Tournament: CPS | Round: 5 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
Links

Rhetoric propagating free speech as the answer to social ills directly trades off with our ability to fight injustice. Free speech is a tool that courts wield in colorblind ways against people. Delgado and Stefancic ‘92
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. “IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?” Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN

III. How THE SYSTEM OF... lofty, romantic-and wrong.

And, more speech is not better – speech tends to reinscribe power relations rather than break them down.  Delgado and Yun ‘94
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974, University of California, Berkeley. David H. Yun – Member of the Colorado Bar. J.D. 1993, University of Colorado. “Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation.” California Law Review. 1994. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1712andcontext=californialawreview JJN

D. "More Speech"-Talking Back... for educating others? 

Their focus on precise legal analysis obscures marginalized voices who are intentionally left out of law reviews and court arguments. Downing 99
John Downing John T. Jones Jr Centennial Professor of Communication at the¶ University of Texas at Austin. “‘Hate speech’ and ‘First Amendment absolutism’ discourses in the US” Discourse and Society 99 Vol 10(2): 175–189

In the first... a seamless tissue.

Their philosophy preaches that everyone is equal – this colorblind ideology perpetuates anti blackness under the myth of American liberalism.  Curry 13
Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013.  NS

Despite the rhetorical... integrated into society.

Impacts

Turns the case – hate speech does real violence to people of color and necessarily locks in relationships of domination. Delgado and Stefacic ‘09
Richard Delgado - University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. Jean Stefancic – Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989, University of San Francisco. “FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH.” WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW. 2009. http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Delgado_LawReview_01.09.pdf

II. OBSERVATION NUMBER TWO:... of free expression.111

Anti-Blackness is the root cause of white supremacy and social oppression. It outweighs the case. Heitzeg 15
Heitzeg, Nancy A a Professor of Sociology and Director of the¶ interdisciplinary Critical Studies of Race/Ethnicity Program at St. Catherine¶ University, St. Paul, MN.. "On The Occasion Of The 50th Anniversary Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: Persistent White Supremacy, Relentless Anti-Blackness, And The Limits Of The Law." Hamline J. Pub. L. and Pol'y 36 (2015): 54.

While all communities... a daunting challenge.22

Alt

The alternative is to embrace the demand of abolitionism – we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements.  Oparah 14
Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).

¶ In my earlier... by academic-MPIC abolition.

Framing

The role of the ballot is to interrogate the AFF’s scholarship using the lens of critical race theory. This makes the passage of the plan irrelevant. 

First, their refusal of minority voices is a conscious choice. Delgado 84
Delgado, Richard. "The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132.3 (1984): 561-578.

It does not... no such tradition.23

Second, Debate is a space in which racial identity can be understood—This dynamic is key to confronting racial domination and questioning the underlying aspects of negative racial identities. Reid-Brinkley 08
Shanara Rose. PhD in Philosophy from the University of Georgia. The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance And Style. https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf  pgs 2-3. 7/5

The attempts at... end racial domination.

Tournament: CPS | Round: 3 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
Neoliberalism structures academic freedom in the status quo. It sets limits on what is acceptable behavior to quell dissent and any facult truly radical enough to challenge corporate hegemony are tossed out before they can pose a real threat. Chatterjee and Maira 14
Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. "The Imperial University: race, war, and the nation-state." The imperial university: Academic repression and scholarly dissent (2014): 1-50.
Our geopolitical positions—of our immediate workplaces as well as trans- national work circuits—underscore the complex contradictions of our locations within the U.S. academy. These paradoxes of positionality and employment have seeded this project in important ways. We have both taught at the University of California for many years—in addition to other U.S. universities—and have been members of the privileged upper caste of U.S. higher education: the tenured professoriate. We have each used these privileges of class, education, and cultural capital to live and work transna- tionally and have organized around and written about issues of warfare, colo- nialism, occupation, immigration, racism, gender rights, youth culture, and labor politics, within and outside the United States. In fact, we first began working together when we collaborated in 2008 on a collective statement of feminist solidarity with women suffering from the violence of U.S. wars and occupation, during the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Israeli siege of Gaza.7 Yet our privileges of entry, of inclusion, and of outside-ness are also always marked by the “dangerous complicities” of imperial privi- lege and neoliberal capital, as the chapters by Julia Oparah; Sylvanna Falcón, Sharmila Lodhia, Molly Talcott, and Dana Collins; Vijay Prashad; and Laura Pulido powerfully remind us. Even as we have recognized the institutional privileges and complicities through which we can do this work, we have experienced at various moments and in different ways—as the chapters by Alexis Gumbs, Clarissa Rojas, Thomas Abowd, and Nicholas De Genova suggest—a keen sense of being “outsiders” within—in the university, in aca- demic disciplines, in different nations.8¶ As scholars and teachers located within “critical ethnic studies” and “women and gender studies,” we are also well aware of a certain politics of value, legitimacy, and marginality at play, especially as the dismantling of the public higher education system and attacks on ethnic studies around the nation accelerate. The struggles to build ethnic studies and women/gen- der/sexuality studies as legitimate scholarly endeavors within the academy, emerging from several strands of the civil rights and antiwar movements, are well chronicled and keenly debated. The precarious positions as well as increasing professionalization and policing of these interdisciplinary fields within the current restructuring of the university is a matter of deep con- cern; for example, in the wake of the assault on ethnic studies in Arizona, the dismantling of women’s studies programs, and in a climate of policing and criminalizing immigrant “others” across the nation.¶ The pressure on academics to fund one’s own research—following the dominant grant-writing models of science and technology—is now even more explicit in a time of fiscal crisis and deepening fissures between faculty in the humanities, social sciences, physical sciences, education, and business who occupy very different positions in an increasingly privatized university.9 Prashad reminds us in his chapter of the consequences of the fiscal crisis for college students who bear a massive and growing burden of debt. We recognize these pressures on faculty and students as stemming from neolib- eral capitalism and the university’s capitulation to a global “structural adjust- ment” policy that is now coming “home” to roost in the United States, as astutely argued by Farah Godrej in her analysis linking the neoliberal uni- versity to militarism and violence. The academy has also tried to market the notion of “public scholarship,” transforming activist scholarship into a commodifiable form of knowledge production and dissemination that can affirm the university’s civic engagement—confined by the parameters of per- missible politics, as incisively critiqued by Salaita, Rojas, and Abowd. If we cannot—or choose not to—market our scholarship and pedagogies through these programs of funding and institutionalization, we find our work further devalued within the dominant terms of privatization in the academy. Given that neoliberal market ideologies now underwrite the “value” of our research and intellectual work, what happens to scholars whose writing directly tack- les the questions of U.S. state violence, logics of settler colonialism, and global political and economic dominance?¶ We know from stories about campaigns related to tenure or defamation of scholars, often shared in hallways during conferences and sometimes through e-mail listservs and the media, that there are serious costs to writing and speaking about these matters. For far too many colleagues who confront the most taboo of topics, such as indigenous critiques of genocide and settler colonialism or especially the question of Palestine, the price paid has been extraordinarily high. It has included the denial of promotion to tenure, being de-tenured, not having employment contracts renewed, or never being hired and being blacklisted, as this book poignantly illustrates. Coupled with the loss of livelihood or exile from the U.S. academy, many scholars have been stigmatized, harassed, and penalized in overt and covert ways. There are numerous such cases, sadly way too many to recount here—most famously those of Ward Churchill, Norman Finkelstein, David Graeber, Joel Kovel, Terri Ginsberg, Marc Ellis, Margo Nanlal-Rankoe, Wadie Said, and Sami Al- Arian—but it is generally only the handful that generate public campaigns that receive attention while many others remain unknown, not to mention innumerable cases of students who have been surveilled or harassed, such as Syed Fahad Hashmi from Brooklyn College, while again there are countless other untold stories.10 These are the scandals and open secrets, we argue, that need to be revealed and placed in broader frames of analysis of labor and survival within the U.S. university system.11

