Tournament: Alta | Round: 1 | Opponent: Summit Academy JE | Judge: Melissa Weiner
Generic
1NC Util 

The standard should be preserving human life

Epistemic modesty breaks any tie and answers all AC pre-empts 

Nick Bostrom, Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority, 2012.  NS

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.

Extinction justifies moral loopholes
Bok, 1988  (Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy, Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, 1988)
The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice.  To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.”  And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake.  For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

Our Offense 

1. Science proves non util ethics are impossible and our version of util solves all aff offense
   Greene 10 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University
   (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)
   What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question. 

2. Uncertainty and social contract require governments use util
Gooden, 1995  (Robert, philsopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)
Consider, first, the argument from necessity.  Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that.  All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course.  But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them.  Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one.  What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates.  They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices.  But that is all.  That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus—if they want to use it at all—to choose general rules of conduct.  Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.
1NC

Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)

The CP Solves the Case 

1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
   Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
   This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as  *906  Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work.
   Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization.
   Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched.
   The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized?
   For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing  *907  programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325

2. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61

Shell

The US is currently holding terrorists at bay through security tactics that go under the public radar and require extreme efficiency. Atkins 11/17 

Doug Atkins writer and contributor to boston globe Nov 17, 2016 Terror at Home: We Are Smarter Than We Think https://ivn.us/2016/11/17/winning-war-terror/

Fear mongering media outlets have convinced many that we are losing the war on terror at home. The truth is, however, that we are doing quite well.¶ According to the October Terror Threat Snapshot, released by the Majority Staff of the Homeland Security Committee, US authorities have arrested 109 suspects in ISIS related incidences since 2014.¶ The report states, “These individuals had, among other acts: plotted attacks; attempted to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria (or facilitated others’ travel); provided money, equipment, and weapons to ISIS; and falsified statements to federal authorities. Eight ISIS-linked terrorists have been killed while carrying out five separate attacks in California, Florida, Massachusetts, Texas, and Minnesota.” Currently, there are over 1,000 active FBI investigations into homegrown terrorism according to Director James Comey. He stated that over 80 percent of those are ISIS related. Since September 11, 2001, there have been at least 171 homegrown jihadist plots in the United States, including attempts to join terrorist groups overseas and execute attacks at home. More than 86 percent of these cases have occurred or been uncovered since 2009.¶ There is a lot of “behind the scenes” action, resulting in statistics like those above, that the general public rarely hears about in mainstream media.¶ Tactics such as leveraging the criminal justice system, seizing financial assets, gathering intelligence, covert operations, restricting movement of suspected terrorists, monitoring social media, and enhanced border restrictions and rules are all tools which aid in capturing US and foreign jihadists. As a result of these methods, fighters traveling into Syria and Iraq (at a one-time high of 2,000 monthly) have now fallen to as few as 50 per month.¶ U.S. efforts to counteract ISIS messaging online have proven an effective way to deter recruitment. ISIS has social media experts, and even hosts real-time Q and A sessions online where recruiters answer questions such as, “How do I travel, undetected, from the US to Syria?” Radical extremists post videos online, encouraging young people who have felt rejected by American society to take up Jihad.¶ According to the Terror Snapshot, here are some of the actions and arrests during this past September which have stopped some of these radicalized individuals from acting:¶ September 8: Marie Castelli, a 56-year-old U.S. citizen and Muslim convert from Maysville, Kentucky, was arrested after issuing violent threats and lying to federal authorities. Castelli promoted ISIS propaganda through social media.¶ September 10: An ISIS-linked cyber hacking group released a “kill list” with information about real estate professionals in the United States and encouraged individuals to locate and attack them.¶ September 18: Ahmad Khan Rahami, a 28-year-old U.S. citizen who was born in Afghanistan and is a resident of Elizabeth, New Jersey, was arrested after launching a bombing campaign targeting multiple locations in New York and New Jersey. Rahami was carrying a journal citing ISIS’s call for its followers in the West to launch attacks at home.¶ September 18: Dahir Adan, a 20-year-old U.S. citizen living in St. Cloud, Minnesota, attacked nearly a dozen people with a knife at a mall. Adan was born to a Somali family in Kenya before immigrating to the United States. Adan reportedly asked victims during his stabbing spree at a mall in Minnesota if they were Muslim. ISIS’s primary media arm claimed Adan was an ISIS supporter shortly after the attack.¶ September 30: Nelash Mohamed Das, a 24-year-old Bangladeshi citizen who has been living in Maryland as a legal permanent resident, was arrested after he plotted to kill a member of the U.S. military on behalf of ISIS.¶ Authorities know that roughly 90 percent of ISIS fanatics charged in the US are male and an average of 26.3 years of age. We are learning how to find these high risk individuals and arrest them. Almost 30 percent of those arrested were planning ISIS related attacks.¶ In a few instances, individuals known to be associated with terrorist groups have unsuccessfully attempted to gain admittance to the US through the refugee program. Over the past fiscal year, the Obama Administration has let almost 13,000 refugees through our borders and planned to allow in even more. By comparison, 1.3 million refugees arrived in Europe during that same time period. Trump has indicated that he intends to reduce these numbers drastically.¶ Although the US has a highly rigorous screening process for incoming refugees (Consuming 18 – 24 months for each person) the Terror Snapshot states that, “American law enforcement and intelligence officials have repeatedly indicated that the U.S. lacks reliable and credible intelligence to properly vet and screen potential Syrian refugees.”¶ President-Elect Trump has repeatedly indicated that he plans to improve this process with what he calls “extreme vetting.”¶ ISIS has proven to be a challenger unlike anything the US has previously faced. Their ability to use the internet and social media to reach high risk individuals and radicalize them to the ISIS cause has created a threat that is difficult to combat. Our intelligence agencies continue to learn and grow, having great, if often unrecognized, successes in protecting the American people.

Qualified immunity for security officials is necessary to secrecy, efficiency, and flexible decision-making.  Samp 6/8
*Brackets in original
Richard A. Samp JD Washington Legal Foundation June 8, 2016 Ascroft v Turkmen Amicus Briefs. BRIEF OF FORMER U.S. ATTORNEYS GENERAL¶ WILLIAM P. BARR, ALBERTO R. GONZALES,¶ EDWIN MEESE III, MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, AND¶ DICK THORNBURGH; FORMER FBI DIRECTORS¶ WILLIAM S. SESSIONS AND WILLIAM H. WEBSTER;¶ AND WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION¶ AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Ashcroft-v-Turkmen-WLF-amicus.pdf

The petitions raise issues of exceptional¶ importance. Amici urge the Court to grant review of¶ all three Questions Presented. We write separately to¶ focus particular emphasis on the qualified immunity¶ question. Qualified immunity not only provides¶ government officials with a defense to liability; it also¶ is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other¶ burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.¶ 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis added). The Court has made¶ clear that the “driving force” behind creation of the¶ qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure¶ that “‘insubstantial claims’ will be resolved prior to¶ discovery.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640¶ n.2 (1987). Yet, the decision below calls into question¶ the ability of high-level Executive Branch officials to¶ win dismissal, on qualified immunity grounds, of even¶ frivolous Bivens litigation filed by anyone claiming to¶ be aggrieved by their official conduct.¶ In the absence of dismissal, those officials face¶ the prospect of discovery proceedings that are highly¶ likely to distract them from their other responsibilities.¶ As former senior Executive Branch officials, the¶ individual amici curiae are concerned by the disruptive¶ effects of such discovery, and they are very concerned¶ that such disruptions are likely to impair the ability of¶ high-level officials to carry out their missions effectively. Review is warranted to determine whether¶ such disruptions are required under the terms of the¶ qualified immunity doctrine and the pleading¶ standards established by the Federal Rules of Civil¶ Procedure, particularly when (as here) the challenged¶ actions involve sensitive national security issues.¶ Respondents raise constitutional claims that are¶ largely the same as those at issue in Iqbal and that¶ arise from precisely the same underlying facts: the¶ detention of Arab/Muslim unauthorized aliens at the¶ MDC under harsh conditions in 2001-02. Iqbal¶ determined that the complaint at issue there did not¶ adequately state a constitutional claim against¶ Ashcroft and Mueller for their alleged role in the¶ detentions. The Second Circuit decision, by reaching¶ the opposite conclusion in connection with a complaint¶ that added little in the way of new factual allegations,¶ is in considerable tension with Iqbal. The same¶ considerations that led the Court to review (and¶ ultimately overturn) the Second Circuit’s assessment¶ of the adequacy of the pleadings in Iqbal should¶ persuade the Court to grant review here as well. In¶ particular, Respondents’ complaint includes no factual¶ allegations from which one can reasonably infer that¶ Ashcroft, Mueller, and Ziglar played any role in¶ determining the conditions of Respondents’¶ confinement.¶ Review is also warranted to determine whether¶ the courts should recognize a judicially inferred¶ damages remedy against senior Executive Branch¶ officials for alleged infringement of Respondents’¶ constitutional rights in the course of carrying out their¶ national security responsibilities. As Petitioners note, the appeals courts are sharply divided on the issue,¶ with the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits¶ issuing decisions that conflict with the decision below.¶ Review is warranted to resolve that conflict.¶ Amici also write separately to note that the¶ Second Circuit’s unprecedented recognition of Bivens¶ actions to challenge Executive Branch national security¶ policy conflicts with decisions of this Court. The Court¶ has cautioned against recognition of new Bivens¶ remedies when, as here, “special factors” counsel¶ hesitation. Those special factors include the national¶ security and immigration-law aspects of this case¶ (areas in which courts traditionally defer to the¶ judgments of the elected branches), the availability of¶ alternative remedies (e.g., habeas corpus proceedings),¶ and the failure of Congress to provide an express¶ damages remedy despite its considerable focus on¶ detention-related issues arising in the course of the¶ 9/11 investigation.¶ REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION¶ I. REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE¶ DECISION BELOW THREATENS THE¶ ABILITY OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS TO¶ AVOID THE BURDENS OF LITIGATION¶ IMPOSED BY INSUBSTANTIAL CLAIMS¶ The Court has long recognized that significant¶ burdens are imposed on government officials when¶ they are required to defend damages claims filed¶ against them in their individual capacities for actions¶ taken in connection with their employment. As the¶ Court explained in Harlow: Each such suit against high-level¶ government officials almost invariably¶ results in these officials and their¶ colleagues being subjected to extensive¶ discovery into traditionally protected¶ areas, such as their deliberations¶ preparatory to the formulation of¶ government policy and their intimate¶ thought processes and communications at¶ the presidential and cabinet levels. Such¶ discovery is wide-ranging, timeconsuming,¶ and not without considerable¶ cost to the officials involved.¶ Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 n.29 (quoting¶ Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (D.C. Cir.¶ 1979) (Gesell, J., concurring)).¶ The burdens can be particularly pronounced¶ among officials working on national security matters,¶ where the high level of public passion can result in¶ increased levels of litigation. As Justice Stevens¶ explained:¶ The passions aroused by matters of¶ national security and foreign policy and¶ the high profile of Cabinet officers with¶ functions in that area make them “easily¶ identifiable targets for suits for civil¶ damages.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.¶ 731, 753 (1982). Persons of wisdom¶ and honor will hesitate to answer the¶ President’s call to serve in these vital¶ positions if they fear that vexatious and¶ politically motivated litigation associated with their public decisions will squander¶ their time and reputation, and sap their¶ personal financial resources when they¶ leave office. The multitude of lawsuits¶ filed against high officials in recent years¶ only confirms the rationality of this¶ anxiety.¶ Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in¶ the judgment).¶ Events proved Justice Stevens’s prescience.¶ Lawsuits seeking damages from senior Executive¶ Branch officials for actions they took regarding¶ national security matters proliferated throughout the¶ administrations of Presidents Barack Obama, George¶ W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. See, e.g., Lebron v.¶ Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012) (suit against¶ Defense Secretaries Leon Panetta and Donald¶ Rumsfeld alleging mistreatment of military detainee);¶ Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (suit against¶ Attorney General alleging improper authorization of¶ material-witness warrants to detain terrorism¶ suspects); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.2d 1228 (11th Cir.¶ 2003) (suit against Attorney General arising from¶ execution of an arrest warrant for six-year-old Elian¶ Gonzalez). A. The Qualified Immunity Doctrine¶ Was Crafted to Reduce the Burden¶ on Government Officials of¶ Defending Against Damages Claims¶ In an effort to reduce the burdens imposed by¶ such suits, the Court has crafted a qualified immunity doctrine designed to provide government officials with¶ not only a defense to liability but also an “immunity¶ from suit.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. The “driving¶ force” behind creation of the doctrine was a desire to¶ ensure that “insubstantial claims will be resolved¶ prior to discovery.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 n.2. See¶ also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (“Where¶ the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on¶ that issue should be made early in the proceedings so¶ that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where¶ the defense is dispositive.”).¶ Qualified immunity shields a government official¶ from liability in an individual capacity so long as the¶ official has not violated “clearly established statutory¶ or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person¶ would have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. To¶ overcome the defense of qualified immunity the¶ plaintiff must show: (1) the facts, viewed in the light¶ most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the¶ deprivation of a statutory or constitutional right; and¶ (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the¶ deprivation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 199. Courts are¶ “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in¶ deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified¶ immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of¶ the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”¶ Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Amici¶ submit that review of the second prong—whether the¶ asserted right was “clearly established”—is¶ particularly warranted in this case.

