Tournament: NA | Round: 1 | Opponent: NA | Judge: NA
Novice CPS AC
Case

In the context of governments like the United States, morality must be based on citizens having the ability to consent to political authority. Otherwise that authority is coercive and illegitimate. Benhabib 94

Seyla Benhabib 94 Eugene Mayer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Yale University, and director of the program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, and a well-known contemporary philosopher, “Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy”, Constellations Volume I, No/, 1994, Published by Blackwell Publishers

I define democratic legitimacy as the belief that the major institutions of a society and the decisions reached by them on behalf of the public are worthy of being obeyed and granted normative recognition. The basis of legitimacy in democratic institutions is to be traced back to the presumption that the instances which claim obligatory power for themselves do so because their decisions represent an impartial standpoint said to be equally in the interests of all. This presumption can only be fulfilled if such decisions are in principle open to appropriate public processes of deliberation.¶ The discourse model of ethics and politics is precisely such a model of practical rationality and deliberative legitimacy. The basic idea behind this model is that only those norms, i.e., general rules of action and institutional arrangements, can be said to be valid which would be agreed to by all those affected by their consequences, if such agreement were reached as a consequence of a process of deliberation which had the following features: a. participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate; b. all have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation; c. all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out. There are no prima facie rules limiting the agenda of the conversation, nor the identity of the participants, as long as each excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question. In certain circumstances this would mean that citizens of a democratic community would have to enter into a practical discourse with non-citizens who may be residing in their countries, at their borders, or in neighboring communities if there are matters which affect them all. Ecology and environmental issues in general are a perfect example of such instances when the boundaries of discourses keep expanding because the consequences of our actions expand and impact increasingly more people.¶ The discourse model of ethics and politics formulates the most general principles and moral intuitions behind the validity claims of a deliberative model of democracy.15 But the procedural specifics of those special¶ argumentation situations called "practical discourses" are not automatically transferrable to a macro-institutional level nor is it necessary that they should be so transferrable. A theory of democracy, as opposed to a general moral theory, would have to be concerned with the question of institutional specifications about practical feasibility. Nonetheless, the procedural constraints of the discourse model can act as test cases for critically evaluating the criteria of membership, the rules for agenda setting, and for the structuring of public discussions within and among institutions.¶ According to the deliberative model, procedures of deliberation generate legitimacy as well as assuring some degree of practical rationality. What are then the claims to practical rationality of deliberative processes? Deliberative processes are essential to the rationality of collective decision- making processes for three reasons. First, as Bernard Manin has observed in an excellent article "On Legitimacy and Deliberation," deliberative processes are also processes which impart information.17 New information is imparted because in the first place no single individual can anticipate and foresee all the variety of perspectives through which matters of ethics and politics would be perceived by different individuals; in the second place, no single individual can possess all the information deemed relevant to a certain decision affecting all.18 Deliberation is a procedure for being informed.

Most importantly, this requires the right to speak freely. Only by securing the right to free speech can the government be democratic. Eberle, Law @ Roger Williams, 94
(Wake Forest LR, Winter)
The Court's decision in R.A.V. reaffirms the preeminence of free speech in our constitutional value structure. n62 Theoretically, free speech is intrinsically valuable as a chief means by which we develop our faculties and control our destinies. n63 Free speech is also of instrumental value in facilitating other worthy ends such as democratic or personal self-government, n64 public and private decisionmaking, n65 and the advancement of knowledge and truth. n66 Ultimately, the value of free speech rests upon a complex set of justifications, as compared to reliance on any single foundation. n67 The majority of the Court in R.A.V. preferred a nonconsequentialist view, finding that speech is valuable as an end itself, independent of any consequences that it might produce. In this view, free speech is an essential part of a just and free society that treats all people as responsible moral agents. Accordingly, people are entrusted with the responsibility of making judgments about the use or abuse of speech. n68 From this vantage point, the majority saw a certain moral equivalency in all speech. Even hate speech merits protection under the First Amendment, because all speech has intrinsic value. This is so because all speech, even hate speech, is a communication to the world, and therefore implicates the speaker's autonomy or self-realization. Additionally, any information might be valuable to a listener who can then decide its importance or how best to use it. Accordingly, any suspicion or evidence of governmental censorship must be vigilantly investigated.