Free speech is an illusion propagated by corporatists – their model of rights assumes an equal playing field analogous to free market economists view of capital. The promotion of free speech perpetuates the idea that speech is a commodity, which strengthens neoliberalism’s hold on the academy. Brown 15
Brown, Wendy. Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism's stealth revolution. MIT Press, 2015.
At times, kennedy raises the pitch in Citizens United to depict limits on corporate funding of PAC ads as “an outright ban on speech”;19 at other times, he casts them merely as inappropriate government inter- vention and bureaucratic weightiness.20 But beneath all the hyperbole about government’s chilling of corporate speech is a crucial rhetorical move: the figuring of speech as analogous to capital in “the political marketplace.” on the one hand, government intervention is featured throughout the opinion as harmful to the marketplace of ideas that speech generates.21 Government restrictions damage freedom of speech just as they damage all freedoms. on the other hand, the unfettered accumulation and circulation of speech is cast as an unqual- ified good, essential to “the right of citizens to inquire...hear... speak...and use information to reach consensus itself a precondi- tion to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”22 not merely corporate rights, then, but democracy as a whole is at stake in the move to deregulate speech. Importantly, however, democ- racy is here conceived as a marketplace whose goods—ideas, opinions, and ultimately, votes—are generated by speech, just as the economic market features goods generated by capital. In other words, at the very moment that Justice kennedy deems disproportionate wealth irrele- vant to the equal rights exercised in this marketplace and the utili- tarian maximization these rights generate, speech itself acquires the status of capital, and a premium is placed on its unrestricted sources and unimpeded flow.¶ What is significant about rendering speech as capital? economiza- tion of the political occurs not through the mere application of market principles to nonmarket fields, but through the conversion of political processes, subjects, categories, and principles to economic ones. This is the conversion that occurs on every page of the kennedy opinion. If everything in the world is a market, and neoliberal markets con- sist only of competing capitals large and small, and speech is the capital of the electoral market, then speech will necessarily share cap- ital’s attributes: it appreciates through calculated investment, and it advances the position of its bearer or owner. Put the other way around, once speech is rendered as the capital of the electoral marketplace, it is appropriately unrestricted and unregulated, fungible across actors and venues, and existing solely for the advancement or enhancement of its bearer’s interests. The classic associations of political speech with freedom, conscience, deliberation, and persuasion are nowhere in sight.¶ How, precisely, is speech capital in the kennedy opinion? How does it come to be figured in economic terms where its regulation or restriction appears as bad for its particular marketplace and where its monopolization by corporations appears as that which is good for all? The transmogrification of speech into capital occurs on a number of levels in kennedy’s account. First, speech is like capital in its tendency to proliferate and circu- late, to push past barriers, to circumvent laws and other restrictions, indeed, to spite efforts at intervention or suppression.23 speech is thus rendered as a force both natural and good, one that can be wrongly impeded and encumbered, but never quashed.¶ second, persons are not merely producers, but consumers of speech, and government interference is a menace—wrong in prin- ciple and harmful in effect—at both ends. The marketplace of ideas, kennedy repeats tirelessly, is what decides the value of speech claims. every citizen must judge the content of speech for himself or herself; it cannot be a matter for government determination, just as govern- ment should not usurp other consumer choices.24 In this discussion, kennedy makes no mention of shared deliberation or judgment in politics or of voices that are unfunded and relatively powerless. He is focused on the wrong of government “commanding where a per- son may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, using censorship to control thought.”25 If speech generates goods consumed according to individual choice, govern- ment distorts this market by “banning the political speech of millions of associations of citizens” (that is, corporations) and by paternal- istically limiting what consumers may know or consider. Again, if speech is the capital of the political marketplace, then we are polit- ically free when it circulates freely. And it circulates freely only when corporations are not restricted in what speech they may fund or promulgate.¶ Third, kennedy casts speech not as a medium for expression or dialogue, but rather as innovative and productive, just as capital is. There is “a creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expres- sion” that intersects in a lively way with “rapid changes in technol- ogy” to generate the public good.26 This aspect of speech, kennedy argues, specifically “counsels against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”27 Again, the dynamism, innovativeness, and generativity of speech, like that of all capital, is dampened by government intervention.¶ Fourth, and perhaps most important in establishing speech as the capital of the electoral marketplace, kennedy sets the power of speech and the power of government in direct and zero-sum-game opposition to one another. Repeatedly across the lengthy opinion for the majority, he identifies speech with freedom and government with control, cen- sorship, paternalism, and repression.28 When free speech and govern- ment meet, it is to contest one another: the right of speech enshrined in the First Amendment, he argues, is “premised on mistrust of gov- ernmental power” and is “an essential mechanism of democracy because it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”29 Here are other variations on this theme in the opinion:¶ The First Amendment was certainly not understood by the framers to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media. It was understood as a response to the repression of speech.30¶ When Government seeks to use its full power, including criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.... The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.31 This reading of the First Amendment and of the purpose of political speech positions government and speech as warring forces parallel to those of government and capital in a neoliberal economy.

This turns the case – the commodification of speech reflects the capitalist illusion of freedom. It makes speech meaningless and kills value to life. Smith ‘14
R.C. Smith April 24, 2014 “POWER, CAPITAL and THE RISE OF THE MASS SURVEILLANCE STATE: ON THE ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY, ETHICS, DISENCHANTMENT and CRITICAL THEORY” Heathwood Institute and Press http://www.heathwoodpress.com/power-capital-the-rise-of-the-mass-surveillance-state-on-the-absence-of-democracy-ethics-disenchantment-critical-theory/ JJN from file
One pressing issue, moreover, is that majority of the popular movements that have emerged in response to the Snowden leaks appear to be reformist in character. As a result, the discourse isn’t so much about fundamental system change; rather it becomes crafted into making mass surveillance less repulsive and more socially acceptable, even marketable. (Consider, for instance, the latest reforms proposed by President Barack Obama). For Adorno, this reformist inclination can be explained in part through an analysis of the logic of the system of capital. We read in Adorno how under modernity – i.e., capitalism – human beings are treated as commodities4 and the political-economy, which is principled on concentrations of power (i.e., ‘contradictory recognition’5), goes over the head of the individual, particularly as ‘coercive society’ aims to ‘shape people’ on behalf of the economic, social and political status quo.6 The system of capital, along with the instrumental use of Enlightenment ideals to promote a rational, efficient system7 have laid a foundation for society wherein the political-economy influences individuals and manufactures consent.8 Accordingly, people are seen as “substitutable entities valued merely for their instrumental uses or ability to command market resources,” and even where “commodification is resisted, the overriding pull of society is toward the status quo and those forms that are valued by society”. 9 As Kate Schick writes: The mind thus shapes itself into socially acceptable, marketable forms and freedom becomes an illusion, made all the more dangerous and difficult to resist because of the appearance of freedom. This is not the fault of Enlightenment ideals as such, but the instrumental use of these ideals in the promotion of a rational, efficient system: ‘The network of the whole is drawn ever tighter, modelled after the act of exchange’ (Adorno 1981: 21).10 Present in the logic of the system of capital itself is not an ‘emancipatory reason’ that aims toward universal guiding principles of an actually egalitarian democracy – i.e., Equality, Egalitarianism, Justice, Rights, etc. Rather, in modern capitalism, with its instrumental reason and positivist logic, such concepts lose their meaning.11 The social narrative no longer accommodates these fundamental principles or judges them to be delusions, because all concepts must be strictly functional in order to be considered “reasonable”.12 In turn, the ideals of a ‘good’ society, for example ideals toward an actual egalitarian democracy, become dependent on the “interests” of the dominant and governing system, which produces and reproduces the epistemic context of its own validity.13

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return. 

The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Sculos and Walsh 16
Sculos, Bryant William a¶ Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University , and Sean Noah Walsh Department of Political Science and Economics, Capital University. "The Counterrevolutionary Campus: Herbert Marcuse and the Suppression of Student Protest Movements." New Political Science (2016): 1-17.
¶ The recognition of repressive tolerance as a tool of counterrevolution calls for a careful¶ examination of leftist strategy. For example, so-called ‘microaggressions’, or ‘trigger warnings’,¶ should be taken seriously.65 However, we should and need to ask ourselves: in a world of¶ pervasive macroaggressions and trigger-pulling in a world of wretched poverty, torture and¶ disappeared dissidents—if these concerns should take center stage. We ought to reflect and¶ ask if identity concerns are more important than class or economic concerns. Marcuse would¶ surely argue that class remains a crucial component alongside other dimensions of identity¶ and oppression (for example, race, gender, sexuality, sexual orientation, religion et cetera).¶ He would demand that we act locally but organize globally, and that we refuse the lure of¶ divisive identity politics, without eschewing the central importance of criticizing racialized,¶ gendered dimensions to capitalist oppressions. We must principally and aggressively resist¶ the demand that we tolerate the expressions or enactments of these oppressions under the¶ guise of liberal toleration. In response to this revolting, nauseating, murderous demand, we¶ must revolt in all the ways we can, and that is precisely what #BlackLivesMatter, the Black¶ Liberation Collective (a nascent, more radical national student organization, distinct but¶ related to BLM and includes many of the campus protesters from around the United States),¶ and the broader student movements are aiming and struggling for (even if right now what¶ they are struggling for is precisely that focused vision).¶ The claim that free speech is under assault is often deployed as a tool of repressive toleration¶ by the Right. Perhaps we need some more hashtags: #BlackVoicesMatter or¶ #BlackProtestsMatter (though the label ‘black’ here, as it is with BLM, is meant to be inclusive,¶ not exclusive. There are numbers of white and non-black allies of the organization, as can¶ be seen in any cursory examination of these various protests. This is explicitly laid out in the¶ official platform of the BLM organization. This is the case for BDS as well; it is not about identity so much as it is about defending the humanity of all).66 We need more than just¶ hashtags though. Much more. We have seen the foundations of more. BLM’s platform does¶ not, however, include any mention of capitalism or economic exploitation, despite the fact¶ that the leadership of the organization has spoken out against racialized capitalism.67 The¶ Black Liberation Collective already includes a critique of capitalism alongside other forms¶ of oppression in their platform.68 These are the early and precarious stages of a potentially¶ emergent cohesive Left for the twenty-first century. Through Marcuse’s critical gaze, we can¶ observe what these students and activists have already realized, what is truly intolerable:¶ the demand that we all tolerate the intolerable. Today, the path to liberating tolerance¶ requires the refusal to accept such silencing.¶ Importantly, we must not limit ourselves to merely critiquing existing oppressions, or just¶ suggest principled radical reforms that could move us towards an emancipated, just (global)¶ society. As many on the Left have attempted, though sadly without much wider recognition,¶ we need to start building these alternative futures in the counterrevolutionary present wherever¶ and whenever possible. This means first building racially, sexually and gender inclusive¶ communicative and organizational bridges between both nascent and longer established¶ social movements and class-based organizations, including the too often forgotten Left¶ political parties.69 Liberating tolerance could tear open avenues for the development of the¶ ‘new sensibility’ Marcuse heralds in his late work. We see this as crucial for the possibility of¶ a new society, a free, just, and rational society antipodal and antithetical to the unfree, unjust,¶ and irrational confines of neoliberal capitalism. College campuses have, since Marcuse’s time¶ been a potentially key environment for the cultivation of this ‘new sensibility’—a sensibility,¶ a mentality, oriented towards care, compassion, love, justice, cooperation and indeed active¶ disgust at their inverses.70 BLM and BDS and other less well-known organized movements¶ offer us a new hope and opportunity to revitalize a youthful emancipatory disposition with¶ sustainability.¶ Liberating tolerance against repressive tolerance has the potential to open up the material¶ and ideological space for precisely these developments, against every wish of the counterrevolutionary¶ forces that militate against progress through the silencing of the exuberant¶ dissent we are witnessing across college campuses in the United States and around the¶ world. We write in support of these students and their rejection of white supremacy, racial¶ injustice (on campus and beyond), police brutality as standard practice, especially against¶ minorities, and their calls for an egalitarian educational experience, including the extension¶ of that experience for all people in the United States and around the world. Beyond Herbert¶ Marcuse’s words, we have his emancipatory democratic impetus—we hope to have embodied¶ that impetus here and shown it to be more relevant than ever.