The AFF ruling on qualififed immunity limits it for all officials – courts take previous rulings to apply up the executive ladder. Cornyn et al 01
 (John, Andy Taylor First Assistant Attorney General Gregory S. Coleman Solicitor General Counsel of Record Lisa R. Eskow Assistant Solicitor General P.O. Box 12548 Austin, Texas 78711-2548 (512) 936-1700 Counsel for Amici Bill Pryor Attorney General of Alabama 11 South Union Street Montgomery, AL 36130 Bruce M. Botelho Attorney General of Alaska P.O. Box 110300 Juneau, AK 99811-0300 Mark Pryor Attorney General of Arkansas 323 Center St., Ste. 200 Little Rock, AR 72201 Bill Lockyer Attorney General of California 1300 1 Street, Ste. 125 P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Ken Salazar Attorney General of Colorado 1525 Sherman St., 7th Fl. Denver, CO 80203 Richard Blumenthal Attorney General of Connecticut 55 Elm Street Hartford, CT 06141-0120 M. Jane Brady Attorney General of Delaware 820 N. French St. Wilmington, DE 19801 James E. Ryan Attorney General of Illinois 100 W. Randolph St., 12th Fl. Chicago, IL 60601 Richard P. Ieyoub Attorney General of Louisiana P.O. Box 94095 Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095 J. Joseph Curran, Jr. Attorney General of Maryland 200 St. Paul Place Baltimore, MD 21202 Thomas F. Reilly Attorney General of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 Mike Moore Attorney General of Mississippi P.O. Box 220 Jackson, MS 39205 Joseph P. Mazurek Attorney General of Montana 215 N. Sanders P.O. Box 201401 Helena, MT 59620-1401 Don Stenberg Attorney General of Nebraska 2115 State Capitol Lincoln, NE 68509 Eliot Spitzer Attorney General of New York The Capitol Albany, NY 12224 Heidi Heitkamp Attorney General of North Dakota 600 E. Boulevard Ave. Bismarck, ND 58505-0040 Betty D. Montgomery Attorney General of Ohio 30 E. Broad St., 17th Fl. Columbus, OH 43215 W.A. Drew Edmondson Attorney General of Oklahoma 2300 N. Lincoln Blvd., Ste. 112 Oklahoma City, OK 73105-4894 Hardy Myers Attorney General of Oregon 1162 Court St. N.E. Salem, OR 97310 D. Michael Fisher Attorney General of Pennsylvania 16th Fl., Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 Charles M. Condon Attorney General of South Carolina P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 Mark Barnett Attorney General of South Dakota 500 East Capitol Avenue Pierre, SD 57501-5070 Paul G. Summers Attorney General of Tennessee 425 Fifth Ave., North Nashville, TN 37243 Jan Graham Attorney General of Utah 236 State Capitol Salt Lake City, UT 84114 William H. Sorrell Attorney General of Vermont 109 State Street Montpelier, VT 05609-1001 Christine O. Gregoire Attorney General of Washington 1125 Washington Street P.O. Box 40100 Olympia, WA 98504-0100 Brief of The States of Texas, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,¶ Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner)
The “reasonable mistake” is one of the core tenets of qualified immunity jurisprudence. In fact, were this Court to prohibit or limit the applicability of qualified immunity and the “reasonable mistake” with respect to excessive force claims, that philosophical departure would have ripple effects beyond the excessive force context. If officers who make *21 reasonable, albeit mistaken, judgments about the necessity of force can be categorically excluded from the ambit of qualified immunity, other public employees exercising discretionary functions might fear that their immunity protections could be forfeited next. This could dissuade individuals from taking government jobs. Public servants should not have to worry that courts might make policy-based distinctions about which types of duties should be afforded immunity protections, and which should not. To transform qualified immunity into a guessing game would defeat the purpose of the doctrine. Harlow's objective legal reasonableness test was designed to strike a balance between the need to vindicate civil rights abuses and the need to promote public service and shield government officials from insubstantial civil rights claims. It is inevitable that public servants will err; and when they do, they should be secure in knowing that their errors will not subject them to liability, or suit, provided they err in a manner that is objectively reasonable. Harlow's compromise may be imperfect, but it should be preserved, as it strikes the best “balance between the evils inevitable in an available alternative.” See Harlow, 457 U.S., at 813.

Flexibility is key to fighting terror Kirchner ‘14
Richard (Rik) Kirchner, Jr. is Chief Executive Officer of KIRIK International, Inc., and Executive Director of the Institute for Surveillance and Threat Detection, a first of its kind educational center dedicated solely to the discipline of Surveillance Detection and Behavioral Detection, delivering Antiterrorism and Threat assessment, development, and implementation to High Value Target and Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource program managers for comprehensive Threat Detection programs with subject matter expertise in Hostile Surveillance, Threat Detection, and Threat Management. “Surveillance and Threat Detection: Prevention versus Mitigation.” Elsevier. 2014. https://books.google.com/books?id=NYS-AQAAQBAJandpg=PA37andlpg=PA37anddq=22search+and+seizure22+and+22prevent+terrorism22andsource=blandots=jMP5xoUYQkandsig=u-N0ufTTRfALYHgFDQ_ZNtlWgYMandhl=enandsa=Xandved=0ahUKEwiO94Lu0rHQAhVnrVQKHW63AW8Q6AEISjAJ#v=onepageandq=22search20and20seizure2220and2022prevent20terrorism22andf=false JJN
While counterterrorism and terrorism prevention are concepts traditionally associated with our nation’s intelligence agencies, there are many basic avenues law enforcement can take in fighting terrorism. Simply keeping an eye out for indicators of preincident planning is integral to counterterrorism efforts nationwide. Patriot Act provisions assist law enforcement efforts greatly by facilitating more efficient terrorist monitoring and probable cause development. Finally, familiarization with state and federal law pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks is an absolute must. Terrorism presents a challenge to law enforcement as it requires police to act proactively against crimes (terrorist acts) that, in many cases, have not yet been committed. If the police wait, as they do traditionally, to react to terrorist crimes after they are committed, then the roles of the police are that of a first responder and an investigator. The public, however, expects police to deal with terrorism differently. This is mainly because crimes such as rape, theft, robbery, and even murder target the individual while terrorism targets the public. As such, the public demands that the police act to prevent terrorism before it becomes a criminal reality. Police officers are given the rights to search and seizure based on probable cause (Terry vs Ohio) and to stop a person for inquiry based on reasonable suspicion. These rights were afforded to officers in order to help them prevent a crime that they believe is about to occur. To prove a crime, officers need to find evidence. However, when it comes to terrorism, evidence and weapons are not always there to find even at the execution of the attack. Let’s consider 9/11 and assume for a minute that the terrorists would have been caught prior to boarding the planes. Would we have had the foresight to articulate probable cause based on the terrorists’ behavior and, if so, would we have regarded their box cutters as weapons (evidence) for a possible hijacking? Probably not. In order to reach reasonable suspicion, officers must rely on their training and experience to come up “with an articulable and particularized belief that criminal activity is afoot” Orleans vs United States, 517 U.S. 690 696 (1996) Illinois vs Gates, 462 U.S at 235. To be able to articulate terrorism-related reasonable suspicion, officers must be trained and gain experience in terrorism methods of operations. In other words, officers must be able to look at a situation or activity (suspicion) and have the capability to explain what they are seeing through their terrorist eyes. Officers are not trained (or not having the experience) in doing offensive surveillance, building a bomb or developing a terrorist plan among other things, will never be able to explain what they see as a terrorism-related reasonable cause. As in the case of reasonable suspicion, to develop probable cause, officers need to fall back on their training and experience in order to describe “known facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” Orleans vs United States, 517 U.S. 690 696 (1996) Illinois vs Gates, 462 U.S. at 213,238 (1983). Finding bombs and terrorist weapons is a difficult task, as almost anything can be used as a weapon and bombs appear in countless shapes and forms. In order to develop a terrorist-related probable cause, officers need to rely more on information provided by the suspect than on tangible evidence. To obtain this information, officers must utilize different questioning techniques then those used when interviewing suspected criminals. Approaching the suspect from a “law enforcement” angle will probably not work because the suspect has yet to have broken the law in the case of identifiable reasonable suspicion and probable cause . Moreover, cooperation and information are needed to establish probable cause or refuse the reasonable suspicions found. Asking for an ID and checking the suspect’s criminal record are unlikely to help the officer because most terrorist avoid criminal activities and their records are therefore clean. The key to success lies in open-ended, public service-oriented and inquisitive questioning geared toward refuting reasonable suspicions. In essence, the questioning that the officer conducts should resemble that of a receptionist asking politely about the intentions of a visitor entering a building and not that of an officer who has just pulled over a person for speeding recklessly on the highway.  

A single coordinated attack escalates and kills billions Myhrvold 2014
Myhrvold 2014 (Nathan P chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief technology officer at Microsoft; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action; cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf; kdf)
Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often hope to provoke reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually, the world will recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind. 

Trump responds with Nukes in the Middle East against ISIS. Borgwardt 3/31

Elizabeth Borgwardt is a history professor at Washington University and the author of The Nuremberg Idea, forthcoming from Knopf. “9/11: What Would Trump Do?” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-2016-terrorist-attack-foreign-policy-213784 March 31, 2016

Donald Trump’s March 21 interview with the Washington Post editorial board should make every potential voter’s blood run cold. After noting that ISIS should be knocked out flat, yet indicating that large numbers of U.S. troops should not be involved, Mr. Trump suggested that it was better to be “unpredictable” in the face of U.S. enemies, before twice dodging a question about whether he would advocate the use of tactical nuclear weapons against ISIS. (To be fair, the interview transcript indicates that much more time was spent discussing Mr. Trump’s hand size than anything to do with nuclear weapons.)¶ All this was before the attacks in Belgium; my sense is that a 9/11-style attack on U.S. soil would mean that any remaining restraints to the use of weapons of mass destruction—including nuclear weapons—would likely be swiftly swept aside.¶ General Douglas MacArthur had notoriously floated the idea of using nuclear weapons against China in the Korean conflict (1950-53) when he was concerned about Chinese moves to support North Korean aggression. In posthumously published interviews, MacArthur said that he could have won the war in ten days: “I would have dropped 30 or so atomic bombs … strung across the neck of Manchuria. For at least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Korea from the North.”¶ Part of MacArthur’s logic was that the United States would have needed to fight communist China eventually, so it would be best to nuke them while they were still weak, recovering from World War II and the Chinese Revolution (1949), as opposed to fighting them later after they had become much stronger. “That makes sense to me!” opined a Trump backer with whom I recently spoke on this topic. And yet, I offered, most Americans today are probably pretty happy that we didn’t use nuclear weapons against China in the Korean war, or would be if they knew anything about that historical interlude. “I guess,” he said. “But why not press your advantage when you have one?”¶ I offer this example because my sense is that in a putative Trump administration, “the gloves would be off” and all barriers—including public opinion—to the first use of various kinds of weapons of mass destruction would likely be at an all-time low. Bruce Cumings, the leading U.S. historian of Korea, has commented on the MacArthur incident in an analysis from back in 2004. Cumings noted that “MacArthur sounds like a warmongering lunatic” for advocating the use of nuclear weapons, but also explained that, astonishing as it might seem, the general actually had some support for his outlandish proposal. Cumings also noted that MacArthur’s conduct, quite appropriately, contributed to the celebrated war hero’s dismissal by President Truman. But that was then.

Use of nukes in the ME causes extinction. Russel 9

Russell 9 – Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs @ Naval Postgraduate School ¶ James, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East,” Online

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants.  These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world. 