And, we should guarantee a marketplace of ideas, which supersedes other utilitarian grounds to restrict rights. The right to speak out is valuable in itself. Dwyer 01
Susan Dwyer, philosophy at University of Maryland, 2001 (http://www.umbc.edu/philosophy/dwyer/papers/freespeech.html)
Direct Nonconsequentialism Let us return to the central topic: free speech. From the perspective just sketched, the value of a marketplace of ideas – that notion so central to the consequentialist justification of free speech – lies not so much in its long-term all-things-considered good consequences (the avoidance of dogmatism, democracy, truth, etc.) Rather, free speech is seen as a necessary condition for the realization of any human goods. Constraints on inquiry and expression are constraints on humanity itself. Echoing this thought, Nagel (1995) writes: That the expression of what one thinks and feels should be overwhelmingly one's own business, subject to restriction only when clearly necessary to prevent serious harm distinct from the expression itself, is a condition of being an independent thinking being. It is a form of moral recognition that you have a mind of your own: even if you never want to say anything to which others would object, the idea that they could stop you if they did object is in itself a violation of your integrity (96). A simple yet powerful fact both explains why speech is valuable in and of itself and justifies its stringent protection: when speech is threatened, we are threatened. Direct nonconsequentialism stands in stark contrast to consequentialist approaches which, as we have seen, make the value of speech contingent on its effects. And unlike indirect nonconsequentialism, it makes our status as language users, not our autonomy, the ground for limiting the state's attempts to interfere with our liberty. To repeat: direct nonconsequentialism asserts that speech is valuable because linguistic capacities are the expression of the essence of creatures (us) to whom we attribute the highest moral status. The way in which the direct nonconsequentialist makes explicit what is special about speech helps to make sense of a commonly experienced wariness regarding restrictions on speech we hate. We worry equally when the state seeks to prohibit the speech of sexists or Flat-Earthers. The consequentialist thinks this reaction is explained by attributing to us the belief that any state restriction of speech is the thin end of a wedge: we are discomforted by the thought of the muzzled sexist or Flat-Earther because we think our speech may be next. This may well be the right account of human psychology in these matters. But it is hardly an explanation of the prima facie wrongness of restrictions on lunatics' and sexists’ speech. Our discomfort is a moral discomfort. In bringing out the idea that speech is the expression of our essence, the direct nonconsequentialist is able to capture the true nature of our reaction to state restrictions on others' speech we do not particularly care for. Direct nonconsequentialism also gives substance to a powerful idea that some influential critics – notably, Catharine Mackinnon (1987) – find hopelessly abstract. This is the thought that “every time you strengthen free speech in one place, you strengthen it everywhere (164).” And seeing how direct nonconsequentialism does so will help illustrate some of the practical implications of this strategy for justifying free speech. Proponents of legislation designed to restrict or prohibit problematic speech and courts that rule on the constitutionality of such legislation, often reason in terms of how free speech interests are to be balanced with other interests. For example, proponents of speech codes argue that racist speech harms minorities’ interests in social and political equality; and in the United States, the constitutionality of restrictions on ‘fighting words’ is defended in light of the state’s interests in maintaining law and order. These arguments imply that the expressive rights of individual racists and troublemakers may sometimes be infringed in order to promote the good of some collective. But as the history of free speech debates reveal, once we admit that collective interests can trump individual rights, it is extremely difficult consistently to maintain the belief that a right to free speech imposes severe limits on what the state may do. The direct nonconsequentialist justification of free speech avoids this particular difficulty. Recall, we are working within the context of constitutional provisions – that is, we are thinking about rationales for stringent protections of speech, where these are understood as mechanisms for keeping the government out of some aspect of our lives. In this sense, such provisions express rights had by individuals against the state. But the direct nonconsequentialist’s account of the basis of these rights suggests that it is a mistake to think of them as radically individualistic. True, each of us has a right to free speech, but we have that right in virtue of our membership in a collective – the species H. sapiens – where every member has the same right for the same reason. Thus, in stressing that a universal feature of the species – language mastery – grounds protections on speech, the direct nonconsequentialist avoids individualizing the right to free speech in a way that makes it perpetually vulnerable to the assertion of some collective good. If we think of a person’s right to free speech as protecting just one aspect of his liberty among others, we run the risk of obscuring what is morally relevant about speech. The hatemonger and the pornographer each have a right to free speech, but this is not to be understood in terms of their being free to act on contingent desires they have. My occurrent desire to eat ice-cream holds no weight in the big scheme of things; even I would concede that it is permissible for the state to thwart my satisfying this desire, if doing so meant promoting some very important collective good. But speech is different. It is worthy of protection not because people want to say certain things, but (to repeat) because speech expresses our very nature. What someone wants to say is neither here nor there. Thus, in decoupling the value of free speech from individual desires, direct nonconsequentialism gives content to the idea that when we strengthen (protect) free speech in one place, we strengthen (protect) it everywhere.