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. 

First, neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file
RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. A. Prescription: More Politics The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor, 137 many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s marginalization. B. Prescription: More Normativity Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a number of pitfalls. The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the “distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the societal pie and redistribution is about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain of discourse or ideology. Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like Hayek’s theory, “law and economics is full of stories about how liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it instead folds them into one another: “The Law and Economics movement is rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive communitarian ideal will win.150 Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by her capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for her own needs and service her own ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152 If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as “undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be countered differently. More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. C. Prescription: Acceptance The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in “taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be “self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce the momentum to move forward. VII CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate the practice of critique within the legal academy. A. Why Critique Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: critique. Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies them. Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no alternative.

Tournament: Berkeley | Round: 2 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
The political ontology of liberalism is violent – Rawls assumes a neutral liberal subject which forces marginalized groups to assimilate to and endorse a coded white male identity.  Heyes 02

Cressida Heyes, Identity Politics, SEP, 2002.  NS

A key condition of possibility for contemporary identity politics was institutionalized liberal democracy (Brown 1995). The citizen mobilizations that made democracy real also shaped and unified groups previously marginal to the polity, while extensions of formal rights invited expectations of material and symbolic equality. The perceived paucity of rewards offered by liberal capitalism, however, spurred forms of radical critique that sought to explain the persistence of oppression. At the most basic philosophical level, critics of liberalism suggested that liberal social ontology—the model of the nature of and relationship between subjects and collectives—was misguided. The social ontology of most liberal political theories consists of citizens conceptualized as essentially similar individuals, as for example in John Rawls' famous thought experiment using the “original position,” in which representatives of the citizenry are conceptually divested of all specific identities or affiliations in order to make rational decisions about the social contract (Rawls 1970). To the extent that group interests are represented in liberal polities, they tend to be understood as associational, forms of interest group pluralism whereby those sharing particular interests voluntarily join together to create a political lobby. Citizens are free to register their individual preferences (through voting, for example), or to aggregate themselves for the opportunity to lobby more systematically (e.g. by forming an association such as a neighborhood community league). These lobbies, however, are not defined by the identity of their members so much as by specific shared interests and goals, and when pressing their case the marginalized subjectivity of the group members is not itself called into question. Finally, political parties, the other primary organs of liberal democratic government, critics suggest, have few moments of inclusivity, being organized around party discipline, responsiveness to lobby groups, and broad-based electoral popularity. Ultimately conventional liberal democracy, diverse radical critics claim, cannot effectively address the ongoing structural marginalization that persists in late capitalist liberal states, and may even be complicit with it (Young 1990; P. Williams 1991; Brown 1995; M. Williams 1998).   – Continues -- On a philosophical level, these understandings of the political subject and its relationship to collectivity came to seem inadequate to ensuring representation for women, gays and lesbians, or racial-ethnic groups (M. Williams 1998). Critics charged that the neutral citizen of liberal theory was in fact the bearer of an identity coded white, male, bourgeois, able-bodied, and heterosexual (Pateman 1988; Young 1990; Di Stefano 1991; Mills 1997; Pateman and Mills 2007). This implicit ontology in part explained the persistent historical failure of liberal democracies to achieve anything more than token inclusion in power structures for members of marginalized groups. A richer understanding of political subjects as constituted through and by their social location was required. In particular, the history and experience of oppression brought with it certain perspectives and needs that could not be assimilated through existing liberal structures. Individuals are oppressed by virtue of their membership in a particular social group—that is, a collective whose members have relatively little mobility into or out of the collective, who usually experience their membership as involuntary, who are generally identified as members by others, and whose opportunities are deeply shaped by the relation of their group to corollary groups through privilege and oppression (Cudd 2006). Oppression, then, is the systematic limiting of opportunity or constraints on self-determination because of such membership: for example, Frantz Fanon eloquently describes the experience of being always constrained by the white gaze as a Black man: “I already knew that there were legends, stories, history, and above all historicity… I was responsible at the same time for my body, my race, for my ancestors” (Fanon 1968, 112). Conversely, members of dominant groups are privileged—systematically advantaged by the deprivations imposed on the oppressed. For example, in a widely cited article Peggy McIntosh identifies whiteness as a dominant identity, and lists 47 ways in which she is advantaged by being white compared with her colleagues of color. These range from being able to buy “flesh-colored” Band-Aids that will match her skin tone, to knowing that she can be rude without provoking negative judgments of her racial group, to being able to buy a house in a middle-class community without risking neighbors' disapproval (1993).

Rawlsian theory forces black people into a conceptual abstraction where they must imagine the potentiality of white people to be ethical and impartially choose moral norms that benefit all of society.  Curry 13

Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013.  NS

The potentiality of whiteness—the proleptic call of white anti-racist consciousness— is nothing more than the fiat of an ahistorical dream. A command ushered before thought engages racism, before awareness of the world becomes aware of what is actual. This is forced upon accounts of racism where whiteness is morally obscured from being seen as is.  Whiteness as is partly determined by what could be, since what is was a past potentiality—a could be. The appeal to the sentimentality, morality, the moral abstraction/distraction of equality—both as a political command and its anthropological requisite—complicate the most obvious consequence of anti-Black racism, namely violence. This moral apriorism urges the Black thinker to conceptualize racism as an activist project rooted in the potential of a world filled with non-racists, a world where the white racist is transformed by Black activity into the white anti-racist.  But this project supposes an erroneous view of the white racist which occludes the reality of white supremacy and anti-Black racism. As Robert F. Williams argues in Negroes with Guns, “the racist is a man crazed by hysteria at the idea of coming into equal contact with Negroes. And this mass mental illness called racism is very much a part of the ‘American way of Life.’” The white racist is not seen as the delusional individual ostracized from society as a result of their abhorrent social pathologies of racist hate. Rather the white racist is normal—the extended family, the spouse, the sibling, the friend of the white individual—the very same entities upon which the inter/intrasubjectivity nexus of the white self is founded. The white he experiences no punishment for his longing for Black servitude and his need to exploit and divest the Black worker here and then of his wealth. The white she has no uneasiness about her raping of—the destruction of generations of Black selves—mothers, children, and men—and today usurps the historical imagery of “the nigger,” to politically vacate Blackness and demonize niggers as beyond political consideration. She rewrites history, pens morality, and embodies the post-racial civil rights subject. As such, racism, the milieu of the white racist is not the exposed pathological existence of the white race, but rather valorized in white individuality, the individuality that conceptualizes their racism as a normative aspiration of what the world should look like, and even more damning, an aspiration that can be supported and propagated in the world. The white racist recognizes the deliberateness of the structures, relations, and systems in a white supremacist society and seeks like their colonial foreparents to claim them as their own. 