Disad turns the case – the AFF results in massive Constitutional violations and a state of emergency. Stout 3/31

Martha Stout is a psychologist and author of The Sociopath Next Door “9/11: What Would Trump Do?” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-2016-terrorist-attack-foreign-policy-213784 March 31, 2016

As a psychologist who has spent her career studying human personality and its variations, I can tell you that personalities don’t have an off switch, not even for dire emergencies. If we suffered another brutal terrorist attack, I fear that President Trump would exhibit the same bombast, rage and impulsivity that he has shown in the campaign trail and imperil his fellow human beings, perhaps with even more lasting effects than those of the disaster itself.¶ The personality that underlies Trump’s observable behaviors—a demeanor of personal superiority, a focus on being admired, immediate heated anger when challenged, an emphasis on unlimited success, and an apparent expectation of automatic compliance—would be problematic in a U.S. president at any time, and plainly dangerous should our nation experience another terrorist atrocity. A president with such a personality would experience a large terrorist event as an attack on him personally, an enormous “narcissistic injury”—what psychologists call a perceived threat to self-worth—and his rage would be white-hot. The anger we have seen directed at protesters during Trump rallies would be multiplied by an unknowable factor. That whisper in the ear from an aide, telling him that an event had occurred, would instantly evoke a need for reprisal, a desire to attack and to do so right away, using airstrikes, boots on the ground, torture in interrogations and any other “powerful” tactic that occurred to him.¶ If there is a positive thread in this psychologically predicted scenario, it is that such a huge perceived injury to Trump’s sense of self-worth would compel him to focus utterly on the source of that injury. He would be single-mindedly intent on destroying the terrorists and would have no tolerance for those who might wish to refashion the country’s pain and anger into a willingness to attack a different target. In the aftermath of our waking nightmare in 2001, we might have benefited from some portion of that single-mindedness. Still, with a President Trump, the surge of bigotry and the resulting deportation and internment efforts would do their own inestimable damage.¶ Given a re-terrorized nation, Trump’s famous skill at gaining allegiance from people through their heightened fears might very well sway Congress and result in the actual implementation of some of his ideas: a wholesale military response, a lockdown of Muslim communities, and attempts to deport large groups of people. With an unapologetically self-involved and rage-prone commander-in-chief—which is what we evidently would be getting with a President Trump—nothing would be off the table.

Tournament: Damus | Round: 1 | Opponent: Peninsula IG | Judge: Olivia Panchal
CRB CP and Hollow Hope DA

See open source

Tournament: Damus | Round: 3 | Opponent: Peninsula KL | Judge: Adam Bistagne
1NC

Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)

The CP Solves the Case 

1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
   Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
   This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as  *906  Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work.
   Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization.
   Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched.
   The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized?
   For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing  *907  programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325
   2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations
   Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
   First, even a highly effective LOPRB providing quality policy recommendations to a police department would likely encounter some department resistance to the civilian oversight. This resistance may be created because of police department views of a civilian entity "meddling" or just the potential perception of an adversarial relationship between the *1058 LOPRB and police department. n207 However, the structure of LOPRBs help overcome most of this resistance traditionally leveled against civilian oversight from police departments. The emphasis on policy review, rather than complaint review, means that LOPRBs will not directly regulate individual police officers but rather the department as a whole. This change in focus will likely reduce the intensity of any police department resistance because the potential adversarial relationship will be between the LOPRB and the police department instead of individual officers. n208 Furthermore, any resistance can be ameliorated by public pressure on police departments to enact the LOPRB's policy recommendations. The LOPRB's outreach will inform the local community of the use of data-collection technologies, potentially generating popular support behind LOPRB recommendations. LOPRBs can thus indirectly enforce their recommendations through utilizing that popular support and pressure on police departments. That indirect pressure on police departments will help reduce potential police department resistance because policy changes brought about through public pressure will be a reaction by the police department to the public at large, rather than directly reacting to the adversarial LOPRB. Thus, while police department resistance likely cannot be completely overcome, LOPRBs can ameliorate this traditional civilian oversight problem.

3. The CRB doesn’t have to work- it creates a deterrent effect
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
3. Individual Deterrence and Systemic Correction. - Finally, civilian oversight has some meaningful deterrence on individual actors while also providing a functioning mechanism to address local systemic issues. n163 Individual police officers are more likely to undertake regulation of their own behavior when the officer knows that they are being watched by an oversight body. n164 External civilian oversight can ensure greater accountability not only among rank-and-file officers, but also among command officers, and can also address systemic issues facing dys-functional departments. n165 Approximately two-thirds of civilian oversight entities undertake policy review in addition to complaint review, n166 allowing civilian oversight bodies to review general policies and advocate for systemic reform. n167 Samuel Walker, a scholar whose work focuses on police accountability, emphasized that successful civilian oversight bodies "take a proactive view of their role and actively seek out the underlying causes of police misconduct or problems in the complaint process." n168 If civilian oversight mechanisms continually provide policy recommendations to police departments, those recommendations as a whole can have a significant effect on police misconduct, while at the same time making the police department more "accustomed to input from outsiders." n169 Civilian oversight thus can have a transformative impact on entire police departments rather than only correcting the actions of a singular officer.

4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61

The net benefit is Tech Shift
A. Absent established, oppositional civilian review police harassment will shift to technology based surveillance which avoids rights protections
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
Technology has provided police departments with powerful tools to collect extensive data on private citizens. Those tools have captured images of every license plate passing through an intersection; n1 used facial-recognition technology to determine whether Super Bowl attendees had criminal records; n2 and implemented multi-technology systems that "aggregate and analyze information from approximately 3,000 surveil-lance cameras around the city ... ." n3 New technologies allow police departments to collect a range of data on the public space, including private citizens not under investigation, raising concerns regarding how that data may be used in the future. n4 And as storage and database capabilities have become cheaper and more efficient, the potential for expansive databases has become not only a science-fiction trope n5 but a reality. n6 *1030 But despite potential, these new tools fit poorly within the current regulatory framework. Police departments have embraced the information age with little guidance or oversight, raising significant privacy concerns regarding the effect of mass-data collection on the privacy rights the general public has enjoyed for centuries. n7 At the same time, current regulatory mechanisms have not adequately addressed how police departments should use cutting-edge surveillance technologies. n8 Such regulatory mechanisms often are inhibited by conflicting motivations n9 or poorly adapted to technological change. n10 Scholars have proposed a variety of solutions to address the privacy and criminal law concerns raised by these "data-collection technologies," but these approaches often provide inadequate flexibility to local jurisdictions to address their unique problems n11 or focus too narrowly on correcting a particular, novel iteration of the problem. n12 *1031 To overcome this regulatory deficit, civilian oversight can provide effective regulatory oversight of police departments' use of new and emerging technologies. Specifically, I argue that a specialized form of civilian oversight, the "Loyal Opposition" Policy Review Board (LOPRB), would function as a regulatory mechanism that not only provides proactive regulatory guidance on technology usage by police departments but would also allow for that guidance to be specifically tailored to the local community. n13 LOPRBs, composed of members who are informed on and invested in technology and civil rights, would undertake policy review of police department procedures for the use of new technologies and recommend "best practices" approaches to ensuring that individual privacy rights and police department investigative needs are effectively balanced. n14 Such a civilian oversight mechanism would ensure that the privacy concerns of the average citizen remain protected as new technologies are incorporated into the daily operations of police departments.
B. Civil rights focus fails- it takes a black and white approach to police conduct that ensures resistance
Schlanger, 15 – Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan (Margo, “Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 6, pg. 112, 2015, Lexis)
I have suggested that rights discourse tends to sweep under the rug the messiness of civil liberties protections--the policy issues that lie at the core of civil liberties interests. That messiness will be apparent in what follows; there are no magic bullets here. But a measure can be useful even if messy or compromised. It is possible that that none of the offices described below will accomplish very much. It seems to me, however, that soft administrative measures are useful tools in the civil liberties toolkit, well worth trying by a principal--whether that principal is the President or the Congress--who wants to give more priority to civil liberties but lacks the institutional capacity to do so directly and repeatedly over time. Each of these three offices might represent civil liberties interests more systematically than current arrangements, and might advocate for more liberty protective government protocols and programs. It is worth emphasizing, too, that measures such as these might have not just cumulative but also mutually reinforcing effects, creating a civil liberties cadre with security clearances, who might assist each other in a variety of ways. n360 In addition to promoting civil liberties/privacy interstitially, offices like these assist other more authoritative rulemakers to understand the civil liberties implications of their choices. For example, they can help Congress in its otherwise very difficult oversight task, flagging issues that need more congressional attention. n361 And in several different ways, they may increase public access to otherwise secret matters, which in turn increases pressure on those authoritative rulemakers: They generate reports--both public and private--which can be used by Congress and the public. n362 And they build relationships with non-governmental organizations that promote increased official disclosure. My argument is not that offices like these are a cure-all  *193  for achieving optimal policy, but that they may be a useful part of a complicated ecology.

TPP DA
TPP is predicted to pass, but there’s no time to waste. Mitchell ‘11/2
Peter Mitchell - AAP US Correspondent, Australian Associated Press. “US: White House bullish on TPP passing.” News.com.au. November 2, 2016. http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/us-white-house-bullish-on-tpp-passing/news-story/66aaccb30c94f3301f95fa652040190f JJN
US President Barack Obama's top Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiator has bullishly predicted the trade deal will be approved by Congress after next week's presidential election if congressional leaders bring it up for a vote. Michael Froman also warned if Congress does not ratify the 12-nation free trade proposal Australia, China and other nations will swoop in and steal markets from the US in the Asia-Pacific. "It's up to the congressional leadership to decide to bring it forward," Mr Froman told CNBC on Tuesday. "If they bring it forward I think we can get the votes there." Presidential frontrunners Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both oppose the TPP and members of Congress, many who are also up for re-election next Tuesday, have been reluctant to show public support for the contentious trade pact. Mr Obama and Mr Froman are hoping the the anti-trade sentiment will recede after the election and members of Congress will be willing to ratify it before Mr Obama moves out of the White House in January. "I think the key thing is the rest of the world isn't standing by whether it is China negotiating its own trade agreements or the EU, Canada or Australia or others, they are going to move ahead and get access to these markets at our expense," Mr Froman said. "Our market share is actually in decline in some of these important, fast growing and large markets so it is awfully important we show leadership." The TPP signatories are: Australia, the US, New Zealand, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru.

TPP is top of Obama’s priorities, PC is key. Creighton ‘10/27
Adam Creighton – economics correspondent Washington. “Hope for TPP as Obama administration works the phones.” The Australian Business Review. October 27, 2016. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/economics/hope-for-tpp-as-obama-administration-works-the-phones/news-story/8ce5e112900eb06ca2bb0711d3aa16ce JJN
The world’s biggest free trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Australian officials have written off as a casualty of a fierce anti-trade backlash in the US, has an almost even chance of success in Congress, according to people familiar with the matter in Washington DC. The Obama administration has been hitting the phones and sending cabinet ministers to remote US towns in an unprecedented bid to persuade Congress to pass the controversial Asia-Pacific trade deal among 12 countries. Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have repudiated the deal. The former top economics adviser to Vice-President Joe Biden, Jared Bernstein, said the chance the TPP would be passed after November 8 but before the new president took office was almost 50 per cent, offering hope for the deal signed by the Turnbull government and 11 other nations in February, which frees up trade and investment across 40 per cent of the world’s GDP. “I think the probability is a lot higher than conventional wisdom on the street; I’d give it a 45 per cent chance,” said Mr Bernstein. He said President Obama would certainly send the deal to Congress whoever won the election. “What’s interesting is just how (hard) the administration is working it … full-court press behind the scenes,” he said. “More than on healthcare, more than on stimulus, more than on financial reform: it’s remarkable,” added Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizens Global Trade Watch. She said cabinet ministers had been traipsing the country trying to convince wavering Congressmen. “They are working the phones to a degree that actually is really interesting; cabinet secretary folks are once or twice a week since April calling House members who they might have any kind of chance with,” she added. “The odds of stopping it are slightly better, but it’s close.” Ambassador Joe Hockey and visiting Turnbull government ministers have been strenuously promoting the TPP in Washington, but confidence that the deal — which is also being sold as a way to entrench US and Australian commercial norms in a region increasingly dominated by China — will pass has dwindled significantly. Consonant with the mix of confected and genuine dissatisfaction with the TPP that permeates Republican and Democrat ranks in Congress, Republican congressman Kevin Brady earlier told The Australian the deal wouldn’t pass without additional protections for intellectual property, which Australia has publicly ruled out. Ms Wallach and Mr Bernstein, now at the Centre for Budget Priorities, by contrast argued the TPP deal had been captured by US corporate interests, and should be renegotiated to pare back the extra patent and intellectual property protections demanded by the US on behalf of its pharmaceutical industry. They also want to see clauses outlawing currency manipulation and removing investor-state dispute clauses that potentially limit governments’ freedom to make policies that damage foreign commercial interests. The TPP would be the first trade agreement to be rejected by Congress. If it doesn’t pass in the “lame duck” session — before the new house, senate and president are in place — it will be very unlikely the US would begin new trade negotiations given the febrile environment. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has made rewriting or rescinding US trade agreements the centrepiece of his economic strategy. “One of the reasons it’s 45 per cent (chance of success) and not 25 per cent is because … the undecideds are getting much more pressure from the administration than from (labour groups),” said Mr Bernstein. “Democrat and Republican elites have literally for decades ignored the costs of trade.”