Therefore, my value criterion is respecting democratic deliberation. This means that the judge should vote for which side best promotes discussion and dialogue at universities. 

Our central thesis for this debate is that universities are a place for learning and that restrictions on free speech limit student dissent and make it an undemocratic environment. Only by allowing free and open discussion can democracy work. 

Updated Advantages
Advantage 1 – Free press
My first contention is about freedom of the press – right now restrictions on free speech are loading up on college campuses. This is a damaging precedent for student newspapers. Schuman 08
(Rebecca, http://www.slate.com/articles/life/education/2016/12/student_journalists_are_under_threat.html)
Well, here’s some great news to cheer you up: The American student press is under siege! Apparently, we’ve been too busy blowing gaskets over professor watch lists and “safe spaces” to recognize the actual biggest threat to free speech on college campuses today. According to a new report by the American Association of University Professors, in conjunction with three other nonpartisan free-speech advocacy organizations, a disquieting trend of administrative censorship of student-run media has been spreading quietly across the country—quietly, of course, because according to the report, those censorship efforts have so far been successful. The report finds that recent headlines out of Mount St. Mary’s University, for example, may be “just the tip of a much larger iceberg.” Indeed, “it has become disturbingly routine for student journalists and their advisers to experience overt hostility that threatens their ability to inform the campus community and, in some instances, imperils their careers or the survival of their publications.” The report chronicles more than 20 previously unreported cases of media advisers “suffering some degree of administrative pressure to control, edit, or censor student journalistic content.” Furthermore, this pressure came “from every segment of higher education and from every institutional type: public and private, four-year and two-year, religious and secular.” It gets worse. In many of the cases in the report, administration officials “threatened retaliation against students and advisers not only for coverage critical of the administration but also for otherwise frivolous coverage that the administrators believed placed the institution in an unflattering light,” including an innocuous listicle of the best places to hook up on campus. In many cases, the student publications were subject to prior review from either an adviser who reported directly to the administration or the administration itself. Prior review means getting what’s in your newspaper signed off on by someone up top before it can be published. It is—to use the parlance of my years of professional journalistic training that began with my time as features editor of the Vassar College Miscellany News in the mid-’90s—absolute bullshit. (At public universities, it’s also illegal.) First, and most obviously, this is because a free student press is a hallmark of the American higher education system, and any threat to that freedom is on its face worrying. But there’s also this: The last thing we need right now, in the creeping shadow of American authoritarianism, is an entire generation of fledgling journalists who’ve come up thinking censorship is acceptable.