The alternative is anti ethics –a rupture of ideal theory, western conceptions of man and moral abstraction.  Curry 13

Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013.  NS

Anti-ethics; the call to demystify the present concept of man as illusion, as delusion, and as stratagem, is the axiomatic rupture of white existence and the multiple global oppressions like capitalism, militarism, genocide, and globalization, that formed the evaluative nexus which allows whites to claim they are the civilized guardians of the world’s darker races. It is the rejection of white virtue, the white’s axiomatic claim to humanity that allows the Black, the darker world to sow the seeds of consciousness towards liberation from oppression. When white (in)humanity is no longer an obstacle weighed against the means for liberation from racism, the oppressed are free to overthrow the principles that suggest their paths to liberation are immoral and hence not possible. To accept the oppressor as is, the white made manifest in empire, is to transform white western (hu)man from semi-deitous sovereign citizen to contingent, mortal, and un-otherable. Exposing the inhumanity of white humanity is the destruction/refusal of the disciplinary imperative for liberal reformism and dialogue as well as a rejection of the social conventions that dictate speaking as if this white person, the white person and her white people before you are in fact not racist white people, but tolerable—not like the racist white people abstracted from reality, but really spoken of in conversations about racism. The revelatory call, the coercively silenced but intuitive yearning to describe the actual reality set before Black people in an anti-Black society, is to simply say there is no negotiating the boundaries of anti-Blackness or the horizons of white supremacy. Racism, the debasement of melaninated bodies and nigger-souls, is totalizing. 

This is a prior question:

1. Their args beg the question of who gets access to philosophical principles – they’re not relevant if marginalized groups are excluded from using them

2. Standpoint epistemology of the oppressed is key to assessing their truth claims.  Mills 05

Edited for ableist language
Charles Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005.  NS

The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading. Think of the original challenge Marxist models of capitalism posed to liberalism’s social ontology: the claim that to focus on relations of aparently equal exchange, free and fair, among equal individuals was illusory, since at the level of the relations of production, the real ontology of worker and capitalist manifested a deep structure of constraint that limited proletarian freedom. Think of the innovation of using patriarchy to force people to recognize, and condemn as political and oppressive, rather than natural, apolitical, and unproblematic, male domination of women. Think of the recent resurrection of the concept of white supremacy to map the reality of a white domination that has continued in more subtle forms past the ending of de jure segregation. These are all global, high-level concepts, undeniable abstractions. But they map accurately (at least arguably) crucial realities that differentiate the statuses of the human beings within the systems they describe; so while they abstract, they do not idealize. Or consider conceptual innovation at the more local level: the challenge to the traditional way the public/private distinction was drawn, the concept of sexual harassment. In the first case, a seemingly neutral and innocuous conceptual divide turned out, once it was viewed from the perspective of gender subordination, as contributing to the reproduction of the gender system by its relegation of “women’s issues” to a seemingly apolitical and naturalized space. In the case of sexual harassment, a familiar reality—a staple of cartoons in men’s magazines for years (bosses chasing secretaries around the desk and so on)—was reconceptualized as negative (not something funny, but something morally wrong) and a contributor to making the workplace hostile for women. These realizations, these recognitions, did not spontaneously crystallize out of nowhere; they required conceptual labor, a different map of social reality, a valorization of the distinctive experience of women. As a result of having these concepts as visual aids, we can now see better: our perceptions are no longer ignorant blinded to realities to which we were previously obtuse. In some sense, an ideal observer should have been able to see them—yet they did not, as shown by the nonappearance of these realities in male-dominated philosophical literature.

Tournament: Alta | Round: 1 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
Shell
Generic
Capitalism is at a crisis point – Trump in the white house has put American society on a collision course and the political has already been ceded to the far right. The only solution is an unflinching critique of neoliberalism. Hedges 11/11
Chris Hedges Chris Hedges, whose column is published weekly on Truthdig, has written 11 books, including the New York Times best seller “Days of Destruction 11/11/16 It’s Worse Than You Think http://www.truthdig.com/report/page2/its_worse_than_you_think_20161111

The affirmative’s legalistic approach to police violence brings us further away from recognizing the economic forces at work that makes police violence inevitable. Lane 7/21.
ALYCEE LANE JULY 21, 2016 “Violence, Death and Our Neoliberal Police”  http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/07/21/violence-death-and-our-neoliberal-police/

Blaming violence on ‘bad individual’s through civil suits replicates neoliberalism – it deflects blame on to individuals whose actions are predetermined by neoliberalism. Smith 15
Robert C. Smith The author of several books and over 100 academic articles, Robert is a Teaching-Scholar at the Cooperative Institute of Transnational Studies. He is also the founder of Heathwood Institute and PressHeathwood Institute and Press¶ AN INSTITUTION OF OPPRESSION OR FOR PUBLIC WELL-BEING AND CIVIL RIGHTS? REFLECTIONS ON THE INSTITUTION OF POLICE AND A RADICAL ALTERNATIVE May 4, 2015¶  http://www.heathwoodpress.com/an-institution-of-oppression-or-for-public-well-being-and-civil-rights-reflections-on-the-institution-of-police-and-a-radical-alternative-r-c-smith/

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)

The alternative is an embrace of class-consciousness as a method of critiquing neoliberalism’s grip on policing. LaVenia 15
Peter A. LaVenia PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, SUNY. He is the Secretary of the NY State Green Party and manages Matt Funiciello’s campaign for Congress. JANUARY 16, 2015 “Police Behavior and Neoliberalism” http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/01/16/police-behavior-and-neoliberalism/

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. 

First, neoliberalism sustains itself by operating by propagating a narrow lens of what it means to be ‘political.’ We situate the judge as a critical educator who steps back to evaluate the frames through which we view policy first. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file

Tournament: Damus | Round: 1 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
CP

Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)

The CP Solves the Case 

Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as  *906  Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work.
Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization.
Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched.
The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized?
For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing  *907  programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325
2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
First, even a highly effective LOPRB providing quality policy recommendations to a police department would likely encounter some department resistance to the civilian oversight. This resistance may be created because of police department views of a civilian entity "meddling" or just the potential perception of an adversarial relationship between the *1058 LOPRB and police department. n207 However, the structure of LOPRBs help overcome most of this resistance traditionally leveled against civilian oversight from police departments. The emphasis on policy review, rather than complaint review, means that LOPRBs will not directly regulate individual police officers but rather the department as a whole. This change in focus will likely reduce the intensity of any police department resistance because the potential adversarial relationship will be between the LOPRB and the police department instead of individual officers. n208 Furthermore, any resistance can be ameliorated by public pressure on police departments to enact the LOPRB's policy recommendations. The LOPRB's outreach will inform the local community of the use of data-collection technologies, potentially generating popular support behind LOPRB recommendations. LOPRBs can thus indirectly enforce their recommendations through utilizing that popular support and pressure on police departments. That indirect pressure on police departments will help reduce potential police department resistance because policy changes brought about through public pressure will be a reaction by the police department to the public at large, rather than directly reacting to the adversarial LOPRB. Thus, while police department resistance likely cannot be completely overcome, LOPRBs can ameliorate this traditional civilian oversight problem.
3. The CRB doesn’t have to work- it creates a deterrent effect
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
3. Individual Deterrence and Systemic Correction. - Finally, civilian oversight has some meaningful deterrence on individual actors while also providing a functioning mechanism to address local systemic issues. n163 Individual police officers are more likely to undertake regulation of their own behavior when the officer knows that they are being watched by an oversight body. n164 External civilian oversight can ensure greater accountability not only among rank-and-file officers, but also among command officers, and can also address systemic issues facing dys-functional departments. n165 Approximately two-thirds of civilian oversight entities undertake policy review in addition to complaint review, n166 allowing civilian oversight bodies to review general policies and advocate for systemic reform. n167 Samuel Walker, a scholar whose work focuses on police accountability, emphasized that successful civilian oversight bodies "take a proactive view of their role and actively seek out the underlying causes of police misconduct or problems in the complaint process." n168 If civilian oversight mechanisms continually provide policy recommendations to police departments, those recommendations as a whole can have a significant effect on police misconduct, while at the same time making the police department more "accustomed to input from outsiders." n169 Civilian oversight thus can have a transformative impact on entire police departments rather than only correcting the actions of a singular officer.