The plan sparks congressional debate and kills Obama’s PC. Orenstein ‘16
WALKER ORENSTEIN. “Reform advocates upset over pushback over changing malice law.” The News Tribune. July 29, 2016. http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article92684372.html JJN
When an effort by state lawmakers to make prosecuting police for improper use of deadly force easier stalled last year, legislators compromised. They agreed to let a task force study the issue and recommend policy to next year’s Legislature on how to reduce violent interactions involving law enforcement. But some on the state-appointed committee, which had its second meeting Tuesday, say lawmakers overseeing the panel are filibustering even a dialogue about changing controversial state law regulating police use of deadly force. Amending state statute on the subject was a key component of reform-advocates’ demands that spurred the task force. It’s also the subject of a proposed initiative to the Legislature that would amend the law if enacted. Washington’s law is regarded as unique in the country. Convicting an officer for using deadly force requires proof the officer acted with “malice.” It’s a standard many, including the American Civil Liberties Union, have said is more or less impossible to meet, effectively giving police immunity when they use deadly force. Some committee members say changing the law would reduce police use of deadly force, a stated end-goal of the task force. Others on the panel have pushed back, saying changing the statute won’t help that cause. The split could derail what Karen Johnson, chairwoman of the Black Alliance of Thurston County, described as a “golden opportunity” to be a “national model” for discourse between law enforcement and police reform advocates. ‘SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY’ De’Sean Quinn, a member of the state’s African American Commission on the task force, said he wants the group to be “action oriented.” Real action for him might include recommending the state collect data on police use of force to easier analyze how to reduce it, he said. But the key aim, he said, is to reach consensus on how to change Washington’s malice law, particularly in light of the recent police killings of Philando Castile in Minnesota and Alton Sterling in Louisiana. “I feel a sense of responsibility for my kids that we really try and address this issue,” Quinn, who has two sons, said in an interview. Gerald Hankerson, a member of the committee and president of the NAACP of Alaska, Oregon and Washington, said lawmakers and some law enforcement officials on the panel have been hesitant to broach the topic in seriousness. Others on the task force agree. Tuesday’s meeting centered mostly on law enforcement training. Toshiko Hasegawa, appointed to the task force as a member of the state’s Asian American Commission, called out lawmakers during committee session, saying they were avoiding a deeper discussion on changing the law by “hiding behind procedure.” She added in a later phone interview that committee co-chairman Sen. Kirk Pearson, R-Monroe, was deliberately avoiding the topic. “Why is the police task force on deadly force not discussing deadly force?” Hasegawa asked. The task force is required to meet only four times. Johnson, Quinn, Hasegawa and others signed a letter sent to Pearson and co-chairman Rep. Roger Goodman, D-Kirkland, before Tuesday’s meeting, asking for clearer guidelines on discussing the malice statute and more input on meeting agendas. Quinn said he felt work on the statute was being ducked, and said the Legislature is not responding fast enough to outcries for police reform in the country. “It’s not OK to not deal with the difficult issues,” he said. Although the Legislature is not obligated to act on task force recommendations, “consensus with law enforcement” on legal changes “would be significant for the Legislature going forward,” said Sen. David Frockt, D-Seattle. Rather than building consensus, the meetings so far have “almost been like it’s a dog and pony show,” Hankerson said. ‘NOT THE FIRST THING ON MY MIND’ Rep. Dave Hayes, R-Camano Island, is a sergeant with the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office and one of four legislators on the panel. He said the task force should look at all sorts of avenues to reduce violent interactions involving police, and said changing Washington’s malice standard is “definitely not the first thing on my mind.” Added Hayes: “I don’t believe that changing the statute is going to fix anything.” He said he expects the result of the task force to be “a couple bills regarding data collection and how we use that data to make our local law enforcement officers better.” He cautioned the Legislature would have to weigh the cost of those bills to not place a burden on local law enforcement departments. Pearson, who left before the conclusion of Tuesday’s meeting, did not return calls or messages from The News Tribune asking for comment. On Tuesday, he said reviewing past applications of the malice statute is “beyond” what the committee was designed to do. Goodman said at the meeting the task force needs to learn more about perspectives of law enforcement officers, their training, and about data collection, and not just work on the malice statute. “We can’t be sort of rushing to focus on one aspect — one very important aspect and that is perception of flaws in the law — but we need to sit back and continue to listen,” he said during the committee meeting. Sue Rahr, the executive director of the Criminal Justice Training Commission, said at the meeting that prosecuting officers for improper use of deadly force “isn’t enough” to reduce violent encounters with law enforcement. Police officers in Washington train at Rahr’s organization with the exception of the Washington State Patrol. Rahr is on the task force. “If the task force does change the law, that’s only going to solve one piece of the problem,” she said. “The problem is much bigger and much more complex than that.” GOING FORWARD Johnson and others have tried to soothe brewing discontent in the group. She reminded task force members there would be more meetings, and that they can schedule more than four if needed. Goodman promised a more collaborative approach to setting new meeting agendas. A minority report can be filed if task force members don’t agree with the final group report to the Legislature. Frockt said Monday that he was looking at the malice law “very seriously,” and feels “ a deep sense of obligation and gravity surrounding this given what’s happening around the country.” “There are people who are going to be clearly disappointed if we don’t make some changes in some Washington law,” he added. “I hope that this is not the situation where the task force goes through, does a lot of work and nothing really happens with it.” Quinn said he’s still optimistic that thorough work on the malice statute will come. But, he said, “there needs to be a demonstration that we need to address these issues.”

TPP Solves multiple extinction scenarios. Morimoto ‘15
Andy Morimoto is a research associate at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “The Strategic Costs of TPP Failure.” The Diplomat. August 22, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-strategic-costs-of-tpp-failure/ JJN
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is in trouble. Trade ministers failed last month to conclude the massive 12-nation trade deal by their hoped-for summer deadline, putting negotiations in danger of collapse. This is a problem. Trade advocates argue that letting the TPP die would be a significant lost opportunity for the global economy. But there’s a potentially bigger problem here – one that may have serious consequences for both U.S. national security and regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. Just consider the strategic backdrop against which last month’s negotiations occurred. Maritime disputes flaring across the South China Sea. Tensions rising between Beijing and Tokyo. Perennial friction between China and Taiwan and a growing nuclear stockpile in North Korea. If the TPP falls through, it could greatly hurt the America’s ability to stabilize the fraught geopolitics of Asia. Some have argued that a TPP failure would be a net positive for regional stability. The deal, they claim, would isolate and provoke China, and should therefore be abandoned. But this view is blinkered. Given the high trade volumes and trade arrangements across the Asia-pacific, China stands very little chance of being isolated. Moreover, Chinese officials have other ventures on their minds. According to He Weiwen, a former Chinese Commerce Ministry official, “the Chinese are more or less neutral because we have our own agenda, pushing forward ASEAN plus six and the Silk Road.” In fact, there are a number of reasons to believe that the opposite is true: that a TPP failure will cause a number of strategic problems for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. First, failure would mean stunting the growth of America’s Pacific partners. This is problematic for two reasons. Most importantly, fewer states would be devoting fewer resources to meet shared challenges like counterterrorism and climate change. In addition, as countries get richer and more interdependent, they become more invested in the well-being of their neighbors. And while free trade, interdependence, and prosperity do not guarantee stability and peace (see: World War I), they do create conditions that make conflict less appealing. Second, failure would create more potential for instability and crises. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which China and one of its neighbors along the South China Sea (say, Vietnam) get into a serious spat over territorial claims. With the TPP, this spat would be less likely to escalate into a full-blown crisis, as China understands that the U.S. is more inclined to intervene in situations that threaten its growing trade interests. Without the TPP, there is less clarity about U.S. resolve, so the potential for miscalculation and escalation increases. Third, failure would send a strong signal that the U.S. no longer has the political will to lead in the region. This would come at a time when allies are already uncertain of U.S. commitments. Earlier this week, for example, Japan’s trade minister expressed disappointment in last month’s trade meetings, saying “every TPP country wondered why the U.S. was quick to give up the conclusion without its usual relentless persistence.” If the U.S. allows negotiations to collapse, it would demonstrate the Obama administration’s declaration – that the U.S. is “all in, when it comes to the Asia-Pacific” – to be hollow. This has important geopolitical implications. If Asia’s great powers perceive the U.S. to be unserious about its role in the region, this will increase the incentive for the powerful regional states (i.e. China and Japan) to jockey with one another for regional hegemony. Finally, failure would be a missed opportunity for the U.S. economy – and America’s ability to project strength abroad rests on its economic foundation at home. According to an analysis from the Peterson Institute, U.S. income gains under the TPP would be significant, potentially adding $59 billion per year by 2020. Failing to conclude the TPP would forego these potential gains, and would make it more difficult for the U.S. to stem the defense cuts put in place by the sequester and invest in our military presence in the Asia-Pacific. The Nobel Prize winning economist Thomas Schelling noted that “trade is what most of international relations are about. For that reason trade policy is national security policy.” Today, U.S. trade policy – and indeed, its national security policy – are in danger of falling apart. Getting something as big and complicated as the TPP across the line won’t be easy. But given the smoldering flashpoints across Asia, the U.S. can hardly afford to squander any tools in its foreign policy toolkit. The stakes are too high.

Regional hegemony is key to stop nuke war.  Rudd 11

Rudd 11 – Kevin Rudd, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “The Case for American Engagement in Asia: The Australian Perspective”, 9-15, http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2011/kr_sp_110915.aspx?ministerid=2

