Tournament: Alta | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Sky View JK | Judge: Sierra Inglet, Hans Liu, Ashan Peiris
1NC

Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)

The CP Solves the Case 

1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
   Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
   This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as  *906  Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work.
   Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization.
   Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched.
   The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized?
   For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing  *907  programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325

2. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61

DA

A. Uniqueness- 

The new generation LGBTQ movement is working with community-based solutions, moving away from the flare of courts. Lazare ‘10/13
Sarah Lazare is a staff writer for AlterNet, A former staff writer for Common Dreams. “Meet 5 Movement Leaders Across the U.S. Fighting for LGTBQ Issues on the Ground.” Alternet. October 13, 2016. http://www.alternet.org/lgbtq/meet-5-movement-leaders-across-us-fighting-lgtbq-issues-ground JJN
"We've gotten dragged into a national conversation where same-sex marriage is held up as the pinnacle of the LGBTQ struggle, but there are so many other things our communities struggle around, issues that have to do with life and death,” Paulina Helm-Hernandez, the co-director of the queer liberation group Southerners on New Ground (SONG), told AlterNet. “We’re dealing with issues like criminalization, health care access and core safety. We’re thinking about ways our people know a lot about violence and how to survive." Helm-Hernandez is one of countless movement leaders in rural communities and urban centers across the country bringing a queer lens to racial, social and economic justice activism. LGBTQ organizers are at the helm of the Movement for Black Lives, calling for an end to extrajudicial police killings, and on the frontlines of native resistance at Standing Rock, where indigenous earth defenders have erected a "two-spirit camp," for gay and lesbian indigenous people. They are demanding an stop to deportations and mass incarceration and devising concrete, community-safety alternatives to calling the police. While fending off the racist incitement of the 2016 election cycle, LGBTQ organizers are also going on the offensive, preparing to mobilize for demilitarization at home and abroad no matter who wins in November. AlterNet spoke with five U.S.-based organizers whose political and cultural work shows that LGBTQ movements go far beyond marriage equality, and are shaping the social movements that define our times. 1. Kym Anthoni, New Orleans “Second lining is very big in New Orleans culture,” said Anthoni, an organizer with the youth-led LGBTQ organization BreakOUT. “After someone passes away, people will do a dance celebrating resilience. Every year around the anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, we do a second line for the people who died to celebrate resilience, strength and moving forward.” “When a transgender woman has been killed, or you’ve gone through a bunch of bullshit, we embody the culture of second line, recognizing that we have a lot of pain and embracing resilience, saying let’s let go of the harsh shit that you’ve been through and celebrate the fact that you made it,” Anthoni continued. “Last year for the Trans March of resilience, we had a whole second line. We were uplifting the voices that are normally not uplifted in our culture.” New Orleans has been hit hard in recent years by a wave of killings targeting transgender women of color. Among them was BreakOUT community member Penny Proud, a 21-year-old black transgender woman murdered in 2015. This summer, the organization released a statement reading, “It is with heavy hearts that we share the news that another young, black trans/gender non-conforming person, Devin Diamond, has been murdered in New Orleans, just a few weeks after 24-year-old Erica ‘E’ Davis was shot in the Treme neighborhood on her way to work.” Key to BreakOUT’s organizing is the principle that “we deserve to walk down the street and not be attacked, we deserve to not be criminalized,” said Anthoni. This demand is aimed at curbing vigilante violence as well as law enforcement brutality. The organization’s first campaign was called We Deserve Better and took on rampant abuse by the New Orleans Police Department. According to a report released in 2014 by BreakOUT, police abuse is widespread. The survey found that “75 percent of people of color respondents feel they have been targeted by police for their sexual orientation or gender identity or gender expression compared with 24 percent of white respondents.” In addition, the report states that “43 percent of people of color respondents have been asked for a sexual favor by police compared with 11 percent of white respondents.” Anthoni emphasized that it is important for the broader public to understand that police brutality is also an LGBTQ issue. “Police always target trans women of color just for being trans,” Anthoni said. “They over-eroticize transgender bodies. The queer and transgender youth of color are most targeted by law enforcement. It’s a huge issue because it takes your power away, it makes you feel vulnerable. Our vulnerability can sometimes cost us our lives.” In addition to organizing, political education and youth work in local high schools, Anthoni said, “The main core of what we do is heart healing justice work. We focus on finding ways to heal as a community.”

B. Links- 

1. Court civil rights victories act as fly paper drawing other social movements into the court to focus on litigation strategies
   Rosenberg 8 (Gerald N., University of Chicago political science and law professor, Ph.D. from Yale University, member of the Washington, D.C. bar, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?, p. 427)
   If this is the case, then there is another important way in which courts affect social change. It is, to put it simply, that courts act as “fly-paper” for social reformers who succumb to the “lure of litigation.” If the constraints of the Constrained Court view are correct, then courts can seldom produce significant social reform. Yet if groups advocating such reform continue to look to the courts for aid, and spend precious resources in litigation, then the courts also limit change by deflecting claims from substantive political battles, where success is possible, to harmless legal ones where it is not. Even when major cases are won, the achievement is often more symbolic that real. Thus, courts may serve an ideological function of luring movements for social reform to an institution that is structurally constrained from serving their needs, providing only an illusion of change.

2. This is specifically true for LGBTQ movements
Jane S. Schacter* James E. and Ruth B. Doyle-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School; Edwin A. Heafey, Jr. Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, 2005-2006; A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1980; J.D., Harvard University, 1984. Drake Law Review Summer 06
There is an emerging view of the role of courts in the sexual orientation domain that echoes Professor Gerald Rosenberg's landmark book, The Hollow hope. n9 This view is distinctly skeptical about the prospects of courts accomplishing much reform in the area of gay rights. n10 *863 It should not be confused with normative critiques of "activist courts" made by those who object to same-sex marriage or other gay rights. n11 The skepticism inspired by The Hollow hope is empirical in nature and often made by those evincing no particular hostility to gay rights. n12 The thinking goes roughly like this: courts cannot produce significant change, only legislatures can. Legislators, who are politically accountable, will act in ways that are consistent with public opinion. By contrast, courts may get out too far in front of public opinion and, when they do, backlash is sure to follow. Against this background, count my Essay as a plea for caution and context. The question whether courts can, or do, produce social change on sexual orientation issues is a question that is, on closer analysis, too crude to be all that useful. I will suggest that rather than staking out broad claims or pursuing unbroken causal arrows, scholars ought to bring into focus the variability, contingency, and complexity that presents itself as we try to map the relationship between courts and social change in the area of gay rights. True, any romanticized picture of judges as countermajoritarian revolutionaries, single-handedly making public policy more progressive, is empirically unsustainable. But we should not replace one piece of mythology with another. The notion that the institutional properties of courts disable them from ever driving social change in a significant way has its own caricatured qualities.

C. Internal Link- Courts Wreck movements

1. Judicial review produces divide and conquer
   Becker 93 (Mary, Prof of Law @ University of Chicago Law School; 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 975 ln)
   Binding judicial review can impede political movements even when the Supreme Court does not actually block success. The relegation of high matters, such as sexual equality, to the courts saps political movements of their strength, particularly after ineffective victories. 76 At the same time, judicial review can mobilize the opposition, and the Court itself will be influenced by the resulting political climate, a climate it has helped create. When ineffective judicial victories weaken a movement, there may be less grass-roots pressure for change. Yet, real change in the relationship between the sexes is unlikely without change at the grass-roots level. Decisions from on high are unlikely to transform intimate relationships. Judicial victories protecting one or some outsider groups, but not all such groups, also interfere with the development of effective coalitions. This may be most harmful to the most vulnerable groups, such as lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. Real or perceived judicial protection of less marginal groups, such as straight women or racial minorities, may mean that these groups are less likely to form effective coalitions with the more marginal groups. Judicial review is, therefore, a "divide and conquer" strategy.
   2. Perceived victories cause mass movement deflation
   Rosenberg 8 (Gerald N., University of Chicago political science and law professor, Ph.D. from Yale University, member of the Washington, D.C. bar, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, p. 422-423)
   In contrast to this conclusion, it might be suggested that throughout this book I have asked too much of courts.  After all, in all the cases examined, court decisions produced some change, however small.  Given that political action appeared impossible in many instances, such as with civil rights in the 1950s, same-sex marriage in the 1990s, and reform of the criminal justice system more generally, isn’t some positive change better than none?  In a world of unlimited resources, this would be the case.  In the world in which those seeking significant social reform live, however, strategic choices have costs, and a strategy that produces little or not change and induces backlash drains resources that could be more effectively employed in other strategies.  In addition, vindication of constitutional principles accompanied by small change may be mistaken for widespread significant social reform, inducing reformers to relax their efforts.
   D. Impacts
   LGBTQ Rights are crucial to fight dominant structures and avoid extinction Tatchell ’89
   Peter Tatchell - is a British human rights campaignerbest known for his work with LGBT social movements, was selected as Labour Party Parliamentary candidate for Bermondsey. “Gay Liberation is Central to Human Emancipation.” Peter Tatchell.net. However, note at the bottom: “An edited version of this article was published in "Labour Briefing", 1989. See also "Beyond lesbian and gay rights", Interlink. May /June 1989.” http://www.petertatchell.net/masculinity/gay_liberation.htm JJN *bracketed for offensive language
   Lesbian and gay LGTBQ liberation is of critical importance to the broader project of human emancipation. It is not merely a minority issue, nor purely a question of civil rights and sexual freedom. The ultimate aim is a cultural revolution to end heterosexual supremacism and the concomitant cult of heterosexual masculinity which underpins all relations of oppression and exploitation. This was the revolutionary agenda of the lesbian and gay liberation movement which emerged 20 years ago following the Stonewall Riots in New York in June 1969. In contrast to earlier liberal-oriented movements for homosexual equality, the lesbian and gay liberation movement did not seek to ape heterosexual values or secure the acceptance of homosexuals within the existing sexual conventions. Indeed, it repudiated the prevailing sexual morality and institutions - rejecting not only heterosexism but also heterosexual masculinity with its oppressive predisposition to rivalry, toughness and aggression (most potently symbolised by the rapist and the queer-basher). In contrast the "radical drag" and''gender-bender" politics of the Gay Liberation Front glorified male gentleness. It was a conscious, if sometimes exaggerated, attempt to renounce the oppressiveness of masculinity and subvert the way masculinity functions to buttress the subordination of women and gay men. Lesbian and gay liberation is therefore truly revolutionary because it specifically rejects the male heterosexual cult of masculine competitiveness, domination and violence. Instead, it affirms the worthwhileness of male sensitivity and affection between men and, in the case of lesbians, the intrinsic value of an eroticism and love independent of heterosexual men. By challenging heterosexual masculinity, the politics of lesbian and gay liberation has profound radical implications for oppressed peoples everywhere: it actively subverts the male heterosexual machismo' values which lie at the heart of all systems of domination, exploitation and oppression. Lesbian and gay liberation is therefore not an issue which is peripheral. It is, indeed absolutely central to revolutionary change and human liberation in general. Without the successful construction of a cult of heterosexual masculinity and a mass of aggressive male egos, neither sexual, class, racial, species, nor imperialist oppression are possible. All these different forms of oppression depend on two factors for their continued maintenance. First, on specific economic and political structures. And second, on a significant proportion of the population, mainly heterosexual men, being socialised into the acceptance of harsh masculine values which involve the legitimisation of aggression and the suppression of gentleness and emotion. The embracing of these culturally-conditioned macho values, whether consciously or unconsciously, is what makes so many millions of people able to participate in repressive regimes. (This interaction between social structures, ideology and individual psychology was a thesis which the communist psychologist, Wilhelm Reich, was attempting to articulate nearly 60 years ago in his book, The Mass Psychology of Fascism). In the case of German fascism, what Nazism did was merely awake and excite the latent brutality which is intrinsic to heterosexual masculinity in class societies. It then systematically manipulated and organised this unleashed masculine violence into a fascist regime of terror and torture which culminated in the holocaust. Since it is the internalisation of the masculine cult of toughness and domination which makes people psychologically suited and willing to be part of oppressive relations of exploitation and subjection, repressive states invariably glorify masculine "warrior" ideals and legally and ideologically suppress those men - mainly homosexuals - who fail to conform to them. Given that this internalisation of masculine aggression within the male population is a prerequisite for injustice and tyranny, love and tenderness between men ceases to be a purely private matter or simply a question of personal lifestyle. Instead, it objectively becomes an act of subversion which undermines the very foundations of oppression. Hence the Nazis' vilification of gay men as "sexual subversives" and "sexual saboteurs" who, in the words of Heinrich Himmler, had to be "exterminated- root and branch." In conclusion: the goal of eradicating injustice and exploitation requires us to change both the social structure and the individual personality to create people who, liberated from masculinity, no longer psychologically crave the power to dominate and exploit others and who are therefore unwilling to be the agents of oppressive regimes (whether as soldiers, police, gaolers and censors or as routine civil servants and state administrators who act as the passive agents of repression by keeping the day-to-day machinery of unjust government ticking over). By challenging the cult of heterosexual masculinity, lesbian and gay liberation politics is about much more than the limited agenda of human rights. It offers a unique and revolutionary contribution to the emancipation of the whole of humanity from all forms of oppression and subjugation.

Disproves your root cause claim. Masculinity is the rc of psych warfare since people want to seem as dominante as possible b/c of masculinity and use psychological violence to do so.

AC

Civil suits don’t encourage reform- prefer our evidence it’s a direct response to their 1AC evidence Harmon 09
Rachel A., PROMOTING CIVIL RIGHTS THROUGH PROACTIVE POLICING REFORM, 2009 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, from the Stanford Law Review at 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009). For information visit http://lawreview.stanford.edu.
Federal law has played an important role in regulating police misconduct. In particular, federal criminal prosecutions, civil suits for damages under § 1983, and the exclusionary rule are all legal tools that attempt to reduce police misconduct by punishing specific incidents of it and by deterring it in the future. Unfortunately, each is inadequate to promote wholesale institutional change. Federal criminal civil rights prosecutions face significant legal and practical obstacles, including that federal law imposes an onerous intent requirement on civil rights crimes; that victims of police misconduct often make problematic witnesses; and that juries frequently believe and sympathize with defendant officers.16 As a result, prosecutions against police officers are too rare to deter misconduct. Even if criminal prosecutions were more common, however, it is not clear that charges against individual officers would encourage departmental change. Almost inevitably, when some officers in a department are prosecuted, others are not. Criminal prosecution may therefore enable cities to characterize egregious misconduct as resulting from individual pathology rather than systemic problems and to deny the need for departmental improvement.17 Successful § 1983 suits for damages encourage some departmental reform, but they too are limited. Suits against individual officers are difficult to win, both because they suffer some of the same trial challenges as criminal cases against officers, and because officers often have qualified immunity for their actions, even when the conduct is unconstitutional.18 Suing supervisors or chiefs often requires establishing deliberate indifference or reckless action rather than negligence, and suing a city requires a plaintiff to show that misconduct was not only unconstitutional, but reflected municipal “policy” or “custom.”19 Some civil actions succeed despite these obstacles, but many incidents of serious misconduct result in an unsuccessful § 1983 suit or an inexpensive settlement, and therefore provide little incentive for reform.20 Moreover, some scholars have argued that even when plaintiffs win civil suits, damages actions against government actors are an ineffectual—even perverse—means of encouraging local officials to reduce misconduct.21 Daryl Levinson, for example, contends that government officers, police chiefs, and mayors respond to political incentives, and may never be forced to internalize the economic costs of damages paid by municipalities.22 Although Levinson may overstate the case against civil suits,23 he persuasively argues that even when they are successful, civil suits are at best an inefficient and limited means of encouraging institutional reform.24 Footnote- 16. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 465-67 (2004); Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE 247, 253, 258-59, 266 (William A. Geller and Hans Toch eds., 1996); John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 806-11; David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 488, 490-92 (1992). 

The plan will be circumvented – local authorities will continue discriminating regardless of legal barriers – empirics. Garrison 14
Garrison, ’14 (Arthur H. Garrison, LP.D. - Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Kutztown University, “NYPD Stop and Frisk, Perceptions of Criminals, Race and the Meaning of Terry v Ohio: A Content Analysis of Floyd, et al. v City of New York” February 2014, Rutgers Race and the Law Review, 15 Rutgers Race and L. Rev. 65) GY
The court proceeded to dedicate 57 pages of its 195-page opinion n101 on the failure of the city to recognize the consti-tutional violations that the NYPD officers were making as well as the actual policies and customs that the leadership of the NYPD were requiring their officers to carry out, both directly resulting in constitutional violations. n102 The court found that in addition to actual knowledge of violations, the NYPD failed to adequately train their officers in the correct understanding of the requirements of Terry and they knew that such failure would result in *96 constitutional vio-lations. n103 The court concluded that "the NYPD instituted a policy of indirect racial profiling by directing its com-manders and officers to focus their stop activity on "the right people" -- the demographic groups that appear most often in a precinct's crime complaints. This policy led inevitably to impermissibly targeting blacks and Hispanics for stops and frisks at a higher rate than similarly situated whites." n104¶ The court found liability on the part of the NYPD because it "has known for more than a decade that its officers were conducting unjustified stops and frisks and were disproportionately stopping blacks and Hispanics and it ex-panded its use of stop and frisk by seven-fold between 2002 and 2011." n105 The plaintiffs argued in court that in an effort to reduce gun violence n106 during his tenure, Mayor Bloomberg through Commissioner Kelly directed and "pressured commanders at Compstat meetings and commanders, in turn, pressured mid-level managers and line of-ficers to increase stop activity by rewarding high stoppers and denigrating or punishing those with lower numbers of stops." n107¶ The court held that the NYPD was put on official notice that the current stop and frisk program was unconstitu-tionally implemented when the state Attorney General issued a report in 1999 which found that "15 of the UF-250s contained facts that did not meet the legal test for reasonable suspicion." n108 More importantly, the report by the At-torney General tested the assertion made then and now that "the apparently disproportionate stopping of blacks and *97 Hispanics can be explained on race-neutral grounds by police deployment to high crime areas, and by racial differences in crime rates" to which the report concluded "that blacks and Hispanics were significantly more likely that whites to be 'stopped' even after controlling for race-specific precinct crime rates and precincts population composi-tion by race." n109 The NYPD rejected the study and its subsequent recommendations because it did not use suspect description data as its benchmark. n110

Trump can’t force stop and frisk
Calder 11-14-16
(Rich, http://nypost.com/2016/11/14/de-blasio-says-trump-cant-bring-back-stop-and-frisk/)
Mayor de Blasio said Monday there’s nothing that President-elect Trump could do that would lead the city to reinstitute stop-and-frisk. ‘The constitutional system … gives a lot of power to states and localities, and the federal government doesn’t get to tell us how to police our streets,” de Blasio said during an appearance on Hot 97 radio. “They can threaten to take away money, but they cannot tell us how to police our streets, and we are not going back to a broken policy of stop and frisk. That will never happen under my watch.”

Civil litigation is extremely expensive – those most wronged by the system can’t access it anyways. Sutton ‘15
RALPH SUTTON - former litigator, is chief investment officer of Bentham in New York. “With America’s poor record on civil justice, shouldn’t we encourage litigation finance?.” The Hill. 8/7/15. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/251086-with-americas-poor-record-on-civil-justice-shouldnt-we-encourage JJN
The World Justice Project recently released its annual assessment of the “rule of law” as practiced by 102 countries across the globe. To put it mildly, the report contains disturbing findings on the state of civil justice in America. This independent analysis placed the U.S. in 65th place on the affordability and accessibility of our legal system, tied with those stalwarts of civil justice Botswana and Pakistan. Stunning, you say? Juan Carlos Botero, executive director of the WJP, a group led by a stellar board chosen from the highest ranks of the American legal profession, doesn’t think so. “We have done this study year after year,” says Botero, “and have always found the same thing...(civil justice) is significantly more accessible and affordable in Western European countries than it is in the United States.” Botero is being kind. According to the WJP’s report, not only do most advanced nations like Britain, Norway, Sweden and Germany outrank the US; so, too, do Third World countries like Moldova, Sri Lanka, Honduras, Colombia, Venezuela, and even Iran, Bulgaria and Russia. Why, in the United States, where we value equality and fairness, do we fail so miserably at providing access to justice for those who feel that they have been wronged? One plausible explanation is the extreme economic imbalance that exists in America’s judicial system, favoring parties with the deepest pockets. This is truer than ever in the civil context, where litigation has become an enormously expensive proposition for businesses and individuals without substantial financial resources. In addition to the cost of obtaining quality counsel there is the ever-expanding price tag associated with trial discovery, compounded by funds needed for a whole battery of trial necessities – from witness preparation to jury research, plus the small fortune needed in reserve in the likely event of an appeal. In short, litigation has become America’s biggest money pit and good luck to any claimant who can’t ante up the stakes, no matter how righteous the cause. 

Police culture is not about individual reforms but rather overarching structures like masculinity and racism that the aff can’t solve for. Benson 01
Benson, Rober. "Changing Police Culture: The Sine Qua Non of Reform." 2001. Accessed November 9, 2016. http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2265andcontext=llr. SP
The full job of analyzing police culture in Los Angeles would require a good deal more time and space than is allotted to me here. It would start with the history of policing in the United States and end with the particular history of the LAPD. For today, I will just jump ahead of the story to identify four current sources of cultural values within the LAPD that seem to be driving many of the human rights abuses and illegal acts that have erupted in the Rampart scandal, in the department's behavior during the recent Democratic National Convention, and in other incidents. Those sources are as follows: (1) machismo; (2) militarism; (3) racism; and (4) the code of silence. I will discuss only the first two. The third, racism, is an oftentold story. Both the McCone Commission, reporting after the 1965 Los Angeles riots, and the Christopher Commission, reporting in 1991 after the Rodney King incident, officially urged the kind of cultural change within the LAPD that I am urging here, primarily through recruitment of more minority officers. We can say that, while some steps have been taken in the right direction, the goal of ridding the LAPD of a culture of racism continues tragically to elude us. The fourth source, the code of silence, is discussed in the new Chemerinsky report. Machismo, or what some have called hypermasculinity, 4 is the value system that celebrates male physical strength, aggression, violence, competition, and dominance. It denigrates the lack of these qualities as weak, female behavior. Professor Angela Harris notes in a recent article in the Stanford Law Review that "police work has traditionally been coded hypermasculine" by the general culture.5 "The experience of street policing," she writes, is deeply steeped in a masculine culture of brotherhood that rests on the division between "us" and "them." Although "us" is supposed to refer to honest citizens and "them" to awbreakers, often "us" becomes simply a mirror image of "them': our guys against their guys.  And, like the gangs they are dedicated to eradicating, law enforcement officers share a commitment to masculine ideals, moving within a culture of honor in which respect must be paid or violence will follow. ... The hypermasculinity of policing leads to a culture in which violence is always just below the surface. 6 The practical results of this police machismo are that male officers get themselves involved in hostile confrontations with the public, use of excessive force, shootings, drug dealing, and apparently, as we see now in the Rampart scandal, framing of suspects through deceit and lies. The silver lining in this cloud is that female officers are rarely involved in such misconduct, precisely because they rarely share the value system of machismo. In 1991 testimony to the Christopher Commission, Katherine Spillar, national coordinator of the Feminist Majority Foundation, analyzed academic research on the differences between men and women in policing. 7 Spillar noted that the research shows that female police officers are as effective in dangerous situations, but are less authoritarian, less aggressive, involved in fewer shootings, receive fewer complaints, more effective at diffusing potentially violent situations, and have better communication skills than male officers

Psychological Trauma
Courts cause psychological damage when victims have to testify. Nelson 06
Nelson, Leah. "Testifying in Court Can Amplify Trauma For Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse." Http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/testifying-in-court-can-amplify-trauma-for-victims-of-childhood-sexual-abuse#.WCYNtOErJE4. N.p., 2006. Web. SP
Add to that revisiting the abuse in courtroom testimony, and a complex picture emerges about the full impact the abuse can have on a victim. In her invited address at the APS 18th Annual Convention, “Childhood Trauma, and Court: The Psychology and the Law,” Gail Goodman, University of California, Davis, discussed research findings on the after-effects of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), highlighting the potentially damaging effects of a related event that is all too often overlooked: the trauma of testifying about CSA during trial. Between 1986 and 1988, Goodman and her team of researchers studied the behavioral patterns of over 200 children involved as victims in CSA prosecutions. They re-interviewed 174 of the victims as young adults (between 1997 and 2001), looking at their memories of the abuse and their current pathology and searching for correlations between their state as young children at the time of the CSA prosecutions and their later mental health. “

Tournament: Alta | Round: 1 | Opponent: Summit Academy JE | Judge: Melissa Weiner
Generic
1NC Util 

The standard should be preserving human life

Epistemic modesty breaks any tie and answers all AC pre-empts 

Nick Bostrom, Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority, 2012.  NS

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.

Extinction justifies moral loopholes
Bok, 1988  (Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy, Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, 1988)
The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice.  To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.”  And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake.  For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

Our Offense 

1. Science proves non util ethics are impossible and our version of util solves all aff offense
   Greene 10 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University
   (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)
   What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question. 

2. Uncertainty and social contract require governments use util
Gooden, 1995  (Robert, philsopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)
Consider, first, the argument from necessity.  Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that.  All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course.  But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them.  Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one.  What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates.  They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices.  But that is all.  That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus—if they want to use it at all—to choose general rules of conduct.  Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.
1NC

Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)

The CP Solves the Case 

1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
   Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
   This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as  *906  Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work.
   Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization.
   Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched.
   The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized?
   For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing  *907  programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325

2. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61

Shell

The US is currently holding terrorists at bay through security tactics that go under the public radar and require extreme efficiency. Atkins 11/17 

Doug Atkins writer and contributor to boston globe Nov 17, 2016 Terror at Home: We Are Smarter Than We Think https://ivn.us/2016/11/17/winning-war-terror/

Fear mongering media outlets have convinced many that we are losing the war on terror at home. The truth is, however, that we are doing quite well.¶ According to the October Terror Threat Snapshot, released by the Majority Staff of the Homeland Security Committee, US authorities have arrested 109 suspects in ISIS related incidences since 2014.¶ The report states, “These individuals had, among other acts: plotted attacks; attempted to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria (or facilitated others’ travel); provided money, equipment, and weapons to ISIS; and falsified statements to federal authorities. Eight ISIS-linked terrorists have been killed while carrying out five separate attacks in California, Florida, Massachusetts, Texas, and Minnesota.” Currently, there are over 1,000 active FBI investigations into homegrown terrorism according to Director James Comey. He stated that over 80 percent of those are ISIS related. Since September 11, 2001, there have been at least 171 homegrown jihadist plots in the United States, including attempts to join terrorist groups overseas and execute attacks at home. More than 86 percent of these cases have occurred or been uncovered since 2009.¶ There is a lot of “behind the scenes” action, resulting in statistics like those above, that the general public rarely hears about in mainstream media.¶ Tactics such as leveraging the criminal justice system, seizing financial assets, gathering intelligence, covert operations, restricting movement of suspected terrorists, monitoring social media, and enhanced border restrictions and rules are all tools which aid in capturing US and foreign jihadists. As a result of these methods, fighters traveling into Syria and Iraq (at a one-time high of 2,000 monthly) have now fallen to as few as 50 per month.¶ U.S. efforts to counteract ISIS messaging online have proven an effective way to deter recruitment. ISIS has social media experts, and even hosts real-time Q and A sessions online where recruiters answer questions such as, “How do I travel, undetected, from the US to Syria?” Radical extremists post videos online, encouraging young people who have felt rejected by American society to take up Jihad.¶ According to the Terror Snapshot, here are some of the actions and arrests during this past September which have stopped some of these radicalized individuals from acting:¶ September 8: Marie Castelli, a 56-year-old U.S. citizen and Muslim convert from Maysville, Kentucky, was arrested after issuing violent threats and lying to federal authorities. Castelli promoted ISIS propaganda through social media.¶ September 10: An ISIS-linked cyber hacking group released a “kill list” with information about real estate professionals in the United States and encouraged individuals to locate and attack them.¶ September 18: Ahmad Khan Rahami, a 28-year-old U.S. citizen who was born in Afghanistan and is a resident of Elizabeth, New Jersey, was arrested after launching a bombing campaign targeting multiple locations in New York and New Jersey. Rahami was carrying a journal citing ISIS’s call for its followers in the West to launch attacks at home.¶ September 18: Dahir Adan, a 20-year-old U.S. citizen living in St. Cloud, Minnesota, attacked nearly a dozen people with a knife at a mall. Adan was born to a Somali family in Kenya before immigrating to the United States. Adan reportedly asked victims during his stabbing spree at a mall in Minnesota if they were Muslim. ISIS’s primary media arm claimed Adan was an ISIS supporter shortly after the attack.¶ September 30: Nelash Mohamed Das, a 24-year-old Bangladeshi citizen who has been living in Maryland as a legal permanent resident, was arrested after he plotted to kill a member of the U.S. military on behalf of ISIS.¶ Authorities know that roughly 90 percent of ISIS fanatics charged in the US are male and an average of 26.3 years of age. We are learning how to find these high risk individuals and arrest them. Almost 30 percent of those arrested were planning ISIS related attacks.¶ In a few instances, individuals known to be associated with terrorist groups have unsuccessfully attempted to gain admittance to the US through the refugee program. Over the past fiscal year, the Obama Administration has let almost 13,000 refugees through our borders and planned to allow in even more. By comparison, 1.3 million refugees arrived in Europe during that same time period. Trump has indicated that he intends to reduce these numbers drastically.¶ Although the US has a highly rigorous screening process for incoming refugees (Consuming 18 – 24 months for each person) the Terror Snapshot states that, “American law enforcement and intelligence officials have repeatedly indicated that the U.S. lacks reliable and credible intelligence to properly vet and screen potential Syrian refugees.”¶ President-Elect Trump has repeatedly indicated that he plans to improve this process with what he calls “extreme vetting.”¶ ISIS has proven to be a challenger unlike anything the US has previously faced. Their ability to use the internet and social media to reach high risk individuals and radicalize them to the ISIS cause has created a threat that is difficult to combat. Our intelligence agencies continue to learn and grow, having great, if often unrecognized, successes in protecting the American people.

Qualified immunity for security officials is necessary to secrecy, efficiency, and flexible decision-making.  Samp 6/8
*Brackets in original
Richard A. Samp JD Washington Legal Foundation June 8, 2016 Ascroft v Turkmen Amicus Briefs. BRIEF OF FORMER U.S. ATTORNEYS GENERAL¶ WILLIAM P. BARR, ALBERTO R. GONZALES,¶ EDWIN MEESE III, MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, AND¶ DICK THORNBURGH; FORMER FBI DIRECTORS¶ WILLIAM S. SESSIONS AND WILLIAM H. WEBSTER;¶ AND WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION¶ AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Ashcroft-v-Turkmen-WLF-amicus.pdf

The petitions raise issues of exceptional¶ importance. Amici urge the Court to grant review of¶ all three Questions Presented. We write separately to¶ focus particular emphasis on the qualified immunity¶ question. Qualified immunity not only provides¶ government officials with a defense to liability; it also¶ is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other¶ burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.¶ 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis added). The Court has made¶ clear that the “driving force” behind creation of the¶ qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure¶ that “‘insubstantial claims’ will be resolved prior to¶ discovery.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640¶ n.2 (1987). Yet, the decision below calls into question¶ the ability of high-level Executive Branch officials to¶ win dismissal, on qualified immunity grounds, of even¶ frivolous Bivens litigation filed by anyone claiming to¶ be aggrieved by their official conduct.¶ In the absence of dismissal, those officials face¶ the prospect of discovery proceedings that are highly¶ likely to distract them from their other responsibilities.¶ As former senior Executive Branch officials, the¶ individual amici curiae are concerned by the disruptive¶ effects of such discovery, and they are very concerned¶ that such disruptions are likely to impair the ability of¶ high-level officials to carry out their missions effectively. Review is warranted to determine whether¶ such disruptions are required under the terms of the¶ qualified immunity doctrine and the pleading¶ standards established by the Federal Rules of Civil¶ Procedure, particularly when (as here) the challenged¶ actions involve sensitive national security issues.¶ Respondents raise constitutional claims that are¶ largely the same as those at issue in Iqbal and that¶ arise from precisely the same underlying facts: the¶ detention of Arab/Muslim unauthorized aliens at the¶ MDC under harsh conditions in 2001-02. Iqbal¶ determined that the complaint at issue there did not¶ adequately state a constitutional claim against¶ Ashcroft and Mueller for their alleged role in the¶ detentions. The Second Circuit decision, by reaching¶ the opposite conclusion in connection with a complaint¶ that added little in the way of new factual allegations,¶ is in considerable tension with Iqbal. The same¶ considerations that led the Court to review (and¶ ultimately overturn) the Second Circuit’s assessment¶ of the adequacy of the pleadings in Iqbal should¶ persuade the Court to grant review here as well. In¶ particular, Respondents’ complaint includes no factual¶ allegations from which one can reasonably infer that¶ Ashcroft, Mueller, and Ziglar played any role in¶ determining the conditions of Respondents’¶ confinement.¶ Review is also warranted to determine whether¶ the courts should recognize a judicially inferred¶ damages remedy against senior Executive Branch¶ officials for alleged infringement of Respondents’¶ constitutional rights in the course of carrying out their¶ national security responsibilities. As Petitioners note, the appeals courts are sharply divided on the issue,¶ with the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits¶ issuing decisions that conflict with the decision below.¶ Review is warranted to resolve that conflict.¶ Amici also write separately to note that the¶ Second Circuit’s unprecedented recognition of Bivens¶ actions to challenge Executive Branch national security¶ policy conflicts with decisions of this Court. The Court¶ has cautioned against recognition of new Bivens¶ remedies when, as here, “special factors” counsel¶ hesitation. Those special factors include the national¶ security and immigration-law aspects of this case¶ (areas in which courts traditionally defer to the¶ judgments of the elected branches), the availability of¶ alternative remedies (e.g., habeas corpus proceedings),¶ and the failure of Congress to provide an express¶ damages remedy despite its considerable focus on¶ detention-related issues arising in the course of the¶ 9/11 investigation.¶ REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION¶ I. REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE¶ DECISION BELOW THREATENS THE¶ ABILITY OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS TO¶ AVOID THE BURDENS OF LITIGATION¶ IMPOSED BY INSUBSTANTIAL CLAIMS¶ The Court has long recognized that significant¶ burdens are imposed on government officials when¶ they are required to defend damages claims filed¶ against them in their individual capacities for actions¶ taken in connection with their employment. As the¶ Court explained in Harlow: Each such suit against high-level¶ government officials almost invariably¶ results in these officials and their¶ colleagues being subjected to extensive¶ discovery into traditionally protected¶ areas, such as their deliberations¶ preparatory to the formulation of¶ government policy and their intimate¶ thought processes and communications at¶ the presidential and cabinet levels. Such¶ discovery is wide-ranging, timeconsuming,¶ and not without considerable¶ cost to the officials involved.¶ Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 n.29 (quoting¶ Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (D.C. Cir.¶ 1979) (Gesell, J., concurring)).¶ The burdens can be particularly pronounced¶ among officials working on national security matters,¶ where the high level of public passion can result in¶ increased levels of litigation. As Justice Stevens¶ explained:¶ The passions aroused by matters of¶ national security and foreign policy and¶ the high profile of Cabinet officers with¶ functions in that area make them “easily¶ identifiable targets for suits for civil¶ damages.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.¶ 731, 753 (1982). Persons of wisdom¶ and honor will hesitate to answer the¶ President’s call to serve in these vital¶ positions if they fear that vexatious and¶ politically motivated litigation associated with their public decisions will squander¶ their time and reputation, and sap their¶ personal financial resources when they¶ leave office. The multitude of lawsuits¶ filed against high officials in recent years¶ only confirms the rationality of this¶ anxiety.¶ Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in¶ the judgment).¶ Events proved Justice Stevens’s prescience.¶ Lawsuits seeking damages from senior Executive¶ Branch officials for actions they took regarding¶ national security matters proliferated throughout the¶ administrations of Presidents Barack Obama, George¶ W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. See, e.g., Lebron v.¶ Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012) (suit against¶ Defense Secretaries Leon Panetta and Donald¶ Rumsfeld alleging mistreatment of military detainee);¶ Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (suit against¶ Attorney General alleging improper authorization of¶ material-witness warrants to detain terrorism¶ suspects); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.2d 1228 (11th Cir.¶ 2003) (suit against Attorney General arising from¶ execution of an arrest warrant for six-year-old Elian¶ Gonzalez). A. The Qualified Immunity Doctrine¶ Was Crafted to Reduce the Burden¶ on Government Officials of¶ Defending Against Damages Claims¶ In an effort to reduce the burdens imposed by¶ such suits, the Court has crafted a qualified immunity doctrine designed to provide government officials with¶ not only a defense to liability but also an “immunity¶ from suit.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. The “driving¶ force” behind creation of the doctrine was a desire to¶ ensure that “insubstantial claims will be resolved¶ prior to discovery.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 n.2. See¶ also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (“Where¶ the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on¶ that issue should be made early in the proceedings so¶ that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where¶ the defense is dispositive.”).¶ Qualified immunity shields a government official¶ from liability in an individual capacity so long as the¶ official has not violated “clearly established statutory¶ or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person¶ would have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. To¶ overcome the defense of qualified immunity the¶ plaintiff must show: (1) the facts, viewed in the light¶ most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the¶ deprivation of a statutory or constitutional right; and¶ (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the¶ deprivation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 199. Courts are¶ “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in¶ deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified¶ immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of¶ the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”¶ Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Amici¶ submit that review of the second prong—whether the¶ asserted right was “clearly established”—is¶ particularly warranted in this case.

The AFF ruling on qualififed immunity limits it for all officials – courts take previous rulings to apply up the executive ladder. Cornyn et al 01
 (John, Andy Taylor First Assistant Attorney General Gregory S. Coleman Solicitor General Counsel of Record Lisa R. Eskow Assistant Solicitor General P.O. Box 12548 Austin, Texas 78711-2548 (512) 936-1700 Counsel for Amici Bill Pryor Attorney General of Alabama 11 South Union Street Montgomery, AL 36130 Bruce M. Botelho Attorney General of Alaska P.O. Box 110300 Juneau, AK 99811-0300 Mark Pryor Attorney General of Arkansas 323 Center St., Ste. 200 Little Rock, AR 72201 Bill Lockyer Attorney General of California 1300 1 Street, Ste. 125 P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Ken Salazar Attorney General of Colorado 1525 Sherman St., 7th Fl. Denver, CO 80203 Richard Blumenthal Attorney General of Connecticut 55 Elm Street Hartford, CT 06141-0120 M. Jane Brady Attorney General of Delaware 820 N. French St. Wilmington, DE 19801 James E. Ryan Attorney General of Illinois 100 W. Randolph St., 12th Fl. Chicago, IL 60601 Richard P. Ieyoub Attorney General of Louisiana P.O. Box 94095 Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095 J. Joseph Curran, Jr. Attorney General of Maryland 200 St. Paul Place Baltimore, MD 21202 Thomas F. Reilly Attorney General of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 Mike Moore Attorney General of Mississippi P.O. Box 220 Jackson, MS 39205 Joseph P. Mazurek Attorney General of Montana 215 N. Sanders P.O. Box 201401 Helena, MT 59620-1401 Don Stenberg Attorney General of Nebraska 2115 State Capitol Lincoln, NE 68509 Eliot Spitzer Attorney General of New York The Capitol Albany, NY 12224 Heidi Heitkamp Attorney General of North Dakota 600 E. Boulevard Ave. Bismarck, ND 58505-0040 Betty D. Montgomery Attorney General of Ohio 30 E. Broad St., 17th Fl. Columbus, OH 43215 W.A. Drew Edmondson Attorney General of Oklahoma 2300 N. Lincoln Blvd., Ste. 112 Oklahoma City, OK 73105-4894 Hardy Myers Attorney General of Oregon 1162 Court St. N.E. Salem, OR 97310 D. Michael Fisher Attorney General of Pennsylvania 16th Fl., Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 Charles M. Condon Attorney General of South Carolina P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211 Mark Barnett Attorney General of South Dakota 500 East Capitol Avenue Pierre, SD 57501-5070 Paul G. Summers Attorney General of Tennessee 425 Fifth Ave., North Nashville, TN 37243 Jan Graham Attorney General of Utah 236 State Capitol Salt Lake City, UT 84114 William H. Sorrell Attorney General of Vermont 109 State Street Montpelier, VT 05609-1001 Christine O. Gregoire Attorney General of Washington 1125 Washington Street P.O. Box 40100 Olympia, WA 98504-0100 Brief of The States of Texas, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,¶ Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner)
The “reasonable mistake” is one of the core tenets of qualified immunity jurisprudence. In fact, were this Court to prohibit or limit the applicability of qualified immunity and the “reasonable mistake” with respect to excessive force claims, that philosophical departure would have ripple effects beyond the excessive force context. If officers who make *21 reasonable, albeit mistaken, judgments about the necessity of force can be categorically excluded from the ambit of qualified immunity, other public employees exercising discretionary functions might fear that their immunity protections could be forfeited next. This could dissuade individuals from taking government jobs. Public servants should not have to worry that courts might make policy-based distinctions about which types of duties should be afforded immunity protections, and which should not. To transform qualified immunity into a guessing game would defeat the purpose of the doctrine. Harlow's objective legal reasonableness test was designed to strike a balance between the need to vindicate civil rights abuses and the need to promote public service and shield government officials from insubstantial civil rights claims. It is inevitable that public servants will err; and when they do, they should be secure in knowing that their errors will not subject them to liability, or suit, provided they err in a manner that is objectively reasonable. Harlow's compromise may be imperfect, but it should be preserved, as it strikes the best “balance between the evils inevitable in an available alternative.” See Harlow, 457 U.S., at 813.