4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61

DA

The new generation LGBTQ movement is working with community-based solutions, moving away from the flare of courts. Lazare ‘10/13
Sarah Lazare is a staff writer for AlterNet, A former staff writer for Common Dreams. “Meet 5 Movement Leaders Across the U.S. Fighting for LGTBQ Issues on the Ground.” Alternet. October 13, 2016. http://www.alternet.org/lgbtq/meet-5-movement-leaders-across-us-fighting-lgtbq-issues-ground JJN
"We've gotten dragged into a national conversation where same-sex marriage is held up as the pinnacle of the LGBTQ struggle, but there are so many other things our communities struggle around, issues that have to do with life and death,” Paulina Helm-Hernandez, the co-director of the queer liberation group Southerners on New Ground (SONG), told AlterNet. “We’re dealing with issues like criminalization, health care access and core safety. We’re thinking about ways our people know a lot about violence and how to survive." Helm-Hernandez is one of countless movement leaders in rural communities and urban centers across the country bringing a queer lens to racial, social and economic justice activism. LGBTQ organizers are at the helm of the Movement for Black Lives, calling for an end to extrajudicial police killings, and on the frontlines of native resistance at Standing Rock, where indigenous earth defenders have erected a "two-spirit camp," for gay and lesbian indigenous people. They are demanding an stop to deportations and mass incarceration and devising concrete, community-safety alternatives to calling the police. While fending off the racist incitement of the 2016 election cycle, LGBTQ organizers are also going on the offensive, preparing to mobilize for demilitarization at home and abroad no matter who wins in November. AlterNet spoke with five U.S.-based organizers whose political and cultural work shows that LGBTQ movements go far beyond marriage equality, and are shaping the social movements that define our times. 1. Kym Anthoni, New Orleans “Second lining is very big in New Orleans culture,” said Anthoni, an organizer with the youth-led LGBTQ organization BreakOUT. “After someone passes away, people will do a dance celebrating resilience. Every year around the anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, we do a second line for the people who died to celebrate resilience, strength and moving forward.” “When a transgender woman has been killed, or you’ve gone through a bunch of bullshit, we embody the culture of second line, recognizing that we have a lot of pain and embracing resilience, saying let’s let go of the harsh shit that you’ve been through and celebrate the fact that you made it,” Anthoni continued. “Last year for the Trans March of resilience, we had a whole second line. We were uplifting the voices that are normally not uplifted in our culture.” New Orleans has been hit hard in recent years by a wave of killings targeting transgender women of color. Among them was BreakOUT community member Penny Proud, a 21-year-old black transgender woman murdered in 2015. This summer, the organization released a statement reading, “It is with heavy hearts that we share the news that another young, black trans/gender non-conforming person, Devin Diamond, has been murdered in New Orleans, just a few weeks after 24-year-old Erica ‘E’ Davis was shot in the Treme neighborhood on her way to work.” Key to BreakOUT’s organizing is the principle that “we deserve to walk down the street and not be attacked, we deserve to not be criminalized,” said Anthoni. This demand is aimed at curbing vigilante violence as well as law enforcement brutality. The organization’s first campaign was called We Deserve Better and took on rampant abuse by the New Orleans Police Department. According to a report released in 2014 by BreakOUT, police abuse is widespread. The survey found that “75 percent of people of color respondents feel they have been targeted by police for their sexual orientation or gender identity or gender expression compared with 24 percent of white respondents.” In addition, the report states that “43 percent of people of color respondents have been asked for a sexual favor by police compared with 11 percent of white respondents.” Anthoni emphasized that it is important for the broader public to understand that police brutality is also an LGBTQ issue. “Police always target trans women of color just for being trans,” Anthoni said. “They over-eroticize transgender bodies. The queer and transgender youth of color are most targeted by law enforcement. It’s a huge issue because it takes your power away, it makes you feel vulnerable. Our vulnerability can sometimes cost us our lives.” In addition to organizing, political education and youth work in local high schools, Anthoni said, “The main core of what we do is heart healing justice work. We focus on finding ways to heal as a community.”

B. Links- 

Court civil rights victories act as fly paper drawing other social movements into the court to focus on litigation strategies
Rosenberg 8 (Gerald N., University of Chicago political science and law professor, Ph.D. from Yale University, member of the Washington, D.C. bar, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?, p. 427)
If this is the case, then there is another important way in which courts affect social change. It is, to put it simply, that courts act as “fly-paper” for social reformers who succumb to the “lure of litigation.” If the constraints of the Constrained Court view are correct, then courts can seldom produce significant social reform. Yet if groups advocating such reform continue to look to the courts for aid, and spend precious resources in litigation, then the courts also limit change by deflecting claims from substantive political battles, where success is possible, to harmless legal ones where it is not. Even when major cases are won, the achievement is often more symbolic that real. Thus, courts may serve an ideological function of luring movements for social reform to an institution that is structurally constrained from serving their needs, providing only an illusion of change.
2. This is specifically true for LGBTQ movements
Jane S. Schacter* James E. and Ruth B. Doyle-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School; Edwin A. Heafey, Jr. Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, 2005-2006; A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1980; J.D., Harvard University, 1984. Drake Law Review Summer 06
There is an emerging view of the role of courts in the sexual orientation domain that echoes Professor Gerald Rosenberg's landmark book, The Hollow hope. n9 This view is distinctly skeptical about the prospects of courts accomplishing much reform in the area of gay rights. n10 *863 It should not be confused with normative critiques of "activist courts" made by those who object to same-sex marriage or other gay rights. n11 The skepticism inspired by The Hollow hope is empirical in nature and often made by those evincing no particular hostility to gay rights. n12 The thinking goes roughly like this: courts cannot produce significant change, only legislatures can. Legislators, who are politically accountable, will act in ways that are consistent with public opinion. By contrast, courts may get out too far in front of public opinion and, when they do, backlash is sure to follow. Against this background, count my Essay as a plea for caution and context. The question whether courts can, or do, produce social change on sexual orientation issues is a question that is, on closer analysis, too crude to be all that useful. I will suggest that rather than staking out broad claims or pursuing unbroken causal arrows, scholars ought to bring into focus the variability, contingency, and complexity that presents itself as we try to map the relationship between courts and social change in the area of gay rights. True, any romanticized picture of judges as countermajoritarian revolutionaries, single-handedly making public policy more progressive, is empirically unsustainable. But we should not replace one piece of mythology with another. The notion that the institutional properties of courts disable them from ever driving social change in a significant way has its own caricatured qualities.

C. Internal Link- Courts Wreck movements

Judicial review produces divide and conquer
Becker 93 (Mary, Prof of Law @ University of Chicago Law School; 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 975 ln)
Binding judicial review can impede political movements even when the Supreme Court does not actually block success. The relegation of high matters, such as sexual equality, to the courts saps political movements of their strength, particularly after ineffective victories. 76 At the same time, judicial review can mobilize the opposition, and the Court itself will be influenced by the resulting political climate, a climate it has helped create. When ineffective judicial victories weaken a movement, there may be less grass-roots pressure for change. Yet, real change in the relationship between the sexes is unlikely without change at the grass-roots level. Decisions from on high are unlikely to transform intimate relationships. Judicial victories protecting one or some outsider groups, but not all such groups, also interfere with the development of effective coalitions. This may be most harmful to the most vulnerable groups, such as lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. Real or perceived judicial protection of less marginal groups, such as straight women or racial minorities, may mean that these groups are less likely to form effective coalitions with the more marginal groups. Judicial review is, therefore, a "divide and conquer" strategy.
2. Perceived victories cause mass movement deflation
Rosenberg 8 (Gerald N., University of Chicago political science and law professor, Ph.D. from Yale University, member of the Washington, D.C. bar, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, p. 422-423)
In contrast to this conclusion, it might be suggested that throughout this book I have asked too much of courts.  After all, in all the cases examined, court decisions produced some change, however small.  Given that political action appeared impossible in many instances, such as with civil rights in the 1950s, same-sex marriage in the 1990s, and reform of the criminal justice system more generally, isn’t some positive change better than none?  In a world of unlimited resources, this would be the case.  In the world in which those seeking significant social reform live, however, strategic choices have costs, and a strategy that produces little or not change and induces backlash drains resources that could be more effectively employed in other strategies.  In addition, vindication of constitutional principles accompanied by small change may be mistaken for widespread significant social reform, inducing reformers to relax their efforts.

Tournament: Damus | Round: 4 | Opponent: XX | Judge: XX
Plan

Counterplan Text: We advocate the entirety of the aff plan without the use of the words “structural violence”.

The counterplan is inherently competitive. Since we defend the entirety of the aff advocacy aside from a change in certain rhetoric a perm would be severance out of both the reps and the language of the 1AC.   

Definition

They misunderstand the meaning of the term “structural violence”. It is a specific term of art used in the sociological field of peace research that has been widely discredited by both critics and the terms creator.  

Structural violence” is a term coined by Johan Galtung, it refers to violence where no single decision maker is responsible- like poverty which results from the global economy. Gatlung 12
Galtung Institute 12
(https://www.galtung-institut.de/en/network/groups/anything-galtung/forum/topic/understanding-galtungs-violence-triangle-and-structural-violence/)

Theories of structural violence explore how political, economic and cultural structures result in the occurrence of avoidable violence, most commonly seen as the deprivation of basic human needs (will be discussed later). Structural theorists attempt to link personal suffering with political, social and cultural choices. Johan Galtung’s original definition included a lack of human agency; that is the violence is not a direct act of any decision or action made by a particular person but a result of an unequal distribution of resources.Here, we must also understand “institutional violence”. “Institutional violence” is often mistaken for structural violence, but this is not the case. “Institutional violence” should be used to refer to violence perpetrated by institutions like companies, universities, corporations, organisations as opposed to individuals. The fact that women are paid less at an establishment than men is an act of direct violence by that specific establishment. It is true that there is a relationship with structural violence as there is between interpersonal violence and structural violence. And Structural violence is the most problematic area to be addressed for conflict transformation.