THE GEO-STRATEGIC RAMIFICATIONS  But as nations change, so too do relations between nations.  The emergence of new powers inevitably brings new strategic complexity, as the power relativities of the 20th century give way to the new ones.  Asia will be vulnerable to a host of strategic uncertainties, arising from the need for new powers to integrate into the global economic and political order, and for the established powers to accommodate them.  The potential for misunderstanding — and the consequences of miscalculation — is also vast.  Tensions like those we see in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the Persian Gulf may become even more difficult to manage.  Make no mistake: these aren’t just regional problems.  Questions about the future of the South China Sea touch on every regional country’s future, given their global strategic and economic significance.  This theme isn't new, but what I can tell you about this strategic shift is that we — Australia and the United States — will face it as allies.  Sure, there is the possibility of instability in our region.  But we've faced the possibility of conflict — and actual conflict — together in the past.  Many different tests, circumstances and challenges have put the acid to our alliance since the ANZUS treaty was signed, 60 years ago.  We've been reminded again that the only time the ANZUS treaty has been formally invoked was ten years ago this week — in response to the attacks on September 11.  But military and intelligence cooperation with the US continues across a wide range of theatres within the framework of the Alliance.  Here in San Francisco — where the ANZUS treaty was signed, all those years ago — I'm reminded that Australian and American servicemen and women have fought, flown, sailed and — I'm reliably informed — surfed together since the Pacific War.  Today, that Alliance continues to grow in meaning and intensity.  We are fighting together in Afghanistan; working together against global threats like piracy; and responding together to natural disasters across the region.  For us, for our relationship, the end of the Cold War hasn’t meant a downgrading of the importance of our Alliance — if anything, it’s become more intense and more important.  So as we face the challenges of the 21st Century — the challenges of the shift of power to Asia — we will do so together.  We’re working together to ensure our forces are aligned in the right way to provide for the national security of our two countries, and to help us shape the emerging regional environment.  Our forces have to be able to respond to the range of contingencies that can arise in our region, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  Increasingly, we aren’t just working with each other, but with other regional players.  I'm not just talking about the Pacific, or the Asia-Pacific.  The critical region for our future now extends to include the Indian Ocean as well.  The growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean starts with India's rise.  India is the largest democracy in the world.  Forecast to be the third largest economy in the world in coming decades, it is in the interest of both the United States and Australia for India to play the role of a major international power.  For now, India’s focus remains South Asia.  But its strategic weight is increasing with its increasing economic size and strength.  India is increasingly looking east with interest, both for strategic and economic reasons, and because of long-standing cultural connections.  But the importance of the Indian Ocean also lies in its unique role in maritime security and sea lines of communication for a much larger group of economies, both in Europe and Asia.  Lying between the Middle East energy sources and the dynamic global engine room of Asia, its importance grows with each passing year.  The pressures on the Gulf and West Indian Ocean choke points will intensify, as India grows and East Asian centres of growth remain reliant on Gulf energy and African resources.  In the 21st Century, questions of resource, energy and food security are becoming more vital than ever.  As Robert Kaplan says, the Indian Ocean is once again at the heart of the world, as it was in ancient and medieval times.  THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES  The United States has been a guarantor of security and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific for decades.   But the 21st Century will demand more.  As the world changes, it's even more critical that the US builds its engagement with our region.  As the United States transitions back from tough and unforgiving wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it might seem tempting to resist the case for further international engagement.  President Obama has already rightly intensified US involvement with East Asia.  It remains the case, in one way or another, that the United States is vital in solving common problems collectively.  No other power is able or willing to support essential global public goods — like the free movement of trade, capital and people around the world.  Sea-lane security, regional security in critical regions like the Gulf, open markets, the reserve currency, deep and liquid capital markets — who else provides these global public goods?  America has faced these questions before.  On the eve of entry into World War II, Henry Luce's seminal editorial in Life magazine on the American Century was much more than a statement about relative power, as America assumed its position in the new order.  It was a call for American leadership in international affairs.  It is in America’s interest and the world’s interest to provide that leadership — because in its absence, the risks grow that we will see destabilisation that threatens us all.  The interdependence of our economies has been shown clearly by the financial crisis, and a collapse in the conditions for open trade would be an economic disaster for all trading nations.  I share President Obama's view that America can neither retreat from "responsibility as an anchor of global security" nor "confront... every evil that can be found abroad".  But President Obama talked of the need for a "more centered course" — and that lies in a deep US engagement in Asia.  I believe the vast majority of the countries of Asia welcome that continued and expanded American strategic role in our hemisphere.  As Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono said in November 2008, as the financial crisis was wreaking havoc upon us, “none of these global challenges can be addressed by the world community without having America onboard. And conversely, none of these issues can be resolved by the United States alone.”  And as Lee Kuan Yew said a year later, “the consensus in ASEAN is that the US remains irreplaceable in East Asia.”  In the 21st Century, the US needs substantial, sophisticated, nimble engagement in the region.  

AC

Adv 1: so many alt causes to US human rights cred: Drone strikes, gitmo, torture, etc.

Adv 2: Tech shift n/b to CP solves. The CP leads to less surveillance by cops and protects privacy more.

New reports and the shiftiness of the government prove the aff does nothing.
--newest reports prove
--NSA had said they ended domestic email collection, but continued doing it under foreign email collection programs
--it’s part of an endless shell-game
--the NSA will create it secretly and we won’t learn about it until later
Peterson 11/20/15 --- covers technology for the Washington Post (Andrea, “Why it’s so hard to keep up with how the U.S. government is spying on its own people”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/11/20/why-its-so-hard-to-keep-up-with-how-the-u-s-government-is-spying-on-its-own-people/)//trepka
Since 2013, Americans have gained immense insight about how the government conducts digital spying programs, largely thanks to the revelations made by former security contractor Edward Snowden. But a new report shows it's really hard to keep track of all the ways the United States is snooping on its own people. After Snowden revealed the National Security Agency was collecting data en masse about American e-mails, the government said it had ended that particular program in 2011. But it turns out that didn't really stop the NSA from being able to suck data about Americans' e-mails: Instead, the government was able to replace the key functions of that program by relying on legal methods designed to collect information about foreigners, according to a NSA Inspector General report obtained by the New York Times via a Freedom of Information Act suit. And because those methods focused on overseas collection, or collection aimed at non-U.S. citizens, they largely had less oversight than the now-defunct domestic e-mail records program. "This is yet another trick move in the never-ending shell game that the NSA is playing with the American people, and apparently with the secret court whose oversight it is trying to evade," said Kevin Bankston, the director of New America's Open Technology Institute. "New rule: if the NSA claims that a particular surveillance program has ended, or that a particular type of surveillance has halted 'under this program,' assume that it is still going on in another program." There is a reason for all the secrecy: The government argues it has a vested interest in keeping capabilities secret so that terrorists and other targets aren't able to figure out how to evade surveillance. That's one of the reasons some intelligence officials were quick to blame Snowden in the wake of the recent Paris attacks, arguing his revelations may have given terrorists a road map for how evade detection. "Iin the past several years because of a number of unauthorized disclosures and a lot of handwringing over the government’s role in the effort to try to uncover these terrorists, there have been some policy and legal and other actions that are taken that make our ability collectively internationally to find these terrorists much more challenging," CIA Director John Brennan said Monday at a Washington conference. But no evidence has yet emerged that the attacks were coordinated using tools that protected communications through encryption, a security tool Snowden often recommends to everyday users looking to ensure their digital privacy. In fact, the information available so far suggests that the attackers sent an unencrypted text to coordinate the launch of the attack, and several of them had been known to Belgian investigators. The lack of transparency and public awareness of how Americans' data was being collected is also one of the reasons Snowden said he was compelled to come forward with information about government spying. “My sole motive is to inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them,” he wrote in a note that accompanied the first document he leaked to The Washington Post. But big disclosures such as Snowden's come along rarely. And now we're seeing that reporting on these programs is like a sort of like playing whack-a-mole: Even if one program appears to have ended, others spring up in their place -- and the general public often doesn't learn about them until years after they've taken effect.

The aff’s circumvented by states and contracting --- all that is net worse
Goldfarb et al 15 --- Legal Scholar (Ronald, also with David Cole, Edward Wasserman, Tom Blanton, Hodding Carter, Jon Mills, Barry Siegel, “After Snowden: Privacy, Secrecy, and Security in the Information Age”, Google Books)trepka
Another former intelligence official suggested that as a practical matter, the controversial programs Snowden disclosed may be curtailed for economic reasons, especially if their utility is of dubious value.  Further, he speculates, there may be worse incursions of privacy by local and state police officials whose gathering and collating of their terrorism surveillance are likely to be available to federal intelligence agencies.  Still another expert suggested that one of the problems with the post-9/11 national security process is that the NSA hired many contractors to do what its employees did in the past. 

Those contractors are not federal entities which means the plan text and durable fiat don’t solve the total lack of liability
Lumb 15 --- Partner at Corboy and Demetrio (Kenneth, “Federal Tort Pitfall”, http://www.corboydemetrio.com/media/publication/77_Trial_2015_05May_Lumb_Federal20tort20pitfalls_reprint.pdf)//trepka
The United States contracts with a wide range of people and entities to provide services to the government and citizens. With the exception of relationships created by a “personal services” contract, contractors are not italics in original federal employees, and the United States is not vicariously liable for their negligence.

Tournament: Damus | Round: 5 | Opponent: Brentwood EL | Judge: Dan Miyamoto
1NC CP
Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies
- Governments responsible for police officers should enact statutes requiring them to respond to claims of IPV, and establish that the officers are liable for failing to respond. 

We have a solvency advocate available on spot from Hill 15 – I can show in CX or prep

This is what their AC Bishop author advocates as the best solution 

Gary M. Bishop, Section 1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction, 30 B.C.L. Rev. 1357 (1989), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol30/iss5/3
In the absence of such statutes, battered survivors women must seek other means by which to impose liability upon passive police officers. Overzealous police officers may be held liable under section 1983 when they use more force than necessary to place a person in custody, but courts are somewhat more reluctant to impose liability upon police officers who fail to act. 17Drawing upon the general principle that a state actor may violate section 1983 by failing to lend aid to an individual who is in need, courts have begun to recognize that police must assist battered women and must be held accountable for their failure to do so if certain conditions are pres- ent.' 9Some courts have used equal protection analysis as a means to impose liability upon passive police officers. 2° That is, if a com- parison between police response to domestic violence calls and po- lice response to general assault calls reveals that police officers treat domestic violence calls less seriously, the evidence may be sufficient to constitute an equal protection violation. 21Police officers may also be held liable for failure to aid battered women if a special rela- tionship exists between the officer and the victim. 22In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to define clearly the conditions necessary to establish such a special relationship in recognizing a section 1983 claim against police offi- cers who failed to lend assistance to a victim of domestic violence in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department." The 1989 United States Supreme Court case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services seriously undercuts the Balistreri court's efforts, and those of other courts, to provide battered women with a remedy against passive police officers. 24 Prior to DeShaney, courts had imposed a duty to act upon police officers based on the officers' authority to enforce the law, 25 on statutorily prescribed duties, 26 and on the theory of a "special relationship"27 between the victim and the police officer. DeShaney substantially narrowed the circumstances under which a special relationship may arise, 28 thus forcing lower courts to rely upon alternate legal doctrines to aid battered women. This note examines the avenues that are still open to battered women who sue passive police officers, including the limited special relationship concept. Section 1 surveys the various theories that courts have applied to determine when police officers have a duty to act.29 Section II explores the way that courts have utilized the duty-to-act theories in evaluating section 1983 claims of battered women against police officers." Section III analyzes the law regarding battered women and offers some recommendations to these women who bring section 1983 claims against passive police officers. 31 Section IV concludes that the enactment of statutes imposing liability on police officers who fail to take the proper action to protect battered women is the most effective solution to the problem. I. FAILURE TO ACT UNDER SECTION 1983 The language of section 1983 seems to require that a state actor undertake some affirmative act before he or she falls within the statute's purview. 32 Therefore, the threshold question in this area is whether a police officer's failure to act comes within the reach of words such as "cause" or "subject," which both imply positive action. There are a variety of theories under which section 1983 liability has been held to apply to police officers' failure to act. Under the law enforcement theory, a police officer who ignores the duty imposed upon him by his office and fails to aid someone who is within the officer's reach may be held liable under section 1983." The courts have also relied upon statutes that impose upon police officers a duty to act under certain conditions. 34 Finally, the courts have developed the special realtionship concept, und er which police have a duty to act under narrow circumstances." The failure-to-act doctrine is one that the courts began to developed outside of the survivors battered  women context. In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Azar v. Conley that section 1983 is applicable to acts of omission as well as com- mission." Thus, an officer's failure to take steps to aid an individual—an omission—may be actionable under section 1983, just as an officer's actions (i.e., police brutality)—commission—may be deemed actionable. " In Azar, Mr. Conley and his friends and relatives harassed and intimidated Mr. Azar and the other members of his family." The Akron police took no action to assist the Azars. Mr. Conley was a police officer, and the plaintiffs alleged that the members of the force did not want to say anything about possible wrongdoing by a fellow officer. 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)

The CP Solves the Case 

1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
   Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
   This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as *906 Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work. Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization. Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched. The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized? For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing *907 programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325
   2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations
   Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
   First, even a highly effective LOPRB providing quality policy recommendations to a police department would likely encounter some department resistance to the civilian oversight. This resistance may be created because of police department views of a civilian entity "meddling" or just the potential perception of an adversarial relationship between the *1058 LOPRB and police department. n207 However, the structure of LOPRBs help overcome most of this resistance traditionally leveled against civilian oversight from police departments. The emphasis on policy review, rather than complaint review, means that LOPRBs will not directly regulate individual police officers but rather the department as a whole. This change in focus will likely reduce the intensity of any police department resistance because the potential adversarial relationship will be between the LOPRB and the police department instead of individual officers. n208 Furthermore, any resistance can be ameliorated by public pressure on police departments to enact the LOPRB's policy recommendations. The LOPRB's outreach will inform the local community of the use of data-collection technologies, potentially generating popular support behind LOPRB recommendations. LOPRBs can thus indirectly enforce their recommendations through utilizing that popular support and pressure on police departments. That indirect pressure on police departments will help reduce potential police department resistance because policy changes brought about through public pressure will be a reaction by the police department to the public at large, rather than directly reacting to the adversarial LOPRB. Thus, while police department resistance likely cannot be completely overcome, LOPRBs can ameliorate this traditional civilian oversight problem.