This justifies wide spread censorship in a diverse array of cases It’s not just about the press – it’s about the way the administration justifies a choke hold on student activities.  Lukianoff 05
(George, Samantha Harris, Foundation for Individual, Rights in Education, 2005 WL 2736313 (U.S.) (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) Supreme Court of the United States. Margaret L. HOSTY et al., Petitioners, v. Patricia CARTER, Respondent. No. 05-377. October 19, 2005. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Brief Amici Curiae of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education; The Coalition for Student and Academic Rights; Feminists for Free Expression; The First Amendment Project; Ifeminists.Net; National Association of Scholars; Accuracy in Academia; Leadership Institute; The Individual Rights Foundation; The American Council of Trustees and Alumni; and Students for Academic Freedom in Support of Petitioners)
Commentators from across the political spectrum, while often disagreeing on the source, the scale, and the cause of the chilling of free speech on campus, have described the current campus environment as one where the “marketplace of ideas” is under siege.13 Whether in the name of “ tolerance,” *17 risk management, or merely peace and quiet, hundreds (if not thousands) of universities have enacted policies and engaged in practices hostile to free and open discourse over the past few decades.14 Starting in the 1980s, colleges enacted “speech codes” under a variety of creative legal theories. Despite numerous decisions ruling these codes unconstitutional15 and this Court's decision in R.A. E v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), which indicated that viewpoint-based speech codes would be unconstitutional, the number of university speech codes actually increased through the 1990s, see Jon Gould, The Precedent that Wasn't, 35 Law and Soc'y Rev. 345 (2001). Over the past twenty years, numerous books have been written alleging an illiberal, intolerant, and/or partisan atmosphere on campus16 in which dissenting viewpoints and unpopular groups are repressed through a variety of measures. More recently, universities have adopted highly restrictive, and sometimes absurd “speech *18 zone” policies restricting speech from all but small comers of the university.17 Thus far, the law has served to protect the collegiate marketplace of ideas from overreaching administrations, requiring policies and practices in keeping with the First Amendment and academic freedom. For example, in Rosenberger, this Court granted religious student groups equal access to student fee funding. In Bait v. Shippensburg University, 280 F. Supp. 2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003), a federal court in Pennsylvania ruled Shippensburg University's speech code was unconstitutionally overbroad, and in Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853 (N.D. Tex. 2004), a federal court in Texas dismissed a speech zone policy as unconstitutionally overbroad. The Hosty decision, however, is a step in the opposite direction. College administrators have already demonstrated a tenacious will to censor even when the law clearly limited their ability to do so. The legal ambiguity that Hosty creates, the unparalleled discretion it grants college administrators, and the legal protection it provides to administrators who censor all threaten to dramatically worsen the campus free speech crisis. If allowed to stand, Hosty will have numerous, specific, predictable, and far reaching negative consequences for free speech and robust debate on America's college campuses. It is no exaggeration to say that the Hosty opinion threatens the existence of the independent collegiate media. Universities have not shown great tolerance for the free press. If there is no longer a presumption of independence or of public forum status when a public university establishes a student newspaper, *19 there should be no doubt that administrators who wish to censor will take advantage of this ambiguity. Public universities will be able to argue that any paper that receives any kind of benefit - whether financial support or simply the use of office space - from the university is subject to administrative control. If past experience is any guide, colleges will pay lip service to the importance of student press freedom, but they will quickly take advantage of any legal means available to punish or control student newspapers that anger or offend students or administrators. For example, in a memorandum to all California State University presidents written only ten days after the Hosty decision, California State University General Counsel Christine Helwick wrote that: while the Hosty decision is from another jurisdiction and, as such, does not directly impact the CSU, the case appears to signal that CSU campuses may have more latitude than previously believed to censor the content of subsidized student newspapers, provided that there is an established practice of regularized content review and approval for pedagogical purposes.18 In this same way, Hosty threatens the existence of independent student groups. If the primary question under Hosty is whether a student group is in some way “subsidized,” any group that receives any sort of benefit or student fees could be threatened with administrative control. The possibility that a court might later determine that the student group or publication was entitled to some form of public forum status would hardly protect the overwhelming majority of these groups that are neither willing nor affluent enough to mount a legal defense. *20 This case also re-opens issues relating to collegiate liability for student media and student groups formerly considered settled. It also allows administrators virtually unlimited freedom to experiment with censorship above and beyond even the broad discretion granted to them under Hosty. Finally, there is no reason to believe this holding will remain limited to public colleges - private colleges that promise free speech to their students tend to base their own speech policies on First Amendment standards.19 Hosty v. Carter will have reverberations from the community college to the Ivy League. Administrators will impose the “intellectual strait jacket” that this Court has long feared, and the consequences will be profound. As FIRE co-founder Alan Charles Kors once said, “A nation that does not educate in freedom will not survive in freedom, and will not even know when it is lost.”20