Net Benefits
Reliance on the vague concept of “structural violence” recreates oppression.  
Subpoint A: Theories of “structural violence” distract solutions to material conditions in favor of vague criticism of poorly defined systems. Existing structures will co-opt your criticism and the process trades off with more effective reforms.
1.Structural violence obscures analysis necessary to reduce poverty and violence- this card is on fire. Boulding 77
Kenneth Boulding, Prof Univ. of Michigan and UC Boulder,  Journal of Peace Research 1977; 14; 75 p.  Boulding p.   83-4

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of ’structural violence’ and ’positive peace’. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is ’like’ a thug beating up the victim and taking his money away from him in the street, -or it is ’like’ a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modem world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galtung’s metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a ’threshold’ phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent ’breaks’ in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the ’strain’ on a system is too great for its ‘strength’. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficulty to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is the increase in the strength of the system, the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these things, which enable a system to stand Increasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflict of interest are only part of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people to know their interests, and misperceptions of interests take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people’s behavior, not the ’real’ interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined by one unkind commentator as anything that Galltung doesn’t like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, an that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all the problems off poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to the structures which, produce violence. This is not to say  that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are culture of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics of poverty and the success or failure to rise out off ’it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a ’service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

2. Galtung’s theory of structural violence perpetuates the status quo of dominant states by offering an overly vague criticism of oppression. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

In the late 1960's Galtung's foundational model of peace research was subjected to considerable criticism as part of a general upheaval within the peace research community. A group of young, mostly Scandinavian, radicals employed a neo-Marxist perspective to attack the assumptions of symmetry and ideological neutrality that formed the core of Galtung's argument (Schmid 1968, 1970; Olsen and Jarvad 1969; Eckhardt 1971; Dencik 1982). Though their primary target was American conflict research and its contribution to the analysis of the Vietnam War, they questioned also Galtung's assumption that the path to peace lay in the principles of integration and cooperation. For the radicals, Galtung's approach neglected the political-economy of relations between the developed and underdeveloped worlds and in its attempt to preserve a sym- metrical approach to violent conflict was guilty of 'idealistic universal- ism'. From the perspective of the oppressed, an argument for the further integration of the international system was tantamount to defending a status quo which reflected the interests of the dominant states and the beneficiaries of the world capitalist economy. Against this, the radicals called for a peace research that openly sided with the exploited and advocated the 'sharpening' of the various latent conflicts of interests that characterised global politics.

3. Resolving “structural violence” requires action by international powers, as they are the only bodies capable of amending existing “structures”. This reliance on current institutions preserves existing structures of dominance. Schmid 68
Peace Research and Politics; Herman Schmid; Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 217-232; 1968; Sage Publications; http://www.jstor.org/stable/423274

Peace research is an applied or 'oriented' science. An applied science has to be applied by somebody who has the power to apply it. In the case of peace research, this means there must be some kind of institutionalized link between peace re- searchers and decision-makers on the supranational level. Thus, the universalist ethos of peace research becomes operationalized into identification with the interests of the existing international system, that is the interests of those who have power 229 in the international system. So peace research becomes a factor supporting the status quo of the international power structure, providing the decision-makers of the system with knowledge for control, manipulation and integration of the system. That is the institutional aspect of peace research. The theoretical frame of reference dominating peace research closely cor- responds to the institutional needs: the peace researcher/specialist is trained in an ideology of internationalism; he has learned how to solve conflicts, how to integrate a system, how to avoid manifest organized violence, how to prevent major uprisings against the system; and he believes that what is good for the system is in the long run also good for its elements. His concept of peace is essentially a negative one, stressing the need for stable peace,38 and the 'common interest' he will have to fall back on is the avoidance of catastrophe. His positive concept of peace is not sui generis but a negation of his negative peace concept. The essence of peace research is concentrated in the concepts of control of the international sys- tem to prevent major breakdowns, and integration of the international system to make it more stable. That is the ideological aspect of peace research. The institutional and the ideological aspects presuppose and condition each other. To become applied, peace research must meet the needs of the decision- makers. To satisfy their concern about stable peace, peace researchers must ally themselves with the decision-makers of the international system. Given this situation, change of the system can not be advocated by peace research. Structural change would be a threat to the power-holders of the international system. Only adaptive change within the system is possible.

4. Theories of structural violence offer a one-sided mechanism of achieving equality in which instead of aiding the poor we focus primarily on bringing down the rich, resulting in a system that is technically equal but objectively destitute. Boulding 77
Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung; Kenneth E. Boulding; Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86; Sage Publications, Ltd; http://www.jstor.org/stable/423312

Because of his passion for equality, his hatred of hierarchy, dominance, top dogs, and anything which looks like oppression (much of which is praiseworthy), Galtung identifies entropy as a symbol of goodness and regards negentropy, that is, structure, improbability, and potential, as evil. Galt- ung is all for the increase of social entropy so far as that means destruction of organi- zation and hierarchy, the dissipation of wealth, 'and the reduction of everything to a dead level. It would almost seem as if Galtung would regard the last ultimate whimper of the universe, according to the second law of thermodynamics, in which all things are at an equal temperature and equally distributed throughout space so that nothing more can 'conceivably happen, as the ultimate heaven, or perhaps one should say Nirvana, towards which all this uncom- fortable and unequal structure of stars and planets, life and society, will eventually move. Here we see the profound difference be- tween the structural and the evolutionary points of view. The structural point of view turns out to be inimical to the ideal of struc- ture itself, and sees structure as the enemy of equality - which it is. The evolutionary point of view sees the whole evolutionary process as the segregation of entropy, the building up of little castles of order in the crystal, in DNA, in life, in humans, and in their innumerable artifacts both personal, material and organizational, always at the cost, according to the second law, of increas- ing thermodynamic disorder elsewhere, in our case of course nicely segregated in the sun about which we don't have to worry. The structuralist sees pollution in the struc- ture whether it is smoke, slums or vice and says 'away with it. The evolutionist sees pollution as part of the price of evolution itself. Gal'tung's misunderstandings about entro- py derive, one suspects, from the cardinal principle of his normative system, the over- whelmingly strong value which he gives to equality as such. One almost suspect's that Galtung would prefer a society in which everybody were equally destitute rather than one in which some were destitute and 'some were rich. A passion for equality as such, however, can easily lead into the hatred of the rich without any love for the poor. One can put a very strong negative value on poverty and believe it should be abolished wi'thout believing in equality at all. This would lead to a society with a floor below which nobody were allowed to fall, but above which a high degree of inequality would be tolerable. Galtung nowhere spells out what his ideal society would be, and in- deed if any of us did this we would probably decide that we did not like it af'ter all! But the drive for equality as such is extremely strong in all his writings.

Subpoint B: Attempts to resolve “structural violence” inevitably result in the perpetuation of physical violence that shuts off democratic channels for minority representation. 

1. The concept of structural violence shuts down democratic debate and justifies violent lash outs to combat inequality. Maley 98
   William Maley,  Professor and Director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at The Australian National University , Australian Journal of International Affairs 42, 1988

The deployment of a notion of positive peace has been a far from innocuous development in peace research. A comprehensive theory of needs, where needs are not defined simply as necessary means to an agreed end, can be the basis for a suppression of both democratic and liberal aspirations. Democracy and Liberty are both concerned with personal desires, the former in the sphere of the polity, and the latter in the sphere of the individual. Needs theory subjugates both the individual and the polity to the abstract ideology of the needs theorist. When Maxim Litvinov remarked in Geneva in the 1930s that peace is indivisible, he was referring to the negative sense of the term. 'Negative peace' is one of the few social values in whose name crimes can be committed only at the cost of self-contradiction. However, if 'negative peace' must be associated with 'positive peace' to give rise to peace in totality, then peace is no longer indivisible —since direct violence may be defended as a means of eliminating `structural violence'. This defence is a familiar one, resembling the classic liberal justification for rebellion, and even in certain circumstances intervention. Christian Bay has argued that structural violence `may be so extreme that a limited war must be deemed a lesser evil, if there is no other way to end or mitigate the structural violence, and if the war is sure to remain limited and brief in duration.'" This blithe assumption — that there could ever be circumstances in which one could be absolutely sure that a war would remain limited and brief in duration — is a splendid illustration of Bay's detachment from the real world. Nonetheless, the greatest danger in his claim stems from the extraordinary elasticity of the notion of structural violence. This is best brought out by the Danish peace researcher Lars Dencik, although using slightly different terminology. He defines conflicts as `incompatible interests', and goes on to remark that 'incompatible interests are here defined objectively, i.e. by the observing scientist according to his theory and is sic independent of the actual subjective consciousness of the actors involved. This means that incompatible interests are conceived of as structural (actor indepen-dent), the structure defined according to the theory of the scientist.'" He draws the predictable conclusion that 'in certain situations "revolutionary violence" may be the necessary means to obtain conflict resolution proper'." This is irresistibly reminiscent of the conclusion of Georges Sorel's Reflections on Violence, that it is `to violence that Socialism owes those high ethical values by means of which it brings salvation to the modern world'20, and it is instructive, though for peace educators perhaps not very comforting, to recall that Sorel's ideas eventually were used in justification of Italian Fascism." (p. 30)

2. Democratic deliberation is key to avoid massive violence. Halperin 11
(Morton H., Senior Advisor – Open Society Institute and Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress, “Unconventional Wisdom – Democracy is Still Worth Fighting For”, Foreign Policy, January / February, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional_wisdom?page=0,11)