4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61

The net benefit is Tech Shift
A. Absent established, oppositional civilian review police harassment will shift to technology based surveillance which avoids rights protections
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
Technology has provided police departments with powerful tools to collect extensive data on private citizens. Those tools have captured images of every license plate passing through an intersection; n1 used facial-recognition technology to determine whether Super Bowl attendees had criminal records; n2 and implemented multi-technology systems that "aggregate and analyze information from approximately 3,000 surveil-lance cameras around the city ... ." n3 New technologies allow police departments to collect a range of data on the public space, including private citizens not under investigation, raising concerns regarding how that data may be used in the future. n4 And as storage and database capabilities have become cheaper and more efficient, the potential for expansive databases has become not only a science-fiction trope n5 but a reality. n6 *1030 But despite potential, these new tools fit poorly within the current regulatory framework. Police departments have embraced the information age with little guidance or oversight, raising significant privacy concerns regarding the effect of mass-data collection on the privacy rights the general public has enjoyed for centuries. n7 At the same time, current regulatory mechanisms have not adequately addressed how police departments should use cutting-edge surveillance technologies. n8 Such regulatory mechanisms often are inhibited by conflicting motivations n9 or poorly adapted to technological change. n10 Scholars have proposed a variety of solutions to address the privacy and criminal law concerns raised by these "data-collection technologies," but these approaches often provide inadequate flexibility to local jurisdictions to address their unique problems n11 or focus too narrowly on correcting a particular, novel iteration of the problem. n12 *1031 To overcome this regulatory deficit, civilian oversight can provide effective regulatory oversight of police departments' use of new and emerging technologies. Specifically, I argue that a specialized form of civilian oversight, the "Loyal Opposition" Policy Review Board (LOPRB), would function as a regulatory mechanism that not only provides proactive regulatory guidance on technology usage by police departments but would also allow for that guidance to be specifically tailored to the local community. n13 LOPRBs, composed of members who are informed on and invested in technology and civil rights, would undertake policy review of police department procedures for the use of new technologies and recommend "best practices" approaches to ensuring that individual privacy rights and police department investigative needs are effectively balanced. n14 Such a civilian oversight mechanism would ensure that the privacy concerns of the average citizen remain protected as new technologies are incorporated into the daily operations of police departments.
B. Civil rights focus fails- it takes a black and white approach to police conduct that ensures resistance
Schlanger, 15 – Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan (Margo, “Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 6, pg. 112, 2015, Lexis)
I have suggested that rights discourse tends to sweep under the rug the messiness of civil liberties protections--the policy issues that lie at the core of civil liberties interests. That messiness will be apparent in what follows; there are no magic bullets here. But a measure can be useful even if messy or compromised. It is possible that that none of the offices described below will accomplish very much. It seems to me, however, that soft administrative measures are useful tools in the civil liberties toolkit, well worth trying by a principal--whether that principal is the President or the Congress--who wants to give more priority to civil liberties but lacks the institutional capacity to do so directly and repeatedly over time. Each of these three offices might represent civil liberties interests more systematically than current arrangements, and might advocate for more liberty protective government protocols and programs. It is worth emphasizing, too, that measures such as these might have not just cumulative but also mutually reinforcing effects, creating a civil liberties cadre with security clearances, who might assist each other in a variety of ways. n360 In addition to promoting civil liberties/privacy interstitially, offices like these assist other more authoritative rulemakers to understand the civil liberties implications of their choices. For example, they can help Congress in its otherwise very difficult oversight task, flagging issues that need more congressional attention. n361 And in several different ways, they may increase public access to otherwise secret matters, which in turn increases pressure on those authoritative rulemakers: They generate reports--both public and private--which can be used by Congress and the public. n362 And they build relationships with non-governmental organizations that promote increased official disclosure. My argument is not that offices like these are a cure-all  *193  for achieving optimal policy, but that they may be a useful part of a complicated ecology.

TPP
TPP is predicted to pass, but there’s no time to waste. Mitchell ‘11/2
Peter Mitchell - AAP US Correspondent, Australian Associated Press. “US: White House bullish on TPP passing.” News.com.au. November 2, 2016. http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/us-white-house-bullish-on-tpp-passing/news-story/66aaccb30c94f3301f95fa652040190f JJN
US President Barack Obama's top Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiator has bullishly predicted the trade deal will be approved by Congress after next week's presidential election if congressional leaders bring it up for a vote. Michael Froman also warned if Congress does not ratify the 12-nation free trade proposal Australia, China and other nations will swoop in and steal markets from the US in the Asia-Pacific. "It's up to the congressional leadership to decide to bring it forward," Mr Froman told CNBC on Tuesday. "If they bring it forward I think we can get the votes there." Presidential frontrunners Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both oppose the TPP and members of Congress, many who are also up for re-election next Tuesday, have been reluctant to show public support for the contentious trade pact. Mr Obama and Mr Froman are hoping the the anti-trade sentiment will recede after the election and members of Congress will be willing to ratify it before Mr Obama moves out of the White House in January. "I think the key thing is the rest of the world isn't standing by whether it is China negotiating its own trade agreements or the EU, Canada or Australia or others, they are going to move ahead and get access to these markets at our expense," Mr Froman said. "Our market share is actually in decline in some of these important, fast growing and large markets so it is awfully important we show leadership." The TPP signatories are: Australia, the US, New Zealand, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru.

TPP is top of Obama’s priorities, PC is key. Creighton ‘10/27
Adam Creighton – economics correspondent Washington. “Hope for TPP as Obama administration works the phones.” The Australian Business Review. October 27, 2016. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/economics/hope-for-tpp-as-obama-administration-works-the-phones/news-story/8ce5e112900eb06ca2bb0711d3aa16ce JJN
The world’s biggest free trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Australian officials have written off as a casualty of a fierce anti-trade backlash in the US, has an almost even chance of success in Congress, according to people familiar with the matter in Washington DC. The Obama administration has been hitting the phones and sending cabinet ministers to remote US towns in an unprecedented bid to persuade Congress to pass the controversial Asia-Pacific trade deal among 12 countries. Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have repudiated the deal. The former top economics adviser to Vice-President Joe Biden, Jared Bernstein, said the chance the TPP would be passed after November 8 but before the new president took office was almost 50 per cent, offering hope for the deal signed by the Turnbull government and 11 other nations in February, which frees up trade and investment across 40 per cent of the world’s GDP. “I think the probability is a lot higher than conventional wisdom on the street; I’d give it a 45 per cent chance,” said Mr Bernstein. He said President Obama would certainly send the deal to Congress whoever won the election. “What’s interesting is just how (hard) the administration is working it … full-court press behind the scenes,” he said. “More than on healthcare, more than on stimulus, more than on financial reform: it’s remarkable,” added Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizens Global Trade Watch. She said cabinet ministers had been traipsing the country trying to convince wavering Congressmen. “They are working the phones to a degree that actually is really interesting; cabinet secretary folks are once or twice a week since April calling House members who they might have any kind of chance with,” she added. “The odds of stopping it are slightly better, but it’s close.” Ambassador Joe Hockey and visiting Turnbull government ministers have been strenuously promoting the TPP in Washington, but confidence that the deal — which is also being sold as a way to entrench US and Australian commercial norms in a region increasingly dominated by China — will pass has dwindled significantly. Consonant with the mix of confected and genuine dissatisfaction with the TPP that permeates Republican and Democrat ranks in Congress, Republican congressman Kevin Brady earlier told The Australian the deal wouldn’t pass without additional protections for intellectual property, which Australia has publicly ruled out. Ms Wallach and Mr Bernstein, now at the Centre for Budget Priorities, by contrast argued the TPP deal had been captured by US corporate interests, and should be renegotiated to pare back the extra patent and intellectual property protections demanded by the US on behalf of its pharmaceutical industry. They also want to see clauses outlawing currency manipulation and removing investor-state dispute clauses that potentially limit governments’ freedom to make policies that damage foreign commercial interests. The TPP would be the first trade agreement to be rejected by Congress. If it doesn’t pass in the “lame duck” session — before the new house, senate and president are in place — it will be very unlikely the US would begin new trade negotiations given the febrile environment. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has made rewriting or rescinding US trade agreements the centrepiece of his economic strategy. “One of the reasons it’s 45 per cent (chance of success) and not 25 per cent is because … the undecideds are getting much more pressure from the administration than from (labour groups),” said Mr Bernstein. “Democrat and Republican elites have literally for decades ignored the costs of trade.”
The plan sparks congressional debate. Orenstein ‘16
WALKER ORENSTEIN. “Reform advocates upset over pushback over changing malice law.” The News Tribune. July 29, 2016. http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article92684372.html JJN
When an effort by state lawmakers to make prosecuting police for improper use of deadly force easier stalled last year, legislators compromised. They agreed to let a task force study the issue and recommend policy to next year’s Legislature on how to reduce violent interactions involving law enforcement. But some on the state-appointed committee, which had its second meeting Tuesday, say lawmakers overseeing the panel are filibustering even a dialogue about changing controversial state law regulating police use of deadly force. Amending state statute on the subject was a key component of reform-advocates’ demands that spurred the task force. It’s also the subject of a proposed initiative to the Legislature that would amend the law if enacted. Washington’s law is regarded as unique in the country. Convicting an officer for using deadly force requires proof the officer acted with “malice.” It’s a standard many, including the American Civil Liberties Union, have said is more or less impossible to meet, effectively giving police immunity when they use deadly force. Some committee members say changing the law would reduce police use of deadly force, a stated end-goal of the task force. Others on the panel have pushed back, saying changing the statute won’t help that cause. The split could derail what Karen Johnson, chairwoman of the Black Alliance of Thurston County, described as a “golden opportunity” to be a “national model” for discourse between law enforcement and police reform advocates. ‘SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY’ De’Sean Quinn, a member of the state’s African American Commission on the task force, said he wants the group to be “action oriented.” Real action for him might include recommending the state collect data on police use of force to easier analyze how to reduce it, he said. But the key aim, he said, is to reach consensus on how to change Washington’s malice law, particularly in light of the recent police killings of Philando Castile in Minnesota and Alton Sterling in Louisiana. “I feel a sense of responsibility for my kids that we really try and address this issue,” Quinn, who has two sons, said in an interview. Gerald Hankerson, a member of the committee and president of the NAACP of Alaska, Oregon and Washington, said lawmakers and some law enforcement officials on the panel have been hesitant to broach the topic in seriousness. Others on the task force agree. Tuesday’s meeting centered mostly on law enforcement training. Toshiko Hasegawa, appointed to the task force as a member of the state’s Asian American Commission, called out lawmakers during committee session, saying they were avoiding a deeper discussion on changing the law by “hiding behind procedure.” She added in a later phone interview that committee co-chairman Sen. Kirk Pearson, R-Monroe, was deliberately avoiding the topic. “Why is the police task force on deadly force not discussing deadly force?” Hasegawa asked. The task force is required to meet only four times. Johnson, Quinn, Hasegawa and others signed a letter sent to Pearson and co-chairman Rep. Roger Goodman, D-Kirkland, before Tuesday’s meeting, asking for clearer guidelines on discussing the malice statute and more input on meeting agendas. Quinn said he felt work on the statute was being ducked, and said the Legislature is not responding fast enough to outcries for police reform in the country. “It’s not OK to not deal with the difficult issues,” he said. Although the Legislature is not obligated to act on task force recommendations, “consensus with law enforcement” on legal changes “would be significant for the Legislature going forward,” said Sen. David Frockt, D-Seattle. Rather than building consensus, the meetings so far have “almost been like it’s a dog and pony show,” Hankerson said. ‘NOT THE FIRST THING ON MY MIND’ Rep. Dave Hayes, R-Camano Island, is a sergeant with the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office and one of four legislators on the panel. He said the task force should look at all sorts of avenues to reduce violent interactions involving police, and said changing Washington’s malice standard is “definitely not the first thing on my mind.” Added Hayes: “I don’t believe that changing the statute is going to fix anything.” He said he expects the result of the task force to be “a couple bills regarding data collection and how we use that data to make our local law enforcement officers better.” He cautioned the Legislature would have to weigh the cost of those bills to not place a burden on local law enforcement departments. Pearson, who left before the conclusion of Tuesday’s meeting, did not return calls or messages from The News Tribune asking for comment. On Tuesday, he said reviewing past applications of the malice statute is “beyond” what the committee was designed to do. Goodman said at the meeting the task force needs to learn more about perspectives of law enforcement officers, their training, and about data collection, and not just work on the malice statute. “We can’t be sort of rushing to focus on one aspect — one very important aspect and that is perception of flaws in the law — but we need to sit back and continue to listen,” he said during the committee meeting. Sue Rahr, the executive director of the Criminal Justice Training Commission, said at the meeting that prosecuting officers for improper use of deadly force “isn’t enough” to reduce violent encounters with law enforcement. Police officers in Washington train at Rahr’s organization with the exception of the Washington State Patrol. Rahr is on the task force. “If the task force does change the law, that’s only going to solve one piece of the problem,” she said. “The problem is much bigger and much more complex than that.” GOING FORWARD Johnson and others have tried to soothe brewing discontent in the group. She reminded task force members there would be more meetings, and that they can schedule more than four if needed. Goodman promised a more collaborative approach to setting new meeting agendas. A minority report can be filed if task force members don’t agree with the final group report to the Legislature. Frockt said Monday that he was looking at the malice law “very seriously,” and feels “ a deep sense of obligation and gravity surrounding this given what’s happening around the country.” “There are people who are going to be clearly disappointed if we don’t make some changes in some Washington law,” he added. “I hope that this is not the situation where the task force goes through, does a lot of work and nothing really happens with it.” Quinn said he’s still optimistic that thorough work on the malice statute will come. But, he said, “there needs to be a demonstration that we need to address these issues.”

