being a descriptive rather than analytical discourse it cannot provide that ideology. Though aware of the problem of defending values outside of a dis-tinctly normative discourse, Galtung was not apparently perturbed by it. In his discussion of functionalism (1959a) he claimed that there were' fairly inter-subjectively communicable and consensual standards' such as 'sane', 'healthy' or 'normal', against which social systems could be judged. For Galtung, to describe a system as 'healthy' was not a value-judgement, in contrast to the claim that 'healthy is good'. Leaving aside the question as to whether the distinction holds or if 'fairly consensual 'constitutes a scientific category, it became clear that when Galtung turned to peace research the evaluative standard of 'peace' was to be sim-ilarly derived and understood. In its Galtungian mould, peace research was differentiated from earlier forms of normative enquiry into global social relations by the absence of any distinctly normative discourse.

5. Galtung’s theory of structural violence is entirely theoretical. It makes massive leaps in logic and cannot even quantify the violence people suffer. Rummel
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR: VOL. 5: THE JUST PEACE, Chapter 3, Alternative Concepts Of Peace*; R.J. Rummel; https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/TJP.CHAP3.HTM

Structural violence appears, for Galtung, when resources, or especially the power to allocate them, are unevenly distributed: when people are starving and this could be avoided; when life expectancy is much greater in the upper class; when a small elite control the entry into high status. Here, without any prior ethical analysis or normative preparation,110 Galtung makes his first intellectual broad jump from the analytical-empirical plane to the ethical, but in a most cavalier manner: "In order not to overwork the word violence we shall sometimes refer to the condition of structural violence as social injustice."111¶ Then Galtung presents his final two distinctions (dimensions) regarding violence: it may be intended or unintended, or manifest or latent. With these and the other distinctions mentioned, Galtung defines a "typology of violence" in which the personal-structural distinctions are basic. In focusing on the means of personal and structural violence Galtung makes his second broad jump, but now back from the ethical to the analytical-empirical plane--again without analysis and as offhanded: "If we accept that the general formula behind structural violence is inequality, above all in the distribution of power, then this can be measured."112¶ D. His Concept of "Positive Peace." The above serves as an introduction to six factors maintaining inequalitarian distributions--that is, "mechanisms of structural violence"113--which are of no concern here. Nor need we tarry over Galtung's discussion of the relationship between personal and structural violence, and the trade-offs in emphasizing a system that is higher on one than another. But what I should mention is his conclusion on the definition of peace: ¶ E. His Political Theory. Thus, structural violence = unactualized human potentials = social injustice = inequality. Therefore, positive peace = equality = social justice = realized human potentials = absence of structural violence. This equation is stipulated; analysis to support the critical relationships are lacking; and the definitional and substantive problems in the formulation are glaring. One should understand, however, that the critical relationships and definitions are entirely theoretical. Even violence, usually an easily measured empirical concept of physical harm and destruction, is converted into a construct meaning unactualized human potential, then equated in theory with injustice and, thence, equality--each of them constructs.

Counter Interp

Counter interp: the NEG may read one unconditional word pic.

Net benefit is discursive advocacy skills:

Without word pics the NEG can’t test the specific rhetoric of the plan.  That’s the most important impact:

3.  Understanding language is key to everyday life and fighting oppressive structures. Kehl 99

D.G. Kehl and Livingston 99, Howard Livingston, English at Arizona State University and Pace University, July 1999 (English Journal 88.6) 