As the United States struggles to wind down two wars and recover from a humbling financial crisis, realism is enjoying a renaissance. Afghanistan and Iraq bear scant resemblance to the democracies we were promised. The Treasury is broke. And America has a president, Barack Obama, who once compared his foreign-policy philosophy to the realism of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr: "There's serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain," Obama said during his 2008 campaign. "And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things." But one can take such words of wisdom to the extreme-as realists like former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and writer Robert Kaplan sometimes do, arguing that the United States can't afford the risks inherent in supporting democracy and human rights around the world. Others, such as cultural historian Jacques Barzun, go even further, saying that America can't export democracy at all, "because it is not an ideology but a wayward historical development." Taken too far, such realist absolutism can be just as dangerous, and wrong, as neoconservative hubris. For there is one thing the neocons get right: As I argue in The Democracy Advantage, democratic governments are more likely than autocratic regimes to engage in conduct that advances U.S. interests and avoids situations that pose a threat to peace and security. Democratic states are more likely to develop and to avoid famines and economic collapse. They are also less likely to become failed states or suffer a civil war. Democratic states are also more likely to cooperate in dealing with security issues, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the bloody aftermath of the Iraq invasion painfully shows, democracy cannot be imposed from the outside by force or coercion. It must come from the people of a nation working to get on the path of democracy and then adopting the policies necessary to remain on that path. But we should be careful about overlearning the lessons of Iraq. In fact, the outside world can make an enormous difference in whether such efforts succeed. There are numerous examples-starting with Spain and Portugal and spreading to Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia-in which the struggle to establish democracy and advance human rights received critical support from multilateral bodies, including the United Nations, as well as from regional organizations, democratic governments, and private groups. It is very much in America's interest to provide such assistance now to new democracies, such as Indonesia, Liberia, and Nepal, and to stand with those advocating democracy in countries such as Belarus, Burma, and China. It will still be true that the United States will sometimes need to work with a nondemocratic regime to secure an immediate objective, such as use of a military base to support the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, or in the case of Russia, to sign an arms-control treaty. None of that, however, should come at the expense of speaking out in support of those struggling for their rights. Nor should we doubt that America would be more secure if they succeed.

3. Combatting “structural violence” justifies reactionary violence against a system that is poorly defined. This makes conflict inevitable and trades-off with peaceful reform. Quester
George H. Quester is chair of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, ANNALS, AAPSS, 504, July 1989
A third major problem to be raised about some forms of peace research and peace studies, again related to what we have al- ready discussed, arises in the tendency to define peace as much more than an absence of the organized violence of warfare, to define it indeed as the elimination also of poverty and injustice and of prejudice and tyranny, and so on-namely, to define peace simply as a synonym for what is good, for what an economist would call utility. Sometimes we are thus told that an op- position to violence must include an oppo- sition to "structural violence,"7 with the latter phrase presumably meaning any or- ganizational or power relationships that vi- olate the moral standards of the beholder, or we are also told that we must be in favor of "positive peace," which will include all of these good things, accomplished some- how simultaneously, rather than being con- tent with a "negative peace," limited merely to an absence of warfare. Surely there is a great deal that is lost from all of these definitional innovations, but what is there to be gained? If someone assumed, as noted previously, that con- sciousnesses somehow have to be raised, then it may well seem important. as an educational and motivational vehicle, to insist that peace includes an end to poverty or racism. If one assumes that there can never be an avoidance of war unless one simultaneously has an avoidance of pov-erty or racism or other social evils, then this causal link will also suggest a definitional link. But, if there is indeed no such one-to- one link in causal relationships and if mo- tivation is not the entirety of the problem of war and peace, then we surely will have thrown away a great deal of clarity if we insist on calling everything bad "war" or "violence" and if we insist on referring to everything we favor as "peace." This would be a little like telling the American Cancer Society that every disease now has to be referred to as "cancer," including heart disease and cholera and meningitis. Can medicine make any progress at all if it is not allowed to use different words for different ailments? Is it really true that to use different words for war and dictator- ship and poverty is to weaken our motiva- tion or to accept the inevitability of some evils or actually to favor the existence of such evils? If one goes far enough in accepting the definitional innovations produced by some peace studies curricula, it becomes possi- ble then to define violent attacks as peace- ful, as long as they are intended to eliminate racism or injustice, because these attacks are to oppose "structural violence." At the worst, this kind of redefinition is deliberately misleading, as war and vio- lence are defined as being inappropriate for any cause except one's own. At a less du- plicitous level, we simply have some need- less confusion brought into the process, by some relatively honest and well-meaning people.

Subpoint C: The term “structural violence” is insufficient for diagnosing the reality of oppression. It is not a method for liberation, just an ivory tower theory. 

1. The term “structural violence” is incredibly vague. It can refer to any form of exploitation. Leech 12
   Galtung’s ‘Structural Violence’ and the Sierra Leone Civil War c.1985-1992; Dr. Philip JM Leech lecturer in International Relations at Plymouth University where he teaches International Relations of the Middle East; October 12, 2012;
   https://whereshouldthebirdsfly.wordpress.com/2012/10/12/galtungs-structural-violence-and-the-sierra-leone-civil-war-c-1985-1992/

The critical element or link in the chain of this ‘causal flow’ (200 Galtung, 1996) is structural violence. It is the process that links cultural distinction to Direct Violence. Structural violence is an ostensive label that may be applied to a broad range of phenomena. What Galtung notes as definitive is that Structural violence is the process of deprivation of needs. Each part of the violence equation depends on the existence of the other two before the violent conflict become truly serious and sustained  (197-200 Galtung, 1996). It need not be consistent or radical . Simply put, it is violence embodied by a structure, or violence that ‘operates regardless of intent’ (93 Galtung, 1996). It is characterized politically as repression, and economically by exploitation. However, Galtung notes that ‘blunt repression/exploitation is necessary but not sufficient’ (93 Galtung, 1996). In fact the nature of structural violence is somewhat vague in that it allows the quantity and the qualitative nature of aggression and dominance to be variable (201 Galtung, 1996).

2. John Galtung, the creator of the concept of “structural violence”, admitted that his theory couldn’t be applied objectively. We cannot even assess what “structural violence” is. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

For Galtung sociology was undoubtedly a science. In contrast to the formal sciences of logic and mathematics, sociology was a 'factual' science, which in terms of scientific rigour occupied a middle position between physics and the 'humanistic sciences' (Galtung 1958d, p.88). His account of the virtues of applying science to the study of the social world was, nonetheless, ambiguous. Galtung (1958d) recognised that the object-domain of the social sciences made the application of scientific method difficult and perhaps impossible if overly high standards were applied. Consequently he argued that the primary purpose of social science was to generate descriptive empirical statements which would have to be sub-jected to some form of testing procedure (1958b). Theory-building could follow but was not essential to the claim for scientific status (Galtung1959b, p. 10). Galtung also admitted that significant problems existed regarding the scientific assessment of theoretical statements about the social world, but in a manner characteristic of his subsequent work appealed to the future development of suitable analytical tools. Though his discussion of the question of value-freedom was often ambiguous in his early sociological papers, Galtung informed his stu-dents that value-statements were not testable and therefore unscientific(1958d, p.92). Though Galtung recognised that values impinged upon the conduct of social science in a variety of ways — inter alia, the deter-mination of investigative focus, the exclusion of undesired results and the procurement of financial support — the problem was consistently presented as one of degree and not destructive of a genuinely scientific sociology (1958b).

3. “Structural violence” rejects holding any specific group or class responsible for exploitation in favor of a vacuous criticism of a “system” that it never fully identifies. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

Galtung also rejected the implication of the radical critique that specific groups or social classes were responsible for exploitation. The term 'exploitation' was refused by him on the grounds that it was politically and emotionally overloaded. The continuing influence of his sociological orientation was evident in the preference for offering a definition of violence as an abstract systemic property that can be comprehended without reference to specific historical conjunctures or agents. But Gal- tung's approach also reflected the influence of Gandhi, from whom was taken the view that a distinction should be made between status actions and status holders (1959c, 1980). It is the structure of social interaction within which agents of violence act that is to be attacked, rather than the agents themselves. To attack the agents is to meet one form of violence with another. True dedication to the doctrine of ahimsa required 'the return of good for evil' and a distinction between the doer and the deed (Galtung 1959c; Borman 1986). However Gandhian ethics arose out of a complex matrix of occidental and oriental philosophical principles never fully explicated by even Gandhi himself (Sharma 1965; Borman 1986). Galtung restricted his treatment of Gandhi's thought to the draw- ing out of some practical implications. Though he was to later complain of the failure of his critics to see the imprint of Gandhi on his work, this is hardly surprising since few clues were provided. The fundamental problem with the concept of structural violence was that it was vacuous without a substantiation of the value-system on which it depended. The denial of potentiality by structural violence, presupposed some notion of human potential. As one critic noted, without a clear analysis of the values underpinning it, the concept was reduced to a label to be applied to anything its author did not like (Eide 1971)