Plan kills Obama’s agenda
KRINER 10 Assistant professor of political science at Boston University Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, page 276-77
One of the mechanisms by which congressional opposition influences presidential cost-benefit calculations is by sending signals of American disunity to the target state. Measuring the effects of such congressional signals on the calculations of the target state is always difficult. In the case of Iraq it is exceedingly so, given the lack of data on the non-state insurgent actors who were the true “target” of the American occupation after the fall of the Hussein regime. Similarly, in the absence of archival documents, such as those from the Reagan Presidential Library presented in chapter 5, it is all but impossible to measure the effects of congressional signals on the administration’s perceptions of the military costs it would have to pay to achieve its objectives militarily. By contrast. measuring the domestic political costs of congressional opposition, while still difficult, is at least a tractable endeavor. Chapter 2 posited two primary pathways through which congressional opposition could raise the political costs of staying the course militarily for the president. First. high-profile congressional challenges to a use of force can affect real or anticipated public opinion and bring popular pressures to bear on the president to change course. Second, congressional opposition to the president’s conduct of military affairs can compel him to spend considerable political capital in the military arena to the detriment of other major items on his programmatic agenda. On both of these dimensions, congressional opposition to the war in Iraq appears to have had the predicted effect.  

Solves multiple extinction scenarios. Morimoto ‘15
Andy Morimoto is a research associate at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “The Strategic Costs of TPP Failure.” The Diplomat. August 22, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-strategic-costs-of-tpp-failure/ JJN
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is in trouble. Trade ministers failed last month to conclude the massive 12-nation trade deal by their hoped-for summer deadline, putting negotiations in danger of collapse. This is a problem. Trade advocates argue that letting the TPP die would be a significant lost opportunity for the global economy. But there’s a potentially bigger problem here – one that may have serious consequences for both U.S. national security and regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. Just consider the strategic backdrop against which last month’s negotiations occurred. Maritime disputes flaring across the South China Sea. Tensions rising between Beijing and Tokyo. Perennial friction between China and Taiwan and a growing nuclear stockpile in North Korea. If the TPP falls through, it could greatly hurt the America’s ability to stabilize the fraught geopolitics of Asia. Some have argued that a TPP failure would be a net positive for regional stability. The deal, they claim, would isolate and provoke China, and should therefore be abandoned. But this view is blinkered. Given the high trade volumes and trade arrangements across the Asia-pacific, China stands very little chance of being isolated. Moreover, Chinese officials have other ventures on their minds. According to He Weiwen, a former Chinese Commerce Ministry official, “the Chinese are more or less neutral because we have our own agenda, pushing forward ASEAN plus six and the Silk Road.” In fact, there are a number of reasons to believe that the opposite is true: that a TPP failure will cause a number of strategic problems for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. First, failure would mean stunting the growth of America’s Pacific partners. This is problematic for two reasons. Most importantly, fewer states would be devoting fewer resources to meet shared challenges like counterterrorism and climate change. In addition, as countries get richer and more interdependent, they become more invested in the well-being of their neighbors. And while free trade, interdependence, and prosperity do not guarantee stability and peace (see: World War I), they do create conditions that make conflict less appealing. Second, failure would create more potential for instability and crises. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which China and one of its neighbors along the South China Sea (say, Vietnam) get into a serious spat over territorial claims. With the TPP, this spat would be less likely to escalate into a full-blown crisis, as China understands that the U.S. is more inclined to intervene in situations that threaten its growing trade interests. Without the TPP, there is less clarity about U.S. resolve, so the potential for miscalculation and escalation increases. Third, failure would send a strong signal that the U.S. no longer has the political will to lead in the region. This would come at a time when allies are already uncertain of U.S. commitments. Earlier this week, for example, Japan’s trade minister expressed disappointment in last month’s trade meetings, saying “every TPP country wondered why the U.S. was quick to give up the conclusion without its usual relentless persistence.” If the U.S. allows negotiations to collapse, it would demonstrate the Obama administration’s declaration – that the U.S. is “all in, when it comes to the Asia-Pacific” – to be hollow. This has important geopolitical implications. If Asia’s great powers perceive the U.S. to be unserious about its role in the region, this will increase the incentive for the powerful regional states (i.e. China and Japan) to jockey with one another for regional hegemony. Finally, failure would be a missed opportunity for the U.S. economy – and America’s ability to project strength abroad rests on its economic foundation at home. According to an analysis from the Peterson Institute, U.S. income gains under the TPP would be significant, potentially adding $59 billion per year by 2020. Failing to conclude the TPP would forego these potential gains, and would make it more difficult for the U.S. to stem the defense cuts put in place by the sequester and invest in our military presence in the Asia-Pacific. The Nobel Prize winning economist Thomas Schelling noted that “trade is what most of international relations are about. For that reason trade policy is national security policy.” Today, U.S. trade policy – and indeed, its national security policy – are in danger of falling apart. Getting something as big and complicated as the TPP across the line won’t be easy. But given the smoldering flashpoints across Asia, the U.S. can hardly afford to squander any tools in its foreign policy toolkit. The stakes are too high.

Regional hegemony is key to stop nuke war.  Rudd 11

Rudd 11 – Kevin Rudd, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “The Case for American Engagement in Asia: The Australian Perspective”, 9-15, http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2011/kr_sp_110915.aspx?ministerid=2

THE GEO-STRATEGIC RAMIFICATIONS  But as nations change, so too do relations between nations.  The emergence of new powers inevitably brings new strategic complexity, as the power relativities of the 20th century give way to the new ones.  Asia will be vulnerable to a host of strategic uncertainties, arising from the need for new powers to integrate into the global economic and political order, and for the established powers to accommodate them.  The potential for misunderstanding — and the consequences of miscalculation — is also vast.  Tensions like those we see in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the Persian Gulf may become even more difficult to manage.  Make no mistake: these aren’t just regional problems.  Questions about the future of the South China Sea touch on every regional country’s future, given their global strategic and economic significance.  This theme isn't new, but what I can tell you about this strategic shift is that we — Australia and the United States — will face it as allies.  Sure, there is the possibility of instability in our region.  But we've faced the possibility of conflict — and actual conflict — together in the past.  Many different tests, circumstances and challenges have put the acid to our alliance since the ANZUS treaty was signed, 60 years ago.  We've been reminded again that the only time the ANZUS treaty has been formally invoked was ten years ago this week — in response to the attacks on September 11.  But military and intelligence cooperation with the US continues across a wide range of theatres within the framework of the Alliance.  Here in San Francisco — where the ANZUS treaty was signed, all those years ago — I'm reminded that Australian and American servicemen and women have fought, flown, sailed and — I'm reliably informed — surfed together since the Pacific War.  Today, that Alliance continues to grow in meaning and intensity.  We are fighting together in Afghanistan; working together against global threats like piracy; and responding together to natural disasters across the region.  For us, for our relationship, the end of the Cold War hasn’t meant a downgrading of the importance of our Alliance — if anything, it’s become more intense and more important.  So as we face the challenges of the 21st Century — the challenges of the shift of power to Asia — we will do so together.  We’re working together to ensure our forces are aligned in the right way to provide for the national security of our two countries, and to help us shape the emerging regional environment.  Our forces have to be able to respond to the range of contingencies that can arise in our region, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  Increasingly, we aren’t just working with each other, but with other regional players.  I'm not just talking about the Pacific, or the Asia-Pacific.  The critical region for our future now extends to include the Indian Ocean as well.  The growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean starts with India's rise.  India is the largest democracy in the world.  Forecast to be the third largest economy in the world in coming decades, it is in the interest of both the United States and Australia for India to play the role of a major international power.  For now, India’s focus remains South Asia.  But its strategic weight is increasing with its increasing economic size and strength.  India is increasingly looking east with interest, both for strategic and economic reasons, and because of long-standing cultural connections.  But the importance of the Indian Ocean also lies in its unique role in maritime security and sea lines of communication for a much larger group of economies, both in Europe and Asia.  Lying between the Middle East energy sources and the dynamic global engine room of Asia, its importance grows with each passing year.  The pressures on the Gulf and West Indian Ocean choke points will intensify, as India grows and East Asian centres of growth remain reliant on Gulf energy and African resources.  In the 21st Century, questions of resource, energy and food security are becoming more vital than ever.  As Robert Kaplan says, the Indian Ocean is once again at the heart of the world, as it was in ancient and medieval times.  THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES  The United States has been a guarantor of security and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific for decades.   But the 21st Century will demand more.  As the world changes, it's even more critical that the US builds its engagement with our region.  As the United States transitions back from tough and unforgiving wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it might seem tempting to resist the case for further international engagement.  President Obama has already rightly intensified US involvement with East Asia.  It remains the case, in one way or another, that the United States is vital in solving common problems collectively.  No other power is able or willing to support essential global public goods — like the free movement of trade, capital and people around the world.  Sea-lane security, regional security in critical regions like the Gulf, open markets, the reserve currency, deep and liquid capital markets — who else provides these global public goods?  America has faced these questions before.  On the eve of entry into World War II, Henry Luce's seminal editorial in Life magazine on the American Century was much more than a statement about relative power, as America assumed its position in the new order.  It was a call for American leadership in international affairs.  It is in America’s interest and the world’s interest to provide that leadership — because in its absence, the risks grow that we will see destabilisation that threatens us all.  The interdependence of our economies has been shown clearly by the financial crisis, and a collapse in the conditions for open trade would be an economic disaster for all trading nations.  I share President Obama's view that America can neither retreat from "responsibility as an anchor of global security" nor "confront... every evil that can be found abroad".  But President Obama talked of the need for a "more centered course" — and that lies in a deep US engagement in Asia.  I believe the vast majority of the countries of Asia welcome that continued and expanded American strategic role in our hemisphere.  As Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono said in November 2008, as the financial crisis was wreaking havoc upon us, “none of these global challenges can be addressed by the world community without having America onboard. And conversely, none of these issues can be resolved by the United States alone.”  And as Lee Kuan Yew said a year later, “the consensus in ASEAN is that the US remains irreplaceable in East Asia.”  In the 21st Century, the US needs substantial, sophisticated, nimble engagement in the region.  

Case
We’ll go through their evidence and demonstrate the problems

Gray says lack of GOVERNMENT accountability is the problem- even when mandatory response laws are passed police command don’t enforce them. It also says the lack of an affirmative right to police action is a problem- the aff doesn’t fix either of these problems 

Lela Gray, J.D. Candidate, Albany Law School, 2011; B.A., University of South Florida, 2007. “Municipal Accountability in Domestic Violence: A Promising New Case,” http://www.albanygovernmentlawreview.org/Articles/Vol04_1/4.1.362-Gray.pdf
In this paper, I argue that one reason for the continued existence of this IPV domestic violence plague is the lack of local government and law enforcement accountability. In Part I of this paper, I discuss the general rule that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers no affirmative right to governmental protection, and the two exceptions to the general rule. I posit that even though these two exceptions were supposed to enhance governmental accountability, the courts’ interpretation of these exceptions has meant that municipalities and the police are seldom held responsible in claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983 claims), even when they fail to adhere to the laws. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported in 1978 that on the issue of intimate violence, “the most serious law enforcement problem . . . is the failure of the police to respond to a call for help.”14 Six years later, the U.S. Attorney General’s Office announced a nationwide failure of law enforcement to respond adequately in IPV domestic violence cases.15 Reports like these spurred the passage of mandatory arrest policies in many states;16 however, in the 1990’s the studies and reports on IPV domestic violence continued to show an overall inadequate police response to the problem.17 One reason for the inadequate response is a lack of local government and law enforcement accountability. Expanding the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process exceptions would help cure this problem.