Flexibility is key to fighting terror Kirchner ‘14
Richard (Rik) Kirchner, Jr. is Chief Executive Officer of KIRIK International, Inc., and Executive Director of the Institute for Surveillance and Threat Detection, a first of its kind educational center dedicated solely to the discipline of Surveillance Detection and Behavioral Detection, delivering Antiterrorism and Threat assessment, development, and implementation to High Value Target and Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource program managers for comprehensive Threat Detection programs with subject matter expertise in Hostile Surveillance, Threat Detection, and Threat Management. “Surveillance and Threat Detection: Prevention versus Mitigation.” Elsevier. 2014. https://books.google.com/books?id=NYS-AQAAQBAJandpg=PA37andlpg=PA37anddq=22search+and+seizure22+and+22prevent+terrorism22andsource=blandots=jMP5xoUYQkandsig=u-N0ufTTRfALYHgFDQ_ZNtlWgYMandhl=enandsa=Xandved=0ahUKEwiO94Lu0rHQAhVnrVQKHW63AW8Q6AEISjAJ#v=onepageandq=22search20and20seizure2220and2022prevent20terrorism22andf=false JJN
While counterterrorism and terrorism prevention are concepts traditionally associated with our nation’s intelligence agencies, there are many basic avenues law enforcement can take in fighting terrorism. Simply keeping an eye out for indicators of preincident planning is integral to counterterrorism efforts nationwide. Patriot Act provisions assist law enforcement efforts greatly by facilitating more efficient terrorist monitoring and probable cause development. Finally, familiarization with state and federal law pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks is an absolute must. Terrorism presents a challenge to law enforcement as it requires police to act proactively against crimes (terrorist acts) that, in many cases, have not yet been committed. If the police wait, as they do traditionally, to react to terrorist crimes after they are committed, then the roles of the police are that of a first responder and an investigator. The public, however, expects police to deal with terrorism differently. This is mainly because crimes such as rape, theft, robbery, and even murder target the individual while terrorism targets the public. As such, the public demands that the police act to prevent terrorism before it becomes a criminal reality. Police officers are given the rights to search and seizure based on probable cause (Terry vs Ohio) and to stop a person for inquiry based on reasonable suspicion. These rights were afforded to officers in order to help them prevent a crime that they believe is about to occur. To prove a crime, officers need to find evidence. However, when it comes to terrorism, evidence and weapons are not always there to find even at the execution of the attack. Let’s consider 9/11 and assume for a minute that the terrorists would have been caught prior to boarding the planes. Would we have had the foresight to articulate probable cause based on the terrorists’ behavior and, if so, would we have regarded their box cutters as weapons (evidence) for a possible hijacking? Probably not. In order to reach reasonable suspicion, officers must rely on their training and experience to come up “with an articulable and particularized belief that criminal activity is afoot” Orleans vs United States, 517 U.S. 690 696 (1996) Illinois vs Gates, 462 U.S at 235. To be able to articulate terrorism-related reasonable suspicion, officers must be trained and gain experience in terrorism methods of operations. In other words, officers must be able to look at a situation or activity (suspicion) and have the capability to explain what they are seeing through their terrorist eyes. Officers are not trained (or not having the experience) in doing offensive surveillance, building a bomb or developing a terrorist plan among other things, will never be able to explain what they see as a terrorism-related reasonable cause. As in the case of reasonable suspicion, to develop probable cause, officers need to fall back on their training and experience in order to describe “known facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” Orleans vs United States, 517 U.S. 690 696 (1996) Illinois vs Gates, 462 U.S. at 213,238 (1983). Finding bombs and terrorist weapons is a difficult task, as almost anything can be used as a weapon and bombs appear in countless shapes and forms. In order to develop a terrorist-related probable cause, officers need to rely more on information provided by the suspect than on tangible evidence. To obtain this information, officers must utilize different questioning techniques then those used when interviewing suspected criminals. Approaching the suspect from a “law enforcement” angle will probably not work because the suspect has yet to have broken the law in the case of identifiable reasonable suspicion and probable cause . Moreover, cooperation and information are needed to establish probable cause or refuse the reasonable suspicions found. Asking for an ID and checking the suspect’s criminal record are unlikely to help the officer because most terrorist avoid criminal activities and their records are therefore clean. The key to success lies in open-ended, public service-oriented and inquisitive questioning geared toward refuting reasonable suspicions. In essence, the questioning that the officer conducts should resemble that of a receptionist asking politely about the intentions of a visitor entering a building and not that of an officer who has just pulled over a person for speeding recklessly on the highway.  

A single coordinated attack escalates and kills billions Myhrvold 2014
Myhrvold 2014 (Nathan P chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief technology officer at Microsoft; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action; cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf; kdf)
Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often hope to provoke reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually, the world will recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind. 

Trump responds with Nukes in the Middle East against ISIS. Borgwardt 3/31

Elizabeth Borgwardt is a history professor at Washington University and the author of The Nuremberg Idea, forthcoming from Knopf. “9/11: What Would Trump Do?” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-2016-terrorist-attack-foreign-policy-213784 March 31, 2016

Donald Trump’s March 21 interview with the Washington Post editorial board should make every potential voter’s blood run cold. After noting that ISIS should be knocked out flat, yet indicating that large numbers of U.S. troops should not be involved, Mr. Trump suggested that it was better to be “unpredictable” in the face of U.S. enemies, before twice dodging a question about whether he would advocate the use of tactical nuclear weapons against ISIS. (To be fair, the interview transcript indicates that much more time was spent discussing Mr. Trump’s hand size than anything to do with nuclear weapons.)¶ All this was before the attacks in Belgium; my sense is that a 9/11-style attack on U.S. soil would mean that any remaining restraints to the use of weapons of mass destruction—including nuclear weapons—would likely be swiftly swept aside.¶ General Douglas MacArthur had notoriously floated the idea of using nuclear weapons against China in the Korean conflict (1950-53) when he was concerned about Chinese moves to support North Korean aggression. In posthumously published interviews, MacArthur said that he could have won the war in ten days: “I would have dropped 30 or so atomic bombs … strung across the neck of Manchuria. For at least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Korea from the North.”¶ Part of MacArthur’s logic was that the United States would have needed to fight communist China eventually, so it would be best to nuke them while they were still weak, recovering from World War II and the Chinese Revolution (1949), as opposed to fighting them later after they had become much stronger. “That makes sense to me!” opined a Trump backer with whom I recently spoke on this topic. And yet, I offered, most Americans today are probably pretty happy that we didn’t use nuclear weapons against China in the Korean war, or would be if they knew anything about that historical interlude. “I guess,” he said. “But why not press your advantage when you have one?”¶ I offer this example because my sense is that in a putative Trump administration, “the gloves would be off” and all barriers—including public opinion—to the first use of various kinds of weapons of mass destruction would likely be at an all-time low. Bruce Cumings, the leading U.S. historian of Korea, has commented on the MacArthur incident in an analysis from back in 2004. Cumings noted that “MacArthur sounds like a warmongering lunatic” for advocating the use of nuclear weapons, but also explained that, astonishing as it might seem, the general actually had some support for his outlandish proposal. Cumings also noted that MacArthur’s conduct, quite appropriately, contributed to the celebrated war hero’s dismissal by President Truman. But that was then.

Use of nukes in the ME causes extinction. Russel 9

Russell 9 – Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs @ Naval Postgraduate School ¶ James, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East,” Online

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants.  These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world. 

Disad turns the case – the AFF results in massive Constitutional violations and a state of emergency. Stout 3/31

Martha Stout is a psychologist and author of The Sociopath Next Door “9/11: What Would Trump Do?” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-2016-terrorist-attack-foreign-policy-213784 March 31, 2016

As a psychologist who has spent her career studying human personality and its variations, I can tell you that personalities don’t have an off switch, not even for dire emergencies. If we suffered another brutal terrorist attack, I fear that President Trump would exhibit the same bombast, rage and impulsivity that he has shown in the campaign trail and imperil his fellow human beings, perhaps with even more lasting effects than those of the disaster itself.¶ The personality that underlies Trump’s observable behaviors—a demeanor of personal superiority, a focus on being admired, immediate heated anger when challenged, an emphasis on unlimited success, and an apparent expectation of automatic compliance—would be problematic in a U.S. president at any time, and plainly dangerous should our nation experience another terrorist atrocity. A president with such a personality would experience a large terrorist event as an attack on him personally, an enormous “narcissistic injury”—what psychologists call a perceived threat to self-worth—and his rage would be white-hot. The anger we have seen directed at protesters during Trump rallies would be multiplied by an unknowable factor. That whisper in the ear from an aide, telling him that an event had occurred, would instantly evoke a need for reprisal, a desire to attack and to do so right away, using airstrikes, boots on the ground, torture in interrogations and any other “powerful” tactic that occurred to him.¶ If there is a positive thread in this psychologically predicted scenario, it is that such a huge perceived injury to Trump’s sense of self-worth would compel him to focus utterly on the source of that injury. He would be single-mindedly intent on destroying the terrorists and would have no tolerance for those who might wish to refashion the country’s pain and anger into a willingness to attack a different target. In the aftermath of our waking nightmare in 2001, we might have benefited from some portion of that single-mindedness. Still, with a President Trump, the surge of bigotry and the resulting deportation and internment efforts would do their own inestimable damage.¶ Given a re-terrorized nation, Trump’s famous skill at gaining allegiance from people through their heightened fears might very well sway Congress and result in the actual implementation of some of his ideas: a wholesale military response, a lockdown of Muslim communities, and attempts to deport large groups of people. With an unapologetically self-involved and rage-prone commander-in-chief—which is what we evidently would be getting with a President Trump—nothing would be off the table.

Tournament: Alta | Round: 3 | Opponent: Logan WC | Judge: Matt Marr
The standard should be preserving human life

Epistemic modesty breaks any tie and answers all AC pre-empts 

Nick Bostrom, Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority, 2012.  NS

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.

Uncertainty and social contract require governments use util Goodin 95
Gooden, 1995  (Robert, philsopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy. P. 62-63)
Consider, first, the argument from necessity.  Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that.  All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course.  But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them.  Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one.  What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates.  They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices.  But that is all.  That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus—if they want to use it at all—to choose general rules of conduct.  Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.

1NC

Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)

The CP Solves the Case 

1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
   Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
   This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as  *906  Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work.
   Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization.
   Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched.
   The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized?
   For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing  *907  programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325

2. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61

DA

A. Uniqueness- 

The new generation LGBTQ movement is working with community-based solutions, moving away from the flare of courts. Lazare ‘10/13
Sarah Lazare is a staff writer for AlterNet, A former staff writer for Common Dreams. “Meet 5 Movement Leaders Across the U.S. Fighting for LGTBQ Issues on the Ground.” Alternet. October 13, 2016. http://www.alternet.org/lgbtq/meet-5-movement-leaders-across-us-fighting-lgtbq-issues-ground JJN
"We've gotten dragged into a national conversation where same-sex marriage is held up as the pinnacle of the LGBTQ struggle, but there are so many other things our communities struggle around, issues that have to do with life and death,” Paulina Helm-Hernandez, the co-director of the queer liberation group Southerners on New Ground (SONG), told AlterNet. “We’re dealing with issues like criminalization, health care access and core safety. We’re thinking about ways our people know a lot about violence and how to survive." Helm-Hernandez is one of countless movement leaders in rural communities and urban centers across the country bringing a queer lens to racial, social and economic justice activism. LGBTQ organizers are at the helm of the Movement for Black Lives, calling for an end to extrajudicial police killings, and on the frontlines of native resistance at Standing Rock, where indigenous earth defenders have erected a "two-spirit camp," for gay and lesbian indigenous people. They are demanding an stop to deportations and mass incarceration and devising concrete, community-safety alternatives to calling the police. While fending off the racist incitement of the 2016 election cycle, LGBTQ organizers are also going on the offensive, preparing to mobilize for demilitarization at home and abroad no matter who wins in November. AlterNet spoke with five U.S.-based organizers whose political and cultural work shows that LGBTQ movements go far beyond marriage equality, and are shaping the social movements that define our times. 1. Kym Anthoni, New Orleans “Second lining is very big in New Orleans culture,” said Anthoni, an organizer with the youth-led LGBTQ organization BreakOUT. “After someone passes away, people will do a dance celebrating resilience. Every year around the anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, we do a second line for the people who died to celebrate resilience, strength and moving forward.” “When a transgender woman has been killed, or you’ve gone through a bunch of bullshit, we embody the culture of second line, recognizing that we have a lot of pain and embracing resilience, saying let’s let go of the harsh shit that you’ve been through and celebrate the fact that you made it,” Anthoni continued. “Last year for the Trans March of resilience, we had a whole second line. We were uplifting the voices that are normally not uplifted in our culture.” New Orleans has been hit hard in recent years by a wave of killings targeting transgender women of color. Among them was BreakOUT community member Penny Proud, a 21-year-old black transgender woman murdered in 2015. This summer, the organization released a statement reading, “It is with heavy hearts that we share the news that another young, black trans/gender non-conforming person, Devin Diamond, has been murdered in New Orleans, just a few weeks after 24-year-old Erica ‘E’ Davis was shot in the Treme neighborhood on her way to work.” Key to BreakOUT’s organizing is the principle that “we deserve to walk down the street and not be attacked, we deserve to not be criminalized,” said Anthoni. This demand is aimed at curbing vigilante violence as well as law enforcement brutality. The organization’s first campaign was called We Deserve Better and took on rampant abuse by the New Orleans Police Department. According to a report released in 2014 by BreakOUT, police abuse is widespread. The survey found that “75 percent of people of color respondents feel they have been targeted by police for their sexual orientation or gender identity or gender expression compared with 24 percent of white respondents.” In addition, the report states that “43 percent of people of color respondents have been asked for a sexual favor by police compared with 11 percent of white respondents.” Anthoni emphasized that it is important for the broader public to understand that police brutality is also an LGBTQ issue. “Police always target trans women of color just for being trans,” Anthoni said. “They over-eroticize transgender bodies. The queer and transgender youth of color are most targeted by law enforcement. It’s a huge issue because it takes your power away, it makes you feel vulnerable. Our vulnerability can sometimes cost us our lives.” In addition to organizing, political education and youth work in local high schools, Anthoni said, “The main core of what we do is heart healing justice work. We focus on finding ways to heal as a community.”

B. Links- 

1. Court civil rights victories act as fly paper drawing other social movements into the court to focus on litigation strategies
   Rosenberg 8 (Gerald N., University of Chicago political science and law professor, Ph.D. from Yale University, member of the Washington, D.C. bar, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?, p. 427)
   If this is the case, then there is another important way in which courts affect social change. It is, to put it simply, that courts act as “fly-paper” for social reformers who succumb to the “lure of litigation.” If the constraints of the Constrained Court view are correct, then courts can seldom produce significant social reform. Yet if groups advocating such reform continue to look to the courts for aid, and spend precious resources in litigation, then the courts also limit change by deflecting claims from substantive political battles, where success is possible, to harmless legal ones where it is not. Even when major cases are won, the achievement is often more symbolic that real. Thus, courts may serve an ideological function of luring movements for social reform to an institution that is structurally constrained from serving their needs, providing only an illusion of change.

C. Internal Link- Courts Wreck movements

1. Judicial review produces divide and conquer
   Becker 93 (Mary, Prof of Law @ University of Chicago Law School; 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 975 ln)
   Binding judicial review can impede political movements even when the Supreme Court does not actually block success. The relegation of high matters, such as sexual equality, to the courts saps political movements of their strength, particularly after ineffective victories. 76 At the same time, judicial review can mobilize the opposition, and the Court itself will be influenced by the resulting political climate, a climate it has helped create. When ineffective judicial victories weaken a movement, there may be less grass-roots pressure for change. Yet, real change in the relationship between the sexes is unlikely without change at the grass-roots level. Decisions from on high are unlikely to transform intimate relationships. Judicial victories protecting one or some outsider groups, but not all such groups, also interfere with the development of effective coalitions. This may be most harmful to the most vulnerable groups, such as lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. Real or perceived judicial protection of less marginal groups, such as straight women or racial minorities, may mean that these groups are less likely to form effective coalitions with the more marginal groups. Judicial review is, therefore, a "divide and conquer" strategy.
   2. Perceived victories cause mass movement deflation
   Rosenberg 8 (Gerald N., University of Chicago political science and law professor, Ph.D. from Yale University, member of the Washington, D.C. bar, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, p. 422-423)
   In contrast to this conclusion, it might be suggested that throughout this book I have asked too much of courts.  After all, in all the cases examined, court decisions produced some change, however small.  Given that political action appeared impossible in many instances, such as with civil rights in the 1950s, same-sex marriage in the 1990s, and reform of the criminal justice system more generally, isn’t some positive change better than none?  In a world of unlimited resources, this would be the case.  In the world in which those seeking significant social reform live, however, strategic choices have costs, and a strategy that produces little or not change and induces backlash drains resources that could be more effectively employed in other strategies.  In addition, vindication of constitutional principles accompanied by small change may be mistaken for widespread significant social reform, inducing reformers to relax their efforts.
   D. Impacts
   LGBTQ Rights are crucial to avoid extinction Tatchell ’89
   Peter Tatchell - is a British human rights campaignerbest known for his work with LGBT social movements, was selected as Labour Party Parliamentary candidate for Bermondsey. “Gay Liberation is Central to Human Emancipation.” Peter Tatchell.net. However, note at the bottom: “An edited version of this article was published in "Labour Briefing", 1989. See also "Beyond lesbian and gay rights", Interlink. May /June 1989.” http://www.petertatchell.net/masculinity/gay_liberation.htm JJN *bracketed for offensive language
   Lesbian and gay LGTBQ liberation is of critical importance to the broader project of human emancipation. It is not merely a minority issue, nor purely a question of civil rights and sexual freedom. The ultimate aim is a cultural revolution to end heterosexual supremacism and the concomitant cult of heterosexual masculinity which underpins all relations of oppression and exploitation. This was the revolutionary agenda of the lesbian and gay liberation movement which emerged 20 years ago following the Stonewall Riots in New York in June 1969. In contrast to earlier liberal-oriented movements for homosexual equality, the lesbian and gay liberation movement did not seek to ape heterosexual values or secure the acceptance of homosexuals within the existing sexual conventions. Indeed, it repudiated the prevailing sexual morality and institutions - rejecting not only heterosexism but also heterosexual masculinity with its oppressive predisposition to rivalry, toughness and aggression (most potently symbolised by the rapist and the queer-basher). In contrast the "radical drag" and''gender-bender" politics of the Gay Liberation Front glorified male gentleness. It was a conscious, if sometimes exaggerated, attempt to renounce the oppressiveness of masculinity and subvert the way masculinity functions to buttress the subordination of women and gay men. Lesbian and gay liberation is therefore truly revolutionary because it specifically rejects the male heterosexual cult of masculine competitiveness, domination and violence. Instead, it affirms the worthwhileness of male sensitivity and affection between men and, in the case of lesbians, the intrinsic value of an eroticism and love independent of heterosexual men. By challenging heterosexual masculinity, the politics of lesbian and gay liberation has profound radical implications for oppressed peoples everywhere: it actively subverts the male heterosexual machismo' values which lie at the heart of all systems of domination, exploitation and oppression. Lesbian and gay liberation is therefore not an issue which is peripheral. It is, indeed absolutely central to revolutionary change and human liberation in general. Without the successful construction of a cult of heterosexual masculinity and a mass of aggressive male egos, neither sexual, class, racial, species, nor imperialist oppression are possible. All these different forms of oppression depend on two factors for their continued maintenance. First, on specific economic and political structures. And second, on a significant proportion of the population, mainly heterosexual men, being socialised into the acceptance of harsh masculine values which involve the legitimisation of aggression and the suppression of gentleness and emotion. The embracing of these culturally-conditioned macho values, whether consciously or unconsciously, is what makes so many millions of people able to participate in repressive regimes. (This interaction between social structures, ideology and individual psychology was a thesis which the communist psychologist, Wilhelm Reich, was attempting to articulate nearly 60 years ago in his book, The Mass Psychology of Fascism). In the case of German fascism, what Nazism did was merely awake and excite the latent brutality which is intrinsic to heterosexual masculinity in class societies. It then systematically manipulated and organised this unleashed masculine violence into a fascist regime of terror and torture which culminated in the holocaust. Since it is the internalisation of the masculine cult of toughness and domination which makes people psychologically suited and willing to be part of oppressive relations of exploitation and subjection, repressive states invariably glorify masculine "warrior" ideals and legally and ideologically suppress those men - mainly homosexuals - who fail to conform to them. Given that this internalisation of masculine aggression within the male population is a prerequisite for injustice and tyranny, love and tenderness between men ceases to be a purely private matter or simply a question of personal lifestyle. Instead, it objectively becomes an act of subversion which undermines the very foundations of oppression. Hence the Nazis' vilification of gay men as "sexual subversives" and "sexual saboteurs" who, in the words of Heinrich Himmler, had to be "exterminated- root and branch." In conclusion: the goal of eradicating injustice and exploitation requires us to change both the social structure and the individual personality to create people who, liberated from masculinity, no longer psychologically crave the power to dominate and exploit others and who are therefore unwilling to be the agents of oppressive regimes (whether as soldiers, police, gaolers and censors or as routine civil servants and state administrators who act as the passive agents of repression by keeping the day-to-day machinery of unjust government ticking over). By challenging the cult of heterosexual masculinity, lesbian and gay liberation politics is about much more than the limited agenda of human rights. It offers a unique and revolutionary contribution to the emancipation of the whole of humanity from all forms of oppression and subjugation.
   
   Disproves root cause claim
   AT Case
   Everyday violence doesn’t cause war and genocide because of significant differences in the degree of intentionality
   Bradby and Hundt, PhDs,  10
   (Hannah Bradby, Co-Director of the Institute of Health at the University of Warwick, Lecturer in Sociology at Warwick Medical School, and Gillian Lewando Hundt, Professor of Social Sciences in Health at the University of Warwick, 2010, “Introduction,” in Global perspectives on war, gender and health: the sociology and anthropology of suffering, p. 5-6)
   Far from being a uniquely horrific activity Scheper-Hughes (2002) views genocide as an extension of the dehumanising processes identifiable in many daily interactions. Drawing on analysis of the holocaust as the outcome of the general features of modernity, Scheper-Hughes posits a ‘genocidal continuum’ that connects daily, routine suffering and concomitant insults to a person’s humanity with genocide (Scheper-Hughes 2002: 371). The institutional ‘destruction of personhood’, as seen in the withdrawal of humane empathy from the poor or the elderly, creates the conditions which eventually make genocide possible. The argument that conditions of modernity including western rational legal metaphysics facilitate genocide has been criticised as too unifying and as conferring ‘super-eminence’ on the holocaust (Rose 1996: 11). The holocaust has become a crucial emblem through which we have sought to understand subsequent violence, wars and genocides. But the centrality of the holocaust in developing European thinking around conflict and suffering has made the resultant theoretical perspectives difficult to apply in non-European settings and in instances where conflict is less focussed around a clash of ideology. While the scale of the death toll of the holocaust should continue to shock, as should the organised nature of the attempted destruction of Jews, Roma, Gays and the disabled, there is very little to be gained in comparing scales or forms of suffering. It should be possible to use the study of the holocaust to inform understanding of other genocides in the context of other wars, to interrogate the link between war and suffering and to think through gendered perspectives without essentialising gender or making it the only explanatory variable. This collection does not primarily seek to add to the discussion of the role of the holocaust in theories of human suffering. Our chapters are, however, an unfortunate witness to the fact that despite contemporary hopes and the scale of combatant and non-combatants deaths, the two World Wars were not the wars to end all wars. Rather wars, and their associated suffering, have been ongoing ever since, both in Europe and beyond. War and Medicine While structural approaches can problematise a division between intentional and unintentional suffering, intentionality is nonetheless crucial to the contradictory relationship that war and medicine have with suffering. War is an organised conflict between two military groups and armed conflict is bound to be accompanied by suffering. Although ‘rules of engagement’ and the rhetoric of ‘targeted interventions’ deploying ‘surgical strikes’ suggest that ‘unnecessary’ blood shed can be avoided, war entails suffering, even if this is restricted to combatants. A limited, or targeted war is an oxymoron since war tends to be found in company with the other horsemen of the apocalypse, that is, pestilence, famine and death. Moreover, while the effect of war on soldiers is closely monitored by both sides, the disproportionate way in which the apocalyptic horsemen affect non-combatants and particularly those who are already disempowered such as women, the old and the young, has been less subject to scrutiny. 

Their framework requires consequentialism – only valuing intent is ivory tower theorizing because it doesn’t value the material conditions of real people – just aims to follow rules without rectifying current injustice

Taxes Turn
Civil suits force minority communities to suffer and pay for officers. Phillip 15
Phillip, Abby. "Why the Poor Often Pay for Police Misconduct with Their Pocketbooks." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 2015. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. SP
Late last month, the city of Inkster settled a lawsuit with Dent for nearly $1.4 million. According to the Detroit Free Press, Inkster’s financial manager said the city would levy a tax on property owners to help cover the cost of compensating Dent. Inkster is a city of about 25,000 residents, according to the most recent Census figures, and the median income there is just $26,500. Seventy-three percent of Inkster’s residents are black, and nearly 40 percent of the people in the city live below the poverty line. Black motorist beaten by white Inkster officer will receive $1.4 million settlement There is a bitter irony to the situation, but it’s not unusual that the very people who are most beset by police violence are the ones who wind up paying for it with their pocketbooks. When victims or their families are paid out by cities and municipalities in excessive-force cases that are settled or tried, taxpayers pay every time, highlighting the direct relationship between the social and financial costs of police violence. In Chicago: $84 million in one year. Los Angeles: $54 million. Philadelphia: $40 million in cases brought since 2009. Fatal police shootings in 2015 approaching 400 nationwide In Inkster, the sum is small and deals with just one case. But for its residents, the reality will be unavoidable: The tax will amount to a $178.67 on a home valued at about $55,400, the Free Press estimates. “The price of this is enormous, and it probably is hardest on those who can least afford it and whose communities are most egregiously beset with the misconduct problems,” noted Andy Shaw, president and CEO of the Better Government Association, which has studied the high financial and social costs of police misconduct in Chicago. In Chicago, police-related settlements over the last decade cost the city more than $500 million according to a study published by the group last year. Everyone pays the price, including renters who are likely to be least able to afford it. “They not only face the financial burden and the reduction of services, these dollars could have improved their schools could have given them more cops on the streets to improve their neighborhoods,” Shaw said. “Instead they were transfer payments to victims and victims’ attorneys.” Shaw added: “It takes a terrible toll.” In Inkster, residents are asking why they will now be forced to shoulder this burden. “It’s not our responsibility that there was mistakes made with the police department and the city,” resident Juanita Davis told WDIV in Detroit. Thousands of people fatally shot by police, few prosecutions “It is absolutely true that the innocent citizens in Inkster shouldn’t have to put up with this, and they don’t have to,” said Dan Korobkin, deputy legal director of the ACLU of Michigan. “They ought to demand of their city council people, of their mayor, of their police chief and police officers — all of whom are accountable to the public — that they police this city by respecting the people of the city and complying with basic principles of decency and the constitution. “This is really an opportunity for residents of Inkster and any other municipality to say to the officials that enough is enough.” The true cost of police misconduct is rarely this clear. Piecemeal investigations have revealed astounding costs over a period of years. Critics have likened excessive lawsuits and settlements to a lottery for alleged victims. Often, the expensive legal settlements prompt calls for tort reform; some states have even capped judgments that can be paid out to victims. But not only do body cameras and dashboard cameras hold some promise of being a form of oversight that deters misconduct by officers; it also makes it clear when accusations of misconduct are justified, the ACLU’s Korobkin said.

Taxpayers are the ones most impacted by civil suits not police. Reuters 16
Reuters. "Police Misconduct Lawsuits Cost Taxpayers, Not Cops, Millions." July 28, 2016. https://www.rt.com/usa/311014-costs-police-misconduct-settlements/. SP
From big cities to small towns, American taxpayers are footing the bill for police gone rogue. When an officer or department is sued for police brutality or an in-custody death, the municipality is the one to pay up. And it’s costing taxpayers millions. Property taxes that would otherwise be used for schools, recreation centers, fixing potholes, cleaning up graffiti and other problems are instead being spent on lawsuits and settlements claiming police abuse or neglect. Inkster, an impoverished suburb of Detroit, Michigan, is issuing a one-time property tax assessment of nearly $200 levied on its residents’ properties... to cover settlements in police brutality cases, RT’s Manila Chan reported. One of those lawsuits involved Floyd Dent, a 57-year-old African-American man who was driving home one evening in January when he was pulled over and badly beaten by Inkster Police Department. The incident was all caught on the officer’s dashboard camera. Losing the lawsuit is costing the suburb nearly $1.4 million ‒ the largest settlement on local record. It’s a payment that Inkster, which has been on the brink of insolvency since 2008, can’t afford ‒ hence the property tax. But its residents can’t afford the $192 payment per property this month, either. In Inkster, the median home value is hovering around $55,000, the median household income is just over $26,000 and 38 percent of residents live below the poverty line. "It’s a stark reminder that police brutality has real consequences, not just for the victims who are physically hurt by it, but for the residents of the community that the police are supposed to be serving,” Dan Korobkin of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Michigan chapter told local press. Inkster is far from the only small town having to find ways to pay for police brutality and in-custody death settlements. On Monday, Snohomish County, Washington authorized a $620,000 payment to the family of Michael Saffioti, 22, who died of an allergy at the county jail three years ago. But the relatives say the actual settlement amount is four times higher, the Everett Daily Herald reported. “There was a global settlement discussed of $2.4 million,” the family’s attorney, Cheryl Snow, said. “The plaintiffs are concerned about the gross misrepresentation of the amount that’s claimed to be paid by Snohomish County and its insurers.” Not all costs associated with police brutality or neglect that leads to someone’s death while in custody are monetary, though. “One hidden cost: The perception that officers are violent can poison the relationship between residents and police,” the Baltimore Sun’s Mark Puente wrote in September, noting a trend of city police brutally mistreating residents, especially those in the poorer communities. In April, tensions in Baltimore broke out into unrest and riots after the in-custody death of Freddie Gray. The six officers involved in his arrest were all charged with crimes, up to and including second degree depraved-heart murder, after the state’s attorney ruled Gray’s death a homicide. According to the Sun’s six-month investigation into lawsuits, Baltimore paid some $5.7 million

Tournament: Alta | Round: 5 | Opponent: Sunset AB | Judge: Liz Letak
T – Policy

Interpretation - The AFF must defend hypothetical implementation of government action and legislative policy. 

This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge.  Solves their method good offense – they can read  as a framework argument to justify a government plan, there’s no reason voting off it is key.

Parcher 01 defines resolved

Parcher 1 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in original) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at *Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision.  (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

B.  Violation:

The AFF is clearly not a government policy - individual criticism or rejection is not sufficient – they say .   

C.  Standards: 

1.  Legal change: 

A. Understanding the intricacies of politics and the state is a prerequisite to addressing oppression – their ideological critique falsely assumes that social relations rather than material structures create systemic oppression.  Bryant 12  

Bryant 12 – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/).  NS

We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of “military logistics”. We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target. What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene. We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of “distribution”. The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both. I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you guys behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take. This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.

B.  Anti politics creates material authoritarian oppression which outweighs since it affects people’s real lives instead of being ivory tower theorizing.  Boggs 97

Boggs 97 — Carl Boggs, 1997 (“The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America,” Theory and Society, Volume 26, Issue 6, December, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SpingerLink, p. 773-775)

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here — localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post- modernism, Deep Ecology — intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. end page 773. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved — perhaps even unrecognized — only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.¶ This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites — an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise — or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75 end page 774¶ The historic goal of recovering politics in the Aristotelian sense, therefore, suggests nothing less than a revitalized citizenry prepared to occupy that immense expanse of public space. Extension of democratic control into every area of social life requires insurgency against the charade of normal politics, since the persistence of normal politics is just another manifestation of anti-politics. If authentic citizenship is to be forged, then information, skills, and attitudes vital to political efficacy need to flourish and be widely distributed throughout the population, without this, “consciousness transformation” is impossible, or at least politically meaningless. A debilitating problem with the culture of anti-politics, however, is that it precisely devalues those very types of information, skills, and attitudes.

C.  The state is inevitable - their resistance fails without a concrete plan of action.  Day 09

Day 09 – (Christopher, The Historical Failure of Anarchism: Implications for the Future of the Revolutionary Project, http://mikeely.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/historical_failure_of_aanarchism_chris_day_kasama.pdf).  NS

The strength of anarchism is its moral insistence on the primacy of human freedom over political expediency. But human freedom exists in a political context. It is not sufficient, however, to simply take the most uncompromising position in defense of freedom. It is neccesary to actually win freedom. Anti-capitalism doesn’t do the victims of capitalism any good if you don’t actually destroy capitalism. Anti-statism doesn’t do the victims of the state any good if you don’t actually smash the state. Anarchism has been very good at putting forth visions of a free society and that is for the good. But it is worthless if we don’t develop an actual strategy for realizing those visions. It is not enough to be right, we must also win. Continues… Finally revolutionaries have a responsibility to have a plausible plan for making revolution. Obviously there are not enough revolutionaries to make a revolution at this moment. We can reasonably anticipate that the future will bring upsurges in popular opposition to the existing system. Without being any more specific about where those upsurges might occur it seems clear that it is from the ranks of such upsurges that the numbers of the revolutionary movement will be increased, eventually leading to a revolutionary situation (which is distinguished from the normal crises of the current order only by the existence of a revolutionary movement ready to push things further). People who are fed up with the existing system and who are willing to commit themselves to its overthrow will look around for likeminded people who have an idea of what to do. If we don’t have a plausible plan for making revolution we can be sure that there will be somebody else there who will. There is no guarantee that revolutionary-minded people will be spontaneously drawn to anti-authoritarian politics. The plan doesn’t have to be an exact blueprint. It shouldn’t be treated as something sacred. It should be subject to constant revision in light of experience and debate. But at the very least it needs to be able to answer questions that have been posed concretely in the past. We know that we will never confront the exact same circumstances as previous revolutions. But we should also know that certain problems are persistent ones and that if we can’t say what we would have done in the past we should not expect people to think much of our ability to face the future. 

We solve their offense:

A. Using the government strategically doesn’t legitimate it – hate crime laws that stopped KKK members from lynching black people didn’t change the entire system, but they were a step in the right direction as a demand from black communities.  

B.  Defending a plan doesn’t require assimilation into the government.  Harris 13

Scott Harris, Director of Debate, Kansas University, 2013, This Ballot, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0 CC

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. This idea that debate is about role playing being a part of the government puzzles me greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now never once have I role played being part of the government. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has formed many opinions about what the government and other institutions should or should not do without ever role playing being part of those institutions. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. I have no idea at all why it would be oppressive for someone to form an opinion about whether or not they think the government should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

C.  The state is inevitably a unit of analysis given that it exists now even if we want to move beyond it.  Frost 96

Mervyn Frost, U of Kent, 1996, Ethics in Int’l Relations, p. 90-1.  NS

A first objection which seems inherent in Donelan’s approach is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the system.  This objection is not well founded, by having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them.  As I have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state.  Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus,for example. any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.

2.  Procedural fairness:

A.  Predictability - Non state advocacies mean they can defend incredibly vague advocacies making it unclear what DAs the 1NC can read – also allows massive 1AR shifts to clarify their advocacy and delink from all NEG offense.  Defending a policy means there are clear legislative steps we can contest.  

B.  Ground - The majority of NEG arguments come from policy enforcement, like  _.  Generic Ks of their method will always lose to the specificity of the plan and a case specific prep advantage

This is an independent voting issue which outweighs:

A.  Evaluation – even if their arguments seem true, that’s only because they already had an advantage – fairness is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who best meets their ROB.
B.  Fairness is key to effective dialogue.  Galloway 07

Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

Voter: Drop the debater on T – our state good offense justifies a counter ROB which outweighs and turns theirs.  Also, the round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded by ability to generate NC offense– letting them sever doesn’t solve any of the abuse

Vote on substantive engagement:  otherwise we’re speaking without debating and there’s nothing to separate us from dueling oratory.   It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics.
Drop the debater on T:

A. Hold them accountable for their interp – a topical advocacy frames the debate - drop the arg lets them jump ship to a new layer killing NEG ground.
B. Drop the arg on T is the same thing as drop the debater since T indicts their advocacy 

Competing interps since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

No RVIs
A. Topicality is a prima facie burden for the AFF. You wouldn’t vote for them just because they didn’t speak over their time limits and you shouldn’t vote for them for following the most basic rule of debate.
B. They incentivize debaters to go all in in theory and bait it with abusive practices, killing substantive clash on other flows.
Case

Agamben’s kritik fails, another state formation will always rise instead we should use the state in strategic instances for responsibility of human needs.

Passavant, 2007 (Paul A, Political Theory 2007; 35; 147, “The Contradictory State of Giorgi Agamben,” http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/2/147, Pg25-26)
Finally, Agamben indicates, through the example of the apostle Paul and the remnant of those who faithfully adhere to messianic law, the possibility of active political subjects adequate to the challenge of state sovereignty. This argument, however, contradicts his earlier positions embracing potentiality over the acts emblematic of sovereign decisions, and an experience of being beyond any idea of law. It also, by relying on a determinate situation to create the conditions of possibility for a successful speech act, occludes the forms of power needed to maintain this situation against other ontological possibilities much as his first theory of passage beyond the state of integrated spectacle did. This argument also begs the question of how this messianic community might relate to that which remains other to its situation. That is, Agamben must address the very questions that his ontological approach to state sovereignty intended to avoid— questions of power and otherness. In sum, Agamben remains haunted by the very problems that motivated not only his critique of the state but also his attempt to remove this inquiry from political philosophy to “first” philosophy. 43 At the end of Agamben’s theory of the state, politics remains. There are four implications of this critique for political theory and the state. First, the modern state is poorly understood as transcendent, unitary,  and sovereign. The “state” encompasses a variety of institutions, many of which predate modernity.44 The Foucauldian understanding of government, I suggested, is the practice by which articulations between these institutions are forged—and non-state institutions are joined to this chain—and they are mobilized toward various purposes. The plural nature of this ensemble is precisely what gives extension to the modern state.45 Second, if we treat the state as an ensemble of institutions, then the concept of a state of emergency is poorly suited to understanding our political present. Agamben rightly criticizes the USA PATRIOT Act in State of Exception. This law, like most laws that are passed in an ongoing legal system, amends a variety of other laws and sits on a foundation created by these other laws, such as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The Antiterrorism Act created the possibility of attributing guilt by association since it criminalized the provision of material support for organizations that the administration deems “terrorist”—provisions that the USA PATRIOT Act builds upon.46 From this perspective, current policies are less “exceptional,” unfortunately, and more a continuing development of a national security state apparatus that has been built through legislation like the National Security Act of 1947, through discourse, and through the creation of stakeholders (the military-industrial complex).47 In other words, another state formation is struggling to emerge through the ruin of liberal democracy in the United States, and this emergence (and ruin) is hastened by those who seek to enhance surveillance and presidential powers, while diminishing the power of courts and legislative oversight as a response to September 11, 2001.48 Third, any social formation is constituted by elements of both contingency and determination. By emphasizing pure potentiality, Agamben misses this and either cherishes the excessive quality of pure potentiality to the neglect of the exigent needs of the present, or neglects how the active political subjects he does defend are embedded within finite commitments that necessarily persevere through the foreclosure of other possibilities. Some contemporary political theorists concerned with injustice and the lack of democracy also emphasize contingency, excess, and potentiality over determination, finitude, and acts.49 These theorists correctly seek to disrupt oppressive patterns. Since politics—hence political change—would  not be possible under conditions of absolute determination, emphasizing contingency or excess makes sense. Yet reflection upon the retraction of certain state services from places like the Bronx during the late 1970s permits us to see how neither justice nor democracy is served by excessive economic duress or violence. Not only are these contingencies unjust, but also their incapacitating effects prevent democratic practices of government where the latter necessarily presupposes some collective capacity to direct and achieve collective purposes. State actions that mitigate chaos, economic inequality, and violence, then, potentially contribute to the improved justice of outcomes and democracy. Political theorists must temper celebrating contingency with a simultaneous consideration of the complicated relation that determination has to democratic purposes.5 Fourth, the state’s institutions are among the few with the capacity to respond to the exigency of human needs identified by political theorists. These actions will necessarily be finite and less than wholly adequate, but responsibility may lie on the side of acknowledging these limitations and seeking to redress what is lacking in state action rather than calling for pure potentiality and an end to the state. We may conclude that claims to justice or democracy based on the wish to rid ourselves of the state once and for all are like George W. Bush claiming to be an environmentalist because he has proposed converting all of our cars so that they will run on hydrogen.51 Meanwhile, in the here and now, there are urgent claims that demand finite acts that by definition will be both divisive and less than what a situation demands.52 In the end, the state remains. Let us defend this state of due process and equal protection against its ruinous other.

. Liberal democratic protections prevent the slide to totalitarianism.  Heins 05

Heins, 05  (Volker, visiting professor of political science at Concordia University and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May,
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598)

According to this basic Principle of Distinction, modern humanitarian action is directed towards those who are caught up in violent conflicts without possessing any strategic value for the respective warring parties. Does this imply that classic humanitarianism and its legal expressions reduce the lives of noncombatants to the "bare life" of nameless individuals beyond the protection of any legal order? I would rather argue that humanitarianism is itself an order-making activity. Its goal is not the preservation of life reduced to a bare natural fact, but conversely the protection of civilians and thereby the protection of elementary standards of civilization which prevent the exclusion of individuals from any legal and moral order. The same holds true for human rights, of course. Agamben fails to appreciate the fact that human rights laws are not about some cadaveric "bare life", but about the protection of moral agency.  His sweeping critique also lacks any sense for essential distinctions. It may be legitimate to see "bare life" as a juridical fiction nurtured by the modern state, which claims the right to derogate from otherwise binding norms in times of war and emergency, and to kill individuals, if necessary, outside the law in a mode of "effective factuality." Agamben asserts that sovereignty understood in this manner continues to function in the same way since the seventeenth century and regardless of the democratic or dictatorial structure of the state in question. This claim remains unilluminated by the wealth of evidence that shows how the humanitarian motive not only shapes the mandate of a host state and nonstate agencies, but also serves to restrict the operational freedom of military commanders in democracies, who cannot act with impunity and who do not wage war in a lawless state of nature. Furthermore, Agamben ignores the crisis of humanitarianism that emerged as a result of the totalitarian degeneration of modern states in the twentieth century. States cannot always be assumed to follow a rational self-interest which informs them that there is no point in killing others indiscriminately. The Nazi episode in European history has shown that sometimes leaders do not spare the weak and the sick, but take extra care not to let them escape, even if they are handicapped, very old or very young. Classic humanitarianism depends on the existence of an international society whose members feel bound by a basic set of rules regarding the use of violence—rules which the ICRC itself helped to institutionalize. Conversely, classic humanitarianism becomes dysfunctional when states place no value at all on their international reputation and see harming the lives of defenseless individuals not as useless and cruel, but as part of their very missionThe founders of the ICRC defined war as an anthropological constant that produced a continuous stream of new victims with the predictable regularity and unavoidability of floods or volcanic eruptions. Newer organizations, by contrast, have framed conditions of massive social suffering as a consequence of largely avoidable political mistakes. The humanitarian movement becomes political, to paraphrase Carl Schmitt, in so far as it orients itself to humanitarian states of emergency, the causes of which are located no longer in nature, but in society and politics. Consequently, the founding generation of the new humanitarian organizations have freed themselves from the ideals of apolitical philanthropy and chosen as their new models historical figures like the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who saved thousands of Jews during the Second World War. In a different fashion than Agamben imagines, the primary concern in the field of humanitarian intervention and human rights politics today is not the protection of bare life, but rather the rehabilitation of the lived life of citizens who suffer, for instance, from conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder. At the same time, there is a field of activity emerging beneath the threshold of the bare life. In the United States, in particular, pathologists working in conjunction with human rights organizations have discovered the importance of corpses and corporal remains now that it is possible to identify reliable evidence for war crimes from exhumed bodies.