Moreover, censorship is the most important impact for student freedom. It makes students bad reporters and activists later on in their life. Free press is the most important version of free speech. Sanders 06
Chris Sanders Jd Censorship 101: Anti-Hazelwood Laws and the Preservation of Free Speech at Colleges and Universities 58 Ala. L. Rev. 159, 2006

More significantly for the realm of American collegiate press freedom, the decision marked the first time that an en banc circuit court ever explicitly applied the Hazelwood framework to an extracurricular student publication. 99 The court rejected the idea that college students' status as adults frees them from Hazelwood's grasp, noting that though age is a relevant factor as to students' maturity, it is irrelevant to other concerns expressed in Hazelwood, such as "the desire to ensure 'high standards for the student speech that is disseminated under the school's auspices'" and "the goal of dissociating the school from 'any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.'" 100 The court also refused to draw a bright-line distinction between curricular and extracurricular student speech, though it pointed to evidence that the Innovator reasonably could be considered a limited public forum under Hazelwood. 101 In a vigorous dissent, Circuit Judge Evans argued that the majority underestimated the significance that Hazelwood attached to students' age and that the secondary and postsecondary environments are not analogous. 102 The dissent also observed that no other post-Hazelwood case "would suggest to a reasonable person . . . that she could prohibit publication simply because she did not like the articles the paper was publishing" 103 and warned that Hosty "now gives the green light to school administrators to restrict student speech in a manner inconsistent with the First Amendment." 104¶ B. The Big Chill: How the Hazelwood Framework Could Hurt College Students' Free Speech¶ Even though the Supreme Court opted not to hear an appeal in Hosty, 105 the Seventh Circuit's controversial decision has reinvigorated the old Hazelwood debate and has raised the prospect of college students' fighting the same sort of First Amendment battles they thought they had left behind upon their high school graduations. It thus is both timely and relevant to examine the hazardous and unintended consequences that could ensue if Hazelwood goes to college. *171 ¶ 1. Say No More: Hazelwood's Dangers for College Students' Free Expression¶ Post-Hazelwood censorship disputes have not been limited to high schools; a number of colleges and universities have gotten in on the action as well. In 2003, the acting president of Hampton University in Virginia seized the entire press run of the student newspaper, Hampton Script, after it printed her letter responding to a story about a school cafeteria's health-code violations on page three, rather than on the front page as she requested. 106 An Indiana university last year briefly instituted a policy to require students to get approval from the school's marketing department before speaking with reporters. 107 In Alabama, an art student sued in late 2005 after university officials removed his artwork, which included nudity, from an on-campus exhibit that cautioned visitors before they entered that some of the works might contain nudity. 108 And a growing number of higher-education institutions have begun to test the First Amendment's boundaries by establishing "free speech zones" that limit the on-campus locations where citizens can express their grievances 109 and by instituting (frequently overbroad) "speech codes" in an attempt to combat racial and sexual harassment. 110¶ In today's atmosphere of increasing collegiate regulation of student speech, the application of the Hazelwood test to universities could unintentionally cripple college journalism. Because most colleges' student publications receive some form of financial assistance from the university -- either directly through student fee allocations or indirectly through the provision of free or low-cost office space or equipment -- the Hazelwood framework established for school-sponsored student expression potentially could apply to the vast majority of college publications. 111 Such an outcome would leave student newspaper or yearbook editors in a difficult position: Do they play nice and allow administrators to exercise prior review, which could convert their publications into little more than propaganda-laden puff pieces, or do they stick to their ethical guns and risk funding cuts or worse? Under Hazelwood, college editors would be forced to conduct a cost-benefit analysis when faced with a column that expresses an unpopular opinion or a story *172 that could make their school look bad. Inevitably, like many of their high school counterparts, some might decide to forego the hassle. 112¶ The fallout from Hazelwood's application to colleges would not be limited to newspapers and yearbooks. 113 Other forms of student expression, such as a student group's choice of speaker or performance artist, could be subject to administrative veto. Newly created publications would be especially vulnerable, as they would likely have a more difficult time demonstrating their status as a public forum than established publications. Even professors could wake up one day to discover that the academic freedom they have cherished for so long is now nothing more than "a professional courtesy that college administrators may lawfully disregard on pedagogical grounds." 114 If Hazelwood arrives on college campuses, it is difficult to see a stopping point for the wreckage it could leave in its wake.¶ 2. "Too Much Freedom": How the Extension of Hazelwood to Universities Could Endanger the Future of the First Amendment¶ Because Hazelwood, intentionally or otherwise, greatly expanded secondary school officials' powers to censor student speech on a host of topics, 115 college effectively provides many young people with their first taste of largely unfettered free speech rights. If Hazelwood follows students to universities, however, their introduction to a fully functioning free press could be delayed for years longer. This result would be disastrous for the journalism profession, which soon would find its ranks filled with freshly minted journalism school graduates inadequately prepared to pursue controversial stories aggressively and to endure the backlash therefrom.¶ It also likely would exacerbate what appears to be a disturbing trend in American society: the existence of a sizable plurality of citizens who do not understand the importance of free speech rights. A 2004 University of Connecticut survey of more than 112,000 high school students found that 32 of them think the press has "too much freedom" and that 36 believe *173 newspapers should clear their reporting with the government before publication. 116 Meanwhile, the 2005 State of the First Amendment survey discovered that those beliefs often do not change much once citizens reach the age of maturity; 23 of the survey's adult respondents said the First Amendment "goes too far in the rights it guarantees," down from almost 50 in 2002 (shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks). 117 The extension of Hazelwood to colleges could lead an even larger number of Americans, during some of their most formative years, to become more accepting of official limitations on the content of their speech. 118 That, in turn, could pave a dangerous path toward vastly expanded federal and state speech regulation and a society in which "free" speech is nothing more than a distant memory from an earlier time.