Their stein Evidence is not a solvency advocate- it is not about qualified immunity or 1983 suits –its about Alabama state law that the plan wouldn’t effect –they selectively underlined it to not show that
Kelsey Stein, journalist for AL.com, “Wrongful death lawsuit dismissed after Hoover police did not immediately enter home after woman’s fatal stabbing,” September 18, 2104, http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2014/09/judge_dismisses_lawsuit_claimi.html
The death of my sister, Kimberly Jamison Ozburn, is a chilling example of what can happen when police wait to assist a victim. The facts of the Jamison family's subsequent lawsuit must not be ignored. On March 19, 2013, Kimberly called 911 at 9:25 p.m., telling dispatch that her assailant had a gun, pleading for police to "come fast," and, a short time later, screaming that her assailant was stabbing her. She desperately needed help, and she needed it fast. Our mother, Virginia, escaped from the home and called dispatch at 9:28, telling them the assailant's full name, that he was armed with a knife and gun, and that, as she fled the scene, he was trying to stab her daughter. Police arrived during this call, which records Virginia telling police this essential information and also how to enter the house, and where Kimberly and her assailant were located. The first two responders were on the scene by 9:30, fully aware of the information in the 911 calls. By 9:37, four more officers had arrived. My family, then, doesn't understand how it could have taken almost two hours for these officers to "assess the situation" and "develop a plan" before entering the home at 11:16 p.m. The city of Hoover explains the action of its officers by claiming that a fast entry would not have been in time to prevent Kimberly's death. But we do know this: an ambulance was on the scene by 9:32. The Jamison home is less than a half mile from the interstate; less than 10 minutes from UAB hospital. And phone records show that Kimberly was alive -- she attempted to make an outgoing call from the house phone -- at 9:34 p.m. Virginia sued the city, but that wrongful death action was dismissed, not because of lack of merit, but because of the Alabama law that renders police immune from lawsuits. And that, we believe, is the larger issue stemming from this incident: In times of crisis, citizens should be able to count on police who know how to respond promptly! The Jamison family fears that survivors victims of domestic violence in Alabama are in a truly terrible situation, unable to rely on 911 for meaningful assistance. We understand that the purpose of qualified immunity is to encourage police to take actions in the line of duty without concern about being second-guessed after the fact.  However, under the Alabama statute and the Cranman state Supreme Court restatement of immunity law, police are protected by this "qualified' immunity under almost all circumstances, unless their decision making is willful, malicious, or in bad faith.  We believe Hoover PD was negligent in its failure to act. We acknowledge that Alabama law confers immunity to protect police negligence, but we believe that law needs to be changed. Serious negligence should not be protected. And police should not enjoy immunity when they fail to take reasonable action.

Their second Gray card is a reason to vote neg on presumption- it says UNLESS local governments are held accountable there will be no effect on IPV. Gray 2
However, both the “special relationship” exception and the “state-created danger” exceptions have been applied only in the most flagrant cases, which effectively stripped the exceptions of any usefulness in the area of domestic abuse. While this narrow application is sound in most areas of the law, there is a sore need and good reason for expansion and broad application of these exceptions in the area of domestic violence. Unlike other criminals, batterers often continue to abuse the same survivors victim(s) day-after-day. Also unlike other crimes or torts, IPV domestic violence is not a random crime and the survivors victims of domestic violence are not sporadically chosen. Because domestic violence is so widespread and the victims are often re-victimized again and again, empowerment of batterers is particularly troublesome. When officers like those in the Okin case empower batterers, they send a message that the continued torment of the victim is permissible. The Battered Women’s Movement and other activist groups have done their jobs and pushed for over twenty years to get the attention and backing of the New York Legislature. Likewise, Congress and other State Legislatures have made great strides nationally in the area of domestic violence, enacting domestic violence statutes over the past twenty years both federally and in every state in the nation.163 Without local government accountability in federal court, IPV domestic violence laws remain nearly meaningless. Extending Okin and allowing §1983 claims against state and local governments in the area of domestic violence will help ensure that batterers are not empowered by deliberate indifference and a custom of inaction. This expansion and a broader application of substantive due process in domestic violence cases will add teeth to the current domestic violence laws as local governments and police face accountability under § 1983. Without accountability, the huge strides made in IPV domestic violence legislation over the past twenty years will remain but words on a page.
Turns
Civil suits don’t encourage reform- prefer our evidence it’s a direct response to their 1AC evidence Harmon 09
Rachel A., PROMOTING CIVIL RIGHTS THROUGH PROACTIVE POLICING REFORM, 2009 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, from the Stanford Law Review at 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009). For information visit http://lawreview.stanford.edu.
Federal law has played an important role in regulating police misconduct. In particular, federal criminal prosecutions, civil suits for damages under § 1983, and the exclusionary rule are all legal tools that attempt to reduce police misconduct by punishing specific incidents of it and by deterring it in the future. Unfortunately, each is inadequate to promote wholesale institutional change. Federal criminal civil rights prosecutions face significant legal and practical obstacles, including that federal law imposes an onerous intent requirement on civil rights crimes; that victims of police misconduct often make problematic witnesses; and that juries frequently believe and sympathize with defendant officers.16 As a result, prosecutions against police officers are too rare to deter misconduct. Even if criminal prosecutions were more common, however, it is not clear that charges against individual officers would encourage departmental change. Almost inevitably, when some officers in a department are prosecuted, others are not. Criminal prosecution may therefore enable cities to characterize egregious misconduct as resulting from individual pathology rather than systemic problems and to deny the need for departmental improvement.17 Successful § 1983 suits for damages encourage some departmental reform, but they too are limited. Suits against individual officers are difficult to win, both because they suffer some of the same trial challenges as criminal cases against officers, and because officers often have qualified immunity for their actions, even when the conduct is unconstitutional.18 Suing supervisors or chiefs often requires establishing deliberate indifference or reckless action rather than negligence, and suing a city requires a plaintiff to show that misconduct was not only unconstitutional, but reflected municipal “policy” or “custom.”19 Some civil actions succeed despite these obstacles, but many incidents of serious misconduct result in an unsuccessful § 1983 suit or an inexpensive settlement, and therefore provide little incentive for reform.20 Moreover, some scholars have argued that even when plaintiffs win civil suits, damages actions against government actors are an ineffectual—even perverse—means of encouraging local officials to reduce misconduct.21 Daryl Levinson, for example, contends that government officers, police chiefs, and mayors respond to political incentives, and may never be forced to internalize the economic costs of damages paid by municipalities.22 Although Levinson may overstate the case against civil suits,23 he persuasively argues that even when they are successful, civil suits are at best an inefficient and limited means of encouraging institutional reform.24 Footnote- 16. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 465-67 (2004); Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE 247, 253, 258-59, 266 (William A. Geller and Hans Toch eds., 1996); John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 806-11; David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 488, 490-92 (1992

Testifying in court can cause psychological damage – moving away from courts as a whole is better. Nelson 06
Leah Nelson, 8-1-2006, "Testifying in Court Can Amplify Trauma For Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse," Association for Psychological Science, http://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/observer/2006/august-06/testifying-in-court-can-amplify-trauma-for-victims-of-childhood-sexual-abuse.html MG
It goes without saying that childhood sexual abuse is often a traumatic experience. Add to that revisiting the abuse in courtroom testimony, and a complex picture emerges about the full impact the abuse can have on a victim. In her invited address at the APS 18th Annual Convention, “Childhood Trauma, and Court: The Psychology and the Law,” Gail Goodman, University of California, Davis, discussed research findings on the after-effects of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), highlighting the potentially damaging effects of a related event that is all too often overlooked: the trauma of testifying about CSA during trial. Between 1986 and 1988, Goodman and her team of researchers studied the behavioral patterns of over 200 children involved as victims in CSA prosecutions. They re-interviewed 174 of the victims as young adults (between 1997 and 2001), looking at their memories of the abuse and their current pathology and searching for correlations between their state as young children at the time of the CSA prosecutions and their later mental health. “The picture is really complex, and you have to understand the circumstances surrounding the child and the case to make a prediction,” said Goodman. Certain conditions, such as whether the child had to testify multiple times throughout a prosecution, was the strongest predictor of later traumatization. Other, less stable predictors include gender, age at the time of testimony, and the length of the perpetrator’s sentence. In children who testified multiple times, especially if the abuse was severe and intrafamilial, Goodman’s team found correlations with later sexual problems, defensive avoidance, and internalization problems, such as depression. Even “children who in the 1980s seemed more resilient, if they testified more than once, later as adults did nearly as badly as those who presented behavioral problems” at the time of testimony, Goodman said. Children who were already deeply disturbed at the time of the testimony fared worst of all: “If the child is already crying at that point, that’s a bad sign for later on.” Despite these troublesome findings, Goodman does not believe that keeping young children from testifying is always the right solution. “In terms of attitudes, it may be important for the child to testify,” she said. CSA victims who had the chance to speak at trial tend to have a more positive attitude towards the legal system and are more likely to think that the trial of their abuser was fair, she explained. Part of Goodman’s study focused on memory in conjunction with research on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and Goodman’s team found many connections between the two. Delayed disclosure of CSA is common, so knowing how well people remember is important in considering whether they should testify about events that occurred. Goodman asked the adults what they remembered about the CSA and also what was the most traumatic event of their lives. Based on comparisons between what they reported as young children and what they said when later interviewed, adults with PTSD who were victimized had clear memories of the abuse whether or not the PTSD was caused by CSA. Those with few symptoms of PTSD who remembered something else, like a car accident, as their most traumatic life event had the least accurate memories. She proposed that poor memory is associated with defensive avoidance: that individuals who suppress their feelings about the trauma, don’t want to think about the past, and don’t show signs of PTSD are more likely to have faded memories than those who are more overtly traumatized. Overall, the best predictor for correct memory was the level of abuse. “The worse it is, the more traumatizing, the better the memory,” she said. However, for avoidant individuals, this was not necessarily so. Throughout her presentation, Goodman emphasized that although predictors exist, there are variations among individuals that must be considered in each case. Regardless of this caveat, audience members were intrigued. Chuck Mueller, a child clinical psychologist from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, said, “It’s very interesting, very provocative…. I was thinking about how much we want to incorporate this topic.” National Institute of Child Health and Human Development researchers Mel Pipe and Yael Orbach expressed their admiration for Goodman’s care in taking so many factors into account. “She, in many ways, started the field,” said Pipe. “It really is a great example of science being applied.”

Tournament: Grapevine | Round: 2 | Opponent: Cy-Fair KA | Judge: Kris Wright
SSD CP, Warming DA, Elections DA

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Tournament: Grapevine | Round: 4 | Opponent: Collegiate DM | Judge: Paul Gravley
Must spec one country theory, Orientalism K, case answers to nuke propoganda

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Tournament: Holy Cross | Round: 2 | Opponent: Prosper EH | Judge: Craig Wall
MSR CP, Warming DA, case answers to indigenous

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Tournament: Holy Cross | Round: 3 | Opponent: Katy Taylor CR | Judge: Jonathan Alston
T - Generics, Japan Econ DA, Japan Regulations CP, case answers

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Tournament: Holy Cross | Round: 6 | Opponent: Prosper MK | Judge: Clement Agho Otoghile
Oppression (Mills) FW and Africa PIC

Tournament: St Marks | Round: 2 | Opponent: Lynbrook SZ | Judge: Rodrigo Paramo
T - Plural, Ukraine DA, Heg Impact Turn, Terrorism case D

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Tournament: St Marks | Round: 3 | Opponent: Immaculate Heart MC | Judge: Neel Yerneni
T - Plural, MSR CP, Warming DA, India-Russia Relations DA, 2 impact d cards

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Tournament: St Marks | Round: 5 | Opponent: Cedar Park MT | Judge: Bekah Boyer
Armenia PIC, Russia-Armenia Relations DA, Econ DA, PIC Theory Pre-empt

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