1.  We need to learn about the complex state, even if it’s bad, to create effective solutions.  Zanotti 14

Dr. Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech.  Her research and teaching include critical political theory as well as international organizations, UN peacekeeping, democratization and the role of NGOs in post-conflict governance.“Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World” – Alternatives: Global, Local, Political – vol 38(4):p. 288-304,. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – The Stated “Version of Record” is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013. Obtained via Sage Database.  NS from file

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’  Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.’’84 

No biopolitical violence impact
Jonathan Short 5, Ph.D. candidate in the Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought, York University, “Life and Law: Agamben and Foucault on Governmentality and Sovereignty,” Journal for the Arts, Sciences and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 1
Adding to the dangerousness of this logic of control, however, is that while there is a crisis of undecidability in the domain of life, it corresponds to a similar crisis at the level of law and the national state. It should be noted here that despite the new forms of biopolitical control in operation today, Rose believes that bio-politics has become generally less dangerous in recent times than even in the early part of the last century. At that time, bio- politics was linked to the project of the expanding national state in his opinion. In disciplinary-pastoral society, bio-politics involved a process of social selection of those characteristics thought useful to the nationalist project. Hence, according to Rose, "once each life has a value which may be calculated, and some lives have less value than others, such a politics has the obligation to exercise this judgement in the name of the race or the nation" (2001: 3). Disciplinary-pastoral bio- politics sets itself the task of eliminating "differences coded as defects", and in pursuit of this goal the most horrible programs of eugenics, forced sterilization, and outright extermination, were enacted (ibid.: 3). If Rose is more optimistic about bio-politics in 'advanced liberal' societies, it is because this notion of 'national fitness', in terms of bio- political competition among nation-states, has suffered a precipitous decline thanks in large part to a crisis of the perceived unity of the national state as a viable political project (ibid.: 5). To quote Rose once again, "the idea of 'society' as a single, if heterogeneous, domain with a national culture, a national population, a national destiny, co-extensive with a national territory and the powers of a national political government" no longer serves as premises of state policy (ibid.: 5). Drawing on a sequential reading of Foucault's theory of the governmentalization of the state here, Rose claims that the territorial state, the primary institution of enclosure, has become subject to fragmentation along a number of lines. National culture has given way to cultural pluralism; national identity has been overshadowed by a diverse cluster of identifications, many of them transcending the national territory on which they take place, while the same pluralization has affected the once singular conception of community (ibid.: 5). Under these conditions, Rose argues, the bio-political programmes of the molar enclosure known as the nation-state have fallen into disrepute and have been all but abandoned. 

Turn - Biopower operates to sustain life-not kill it—and rejecting it risks creating more attrocities
Ojakangas, 2005 (Mike, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Finland
 “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power Agamben and Foucault,” Foucault Studies, May, http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf)

In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that there exists a form of power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing people’s lives. The effectiveness of bio‐power can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice. In bio‐ political societies, according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: “One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others.”112 However, given that the “right to kill” is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the bio‐political societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely bio‐political. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is entirely bio‐political. Nevertheless, the fact is that present‐day European societies have abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very “right to kill” that has been called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of bio‐political thinking and practice. For all these reasons, Agamben’s thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the fundamental bio‐political paradigm of the West, has to be corrected.113 The bio‐political paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the present‐day welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the bio‐political society can be seen, for example, in the middle‐class Swedish social‐democrat. Although this figure is an object – and a product – of the huge bio‐political machinery, it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide. Actually, the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest “crime” against the machinery. (In bio‐political societies, death is not only “something to be hidden away,” but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most “shameful thing of all”.114) Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying. In fact, the bio‐political machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him, with all its material and spiritual capacities, to live healthily, to live long and to live happily – even when, in biological terms, he “should have been dead long ago”.115 This is because bio‐power is not bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the condition of all life – individual as well as collective – that is the measure of the success of bio‐power. Another important question is whether these bio‐political societies that started to take shape in the seventeenth century (but did not crystallize until the 1980s) are ideologically, especially at the level of practical politics, collapsing – to say nothing about the value of the would‐be collapse. One thing is clear, however. At the global level, there has not been, and likely will not be, a completely bio‐political society. And to the extent that globalization takes place without bio‐political considerations of health and happiness of individuals and populations, as it has done until now, it is possible that our entire existence will someday be reduced to bare life, as has already occurred, for instance, in Chechnya and Iraq. On that day, perhaps, when bio‐political care has ceased to exist, and we all live within the sovereign ban of Empire without significance, we can only save ourselves, as Agamben suggests, “in perpetual flight or a foreign land”116 – although there will hardly be either places to which to flee, or foreign lands. 

The k has ZERO explanatory power – the plan tactical deployment is effective and alters the essence of the law – no risk of escalating violence
Ross, 12 “Agamben’s Political Paradigm of the Camp: Its Features and Reasons” Alison Ross is Lecturer in Critical Theory in the Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, Monash University, Australia, Constellations Volume 19, No 3, 2012, p. Blackwell Publications
The difficulty here is that Agamben, given the ahistoricity of his theory, is unable to provide an account of why the state of exception has become a problem at this particular point in time. Similarly, he claims that the law is more likely to bring violence into play now, in the present historical juncture, than ever before, a claim that pertains to questions of fact. Agamben, however, cannot draw a link between the thesis concerning law’s “constitutive violence” and current circumstances because he pays no attention to issues such as historical relationships between political institutions and policing mechanisms, which disciplines like political sociology deal with. Agamben’s ontological theses regarding the “essence” of the law do not help in attending to the historical problem his theory needs to be able to address: namely, to show the process by which “the state of exception has become the norm.” More generally, it is difficult to see how his commitment to such theses sheds any light on the workings of the law. Agamben sees the purported “legitimacy of law” as a ruse of the liberal state, which in the social contract narrative claims legitimacy for law on account of its protection of otherwise vulnerable life. This position may usefully be compared with Foucault’s comments on the same topic. Foucault addresses the topic of law’s legitimacy from two different angles. First, he sees in political philosophy’s interest in the question of the features that qualifysovereign power as legitimate a tendency to avoid the crucial question of how “legitimate” power actually operates. In this sense, the account he provides in his work on prisons of how law’s violence manifests in penal institutions is a critique of the adequacy of the theory of sovereignty to form an accurate picture of the complex forces and instruments involved in social organization.32 Second, in his 1978–9 lectures on biopolitics, Foucault argues that liberalism is a government of life rather than the exercise of sovereignty over life and death. His analysis of the policy direction of post-war German intellectuals is premised on the assumption that their activities were strategically meaningful. Their social integration and state building initiatives were based on the goal of economic success. Even their “power politics” were staked on rapid economic growth.33 Foucault’s analysis of liberalism follows an injunction comparable to his focus on reformist manuals and prison plans in Discipline and Punish. Institutional practices do not function independently of what people think about them. They are intelligible precisely because they embody strategically considered ends (even if these ends are not realized or contained by those strategies).34 C _ 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 428 Constellations, Volume 19, Issue 3, 2012 The premise of Agamben’s analysis, in contrast, renders power senseless. What possible intelligible motives might Agamben’s sovereign have for wanting perpetual and unlimited disposition over the physical existence of its subjects in the manner of a Nazi camp warden? This question cannot be raised in Agamben’s scheme. Moreover, it is precisely because the law is not – as Agamben’s analysis assumes – an objective mechanism that could function independently of what people think about it that he obscures how the different ways in which the law is experienced as legitimate (e.g., in its strategic deployment to realize specific ends) can affect its “essential nature.” This renders Agamben’s thesis of the “constitutive violence” of the law, if not unintelligible, at least inscrutable. Is it the way political institutions are shaped or the way human individuals are conceptualized in legal doctrine that produces this state of affairs? The deficiencies of this perspective can partly be found in the ontological nature of his framework, which thus has very little to do with an inquiry into institutional features and practices. It aims to pose questions regarding legal institutions and practices at the “fundamental” level of the forces or elements that drive history. His fascination with the terminology of the “exception” as the incisive political vocabulary for our times is a case in point. His use of this terminology marks out extreme situations not as anomalous, but as if they had general significance. This mode of argumentation necessarily looks past the task of analyzing institutional functioning because it imports the grammar of such functioning from the “exceptional” situation. iii. Agamben treats those subject to law as totally passive “bodies.” His focus on the camp situation is telling because this is the only situation where his doctrine seems to work: in the extermination camp, action does not meet other actions, but bodies. Foucault insisted that this type of situation was not a relation of power, but one of submission to force.35 Similarly, sociological models of social interaction differentiate the study of social organization defined as actions influencing other actions from situations of crude force. Since he is so often contemptuous of the assumptions of liberalism, it is worth comparing Agamben’s position on this question of force with that of liberalism. Classical liberal theory acknowledges the ultimate dependence of order on relations of force; it holds the unification of the aggregate force of society under a single coercive law to be the virtue of the state. The purpose of such force is the protection of the members of its aggregate body. However, there are limits on the capacity of force to decide conflicts internal to this aggregate body. These limits are a central topic in liberal political philosophy, which sees reliance on force to manage social conflicts as a sign of the system’s weakness: such reliance places inflationary pressure on force, thus devaluing it. “Force” as it is understood and used in liberal political theory is a differential quantity that has to present itself and be received as a “quality,” as authority, on the pain of dissipation. In The State and the Rule of Law, Blandine Kriegel reads the history of theories of the state in these terms, emphasizing the perils of naked reliance on force pointed out in such theories. She notes, for instance, that theorists of the state since Bodin have found the state that restrains itself in its use of force and its extension of powers more powerful than one with unlimited powers.36 The question of force can also be approached from the perspective of other mechanisms that are important for social organization and that presuppose the existence of distinct currencies that pertain to the different media of the social system. Liberal theory acknowledges the findings of political sociology that describes how social order is constituted through, for instance, symbolic integration and economic instruments. Social integration and organization take place in multiple dimensions or media: symbolic (cultural, ideological, etc.), C _ 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Agamben’s Political Paradigm of the Camp: Alison Ross 429 economic, and political (participation in collective decisions at various levels).37 Talcott Parsons attempted to define the problem of social interaction in terms of “systems of action” that use different “symbolically generalized media of communication” where action influences action. As part of this approach, he maintained the importance of patterns of interaction in establishing and reinforcing expectations for the functioning of such media. When a cultural system changes, this marks the introduction of a new pattern whose meaning is intelligible to and expected by social actors.38 In particular, Parsons was interested to account for the interaction between social, cultural, and personality systems. These relationships are all bidirectional according to him; that is, these symbolic systems are intelligible to agents whose action is susceptible to the “actions” of social and cultural systems of meaning.39 This approach is important not just because of the elements it deploys to explain social organization, but because of the image it produces of such organization. I will return to this point in my concluding remarks to this paper. The economic system is based on interactions in which actors select actions that will optimize their ends. They want to act “in the most profitable way to achieve the highest benefits when costs are substantial.” In this system, the symbolic medium of money is ordered according to a specific set of norms for its use and acquisition. Within the system, money is not replaceable by force. For instance, as a legitimate means for acquiring property, the use of money as a symbolic mechanism of exchange forbids as illegitimate “the use of force” for property acquisition.40 Similarly, in the political system, force is understood as an abortive way of managing conflicting goals since it is susceptible to counter-action by the force of others. It thus fails to make decisions that could bind everyone in a social system. The political system uses forms of collective decision-making to maximize the realization of actors’ specific goals. Legitimate political power is a general medium that can make collectively binding and effective decisions in a way that force cannot.41 Insofar as such mechanisms are effective, they are real; and they need to be understood and analyzed in terms of their actual mechanics and dynamics, not dismissed as masks.42 With these comments I do not intend to mount a defence of liberal political philosophy. Rather, I want to ask whether Agamben’s style of analysis allows things to be seen more clearly than they are in sociologically influenced liberal theory. Agamben’s criticisms of law are directed to the potential he sees realized in the camps to hold life in a relation of exposure to pure force. Of course, the critical stand he takes on law is explicable in terms of the ontological perspective he adopts, but we need to ask whether adopting this stance helps us illuminate current political circumstances. Why, for instance, does he choose to explain what happens in the camp as a potential of liberal law, rather than as a degradation of liberal protections?43 Additionally, how useful are categories crafted in the field of jurisprudence, which have their proper register of application within this field, for the purpose of describing what occurs in extreme situations like the camp? What makes the camp analogy especially unsuitable as a paradigm for understanding the organization of a society is that the “camp population,” unlike society, is not meant to have a future (and here one needs think of all those things that are required for a society to have a future: from material production to symbolic identity, etc.). The murderous contempt shown the camp inmate is simply not a viable option for a state.

Tournament: College Prep | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Immaculate Heart DD | Judge: Sheelah Bearfoot, Panny Shah, Felix Tan
The call for tolerance is a conservative diversion tactic – under the name of ‘freedom’ radical movements against capitalism get shut down. Sculos and Walsh 16
Sculos, Bryant William a¶ Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University , and Sean Noah Walsh Department of Political Science and Economics, Capital University. "The Counterrevolutionary Campus: Herbert Marcuse and the Suppression of Student Protest Movements." New Political Science (2016): 1-17.
There has been no explicit proposal for legally limiting free speech. Indeed, our point is¶ just the opposite: it is exactly in those calls for the enlargement of free speech, for more¶ tolerant leftist students, that a tactic of repression is unfolding. In the guise, therefore, of¶ ‘free speech’ and ‘toleration’, students on the left are called toward silence and acquiescence.¶ It is this demand, which equates tolerance with passively listening to what is already recognized¶ as harmful, that threatens to drown dissent against the Establishment, the constellation¶ of corporate, military and state powers that administer and profit from late capitalism. The¶ principle of toleration has become an instrument of reactionary forces in suppressing the¶ radical Left. Dialectically understood, the banner of tolerance is being used as a means to¶ neutralize the student opposition against an unjust and exploitative system; tolerance is¶ ironically inverted into an instrument of oppression. This is the condition that Herbert¶ Marcuse forewarned in one of his more controversial essays, ‘Repressive Tolerance’.¶ Writing in 1965, Marcuse examined the dialectical repercussions of an essentially unabridged,¶ unrestricted toleration—a condition in which the demand for tolerance was all but¶ boundless. Marcuse held that advanced industrial nations in the West proceeded under the false premise that a free society could only be realized if it permitted nearly absolute toleration.¶ The exercise of free speech, for example, to protest the war in Vietnam was apparently¶ only guaranteed if it also allowed the National Socialist Party of America to March in the¶ predominantly Jewish city of Skokie, Illinois. In that regard, toleration was extended so far¶ as to permit what any reasonable person could recognize as being necessarily harmful. Thus,¶ the apparently slavish liberal insistence on absolute toleration had been extended so far as¶ to become an instrument of repression. As Marcuse writes:¶ The toleration for the systematic moronization of children and adults alike by publicity and propaganda,¶ the release of destructiveness in aggressive driving, the recruitment for and training of¶ special forces, the impotent and benevolent tolerance toward outright deception in merchandising,¶ waste, and planned obsolescence are not distortions and aberrations, they are the essence¶ of a system which fosters tolerance as a means for perpetuating the struggle for existence and¶ suppressing the alternatives.7¶ Under the banner that nearly everything must be permissible, all manner of destructive¶ behaviors find adequate space to flourish. For Marcuse, capitalism is predicated on the repression¶ of Eros, and the largely free reign of the death instinct.8 That which is tolerated, more¶ often than not, is violent and bellicose. At the point where it becomes its own end, rather¶ than an instrument for the achievement of a rational, humane and pacific civilization, tolerance—like¶ any other tool—accommodates decidedly deleterious forms. For Marcuse, tolerance¶ taken to its extreme, tolerance as its own objective, becomes dialectically inverted.¶ It becomes repressive. Rather than an instrument for freedom, it lapses under the weight of¶ bellicosity in advanced industrial society, emerging as an absurdity that results in a totalitarian¶ scene. As Marcuse maintained, ‘Tolerance is extended to policies and conditions, and¶ modes of behavior which should not be tolerated because they are impeding, if not destroying,¶ the chances of creating an existence without fear and misery’.9¶ Marcuse’s essay represents a criticism of tolerance as an end unto itself, especially under¶ the violent and exploitative conditions of capitalism. Since their views are frequently predicated¶ on aggression, sexual repression and discrimination, conservative and reactionary¶ elements have distorted his critique as a categorical attack on free speech. Accordingly,¶ Bauer portrays Marcuse as making a ‘case for repression—of thought, conscience, speech,¶ and science’.10 However, in his essay, Marcuse wrote that a liberating tolerance:¶ Would include the withdrawal of toleration of speech and assembly from groups and movements¶ which promote aggressive policies, armament, chauvinism, discrimination on the grounds¶ of race and religion, or which oppose the extension of public services, social security, medical¶ care, etc. Moreover, the restoration of freedom of thought may necessitate new and rigid restrictions¶ on teachings and practices in the educational institutions which, by their very methods and¶ concepts, serve to enclose the mind within the established universe of discourse and behavior¶ — thereby precluding a priori a rational evaluation of the alternatives. And to the degree to¶ which freedom of thought involves the struggle against inhumanity, restoration of such freedom¶ would also imply intolerance toward scientific research in the interest of deadly “deterrents,” of¶ abnormal human endurance under inhuman conditions, etc.11

Agonistic democracy obscures class conflict – it makes all politics communicative which makes radicalism impossible. Kebir – No date
Ali Kebir Université de Rennes, Philosophy, Graduate Student Agonistic Democracy Contra Deliberative democracy?¶ Mouffe, Rancière and the Issue of Conflict.
As a result, in agonistic democracy conflict is above all a communicational language¶ practice that opens a common world. One must conclude that radical conflict, that is the¶ incommensurable struggle against domination, is eliminated since relations between¶ dominants and dominated are shaped by a more or less conflicting dialogue. To be sure¶ deliberative and agonistic models are very different, and it is obvious that the latter’s¶ emphasis on conflict is absent from the former (at least in its standard version). However,¶ they share the same consequences in regard to the notion of conflict that is, in each case,¶ emptied from its most radical potentialities in regard to challenging domination.¶ I would now like to draw attention on what is at stake in this long criticism of agonistic¶ democracy: by showing how the most radical democratic model of politics conceptualises¶ conflict as struggle against domination, I wanted to focus on the type of relation that we are¶ enjoined today – under the hegemonic democratic value – to tie up with domination. I argue¶ that the agonistic approach, by attenuating it through a common language grid, cannot allow¶ us to deal with domination in such a manner that we can envisage the destruction of its current¶ form. Indeed, as we saw, what Mouffe and Rancière propose is only an everlasting discussion¶ with domination that legitimizes its existence. Catherine Colliot-Thélène put this very well in¶ her scrutiny of radical contemporary democratic theory: “this radicalism doesn’t aim at¶ destroying power anymore …, rather it takes notice of its irreducible exteriority. Power is¶ henceforth thought as the necessary partner of conflictual relationship only susceptible of¶ interim solutions, and as the recipient of demands that presuppose it at the same time they call¶ it into question” (2009, my italics).¶ Besides this criticism of agonistic democracy, I would like to challenge what I believe to¶ be a real political program producing specific political subjects, which is contained in¶ democratic theories. To understand that point, I must quickly explicit the method I am using¶ here to read those authors. Adopting a Foucauldian framework, I consider that theoretical¶ discourses carry out excluding and constitutive power relations. By this way, what is really at stake here, is how the democratic discourses of Mouffe and Rancière can shape and solidify¶ “what is possible and impossible, to think, say, do and be” politically (Cruikshank, 1999).¶ The mix between conflict and common language in the definition of politics, which I brought¶ into light, constitutes what I call a regime of commensurability, that is to say a real program¶ shaping how to act, think and speak politically. It consists in the idea that political practices¶ are to be transformed from antagonistic ones into com-possible ones, forming a homogenous¶ complex even when they are in opposition. It is the production of political practices that do¶ not entail incommensurable conflict but reduce political interactions to a network of pacified¶ linguistic connections that can, in the same time, be relatively conflictual since they have a¶ common measure, based on common language and experience, but that is relatively¶ indeterminate. In other words, commensurability involves the possibility of controversies and¶ disagreements between agonistic positions, but those must always have a common measure¶ grounded on common language and experience. The regime of commensurability, thanks to¶ communicational language technology, makes possible the constitution of political subjects¶ that are pre-eminently subjects of communication and who are crucially made so in the¶ conflictual dimension of their lives. Such subjects are defined in such a way that they are¶ impelled to participate, to cooperate, to manage their conflicts as a game of contestation¶ grounded on securing common rules. Then, they are also constituted in such a way that they¶ cannot envisage an antagonistic relation structured by warfare, meaning an incommensurable¶ political practice. The democratic regime of commensurability is the contemporary political condition of¶ impossibility for any political subjectivation shaped on the example of struggle against¶ domination as warfare. Michel Foucault draws its basic features very well. In “Society Must¶ Be Defended” he writes the history of a discourse that has been buried, namely the “historicopolitical”¶ discourse. Its specificity lies on a conception of society as divided in two¶ races/classes that are in war. One of them dominates the other, but hides that fact behind the¶ discourses of law and political philosophy celebrating unity. Law and political institutions are¶ the tools of a non-avowed war won by the dominants. Hence Foucault’s famous definition of¶ politics as “war continued by other means”. Against domination, those who resist12 use the¶ history of wars to denounce the supposed neutrality of the state. Their discourse is “interested¶ in rediscovering the blood that has dried in the codes” (Foucault, 2003, 56). Its fundamental¶ aim is to show that there is absolutely no community of any kind between the two groups at¶ war.¶ There is a very specific political subjectivation at stake here: in politics there cannot be¶ one unified subject such as the people or the nation or the community. The subject who resists¶ domination does not aim at universality of law and truth, that is to say it does not enter a¶ communicational relationship (neither rationalist deliberation, nor adversarial or disagreeing¶ interlocution). It is always situated in a particular balance of power holding an absolute¶ singular position to defend. It is a cleaved subject. One may say that while the subject that¶ underlies the agonistic/democratic approach is polemical, the subject at stake here is warlike.¶ In the first case we have polemical disagreement between adversaries, in the second we have¶ a strategic face-off between enemies. Therefore, in conflict – as it was defined by the¶ discourses of war – there is no common language between dominants and dominated. The¶ latter denounce domination veiled in the language of the former and do not try to assert a¶ common language but try to create their own.

Free speech is an illusion propagated by corporatists – their model of rights assumes an equal playing field analogous to free market economists view of capital. The promotion of free speech perpetuates the idea that speech is a commodity, which strengthens neoliberalism’s hold on the academy. Brown 15
Brown, Wendy. Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism's stealth revolution. MIT Press, 2015.
At times, kennedy raises the pitch in Citizens United to depict limits on corporate funding of PAC ads as “an outright ban on speech”;19 at other times, he casts them merely as inappropriate government inter- vention and bureaucratic weightiness.20 But beneath all the hyperbole about government’s chilling of corporate speech is a crucial rhetorical move: the figuring of speech as analogous to capital in “the political marketplace.” on the one hand, government intervention is featured throughout the opinion as harmful to the marketplace of ideas that speech generates.21 Government restrictions damage freedom of speech just as they damage all freedoms. on the other hand, the unfettered accumulation and circulation of speech is cast as an unqual- ified good, essential to “the right of citizens to inquire...hear... speak...and use information to reach consensus itself a precondi- tion to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”22 not merely corporate rights, then, but democracy as a whole is at stake in the move to deregulate speech. Importantly, however, democ- racy is here conceived as a marketplace whose goods—ideas, opinions, and ultimately, votes—are generated by speech, just as the economic market features goods generated by capital. In other words, at the very moment that Justice kennedy deems disproportionate wealth irrele- vant to the equal rights exercised in this marketplace and the utili- tarian maximization these rights generate, speech itself acquires the status of capital, and a premium is placed on its unrestricted sources and unimpeded flow.¶ What is significant about rendering speech as capital? economiza- tion of the political occurs not through the mere application of market principles to nonmarket fields, but through the conversion of political processes, subjects, categories, and principles to economic ones. This is the conversion that occurs on every page of the kennedy opinion. If everything in the world is a market, and neoliberal markets con- sist only of competing capitals large and small, and speech is the capital of the electoral market, then speech will necessarily share cap- ital’s attributes: it appreciates through calculated investment, and it advances the position of its bearer or owner. Put the other way around, once speech is rendered as the capital of the electoral marketplace, it is appropriately unrestricted and unregulated, fungible across actors and venues, and existing solely for the advancement or enhancement of its bearer’s interests. The classic associations of political speech with freedom, conscience, deliberation, and persuasion are nowhere in sight.¶ How, precisely, is speech capital in the kennedy opinion? How does it come to be figured in economic terms where its regulation or restriction appears as bad for its particular marketplace and where its monopolization by corporations appears as that which is good for all? The transmogrification of speech into capital occurs on a number of levels in kennedy’s account. First, speech is like capital in its tendency to proliferate and circu- late, to push past barriers, to circumvent laws and other restrictions, indeed, to spite efforts at intervention or suppression.23 speech is thus rendered as a force both natural and good, one that can be wrongly impeded and encumbered, but never quashed.¶ second, persons are not merely producers, but consumers of speech, and government interference is a menace—wrong in prin- ciple and harmful in effect—at both ends. The marketplace of ideas, kennedy repeats tirelessly, is what decides the value of speech claims. every citizen must judge the content of speech for himself or herself; it cannot be a matter for government determination, just as govern- ment should not usurp other consumer choices.24 In this discussion, kennedy makes no mention of shared deliberation or judgment in politics or of voices that are unfunded and relatively powerless. He is focused on the wrong of government “commanding where a per- son may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, using censorship to control thought.”25 If speech generates goods consumed according to individual choice, govern- ment distorts this market by “banning the political speech of millions of associations of citizens” (that is, corporations) and by paternal- istically limiting what consumers may know or consider. Again, if speech is the capital of the political marketplace, then we are polit- ically free when it circulates freely. And it circulates freely only when corporations are not restricted in what speech they may fund or promulgate.¶ Third, kennedy casts speech not as a medium for expression or dialogue, but rather as innovative and productive, just as capital is. There is “a creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expres- sion” that intersects in a lively way with “rapid changes in technol- ogy” to generate the public good.26 This aspect of speech, kennedy argues, specifically “counsels against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”27 Again, the dynamism, innovativeness, and generativity of speech, like that of all capital, is dampened by government intervention.¶ Fourth, and perhaps most important in establishing speech as the capital of the electoral marketplace, kennedy sets the power of speech and the power of government in direct and zero-sum-game opposition to one another. Repeatedly across the lengthy opinion for the majority, he identifies speech with freedom and government with control, cen- sorship, paternalism, and repression.28 When free speech and govern- ment meet, it is to contest one another: the right of speech enshrined in the First Amendment, he argues, is “premised on mistrust of gov- ernmental power” and is “an essential mechanism of democracy because it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”29 Here are other variations on this theme in the opinion:¶ The First Amendment was certainly not understood by the framers to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media. It was understood as a response to the repression of speech.30¶ When Government seeks to use its full power, including criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.... The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.31 This reading of the First Amendment and of the purpose of political speech positions government and speech as warring forces parallel to those of government and capital in a neoliberal economy.

This turns the case – the commodification of speech reflects the capitalist illusion of freedom. It makes speech meaningless and kills value to life. Smith ‘14
R.C. Smith April 24, 2014 “POWER, CAPITAL and THE RISE OF THE MASS SURVEILLANCE STATE: ON THE ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY, ETHICS, DISENCHANTMENT and CRITICAL THEORY” Heathwood Institute and Press http://www.heathwoodpress.com/power-capital-the-rise-of-the-mass-surveillance-state-on-the-absence-of-democracy-ethics-disenchantment-critical-theory/ JJN from file
One pressing issue, moreover, is that majority of the popular movements that have emerged in response to the Snowden leaks appear to be reformist in character. As a result, the discourse isn’t so much about fundamental system change; rather it becomes crafted into making mass surveillance less repulsive and more socially acceptable, even marketable. (Consider, for instance, the latest reforms proposed by President Barack Obama). For Adorno, this reformist inclination can be explained in part through an analysis of the logic of the system of capital. We read in Adorno how under modernity – i.e., capitalism – human beings are treated as commodities4 and the political-economy, which is principled on concentrations of power (i.e., ‘contradictory recognition’5), goes over the head of the individual, particularly as ‘coercive society’ aims to ‘shape people’ on behalf of the economic, social and political status quo.6 The system of capital, along with the instrumental use of Enlightenment ideals to promote a rational, efficient system7 have laid a foundation for society wherein the political-economy influences individuals and manufactures consent.8 Accordingly, people are seen as “substitutable entities valued merely for their instrumental uses or ability to command market resources,” and even where “commodification is resisted, the overriding pull of society is toward the status quo and those forms that are valued by society”. 9 As Kate Schick writes: The mind thus shapes itself into socially acceptable, marketable forms and freedom becomes an illusion, made all the more dangerous and difficult to resist because of the appearance of freedom. This is not the fault of Enlightenment ideals as such, but the instrumental use of these ideals in the promotion of a rational, efficient system: ‘The network of the whole is drawn ever tighter, modelled after the act of exchange’ (Adorno 1981: 21).10 Present in the logic of the system of capital itself is not an ‘emancipatory reason’ that aims toward universal guiding principles of an actually egalitarian democracy – i.e., Equality, Egalitarianism, Justice, Rights, etc. Rather, in modern capitalism, with its instrumental reason and positivist logic, such concepts lose their meaning.11 The social narrative no longer accommodates these fundamental principles or judges them to be delusions, because all concepts must be strictly functional in order to be considered “reasonable”.12 In turn, the ideals of a ‘good’ society, for example ideals toward an actual egalitarian democracy, become dependent on the “interests” of the dominant and governing system, which produces and reproduces the epistemic context of its own validity.13

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return. 

The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Sculos and Walsh 16
Sculos, Bryant William a¶ Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University , and Sean Noah Walsh Department of Political Science and Economics, Capital University. "The Counterrevolutionary Campus: Herbert Marcuse and the Suppression of Student Protest Movements." New Political Science (2016): 1-17.
¶ The recognition of repressive tolerance as a tool of counterrevolution calls for a careful¶ examination of leftist strategy. For example, so-called ‘microaggressions’, or ‘trigger warnings’,¶ should be taken seriously.65 However, we should and need to ask ourselves: in a world of¶ pervasive macroaggressions and trigger-pulling in a world of wretched poverty, torture and¶ disappeared dissidents—if these concerns should take center stage. We ought to reflect and¶ ask if identity concerns are more important than class or economic concerns. Marcuse would¶ surely argue that class remains a crucial component alongside other dimensions of identity¶ and oppression (for example, race, gender, sexuality, sexual orientation, religion et cetera).¶ He would demand that we act locally but organize globally, and that we refuse the lure of¶ divisive identity politics, without eschewing the central importance of criticizing racialized,¶ gendered dimensions to capitalist oppressions. We must principally and aggressively resist¶ the demand that we tolerate the expressions or enactments of these oppressions under the¶ guise of liberal toleration. In response to this revolting, nauseating, murderous demand, we¶ must revolt in all the ways we can, and that is precisely what #BlackLivesMatter, the Black¶ Liberation Collective (a nascent, more radical national student organization, distinct but¶ related to BLM and includes many of the campus protesters from around the United States),¶ and the broader student movements are aiming and struggling for (even if right now what¶ they are struggling for is precisely that focused vision).¶ The claim that free speech is under assault is often deployed as a tool of repressive toleration¶ by the Right. Perhaps we need some more hashtags: #BlackVoicesMatter or¶ #BlackProtestsMatter (though the label ‘black’ here, as it is with BLM, is meant to be inclusive,¶ not exclusive. There are numbers of white and non-black allies of the organization, as can¶ be seen in any cursory examination of these various protests. This is explicitly laid out in the¶ official platform of the BLM organization. This is the case for BDS as well; it is not about identity so much as it is about defending the humanity of all).66 We need more than just¶ hashtags though. Much more. We have seen the foundations of more. BLM’s platform does¶ not, however, include any mention of capitalism or economic exploitation, despite the fact¶ that the leadership of the organization has spoken out against racialized capitalism.67 The¶ Black Liberation Collective already includes a critique of capitalism alongside other forms¶ of oppression in their platform.68 These are the early and precarious stages of a potentially¶ emergent cohesive Left for the twenty-first century. Through Marcuse’s critical gaze, we can¶ observe what these students and activists have already realized, what is truly intolerable:¶ the demand that we all tolerate the intolerable. Today, the path to liberating tolerance¶ requires the refusal to accept such silencing.¶ Importantly, we must not limit ourselves to merely critiquing existing oppressions, or just¶ suggest principled radical reforms that could move us towards an emancipated, just (global)¶ society. As many on the Left have attempted, though sadly without much wider recognition,¶ we need to start building these alternative futures in the counterrevolutionary present wherever¶ and whenever possible. This means first building racially, sexually and gender inclusive¶ communicative and organizational bridges between both nascent and longer established¶ social movements and class-based organizations, including the too often forgotten Left¶ political parties.69 Liberating tolerance could tear open avenues for the development of the¶ ‘new sensibility’ Marcuse heralds in his late work. We see this as crucial for the possibility of¶ a new society, a free, just, and rational society antipodal and antithetical to the unfree, unjust,¶ and irrational confines of neoliberal capitalism. College campuses have, since Marcuse’s time¶ been a potentially key environment for the cultivation of this ‘new sensibility’—a sensibility,¶ a mentality, oriented towards care, compassion, love, justice, cooperation and indeed active¶ disgust at their inverses.70 BLM and BDS and other less well-known organized movements¶ offer us a new hope and opportunity to revitalize a youthful emancipatory disposition with¶ sustainability.¶ Liberating tolerance against repressive tolerance has the potential to open up the material¶ and ideological space for precisely these developments, against every wish of the counterrevolutionary¶ forces that militate against progress through the silencing of the exuberant¶ dissent we are witnessing across college campuses in the United States and around the¶ world. We write in support of these students and their rejection of white supremacy, racial¶ injustice (on campus and beyond), police brutality as standard practice, especially against¶ minorities, and their calls for an egalitarian educational experience, including the extension¶ of that experience for all people in the United States and around the world. Beyond Herbert¶ Marcuse’s words, we have his emancipatory democratic impetus—we hope to have embodied¶ that impetus here and shown it to be more relevant than ever.

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. 

First, neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file
RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. A. Prescription: More Politics The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor, 137 many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s marginalization. B. Prescription: More Normativity Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a number of pitfalls. The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the “distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the societal pie and redistribution is about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain of discourse or ideology. Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like Hayek’s theory, “law and economics is full of stories about how liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it instead folds them into one another: “The Law and Economics movement is rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive communitarian ideal will win.150 Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by her capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for her own needs and service her own ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152 If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as “undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be countered differently. More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. C. Prescription: Acceptance The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in “taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be “self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce the momentum to move forward. VII CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate the practice of critique within the legal academy. A. Why Critique Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: critique. Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies them. Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no alternative. 

Second, the knowledge claims of the AC are the jumping off point for the debate – our framework provides a more reasonable neg burden. When a student turns in an F paper, no teacher has an obligation to write an entirely new paper to show it was bad – pointing out major academic deficiencies would justify failing the paper – the ballot asks who did the better debating, so if their analysis is wrong, they haven’t. 

Third, neoliberalism is a conceptual framework that has to be challenged at the level of scholarship. Godrej 14
Farah Godrej Department of Political Science¶ University of California-Riverside “neoliberalism, Militarization, and the Price of dissent¶ Policing Protest at the University of California¶ “Edited by Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. The Imperial University. University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
I have offered here a particular window into the ways in which the interests, mechanisms, and operations of both the university system and the neoliberal state are aligned with those of private capital. Of course, that the academy is made to strategically ally with capital as a key piece of neoliberal consolida- tion should not surprise us. Rather, what is worth noting, I have argued here, is the necessity of the linkages between disinvestment in public education, militarization, and the criminalization of dissent. These necessary link- ages demonstrate this volume’s premise that the university is an institution embedded in the hierarchies and inequalities of U.S. racial, gender, and class politics and shed light on the confluence of military and industrial interests as they appear within the U.S. university. I have sought also to emphasize the systematicity and multilayered complexity of this phenomenon. That is, the various pieces of this picture necessarily go together, as rhetoric, law, bureaucracy, and the force of arms all combine effectively to produce the desired end.¶ The neoliberal logic entailed in the privatization of the University of Cal- ifornia is, I have argued, necessarily interlinked with the logic of militari- zation and the criminalization of dissent, because it employs a militarized enforcement strategy, coupled with a political rhetoric that criminalizes the specific behaviors involved in protest and dissent against these strate- gies. The militarization of the university campus is thus not simply a reflec- tion of the increasing militarization of American law enforcement based on the logic of ongoing threats to public safety encoded in years of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror.25 Rather, such militarization is one prong of a necessary enforcement strategy designed to convey that dissent against privatization is meant to be costly in inflicting various forms of legitimized violence upon those who dissent. The second prong of the enforcement strategy also conveys that dissenters will pay a high price by being criminal- ized, either through rhetoric that paints them as violent and therefore mar- ginal, unworthy, and undesirable in the public imagination or through legal machinations that force them to expend tremendous financial resources on extricating themselves from prosecution.¶ The language of cost and price here, of course, reminds us of the ongo- ing hegemony—and perhaps victory—of the conceptual frameworks of neoliberalism and its theoretical accompaniments, such as rational choice theory, predominantly featured in neoclassical economics. These strategies of criminalization and militarization rest on sending signals to adversaries, encoded precisely in these languages, wherein value and worth are measured in terms of indicators such as price or cost, and rational actors are assumed to be guided by a universally comprehensible incentive structure. Thus the strategies of criminalization and militarization rest on de-incentivizing dis- sent, so to speak, assuming that dissenters will measure the costs inherent in their actions and choose rationally to cease from engaging in such dissent. The continued insistence on dissent is therefore resistance to the logic of neoliberal privatization on multiple levels: it not only calls out the complic- ity of the university with the neoliberal state and the forces of private capital but also continues to dissent despite the “incentives” offered in exchange for desisting from dissent. And in so doing, it should be signaling its rejection not simply of privatization but of the entire conceptual baggage of neolib- eralism, including its logics of rational choice, cost, price, and incentive, as well as its logic of structural violence. In other words, the ongoing struggle against the logic of neoliberal privatization requires that dissent continue, despite its high “price.”¶ 

Case

College students are hyper aware of global issues – they spend all their time engaging politics. Levine 9/19
Saul Levine M.D. is Professor Emeritus in Psychiatry at the University of California at San Diego. College Students: Coddled or Constructive Activists?, Sep 19 2016, Psychology Today EE

Lest you think that today's students are ignorant of prevalent political and societal unrest, let me assure you that this is not the case. In this era of 24/7 internet and media, they are more aware than most of us were at their ages. You might also notice, however, that all is not serene, and that there is as much ferment and anger as ever. You have likely read recent newspaper stories about student-faculty confrontations at Oberlin, Yale University, and the University of Chicago, but these are in fact occurring at many colleges. In these events, outspoken students are extremely concerned about their personal travails and social pressures on campus. They are frustrated about perceived personal slights and injustices, psychologically toxic environments, political correctness and bruised feelings. Students on many campuses are clamoring for protection from psychological "triggers" in the curriculum or in campus announcements. They are demanding designated "safe zones," where they can feel secure, protected from those whose words or tones of voice they find distasteful, unacceptable or even threatening. Many also expect personal attention for their feelings and vulnerabilities. Some complaints have to do with perceived hectoring by faculty and administrators about how to act in certain situations. They say they’re being infantilized, not treated respectfully as adults. On the other hand, there are demands that colleges provide individual attention for their personal and pedagogic difficulties. Others criticize professors either for not being culturally sensitive to their particular group (religion, race, language, dress, gender or gender identity), or for pandering in offensive ways, trying too hard to assuage perceived offense. In a few of the filmed vociferous confrontations, indignant students were shown yelling, swearing, and sobbing. They felt unheard and they upbraided faculty and administrators for being dense or duplicitous, or even dangerous and evil. There have been threats of lawsuits, removal of donor funding, or even violence. This not meant to be a litany of complaints about contemporary students, who are an impressive generation. College is a major step in their personal maturation and socialization, and most students appreciate the opportunities higher education offers. College can also be a challenge, an exciting yet unnerving cauldron of new experiences, people and ideas. Students experience conflicts and clashes within their own evolving identities, relationships and values. The Right tells them to “Grow Up!” or “Suck It Up!” The Left says that students have to be heard and their grievances addressed. There are legitimate grievances which students can and should give voice to. Indeed, we should expect and encourage demonstrations and confrontations as part and parcel of this seminal growth experience. But insolence, bullying or threats are unacceptable from the students…or from their elders, for that matter. Colleges and universities have vital and challenging social responsibilities, and many are under fiscal and/or political pressures. In spite of this, most have actually been attentive and responsive to the needs of students. There are psychological counseling services, medical clinics, tutoring facilities and personnel, special learning and test-taking accommodations, and even dedicated “safe zones.” There is active communication between student leaders and faculty, and student participation in committees which address grievances or requests for improvements. Faculty and administrative staff undergo repeated “sensitivity training” on issues like civility and respect, cross-cultural awareness, systemic and unconscious racial or other biases, gender variations and equality, and psychological needs. Colleges and universities are far from perfect: Costs are increasingly prohibitive, and there are indeed some for-profit "degree mills" which eschew thoughtful education and scholarship. But the vast majority of our educational institutions are trying assiduously to give their students enriching scholarly, psychological and social experiences. More open dialogue (as opposed to ad hominem attacks) and empathy would go a long way toward bringing mutual understanding and improvements.