Censorship of college journalism guts civic engagement. LoMonte 16
(Frank D., http://www.splc.org/article/2016/12/college-media-threats-report-2016)
Frank D. LoMonte, executive director of the SPLC, said, “It is hypocritical for colleges to claim they support civic engagement while defunding student news organizations, removing well-qualified faculty advisers, and otherwise intimidating journalists into compliance. Colleges are more obsessed with promoting a favorable public image than ever before, but a college that retaliates against students and faculty for unflattering journalism doesn't just look bad—it is bad. We need a top-level commitment from the presidents of America's colleges and universities to support editorially independent student-run news coverage, including secure funding and retaliation protection for students and their advisers.” Joan Bertin, NCAC executive director, said, “This report exposes restrictions on press and speech freedoms on campus and exhorts college and university administrators to educate students in the operation of our constitutional system by allowing students to engage in its most critical functions: seeking information, becoming engaged and informed, and speaking out on matters of importance.” Kelley Lash, president of CMA, said, “This issue impacts millions of educators and students. College Media Association emphatically supports the First Amendment freedoms of all student media at all institutions, both public and private, and agrees that these media must be free from all forms of external interference designed to influence content. Student media participants, and their advisers, should not be threatened or punished due to the content of the student media. Their rights of free speech and free press must always be guaranteed.”

Civic engagement is the vital internal link to solving every existential problem. Small 06
(Jonathan, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition,  “Moving Forward,” The Journal for Civic Commitment,  Spring, http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.jsp)
What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, the new century will present challenges that require collective action, unity, and enlightened self-interest. Confronting global warming, depleted natural resources, global super viruses, global crime syndicates, and multinational corporations with no conscience and no accountability will require cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and most of all solidarity – ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life through the tiny lens of our own existence. Never in the history of the world has our collective fate been so intricately interwoven. Our very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society.  With humankind’s next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish together in alienation. Unlike any other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events. Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and tolerance in schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our conception of education. We’ll need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world.  In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body.  Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in Education. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, civic engagement, and service learning in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty. As such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality. The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social justice.  Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, let’s not get bogged down on subtleties. Civic engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate around community issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that today’s youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement. And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and today’s youth. But one thing is for sure; today’s youth no longer see government and politics as an effective or valuable tool for affecting positive change in the world. Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author Kurt Vonnegut said, “There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don’t know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president.” Maybe the youth’s rejection of American politics isn’t a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience. Consequently, the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twenty-first century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our challenge becomes convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government and commerce, have the potential for positive change. Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context.  Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them. However, until we get momentum behind them, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.