Second, students’ own linguistic vulnerability should be demonstrated in a meaningful and convincing way. How would they react, for example, if while shopping they encounter “vegetarian leather” for plain, cheap vinyl; or “synthetic glass” for plastic; or, in place of down payment, they get “customer capital cost reduction”? Third, they should be made more sensitive to language and how it works, not just denotation but connotation, concrete versus abstract terms, specific versus general, adjectives as evaluative projections of a speaker or writer, slanted language, and much more. For example, they can be asked to consider how many times in a year they buy something simply on the persuasive appeal of words rather than on the genuine merits of the product, whether that product is sunglasses, clothes, vehicles, or food. Especially illuminating in developing sensitivity to language are exercises that ask students to distinguish differences in connotation among lists of so-called synonyms. For example, which of the following would they like to be called—and why: boy/girl, lad/lassie, kid, young person, youngster, tyke, juvenile, future citizen, Generation X-er, member of the rising generation? Lively discussions can be conducted on the connotative effects of the language of advertising. For example, why are certain words taboo in advertising, requiring the substitution of euphemisms: not “fat” but “full figured,” not “cheap” but “inexpensive,” not “used car” but “preowned automobile,” not “smell” but “aroma.” (A recent example of doublespeak for “stink” is “exceed the olfactory threshold.”) Fourth, students should be taught not only to read critically but also to speak and write responsibility Wasn't’it Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch who noted that a writer should be prepared to stand cross-examination on every word? And as for reading critically, perhaps Thomas Carlyle said it best: “If we think of it, all that a university or final highest school can do for us is still but what the first school began doing—teach us to read.” Isn’t that at least a significant part of the English teacher’s job description? Finally, students should be taught how to “talk back” by disarming and defusing doublespeak through what Judith Butler calls “counter-appropriation” (or what Hugh Rank has called “intensifying” and “downplaying” in his Doublespeak Schema). Recent communication theory offers further direction for discussing doublespeak in the classroom. For example, even a brilliant, well-organized, and illustrated lecture on language manipulation may have limited success (the doublespeaker would call it “counterproductive”). 

Outweighs policy focus since we won’t actually become policy makers, but we do need to know how powerful people manipulate language to fight back every day.

4.  Analyzing dominant social power behind discourse is a pre requisite to solutions – any solutions using bad discourse are doomed to exclude people.  Smith and Bell 07

Phillipa Smith and Alan Bell 07 Philippa Smith is a PhD in discourses in national identity at AUT University in New Zealand, Allan Bell is Allan Bell is Professor of Language and Communication and the Director of the Institute of Culture, Discourse and Communication at Auckland University of Technology, “Unraveling the Web of Discourse Analysis” http://www.aut.ac.nz/resources/research/research_institutes/ccr/sage_proofs_05-devereux-ch-04.pdf

Foucault’s interest in the power play of specific discourses over society has influenced the postmodern connection between language and social structure (Devereux, 2003). This is echoed by Fairclough when referring to discursive practice contributing not just to the reproduction of society (‘social identities, social relationships, systems of knowledge and belief’), but also to the transformation of society (1992: 65). Analysis of texts also enables identification of the representation, identity and stereotyping of groups and individuals. It allows for critical analysis, an awareness of persuasive language, and uncovers dominating social powers behind discourses. Such critical analysis might not solve problems, but it is a prerequisite that has the ability to identify and analyze situations, and perhaps suggest ways of alleviating or resolving them (Fairclough et al., 2004). The New Zealand Government, for example, recognized that promotional texts used by tobacco companies carried tempting lifestyle messages to influence, particularly, young people’s behaviour and their attitudes towards smoking. As a result, tobacco and advertising sponsorships were banned in the 1990s (Health NZ, 2005). A burgeoning of text types in society, largely brought about through developing technologies, compels researchers to seek understanding of social reality through analyzing the discourse of the texts and questioning them. Legal documents, advertisements, political and Government papers, company newsletters, propaganda leaflets, articles in newspapers, magazines, and books, television, radio and film, music and lyrics, performing arts and more recently the Internet, mobile phones, mobile television and computer games: these are just some examples of the proliferation of texts. Added to this are the changing and merging of existing discourses through processes of globalization of discourses and discourse genres (Fairclough, 2001).

5.  To be real policymakers people need to be aware of language – this type of education is most useful.  Woods

Steve Woods, Director of Forensics at Western Washington University, “Changing the Game?: Embracing the Advocacy Standard”, No date given

The world of policy technocrats and public decision makers is bound to strict codes of expectation regarding their public statements about constituencies and members of the public. Racist or gender-insensitive comments would not be tolerated by administrators, especially those who see such comments as public liabilities. In the debate context, making sure that all references or literature introduced into the debate are consistent, and that the in-round rhetoric of the debater in explaining the arguments is consistent with the assumptions of the literature, is a parallel expectation.