The marketplace of ideas is terrible – government influence creates a chilling effect, it acts as a palliative for broader reform, and shuts dissent into endless debate instead of action – the aff opens a procedural can of worms that makes change impossible. Inbger 84
Stanley Ingber, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: A LEGITIMIZING MYTH, Duke Law Review, February 1984 EE
The clear and present danger test presupposes that market imperfections sometimes give speakers an unacceptable level of advantage in influencing others. Because information opposing the speaker's viewpoint cannot be transmitted instantaneously to all market participants, the real market substantially departs from the theoretical one.80 Therefore, emergency situations are exempted from first amendment coverage. As long as sufficient time remains for the marketplace's process of deliberation to persist, however, and as long as lawless action is not imminent, no emergency exists and all speech must be protected. Yet the goal of free speech is not merely to have citizens enjoy participating in an effete truth-seeking process. Instead, citizens seek truth through free speech precisely to influence choice and behavior. Recognizing that beliefs are important primarily because those who hold them are likely to act accordingly, Holmes conceded that "every idea is an incitement. '81 Ironically, however, Holmes's "clear and present danger" formula allows government officials to prohibit expression precisely when such speech threatens to incite action.82 An interpretation of the first amendment that permits the state to cut off expression as soon as it comes close to being effective essentially limits the amendment's protection to encompass only abstract or innocuous communication. 83 Consequently, speech is constitutionally protected under the clear and present danger test as long as it is either ineffective84 or insignificant. 85 In either instance the test creates an establishment bias. Other factors peculiar to the clear and present danger test accentuate this bias. The test is both ad hoc and vague. Speakers receive no warning whether their contemplated speech extends beyond the parameters of constitutional protection. The test is totally contextual, giving little guidance to either the speaker or the official censor who must predict the impact of the expression. 6 For the speaker, this lack of notice fosters continuous uncertainty and thus may chill a risk-averse speaker who desires to minimize his personal legal peril.87 Such a person may censor himself by intentionally avoiding those messages he perceives as approaching the fringe of official acceptability. The official, in turn, must decide when the expression is clearly dangerous and when insufficient time exists for a full and fair hearing of responsive expression that would allow good counsel to defeat bad.88 The censor's evaluation involves a two-tiered decision. First, the official must evaluate the speech ideologically to determine whether it is good or evil, because if the speech is good the lack of sufficient time for response is irrelevant. 89 But under the market model, only the marketplace can accurately separate good from evil; therefore, no criteria can exist to determine whether speech is sufficiently evil to warrant exclusion from the market. Second, the official must calculate the seriousness of the speech's evil, because the market requires greater response time for more serious evils. This requirement forces the official to differentiate without any guidelines between evil counsel that is about to lead an insufficiently educated public astray, and good counsel that merely has convinced an adequately informed public of its "rightness." Under a test with such elasticity, speakers who proclaim any radical political doctrine may expect to receive little or no protection because they will always appear as a threat to the nation and, thus, embody the most serious of all possible evils. 90 The establishment bias is again obvious. The clear and present danger test also encourages prolonging debate indefinitely. According to Brandeis, expression may not be prohibited so long as debate remains ongoing. 91 Thus, only the process of truth-seeking is fully protected; decisions and actions predicated upon truths once discovered are protected not at all.92 Brandeis's approach to the marketplace of ideas accordingly encourages prolonged discussion and, therefore, the delay of decisions that might lead to actions contrary to society's generally accepted "truths." There is, however, little value in the discovery of truth that cannot be used as a basis of choice and behavior. Brandeis's focus on procedural aspects of the market rather than on the substantive actions it triggers also fosters delay in implementing any ideas that challenge the status quo perspective. Disputes over the best solutions for societal problems are converted into disputes over proper marketplace processes. For example, rather than focusing on whether the military draft should be reinstated, the debate may well center on whether antidraft groups should be allowed to stage a massive demonstration in a business district. Such procedural concerns divert attention from the substantive issue so that the status quo is more easily preserved. Through this process of transforming substantive conflicts into procedural debates, challengers to the status quo may be placated with a procedural victory while their overt threat is defused.93 This shift in focus helps to insulate society from the trauma of having to reconsider its accepted values while at the same time it allows the protesting individual and his supporters to believe that they have a fair opportunity to win popular support for their position.94 If freedom of expression only gives protection as long as decisions are not yet made, actions are not yet taken, and debate is still in progress, then there is little threat to established norms

Tournament: College Prep | Round: 2 | Opponent: Mission San Jose AS | Judge: Matt Marr
1
Standpoint epistemology is the best starting point for moral decisions – other methods exclude some viewpoints, which makes true analysis of reality impossible.  Mills 

• - Dominant narratives shape what’s counted as “real ethics”, so the standpoint of the oppressed is more likely correct – better starting point
  Edited for ableist language
  Charles Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005.  NS

The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading. Think of the original challenge Marxist models of capitalism posed to liberalism’s social ontology: the claim that to focus on relations of aparently equal exchange, free and fair, among equal individuals was illusory, since at the level of the relations of production, the real ontology of worker and capitalist manifested a deep structure of constraint that limited proletarian freedom. Think of the innovation of using patriarchy to force people to recognize, and condemn as political and oppressive, rather than natural, apolitical, and unproblematic, male domination of women. Think of the recent resurrection of the concept of white supremacy to map the reality of a white domination that has continued in more subtle forms past the ending of de jure segregation. These are all global, high-level concepts, undeniable abstractions. But they map accurately (at least arguably) crucial realities that differentiate the statuses of the human beings within the systems they describe; so while they abstract, they do not idealize. Or consider conceptual innovation at the more local level: the challenge to the traditional way the public/private distinction was drawn, the concept of sexual harassment. In the first case, a seemingly neutral and innocuous conceptual divide turned out, once it was viewed from the perspective of gender subordination, as contributing to the reproduction of the gender system by its relegation of “women’s issues” to a seemingly apolitical and naturalized space. In the case of sexual harassment, a familiar reality—a staple of cartoons in men’s magazines for years (bosses chasing secretaries around the desk and so on)—was reconceptualized as negative (not something funny, but something morally wrong) and a contributor to making the workplace hostile for women. These realizations, these recognitions, did not spontaneously crystallize out of nowhere; they required conceptual labor, a different map of social reality, a valorization of the distinctive experience of women. As a result of having these concepts as visual aids, we can now see better: our perceptions are no longer ignorant blinded to realities to which we were previously obtuse. In some sense, an ideal observer should have been able to see them—yet they did not, as shown by the nonappearance of these realities in male-dominated philosophical literature.

That necessitates non-ideal theory – we need to recognize current oppressive power structures that obstruct the realization of ideal principles. And, ideal theory destroys the practical application of ethics. Mills 9
Mills, C. W. (2009), Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 47: 161–184

Now how can this ideal ideal—a society not merely without a past history of racism but without races themselves—serve to adjudicate the merits of competing policies aimed at correcting for a long history of white supremacy manifest in Native American expropriation, African slavery, residential and educational segregation, large differentials in income and huge differentials in wealth, nonwhite underrepresentation in high-prestige occupations and overrepresentation in the prison system, contested national narratives and cultural representations, widespread white evasion and bad faith on issues of their racial privilege, and a corresponding hostile white backlash against (what remains of) those mild corrective measures already implemented? Obviously, it cannot. As Thomas Nagel concedes: “Ideal theory enables you to say when a society is unjust, because it falls short of the ideal. But it does not tell you what to do if, as is almost always the case, you find yourself in an unjust society, and want to correct that injustice” (2003a, 82). Ideal theory represents an unattainable target that would require us to roll back the clock and start over.  So in a sense it is an ideal with little or no practical worth. What is required is the nonideal (rectificatory) ideal that starts from the reality of these injustices and then seeks some fair means of correcting for them, recognizing that in most cases the original prediscrimination situation (even if it can be intelligibly characterized and stipulated) cannot be restored. Trying to rectify systemic black disadvantage through affirmative action is not the equivalent of not discriminating against blacks, especially when there are no blacks to be discriminated against. Far from being indispensable to the elaboration of nonideal theory, ideal theory would have been revealed to be largely useless for it. But the situation is worse than that. As the example just given illustrates, it is not merely a matter of an ideal with problems of operationalization and relevance, but of an ideal likely to lend itself more readily to retrograde political agendas. If the ideal ideal rather than the rectificatory ideal is to guide us, then a world without races and any kind of distinctiondrawing by race may seem to be an attractive goal. One takes the ideal to be colorblind nondiscrimination, as appropriate for a society beginning from the state of nature, and then—completely ignoring the nonideal history that has given whites a systemic illicit advantage over people of color—conflates together as “discrimination” all attempts to draw racial distinctions for public policy goals, no matter what their motivation, on the grounds that this perpetuates race and invidious differential treatment by race. In the magisterial judgment of Chief Justice John Roberts in the June 2007 Supreme Court decision on the Seattle and Louisville cases where schools were using race as a factor to maintain diversity, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,”6 a statement achieving the remarkable feat of depicting not merely as true, but as tautologically true, the equating of Jim Crow segregation and the attempt to remedy Jim Crow tion! What is ideally called for under ideal circumstances is not, or at least is not necessarily, what is ideally called for under nonideal circumstances. Claiming that all we need to do is to cease (what is here characterized as) discrimination ignores the differential advantages and privileges that have accumulated in the white population because of the past history of discrimination. So the defense in terms of ideal theory is doubly problematic. In the first place, ideal theory was never supposed to be an end in itself, but a means to improving our handling of nonideal matters, and the fact that Rawls and his disciples and commentators have for the most part stayed in the realm of the ideal represents an evasion of the imperative of dealing with what were supposed to be the really pressing issues. And in the second place, it is questionable in any case how useful the ideal ideal in the Rawlsian sense is or ever would have been in assisting this task. So it is not merely that ideal theory has not come to the aid of those dealing with nonideal injustice but that it was unlikely to have been of much help when and if it ever did arrive.

Implications:

A.  Only non-ideal theory is motivating: groups who have historically been excluded from ideal ethics can’t be compelled to participate in such a system.  That’s a prerequisite to ethics – if people can’t adopt a theory, it has no use.

B.  Non-ideal philosophical discussion is most educationally valuable since it’s always excluded from academia, so it’s a unique insight we should explore.

Thus, the standard is resisting oppression 

Prefer my framework

1) Attempting to abstract away from social realities is repugnant and eliminates the possibility of a concrete solution to oppression. Curry 14

Curry, Tommy J. Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy, Texas A and M University “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century.”  Victory Briefs, January/February 2015.  CC

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, it is set against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

2) It’s uniquely key in education – judges have an obligation to reject oppressive ideologies.  Trifonas 03 

Trifonas, Peter. PEDAGOGIES OF DIFFERENCE: RETHINKING EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE. New York, London. 2003.

Domination and subordination, I imply that they are relations of power. In an educational context, the exercise of power is accomplished in interactions (i.e., in a social organization), manifesting itself as acts of exclusion, marginalization, silencing, and so forth. Thus, paying attention to how power operates along axes of gender, race, class, and ability (that is, recognizing that social differences are not given, but are accomplished in and through educational settings) is a step toward educational equity. What does the above discussion mean in the educational context? It means that in the interactions of teachers with students in the classroom, or in other contexts, attention needs to be directed toward how dominant and subordinate relations (be they based on race, gender, class, or ability) permeate these contexts and intersect in complicated ways to produce inequality and marginalization. The frequently used and well-meaning phrase, “I treat everyone the same, ” often used by teachers and administrators to indicate their lack of bias in a diverse educational setting, in fact masks unequal power relations. Similarly, educational policies that assume that people are the same or equal may serve to entrench existing inequality precisely because people enter into the educational process with different and unequal experiences. These attempts, well meaning though they may be, tend to render inequality invisible, and thus work against equity in education. In her exploration of white privilege in higher education in the United States, Frances Rains (1998), an aboriginal-Japanese American woman, states emphatically that these benign acts are disempowering for the minority person because they erase his or her racial identity. The denial of racism in this case is in fact a form of racism. Thus, in moving toward equity in education that allows us to address multiple and intersecting axes of difference and inequality, I recommend that we try to think and act “against the grain” in developing educational policies and handling various kinds of pedagogical situations. 5 To work against the grain is to recognize that education is not neutral; it is contested. Mohanty puts it as such: … Education represents both a struggle for meaning and a struggle over power relations. It is a central terrain where power and politics operate out of the lived culture of individuals and groups situated in asymmetrical social and political positions. (Mohanty 1990:184) We need to develop a critical awareness of the power dynamics operative in institutional relations-and of the fact that people participate in institutions as unequal subjects. Working against the grain is to take a proactive approach to understanding and acting upon institutional relations, whether in the classroom, in other interactions with students, or in policy development. Rather than overlooking the embeddedness of gender, race, class, ability, and other forms of inequality that shape our interactions, working against the grain makes explicit the political nature of education and how power operates to privilege, silence, and marginalize individuals who are differently located in the educational process. In her exploration of feminist pedagogy, Linda Briskin (1990) makes a clear distinction between nonsexist and antisexist education critical to our understanding here. She asserts that nonsexism is an approach that attempts to neutralize sexual inequality by pretending that gender can be made irrelevant in the classroom. Thus, for instance, merely asserting that male and female students should have equal time to speak-and indeed giving them equal time-cannot adequately rectify the endemic problem of sexism in the classroom. One of Briskin's students reported that in her political science tutorials that when the male students spoke, everyone paid attention. When a female student spoke, however, the class acted as if no one was speaking (13). Neutrality is an attempt to conceal the unequal distribution of power. An against the grain approach would acknowledge explicitly that we are all gendered, racialized, and differently constructed subjects who do not participate in interactional relations as equals. This goes beyond formulating sexism, racism, abilism, and class privilege in individualist terms and treating them as if they were personal attitudes. Terry Wolverton (1983) discovered the difference between nonracism and antiracism in her consciousness-raising attempt: I had confused the act of trying to appear not to be racist with actively working to eliminate racism. Trying to appear not racist had made me deny my racism, and therefore exclude the possibility of change. (191) Being against the grain means seeing inequality as systemic and interpersonal (rather than individual), and combatting oppression as a collective responsibility, not just as a personal attribute (so that somehow a person can cleanse herself or himself of sexism, racism, abilism, or class bias). It is to pay attention to oppression as an interactional property that can be altered (see Manners 1998). Roger Simon (1993) suggests, in his development of a philosophical basis for teaching against the grain, which shares many commonalities in how I think about an integrative approach to equity in education, that teaching against the grain is fundamentally a moral practice. By this he does not mean that teachers simply fulfill the mandate and guidelines of school authorities. He believes that teachers must expose the partial and imperfect nature of existing knowledge, which is constructed on the basis of asymmetrical power relations (for instance, who has the power to speak and whose voices are suppressed?). It is the responsibility of the teacher or educator to show how dominant forms of knowledge and ways of knowing constrict human capacities. In exposing the power relations integral to the knowledge construction process, the educator, by extension, must treat teaching and learning as a mutual and collaborative act between teachers and students. What may this ideal look like in practice? Marilyn Cochran-Smith (1991) also explores the notion of teaching against the grain in her research on how teachers and students worked together in a preservice program in the Philadelphia area. Borrowing from Gramsci's formulation that action is everyone's responsibility, she asserts that teaching is fundamentally a political activity. In practical terms, she outlines what it may mean to teach against the grain in an actual teaching and learning situation. Her succinct articulation is worth quoting at length: To teach against the grain, teachers have to understand and work both within and around the culture of teaching and the politics of schooling at their particular schools and within their larger school system and communities. They cannot simply announce better ways of doing things, as outsiders are likely to do. They have to teach differently without judging the ways other teach or dismissing the ideas others espouse…. They are not at liberty to publicly announce brilliant but excoriating critiques of their colleagues and the bureaucracies in which they labor. Their ultimate commitment is to the school lives and futures of the children with whom they live and work. Without condescension or defensiveness, they have to work with parents and other teachers on different ways of seeing and measuring development, connecting and dividing knowledge, and knowing about teaching and schooling. They have to be astute observers of individual learners with the ability to pose and explore questions that transcend cultural attribution, institutional habit, and the alleged certainty of outside experts. They have to see beyond and through the conventional labels and practices that sustain the status quo by raising unanswerable and often uncomfortable questions. Perhaps most importantly, teachers who work against the grain must name and wrestle with their own doubts, must fend off the fatigue of reform and depend on the strength of their individual and collaborative convictions that their work ultimately makes a difference in the fabric of social responsibility. (Cochran-Smith 1991:284-85) For me, to be against the grain is therefore to recognize that the routinized courses of action and interactions in all educational contexts are imbued with unequal distribution of power that produce and reinforce various forms of marginalization and exclusion. Thus, a commitment to redress these power relations (i.e., equity in education) involves interventions and actions that may appear “counter-intuitive.” 6 Undoing inequality and achieving equity in education is a risky and uncomfortable act because we need to disrupt the ways things are “normally” done. This involves a serious (and frequently threatening) effort to interrogate our privilege as well as our powerlessness. It obliges us to examine our own privilege relative though it may be, to move out of our internalized positions as victims, to take control over our lives, and to take responsibilities for change. It requires us to question what we take for granted, and a commitment to a vision of society built on reflection, reform, mutuality, and respect in theory and in practice. Teaching and learning against the grain is not easy, comfortable, or safe. It is protracted, difficult, uncomfortable, painful, and risky. It involves struggles with our colleagues, our students, as well as struggles within ourselves against our internalized beliefs and normalized behaviors. In other words, it is a lifelong challenge. However, as Simon (1993) puts it, teaching against the grain is also a project of hope. We engage in it with the knowledge and conviction that we are in a long-term collaborative project with like-minded people whose goal is to make the world a better place for us and for our children.
CP
A: Public universities and colleges should either create policies, or reform their current policies on sexual harassment, to set strict harassment guidelines for in classroom behavior for teachers that prohibits speech that creates a hostile learning environment. They should also implement guidelines prohibiting student-to-student content that creates an hostile learning environment due to the sexual nature of the speech. These regulations will be enforced consistent with Title IX and VII of the Civil Rights Act. Dower 12 J.d
Dower, Benjamin. Assistant Attorney General at Texas Attorney General "Scylla of Sexual Harassment and the Charybdis of Free Speech: How Public Universities Can Craft Policies to Avoid Liability, The." Rev. Litig. 31 (2012): 703.
Sexual Harassment Policy for University Students¶ Students are prohibited from committing sexual harassment.¶ Sexual harassment for students is defined as:¶ (1) Words of a sexual nature directed at the person of the¶ addressee that, by their very utterance, inflict injury, provoke¶ resentment in the addressee, and tend to incite an immediate breach¶ of the peace. Breach of the peace, as contemplated by this provision,¶ is defined as public disorder that involves the outbreak of physical¶ violence.¶ (2) Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,¶ and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when¶ (a) submission to such conduct is made either¶ explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's¶ academic or employment status; or¶ (b) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an¶ individual is used as the basis for employment or academic¶ decision affecting such individual.¶ (3) Conduct of a sexual nature that is so severe and¶ pervasive-viewed both objectively and from the perspective of the¶ recipient of the remarks and considering the totality of the¶ circumstances-as to create a hostile learning environment.¶ Sexual Harassment Policy for University Employees¶ University employees are prohibited from committing sexual harassment.¶ Sexual harassment for university employees is defined as:¶ (1) Words of a sexual nature directed at the person of the addressee that, by their very utterance, inflict injury, provoke resentment in the addressee, and tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Breach of the peace, as contemplated by this provision, *746 is defined as public disorder that involves the outbreak of physical violence.¶ (2) Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when¶ (a) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s academic or employment status; or¶ (b) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment or academic decision affecting such individual.¶ ¶ (3) Conduct of a sexual nature that is so severe or pervasive--viewed both objectively and from the perspective of the recipient of the remarks and considering the totality of the circumstances--as to create a hostile learning environment.¶ ¶ Possible Addition¶ ¶ A university employee accused of sexual harassment stemming from speech conducted in the classroom may raise, as a defense, that his or her classroom expression was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical interest. If the employee is able to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her classroom expression was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical interest, the committee shall weigh the value of that interest against the harm of the alleged harassment in determining both guilt and punishment.¶ 

The counterplan resolves a grey area within harassment law – right now professor speech gets protected under the first amendment. The counterplan shifts the precedent to take a stance against harassment. Marcus 08
Kenneth L  Marcus Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College¶ School of Public Affairs. "Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism." Wm. and Mary Bill Rts. J. 16 (2007): 1025.
These incidents highlight a puzzling phenomenon in contemporary constitutional¶ culture. The puzzle has been the relatively recent appearance and eager¶ acceptance, especially in higher education, of First Amendment or academic¶ freedom arguments in areas which had long been beyond their reach. For at least¶ the "first fifteen years of its development," the law of harassment had been wellunderstood¶ to regulate a sphere of constitutionally unprotected, proscribable¶ conduct, even when it incidentally included the use of words.2' Yet in recent years¶ free-speech arguments have become a favorite topic-changing device for defenders¶ of all forms of harassment, 22 especially in post-secondary education where many are¶ especially sensitized to issues of free speech and academic freedom. The tendency¶ to construct harassing conduct as speech has important ramifications since the¶ appearance of the First Amendment, with its powerful array of standards and¶ presumptions, augurs ill for any area of regulation which is brought within its¶ shifting boundaries. As Frederick Schauer put it, "Once the First Amendment shows¶ up, much of the game is over., 23 And indeed, arguably, the game may now be over¶ for harassment law, which is to say, free speech issues may have obtained too much traction in this area to be dismissed out of hand. On the other hand, it remains at¶ best unclear as to whether the First Amendment is even salient as to this area of law.¶ The appearance of the First Amendment in this area was likely hastened by¶ overreaching on the part of civil rights advocates who, during the 1980s and 1990s,¶ introduced campus speech codes which could not help but raise First Amendment¶ attention.24 For many years, this conflict played itself out in a series of arguments¶ about campus speech codes, which were devised to protect various groups from¶ expressions which might be considered offensive or "hateful."' While these codes¶ drew some support from academic commentators, 26 the courts generally found them¶ to violate the First Amendment and other commentators agreed.27 Interestingly, few institutions have withdrawn speech or harassment codes unless threatened with the¶ risk of litigation or faced with adverse judicial decisions, and many apparently¶ remain on the books.28¶ At the same time, however, most universities have also promulgated antidiscrimination¶ and harassment policies pursuant to the requirements of various¶ federal civil rights statutes (especially Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 and¶ Title IX3¶ " of the Education Amendments Act).3¶ ' Unlike hate speech codes,¶ harassment regulations (such as the federal regulations or public universities'¶ implementing policies) are not directly aimed at speech, although the harassing¶ conduct they regulate may include words.32 Given the prominence of speech¶ interests to the academic setting, however, free speech claims are now regularly¶ raised in response to various allegations of harassment; this is nowhere more true¶ than with respect to allegations of anti-Semitic harassment. Indeed, Justice Kennedy¶ once remarked in dissent that federal education harassment law is "circumscribed by the First Amendment,"33 and federal regulatory policy has assumed this to be so¶ for over a decade. 34 Nevertheless, there is reason to question the validity of this¶ assumption and the salience of free speech to the regulation of education harassment.¶ To the extent that harassment regulation encompasses some speech activities by¶ state actors on the basis of content, the most difficult constitutional question may be¶ whether First Amendment doctrine even applies to such questions or whether they¶ lay outside of the boundaries of First Amendment coverage. 35 This Article will¶ argue that the salience of the First Amendment to questions of academic harassment¶ is at best unsettled; that efforts to apply First Amendment doctrine to harassment¶ law may be seen as a form of what Frederick Schauer has described as "First¶ Amendment opportunism; ' 36 and that such efforts to extend the boundaries of the¶ First Amendment are ultimately unresolvable on the basis of constitutional doctrine¶ alone. Special attention is given to the recently resurgent problem of campus antiSemitism¶ because harassment allegations under this rubric have been subjected to¶ frequent, intense challenge as of late.37z

DA Shell
Harassment cases persist because of a lack of clarity in requirements – a commitment to accountability is key. Saha 8/22

MADHUMITA SAHA The writer is an academic-turned journalist. She taught history at Drexel University and New York University before joining WION. Mon, 22 Aug 2016 http://www.dnaindia.com/world/column-academia-s-feet-of-clay-sexual-misconduct-and-gender-discrimination-in-schools-2247826

In the present context, Tyann Sorrell ’s recourse to legal action seems an obvious choice. But the legal history of sexual harassment shows that the road to public protest had been tough and long. Professor Carrie N. Baker shows in her book, The Women’s Movement against Sexual Harassment, how characterizations of sexual behaviour in workplaces have evolved from being considered a moral problem of a working woman, to a social problem of male lust and seduction, and eventually in the 1970s, such acts came to be interpreted as acts of violence against women and a violation of women’s civil rights.¶ In response to public awakening to the issue, the judges ruled in the William v. Saxbe federal court case of 1976 that sexual harassment is a form of illegal sex discrimination under Title VII. Before this verdict, the US courts were of the opinion that sexual harassment was merely disharmony in a personal relationship, the result of personal urges of individuals, and not part of company policy.¶ We trust in numbers: quantifying sexual harassment in the campus¶ ¶ American universities with the most reports of rape, 2014¶ University campuses are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment of various types. Different sorts of authorities - formal, informal, achieved as well as ascribed- are exercised over students, assistant professors, and administrative assistants. According to the federal campus safety data, nearly 100 US colleges and universities had at least 10 reports of rape on their main campuses in 2014, with Brown University and the University of Connecticut tied for the highest annual total of 43 each.¶ Recently, Association of American Universities (AAU) conducted a Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct among 150,000 students at 27 schools, including most of the Ivy League. Of the female undergraduate student respondents, 23.1 per cent informed the surveyors that they have experienced sexual misconduct due to physical force, threats of physical force, or incapacitation.¶ 2¶ Per cent of college students reporting sexual assault, 2015¶ One of the most disturbing revelations of the survey indicates that overall rates of reporting to campus officials and law enforcement were rather low.¶ Depending on the specific type of sexual harassment, only five per cent to 28 per cent of respondents claim to have reported their experience of sexual harassment to the appropriate authorities. According to the AAU Climate Survey, the most common reason for not reporting incidents of sexual assault and sexual misconduct was that it was not considered serious enough. Among other reasons, students cited they were “embarrassed, ashamed or that it would be too emotionally difficult,” and because they “did not think anything would be done about it.”¶ Taking it from here to a safer future¶ There is nothing peculiar about sexual harassment and misconduct in the US educational institutions. Embedded in the similar kind of power structure, I am sure, such acts of sexual transgression is common enough occurrence in any university under the sun. So, let’s not point a finger and try to make a case of western sexual promiscuity out of it; we are all living in fragile glass houses.¶ On 14 December 2015, Smriti Irani, the former human resource and development minister of India reported, that as per University Grants Commission (UGC), there have been 295 cases of sexual harassment against women during 2014-15 in various institutes of higher learning in India.¶ As various scholars and activists working on sexual misconduct have already pointed out, we have to be aware that even when a sexual assault has not taken place, a person can experience sexual harassment; a hostile, offensive and intimidating atmosphere - created in academic spaces - does count as sex harassment too.¶ Women belonging to minority groups of different race, caste, and religion are more vulnerable. As are people belonging to the third gender.¶ While acknowledging that women are more vulnerable to sexual conduct, we also need to come up with regulations that look into the harassment suffered by other genders too. Recently, the UGC has taken the right step towards this direction when it introduced the first gender neutral regulation on sexual harassment in India. Under this regulation, both male students and students of the third gender in universities can lodge complaints against sexual harassment faced by them.¶ Tyann Sorrell 's case, and similar other cases reported from academic institutions, should be used to create greater awareness. Sexual harassment is indeed ubiquitous; such heinous crime is not solely committed by blacks, poor and the uneducated, as is widely perceived. Power is deeply entrenched in such actions and, thus, the perpetrators often come from the most privileged section of our societies.

Successful lawsuits force school accountability to fight harassment. Silbaugh 15

Silbaugh, Katharine Law Alumni Scholar¶ BA magna cum laude, Amherst College¶ JD with high honors and Order of the Coif, University of Chicago¶ . "Reactive to Proactive: Title IX's Unrealized Capacity to Prevent Campus Sexual Assault." BUL Rev. 95 (2015): 1049.

In March of 2013, President Obama signed a re-authorization of the¶ Violence Against Women Act.97 Within the re-authorization were amendments¶ to the Clery Act, which requires educational institutions to disclose statistics¶ about the number of sexual assaults on campus in an annual report that must be¶ distributed to students and prospective students, engaging market pressures to¶ press universities into addressing sexual assault.98 The amendments to the¶ Clery Act (entitled the Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act, or SaVE¶ Act)99 strengthen reporting requirements and go beyond DOE’s¶ “recommendation” that colleges educate staff and students to require¶ educational institutions to educate staff and students about campus sexual assault, including statements that sexual assault is prohibited, definitions of¶ sexual assault and consent, bystander tools, and awareness programs for new¶ students.100 The Clery Act is enforced by the DOE primarily through fines, but¶ it is not a part of Title IX. While the focus of the Clery Act remains the¶ accurate reporting of crimes, it will serve as a limited and defined mechanism¶ for getting colleges to introduce education and prevention strategies to¶ students. However, the Clery Act, unlike Title IX, does not mandate equality in¶ the provision of education; a school can check off requirements under the new¶ Clery Amendments without evaluating their efficacy or revising them toward¶ the particular goal of equal educational opportunity. Title IX has a far greater¶ capacity to address sexual assault prevention because colleges could be¶ compelled to take whatever reasonable steps can be shown to reduce assaults,¶ or combination of steps as research about efficacy continues to develop. The¶ DOE has the ability to develop a far more comprehensive approach to assault¶ prevention under Title IX than the specific prescriptions the Clery¶ Amendments mandate.¶ Does the Gebser framework constrain Title IX from doing prevention work?¶ Not for the DOE. To the contrary, the DOE has effectively used Title IX to¶ change campus culture more broadly already. Consider Title IX as the rest of¶ the world has: as sports law. Title IX applied pressure on institutions to offer¶ equality in programming and in the educational experience. Differences in¶ interest in participation couldn’t be offered as an excuse for noncompliance¶ with Title IX: if there was not a culture of sports for girls and women, schools¶ needed to create that culture to ensure equality.101 While it was not smooth¶ sailing throughout, schools largely achieved that cultural shift. This may have¶ been possible because relative to other institutions, schools are good creators¶ of culture. When schools first tried to say that they simply found the world as¶ is, with girls not wanting to participate in sports at the rate boys did, the DOE¶ pushed back. In response, schools became creative at expanding and¶ cultivating interest in sports among girls and women. The social change around¶ girls in sports resulted in large part from a charge to schools to cultivate that¶ change, taking concrete steps that would have the effect of changing cultural¶ dynamics. The colleges faced cultural resistance to change and allegations that¶ they were going too far in redesigning athletic programs and opportunities,102 much as colleges do today as they deliberate over the right sexual assault¶ prevention measures.103 But they demonstrated a powerful ability to transform¶ the culture and expectations of equality in sports participation.¶ Title IX operates primarily as a spending clause regulation overseen by the¶ DOE. The DOE should not have felt constrained by the doctrine developed to¶ address the individual cause of action. If poor reaction in response to an actual,¶ individual sexual assault can give rise to an individual cause of action, why¶ can’t high rates of sexual assault in a school’s population amount to sex¶ discrimination for purposes of DOE enforcement? If higher rates of assault¶ overall result when a school fails to take evidence-based steps to reduce the¶ overall rate of sexual assault, why wouldn’t the DOE nudge schools to be¶ proactive? What if schools have concrete tools at their disposal to reduce the¶ overall rate of assault? Isn’t that within the DOE’s enforcement purview?¶ Consider, by comparison, the legislative approach to school bullying. In the¶ past decade, nearly every state has passed laws addressing the obligations of a¶ school system to address incidents of bullying and to prevent bullying.104¶ While those statutes are aimed at both prevention and post-incident¶ intervention, the most recent and best-regarded statutes focus substantial¶ energy on requiring schools to deliver evidence-based bullying prevention¶ programming in an effort to reduce the amount of bullying within each¶ school.105 Prevention and culture change are at the core of these legal¶ interventions.106 Ideally, they would be at the core of the DOE’s approach to¶ Title IX’s guarantee of equal access to education on college campuses. Perhaps we are seeing the beginning of this exact reform: the DOE is¶ investigating schools, and, in turn, schools have stepped up their evaluations of¶ their own processes. If so, I would hope the next step will be a DOE guidance¶ on prevention measures, because to date, they’ve drawn colleges far into the¶ weeds on responses without adequately directing them toward prevention.

AFF causes a snowball effect that makes first amendment defenses impossible to beat. Schauer 04
Schauer, Frederick David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law. "The boundaries of the First Amendment: A preliminary exploration of constitutional salience." Harvard Law Review (2004): 1765-1809.
In addition to the properties of First Amendment claims that may¶ make them less likely to appear legally frivolous, the First Amend-¶ ment's magnetism may assist in ensuring that those claims will not¶ arise in isolation. There will often be multiple lawyers, multiple liti-¶ gants, and multiple public actors who perceive the virtues of the same¶ opportunistic strategy at roughly the same time, or who even may be¶ in active coordination with each other - as with the multiple chal-¶ lenges to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the proliferation of First¶ Amendment rhetoric surrounding legal arguments regarding computer¶ source code, and the panoply of parallel claims about First Amend-¶ ment limitations on copyright. When this is the case, the multiplicity¶ of individually tenuous claims may produce a cascade effect160 such¶ that the claims no longer appear tenuous. The combination of, say,¶ four scarcely plausible but simultaneous court challenges and twenty¶ scarcely plausible public claims of a First Amendment problem could make all these individually implausible claims seem more credible¶ than they actually are.161 From the standpoint of an interest group¶ seeking to achieve change and to mobilize public support or the sup-¶ port of other interest groups,162 winning is better than losing publicly,¶ but losing publicly is perhaps still preferable to being ignored.¶ Once the claim or argument achieves a critical mass of plausibility,¶ the game may be over. Even if individual courts reject the claim, the¶ multiplicity of now-plausible claims may give the issue what is re-¶ ferred to in inside-the-Beltway political jargon as "traction" and in¶ newsroom jargon as "legs." Interestingly, this phenomenon sometimes¶ survives even authoritative rejection of the claim. With respect to the¶ argument that hostile-environment sexual harassment enforcement has¶ serious First Amendment implications, for example, neither the Su-¶ preme Court's rejection of this argument in dicta in R.A. V v. City of¶ St. Paul163 nor the Court's silent dismissal of the same claim in Harris¶ v. Forklift Systems, Inc.164 has slowed the momentum of those who¶ would wage serious First Amendment battle against hostile-¶ environment sexual harassment law.'65 Similarly, decades of judicial¶ rejection of the argument that copyright law must be substantially re-¶ stricted by the commands of the First Amendment have scarcely dis-¶ couraged those who urge otherwise; and in some respects the Supreme¶ Court's recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroftl66 can be considered not a¶ defeat, but rather one further step toward the entry of copyright into¶ the domain of the First Amendment: the Supreme Court did grant cer-¶ tiorari, in part to determine "whether ... the extension of existing and¶ future copyrights violates the First Amendment;"'67 and the seven-¶ Justice majority, as well as Justice Breyer in dissent,'68 acknowledged¶ that the First Amendment was not totally irrelevant. 

Sexual harassment in the classroom is a result of patriarchal violence that invades academia. Sexual harassment represents an oppressive use of power by professors and kills the participation and success of the harassed. Benson and Thomson 

Benson, Donna J., and Gregg E. Thomson. "Sexual harassment on a university campus: The confluence of authority relations, sexual interest and gender stratification." Social problems 29.3 (1982): 236-251.

It is precisely this widespread confluence of authority relations, sexual interest and gender¶ stratification which defines the problem of sexual harassment. There is, in other words, a nexus¶ of power and sexualprerogative often enjoyed by men with formal authority over women. Men¶ in such positions can engage in (or "get away with") overt sexual behaviors that would be rebuffed¶ or avoided were the relationship not one of superior and subordinate. They can also discharge selectively the power and rewards of their positions as a means to obligate women sexualy (Blau,¶ 1964).¶ As well as reward and punish women directly, men can manipulate and obscure their sexual in-¶ tentions toward female subordinates. Women learn that the "official" attention of a male¶ superior is often but a vehicle through which he can "press his pursuits" (Goffman, 1977). In¶ turn, what is often mistakenly perceived by men as an unfounded distrust or suspicion of motives¶ has its basis in previous experience with male "helpfulness." Therefore, as Thorne5 suggests, there¶ is an intrinsic ambiguity between the formal definition of the male superior/female subordinate¶ relationship and a sexual one, in which the gender of the woman can be made salient at the in-¶ itiative of the man.¶ Male Authority and Sexual Interest on the University Campus¶ At major universities, student access to individual instructors can be a scarce resource. Faculty¶ members serve as gatekeepers to the professions, yet an institutional priority on research severely¶ constrains the time and energy that they devote to instruction and interaction with under-¶ graduates (Blau, 1973). Moreover, though students are supposedly evaluated according to merit,¶ the teacher's role permits a wide latitude in the degree of interaction and helpfulness granted to¶ individual students. An instructor enjoys considerable discretionary power to provide or¶ withhold academic rewards (grades, recommendations) and related resources (help, psychological¶ support).6¶ As in the workplace, it is usually men who exercise this discretionary power over female univer-¶ sity students. While women now comprise more than half of all college students,¶ faculty-especially within higher ranks and at major universities-are overwhelmingly male.¶ About 95 percent of university full professors are men (Patterson and Engelberg, 1978). Nor-¶ mative requirements for career advancement at competitive universities are based on traditional,¶ male life-cycle patterns and work schedules that are not convenient to many women (Hochschild,¶ 1975).¶ In the past, it has been difficult for women to successfully enter any prestigious and male-¶ dominated - hence, "non-traditional" - field (Epstein, 1970). Social psychological analyses (Med-¶ nick et. al., 1975) have identified some of the barriers still faced by college women seeking such¶ careers. Yet a recent compendium of student responses to a University of California ad-¶ ministrative query about sex discrimination on campus is replete with testimony from male¶ students that female students' sexuality now gives them an unfair advantage in this competition¶ (University of California, Berkeley, 1977). While women allude to numerous sexist remarks and¶ behaviors by faculty which derogate the abilities of women as a group, the male respondents¶ claim that individual women profit from their sexual attributes because male instructors go out of¶ their way to be "extra friendly" and helpful to them. According to the male perception, then, the¶ latitude permitted in the faculty-student relationship works - at the initiative of either instructor¶ or student - to the advantage of attractive women.¶ Some sociologists of higher education view faculty-student sexual exchanges only as women at-¶ tempting to use their sexuality to compensate for a lack of academic accomplishment:¶ Innumerable girls have found that a pretty face and a tight sweater were an adequate substitute for diligence and cleverness when dealing with a male teacher. Some, having been frustrated in efforts to get¶ by on this basis, have pushed matters further and ended up in bed-though not necessarily with an A¶ (Jencks and Riesman, 1968:427n).¶ Similarly, Singer's (1964:148) empirical study of the relationship between personal attrac-¶ tiveness and university grades relies on unsupported conjecture about female manipulativeness to¶ conclude that ". . . the poor college professor is . . . enticed by the female students ... as he goes¶ about his academic and personal responsibilities." In both studies we find the unquestioned¶ assumption that women (unfairly) capitalize on their sexuality in an otherwise meritocratic and¶ asexual relationship.7¶ Our analysis of sexual harassment as the nexus of power and sexual prerogative implies that,¶ from the woman's perspective, the situation is more complex and decidedly less sanguine. Rather¶ than having a unilateral "sex advantage," female students face the possibility that male instruc-¶ tors may manipulate sexual interest and authority in ways which ultimately undermine the posi-¶ tion of women in academia. Because women can no longer be openly denied access to educational¶ and professional training legally, sexual harassment may remain an especially critical factor of¶ more covert discrimination.

Case
Overview:

1. Even if they win all their f/w arguments that just means we should evaluate the testimony of experts about free speech and college campuses, not people detached from it. Their experts are qualified to speak to moral absolutes like ‘thou shalt not kill or lie’ but not complicated questions of applied ethics. Matters of public policy require nuanced understanding of the issue at hand that experts in virtue don’t have access to. 

2. Their f/w only proves that testimony is one piece of evidence when making a decision. But, we should still look for counter-evidence that affirms or denies experts. Hold them to an incredibly high threshold for how extreme their epistemic positions is. Sliwa 12

• • Sliwa agrees with testimony, and is summarizing a counter argument
    Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012.  NS

Suppose I go to the doctor, whom I take to be reliable and trustworthy, to ask him what to take for my headache.  Thee doctor tells me that my headache could be cured by taking a generous spoonful of cyanide. Now, even if prior to his testimony, I regarded the doctor as reliable and trustworthy, I would be epistemically irrational (and most likely dead) if I simply believed what was said to me.  That’s because even reliable testimony is in general just one piece of evidence that I have. In this case, I have other evidence about headaches and the likely effects of cyanide. What I need to do is to weigh the evidence from testimony against all the other non-testimonial evidence that I have.  That requires critical reflection about the testimony itself. Even in cases in which a speaker’s testimony is the only evidence I have about some question, epistemic rationality may still require me to think about the plausibility of what I have been told.  After all, even someone who’s usually reliable and trustworthy can be tired or drugged or joking on that particular occasion. Asking “What makes you think so?” is an easy way to check whether the speaker has really thought the problem through, whether she really has got your question right and to rule out that she’s not just trying to get rid of us, or joking or drunk.  That’s why we often don’t just simply believe as we’re told without any further questions and that’s why scenarios in which the agent doesn’t do so may seem intuitively odd.13

3. Their model of debate is wrong – they assume the resolution is a question of merely figuring out the right answer – as if we just need a calculator to decide what the right thing to do is. We will win that debate is about process as well as content and we should debate about the reasons why things are right or wrong. 