Advantage 2 – state control
My second contention is that instances of censorship will get misapplied. This debate comes down to who you want making decisions for you. If the government makes those decisions they will always make decisions on behalf of the powerful, not the powerless. Majeed, BA, 09
Majeed, Azhar. "Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence, and Prevalence of Campus Speech Codes." Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 7.2 (2009). CC
B. Impact on Campus Speech Due to their many constitutional flaws, speech codes have had, and continue to have, a severely harmful impact on campus speech. First, speech codes create a “chilling effect” on much campus speech, whereby students in many instances censor themselves or refrain from speaking altogether. Second, speech codes suppress disfavored speech. Third, speech codes invite a feeling of entitlement, or a perceived right not to be offended, among many students. Fourth, by stifling campus speech so pervasively, speech codes threaten the very vitality and functioning of America’s colleges and universities. 1. The Chilling Effect As discussed in the previous section, speech codes are often overbroad or vague or both. They typically fail to provide students with adequate notice of the categories of speech that are prohibited and the forms that remain permis- sible. Students must necessarily guess as to the scope of the speech code, and additionally, an administrator attempting to enforce the speech code in a particu- lar case must arbitrate the imprecise language and uncertain reach of the code. Under these circumstances, “members of the university community may well err on the side of caution to avoid being charged with a violation.”130 Some potential speakers may even refrain from speaking out altogether, as they become “so fearful of offending any person or group that they will effectively exercise self-censorship.”131 This chilling effect prevents many crucial forms of discussion and debate from taking place, detracting from the university cam- pus’s function as a true marketplace of ideas. Such chilling of expression is fundamentally impermissible under First Amendment law.132 The chilling effect is made even worse by the use of “implicit speech codes,” whereby universities, rather than maintain a written policy to be followed, selectively punish speech on a case-by-case basis.133 Implicit speech codes are informal mechanisms through which administrators, on an ad hoc basis, seek to censor and punish speech which they dislike. They represent a blatant attempt to evade the constitutional scrutiny attached to written speech codes.134 Whereas written speech codes, it can be argued, “at a minimum, are informative of what speech or viewpoint is prohibited even if they are overbroad,” implicit speech codes are “inherently vague because they provide no set of rules to follow.”135 This means that students “are not given adequate warning that their speech could result in sanctions.”136 As a result, “a strong likelihood exists that speech will be chilled because people will be overly cautious so as to avoid being sanctioned.”137 Therefore, the use of implicit speech codes contributes to the chilling effect on student speech, further hindering the free flow of ideas on campus.138

Additionally, restrictions on speech send the wrong message – college in particular is a time where students need to learn how to be activists before anything else. They should not have their words controlled by the state. Majeed, BA, 09
Majeed, Azhar. "Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence, and Prevalence of Campus Speech Codes." Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 7.2 (2009). CC

2. Suppression of Disfavored...the college environment

Restrictions of speech automatically shut out some views from the start, which is undemocratic because it fosters dogmatism where neither side has to listen to the other.
Kozinski, 9th circuit judge, 10

Restrictions of speech...(9th Cir. 1975).

And, counter speech is an effective form of speaking out and empowering students. There’s no harm to free speech. Counter speech is effective and empowers students. Calleros 95
Charles R. Calleros, Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1249 (1995). CC

Speech as an...such partisan speech. 72

Finally, independently we need to preserve free speech. Every major civil rights movement is built on it. There is no liberty without free speech. Strossen, Former President of the ACLU, 00
Strossen, Nadine. "Incitement to hatred: Should there be a limit." S. Ill. ULJ 25 (2000): 243. CC
C. A Robust Freedom...on both scores.62