4. “Structural violence” cannot explain social changes or the exact origins of violence beyond the fact that it simply exists. Lawler 89
Peter Lawler (1989) A question of values: A critique of Galtung's peace research, Interdisciplinary Peace Research: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 1:2, 27-55, DOI: 10.1080/14781158908412711 

In his sociological writings Galtung provided no analysis or defence of any specific values, other than to claim that they were empirically held, or to assert that values should be revised in reflection of systemic changes. What was missing was a sense of the politics of social change. Even if consensus could be established as to the direction in which a social system is moving, it is a different matter to evaluate such change. Furth-ermore, how are we to choose between competing and non-commensurable understandings of systemic 'health'? The only answer implicit in Galtung's discussion was that empirical evidence must be produced to show which set of values accorded best with the social system under scrutiny. That brings us back full-circle to the value-contamination of observation and the impact of the political perspective that conditions our analysis of social systems. Functionalism can be wedded to any political ideology, but being a descriptive rather than analytical discourse it cannot provide that ideology. Though aware of the problem of defending values outside of a dis-tinctly normative discourse, Galtung was not apparently perturbed by it. In his discussion of functionalism (1959a) he claimed that there were' fairly inter-subjectively communicable and consensual standards' such as 'sane', 'healthy' or 'normal', against which social systems could be judged. For Galtung, to describe a system as 'healthy' was not a value-judgement, in contrast to the claim that 'healthy is good'. Leaving aside the question as to whether the distinction holds or if 'fairly consensual 'constitutes a scientific category, it became clear that when Galtung turned to peace research the evaluative standard of 'peace' was to be sim-ilarly derived and understood. In its Galtungian mould, peace research was differentiated from earlier forms of normative enquiry into global social relations by the absence of any distinctly normative discourse.

5. Galtung’s theory of structural violence is entirely theoretical. It makes massive leaps in logic and cannot even quantify the violence people suffer. Rummel
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR: VOL. 5: THE JUST PEACE, Chapter 3, Alternative Concepts Of Peace*; R.J. Rummel; https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/TJP.CHAP3.HTM

Structural violence appears, for Galtung, when resources, or especially the power to allocate them, are unevenly distributed: when people are starving and this could be avoided; when life expectancy is much greater in the upper class; when a small elite control the entry into high status. Here, without any prior ethical analysis or normative preparation,110 Galtung makes his first intellectual broad jump from the analytical-empirical plane to the ethical, but in a most cavalier manner: "In order not to overwork the word violence we shall sometimes refer to the condition of structural violence as social injustice."111¶ Then Galtung presents his final two distinctions (dimensions) regarding violence: it may be intended or unintended, or manifest or latent. With these and the other distinctions mentioned, Galtung defines a "typology of violence" in which the personal-structural distinctions are basic. In focusing on the means of personal and structural violence Galtung makes his second broad jump, but now back from the ethical to the analytical-empirical plane--again without analysis and as offhanded: "If we accept that the general formula behind structural violence is inequality, above all in the distribution of power, then this can be measured."112¶ D. His Concept of "Positive Peace." The above serves as an introduction to six factors maintaining inequalitarian distributions--that is, "mechanisms of structural violence"113--which are of no concern here. Nor need we tarry over Galtung's discussion of the relationship between personal and structural violence, and the trade-offs in emphasizing a system that is higher on one than another. But what I should mention is his conclusion on the definition of peace: ¶ E. His Political Theory. Thus, structural violence = unactualized human potentials = social injustice = inequality. Therefore, positive peace = equality = social justice = realized human potentials = absence of structural violence. This equation is stipulated; analysis to support the critical relationships are lacking; and the definitional and substantive problems in the formulation are glaring. One should understand, however, that the critical relationships and definitions are entirely theoretical. Even violence, usually an easily measured empirical concept of physical harm and destruction, is converted into a construct meaning unactualized human potential, then equated in theory with injustice and, thence, equality--each of them constructs.

Counter Interp

Counter interp: the NEG may read one unconditional word pic.

Net benefit is discursive advocacy skills:

Without word pics the NEG can’t test the specific rhetoric of the plan.  That’s the most important impact:

3.  Understanding language is key to everyday life and fighting oppressive structures. Kehl 99

D.G. Kehl and Livingston 99, Howard Livingston, English at Arizona State University and Pace University, July 1999 (English Journal 88.6) 

Second, students’ own linguistic vulnerability should be demonstrated in a meaningful and convincing way. How would they react, for example, if while shopping they encounter “vegetarian leather” for plain, cheap vinyl; or “synthetic glass” for plastic; or, in place of down payment, they get “customer capital cost reduction”? Third, they should be made more sensitive to language and how it works, not just denotation but connotation, concrete versus abstract terms, specific versus general, adjectives as evaluative projections of a speaker or writer, slanted language, and much more. For example, they can be asked to consider how many times in a year they buy something simply on the persuasive appeal of words rather than on the genuine merits of the product, whether that product is sunglasses, clothes, vehicles, or food. Especially illuminating in developing sensitivity to language are exercises that ask students to distinguish differences in connotation among lists of so-called synonyms. For example, which of the following would they like to be called—and why: boy/girl, lad/lassie, kid, young person, youngster, tyke, juvenile, future citizen, Generation X-er, member of the rising generation? Lively discussions can be conducted on the connotative effects of the language of advertising. For example, why are certain words taboo in advertising, requiring the substitution of euphemisms: not “fat” but “full figured,” not “cheap” but “inexpensive,” not “used car” but “preowned automobile,” not “smell” but “aroma.” (A recent example of doublespeak for “stink” is “exceed the olfactory threshold.”) Fourth, students should be taught not only to read critically but also to speak and write responsibility Wasn't’it Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch who noted that a writer should be prepared to stand cross-examination on every word? And as for reading critically, perhaps Thomas Carlyle said it best: “If we think of it, all that a university or final highest school can do for us is still but what the first school began doing—teach us to read.” Isn’t that at least a significant part of the English teacher’s job description? Finally, students should be taught how to “talk back” by disarming and defusing doublespeak through what Judith Butler calls “counter-appropriation” (or what Hugh Rank has called “intensifying” and “downplaying” in his Doublespeak Schema). Recent communication theory offers further direction for discussing doublespeak in the classroom. For example, even a brilliant, well-organized, and illustrated lecture on language manipulation may have limited success (the doublespeaker would call it “counterproductive”). 

Outweighs policy focus since we won’t actually become policy makers, but we do need to know how powerful people manipulate language to fight back every day.

4.  Analyzing dominant social power behind discourse is a pre requisite to solutions – any solutions using bad discourse are doomed to exclude people.  Smith and Bell 07

Phillipa Smith and Alan Bell 07 Philippa Smith is a PhD in discourses in national identity at AUT University in New Zealand, Allan Bell is Allan Bell is Professor of Language and Communication and the Director of the Institute of Culture, Discourse and Communication at Auckland University of Technology, “Unraveling the Web of Discourse Analysis” http://www.aut.ac.nz/resources/research/research_institutes/ccr/sage_proofs_05-devereux-ch-04.pdf

Foucault’s interest in the power play of specific discourses over society has influenced the postmodern connection between language and social structure (Devereux, 2003). This is echoed by Fairclough when referring to discursive practice contributing not just to the reproduction of society (‘social identities, social relationships, systems of knowledge and belief’), but also to the transformation of society (1992: 65). Analysis of texts also enables identification of the representation, identity and stereotyping of groups and individuals. It allows for critical analysis, an awareness of persuasive language, and uncovers dominating social powers behind discourses. Such critical analysis might not solve problems, but it is a prerequisite that has the ability to identify and analyze situations, and perhaps suggest ways of alleviating or resolving them (Fairclough et al., 2004). The New Zealand Government, for example, recognized that promotional texts used by tobacco companies carried tempting lifestyle messages to influence, particularly, young people’s behaviour and their attitudes towards smoking. As a result, tobacco and advertising sponsorships were banned in the 1990s (Health NZ, 2005). A burgeoning of text types in society, largely brought about through developing technologies, compels researchers to seek understanding of social reality through analyzing the discourse of the texts and questioning them. Legal documents, advertisements, political and Government papers, company newsletters, propaganda leaflets, articles in newspapers, magazines, and books, television, radio and film, music and lyrics, performing arts and more recently the Internet, mobile phones, mobile television and computer games: these are just some examples of the proliferation of texts. Added to this are the changing and merging of existing discourses through processes of globalization of discourses and discourse genres (Fairclough, 2001).

5.  To be real policymakers people need to be aware of language – this type of education is most useful.  Woods

Steve Woods, Director of Forensics at Western Washington University, “Changing the Game?: Embracing the Advocacy Standard”, No date given

The world of policy technocrats and public decision makers is bound to strict codes of expectation regarding their public statements about constituencies and members of the public. Racist or gender-insensitive comments would not be tolerated by administrators, especially those who see such comments as public liabilities. In the debate context, making sure that all references or literature introduced into the debate are consistent, and that the in-round rhetoric of the debater in explaining the arguments is consistent with the assumptions of the literature, is a parallel expectation.