A) Best education – moral actions requires moral understanding Hills 09

Alison Hills, Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology, Ethics, Vol. 120, No. 1 (October 2009), University of Chicago Press, pp. 94-127.  NS

So far I have argued that moral understanding is essential to good character. But I think that it also has a role to play in important kinds of moral action. There is a well-known distinction between doing the right action and acting well or performing morally worthy actions. Your action is morally worthy only if it is a right action performed for the right reasons, and I will argue that moral understanding is crucial to certain kinds of morally worthy action.  There is a connection between having a good character and per forming morally worthy action: virtue can reasonably be regarded as a disposition to perform morally worthy actions. But you can perform morally worthy actions without being virtuous, because you do the right thing for the right reasons, though you do not habitually do so, and you are not disposed to do so in other circumstances. And you can have the virtues without performing a morally worthy action on an occasion when you uncharacteristically fail to respond to moral reasons. The best known examples illustrating the difference between right action and morally worthy action involve different types of motivation.  Kant famously drew a distinction between two shopkeepers. One gives the right change to his customers only for the sake of his reputation. He is not really acting well: he is doing what is morally right but only because it is in his interests to do so.  Whereas the shopkeeper who gives the right change because doing so is fair, in order to treat his customers with respect, is acting well, and his action has moral worth.  But I will argue that your beliefs and the ground of those beliefs are also crucial to acting rightly for the right reasons. Just as virtue had motivational and cognitive components, morally worthy action does too.  It is widely accepted that in order to act well, it is not sufficient that you do the right thing, because you (correctly) think it is morally right and you want to do the right thing, as an example from Nomy Arpaly illustrates. The Extremist?  Ron is an extremist, believing that killing a person is not generally immoral but that killing a fellow Jew is a grave sin. Ron would like to kill Tamara, but he refrains from doing so because he wants to do the right thing, and he believes the right thing to do is to refrain from killing Jews.33 Ron does the right thing but not for the right reasons: it is right not to kill Tamara, but not because she is a Jew; instead it is right not to kill her because she is a person. Notice that Ron is well motivated: he sincerely wants to do what is morally right. In that respect, Ron is very different from Kant's shopkeeper who does the right thing from selfishness. But in another regard his fault is similar, he is doing the right action, but his action is not morally worthy.  Arpaly suggests two explanations of why Ron's action is not morally worthy. First, it is merely accidental that he did the right thing in this case: "Just as, in the case of the prudent grocer, it is fortunate that the prudent action also happens to be the moral one, in Ron's case it is fortunate that favoring Jews in a certain way ... is moral."34 Second, Ron's reasons for action have nothing to do with the right-making features of his action.35

B) Moral dialogue requires justification for beliefs – they make debate about ethics pointless Hills 09

Alison Hills, Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology, Ethics, Vol. 120, No. 1 (October 2009), University of Chicago Press, pp. 94-127.  NS

The requirement to be able to justify yourself involves at least being able to say what you take yourself to be doing and why you thought doing so was a good idea. You might say: I had to help those people who were strangers to me because they were very badly injured, whereas my friend's injuries were only minor.  Giving a justification involves giving the reasons why what you did was right. If you do not understand why your action was right, you are in a very awkward position. Suppose your reliable friend has told you not to cheat your customers because doing so is unfair. You believe her, but on your own behalf, you cannot really see anything wrong with enriching your share holders at your customers' expense. There is a perfectly good sense in which you know why cheating your customers is wrong: you know that it is unfair. And yet you yourself have not grasped the connection between the wrongness of the action and the reasons why it is wrong. So you say to your customers what you were told, citing the unfairness of giving the wrong change as a justification for your action, but you cannot give an explanation in your own words, and you cannot reassure customers that under slightly different circumstances, you would treat them well (since you yourself are not able to work out what you would have moral reason to do in those circumstances). Without moral understanding, your ability to participate in the exchange of reasons is necessarily limited. So moral understanding is important in part because being in a position to justify yourself to others is morally important. 

C) Pure application of testimony leads to worse results; tough decisions require reasons - Nickel 01

Philip Nickel, Moral Testimony and Its Authority, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 4, No. 3, Cultivating Emotions (Sep., 2001), pp. 253-266, Springer.  NS

The first point is that even in contexts where I am considering some moral claim C that is not immediately relevant to action, the Recognition Requirement is not neutral toward the claim if C is related to other claims bearing immediately on action.  My understanding of other claims which are relevant to action is better when I believe and understand C than when I believe C without understanding it.  My failure to grasp what counts as a justification of the claim will have consequences in areas that are potentially relevant to my actions or the actions of those around me. It is impossible fully to understand a moral claim in one context without being capable of applying it in many other contexts, that is, without being aware of its conditions of application and the potential justifications for it. Even if I am not a potential murderer, if I do not understand why I should not kill Smith, then I will not be capable of responding morally to other possible situations in which related justificatory concerns are at issue. Suppose Smith is threatening my life, and I am in a position to kill him in self defense. If I am not in some sense responsive to the grounds which support not killing Smith in the general case, then I will not be able to see the ways in which killing in self-defense is different. My failure to understand why I should not kill in general will undermine my reasoning when I am in a position to kill Smith in self-defense. This is why many beliefs gained from moral dependence (including past tense beliefs, e.g., "Socrates should have fled prison") are deficient: such aims, if relied on without independent justification, are not fully understood, and are not capable of having their proper general action-guiding force.  They are not appropriately linked up with the epistemic framework that enables one to be responsive to moral reasons.  Insofar as such beliefs contain some insight, it is not an insight that can have any effect on the way the agent thinks about other more pressing matters. Insofar as their justificatory basis bears a similarity to that in some other domain, it is not a similarity which can bring better understanding for other claims.  For this reason, the Recognition Requirement is not indifferent to moral dependence, even when the claim relied upon does not directly concern the actions of the dependent person. There are few moral claims which have a negligible relationship to action, and whose justificatory basis can therefore be ignored. Such a formulation represents the first of the two points I want to make in elaborating the claim that requirements of understanding limit moral dependence. The Recognition Requirement has broad implications for moral belief.

Framework

1. Aff’s framework assumes we can engage with the views of moral authorities but some people are structurally excluded. This assumes black hope! Outweighs since I account for material conditions without abstracting from realities. My arguments are epistemic questions about peoples’ ability to access the ethical system he advocates so it’s a prior question. 

2. Begs question of level of generality -- moral authorities best suited at creating general theories for us to follow, i.e. we must help the poor or reject oppression, not specific things like "give poor people

Tournament: College Prep | Round: 3 | Opponent: Mission San Jose LS | Judge: Karen Qi
Shell General
Neoliberalism structures academic freedom in the status quo. It sets limits on what is acceptable behavior to quell dissent and any faculty truly radical enough to challenge corporate hegemony are tossed out before they can pose a real threat. Chatterjee and Maira 14
Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. "The Imperial University: race, war, and the nation-state." The imperial university: Academic repression and scholarly dissent (2014): 1-50.
Our geopolitical positions—of our immediate workplaces as well as trans- national work circuits—underscore the complex contradictions of our locations within the U.S. academy. These paradoxes of positionality and employment have seeded this project in important ways. We have both taught at the University of California for many years—in addition to other U.S. universities—and have been members of the privileged upper caste of U.S. higher education: the tenured professoriate. We have each used these privileges of class, education, and cultural capital to live and work transna- tionally and have organized around and written about issues of warfare, colo- nialism, occupation, immigration, racism, gender rights, youth culture, and labor politics, within and outside the United States. In fact, we first began working together when we collaborated in 2008 on a collective statement of feminist solidarity with women suffering from the violence of U.S. wars and occupation, during the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Israeli siege of Gaza.7 Yet our privileges of entry, of inclusion, and of outside-ness are also always marked by the “dangerous complicities” of imperial privi- lege and neoliberal capital, as the chapters by Julia Oparah; Sylvanna Falcón, Sharmila Lodhia, Molly Talcott, and Dana Collins; Vijay Prashad; and Laura Pulido powerfully remind us. Even as we have recognized the institutional privileges and complicities through which we can do this work, we have experienced at various moments and in different ways—as the chapters by Alexis Gumbs, Clarissa Rojas, Thomas Abowd, and Nicholas De Genova suggest—a keen sense of being “outsiders” within—in the university, in aca- demic disciplines, in different nations.8¶ As scholars and teachers located within “critical ethnic studies” and “women and gender studies,” we are also well aware of a certain politics of value, legitimacy, and marginality at play, especially as the dismantling of the public higher education system and attacks on ethnic studies around the nation accelerate. The struggles to build ethnic studies and women/gen- der/sexuality studies as legitimate scholarly endeavors within the academy, emerging from several strands of the civil rights and antiwar movements, are well chronicled and keenly debated. The precarious positions as well as increasing professionalization and policing of these interdisciplinary fields within the current restructuring of the university is a matter of deep con- cern; for example, in the wake of the assault on ethnic studies in Arizona, the dismantling of women’s studies programs, and in a climate of policing and criminalizing immigrant “others” across the nation.¶ The pressure on academics to fund one’s own research—following the dominant grant-writing models of science and technology—is now even more explicit in a time of fiscal crisis and deepening fissures between faculty in the humanities, social sciences, physical sciences, education, and business who occupy very different positions in an increasingly privatized university.9 Prashad reminds us in his chapter of the consequences of the fiscal crisis for college students who bear a massive and growing burden of debt. We recognize these pressures on faculty and students as stemming from neolib- eral capitalism and the university’s capitulation to a global “structural adjust- ment” policy that is now coming “home” to roost in the United States, as astutely argued by Farah Godrej in her analysis linking the neoliberal uni- versity to militarism and violence. The academy has also tried to market the notion of “public scholarship,” transforming activist scholarship into a commodifiable form of knowledge production and dissemination that can affirm the university’s civic engagement—confined by the parameters of per- missible politics, as incisively critiqued by Salaita, Rojas, and Abowd. If we cannot—or choose not to—market our scholarship and pedagogies through these programs of funding and institutionalization, we find our work further devalued within the dominant terms of privatization in the academy. Given that neoliberal market ideologies now underwrite the “value” of our research and intellectual work, what happens to scholars whose writing directly tack- les the questions of U.S. state violence, logics of settler colonialism, and global political and economic dominance?¶ We know from stories about campaigns related to tenure or defamation of scholars, often shared in hallways during conferences and sometimes through e-mail listservs and the media, that there are serious costs to writing and speaking about these matters. For far too many colleagues who confront the most taboo of topics, such as indigenous critiques of genocide and settler colonialism or especially the question of Palestine, the price paid has been extraordinarily high. It has included the denial of promotion to tenure, being de-tenured, not having employment contracts renewed, or never being hired and being blacklisted, as this book poignantly illustrates. Coupled with the loss of livelihood or exile from the U.S. academy, many scholars have been stigmatized, harassed, and penalized in overt and covert ways. There are numerous such cases, sadly way too many to recount here—most famously those of Ward Churchill, Norman Finkelstein, David Graeber, Joel Kovel, Terri Ginsberg, Marc Ellis, Margo Nanlal-Rankoe, Wadie Said, and Sami Al- Arian—but it is generally only the handful that generate public campaigns that receive attention while many others remain unknown, not to mention innumerable cases of students who have been surveilled or harassed, such as Syed Fahad Hashmi from Brooklyn College, while again there are countless other untold stories.10 These are the scandals and open secrets, we argue, that need to be revealed and placed in broader frames of analysis of labor and survival within the U.S. university system.11

Free speech is an illusion propagated by corporatists – their model of rights assumes an equal playing field analogous to free market economists view of capital. The promotion of free speech perpetuates the idea that speech is a commodity, which strengthens neoliberalism’s hold on the academy. Brown 15
Brown, Wendy. Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism's stealth revolution. MIT Press, 2015.
At times, kennedy raises the pitch in Citizens United to depict limits on corporate funding of PAC ads as “an outright ban on speech”;19 at other times, he casts them merely as inappropriate government inter- vention and bureaucratic weightiness.20 But beneath all the hyperbole about government’s chilling of corporate speech is a crucial rhetorical move: the figuring of speech as analogous to capital in “the political marketplace.” on the one hand, government intervention is featured throughout the opinion as harmful to the marketplace of ideas that speech generates.21 Government restrictions damage freedom of speech just as they damage all freedoms. on the other hand, the unfettered accumulation and circulation of speech is cast as an unqual- ified good, essential to “the right of citizens to inquire...hear... speak...and use information to reach consensus itself a precondi- tion to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”22 not merely corporate rights, then, but democracy as a whole is at stake in the move to deregulate speech. Importantly, however, democ- racy is here conceived as a marketplace whose goods—ideas, opinions, and ultimately, votes—are generated by speech, just as the economic market features goods generated by capital. In other words, at the very moment that Justice kennedy deems disproportionate wealth irrele- vant to the equal rights exercised in this marketplace and the utili- tarian maximization these rights generate, speech itself acquires the status of capital, and a premium is placed on its unrestricted sources and unimpeded flow.¶ What is significant about rendering speech as capital? economiza- tion of the political occurs not through the mere application of market principles to nonmarket fields, but through the conversion of political processes, subjects, categories, and principles to economic ones. This is the conversion that occurs on every page of the kennedy opinion. If everything in the world is a market, and neoliberal markets con- sist only of competing capitals large and small, and speech is the capital of the electoral market, then speech will necessarily share cap- ital’s attributes: it appreciates through calculated investment, and it advances the position of its bearer or owner. Put the other way around, once speech is rendered as the capital of the electoral marketplace, it is appropriately unrestricted and unregulated, fungible across actors and venues, and existing solely for the advancement or enhancement of its bearer’s interests. The classic associations of political speech with freedom, conscience, deliberation, and persuasion are nowhere in sight.¶ How, precisely, is speech capital in the kennedy opinion? How does it come to be figured in economic terms where its regulation or restriction appears as bad for its particular marketplace and where its monopolization by corporations appears as that which is good for all? The transmogrification of speech into capital occurs on a number of levels in kennedy’s account. First, speech is like capital in its tendency to proliferate and circu- late, to push past barriers, to circumvent laws and other restrictions, indeed, to spite efforts at intervention or suppression.23 speech is thus rendered as a force both natural and good, one that can be wrongly impeded and encumbered, but never quashed.¶ second, persons are not merely producers, but consumers of speech, and government interference is a menace—wrong in prin- ciple and harmful in effect—at both ends. The marketplace of ideas, kennedy repeats tirelessly, is what decides the value of speech claims. every citizen must judge the content of speech for himself or herself; it cannot be a matter for government determination, just as govern- ment should not usurp other consumer choices.24 In this discussion, kennedy makes no mention of shared deliberation or judgment in politics or of voices that are unfunded and relatively powerless. He is focused on the wrong of government “commanding where a per- son may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, using censorship to control thought.”25 If speech generates goods consumed according to individual choice, govern- ment distorts this market by “banning the political speech of millions of associations of citizens” (that is, corporations) and by paternal- istically limiting what consumers may know or consider. Again, if speech is the capital of the political marketplace, then we are polit- ically free when it circulates freely. And it circulates freely only when corporations are not restricted in what speech they may fund or promulgate.¶ Third, kennedy casts speech not as a medium for expression or dialogue, but rather as innovative and productive, just as capital is. There is “a creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expres- sion” that intersects in a lively way with “rapid changes in technol- ogy” to generate the public good.26 This aspect of speech, kennedy argues, specifically “counsels against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”27 Again, the dynamism, innovativeness, and generativity of speech, like that of all capital, is dampened by government intervention.¶ Fourth, and perhaps most important in establishing speech as the capital of the electoral marketplace, kennedy sets the power of speech and the power of government in direct and zero-sum-game opposition to one another. Repeatedly across the lengthy opinion for the majority, he identifies speech with freedom and government with control, cen- sorship, paternalism, and repression.28 When free speech and govern- ment meet, it is to contest one another: the right of speech enshrined in the First Amendment, he argues, is “premised on mistrust of gov- ernmental power” and is “an essential mechanism of democracy because it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”29 Here are other variations on this theme in the opinion:¶ The First Amendment was certainly not understood by the framers to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media. It was understood as a response to the repression of speech.30¶ When Government seeks to use its full power, including criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.... The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.31 This reading of the First Amendment and of the purpose of political speech positions government and speech as warring forces parallel to those of government and capital in a neoliberal economy.

This turns the case – the commodification of speech reflects the capitalist illusion of freedom. It makes speech meaningless and kills value to life. Smith ‘14
R.C. Smith April 24, 2014 “POWER, CAPITAL and THE RISE OF THE MASS SURVEILLANCE STATE: ON THE ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY, ETHICS, DISENCHANTMENT and CRITICAL THEORY” Heathwood Institute and Press http://www.heathwoodpress.com/power-capital-the-rise-of-the-mass-surveillance-state-on-the-absence-of-democracy-ethics-disenchantment-critical-theory/ JJN from file
One pressing issue, moreover, is that majority of the popular movements that have emerged in response to the Snowden leaks appear to be reformist in character. As a result, the discourse isn’t so much about fundamental system change; rather it becomes crafted into making mass surveillance less repulsive and more socially acceptable, even marketable. (Consider, for instance, the latest reforms proposed by President Barack Obama). For Adorno, this reformist inclination can be explained in part through an analysis of the logic of the system of capital. We read in Adorno how under modernity – i.e., capitalism – human beings are treated as commodities4 and the political-economy, which is principled on concentrations of power (i.e., ‘contradictory recognition’5), goes over the head of the individual, particularly as ‘coercive society’ aims to ‘shape people’ on behalf of the economic, social and political status quo.6 The system of capital, along with the instrumental use of Enlightenment ideals to promote a rational, efficient system7 have laid a foundation for society wherein the political-economy influences individuals and manufactures consent.8 Accordingly, people are seen as “substitutable entities valued merely for their instrumental uses or ability to command market resources,” and even where “commodification is resisted, the overriding pull of society is toward the status quo and those forms that are valued by society”. 9 As Kate Schick writes: The mind thus shapes itself into socially acceptable, marketable forms and freedom becomes an illusion, made all the more dangerous and difficult to resist because of the appearance of freedom. This is not the fault of Enlightenment ideals as such, but the instrumental use of these ideals in the promotion of a rational, efficient system: ‘The network of the whole is drawn ever tighter, modelled after the act of exchange’ (Adorno 1981: 21).10 Present in the logic of the system of capital itself is not an ‘emancipatory reason’ that aims toward universal guiding principles of an actually egalitarian democracy – i.e., Equality, Egalitarianism, Justice, Rights, etc. Rather, in modern capitalism, with its instrumental reason and positivist logic, such concepts lose their meaning.11 The social narrative no longer accommodates these fundamental principles or judges them to be delusions, because all concepts must be strictly functional in order to be considered “reasonable”.12 In turn, the ideals of a ‘good’ society, for example ideals toward an actual egalitarian democracy, become dependent on the “interests” of the dominant and governing system, which produces and reproduces the epistemic context of its own validity.13

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return. 

The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Sculos and Walsh 16
Sculos, Bryant William a¶ Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University , and Sean Noah Walsh Department of Political Science and Economics, Capital University. "The Counterrevolutionary Campus: Herbert Marcuse and the Suppression of Student Protest Movements." New Political Science (2016): 1-17.
¶ The recognition of repressive tolerance as a tool of counterrevolution calls for a careful¶ examination of leftist strategy. For example, so-called ‘microaggressions’, or ‘trigger warnings’,¶ should be taken seriously.65 However, we should and need to ask ourselves: in a world of¶ pervasive macroaggressions and trigger-pulling in a world of wretched poverty, torture and¶ disappeared dissidents—if these concerns should take center stage. We ought to reflect and¶ ask if identity concerns are more important than class or economic concerns. Marcuse would¶ surely argue that class remains a crucial component alongside other dimensions of identity¶ and oppression (for example, race, gender, sexuality, sexual orientation, religion et cetera).¶ He would demand that we act locally but organize globally, and that we refuse the lure of¶ divisive identity politics, without eschewing the central importance of criticizing racialized,¶ gendered dimensions to capitalist oppressions. We must principally and aggressively resist¶ the demand that we tolerate the expressions or enactments of these oppressions under the¶ guise of liberal toleration. In response to this revolting, nauseating, murderous demand, we¶ must revolt in all the ways we can, and that is precisely what #BlackLivesMatter, the Black¶ Liberation Collective (a nascent, more radical national student organization, distinct but¶ related to BLM and includes many of the campus protesters from around the United States),¶ and the broader student movements are aiming and struggling for (even if right now what¶ they are struggling for is precisely that focused vision).¶ The claim that free speech is under assault is often deployed as a tool of repressive toleration¶ by the Right. Perhaps we need some more hashtags: #BlackVoicesMatter or¶ #BlackProtestsMatter (though the label ‘black’ here, as it is with BLM, is meant to be inclusive,¶ not exclusive. There are numbers of white and non-black allies of the organization, as can¶ be seen in any cursory examination of these various protests. This is explicitly laid out in the¶ official platform of the BLM organization. This is the case for BDS as well; it is not about identity so much as it is about defending the humanity of all).66 We need more than just¶ hashtags though. Much more. We have seen the foundations of more. BLM’s platform does¶ not, however, include any mention of capitalism or economic exploitation, despite the fact¶ that the leadership of the organization has spoken out against racialized capitalism.67 The¶ Black Liberation Collective already includes a critique of capitalism alongside other forms¶ of oppression in their platform.68 These are the early and precarious stages of a potentially¶ emergent cohesive Left for the twenty-first century. Through Marcuse’s critical gaze, we can¶ observe what these students and activists have already realized, what is truly intolerable:¶ the demand that we all tolerate the intolerable. Today, the path to liberating tolerance¶ requires the refusal to accept such silencing.¶ Importantly, we must not limit ourselves to merely critiquing existing oppressions, or just¶ suggest principled radical reforms that could move us towards an emancipated, just (global)¶ society. As many on the Left have attempted, though sadly without much wider recognition,¶ we need to start building these alternative futures in the counterrevolutionary present wherever¶ and whenever possible. This means first building racially, sexually and gender inclusive¶ communicative and organizational bridges between both nascent and longer established¶ social movements and class-based organizations, including the too often forgotten Left¶ political parties.69 Liberating tolerance could tear open avenues for the development of the¶ ‘new sensibility’ Marcuse heralds in his late work. We see this as crucial for the possibility of¶ a new society, a free, just, and rational society antipodal and antithetical to the unfree, unjust,¶ and irrational confines of neoliberal capitalism. College campuses have, since Marcuse’s time¶ been a potentially key environment for the cultivation of this ‘new sensibility’—a sensibility,¶ a mentality, oriented towards care, compassion, love, justice, cooperation and indeed active¶ disgust at their inverses.70 BLM and BDS and other less well-known organized movements¶ offer us a new hope and opportunity to revitalize a youthful emancipatory disposition with¶ sustainability.¶ Liberating tolerance against repressive tolerance has the potential to open up the material¶ and ideological space for precisely these developments, against every wish of the counterrevolutionary¶ forces that militate against progress through the silencing of the exuberant¶ dissent we are witnessing across college campuses in the United States and around the¶ world. We write in support of these students and their rejection of white supremacy, racial¶ injustice (on campus and beyond), police brutality as standard practice, especially against¶ minorities, and their calls for an egalitarian educational experience, including the extension¶ of that experience for all people in the United States and around the world. Beyond Herbert¶ Marcuse’s words, we have his emancipatory democratic impetus—we hope to have embodied¶ that impetus here and shown it to be more relevant than ever.

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. 

First, neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file
RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. A. Prescription: More Politics The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor, 137 many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s marginalization. B. Prescription: More Normativity Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a number of pitfalls. The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the “distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the societal pie and redistribution is about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain of discourse or ideology. Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like Hayek’s theory, “law and economics is full of stories about how liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it instead folds them into one another: “The Law and Economics movement is rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive communitarian ideal will win.150 Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by her capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for her own needs and service her own ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152 If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as “undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be countered differently. More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. C. Prescription: Acceptance The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in “taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be “self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce the momentum to move forward. VII CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate the practice of critique within the legal academy. A. Why Critique Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: critique. Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies them. Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no alternative. 

Second, the knowledge claims of the AC are the jumping off point for the debate – our framework provides a more reasonable neg burden. When a student turns in an F paper, no teacher has an obligation to write an entirely new paper to show it was bad – pointing out major academic deficiencies would justify failing the paper – the ballot asks who did the better debating, so if their analysis is wrong, they haven’t. 

Third, neoliberalism is a conceptual framework that has to be challenged at the level of scholarship. Godrej 14
Farah Godrej Department of Political Science¶ University of California-Riverside “neoliberalism, Militarization, and the Price of dissent¶ Policing Protest at the University of California¶ “Edited by Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. The Imperial University. University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
I have offered here a particular window into the ways in which the interests, mechanisms, and operations of both the university system and the neoliberal state are aligned with those of private capital. Of course, that the academy is made to strategically ally with capital as a key piece of neoliberal consolida- tion should not surprise us. Rather, what is worth noting, I have argued here, is the necessity of the linkages between disinvestment in public education, militarization, and the criminalization of dissent. These necessary link- ages demonstrate this volume’s premise that the university is an institution embedded in the hierarchies and inequalities of U.S. racial, gender, and class politics and shed light on the confluence of military and industrial interests as they appear within the U.S. university. I have sought also to emphasize the systematicity and multilayered complexity of this phenomenon. That is, the various pieces of this picture necessarily go together, as rhetoric, law, bureaucracy, and the force of arms all combine effectively to produce the desired end.¶ The neoliberal logic entailed in the privatization of the University of Cal- ifornia is, I have argued, necessarily interlinked with the logic of militari- zation and the criminalization of dissent, because it employs a militarized enforcement strategy, coupled with a political rhetoric that criminalizes the specific behaviors involved in protest and dissent against these strate- gies. The militarization of the university campus is thus not simply a reflec- tion of the increasing militarization of American law enforcement based on the logic of ongoing threats to public safety encoded in years of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror.25 Rather, such militarization is one prong of a necessary enforcement strategy designed to convey that dissent against privatization is meant to be costly in inflicting various forms of legitimized violence upon those who dissent. The second prong of the enforcement strategy also conveys that dissenters will pay a high price by being criminal- ized, either through rhetoric that paints them as violent and therefore mar- ginal, unworthy, and undesirable in the public imagination or through legal machinations that force them to expend tremendous financial resources on extricating themselves from prosecution.¶ The language of cost and price here, of course, reminds us of the ongo- ing hegemony—and perhaps victory—of the conceptual frameworks of neoliberalism and its theoretical accompaniments, such as rational choice theory, predominantly featured in neoclassical economics. These strategies of criminalization and militarization rest on sending signals to adversaries, encoded precisely in these languages, wherein value and worth are measured in terms of indicators such as price or cost, and rational actors are assumed to be guided by a universally comprehensible incentive structure. Thus the strategies of criminalization and militarization rest on de-incentivizing dis- sent, so to speak, assuming that dissenters will measure the costs inherent in their actions and choose rationally to cease from engaging in such dissent. The continued insistence on dissent is therefore resistance to the logic of neoliberal privatization on multiple levels: it not only calls out the complic- ity of the university with the neoliberal state and the forces of private capital but also continues to dissent despite the “incentives” offered in exchange for desisting from dissent. And in so doing, it should be signaling its rejection not simply of privatization but of the entire conceptual baggage of neolib- eralism, including its logics of rational choice, cost, price, and incentive, as well as its logic of structural violence. In other words, the ongoing struggle against the logic of neoliberal privatization requires that dissent continue, despite its high “price.”¶ 

Case
A2 Kapoor
Political has already been ceded. That’s proven by the Trump victory. Justifies try-or-die for the K
A2 Bryant
Hold them to a high-threshold of explanation for why my alt isn’t concrete activism. 

Rhetoric propagating free speech as the answer to social ills directly trades off with our ability to fight injustice. Free speech is a tool that courts wield in colorblind ways against people. Delgado and Stefancic ‘92
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. “IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?” Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN
III. How THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION SOMETIMES MAKES MATTERS WORSE Speech and free expression are not only poorly adapted to remedy racism, they often make matters worse-far from being stalwart friends, they can impede the cause of racial reform. First, they encourage writers, filmmakers, and other creative people to feel amoral, nonresponsible in what they do. 18 8 Because there is a marketplace of ideas, the rationalization goes, another film-maker is free to make an antiracist movie that will cancel out any minor stereotyping in the one I am making. My movie may have other redeeming qualities; besides, it is good entertainment and everyone in the industry uses stock characters like the black maid or the bumbling Asian tourist. How can one create film without stock characters? 18 9 Second, when insurgent groups attempt to use speech as an instrument of reform, courts almost invariably construe First Amendment doctrine against them.1 90 As Charles Lawrence pointed out, civil rights activists in the sixties made the greatest strides when they acted in defiance of the First Amendment as then understood. 191 They marched, were arrested and convicted; sat in, were arrested and convicted; distributed leaflets, were arrested and convicted. Many years later, after much gallant lawyering and the expenditure of untold hours of effort, the conviction might be reversed on appeal if the original action had been sufficiently prayerful, mannerly, and not too interlaced with an action component. This history of the civil rights movement does not bear out the usual assumption that the First Amendment is of great value for racial reformers. 19 2 Current First Amendment law is similarly skewed. Examination of the many "exceptions" to First Amendment protection discloses that the large majority favor the interests of the powerful. 19 3 If one says something disparaging of a wealthy and well-regarded individual, one discovers that one's words were not free after all; the wealthy individual has a type of property interest in his or her community image, damage to which is compensable even though words were the sole instrument of the harm. 194 Similarly, if one infringes the copyright or trademark of a well-known writer or industrialist, again it turns out that one's action is punishable. 19 5 Further, if one disseminates an official secret valuable to a powerful branch of the military or defense contractor, that speech is punishable. 19 If one speaks disrespectfully to a judge, police officer, teacher, military official, or other powerful authority figure, again one discovers that one's words were not free;1 9 7 and so with words used to defraud, 198 form a conspiracy, 1 99 breach the peace, 200 or untruthful words given under oath during a civil or criminal proceeding.20 1 Yet the suggestion that we create new exception to protect lowly and vulnerable members of our society, such as isolated, young black undergraduates attending dominantly white campuses, is often met with consternation: the First Amendment must be a seamless web; minorities, if they knew their own self-interest, should appreciate this even more than others. 20 2 This one-sidedness of free-speech doctrine makes the First Amendment much more valuable to the majority than to the minority. The system of free expression also has a powerful after-the-fact apologetic function. Elite groups use the supposed existence of a marketplace of ideas to justify their own superior position. 203 Imagine a society in which all As were rich and happy, all Bs were moderately comfortable, and all Cs were poor, stigmatized, and reviled. Imagine also that this society scrupulously believes in a free marketplace of ideas. Might not the As benefit greatly from such a system? On looking about them and observing the inequality in the distribution of wealth, longevity, happiness, and safety between themselves and the others, they might feel guilt. Perhaps their own superior position is undeserved, or at least requires explanation. But the existence of an ostensibly free marketplace of ideas renders that effort unnecessary. Rationalization is easy: our ideas, our culture competed with their more easygoing ones and won. 20 4 It was a fair fight. Our position must be deserved; the distribution of social goods must be roughly what fairness, merit, and equity call for.20 5 It is up to them to change, not us. A free market of racial depiction resists change for two final reasons. First, the dominant pictures, images, narratives, plots, roles, and stories ascribed to, and constituting the public perception of minorities, are always dominantly negative. 20 6 Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of the sort described in Part I (as well as today's versions) inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. 20 7 Minorities internalize the stories they read, see, and hear every day. Persons of color can easily become demoralized, blame themselves, and not speak up vigorously.208 The expense of speech also precludes the stigmatized from participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas. 20 9 They are often poor-indeed, one theory of racism holds that maintenance of economic inequality is its prime function2 0 -and hence unlikely to command the means to bring countervailing messages to the eyes and ears of others. Second, even when minorities do speak they have little credibility. Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her deserved share? Our very imagery of the outsider shows that, contrary to the usual view, society does not really want them to speak out effectively in their own behalf and, in fact, cannot visualize them doing so. Ask yourself: How do outsiders speak in the dominant narratives? Poorly, inarticulately, with broken syntax, short sentences, grunts, and unsophisticated ideas.21' Try to recall a single popular narrative of an eloquent, self-assured black (for example) orator or speaker. In the real world, of course, they exist in profusion. But when we stumble upon them, we are surprised: "What a welcome 'exception'!" Words, then, can wound. But the fine thing about the current situation is that one gets to enjoy a superior position and feel virtuous at the same time. By supporting the system of free expression no matter what the cost, one is upholding principle. One can belong to impeccably liberal organizations and believe one is doing the right thing, even while taking actions that are demonstrably injurious to the least privileged, most defenseless segments of our society.21 2 In time, one's actions will seem wrong and will be condemned as such, but paradigms change slowly.2 1 3 The world one helps to create-a world in which denigrating depiction is good or at least acceptable, in which minorities are buffoons, clowns, maids, or Willie Hortons, and only rarely fully individuated human beings with sensitivities, talents, personalities, and frailties-will survive into the future. One gets to create culture at outsiders' expense. And, one gets to sleep well at night, too. Racism is not a mistake, not a matter of episodic, irrational behavior carried out by vicious-willed individuals, not a throwback to a long-gone era. It is ritual assertion of supremacy, 214 like animals sneering and posturing to maintain their places in the hierarchy of the colony. It is performed largely unconsciously, just as the animals' behavior is. 2 15 Racism seems right, customary, and inoffensive to those engaged in it, while bringing psychic and pecuniary advantages.21 6 The notion that more speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing can counter this system of oppression is appealing, lofty, romantic-and wrong.

And, more speech is not better – speech tends to reinscribe power relations rather than break them down.

Tournament: College Prep | Round: 5 | Opponent: Del MarTorrey Pines FK | Judge: Shivane Sabharwal
1NC – Must Defend Policy Action

Interpretation - The AFF must defend hypothetical implementation of government action and legislative policy. 

This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge.  Solves their method good offense – they can read  as a framework argument to justify a government plan, there’s no reason voting off it is key.

Parcher 01 defines resolved

Parcher 1 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in original) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at *Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision.  (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.
OED defines ought as "Used to indicate a desirable or expected state", so the aff must defend a desirable state of affairs, not just an obligation
(Oxford English Dictionary, "ought")

B.  Violation:

The AFF is clearly not a government policy - individual criticism or rejection is not sufficient – they say .   

C.  Standards: 

1.  Legal change: 

A. Understanding the intricacies of politics and the state is a prerequisite to addressing oppression – their ideological critique falsely assumes that social relations rather than material structures create systemic oppression.  Bryant 12  

Bryant 12 – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/).  NS

We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of “military logistics”. We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target. What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene. We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of “distribution”. The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both. I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you guys behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take. This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.

B.  Anti politics creates material authoritarian oppression which outweighs since it affects people’s real lives instead of being ivory tower theorizing.  Boggs 97

Boggs 97 — Carl Boggs, 1997 (“The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America,” Theory and Society, Volume 26, Issue 6, December, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SpingerLink, p. 773-775)

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here — localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post- modernism, Deep Ecology — intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. end page 773. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved — perhaps even unrecognized — only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.¶ This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites — an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise — or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75 end page 774¶ The historic goal of recovering politics in the Aristotelian sense, therefore, suggests nothing less than a revitalized citizenry prepared to occupy that immense expanse of public space. Extension of democratic control into every area of social life requires insurgency against the charade of normal politics, since the persistence of normal politics is just another manifestation of anti-politics. If authentic citizenship is to be forged, then information, skills, and attitudes vital to political efficacy need to flourish and be widely distributed throughout the population, without this, “consciousness transformation” is impossible, or at least politically meaningless. A debilitating problem with the culture of anti-politics, however, is that it precisely devalues those very types of information, skills, and attitudes.

C.  The state is inevitable - their resistance fails without a concrete plan of action.  Day 09

Day 09 – (Christopher, The Historical Failure of Anarchism: Implications for the Future of the Revolutionary Project, http://mikeely.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/historical_failure_of_aanarchism_chris_day_kasama.pdf).  NS

The strength of anarchism is its moral insistence on the primacy of human freedom over political expediency. But human freedom exists in a political context. It is not sufficient, however, to simply take the most uncompromising position in defense of freedom. It is neccesary to actually win freedom. Anti-capitalism doesn’t do the victims of capitalism any good if you don’t actually destroy capitalism. Anti-statism doesn’t do the victims of the state any good if you don’t actually smash the state. Anarchism has been very good at putting forth visions of a free society and that is for the good. But it is worthless if we don’t develop an actual strategy for realizing those visions. It is not enough to be right, we must also win. Continues… Finally revolutionaries have a responsibility to have a plausible plan for making revolution. Obviously there are not enough revolutionaries to make a revolution at this moment. We can reasonably anticipate that the future will bring upsurges in popular opposition to the existing system. Without being any more specific about where those upsurges might occur it seems clear that it is from the ranks of such upsurges that the numbers of the revolutionary movement will be increased, eventually leading to a revolutionary situation (which is distinguished from the normal crises of the current order only by the existence of a revolutionary movement ready to push things further). People who are fed up with the existing system and who are willing to commit themselves to its overthrow will look around for likeminded people who have an idea of what to do. If we don’t have a plausible plan for making revolution we can be sure that there will be somebody else there who will. There is no guarantee that revolutionary-minded people will be spontaneously drawn to anti-authoritarian politics. The plan doesn’t have to be an exact blueprint. It shouldn’t be treated as something sacred. It should be subject to constant revision in light of experience and debate. But at the very least it needs to be able to answer questions that have been posed concretely in the past. We know that we will never confront the exact same circumstances as previous revolutions. But we should also know that certain problems are persistent ones and that if we can’t say what we would have done in the past we should not expect people to think much of our ability to face the future. 

We solve their offense:

A. Using the government strategically doesn’t legitimate it – hate crime laws that stopped KKK members from lynching black people didn’t change the entire system, but they were a step in the right direction as a demand from black communities.  

B.  Defending a plan doesn’t require assimilation into the government.  Harris 13

Scott Harris, Director of Debate, Kansas University, 2013, This Ballot, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0 CC

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. This idea that debate is about role playing being a part of the government puzzles me greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now never once have I role played being part of the government. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has formed many opinions about what the government and other institutions should or should not do without ever role playing being part of those institutions. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. I have no idea at all why it would be oppressive for someone to form an opinion about whether or not they think the government should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

C.  The state is inevitably a unit of analysis given that it exists now even if we want to move beyond it.  Frost 96

Mervyn Frost, U of Kent, 1996, Ethics in Int’l Relations, p. 90-1.  NS

A first objection which seems inherent in Donelan’s approach is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the system.  This objection is not well founded, by having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them.  As I have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state.  Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus,for example. any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.

2.  Procedural fairness:

A.  Predictability - Non state advocacies mean they can defend incredibly vague advocacies making it unclear what DAs the 1NC can read – also allows massive 1AR shifts to clarify their advocacy and delink from all NEG offense.  Defending a policy means there are clear legislative steps we can contest.  

B.  Ground - The majority of NEG arguments come from policy enforcement, like  _.  Generic Ks of their method will always lose to the specificity of the plan and a case specific prep advantage

This is an independent voting issue which outweighs:

A.  Evaluation – even if their arguments seem true, that’s only because they already had an advantage – fairness is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who best meets their ROB.
B.  Fairness is key to effective dialogue.  Galloway 07

Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

Voter: Drop the debater on T – our state good offense justifies a counter ROB which outweighs and turns theirs.  Also, the round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded by ability to generate NC offense– letting them sever doesn’t solve any of the abuse

Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

CASE:

1. The narrative of “no progress” is affectively appealing but historically imprecise – major gains have been achieved and the political implications of their ethics risks throwing out the possibility of a less violence, less dehumanizing future around the world.  Winant 15

Winant 15 – (2015, Howard, Professor of Sociology at UC-Santa Barbara, “The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century,” Critical Sociology 2015, Vol. 41(2) 313–324).  NS

The World-Historical Shitpile of Race Structural racism – an odious stinkpile of shit left over from the past and still being augmented in the present – has been accumulated by ‘slavery unwilling to die’,4 by empire, and indeed by the entire racialized modern world system. The immense waste (Feagin et al., 2001, drawing on Bataille) of human life and labor by these historically entrenched social structures and practices still confronts us today, in the aftermath of the post-Second World War racial ‘break’. Our antiracist accomplishments have reduced the size of the pile; we have lessened the stink. But a massive amount of waste still remains. So much racial waste is left over from the practice of racial domination in the early days of empire and conquest, to the present combination of police state and liberalism! Indeed it often seems that this enormous and odious waste pinions the social system under an immovable burden. How often have despair and hopelessness overcome those who bore this sorrow? How often have slave and native, peon and maquiladora, servant and ghetto-dweller, felt just plain ‘sick and tired’ (Nappy Roots, 2003), encumbered by this deadening inertia composed of a racial injustice that could seemingly never be budged? How often, too, have whites felt weighed down by the waste, the guilt and self-destruction built into racism and the ‘psychological wage’? Yet racial politics is always unstable and contradictory. Racial despotism can never be fully stabilized or consolidated. Thus at key historical moments, perhaps rare but also inevitable, the sheer weight of racial oppression – qua social structure – becomes insupportable. The built-up rage and inequity, the irrationality and inutility, and the explosive force of dreams denied, are mobilized politically in ways that would have seemed almost unimaginable earlier. Racism remains formidable, entrenched as a structuring feature of both US and global society and politics. Indeed it often seems impossible to overcome. Yet That’s Not the Whole Story We are so used to losing! We can’t see that the racial system is in crisis both in the US and globally. Large-scale demographic and political shifts have overtaken the modern world (racial) system, undermining and rearticulating it. During and after the Second World War a tremendous racial ‘break’ occurred, a seismic shift that swept much of the world (Winant, 2001). The US was but one national ‘case’ of this rupture, which was experienced very profoundly: racial transformations occurred that were unparalleled since at least the changes brought about by the US Civil War. Omi and I (1994) – and many, many others – have proposed that the terrain of racial politics was tremendously broadened and deepened after the War. The increased importance of race in larger political life not only grounded the modern civil rights movement but shaped a whole range of ‘new social movements’ that we take for granted today as central axes of political conflict. In earlier stages of US history it had not been so evident that ‘the personal is political’ – at least not since the end of Reconstruction. From the explicit racial despotism of the Jim Crow era to the ‘racial democracy’ (of course still very partial and truncated) of the present period … : that is a big leap, people.  In the modern world there were always black movements, always movements for racial justice and racial freedom. The experience of injustice, concrete grievances, lived oppression, and resistance, both large and small, always exists. It can be articulated or not, politicized or not. These movements, these demands, were largely excluded from mainstream politics before the rise of the civil rights movement after the War. Indeed, after the Second World War, in a huge ‘break’ that was racially framed in crucial ways, this ‘politicization of the social’ swept over the world. It ignited (or reignited) major democratic upsurges. This included the explicitly anti-racist movements: the modern civil rights movement, the anti-apartheid movement, and the anti-colonial movement (India, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.). It also included parallel, and more-or-less allied, movements like ‘secondwave’ feminism, LGBTQ (née gay liberation) movements, and others. In short, the world-historical upheaval of the Second World War and its aftermath were racial upheavals in significant ways: the periphery against the center, the colored ‘others’ against ‘The Lords of Human Kind’ (Kiernan, 1995). These movements produced: • Demographic, economic, political, and cultural shifts across the planet • The destruction of the old European empires • The coming and going of the Cold War • The rise of the ‘new social movements’, led by the black movement in the US And this is only the start of what could be a much bigger list. A Crisis of Race and Racism? ‘Crisis’, Gramsci famously wrote, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass’ (Gramsci, 1971: 276). Using the Gramscian formula, I suggest that there is such a crisis of race and racism. On the one hand, the old verities of established racism and white supremacy have been officially discredited, not only in the US but fairly comprehensively around the world. On the other hand, racially-informed action and social organization, racial identity and race consciousness, continue unchecked in nearly every aspect of social life! On the one hand, the state (many states around the world) now claims to be colorblind, non-racialist, racially democratic; while on the other hand, in almost every case, those same states need race to rule. Consider in the US alone: race and electoral politics, race and social control, race and legal order … Why don’t our heads explode under the pressures of such cognitive dissonance? Why doesn’t manifest racial contradiction provoke as much uncertainty and confusion in public life and political activity as it does in everyday experience? Are we just supposed to pretend that none of this is happening? Can anyone really sustain the view that they are operating in a nonracial, ‘colorblind’ society? The ‘colorblind’ claim is that one should not ‘notice’ race. For if one ‘sees’ race, one wouldn’t be ‘blind’ to it, after all.5 But what happens to race-consciousness under the pressure (now rather intense in the US, anyway) to be ‘colorblind’? Quite clearly, racial awareness does not dry up like a raisin in the sun. Not only does it continue as a matter of course in everyday life, but in intellectual, artistic and scientific (both social and natural) life race continues to command attention.6 ‘Colorblind’ ideologies of race today serve to impede the recognition of racial difference or racial inequality based on claims that race is an archaic concept, that racial inclusion is already an accomplished fact, and so on. Just so, persistent race-consciousness highlights racial differences and particularities. ‘Noticing’ race can be linked to despotic or democratic motives, framed either in defense of coercion, privilege, and undeserved advantage, or invoked to support inclusion, human rights, and social justice (Carbado and Harris, 2008; see also Brown et al., 2003). Obama Is he a mere token, a shill for Wall Street? Or is he Neo, ‘the one’? If neither alternative is plausible, then we are in the realm of everyday 21st-century US politics. This is the territory in which, as Sam Rayburn famously said, ‘There comes a time in the life of every politician when he sic must rise above principle.’ Yet Barack Obama has transformed the US presidency in ways we cannot yet fully appreciate. Obama is not simply the first nonwhite (that we know of) to occupy the office. He is the first to have lived in the global South, the first to be a direct descendent of colonized people, the first to have a genuine movement background. Consider: How many community meetings, how many movement meetings did Obama attend before entering electoral politics? But he is no more powerful than any of his predecessors; he is constrained as they were by the US system of rule, by the US racial regime, by structural racism. In addition he is constrained by racism as no other US president has ever been. No other president has experienced racism directly: Moreover, while my own upbringing hardly typifies the African American experience – and although, largely through luck and circumstance, I now occupy a position that insulates me from most of the bumps and bruises that the average black man must endure – I can recite the usual litany of petty slights that during my forty-five years have been directed my way: security guards tailing me as I shop in department stores, white couples who toss me their car keys as I stand outside a restaurant waiting for the valet, police cars pulling me over for no apparent reason. I know what it’s like to have people tell me I can’t do something because of my color, and I know the bitter swill of swallowed back anger. I know as well that Michelle and I must be continually vigilant against some of the debilitating story lines that our daughters may absorb – from TV and music and friends and the streets – about who the world thinks they are, and what the world imagines they should be. (Obama, 2006: 233) On the other hand: he has a ‘kill list’. All presidents kill people, but Obama is the first systematically and publicly to take charge of these egregious and unconstitutional uses of exceptional powers. In this he echoes Carl Schmitt, the Nazi political theorist, whose famous dictum is ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (2004 1922). The drones, the surveillance, and the numerous right turns of his administration all stand in sharp contradiction not only to his campaign rhetoric, but to the anti-racist legacy of the civil rights movement that arguably put him in office. Obama has not interceded for blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in US history, the ‘great recession’ of 2008. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of color are concentrated. Obama himself largely deploys colorblind racial ideology, although he occasionally critiques it as well. Beneath this ostensibly postracial view the palpable and quite ubiquitous system of racial distinction and inequality remains entrenched. Though modernized and ‘moderated’, structural racism has been fortified, not undermined, by civil rights reform; Obama is not challenging it, at least not directly. Reframing the Discussion What should we be studying and teaching now? The list of themes I have highlighted here is partial of course, and perhaps impressionistic as well. If the argument I have proposed has any validity, then the ‘dark matter’ of race, which is even more invisible now than it was in the past – in its present ‘post-civil rights’, ‘colorblind’, and even ‘presidential’ forms – continues to exercise its gravitational pull on our politics. It continues to shape what is called (and improperly deprecated as) ‘identity politics’. The ‘dark matter’ takes on new significance as a central feature of neoliberalism, which is enacted today through the deployment of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, ‘states of exception’, state violence, and exclusionary politics – all political practices that rely on racism. Yet the legacy of centuries of resistance to these depredations, the undeniable achievements of anti-racist and ant-imperialist struggles, the extension of democracy – often tortuous and always incomplete – to peoples of color, also exerts a significant political force. Race-based ‘freedom dreams’ (Kelley again) sustain the hope of democracy, inclusion, equality, and justice in the US and elsewhere

.
2. Multiple historical and empirical analyses by black authors directly disprove the ontology claim.  Massa 14

Andre Lopes Massa (Race Studies Author and Blogger, Website owner and contributor), Implications of Wilderson’s Afro-Pessimism, The Historical Nerds, 2014.  NS

As stated earlier, the main premise to Wilderson’s argument for Afro-pessimism derives from the work done by Orlando Patterson between the relationship between slavery and the condition of social death for the Black Body. Thus, because of this condition of social death, Wilderson believes that the Black Body is incapable of accessing the law through legal reform and progress because of the way they are marked ontologically as the Slave. However, historian Vincent Brown has uncovered evidence with regards to the experience of slavery and social death when he writes, “The premise of Orlando Patterson’s major work, that enslaved Africans were natally alienated and culturally isolated, was challenged even before he published his influential thesis, primarily by scholars concerned with “survivals” or “retentions” of African culture and by historians of slave resistance. In the early to mid-twentieth century, when Robert Park’s view of “the Negro” predominated among scholars, it was generally assumed that the slave trade and slavery had denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa. The historians Carter G. Woodson and W. E. B. Du Bois and the anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits argued the opposite. Their research supported the conclusion that while enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions with them to the Americas, they did maintain significant aspects of their cultural backgrounds. For these scholars, the preservation of distinctive cultural forms has served as an index both of a resilient social personhood, or identity, and of resistance to slavery itself. Scholars of slave resistance have never had much use for the concept of social death. How could they have formed the fragile families documented by social historians if they had been “natally alienated” by definition? Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, if slaves had been uniformly subjected to “permanent violent domination,” they could not have revolted as often as they did or shown the “varied manifestations of their resistance.” (Brown, Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery, pg. 11-13). Patterson’s major theme regarding the social death of slaves is that, since birth, they have been unable to engage in the kind of social relations they desired because their status as fungible objects meant that those relations were always at the discretion of their masters. However, as Brown points out, Patterson, and subsequently Wilderson, have ignored that there were experiences free from the watchful eyes of the master. Furthermore, in the context of Wilderson, the fact that there remains to be evidence that slaves had preserved a distinct culture, than this would indicate that they retained some of there culture from Africa after the Middle Passage, the event that erased Black ontology for Wilderson. To put in bluntly, Africans did not come out of the Middle Passage as Blacks, but came out with some form of their culture still left intact, a culture, that, for Brown, still grew and developed in its own way even during the atrocities of slavery. If Wilderson’s main argument for the ontological death of the Black Body is because of their incapacity to develop their own subjectivity, then the formation of a distinct slave culture would invalidate this argument because the formation of a distinct culture shows that the Black Body still retained some capacity to form their own subjectivity, a sign of life in the ontological realm.  Furthermore, if the Black Body were truly ontologically dead in the present, then statistics would indicate otherwise. A study by the Journal of Blacks in Higher education shows that since 1990, the graduation rate for Black men has improved from 28 to 35 in 2005 and subsequently 34 to 46 for Black women during the same period. The study does conceded that the statistics remain low, but that the progress made in the past 15 years has been encouraging and that reform has been a step in the right direction. If the Black Body were truly socially dead, then institutions such as the university would be completely inaccessible to the Black Body, yet the progress made in graduation rates show that the Black Body still has some agency and capacity to shape their own futures.

3. Ivory tower ontology theorizing ignores the actual conditions of black people and recreates European philosophical traditions which proves the double turn at the heart of Wilderson.  Curry 14

Dr. Tommy Curry, Black Studies, Not Morality: Anti-Black Racism, Neo-Liberal Cooptation, and the Challenges to Black Studies Under Intersectional Axioms, Academia.edu, 2014.  NS

A Black intellectual socialized to imitate white theories and by effect the pre-established semiotics that signify “intellect” as the basis of their discourse with whites under the banner of radicality, pessimism or anti-racist realism is of the greatest concern. In its brute reality, this discursive replication was the primary concern of Carter G. Woodson’s The Miseducation of the Negro (1933). Contrary to the pop culture summation of Woodson’s 1933 work, Woodson was not primarily concerned with the general education of Blacks by whites, Woodson was concerned with the “highly educated Negro,” who in studying the ideas founded upon white understandings of philosophy, economics, law, and religion, sought to apply this knowledge to the Black community. “The educated Negro have the attitude of contempt toward their own people because in their own as well as in their mixed schools Negroes are taught to admire the Hebrew, the Latin and the Teuton and to despite the African” (Woodson, 1933, p.1). Woodson’s comment upon the disciplinary/civilizational basis of “theory,” is profound, despite being almost a century old. The highly educated Negro, the same culprit of E. Franklin Frazier’s Failure of the Negro/Black Intellectual, seeks to distant themselves from the Black community who remain mere objects of study. Seeing themselves as ontologically different from the other-Black-objects they study, these Black theorist(s) speak to white gatekeepers and members of their own intellectual class who reward them for the adamancy and spread of the ideas offered as morality.  By claiming to be enlightened and spreading “truth” the post-structural/intersectional theorist need not know about the actual conditions of the people they speak of, they need only present these bodies and their conditions through the theories accepted by their particular discipline and/or disciplinary community.  Black Study effectively becomes the process of confining/distorting/revising Black life to fit theory. As Ahmed reminds us, “facts require explanations, and all explanations, even bad ones, presume a configuration of concepts, which we provisionally call 'theory,' In other words, theory is not simply a desirable but a necessary relation between facts and their explanations” (1994, p.34). It is when this theory is considered to be ontological—fundamental and necessary to the facts they seek to explain—that they become apriori and ideological. It is this paradigm from which the theory we concern ourselves with, and its effect upon the actual study of Black people, are placed at odds with Black Studies. Since the ontological claim is apriori, it dismisses the need for the study of Black life since it takes the relation between the facts of Black existence and theories proposed to be necessary to the Black bodies observed. The truth concerning Blackness thereby becomes revelation of some constant unchanging principle within Blackness rather than the study of structures, historically conditioned and dynamic, upon Black peoples. This bourgeois fanaticism voids the world of actual Black people and replaces them with Black subjects found wanting for knowledge, recognition, and the politics of the “Black theorist-observer.”

4. Accumulation is a justification for a rejection of future oriented political engagement, it’s bad - it fails to produce emancipatory political change and reifies the status quo.  Bevernage 15

Bevernage 15 – (October 2015, Berber, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Ghent, “The Past is Evil/Evil is Past: On Retrospective Politics, Philosophy of History, and Temporal Manichaeism,” History and Theory Volume 54, Issue 3, pages 333–352).  NS

Torpey is certainly not the only intellectual expressing these worries. According to historian Pieter Lagrou, “our contemporary societies, for lack of future projects, shrink into a ‘passeist’ culture.”12 In European public discourse, he argues, the focus on crimes of the distant past has become so strong that it tends to marginalize claims of victims of contemporary crimes and human rights violations. Therefore, Lagrou argues, “a commemorative discourse of victimhood is very much the opposite of a constructive and dynamic engagement with the present, but rather a paralyzing regression of democratic debate.”13 Lagrou's argument closely resembles many others that turn against retrospective politics and “victim culture” such as Ian Buruma's warning about the peril of minorities defining themselves exclusively as historical victims and engaging in an “Olympics of suffering”14 and Charles Maier's claims about a “surfeit of memory.”15 These warnings about the perils of a retrospective politics outweighing or even banning politics directed at contemporary injustices or striving for a more just future should be taken seriously. Yet the alternative of an exclusively present- or future-oriented politics disregarding all historical injustice is not desirable either. Contemporary injustice often manifests itself in the form of structural repetition or continuity of injustices with a long history. Moreover, totalitarian versions of progressivist politics have frequently abused the idea of a struggle for a more just future in order to justify past and present suffering. It could even be argued that the rise of dominant restrospective politics has been initiated partly on the basis of disillusionment with the exculpatory mechanisms of progressivist ideology.16 Some indeed claim that much of present-day retrospective politics and the “setting straight” of historical injustices would be unnecessary had totalitarian progressivist politics focused less exclusively on the bright future and shown more sensitivity to the contemporary suffering of its day. This claim certainly makes sense if one thinks of extreme examples such as Stalin's five-year plans and Mao's Great Leap Forward. Yet, as Matthias Frisch rightly argues, the risk of the justification of past and present suffering lurks around the corner wherever progressive logics of history or promises of bright and just futures are not counterbalanced by reflective forms of remembrance.17 Therefore, we should resist dualist thinking that forces us to choose between restitution for historical injustices and struggle for justice in the present or the future. Rather, we should look for types of retrospective politics that do not oppose but complement or reinforce the emancipatory and utopian elements in present- and future-directed politics—and the other way around: present- and future-oriented politics that do not forget about historical injustices. In this paper I want to contribute to this goal by focusing on the issue of retrospective politics and by analyzing how one can differentiate emancipatory or even utopian types of retrospective politics from retrospective politics that I classify here as anti-utopian. I argue that the currently dominant strands of retrospective politics indeed do tend to be anti-utopian and have a very limited emancipatory potential. Moreover, I claim that currently dominant retrospective politics do not radically break with several of the exculpatory intellectual mechanisms that are typically associated with progressivist politics but actually modify and sometimes even radicalize them. In that restricted sense, and only in this sense, it can be argued that currently dominant retrospective politics do not represent a fundamentally new way of dealing with historical evil and the ethics of responsibility. My perspective is not a pessimistic one, however. Besides the currently dominant retrospective politics, there exist other strands of retrospective politics that do have emancipatory or even utopian features and that do not force us to choose between restitution for historical injustices and struggle for justice in the present or the future. Anti-utopianism and ethical “passeism,” I argue, are not inherent or necessary features of all retrospective politics but rather result from a specific, underlying type of historical thought or philosophy of history18 that treats the relation between past, present, and future in antinomic terms and prevents us from understanding “transtemporal” injustices and responsibilities. Sometimes this type of historical thought indeed stimulates a moralistic stance in which the past is charged with the worst of all evil, while the present becomes morally discharged by simple comparison. The latter type of “temporal Manichaeism” can be highly problematic, I argue, because it not only posits that the “past is evil” but also tends to turn this reasoning around and stimulates the wishful thought that “evil is past.”

Demands on the state cause crises in the law that solve the K – the aff purposefully cedes the political to keep the left in check Crenshaw 88
Crenshaw , Law Professor at UCLA, 88 (Kimberle Williams, ―RACE, REFORM, AND RETRENCHMENT: TRANSFORMATION AND LEGITIMATION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW,‖ Harvard Law Review, May, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331)
Rights discourse provided the ideological mechanisms through which the conflicts of federalism, the power of the Presidency, and the legitimacy of the courts could be orchestrated against Jim Crow . Movement leaders used these tactics to force open a conflict between whites that eventually benefited Black people. Casting racial issues in the moral and legal rights rhetoric of the prevailing ideology helped create the political controversy without which the state's coercive function would not have been enlisted to aid Blacks. Simply critiquing the ideology from without or making demands in language outside the rights discourse would have accomplished little. Rather, Blacks gained by using a powerful combination of direct action , mass protest, and individual acts of resistance , along with appeals to public opinion and the courts couched in the language of the prevailing legal consciousness. The result was a series of ideological and political crises. In these crises, civil rights activists and lawyers induced the federal government to aid Blacks and triggered efforts to legitimate and reinforce the authority of the law in ways that benefited Blacks . Simply insisting that Blacks be integrated or speaking in the language of "needs" would have endangered the lives of those who were already taking risks -- and with no reasonable chance of success. President Eisenhower , for example, would not have sent federal troop s to Little Rock simply at the behest of protesters demanding that Black schoolchildren receive an equal education . Instead, the successful manipulation of legal rhetoric led to a crisis of federal power that ultimately benefited Blacks . n192 Some critics of legal reform movements seem to overlook the fact that state power has made a significant difference -- sometimes between life and death -- in the efforts of Black people to transform their world. Attempts to harness the power of the state through the appropriate rhetorical/legal incantations should be appreciated as intensely powerful and calculated political acts . In the context of white supremacy, engaging in rights discourse should be seen as an act of self-defense . This was particularly true because the state could not assume a position of neutrality regarding Black people once the movement had mobilized people to challenge the system of oppression: either the coercive mechanism of the state had to be used to support white supremacy, or it had to be used to dismantle it. We know now, with hindsight, that it did both. n193

Tournament: Damus | Round: 1 | Opponent: Peninsula IG | Judge: Olivia Panchal
CRB CP and Hollow Hope DA

See open source

Tournament: Damus | Round: 3 | Opponent: Peninsula KL | Judge: Adam Bistagne
1NC

Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)

The CP Solves the Case 

1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
   Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
   This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as  *906  Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work.
   Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization.
   Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched.
   The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized?
   For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing  *907  programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325
   2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations
   Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
   First, even a highly effective LOPRB providing quality policy recommendations to a police department would likely encounter some department resistance to the civilian oversight. This resistance may be created because of police department views of a civilian entity "meddling" or just the potential perception of an adversarial relationship between the *1058 LOPRB and police department. n207 However, the structure of LOPRBs help overcome most of this resistance traditionally leveled against civilian oversight from police departments. The emphasis on policy review, rather than complaint review, means that LOPRBs will not directly regulate individual police officers but rather the department as a whole. This change in focus will likely reduce the intensity of any police department resistance because the potential adversarial relationship will be between the LOPRB and the police department instead of individual officers. n208 Furthermore, any resistance can be ameliorated by public pressure on police departments to enact the LOPRB's policy recommendations. The LOPRB's outreach will inform the local community of the use of data-collection technologies, potentially generating popular support behind LOPRB recommendations. LOPRBs can thus indirectly enforce their recommendations through utilizing that popular support and pressure on police departments. That indirect pressure on police departments will help reduce potential police department resistance because policy changes brought about through public pressure will be a reaction by the police department to the public at large, rather than directly reacting to the adversarial LOPRB. Thus, while police department resistance likely cannot be completely overcome, LOPRBs can ameliorate this traditional civilian oversight problem.

3. The CRB doesn’t have to work- it creates a deterrent effect
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
3. Individual Deterrence and Systemic Correction. - Finally, civilian oversight has some meaningful deterrence on individual actors while also providing a functioning mechanism to address local systemic issues. n163 Individual police officers are more likely to undertake regulation of their own behavior when the officer knows that they are being watched by an oversight body. n164 External civilian oversight can ensure greater accountability not only among rank-and-file officers, but also among command officers, and can also address systemic issues facing dys-functional departments. n165 Approximately two-thirds of civilian oversight entities undertake policy review in addition to complaint review, n166 allowing civilian oversight bodies to review general policies and advocate for systemic reform. n167 Samuel Walker, a scholar whose work focuses on police accountability, emphasized that successful civilian oversight bodies "take a proactive view of their role and actively seek out the underlying causes of police misconduct or problems in the complaint process." n168 If civilian oversight mechanisms continually provide policy recommendations to police departments, those recommendations as a whole can have a significant effect on police misconduct, while at the same time making the police department more "accustomed to input from outsiders." n169 Civilian oversight thus can have a transformative impact on entire police departments rather than only correcting the actions of a singular officer.

4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61

The net benefit is Tech Shift
A. Absent established, oppositional civilian review police harassment will shift to technology based surveillance which avoids rights protections
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
Technology has provided police departments with powerful tools to collect extensive data on private citizens. Those tools have captured images of every license plate passing through an intersection; n1 used facial-recognition technology to determine whether Super Bowl attendees had criminal records; n2 and implemented multi-technology systems that "aggregate and analyze information from approximately 3,000 surveil-lance cameras around the city ... ." n3 New technologies allow police departments to collect a range of data on the public space, including private citizens not under investigation, raising concerns regarding how that data may be used in the future. n4 And as storage and database capabilities have become cheaper and more efficient, the potential for expansive databases has become not only a science-fiction trope n5 but a reality. n6 *1030 But despite potential, these new tools fit poorly within the current regulatory framework. Police departments have embraced the information age with little guidance or oversight, raising significant privacy concerns regarding the effect of mass-data collection on the privacy rights the general public has enjoyed for centuries. n7 At the same time, current regulatory mechanisms have not adequately addressed how police departments should use cutting-edge surveillance technologies. n8 Such regulatory mechanisms often are inhibited by conflicting motivations n9 or poorly adapted to technological change. n10 Scholars have proposed a variety of solutions to address the privacy and criminal law concerns raised by these "data-collection technologies," but these approaches often provide inadequate flexibility to local jurisdictions to address their unique problems n11 or focus too narrowly on correcting a particular, novel iteration of the problem. n12 *1031 To overcome this regulatory deficit, civilian oversight can provide effective regulatory oversight of police departments' use of new and emerging technologies. Specifically, I argue that a specialized form of civilian oversight, the "Loyal Opposition" Policy Review Board (LOPRB), would function as a regulatory mechanism that not only provides proactive regulatory guidance on technology usage by police departments but would also allow for that guidance to be specifically tailored to the local community. n13 LOPRBs, composed of members who are informed on and invested in technology and civil rights, would undertake policy review of police department procedures for the use of new technologies and recommend "best practices" approaches to ensuring that individual privacy rights and police department investigative needs are effectively balanced. n14 Such a civilian oversight mechanism would ensure that the privacy concerns of the average citizen remain protected as new technologies are incorporated into the daily operations of police departments.
B. Civil rights focus fails- it takes a black and white approach to police conduct that ensures resistance
Schlanger, 15 – Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan (Margo, “Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 6, pg. 112, 2015, Lexis)
I have suggested that rights discourse tends to sweep under the rug the messiness of civil liberties protections--the policy issues that lie at the core of civil liberties interests. That messiness will be apparent in what follows; there are no magic bullets here. But a measure can be useful even if messy or compromised. It is possible that that none of the offices described below will accomplish very much. It seems to me, however, that soft administrative measures are useful tools in the civil liberties toolkit, well worth trying by a principal--whether that principal is the President or the Congress--who wants to give more priority to civil liberties but lacks the institutional capacity to do so directly and repeatedly over time. Each of these three offices might represent civil liberties interests more systematically than current arrangements, and might advocate for more liberty protective government protocols and programs. It is worth emphasizing, too, that measures such as these might have not just cumulative but also mutually reinforcing effects, creating a civil liberties cadre with security clearances, who might assist each other in a variety of ways. n360 In addition to promoting civil liberties/privacy interstitially, offices like these assist other more authoritative rulemakers to understand the civil liberties implications of their choices. For example, they can help Congress in its otherwise very difficult oversight task, flagging issues that need more congressional attention. n361 And in several different ways, they may increase public access to otherwise secret matters, which in turn increases pressure on those authoritative rulemakers: They generate reports--both public and private--which can be used by Congress and the public. n362 And they build relationships with non-governmental organizations that promote increased official disclosure. My argument is not that offices like these are a cure-all  *193  for achieving optimal policy, but that they may be a useful part of a complicated ecology.

TPP DA
TPP is predicted to pass, but there’s no time to waste. Mitchell ‘11/2
Peter Mitchell - AAP US Correspondent, Australian Associated Press. “US: White House bullish on TPP passing.” News.com.au. November 2, 2016. http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/us-white-house-bullish-on-tpp-passing/news-story/66aaccb30c94f3301f95fa652040190f JJN
US President Barack Obama's top Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiator has bullishly predicted the trade deal will be approved by Congress after next week's presidential election if congressional leaders bring it up for a vote. Michael Froman also warned if Congress does not ratify the 12-nation free trade proposal Australia, China and other nations will swoop in and steal markets from the US in the Asia-Pacific. "It's up to the congressional leadership to decide to bring it forward," Mr Froman told CNBC on Tuesday. "If they bring it forward I think we can get the votes there." Presidential frontrunners Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both oppose the TPP and members of Congress, many who are also up for re-election next Tuesday, have been reluctant to show public support for the contentious trade pact. Mr Obama and Mr Froman are hoping the the anti-trade sentiment will recede after the election and members of Congress will be willing to ratify it before Mr Obama moves out of the White House in January. "I think the key thing is the rest of the world isn't standing by whether it is China negotiating its own trade agreements or the EU, Canada or Australia or others, they are going to move ahead and get access to these markets at our expense," Mr Froman said. "Our market share is actually in decline in some of these important, fast growing and large markets so it is awfully important we show leadership." The TPP signatories are: Australia, the US, New Zealand, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru.

TPP is top of Obama’s priorities, PC is key. Creighton ‘10/27
Adam Creighton – economics correspondent Washington. “Hope for TPP as Obama administration works the phones.” The Australian Business Review. October 27, 2016. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/economics/hope-for-tpp-as-obama-administration-works-the-phones/news-story/8ce5e112900eb06ca2bb0711d3aa16ce JJN
The world’s biggest free trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Australian officials have written off as a casualty of a fierce anti-trade backlash in the US, has an almost even chance of success in Congress, according to people familiar with the matter in Washington DC. The Obama administration has been hitting the phones and sending cabinet ministers to remote US towns in an unprecedented bid to persuade Congress to pass the controversial Asia-Pacific trade deal among 12 countries. Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have repudiated the deal. The former top economics adviser to Vice-President Joe Biden, Jared Bernstein, said the chance the TPP would be passed after November 8 but before the new president took office was almost 50 per cent, offering hope for the deal signed by the Turnbull government and 11 other nations in February, which frees up trade and investment across 40 per cent of the world’s GDP. “I think the probability is a lot higher than conventional wisdom on the street; I’d give it a 45 per cent chance,” said Mr Bernstein. He said President Obama would certainly send the deal to Congress whoever won the election. “What’s interesting is just how (hard) the administration is working it … full-court press behind the scenes,” he said. “More than on healthcare, more than on stimulus, more than on financial reform: it’s remarkable,” added Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizens Global Trade Watch. She said cabinet ministers had been traipsing the country trying to convince wavering Congressmen. “They are working the phones to a degree that actually is really interesting; cabinet secretary folks are once or twice a week since April calling House members who they might have any kind of chance with,” she added. “The odds of stopping it are slightly better, but it’s close.” Ambassador Joe Hockey and visiting Turnbull government ministers have been strenuously promoting the TPP in Washington, but confidence that the deal — which is also being sold as a way to entrench US and Australian commercial norms in a region increasingly dominated by China — will pass has dwindled significantly. Consonant with the mix of confected and genuine dissatisfaction with the TPP that permeates Republican and Democrat ranks in Congress, Republican congressman Kevin Brady earlier told The Australian the deal wouldn’t pass without additional protections for intellectual property, which Australia has publicly ruled out. Ms Wallach and Mr Bernstein, now at the Centre for Budget Priorities, by contrast argued the TPP deal had been captured by US corporate interests, and should be renegotiated to pare back the extra patent and intellectual property protections demanded by the US on behalf of its pharmaceutical industry. They also want to see clauses outlawing currency manipulation and removing investor-state dispute clauses that potentially limit governments’ freedom to make policies that damage foreign commercial interests. The TPP would be the first trade agreement to be rejected by Congress. If it doesn’t pass in the “lame duck” session — before the new house, senate and president are in place — it will be very unlikely the US would begin new trade negotiations given the febrile environment. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has made rewriting or rescinding US trade agreements the centrepiece of his economic strategy. “One of the reasons it’s 45 per cent (chance of success) and not 25 per cent is because … the undecideds are getting much more pressure from the administration than from (labour groups),” said Mr Bernstein. “Democrat and Republican elites have literally for decades ignored the costs of trade.”

The plan sparks congressional debate and kills Obama’s PC. Orenstein ‘16
WALKER ORENSTEIN. “Reform advocates upset over pushback over changing malice law.” The News Tribune. July 29, 2016. http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article92684372.html JJN
When an effort by state lawmakers to make prosecuting police for improper use of deadly force easier stalled last year, legislators compromised. They agreed to let a task force study the issue and recommend policy to next year’s Legislature on how to reduce violent interactions involving law enforcement. But some on the state-appointed committee, which had its second meeting Tuesday, say lawmakers overseeing the panel are filibustering even a dialogue about changing controversial state law regulating police use of deadly force. Amending state statute on the subject was a key component of reform-advocates’ demands that spurred the task force. It’s also the subject of a proposed initiative to the Legislature that would amend the law if enacted. Washington’s law is regarded as unique in the country. Convicting an officer for using deadly force requires proof the officer acted with “malice.” It’s a standard many, including the American Civil Liberties Union, have said is more or less impossible to meet, effectively giving police immunity when they use deadly force. Some committee members say changing the law would reduce police use of deadly force, a stated end-goal of the task force. Others on the panel have pushed back, saying changing the statute won’t help that cause. The split could derail what Karen Johnson, chairwoman of the Black Alliance of Thurston County, described as a “golden opportunity” to be a “national model” for discourse between law enforcement and police reform advocates. ‘SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY’ De’Sean Quinn, a member of the state’s African American Commission on the task force, said he wants the group to be “action oriented.” Real action for him might include recommending the state collect data on police use of force to easier analyze how to reduce it, he said. But the key aim, he said, is to reach consensus on how to change Washington’s malice law, particularly in light of the recent police killings of Philando Castile in Minnesota and Alton Sterling in Louisiana. “I feel a sense of responsibility for my kids that we really try and address this issue,” Quinn, who has two sons, said in an interview. Gerald Hankerson, a member of the committee and president of the NAACP of Alaska, Oregon and Washington, said lawmakers and some law enforcement officials on the panel have been hesitant to broach the topic in seriousness. Others on the task force agree. Tuesday’s meeting centered mostly on law enforcement training. Toshiko Hasegawa, appointed to the task force as a member of the state’s Asian American Commission, called out lawmakers during committee session, saying they were avoiding a deeper discussion on changing the law by “hiding behind procedure.” She added in a later phone interview that committee co-chairman Sen. Kirk Pearson, R-Monroe, was deliberately avoiding the topic. “Why is the police task force on deadly force not discussing deadly force?” Hasegawa asked. The task force is required to meet only four times. Johnson, Quinn, Hasegawa and others signed a letter sent to Pearson and co-chairman Rep. Roger Goodman, D-Kirkland, before Tuesday’s meeting, asking for clearer guidelines on discussing the malice statute and more input on meeting agendas. Quinn said he felt work on the statute was being ducked, and said the Legislature is not responding fast enough to outcries for police reform in the country. “It’s not OK to not deal with the difficult issues,” he said. Although the Legislature is not obligated to act on task force recommendations, “consensus with law enforcement” on legal changes “would be significant for the Legislature going forward,” said Sen. David Frockt, D-Seattle. Rather than building consensus, the meetings so far have “almost been like it’s a dog and pony show,” Hankerson said. ‘NOT THE FIRST THING ON MY MIND’ Rep. Dave Hayes, R-Camano Island, is a sergeant with the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office and one of four legislators on the panel. He said the task force should look at all sorts of avenues to reduce violent interactions involving police, and said changing Washington’s malice standard is “definitely not the first thing on my mind.” Added Hayes: “I don’t believe that changing the statute is going to fix anything.” He said he expects the result of the task force to be “a couple bills regarding data collection and how we use that data to make our local law enforcement officers better.” He cautioned the Legislature would have to weigh the cost of those bills to not place a burden on local law enforcement departments. Pearson, who left before the conclusion of Tuesday’s meeting, did not return calls or messages from The News Tribune asking for comment. On Tuesday, he said reviewing past applications of the malice statute is “beyond” what the committee was designed to do. Goodman said at the meeting the task force needs to learn more about perspectives of law enforcement officers, their training, and about data collection, and not just work on the malice statute. “We can’t be sort of rushing to focus on one aspect — one very important aspect and that is perception of flaws in the law — but we need to sit back and continue to listen,” he said during the committee meeting. Sue Rahr, the executive director of the Criminal Justice Training Commission, said at the meeting that prosecuting officers for improper use of deadly force “isn’t enough” to reduce violent encounters with law enforcement. Police officers in Washington train at Rahr’s organization with the exception of the Washington State Patrol. Rahr is on the task force. “If the task force does change the law, that’s only going to solve one piece of the problem,” she said. “The problem is much bigger and much more complex than that.” GOING FORWARD Johnson and others have tried to soothe brewing discontent in the group. She reminded task force members there would be more meetings, and that they can schedule more than four if needed. Goodman promised a more collaborative approach to setting new meeting agendas. A minority report can be filed if task force members don’t agree with the final group report to the Legislature. Frockt said Monday that he was looking at the malice law “very seriously,” and feels “ a deep sense of obligation and gravity surrounding this given what’s happening around the country.” “There are people who are going to be clearly disappointed if we don’t make some changes in some Washington law,” he added. “I hope that this is not the situation where the task force goes through, does a lot of work and nothing really happens with it.” Quinn said he’s still optimistic that thorough work on the malice statute will come. But, he said, “there needs to be a demonstration that we need to address these issues.”

TPP Solves multiple extinction scenarios. Morimoto ‘15
Andy Morimoto is a research associate at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “The Strategic Costs of TPP Failure.” The Diplomat. August 22, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-strategic-costs-of-tpp-failure/ JJN
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is in trouble. Trade ministers failed last month to conclude the massive 12-nation trade deal by their hoped-for summer deadline, putting negotiations in danger of collapse. This is a problem. Trade advocates argue that letting the TPP die would be a significant lost opportunity for the global economy. But there’s a potentially bigger problem here – one that may have serious consequences for both U.S. national security and regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. Just consider the strategic backdrop against which last month’s negotiations occurred. Maritime disputes flaring across the South China Sea. Tensions rising between Beijing and Tokyo. Perennial friction between China and Taiwan and a growing nuclear stockpile in North Korea. If the TPP falls through, it could greatly hurt the America’s ability to stabilize the fraught geopolitics of Asia. Some have argued that a TPP failure would be a net positive for regional stability. The deal, they claim, would isolate and provoke China, and should therefore be abandoned. But this view is blinkered. Given the high trade volumes and trade arrangements across the Asia-pacific, China stands very little chance of being isolated. Moreover, Chinese officials have other ventures on their minds. According to He Weiwen, a former Chinese Commerce Ministry official, “the Chinese are more or less neutral because we have our own agenda, pushing forward ASEAN plus six and the Silk Road.” In fact, there are a number of reasons to believe that the opposite is true: that a TPP failure will cause a number of strategic problems for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. First, failure would mean stunting the growth of America’s Pacific partners. This is problematic for two reasons. Most importantly, fewer states would be devoting fewer resources to meet shared challenges like counterterrorism and climate change. In addition, as countries get richer and more interdependent, they become more invested in the well-being of their neighbors. And while free trade, interdependence, and prosperity do not guarantee stability and peace (see: World War I), they do create conditions that make conflict less appealing. Second, failure would create more potential for instability and crises. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which China and one of its neighbors along the South China Sea (say, Vietnam) get into a serious spat over territorial claims. With the TPP, this spat would be less likely to escalate into a full-blown crisis, as China understands that the U.S. is more inclined to intervene in situations that threaten its growing trade interests. Without the TPP, there is less clarity about U.S. resolve, so the potential for miscalculation and escalation increases. Third, failure would send a strong signal that the U.S. no longer has the political will to lead in the region. This would come at a time when allies are already uncertain of U.S. commitments. Earlier this week, for example, Japan’s trade minister expressed disappointment in last month’s trade meetings, saying “every TPP country wondered why the U.S. was quick to give up the conclusion without its usual relentless persistence.” If the U.S. allows negotiations to collapse, it would demonstrate the Obama administration’s declaration – that the U.S. is “all in, when it comes to the Asia-Pacific” – to be hollow. This has important geopolitical implications. If Asia’s great powers perceive the U.S. to be unserious about its role in the region, this will increase the incentive for the powerful regional states (i.e. China and Japan) to jockey with one another for regional hegemony. Finally, failure would be a missed opportunity for the U.S. economy – and America’s ability to project strength abroad rests on its economic foundation at home. According to an analysis from the Peterson Institute, U.S. income gains under the TPP would be significant, potentially adding $59 billion per year by 2020. Failing to conclude the TPP would forego these potential gains, and would make it more difficult for the U.S. to stem the defense cuts put in place by the sequester and invest in our military presence in the Asia-Pacific. The Nobel Prize winning economist Thomas Schelling noted that “trade is what most of international relations are about. For that reason trade policy is national security policy.” Today, U.S. trade policy – and indeed, its national security policy – are in danger of falling apart. Getting something as big and complicated as the TPP across the line won’t be easy. But given the smoldering flashpoints across Asia, the U.S. can hardly afford to squander any tools in its foreign policy toolkit. The stakes are too high.

Regional hegemony is key to stop nuke war.  Rudd 11

Rudd 11 – Kevin Rudd, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “The Case for American Engagement in Asia: The Australian Perspective”, 9-15, http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2011/kr_sp_110915.aspx?ministerid=2

THE GEO-STRATEGIC RAMIFICATIONS  But as nations change, so too do relations between nations.  The emergence of new powers inevitably brings new strategic complexity, as the power relativities of the 20th century give way to the new ones.  Asia will be vulnerable to a host of strategic uncertainties, arising from the need for new powers to integrate into the global economic and political order, and for the established powers to accommodate them.  The potential for misunderstanding — and the consequences of miscalculation — is also vast.  Tensions like those we see in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the Persian Gulf may become even more difficult to manage.  Make no mistake: these aren’t just regional problems.  Questions about the future of the South China Sea touch on every regional country’s future, given their global strategic and economic significance.  This theme isn't new, but what I can tell you about this strategic shift is that we — Australia and the United States — will face it as allies.  Sure, there is the possibility of instability in our region.  But we've faced the possibility of conflict — and actual conflict — together in the past.  Many different tests, circumstances and challenges have put the acid to our alliance since the ANZUS treaty was signed, 60 years ago.  We've been reminded again that the only time the ANZUS treaty has been formally invoked was ten years ago this week — in response to the attacks on September 11.  But military and intelligence cooperation with the US continues across a wide range of theatres within the framework of the Alliance.  Here in San Francisco — where the ANZUS treaty was signed, all those years ago — I'm reminded that Australian and American servicemen and women have fought, flown, sailed and — I'm reliably informed — surfed together since the Pacific War.  Today, that Alliance continues to grow in meaning and intensity.  We are fighting together in Afghanistan; working together against global threats like piracy; and responding together to natural disasters across the region.  For us, for our relationship, the end of the Cold War hasn’t meant a downgrading of the importance of our Alliance — if anything, it’s become more intense and more important.  So as we face the challenges of the 21st Century — the challenges of the shift of power to Asia — we will do so together.  We’re working together to ensure our forces are aligned in the right way to provide for the national security of our two countries, and to help us shape the emerging regional environment.  Our forces have to be able to respond to the range of contingencies that can arise in our region, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  Increasingly, we aren’t just working with each other, but with other regional players.  I'm not just talking about the Pacific, or the Asia-Pacific.  The critical region for our future now extends to include the Indian Ocean as well.  The growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean starts with India's rise.  India is the largest democracy in the world.  Forecast to be the third largest economy in the world in coming decades, it is in the interest of both the United States and Australia for India to play the role of a major international power.  For now, India’s focus remains South Asia.  But its strategic weight is increasing with its increasing economic size and strength.  India is increasingly looking east with interest, both for strategic and economic reasons, and because of long-standing cultural connections.  But the importance of the Indian Ocean also lies in its unique role in maritime security and sea lines of communication for a much larger group of economies, both in Europe and Asia.  Lying between the Middle East energy sources and the dynamic global engine room of Asia, its importance grows with each passing year.  The pressures on the Gulf and West Indian Ocean choke points will intensify, as India grows and East Asian centres of growth remain reliant on Gulf energy and African resources.  In the 21st Century, questions of resource, energy and food security are becoming more vital than ever.  As Robert Kaplan says, the Indian Ocean is once again at the heart of the world, as it was in ancient and medieval times.  THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES  The United States has been a guarantor of security and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific for decades.   But the 21st Century will demand more.  As the world changes, it's even more critical that the US builds its engagement with our region.  As the United States transitions back from tough and unforgiving wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it might seem tempting to resist the case for further international engagement.  President Obama has already rightly intensified US involvement with East Asia.  It remains the case, in one way or another, that the United States is vital in solving common problems collectively.  No other power is able or willing to support essential global public goods — like the free movement of trade, capital and people around the world.  Sea-lane security, regional security in critical regions like the Gulf, open markets, the reserve currency, deep and liquid capital markets — who else provides these global public goods?  America has faced these questions before.  On the eve of entry into World War II, Henry Luce's seminal editorial in Life magazine on the American Century was much more than a statement about relative power, as America assumed its position in the new order.  It was a call for American leadership in international affairs.  It is in America’s interest and the world’s interest to provide that leadership — because in its absence, the risks grow that we will see destabilisation that threatens us all.  The interdependence of our economies has been shown clearly by the financial crisis, and a collapse in the conditions for open trade would be an economic disaster for all trading nations.  I share President Obama's view that America can neither retreat from "responsibility as an anchor of global security" nor "confront... every evil that can be found abroad".  But President Obama talked of the need for a "more centered course" — and that lies in a deep US engagement in Asia.  I believe the vast majority of the countries of Asia welcome that continued and expanded American strategic role in our hemisphere.  As Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono said in November 2008, as the financial crisis was wreaking havoc upon us, “none of these global challenges can be addressed by the world community without having America onboard. And conversely, none of these issues can be resolved by the United States alone.”  And as Lee Kuan Yew said a year later, “the consensus in ASEAN is that the US remains irreplaceable in East Asia.”  In the 21st Century, the US needs substantial, sophisticated, nimble engagement in the region.  

AC

Adv 1: so many alt causes to US human rights cred: Drone strikes, gitmo, torture, etc.

Adv 2: Tech shift n/b to CP solves. The CP leads to less surveillance by cops and protects privacy more.

New reports and the shiftiness of the government prove the aff does nothing.
--newest reports prove
--NSA had said they ended domestic email collection, but continued doing it under foreign email collection programs
--it’s part of an endless shell-game
--the NSA will create it secretly and we won’t learn about it until later
Peterson 11/20/15 --- covers technology for the Washington Post (Andrea, “Why it’s so hard to keep up with how the U.S. government is spying on its own people”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/11/20/why-its-so-hard-to-keep-up-with-how-the-u-s-government-is-spying-on-its-own-people/)//trepka
Since 2013, Americans have gained immense insight about how the government conducts digital spying programs, largely thanks to the revelations made by former security contractor Edward Snowden. But a new report shows it's really hard to keep track of all the ways the United States is snooping on its own people. After Snowden revealed the National Security Agency was collecting data en masse about American e-mails, the government said it had ended that particular program in 2011. But it turns out that didn't really stop the NSA from being able to suck data about Americans' e-mails: Instead, the government was able to replace the key functions of that program by relying on legal methods designed to collect information about foreigners, according to a NSA Inspector General report obtained by the New York Times via a Freedom of Information Act suit. And because those methods focused on overseas collection, or collection aimed at non-U.S. citizens, they largely had less oversight than the now-defunct domestic e-mail records program. "This is yet another trick move in the never-ending shell game that the NSA is playing with the American people, and apparently with the secret court whose oversight it is trying to evade," said Kevin Bankston, the director of New America's Open Technology Institute. "New rule: if the NSA claims that a particular surveillance program has ended, or that a particular type of surveillance has halted 'under this program,' assume that it is still going on in another program." There is a reason for all the secrecy: The government argues it has a vested interest in keeping capabilities secret so that terrorists and other targets aren't able to figure out how to evade surveillance. That's one of the reasons some intelligence officials were quick to blame Snowden in the wake of the recent Paris attacks, arguing his revelations may have given terrorists a road map for how evade detection. "Iin the past several years because of a number of unauthorized disclosures and a lot of handwringing over the government’s role in the effort to try to uncover these terrorists, there have been some policy and legal and other actions that are taken that make our ability collectively internationally to find these terrorists much more challenging," CIA Director John Brennan said Monday at a Washington conference. But no evidence has yet emerged that the attacks were coordinated using tools that protected communications through encryption, a security tool Snowden often recommends to everyday users looking to ensure their digital privacy. In fact, the information available so far suggests that the attackers sent an unencrypted text to coordinate the launch of the attack, and several of them had been known to Belgian investigators. The lack of transparency and public awareness of how Americans' data was being collected is also one of the reasons Snowden said he was compelled to come forward with information about government spying. “My sole motive is to inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them,” he wrote in a note that accompanied the first document he leaked to The Washington Post. But big disclosures such as Snowden's come along rarely. And now we're seeing that reporting on these programs is like a sort of like playing whack-a-mole: Even if one program appears to have ended, others spring up in their place -- and the general public often doesn't learn about them until years after they've taken effect.

The aff’s circumvented by states and contracting --- all that is net worse
Goldfarb et al 15 --- Legal Scholar (Ronald, also with David Cole, Edward Wasserman, Tom Blanton, Hodding Carter, Jon Mills, Barry Siegel, “After Snowden: Privacy, Secrecy, and Security in the Information Age”, Google Books)trepka
Another former intelligence official suggested that as a practical matter, the controversial programs Snowden disclosed may be curtailed for economic reasons, especially if their utility is of dubious value.  Further, he speculates, there may be worse incursions of privacy by local and state police officials whose gathering and collating of their terrorism surveillance are likely to be available to federal intelligence agencies.  Still another expert suggested that one of the problems with the post-9/11 national security process is that the NSA hired many contractors to do what its employees did in the past. 

Those contractors are not federal entities which means the plan text and durable fiat don’t solve the total lack of liability
Lumb 15 --- Partner at Corboy and Demetrio (Kenneth, “Federal Tort Pitfall”, http://www.corboydemetrio.com/media/publication/77_Trial_2015_05May_Lumb_Federal20tort20pitfalls_reprint.pdf)//trepka
The United States contracts with a wide range of people and entities to provide services to the government and citizens. With the exception of relationships created by a “personal services” contract, contractors are not italics in original federal employees, and the United States is not vicariously liable for their negligence.

Tournament: Damus | Round: 5 | Opponent: Brentwood EL | Judge: Dan Miyamoto
1NC CP
Governments responsible for police officers should implement the Coalition Against Police Abuse proposal for civilian review which includes-
-establish “Loyal Opposition Policy Review Boards” for civilian oversight of police conduct, policy, and hiring/firing decisions
-The boards should be: elected, paid, and independent of police agencies
-The boards should have special investigators with unrestricted access to crime scenes and the power to subpoena police department personnel and records
-The board should have authority over all claims of police misconduct including: assault, discrimination, infiltration of community groups, sexual harassment, false arrest, and misuse of force. The board should be able to mandate training or discipline for officers up to and including firing, protections for police whistleblowers, and mandate of municipal damages
-Special city prosecutors should be appointed independent of the city attorney’s office and the city council who handle all criminal cases against police officers and have full subpoena powers
-staff should be hired on the basis of affirmative action policies
- Governments responsible for police officers should enact statutes requiring them to respond to claims of IPV, and establish that the officers are liable for failing to respond. 

We have a solvency advocate available on spot from Hill 15 – I can show in CX or prep

This is what their AC Bishop author advocates as the best solution 

Gary M. Bishop, Section 1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction, 30 B.C.L. Rev. 1357 (1989), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol30/iss5/3
In the absence of such statutes, battered survivors women must seek other means by which to impose liability upon passive police officers. Overzealous police officers may be held liable under section 1983 when they use more force than necessary to place a person in custody, but courts are somewhat more reluctant to impose liability upon police officers who fail to act. 17Drawing upon the general principle that a state actor may violate section 1983 by failing to lend aid to an individual who is in need, courts have begun to recognize that police must assist battered women and must be held accountable for their failure to do so if certain conditions are pres- ent.' 9Some courts have used equal protection analysis as a means to impose liability upon passive police officers. 2° That is, if a com- parison between police response to domestic violence calls and po- lice response to general assault calls reveals that police officers treat domestic violence calls less seriously, the evidence may be sufficient to constitute an equal protection violation. 21Police officers may also be held liable for failure to aid battered women if a special rela- tionship exists between the officer and the victim. 22In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to define clearly the conditions necessary to establish such a special relationship in recognizing a section 1983 claim against police offi- cers who failed to lend assistance to a victim of domestic violence in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department." The 1989 United States Supreme Court case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services seriously undercuts the Balistreri court's efforts, and those of other courts, to provide battered women with a remedy against passive police officers. 24 Prior to DeShaney, courts had imposed a duty to act upon police officers based on the officers' authority to enforce the law, 25 on statutorily prescribed duties, 26 and on the theory of a "special relationship"27 between the victim and the police officer. DeShaney substantially narrowed the circumstances under which a special relationship may arise, 28 thus forcing lower courts to rely upon alternate legal doctrines to aid battered women. This note examines the avenues that are still open to battered women who sue passive police officers, including the limited special relationship concept. Section 1 surveys the various theories that courts have applied to determine when police officers have a duty to act.29 Section II explores the way that courts have utilized the duty-to-act theories in evaluating section 1983 claims of battered women against police officers." Section III analyzes the law regarding battered women and offers some recommendations to these women who bring section 1983 claims against passive police officers. 31 Section IV concludes that the enactment of statutes imposing liability on police officers who fail to take the proper action to protect battered women is the most effective solution to the problem. I. FAILURE TO ACT UNDER SECTION 1983 The language of section 1983 seems to require that a state actor undertake some affirmative act before he or she falls within the statute's purview. 32 Therefore, the threshold question in this area is whether a police officer's failure to act comes within the reach of words such as "cause" or "subject," which both imply positive action. There are a variety of theories under which section 1983 liability has been held to apply to police officers' failure to act. Under the law enforcement theory, a police officer who ignores the duty imposed upon him by his office and fails to aid someone who is within the officer's reach may be held liable under section 1983." The courts have also relied upon statutes that impose upon police officers a duty to act under certain conditions. 34 Finally, the courts have developed the special realtionship concept, und er which police have a duty to act under narrow circumstances." The failure-to-act doctrine is one that the courts began to developed outside of the survivors battered  women context. In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Azar v. Conley that section 1983 is applicable to acts of omission as well as com- mission." Thus, an officer's failure to take steps to aid an individual—an omission—may be actionable under section 1983, just as an officer's actions (i.e., police brutality)—commission—may be deemed actionable. " In Azar, Mr. Conley and his friends and relatives harassed and intimidated Mr. Azar and the other members of his family." The Akron police took no action to assist the Azars. Mr. Conley was a police officer, and the plaintiffs alleged that the members of the force did not want to say anything about possible wrongdoing by a fellow officer. 

CRBs are a legitimate alternative to immunity reform- their decisions affect the ‘clearly established’ doctrine which solves the case without judicial change
Meltzer, JD, 14
(Ryan E., Texas LR 92: 1277 Qualified Immunity and Constitutional-Norm Generation in the Post-Saucier Era: “Clearly Establishing” the Law Through Civilian Oversight of Police)
In the course of investigating discrete incidents of alleged police misconduct, civilian external investigatory bodies engage in fact-finding and identification and application of governing legal standards in much the same way as a court assesses a motion to suppress evidence or a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights.31 More importantly, these bodies constantly encounter novel factual scenarios, particularly ones implicating the Fourth Amendment,32 such that their findings epitomize the sort of fact-specific guidance endorsed by the Court.33 Further, to the extent that they are empowered to make policy recommendations to the police departments they oversee, civilian external investigatory bodies also resemble compliance agencies like the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), whose advisory reports have helped to provide the sort of “notice” required to overcome an official’s qualified immunity.34 Consequently, the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears to permit the findings of such bodies to contribute to the clearly-established-law analysis. At present, however, the work of civilian external investigatory bodies—work that produces a wealth of valuable information and often confronts constitutional questions that might otherwise escape formal adjudication— is largely divorced from that of the courts.35 This state of affairs represents a costly missed opportunity, especially in the wake of Pearson. (1281-2)

The CP Solves the Case 

1. Only EXTERNAL, CIVILIAN oversight can alter police behavior- the aff’s internal legal reform drives police misconduct underground- it’s a trap
   Akbar, 15 – Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University (Amna, “National Security’s Broken Windows”, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 62, pg. 834, May 2015, Lexis)
   This Article has attempted to identify the problems with community engagement and counterradicalization in the national security context, drawing from the critiques of community policing and broken windows in the ordinary criminal context. The canvas for this critical engagement was limited insofar as *906 Muslim communities' experiences in these programs have been largely sheltered from public view. Harvesting those experiences is no doubt essential to understanding the possibilities and limitations of these programs. This Article provided a sketch of the problems lurking near the surface - that is left to future work. Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization. Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability, meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched. The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities, as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized? For community policing to be an effective tool in changing the relationship between the marginalized and law enforcement, marginalized communities cannot simply be offered a seat at the table to participate in preconceived policing *907 programs. They must have the political power to hold police accountable. For community policing mechanisms to offer potential for real change to marginalized communities, communities must build capacity and political power to demand accountability. So while we might advocate for law enforcement to engage marginalized communities, we cannot rely on law enforcement initiatives to recalibrate relationships long rife with deep inequality. The pressure for meaningful change must come from outside, from the communities themselves organizing for change. n325
   2. The aff attempts to improve regulation of INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. The CP changes police culture as a whole. This reduces police opposition and rights violations
   Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
   First, even a highly effective LOPRB providing quality policy recommendations to a police department would likely encounter some department resistance to the civilian oversight. This resistance may be created because of police department views of a civilian entity "meddling" or just the potential perception of an adversarial relationship between the *1058 LOPRB and police department. n207 However, the structure of LOPRBs help overcome most of this resistance traditionally leveled against civilian oversight from police departments. The emphasis on policy review, rather than complaint review, means that LOPRBs will not directly regulate individual police officers but rather the department as a whole. This change in focus will likely reduce the intensity of any police department resistance because the potential adversarial relationship will be between the LOPRB and the police department instead of individual officers. n208 Furthermore, any resistance can be ameliorated by public pressure on police departments to enact the LOPRB's policy recommendations. The LOPRB's outreach will inform the local community of the use of data-collection technologies, potentially generating popular support behind LOPRB recommendations. LOPRBs can thus indirectly enforce their recommendations through utilizing that popular support and pressure on police departments. That indirect pressure on police departments will help reduce potential police department resistance because policy changes brought about through public pressure will be a reaction by the police department to the public at large, rather than directly reacting to the adversarial LOPRB. Thus, while police department resistance likely cannot be completely overcome, LOPRBs can ameliorate this traditional civilian oversight problem.

4. Civilian review is mutually exclusive and more efficient than court action
Weinbeck, 11 – JD Candidate William Mitchell College of Law (Michael P, “Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement from America's Cities,” William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, pg. 1306)
A police department's internal affairs unit, operating on its own, lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is satisfactory to the community. n50 Minneapolis city council members, in an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own political futures, established the city's review authority. n51 In theory, at least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure that the investigation is conducted without bias. n52 This, in turn, generally supports a perception by the community that its police department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights. n53 As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the *1315 community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and prevention. n54 There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political coverage that the city's elected officials receive when establishing the agency. n55 For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the wrong house in a drug raid. n56 During the course of the botched raid, the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. n57 In another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a Minneapolis hotel. n58 In response to both incidents, outraged community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized demonstrations. n59 Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen oversight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money. n60 Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the investigation. n61

The net benefit is Tech Shift
A. Absent established, oppositional civilian review police harassment will shift to technology based surveillance which avoids rights protections
Seybold, 15 – JD Candidate (Steven D, “Somebody's Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies,” March 2015, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pg. 1029)
Technology has provided police departments with powerful tools to collect extensive data on private citizens. Those tools have captured images of every license plate passing through an intersection; n1 used facial-recognition technology to determine whether Super Bowl attendees had criminal records; n2 and implemented multi-technology systems that "aggregate and analyze information from approximately 3,000 surveil-lance cameras around the city ... ." n3 New technologies allow police departments to collect a range of data on the public space, including private citizens not under investigation, raising concerns regarding how that data may be used in the future. n4 And as storage and database capabilities have become cheaper and more efficient, the potential for expansive databases has become not only a science-fiction trope n5 but a reality. n6 *1030 But despite potential, these new tools fit poorly within the current regulatory framework. Police departments have embraced the information age with little guidance or oversight, raising significant privacy concerns regarding the effect of mass-data collection on the privacy rights the general public has enjoyed for centuries. n7 At the same time, current regulatory mechanisms have not adequately addressed how police departments should use cutting-edge surveillance technologies. n8 Such regulatory mechanisms often are inhibited by conflicting motivations n9 or poorly adapted to technological change. n10 Scholars have proposed a variety of solutions to address the privacy and criminal law concerns raised by these "data-collection technologies," but these approaches often provide inadequate flexibility to local jurisdictions to address their unique problems n11 or focus too narrowly on correcting a particular, novel iteration of the problem. n12 *1031 To overcome this regulatory deficit, civilian oversight can provide effective regulatory oversight of police departments' use of new and emerging technologies. Specifically, I argue that a specialized form of civilian oversight, the "Loyal Opposition" Policy Review Board (LOPRB), would function as a regulatory mechanism that not only provides proactive regulatory guidance on technology usage by police departments but would also allow for that guidance to be specifically tailored to the local community. n13 LOPRBs, composed of members who are informed on and invested in technology and civil rights, would undertake policy review of police department procedures for the use of new technologies and recommend "best practices" approaches to ensuring that individual privacy rights and police department investigative needs are effectively balanced. n14 Such a civilian oversight mechanism would ensure that the privacy concerns of the average citizen remain protected as new technologies are incorporated into the daily operations of police departments.
B. Civil rights focus fails- it takes a black and white approach to police conduct that ensures resistance
Schlanger, 15 – Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan (Margo, “Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 6, pg. 112, 2015, Lexis)
I have suggested that rights discourse tends to sweep under the rug the messiness of civil liberties protections--the policy issues that lie at the core of civil liberties interests. That messiness will be apparent in what follows; there are no magic bullets here. But a measure can be useful even if messy or compromised. It is possible that that none of the offices described below will accomplish very much. It seems to me, however, that soft administrative measures are useful tools in the civil liberties toolkit, well worth trying by a principal--whether that principal is the President or the Congress--who wants to give more priority to civil liberties but lacks the institutional capacity to do so directly and repeatedly over time. Each of these three offices might represent civil liberties interests more systematically than current arrangements, and might advocate for more liberty protective government protocols and programs. It is worth emphasizing, too, that measures such as these might have not just cumulative but also mutually reinforcing effects, creating a civil liberties cadre with security clearances, who might assist each other in a variety of ways. n360 In addition to promoting civil liberties/privacy interstitially, offices like these assist other more authoritative rulemakers to understand the civil liberties implications of their choices. For example, they can help Congress in its otherwise very difficult oversight task, flagging issues that need more congressional attention. n361 And in several different ways, they may increase public access to otherwise secret matters, which in turn increases pressure on those authoritative rulemakers: They generate reports--both public and private--which can be used by Congress and the public. n362 And they build relationships with non-governmental organizations that promote increased official disclosure. My argument is not that offices like these are a cure-all  *193  for achieving optimal policy, but that they may be a useful part of a complicated ecology.

TPP
TPP is predicted to pass, but there’s no time to waste. Mitchell ‘11/2
Peter Mitchell - AAP US Correspondent, Australian Associated Press. “US: White House bullish on TPP passing.” News.com.au. November 2, 2016. http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/us-white-house-bullish-on-tpp-passing/news-story/66aaccb30c94f3301f95fa652040190f JJN
US President Barack Obama's top Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiator has bullishly predicted the trade deal will be approved by Congress after next week's presidential election if congressional leaders bring it up for a vote. Michael Froman also warned if Congress does not ratify the 12-nation free trade proposal Australia, China and other nations will swoop in and steal markets from the US in the Asia-Pacific. "It's up to the congressional leadership to decide to bring it forward," Mr Froman told CNBC on Tuesday. "If they bring it forward I think we can get the votes there." Presidential frontrunners Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both oppose the TPP and members of Congress, many who are also up for re-election next Tuesday, have been reluctant to show public support for the contentious trade pact. Mr Obama and Mr Froman are hoping the the anti-trade sentiment will recede after the election and members of Congress will be willing to ratify it before Mr Obama moves out of the White House in January. "I think the key thing is the rest of the world isn't standing by whether it is China negotiating its own trade agreements or the EU, Canada or Australia or others, they are going to move ahead and get access to these markets at our expense," Mr Froman said. "Our market share is actually in decline in some of these important, fast growing and large markets so it is awfully important we show leadership." The TPP signatories are: Australia, the US, New Zealand, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru.

TPP is top of Obama’s priorities, PC is key. Creighton ‘10/27
Adam Creighton – economics correspondent Washington. “Hope for TPP as Obama administration works the phones.” The Australian Business Review. October 27, 2016. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/economics/hope-for-tpp-as-obama-administration-works-the-phones/news-story/8ce5e112900eb06ca2bb0711d3aa16ce JJN
The world’s biggest free trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Australian officials have written off as a casualty of a fierce anti-trade backlash in the US, has an almost even chance of success in Congress, according to people familiar with the matter in Washington DC. The Obama administration has been hitting the phones and sending cabinet ministers to remote US towns in an unprecedented bid to persuade Congress to pass the controversial Asia-Pacific trade deal among 12 countries. Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have repudiated the deal. The former top economics adviser to Vice-President Joe Biden, Jared Bernstein, said the chance the TPP would be passed after November 8 but before the new president took office was almost 50 per cent, offering hope for the deal signed by the Turnbull government and 11 other nations in February, which frees up trade and investment across 40 per cent of the world’s GDP. “I think the probability is a lot higher than conventional wisdom on the street; I’d give it a 45 per cent chance,” said Mr Bernstein. He said President Obama would certainly send the deal to Congress whoever won the election. “What’s interesting is just how (hard) the administration is working it … full-court press behind the scenes,” he said. “More than on healthcare, more than on stimulus, more than on financial reform: it’s remarkable,” added Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizens Global Trade Watch. She said cabinet ministers had been traipsing the country trying to convince wavering Congressmen. “They are working the phones to a degree that actually is really interesting; cabinet secretary folks are once or twice a week since April calling House members who they might have any kind of chance with,” she added. “The odds of stopping it are slightly better, but it’s close.” Ambassador Joe Hockey and visiting Turnbull government ministers have been strenuously promoting the TPP in Washington, but confidence that the deal — which is also being sold as a way to entrench US and Australian commercial norms in a region increasingly dominated by China — will pass has dwindled significantly. Consonant with the mix of confected and genuine dissatisfaction with the TPP that permeates Republican and Democrat ranks in Congress, Republican congressman Kevin Brady earlier told The Australian the deal wouldn’t pass without additional protections for intellectual property, which Australia has publicly ruled out. Ms Wallach and Mr Bernstein, now at the Centre for Budget Priorities, by contrast argued the TPP deal had been captured by US corporate interests, and should be renegotiated to pare back the extra patent and intellectual property protections demanded by the US on behalf of its pharmaceutical industry. They also want to see clauses outlawing currency manipulation and removing investor-state dispute clauses that potentially limit governments’ freedom to make policies that damage foreign commercial interests. The TPP would be the first trade agreement to be rejected by Congress. If it doesn’t pass in the “lame duck” session — before the new house, senate and president are in place — it will be very unlikely the US would begin new trade negotiations given the febrile environment. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has made rewriting or rescinding US trade agreements the centrepiece of his economic strategy. “One of the reasons it’s 45 per cent (chance of success) and not 25 per cent is because … the undecideds are getting much more pressure from the administration than from (labour groups),” said Mr Bernstein. “Democrat and Republican elites have literally for decades ignored the costs of trade.”
The plan sparks congressional debate. Orenstein ‘16
WALKER ORENSTEIN. “Reform advocates upset over pushback over changing malice law.” The News Tribune. July 29, 2016. http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article92684372.html JJN
When an effort by state lawmakers to make prosecuting police for improper use of deadly force easier stalled last year, legislators compromised. They agreed to let a task force study the issue and recommend policy to next year’s Legislature on how to reduce violent interactions involving law enforcement. But some on the state-appointed committee, which had its second meeting Tuesday, say lawmakers overseeing the panel are filibustering even a dialogue about changing controversial state law regulating police use of deadly force. Amending state statute on the subject was a key component of reform-advocates’ demands that spurred the task force. It’s also the subject of a proposed initiative to the Legislature that would amend the law if enacted. Washington’s law is regarded as unique in the country. Convicting an officer for using deadly force requires proof the officer acted with “malice.” It’s a standard many, including the American Civil Liberties Union, have said is more or less impossible to meet, effectively giving police immunity when they use deadly force. Some committee members say changing the law would reduce police use of deadly force, a stated end-goal of the task force. Others on the panel have pushed back, saying changing the statute won’t help that cause. The split could derail what Karen Johnson, chairwoman of the Black Alliance of Thurston County, described as a “golden opportunity” to be a “national model” for discourse between law enforcement and police reform advocates. ‘SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY’ De’Sean Quinn, a member of the state’s African American Commission on the task force, said he wants the group to be “action oriented.” Real action for him might include recommending the state collect data on police use of force to easier analyze how to reduce it, he said. But the key aim, he said, is to reach consensus on how to change Washington’s malice law, particularly in light of the recent police killings of Philando Castile in Minnesota and Alton Sterling in Louisiana. “I feel a sense of responsibility for my kids that we really try and address this issue,” Quinn, who has two sons, said in an interview. Gerald Hankerson, a member of the committee and president of the NAACP of Alaska, Oregon and Washington, said lawmakers and some law enforcement officials on the panel have been hesitant to broach the topic in seriousness. Others on the task force agree. Tuesday’s meeting centered mostly on law enforcement training. Toshiko Hasegawa, appointed to the task force as a member of the state’s Asian American Commission, called out lawmakers during committee session, saying they were avoiding a deeper discussion on changing the law by “hiding behind procedure.” She added in a later phone interview that committee co-chairman Sen. Kirk Pearson, R-Monroe, was deliberately avoiding the topic. “Why is the police task force on deadly force not discussing deadly force?” Hasegawa asked. The task force is required to meet only four times. Johnson, Quinn, Hasegawa and others signed a letter sent to Pearson and co-chairman Rep. Roger Goodman, D-Kirkland, before Tuesday’s meeting, asking for clearer guidelines on discussing the malice statute and more input on meeting agendas. Quinn said he felt work on the statute was being ducked, and said the Legislature is not responding fast enough to outcries for police reform in the country. “It’s not OK to not deal with the difficult issues,” he said. Although the Legislature is not obligated to act on task force recommendations, “consensus with law enforcement” on legal changes “would be significant for the Legislature going forward,” said Sen. David Frockt, D-Seattle. Rather than building consensus, the meetings so far have “almost been like it’s a dog and pony show,” Hankerson said. ‘NOT THE FIRST THING ON MY MIND’ Rep. Dave Hayes, R-Camano Island, is a sergeant with the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office and one of four legislators on the panel. He said the task force should look at all sorts of avenues to reduce violent interactions involving police, and said changing Washington’s malice standard is “definitely not the first thing on my mind.” Added Hayes: “I don’t believe that changing the statute is going to fix anything.” He said he expects the result of the task force to be “a couple bills regarding data collection and how we use that data to make our local law enforcement officers better.” He cautioned the Legislature would have to weigh the cost of those bills to not place a burden on local law enforcement departments. Pearson, who left before the conclusion of Tuesday’s meeting, did not return calls or messages from The News Tribune asking for comment. On Tuesday, he said reviewing past applications of the malice statute is “beyond” what the committee was designed to do. Goodman said at the meeting the task force needs to learn more about perspectives of law enforcement officers, their training, and about data collection, and not just work on the malice statute. “We can’t be sort of rushing to focus on one aspect — one very important aspect and that is perception of flaws in the law — but we need to sit back and continue to listen,” he said during the committee meeting. Sue Rahr, the executive director of the Criminal Justice Training Commission, said at the meeting that prosecuting officers for improper use of deadly force “isn’t enough” to reduce violent encounters with law enforcement. Police officers in Washington train at Rahr’s organization with the exception of the Washington State Patrol. Rahr is on the task force. “If the task force does change the law, that’s only going to solve one piece of the problem,” she said. “The problem is much bigger and much more complex than that.” GOING FORWARD Johnson and others have tried to soothe brewing discontent in the group. She reminded task force members there would be more meetings, and that they can schedule more than four if needed. Goodman promised a more collaborative approach to setting new meeting agendas. A minority report can be filed if task force members don’t agree with the final group report to the Legislature. Frockt said Monday that he was looking at the malice law “very seriously,” and feels “ a deep sense of obligation and gravity surrounding this given what’s happening around the country.” “There are people who are going to be clearly disappointed if we don’t make some changes in some Washington law,” he added. “I hope that this is not the situation where the task force goes through, does a lot of work and nothing really happens with it.” Quinn said he’s still optimistic that thorough work on the malice statute will come. But, he said, “there needs to be a demonstration that we need to address these issues.”

Plan kills Obama’s agenda
KRINER 10 Assistant professor of political science at Boston University Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, page 276-77
One of the mechanisms by which congressional opposition influences presidential cost-benefit calculations is by sending signals of American disunity to the target state. Measuring the effects of such congressional signals on the calculations of the target state is always difficult. In the case of Iraq it is exceedingly so, given the lack of data on the non-state insurgent actors who were the true “target” of the American occupation after the fall of the Hussein regime. Similarly, in the absence of archival documents, such as those from the Reagan Presidential Library presented in chapter 5, it is all but impossible to measure the effects of congressional signals on the administration’s perceptions of the military costs it would have to pay to achieve its objectives militarily. By contrast. measuring the domestic political costs of congressional opposition, while still difficult, is at least a tractable endeavor. Chapter 2 posited two primary pathways through which congressional opposition could raise the political costs of staying the course militarily for the president. First. high-profile congressional challenges to a use of force can affect real or anticipated public opinion and bring popular pressures to bear on the president to change course. Second, congressional opposition to the president’s conduct of military affairs can compel him to spend considerable political capital in the military arena to the detriment of other major items on his programmatic agenda. On both of these dimensions, congressional opposition to the war in Iraq appears to have had the predicted effect.  

Solves multiple extinction scenarios. Morimoto ‘15
Andy Morimoto is a research associate at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “The Strategic Costs of TPP Failure.” The Diplomat. August 22, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-strategic-costs-of-tpp-failure/ JJN
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is in trouble. Trade ministers failed last month to conclude the massive 12-nation trade deal by their hoped-for summer deadline, putting negotiations in danger of collapse. This is a problem. Trade advocates argue that letting the TPP die would be a significant lost opportunity for the global economy. But there’s a potentially bigger problem here – one that may have serious consequences for both U.S. national security and regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. Just consider the strategic backdrop against which last month’s negotiations occurred. Maritime disputes flaring across the South China Sea. Tensions rising between Beijing and Tokyo. Perennial friction between China and Taiwan and a growing nuclear stockpile in North Korea. If the TPP falls through, it could greatly hurt the America’s ability to stabilize the fraught geopolitics of Asia. Some have argued that a TPP failure would be a net positive for regional stability. The deal, they claim, would isolate and provoke China, and should therefore be abandoned. But this view is blinkered. Given the high trade volumes and trade arrangements across the Asia-pacific, China stands very little chance of being isolated. Moreover, Chinese officials have other ventures on their minds. According to He Weiwen, a former Chinese Commerce Ministry official, “the Chinese are more or less neutral because we have our own agenda, pushing forward ASEAN plus six and the Silk Road.” In fact, there are a number of reasons to believe that the opposite is true: that a TPP failure will cause a number of strategic problems for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. First, failure would mean stunting the growth of America’s Pacific partners. This is problematic for two reasons. Most importantly, fewer states would be devoting fewer resources to meet shared challenges like counterterrorism and climate change. In addition, as countries get richer and more interdependent, they become more invested in the well-being of their neighbors. And while free trade, interdependence, and prosperity do not guarantee stability and peace (see: World War I), they do create conditions that make conflict less appealing. Second, failure would create more potential for instability and crises. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which China and one of its neighbors along the South China Sea (say, Vietnam) get into a serious spat over territorial claims. With the TPP, this spat would be less likely to escalate into a full-blown crisis, as China understands that the U.S. is more inclined to intervene in situations that threaten its growing trade interests. Without the TPP, there is less clarity about U.S. resolve, so the potential for miscalculation and escalation increases. Third, failure would send a strong signal that the U.S. no longer has the political will to lead in the region. This would come at a time when allies are already uncertain of U.S. commitments. Earlier this week, for example, Japan’s trade minister expressed disappointment in last month’s trade meetings, saying “every TPP country wondered why the U.S. was quick to give up the conclusion without its usual relentless persistence.” If the U.S. allows negotiations to collapse, it would demonstrate the Obama administration’s declaration – that the U.S. is “all in, when it comes to the Asia-Pacific” – to be hollow. This has important geopolitical implications. If Asia’s great powers perceive the U.S. to be unserious about its role in the region, this will increase the incentive for the powerful regional states (i.e. China and Japan) to jockey with one another for regional hegemony. Finally, failure would be a missed opportunity for the U.S. economy – and America’s ability to project strength abroad rests on its economic foundation at home. According to an analysis from the Peterson Institute, U.S. income gains under the TPP would be significant, potentially adding $59 billion per year by 2020. Failing to conclude the TPP would forego these potential gains, and would make it more difficult for the U.S. to stem the defense cuts put in place by the sequester and invest in our military presence in the Asia-Pacific. The Nobel Prize winning economist Thomas Schelling noted that “trade is what most of international relations are about. For that reason trade policy is national security policy.” Today, U.S. trade policy – and indeed, its national security policy – are in danger of falling apart. Getting something as big and complicated as the TPP across the line won’t be easy. But given the smoldering flashpoints across Asia, the U.S. can hardly afford to squander any tools in its foreign policy toolkit. The stakes are too high.

Regional hegemony is key to stop nuke war.  Rudd 11

Rudd 11 – Kevin Rudd, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “The Case for American Engagement in Asia: The Australian Perspective”, 9-15, http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2011/kr_sp_110915.aspx?ministerid=2

THE GEO-STRATEGIC RAMIFICATIONS  But as nations change, so too do relations between nations.  The emergence of new powers inevitably brings new strategic complexity, as the power relativities of the 20th century give way to the new ones.  Asia will be vulnerable to a host of strategic uncertainties, arising from the need for new powers to integrate into the global economic and political order, and for the established powers to accommodate them.  The potential for misunderstanding — and the consequences of miscalculation — is also vast.  Tensions like those we see in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the Persian Gulf may become even more difficult to manage.  Make no mistake: these aren’t just regional problems.  Questions about the future of the South China Sea touch on every regional country’s future, given their global strategic and economic significance.  This theme isn't new, but what I can tell you about this strategic shift is that we — Australia and the United States — will face it as allies.  Sure, there is the possibility of instability in our region.  But we've faced the possibility of conflict — and actual conflict — together in the past.  Many different tests, circumstances and challenges have put the acid to our alliance since the ANZUS treaty was signed, 60 years ago.  We've been reminded again that the only time the ANZUS treaty has been formally invoked was ten years ago this week — in response to the attacks on September 11.  But military and intelligence cooperation with the US continues across a wide range of theatres within the framework of the Alliance.  Here in San Francisco — where the ANZUS treaty was signed, all those years ago — I'm reminded that Australian and American servicemen and women have fought, flown, sailed and — I'm reliably informed — surfed together since the Pacific War.  Today, that Alliance continues to grow in meaning and intensity.  We are fighting together in Afghanistan; working together against global threats like piracy; and responding together to natural disasters across the region.  For us, for our relationship, the end of the Cold War hasn’t meant a downgrading of the importance of our Alliance — if anything, it’s become more intense and more important.  So as we face the challenges of the 21st Century — the challenges of the shift of power to Asia — we will do so together.  We’re working together to ensure our forces are aligned in the right way to provide for the national security of our two countries, and to help us shape the emerging regional environment.  Our forces have to be able to respond to the range of contingencies that can arise in our region, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  Increasingly, we aren’t just working with each other, but with other regional players.  I'm not just talking about the Pacific, or the Asia-Pacific.  The critical region for our future now extends to include the Indian Ocean as well.  The growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean starts with India's rise.  India is the largest democracy in the world.  Forecast to be the third largest economy in the world in coming decades, it is in the interest of both the United States and Australia for India to play the role of a major international power.  For now, India’s focus remains South Asia.  But its strategic weight is increasing with its increasing economic size and strength.  India is increasingly looking east with interest, both for strategic and economic reasons, and because of long-standing cultural connections.  But the importance of the Indian Ocean also lies in its unique role in maritime security and sea lines of communication for a much larger group of economies, both in Europe and Asia.  Lying between the Middle East energy sources and the dynamic global engine room of Asia, its importance grows with each passing year.  The pressures on the Gulf and West Indian Ocean choke points will intensify, as India grows and East Asian centres of growth remain reliant on Gulf energy and African resources.  In the 21st Century, questions of resource, energy and food security are becoming more vital than ever.  As Robert Kaplan says, the Indian Ocean is once again at the heart of the world, as it was in ancient and medieval times.  THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES  The United States has been a guarantor of security and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific for decades.   But the 21st Century will demand more.  As the world changes, it's even more critical that the US builds its engagement with our region.  As the United States transitions back from tough and unforgiving wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it might seem tempting to resist the case for further international engagement.  President Obama has already rightly intensified US involvement with East Asia.  It remains the case, in one way or another, that the United States is vital in solving common problems collectively.  No other power is able or willing to support essential global public goods — like the free movement of trade, capital and people around the world.  Sea-lane security, regional security in critical regions like the Gulf, open markets, the reserve currency, deep and liquid capital markets — who else provides these global public goods?  America has faced these questions before.  On the eve of entry into World War II, Henry Luce's seminal editorial in Life magazine on the American Century was much more than a statement about relative power, as America assumed its position in the new order.  It was a call for American leadership in international affairs.  It is in America’s interest and the world’s interest to provide that leadership — because in its absence, the risks grow that we will see destabilisation that threatens us all.  The interdependence of our economies has been shown clearly by the financial crisis, and a collapse in the conditions for open trade would be an economic disaster for all trading nations.  I share President Obama's view that America can neither retreat from "responsibility as an anchor of global security" nor "confront... every evil that can be found abroad".  But President Obama talked of the need for a "more centered course" — and that lies in a deep US engagement in Asia.  I believe the vast majority of the countries of Asia welcome that continued and expanded American strategic role in our hemisphere.  As Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono said in November 2008, as the financial crisis was wreaking havoc upon us, “none of these global challenges can be addressed by the world community without having America onboard. And conversely, none of these issues can be resolved by the United States alone.”  And as Lee Kuan Yew said a year later, “the consensus in ASEAN is that the US remains irreplaceable in East Asia.”  In the 21st Century, the US needs substantial, sophisticated, nimble engagement in the region.  

Case
We’ll go through their evidence and demonstrate the problems

Gray says lack of GOVERNMENT accountability is the problem- even when mandatory response laws are passed police command don’t enforce them. It also says the lack of an affirmative right to police action is a problem- the aff doesn’t fix either of these problems 

Lela Gray, J.D. Candidate, Albany Law School, 2011; B.A., University of South Florida, 2007. “Municipal Accountability in Domestic Violence: A Promising New Case,” http://www.albanygovernmentlawreview.org/Articles/Vol04_1/4.1.362-Gray.pdf
In this paper, I argue that one reason for the continued existence of this IPV domestic violence plague is the lack of local government and law enforcement accountability. In Part I of this paper, I discuss the general rule that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers no affirmative right to governmental protection, and the two exceptions to the general rule. I posit that even though these two exceptions were supposed to enhance governmental accountability, the courts’ interpretation of these exceptions has meant that municipalities and the police are seldom held responsible in claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983 claims), even when they fail to adhere to the laws. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported in 1978 that on the issue of intimate violence, “the most serious law enforcement problem . . . is the failure of the police to respond to a call for help.”14 Six years later, the U.S. Attorney General’s Office announced a nationwide failure of law enforcement to respond adequately in IPV domestic violence cases.15 Reports like these spurred the passage of mandatory arrest policies in many states;16 however, in the 1990’s the studies and reports on IPV domestic violence continued to show an overall inadequate police response to the problem.17 One reason for the inadequate response is a lack of local government and law enforcement accountability. Expanding the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process exceptions would help cure this problem.

Their stein Evidence is not a solvency advocate- it is not about qualified immunity or 1983 suits –its about Alabama state law that the plan wouldn’t effect –they selectively underlined it to not show that
Kelsey Stein, journalist for AL.com, “Wrongful death lawsuit dismissed after Hoover police did not immediately enter home after woman’s fatal stabbing,” September 18, 2104, http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2014/09/judge_dismisses_lawsuit_claimi.html
The death of my sister, Kimberly Jamison Ozburn, is a chilling example of what can happen when police wait to assist a victim. The facts of the Jamison family's subsequent lawsuit must not be ignored. On March 19, 2013, Kimberly called 911 at 9:25 p.m., telling dispatch that her assailant had a gun, pleading for police to "come fast," and, a short time later, screaming that her assailant was stabbing her. She desperately needed help, and she needed it fast. Our mother, Virginia, escaped from the home and called dispatch at 9:28, telling them the assailant's full name, that he was armed with a knife and gun, and that, as she fled the scene, he was trying to stab her daughter. Police arrived during this call, which records Virginia telling police this essential information and also how to enter the house, and where Kimberly and her assailant were located. The first two responders were on the scene by 9:30, fully aware of the information in the 911 calls. By 9:37, four more officers had arrived. My family, then, doesn't understand how it could have taken almost two hours for these officers to "assess the situation" and "develop a plan" before entering the home at 11:16 p.m. The city of Hoover explains the action of its officers by claiming that a fast entry would not have been in time to prevent Kimberly's death. But we do know this: an ambulance was on the scene by 9:32. The Jamison home is less than a half mile from the interstate; less than 10 minutes from UAB hospital. And phone records show that Kimberly was alive -- she attempted to make an outgoing call from the house phone -- at 9:34 p.m. Virginia sued the city, but that wrongful death action was dismissed, not because of lack of merit, but because of the Alabama law that renders police immune from lawsuits. And that, we believe, is the larger issue stemming from this incident: In times of crisis, citizens should be able to count on police who know how to respond promptly! The Jamison family fears that survivors victims of domestic violence in Alabama are in a truly terrible situation, unable to rely on 911 for meaningful assistance. We understand that the purpose of qualified immunity is to encourage police to take actions in the line of duty without concern about being second-guessed after the fact.  However, under the Alabama statute and the Cranman state Supreme Court restatement of immunity law, police are protected by this "qualified' immunity under almost all circumstances, unless their decision making is willful, malicious, or in bad faith.  We believe Hoover PD was negligent in its failure to act. We acknowledge that Alabama law confers immunity to protect police negligence, but we believe that law needs to be changed. Serious negligence should not be protected. And police should not enjoy immunity when they fail to take reasonable action.

Their second Gray card is a reason to vote neg on presumption- it says UNLESS local governments are held accountable there will be no effect on IPV. Gray 2
However, both the “special relationship” exception and the “state-created danger” exceptions have been applied only in the most flagrant cases, which effectively stripped the exceptions of any usefulness in the area of domestic abuse. While this narrow application is sound in most areas of the law, there is a sore need and good reason for expansion and broad application of these exceptions in the area of domestic violence. Unlike other criminals, batterers often continue to abuse the same survivors victim(s) day-after-day. Also unlike other crimes or torts, IPV domestic violence is not a random crime and the survivors victims of domestic violence are not sporadically chosen. Because domestic violence is so widespread and the victims are often re-victimized again and again, empowerment of batterers is particularly troublesome. When officers like those in the Okin case empower batterers, they send a message that the continued torment of the victim is permissible. The Battered Women’s Movement and other activist groups have done their jobs and pushed for over twenty years to get the attention and backing of the New York Legislature. Likewise, Congress and other State Legislatures have made great strides nationally in the area of domestic violence, enacting domestic violence statutes over the past twenty years both federally and in every state in the nation.163 Without local government accountability in federal court, IPV domestic violence laws remain nearly meaningless. Extending Okin and allowing §1983 claims against state and local governments in the area of domestic violence will help ensure that batterers are not empowered by deliberate indifference and a custom of inaction. This expansion and a broader application of substantive due process in domestic violence cases will add teeth to the current domestic violence laws as local governments and police face accountability under § 1983. Without accountability, the huge strides made in IPV domestic violence legislation over the past twenty years will remain but words on a page.
Turns
Civil suits don’t encourage reform- prefer our evidence it’s a direct response to their 1AC evidence Harmon 09
Rachel A., PROMOTING CIVIL RIGHTS THROUGH PROACTIVE POLICING REFORM, 2009 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, from the Stanford Law Review at 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009). For information visit http://lawreview.stanford.edu.
Federal law has played an important role in regulating police misconduct. In particular, federal criminal prosecutions, civil suits for damages under § 1983, and the exclusionary rule are all legal tools that attempt to reduce police misconduct by punishing specific incidents of it and by deterring it in the future. Unfortunately, each is inadequate to promote wholesale institutional change. Federal criminal civil rights prosecutions face significant legal and practical obstacles, including that federal law imposes an onerous intent requirement on civil rights crimes; that victims of police misconduct often make problematic witnesses; and that juries frequently believe and sympathize with defendant officers.16 As a result, prosecutions against police officers are too rare to deter misconduct. Even if criminal prosecutions were more common, however, it is not clear that charges against individual officers would encourage departmental change. Almost inevitably, when some officers in a department are prosecuted, others are not. Criminal prosecution may therefore enable cities to characterize egregious misconduct as resulting from individual pathology rather than systemic problems and to deny the need for departmental improvement.17 Successful § 1983 suits for damages encourage some departmental reform, but they too are limited. Suits against individual officers are difficult to win, both because they suffer some of the same trial challenges as criminal cases against officers, and because officers often have qualified immunity for their actions, even when the conduct is unconstitutional.18 Suing supervisors or chiefs often requires establishing deliberate indifference or reckless action rather than negligence, and suing a city requires a plaintiff to show that misconduct was not only unconstitutional, but reflected municipal “policy” or “custom.”19 Some civil actions succeed despite these obstacles, but many incidents of serious misconduct result in an unsuccessful § 1983 suit or an inexpensive settlement, and therefore provide little incentive for reform.20 Moreover, some scholars have argued that even when plaintiffs win civil suits, damages actions against government actors are an ineffectual—even perverse—means of encouraging local officials to reduce misconduct.21 Daryl Levinson, for example, contends that government officers, police chiefs, and mayors respond to political incentives, and may never be forced to internalize the economic costs of damages paid by municipalities.22 Although Levinson may overstate the case against civil suits,23 he persuasively argues that even when they are successful, civil suits are at best an inefficient and limited means of encouraging institutional reform.24 Footnote- 16. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 465-67 (2004); Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE 247, 253, 258-59, 266 (William A. Geller and Hans Toch eds., 1996); John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 806-11; David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 488, 490-92 (1992

Testifying in court can cause psychological damage – moving away from courts as a whole is better. Nelson 06
Leah Nelson, 8-1-2006, "Testifying in Court Can Amplify Trauma For Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse," Association for Psychological Science, http://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/observer/2006/august-06/testifying-in-court-can-amplify-trauma-for-victims-of-childhood-sexual-abuse.html MG
It goes without saying that childhood sexual abuse is often a traumatic experience. Add to that revisiting the abuse in courtroom testimony, and a complex picture emerges about the full impact the abuse can have on a victim. In her invited address at the APS 18th Annual Convention, “Childhood Trauma, and Court: The Psychology and the Law,” Gail Goodman, University of California, Davis, discussed research findings on the after-effects of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), highlighting the potentially damaging effects of a related event that is all too often overlooked: the trauma of testifying about CSA during trial. Between 1986 and 1988, Goodman and her team of researchers studied the behavioral patterns of over 200 children involved as victims in CSA prosecutions. They re-interviewed 174 of the victims as young adults (between 1997 and 2001), looking at their memories of the abuse and their current pathology and searching for correlations between their state as young children at the time of the CSA prosecutions and their later mental health. “The picture is really complex, and you have to understand the circumstances surrounding the child and the case to make a prediction,” said Goodman. Certain conditions, such as whether the child had to testify multiple times throughout a prosecution, was the strongest predictor of later traumatization. Other, less stable predictors include gender, age at the time of testimony, and the length of the perpetrator’s sentence. In children who testified multiple times, especially if the abuse was severe and intrafamilial, Goodman’s team found correlations with later sexual problems, defensive avoidance, and internalization problems, such as depression. Even “children who in the 1980s seemed more resilient, if they testified more than once, later as adults did nearly as badly as those who presented behavioral problems” at the time of testimony, Goodman said. Children who were already deeply disturbed at the time of the testimony fared worst of all: “If the child is already crying at that point, that’s a bad sign for later on.” Despite these troublesome findings, Goodman does not believe that keeping young children from testifying is always the right solution. “In terms of attitudes, it may be important for the child to testify,” she said. CSA victims who had the chance to speak at trial tend to have a more positive attitude towards the legal system and are more likely to think that the trial of their abuser was fair, she explained. Part of Goodman’s study focused on memory in conjunction with research on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and Goodman’s team found many connections between the two. Delayed disclosure of CSA is common, so knowing how well people remember is important in considering whether they should testify about events that occurred. Goodman asked the adults what they remembered about the CSA and also what was the most traumatic event of their lives. Based on comparisons between what they reported as young children and what they said when later interviewed, adults with PTSD who were victimized had clear memories of the abuse whether or not the PTSD was caused by CSA. Those with few symptoms of PTSD who remembered something else, like a car accident, as their most traumatic life event had the least accurate memories. She proposed that poor memory is associated with defensive avoidance: that individuals who suppress their feelings about the trauma, don’t want to think about the past, and don’t show signs of PTSD are more likely to have faded memories than those who are more overtly traumatized. Overall, the best predictor for correct memory was the level of abuse. “The worse it is, the more traumatizing, the better the memory,” she said. However, for avoidant individuals, this was not necessarily so. Throughout her presentation, Goodman emphasized that although predictors exist, there are variations among individuals that must be considered in each case. Regardless of this caveat, audience members were intrigued. Chuck Mueller, a child clinical psychologist from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, said, “It’s very interesting, very provocative…. I was thinking about how much we want to incorporate this topic.” National Institute of Child Health and Human Development researchers Mel Pipe and Yael Orbach expressed their admiration for Goodman’s care in taking so many factors into account. “She, in many ways, started the field,” said Pipe. “It really is a great example of science being applied.”

Tournament: Golden Desert | Round: 2 | Opponent: West KN | Judge: Kathy Bond
Cap K
Reform within the corporatized university is impossible – the university is built to make speech seem effective, when in reality the university plays a central role in the knowledge is turned into a commodity. Only a direct and unflinching critique of class can solve. The critique turns the case - Monzó 14

Monzó, Lilia D Chapman University, California, United States. "A critical pedagogy for democracy: Confronting higher education’s neoliberal agenda with a critical Latina feminist episteme." Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies (JCEPS) 12.1 (2014): 73-100.

In this contradictory version of Freirian thought, praxis becomes civic engagement that focuses¶ solely on reforms that increase opportunities within the existing capitalist system. Such efforts¶ alone obfuscate the role of class and unwittingly support the existing structure by treating¶ capitalism as a proverbial and impermeable reality or suggesting that minimizing inequalities is¶ both possible and sufficient to creating a just society. Within this liberal agenda, terms such as¶ liberation and freedom index narrow political conceptions such as freedom of speech and¶ freedom of the press – ideologies associated with “democratic” advanced capitalist societies that¶ while important do not address the most fundamental human right – the freedom from necessity¶ and from alienation. A socialist democracy that emphasizes freedom and participation among all¶ citizens, regardless of gender, race, or other social positioning is untenable within a capitalist¶ economy. The extreme and widening gap between the wealthy and the poor, the focus on labor¶ power as opposed to real power, the extortion of surplus value off the poor to maximize profits¶ for the wealthy, the relegation of poverty and a hyper exploitation of racialized communities and especially women of color in the U.S. and across the world, and the alienation experienced by all¶ human beings are incompatible with a democratic way of life.¶ Revolutionary critical pedagogy as developed by Paula Allman, Peter McLaren, and others¶ reinserts a fundamental Marxist emphasis on interrogating and transforming the totalizing nature¶ of capitalism that engulfs humanity through not only political economy but social and cultural¶ relations. These scholars reject and critique the liberal trend to reform, recognizing these as¶ unable to stop the destruction that is inherent in the labor capital social relation calling instead¶ for creating the conditions for revolutionary change that would transform the forces of¶ production outside of capital’s value form. Revolutionary critical pedagogues call for a¶ “collective struggle” across racial, ethnic, gender, and national lines (Darder, 2014). They¶ understand that while racism and patriarchy must be fought these struggles alone will not end¶ human suffering and exploitation. As Darder and Torres (2004) argue, as long as there exists a¶ need for a mass of exploited workers as is needed under capitalism, these will undoubtedly be¶ made of predominantly racialized minorities who have been made thus in order to preserve the¶ dominance of an elite white transnational capitalist class. Racism is not an accident but an¶ orchestrated material reality that hides the role of the capitalist class and sets up workers of “said¶ working class and middle class sectors” to compete with each other for presumed less¶ exploitative jobs, educational opportunities, and a myriad of other social and economic resources¶ all the while the capitalists who own the bulk of the worlds resources are rarely considered in the¶ equation, must less confronted. Likewise, struggles against patriarchy cannot be forged without¶ forging a struggle against capitalism since the exploitation of women in the U.S. and across the¶ world is an important source of capital accumulation of transnational corporations. Thus, while I¶ champion struggles that confront racial and gender oppression and also work to mitigate¶ conditions of exploitation, I also argue that these struggles must be simultaneously accompanied¶ by and conjoined with broader struggles against the capitalist class that aim to transform existing¶ social relations of production. I reject the domesticated version of critical pedagogy discussed¶ earlier in favor of a Marxist revolutionary critical pedagogy that is based on developing clarity¶ rather than charity in which human beings are liberated from wage slavery through a process that¶ necessitates – demands – revolution (Freire, 1970). According to Freire (1970), the oppressed are tasked with forging this revolution because they¶ have insights into the nature of oppression that are necessarily hidden from the dominant group.¶ Thus, the participation of non-dominant groups in the decision-making of our society is a critical¶ component of advancing democracy. If democracy embodies the notion that the diverse¶ perspectives of different individuals and groups add to our collective understanding of society¶ and to moving us forward as human beings, then we must recognize the need to bring the diverse¶ epistemes of women, people of color and other marginalized groups into the spaces that¶ legitimize knowledge – specifically, the university. The university plays a central role in the production of legitimate knowledge. While some have¶ celebrated its historical role in the “advancement” of society through teaching and scholarship,¶ others have called it an “ivory tower” espousing to a presumed superior Eurocentric episteme¶ and positioned outside the sphere of the commons (Basole, 2009). Miller (2009) points out that¶ the university, since inception, has been complicit with the state in promoting cultural¶ imperialism and supporting research that responded to the state’s economic and political ends.¶ Yet in so far as its rhetoric of “academic freedom” must be maintained in order to suppress its¶ relationship to capital interests, it provides the spaces for dissent among faculty and students.¶ Indeed one of the fundamental functions of the university is social critique. University students,¶ energized by their newfound critical acumen, have often been the first in society to vociferously¶ exclaim their outrage in protests and other rebellions (Zill, 2011).¶ The rise of neoliberalism, however, has led to the corporatization of the university and to what is¶ being called “knowledge capitalism,” which has strengthened existing ties between universities¶ and capital interests and dangerously undermining the role of the university as the context with¶ the greatest potential to address social problems and equality. Mike Peters (2011) points out that¶ universities are increasingly clamoring to join the game of marketization, selling themselves to¶ students and investors with consequences to program development, curriculum, and research.¶ Indeed many university presidents now sit on boards of corporations, which could mean conflicts¶ of interest with respect to what the university’s goals are in terms of either advancing the ideals¶ of democracy or corporate interests. It would seem that the latter is winning out. Rather than a social service to society, education is increasingly seen as a highly lucrative commodity¶ purchased by students at grotesquely huge tuitions that will leave students in debt for years to¶ come. Students are, thus, seen as a large source of revenue for banks and other financial¶ institutions.¶ The neoliberal emphasis on privatization, standardization, and accountability is increasingly¶ witnessed at both structural levels and in programmatic and curriculum planning. Similar to the¶ dehumanizing ethic of many transnational corporations that have moved their factories to the so¶ called “third world” to maximize their profits through cheap labor, a number of U.S. universities¶ are seeking new markets for exploitation in the “developing” world where local faculty are often¶ hired at very low wages and as part timers without job security (Ross, 2009). While some may¶ argue that providing university education to students in these countries is a moral imperative, an¶ important concern is how this “offshoring” may result in further distribution of western¶ knowledge systems in non-western countries. In a similar vein, we are also seeing fewer tenure¶ line positions and an increase of poorly paid adjunct positions in U.S. campuses.¶ Faculty research and other scholarly projects are increasingly being reshaped to become more¶ palatable to the business community or boards of trustees. Further impacting faculty are the¶ increasing demands for increased productivity in the form of publications in specialized¶ academic journals, closely tied to tenure and promotion decisions. This increased output and¶ competition are creating a proliferation of journals and articles for consumption that do not¶ necessarily strengthen quality and instead put tremendous pressure and increased workloads on¶ faculty. The standardization of productivity that facilitates accountability has led to a narrowing¶ of what counts as knowledge, with a return to notions of objective and measurable research being¶ considered more rigorous and scientific than qualitative and participatory approaches.¶ The corporate university necessarily functions to prepare students and society to participate in a¶ market economy. However, while the university does prepare citizens to fill jobs it must also¶ engage students in questioning and critiquing the existing structures of society, to recognize and¶ confront policies and practices that are undemocratic, and to learn to imagine and conceive of¶ alternatives that may bring greater equality and a new social order. When what is taught and learned becomes significantly determined through business interests it is difficult for the¶ university to retain autonomy toward these ends as they prove to be in direct conflict to capital¶ interests (Giroux, 2009).

Protests are a reactive form of politics that cede political instiutions – independently turns the case. Srniceke 15
Srnicek, PHD, and Williams, PhD Candidate , 15
(Nick, PhD IR @LSE, Alex, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a world without work)
Today it appears that the greatest amount of effort is needed to achieve the smallest degree of change. Millions march against the Iraq War, yet it goes ahead as planned. Hundreds of thousands protest austerity, but unprecedented budget cuts continue. Repeated student protests, occupations and riots struggle against rises in tuition fees, but they continue their inexorable advance. Around the world, people set up protest camps and mobilise against economic inequality, but the gap between the rich and the poor keeps growing. From the alter-globalisation struggles of the late 1990s, through the antiwar and ecological coalitions of the early 2000s, and into the new student uprisings and Occupy movements since 2008, a common pattern emerges: resistance struggles rise rapidly, mobilise increasingly large numbers of people, and yet fade away only to be replaced by a renewed sense of apathy, melancholy and defeat. Despite the desires of millions for a better world, the effects of these movements prove minimal. A FUNNY THING HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO THE PROTEST Failure permeates this cycle of struggles, and as a result, many of the tactics on the contemporary left have taken on a ritualistic nature, laden with a heavy dose of fatalism. The dominant tactics - protesting, marching, occupying, and various other forms of direct action - have become part of a well established narrative, with the people and the police each playing their assigned roles. The limits of these actions are particularly visible in those brief moments when the script changes. As one activist puts it, of a protest at the 2001 Summit of the Americas: On April 20, the first day of the demonstrations, we marched in our thousands towards the fence, behind which 34 heads of state had gathered to hammer out a hemispheric trade deal. Under a hail of catapult-launched teddy bears, activists dressed in black quickly removed the fence’s supports with bolt cutters and pulled it down with grapples as onlookers cheered them on. For a brief moment, nothing stood between us and the convention centre. We scrambled atop the toppled fence, but for the most part we went no further, as if our intention all along had been simply to replace the state's chain-link and concrete barrier with a human one of our own making.1 We see here the symbolic and ritualistic nature of the actions, combined with the thrill of having done something - but with a deep uncertainty that appears at the first break with the expected narrative. The role of dutiful protestor had given these activists no indication of what to do when the barriers fell. Spectacular political confrontations like the Stop the War marches, the now-familiar melees against the G20 or World Trade Organization and the rousing scenes of democracy in Occupy Wall Street all give the appearance of being highly significant, as if something were genuinely at stake.2 Yet nothing changed, and long-term victories were traded for a simple registration of discontent. To outside observers, it is often not even clear what the movements want, beyond expressing a generalised discontent with the world. The contemporary protest has become a melange of wild and varied demands. The 2009 G20 summit in London, for instance, featured protestors marching for issues that spanned from grandiose anti-capitalist stipulations to modest goals centred on more local issues. When demands can be discerned at all, they usually fail to articulate anything substantial. They are often nothing more than empty slogans - as meaningful as calling for world peace. In more recent struggles, the very idea of making demands has been questioned. The Occupy movement infamously struggled to articulate meaningful goals, worried that anything too substantial would be divisive.5 And a broad range of student occupations across the Western world has taken up the mantra of ‘no demands’ under the misguided belief that demanding nothing is a radical act.4 When asked what the ultimate upshot of these actions has been, participants differ between admitting to a general sense of futility and pointing to the radicalisation of those who took part. If we look at protests today as an exercise in public awareness, they appear to have had mixed success at best. Their messages are mangled by an unsympathetic media smitten by images of property destruction - assuming that the media even acknowledges a form of contention that has become increasingly repetitive and boring. Some argue that, rather than trying to achieve a certain end, these movements, protests and occupations in fact exist only for their own sake.5 The aim in this case is to achieve a certain transformation of the participants, and create a space outside of the usual operations of power. While there is a degree of truth to this, things like protest camps tend to remain ephemeral, small-scale and ultimately unable to challenge the larger structures of the neoliberal economic system. This is politics transmuted into pastime - politics-as-drug experience, perhaps - rather than anything capable of transforming society. Such protests are registered only in the minds of their participants, bypassing any transformation of social structures. While these efforts at radicalisation and awareness-raising are undoubtedly important to some degree, there still remains the question of exactly when these sequences might pay off. Is there a point at which a critical mass of consciousness-raising will be ready for action? Protests can build connections, encourage hope and remind people of their power. Yet, beyond these transient feelings, politics still demands the exercise of that power, lest these affective bonds go to waste. If we will not act after one of the largest crises of capitalism, then when? The emphasis on the affective aspects of protests plays into a broader trend that has come to privilege the affective as the site of real politics. Bodily, emotional and visceral elements come to replace and stymie (rather than complement and enhance) more abstract analysis. The contemporary landscape of social media, for example, is littered with the bitter fallout from an endless torrent of outrage and anger. Given the individualism of current social media platforms - premised on the maintenance of an online identity - it is perhaps no surprise to see online ‘politics’ tend towards the selfpresentation of moral purity. We are more concerned to appear right than to think about the conditions of political change. Yet these daily outrages pass as rapidly as they emerge, and we are soon on to the next vitriolic crusade. In other places, public demonstrations of empathy with those suffering replace more finely tuned analysis, resulting in hasty or misplaced action - or none at all. While politics always has a relationship to emotion and sensation (to hope or anger, fear or outrage), when taken as the primary mode of politics, these impulses can lead to deeply perverse results. In a famous example, 1985's Live Aid raised huge amounts of money for famine relief through a combination of heartstring-tugging imagery and emotionally manipulative celebrity-led events. The sense of emergency demanded urgent action, at the expense of thought. Yet the money raised actually extended the civil war causing the famine, by allowing rebel militias to use the food aid to support themselves.6 While viewers at home felt comforted they were doing something rather than nothing, a dispassionate analysis revealed that they had in fact contributed to the problem. These unintended outcomes become even more pervasive as the targets of action grow larger and more abstract. If politics without passion leads to cold-hearted, bureaucratic technocracy, then passion bereft of analysis risks becoming a libidinally driven surrogate for effective action. Politics comes to be about feelings of personal empowerment, masking an absence of strategic gains. Perhaps most depressing, even when movements have some successes, they are in the context of overwhelming losses. Residents across the UK, for example, have successfully mobilised in particular cases to stop the closure of local hospitals. Yet these real successes are overwhelmed by larger plans to gut and privatise the National Health Service. Similarly, recent anti-fracking movements have been able to stop test drilling in various localities - but governments nevertheless continue to search for shale gas resources and provide support for companies to do so.7 In the United States, various movements to stop evictions in the wake of the housing crisis have made real gains in terms of keeping people in their homes.8 Yet the perpetrators of the subprime mortgage debacle continue to reap the profits, waves of foreclosures continue to sweep across the country, and rents continue to surge across the urban world. Small successes - useful, no doubt, for instilling a sense of hope - nevertheless wither in the face of overwhelming losses. Even the most optimistic activist falters in the face of struggles that continue to fail. In other cases, well-intentioned projects like Rolling Jubilee strive to escape the spell of neoliberal common sense.9 The ostensibly radical aim of crowdsourcing money to pay the debts of the underprivileged means buying into a system of voluntary charity and redistribution, as well as accepting the legitimacy of the debt in the first place. In this respect, the initiative is one among a larger group of projects that act simply as crisis responses to the faltering of state services. These are survival mechanisms, not a desirable vision for the future. What can we conclude from all of this? The recent cycle of struggles has to be identified as one of overarching failure, despite a multitude of smallscale successes and moments of large-scale mobilisation. The question that any analysis of the left today must grapple with is simply: What has gone wrong? It is undeniable that heightened repression by states and the increased power of corporations have played a significant role in weakening the power of the left. Still, it remains debatable whether the repression faced by workers, the precarity of the masses and the power of capitalists is any greater than it was in the late nineteenth century. Workers then were still struggling for basic rights, often against states more than willing to use lethal violence against them.10 But whereas that period saw mass mobilisation, general strikes, militant labour and radical women’s organisations all achieving real and lasting successes, today is defined by their absence. The recent weakness of the left cannot simply be chalked up to increased state and capitalist repression: an honest reckoning must accept that problems also lie within the left. One key problem is a widespread and uncritical acceptance of what we call ‘folk-political’ thinking. (5-9) 

Their activism is based on the idea that speaking loud enough will make our voices heard – this solidifies cap.
Russel Rickford (an associate professor of history at Cornell University. He is the author of We Are an African People: Independent Education, Black Power, and the Radical Imagination. A specialist on the Black Radical Tradition, he teaches about social movements, black transnationalism, and African-American political culture after World War Two). “The Fallacies of Neoliberal Protest”. Black Perspectives. September 24, 2016. http://www.aaihs.org/the-fallacies-of-neoliberal-protest/  AGM

Fallacy Number Three: The Myth of the Disembodied Voice. Part of capitalism’s response to grassroots opposition is to assure the distressed that their “voice” is heard. That the authorities who “hear” you also enable your brutalization is immaterial. The point is to convince you of your continued stake in the system. It is to guide you toward the politics of representation and away from the politics of resistance. Of course, there are other fallacies employed by the oppressor to confuse the oppressed. The fallacy of inclusion v. transformation, for example. Or the fallacy of “diversity” v. genuine antiracism. We are taught to be patriotic, to be patient, to strive to embody the very values of peace and goodwill that this society defiles. These and other myths only perpetuate the system. They leave intact our society’s basic power relations. And they cause us to police ourselves and to seek interpersonal reconciliation rather than confront structural racism and oppression. Truth is, we don’t need “diversity” training. We don’t need focus groups. We don’t need consultants and experts. We don’t need the apparatus of our oppression—racial capitalism itself—to rationalize and regulate our dissent. The logic and techniques of the corporate world won’t end the slaughter of black people, or the dispossession and degradation of indigenous people, or the transformation of the entire Global South into a charred landscape of corpses and refugees. We need an uncompromising, multiracial, grassroots movement against white supremacy, endless war, and vicious corporate capitalism. We need to build solidarity with the resistance in Charlotte, Standing Rock, and Puerto Rico. We need to join the rebellions of workers and the colonized all over the world.This is a human rights struggle. And it will be waged in the streets, not in boardrooms, the halls of Congress, or other strongholds of global capital.
The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Oparah 14
Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).
¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization  of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets.

And, reject the demand for a plan - neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file
RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. A. Prescription: More Politics The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor, 137 many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s marginalization. B. Prescription: More Normativity Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a number of pitfalls. The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the “distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the societal pie and redistribution is about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain of discourse or ideology. Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like Hayek’s theory, “law and economics is full of stories about how liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it instead folds them into one another: “The Law and Economics movement is rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive communitarian ideal will win.150 Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by her capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for her own needs and service her own ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152 If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as “undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be countered differently. More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. C. Prescription: Acceptance The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in “taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be “self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce the momentum to move forward. VII CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate the practice of critique within the legal academy. A. Why Critique Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: critique. Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies them. Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no alternative.
And, working within existing institutions serves to legitimize those institutions – only an unflinching paradigm of critique can solve neoliberalism. Hay ‘06
Colin Hay is Professor of Political Analysis and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham (UK). “The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the institutional embedding of neoliberalism.” August 21, 2006. Economy and Society.  JJN from file
Accordingly, however depoliticized and normalized neoliberalism has become, it remains a political and economic choice, not a simple necessity. This brings us naturally to the question of alternatives. A number of points might here be made which follow fairly directly from the above analysis. First, our ability to offer alternatives to neoliberalism rests now on our ability to identify that there is a choice in such matters and, in so doing, to demystify and deconstruct the rationalist premises upon which its public legitimation has been predicated. This, it would seem, is a condition of the return of a more normative and engaging form of politics in which more is at stake than the personnel to administer a largely agreed and ostensibly technical neoliberal reform agenda. Second, the present custodians of neoliberalism are, in many cases, reluctant converts, whose accommodation to neoliberalism is essentially borne of perceived pragmatism and necessity rather than out of any deep  normative commitment to the sanctity of the market. Thus, rather than defend neoliberalism publicly and in its own terms, they have sought instead to appeal to the absence of a choice which might be defended in such terms. Consequently, political discourse is technocratic rather than political. Furthermore, as Peter Burnham has recently noted, neoliberalism is itself a deeply depoliticizing paradigm (2001), whose effect is to subordinate social and political priorities, such as might arise from a more dialogic, responsive and democratic politics, to perceived economic imperatives and to the ruthless efficiency of the market. As I have sought to demonstrate, this antipathy to ‘politics’ is a direct correlate of public choice theory’s projection of its most cherished assumption of instrumental rationality onto public officials. This is an important point, for it suggests the crucial role played by stylized rationalist assumptions, particularly (as in the overload thesis, public choice theory more generally and even the time-inconsistency thesis) those which relate to the rational conduct of public officials, in contributing to the depoliticizing dynamics now reflected in political disaffection and disengagement. As this perhaps serves to indicate, seemingly innocent assumptions may have alarmingly cumulative consequences. Indeed, the internalization of a neoliberalism predicated on rationalist assumptions may well serve to render the so-called ‘rational voter paradox’ something of a self-fulfilling prophecy
Terror
 New terror regulations stop campus attacks but OSU attack prove rising risk of campus terror. Bernstein 11/29
“Terror attack at Ohio State University prompts Senators to rethink 'extreme vetting,'” Leandra Bernstein, 11/29/16, KBOI2 (Associated Press).  
The violent attack at Ohio State University (OSU) on Monday, being investigated as an act of terror by a Somali refugee living legally in the United States, has led some in Congress to look favorably at the policies of the incoming Donald Trump administration, including the "extreme vetting" of individuals seeking entry to the country.¶ On Monday, an Ohio State student identified as Abdul Razak Ali Artan, drove his car into a group of people on the main campus in Columbus before attacking bystanders with a butcher knife. Artan was subdued by an Ohio State police officer who fatally shot him after he had injured 11 people.¶ As the event was unfolding on Monday, Trump issued a brief message of support to the students and faculty at OSU and first responders. As information about the apparently radicalized Somali-born suspect came in, it prompted many to reflect on Trump's campaign promises to strengthen the vetting of individuals coming to the country and also initiate a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States." Prior to Trump's early campaign statement calling for an end to Muslim immigration to the United States (until U.S. representatives "can figure out what is going on"), Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) introduced a bill to officially pause the resettlement of refugees entering the United States from 33 terror-prone countries, including Somalia. The bill also proposed strengthening the system of background checks.¶ On Tuesday, Paul told Sinclair Broadcast Group, "I am still for putting a pause" on resettlement. He explained that the pause should relate to specific goals, including putting in place a better system to monitor individuals who come into the country as immigrants or on a U.S. visa.¶ Even though his proposal to block terrorists from taking advantage of the U.S. visa and immigration system was defeated back in December 2015, Paul now sees an opportunity to revisit the proposal under a new administration that is "more inclined" to enforce laws that prevent the abuse of immigration and visa laws.¶ "Trump talked about 'extreme vetting,' and I think there needs to be more significant vetting of those who want to come to our country," Paul insisted. "We need to get a better handle on this." Former Trump rival, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) reacted to the the incident at Ohio State University, saying it is a reminder that the United States government "should not be letting people in this country who are security risks." Cruz noted that unlike the Obama administration, the incoming Trump administration is likely to work harder to prevent terrorists from entering the United States.¶ "I am optimistic that the new administration will put, as a far higher priority, keeping this country safe and protecting us against radical Islamic terrorism," Cruz said.¶ For Senate Homeland Security Committee chairman, Ron Johnson (R-Wis.), Trump's pledge to secure the border is even more important than implementing a stricter vetting process for refugees.¶ "I am far more concerned about Islamic terrorists potentially coming through our incredibly porous southern border" Johnson said. "Which is why I am completely supportive of President-elect Trump's commitment to secure the border."¶ With little information about the suspect in the Ohio State University attack, now is not the time prejudge the incident or make broad-reaching policy decisions, according to some lawmakers.¶ Only 24 hours after the attack, it is just too soon to jump to conclusions about the suspect, says Ohio Democrat, Sherrod Brown.¶ "These attacks are always a tragedy for our community," he stated. "I want to know more about this young man's journey to the U.S., and his background... before making a judgment," Brown added. For others, like Georgia Senator Johnny Isakson (R), now is also not the right time to be reactive or push major policy changes. Although Isakson supported previous legislative efforts to curb refugee resettlement from Syria and Iraq, he advised on Tuesday not to let one incident determine changes in existing policy. ¶ The OSU attack "certainly raises the question about Somali refugees," Isakson noted, but the overall policy towards refugees should be reexamined on "an ongoing basis," not just in response to particular events.¶ Law enforcement officials have indicated that they are still a long way from establishing Artan's motives in carrying out the Monday assault. According to media reports, prior to carrying out the attack, Artan posted an anti-American rant on Facebook, where he praised the U.S. citizen turned Islamist cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, as a "hero," and referred to American officials' inability to stop "lone wolf attacks."¶ Law enforcement officials have not made any official findings connecting Artan to the Islamic State, but in a Tuesday internet posting, ISIS claimed the attacker was a "soldier" of the terrorist group. Earlier this month, ISIS issued instructions to its adherents abroad to carry out attacks using knives and cars. Preliminary reports indicate that Artan was born in Somalia and lived there until 2007, when he and his family resettled in Pakistan. Around 2014, the family arrived in the United States as refugees, staying in Dallas temporarily before relocating to Columbus, Ohio, a city with a sizable Somali community. Artan attended Columbus State Community College and graduated last spring before enrolling at OSU.¶ As the identity of the Ohio State attacker was revealed by state law enforcement officials, Ohio's openness to refugees, particularly of Somali origin, came under fire. Even though the states have little power to control refugee flows into their borders, many took to social media to blame Ohio Governor John Kasich, saying that the attack “is on you.” Though critical of the Obama administration's plan to accept additional Syrian refugees into the United States, Kasich has generally spoken favorably about integrating new citizens into his state. According to the Somali Association of Ohio, there are at least 38,000 Somali immigrants and refugees living in the Columbus metropolitan area, with an addition 200 immigrants expected to arrive monthly within the next four years.¶ Earlier this year, the Obama administration announced new targets for resettling refugees after settling 85,000 in FY 2016 and aiming for 110,000 in 2017. Obama's announcement followed on the heels of a heated reaction from the public and lawmakers to revelations that one of the suspects in the Nov. 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris has reportedly entered Europe as a refugee.¶ The Paris attack, which left 130 civilians dead, triggered U.S. officials to begin rethinking federal policies, it prompted changes in visa waiver laws, and a reconsideration of visa-free travel from Europe. It also led to dozens of state governors openly rejecting the resettlement of Syrian refugees in their states.¶ In a prescient testimony before the Senate Homeland Security Committee in 2015, national security analyst Peter Bergen warned that acts of violence perpetrated by homegrown extremists posted "a more immediate challenge" than the threat of foreign terrorists. He warned that the "more likely threat" to the United States came from individuals inspired by ISIS or other militant groups, and who may never even come into direct contact with these groups.¶ The threat of homegrown extremism prompted Obama's Department of Homeland Security to work on a new phase of domestic counter-terrorism efforts. In 2016, DHS stood up a number of community engagement programs, designed to work with members of at-risk communities, including American-Muslim communities, to identify and redirect potential lone wolf attackers, or individuals who could be heading down the path of radicalization.
FS zones k2 prevent campus terrorist attacks – it allows law enforcement to defend and prevent better. Zeiner 05
Zoned Out! Examining Campus Speech Zones, Carol L. Zeiner (Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami Gardens, Florida; former College Attorney for Miami-Dade Community College (now Miami-Dade College)), Louisiana Law Review (Volume 66, No. 1), Fall 2005.
Unfortunately, the possibility of terrorist acts must be¶ considered as well as more general concerns under the heading of¶ campus safety and security. As pointed out in Part II.D,27 there¶ are risks posed by international and domestic terrorist groups.278¶ Obviously, large gatherings constitute a particularly attractive¶ target for terrorists, although any site on a university campus might¶ be considered attractive by those bent on attacking the American¶ way of life. On the one hand, this would seem to suggest that¶ campus speech zones enable terrorists to know which areas of¶ campus might be likely targets and suggests that campus speech¶ zones should be eliminated so that free speech events could occur¶ spontaneously anywhere on campus, and terrorists would not have¶ time to plan an attack. However, it does not take much advance¶ planning to carry a weapons-laden knapsack into a crowd. Thus,¶ perhaps it is more important for security personnel to have the¶ benefit of advance planning. Moreover, security features could be¶ designed into the physical characteristics of designated speech¶ zones more practically than could be accomplished if large¶ gatherings for speech activities could occur anywhere on campus.¶ 

Campus terror sends an ideological message globally – it encourages more terror and threatens education. Flanagin 15
“Why terrorists target schools and universities,” Jake Flanagin, 04/02/2015, The Quartz.
One reason that “terrorist organizations might choose to target educational institutions is that schools and school children act as powerful symbolic targets,” wrote Emma Bradford and Margaret A. Wilson, forensic psychologists at the University of Liverpool, in a 2013 analysis for the Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology. “Attacks on these targets evoke a strong emotional response.”¶ “Schools and other educational institutions represent ‘soft targets,’” they added. “A soft target is a relatively unguarded site where people congregate, normally in large numbers, thus offering the potential for mass casualties.” But practicalities aside, there are also specific, political and cultural reasons a terrorist cell might target a school or university. And this is where such acts diverge from the usual modes of modern terror.¶ Though bombing public transport takes months, if not years of intensive planning, it is intended to make the act appear random—anyone could become a victim by passing through at the wrong time. The terrifying power of this particular terror tactic is, after all, its unpredictability. An ideological message is usually announced in the aftermath.¶ Attacking schools, however, is predictable because the act is the message. Terrorists who attack schools intend to deplete the number of institutions disseminating philosophies ostensibly contradictory to their worldview; “Boko Haram,” roughly translated from the Hausa language means “Western education is forbidden.”¶ “They’re attacking what they see as the institutions of culture, and in particular the institutions of Western culture,” Ebrahim Moosa, professor of Islamic studies at the University of Notre Dame, told The Christian Science Monitor following the attacks in Peshawar. “They see that the process of Westernization begins at school, so schools that violate strict Islamic education become targets.”¶ It’s not difficult to see why Garissa was targeted. Kenyan schools consistently rank toward the best in the region, and the overall Kenyan population demonstrates one of the highest literacy rates on the continent. It is also a highly diverse place, with regards to religion and ethnicity, not unlike many African countries occupying the borderlands between Muslim-dominated North Africa and the Christian-dominated south. Consequently, Kenyan schools and universities are well-positioned for the maximal exchange of cultures, politics, and ideas—a concept that stands in direct opposition to the rigid ideologies of groups like al-Shabab.¶ Al-Shabab has a history of interfering in local education. In areas of Somalia under the group’s control, once co-ed schools have been gender segregated, with the majority of girls being intimidated against enrolling, if not forcibly removed from schools all together. Whole classes of boys have been pulled out of schools and conscripted into its ranks.¶ In an audio message released following the attack at Garissa, Ali Mohamoud Raghe, a spokesperson for al-Shabab, said, “the university had been targeted because it was educating many Christian students in ‘a Muslim land under colony,’” according to The New York Times, “a reference to the large ethnic Somali population in a part of Kenya that Somalia once tried to claim. He called the university part of Kenya’s ‘plan to spread their Christianity and infidelity.’” Which makes al-Shabab’s objective crystal-clear, and all too familiar: to wipe out a generation of ideological non-adherents.

Turns and outweighs case: terrorism reinscribes neoliberalism and militarism into education due to fear and backlash. Di Leo et al 14  
This excerpt from the chapter titled, "Twelve Theses on Education's Future in the Age of Neoliberalism and Terrorism," is taken from the book,  Neoliberalism, Education, Terrorism: Contemporary Dialogues, by Jeffrey R. Di Leo, Henry A. Giroux, Kenneth J. Saltman and Sophia A. McClennen

1. Neoliberalism is one of the greatest threats to the future of progressive education in the United States.¶ The goal of neoliberal education policies is not to improve education, but rather to increase the profits of private corporations. Profit-driven models for education directly contrast the goals of progressive educators. The goal of progressive education is to educate students to be productive participants in democratic culture and to engage actively in critical citizenship. Such goals are not supported by neoliberal educational policy mainstays such as teaching to the test and standardized testing. Because neoliberal education policy tends to be data-driven it works against the development of a student's ability to think critically, thereby undermining the formative culture and values necessary for a democratic society. As long as the United States continues to view educational policy and practice through the lens of market-based values, there is little hope that progressive education, with its aim of educating students for critical citizenship and social and economic justice, will survive.¶ 2. The war on terror and the discourse on terrorism have intensified the militarization of education.¶ The military–industrial complex should not be the driving force of education in the United States. However, the reaction to the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, has become yet another excuse to allow the military-academic complex to drive United States educational policies, practices, and funding. Not only has funding been diverted from public education to support the war on terror, but there has also been a push to understand America and the world in a way that supports American imperial ambitions. The militarization of education encourages the rationalization of state-sanctioned violence as a social and political value and supports educational practices that validate this violence. The celebration of war as a sign of power and knowledge by the military-industrial complex obliterates the democratic values of equality, public debate of political problems, and respect for diversity. The militarized society eschews reasoned political resolutions to public problems in favor of eradication of the designated enemy/other. Hence, the war on terror is a war on democracy, difference, and thinking. Critical citizenship and democratic culture as the major goals of education cannot survive in a culture dominated by extreme fear and a war waged against an emotion, namely, terror.
   False claims of responsibility cause cyber terrorism to escalate into nuclear war. Fritz 09.
   Jason Fritz, (Bond University IR Masters) , “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, July 2009http:www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf
   This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.

Cyber terrorism would destroy the economy, cause food shortages, and extinction. Guterl 12.
Guterl, (executive editor) – Scientific American, 11/28/’12.
(Fred, “Armageddon 2.0,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) The world lived for half a century with the constant specter of nuclear war and its potentially devastating consequences. The end of the Cold War took the potency out of this Armageddon scenario, yet the existential dangers have only multiplied. Today the technologies that pose some of the biggest problems are not so much military as commercial. They come from biology, energy production, and the information sciences -- and are the very technologies that have fueled our prodigious growth as a species. They are far more seductive than nuclear weapons, and more difficult to extricate ourselves from. The technologies we worry about today form the basis of our global civilization and are essential to our survival. The mistake many of us make about the darker aspects of our high-tech civilization is in thinking that we have plenty of time to address them. We may, if we're lucky. But it's more likely that we have less time than we think. There may be a limited window of opportunity for preventing catastrophes such as pandemics, runaway climate change, and cyber attacks on national power grids. Emerging diseases. The influenza pandemic of 2009 is a case in point. Because of rising prosperity and travel, the world has grown more conducive to a destructive flu virus in recent years, many public health officials believe. Most people probably remember 2009 as a time when health officials overreacted. But in truth, the 2009 virus came from nowhere, and by the time it reached the radar screens of health officials, it was already well on its way to spreading far and wide. "H1N1 caught us all with our pants down," says flu expert Robert G. Webster of St. Jude Children's Research Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee. Before it became apparent that the virus was a mild one, health officials must have felt as if they were staring into the abyss. If the virus had been as deadly as, say, the 1918 flu virus or some more recent strains of bird flu, the result would have rivaled what the planners of the 1950s expected from a nuclear war. It would have been a "total disaster," Webster says. "You wouldn't get the gasoline for your car, you wouldn't get the electricity for your power, you wouldn't get the medicines you need. Society as we know it would fall apart." Climate change. Climate is another potentially urgent risk. It's easy to think about greenhouse gases as a long-term problem, but the current rate of change in the Arctic has alarmed more and more scientists in recent years. Tim Lenton, a climate scientist at the University of Exeter in England, has looked at climate from the standpoint of tipping points -- sudden changes that are not reflected in current climate models. We may already have reached a tipping point -- a transition to a new state in which the Arctic is ice-free during the summer months. Perhaps the most alarming of Lenton's tipping points is the Indian summer monsoon. Smoke from household fires, and soot from automobiles and buses in crowded cities, rises into the atmosphere and drifts out over the Indian Ocean, changing the atmospheric dynamics upon which the monsoon depends -- keeping much of the sun's energy from reaching the surface, and lessening the power of storms. At the same time, the buildup of greenhouse gases -- emitted mainly from developed countries in the northern hemisphere -- has a very different effect on the Indian summer monsoon: It makes it stronger. These two opposite influences make the fate of the monsoon difficult to predict and subject to instability. A small influence -- a bit more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and a bit more brown haze -- could have an outsize effect. The Indian monsoon, Lenton believes, could be teetering on a knife's edge, ready to change abruptly in ways that are hard to predict. What happens then? More than a billion people depend on the monsoon's rains. Other tipping points may be in play, says Lenton. The West African monsoon is potentially near a tipping point. So are Greenland's glaciers, which hold enough water to raise sea levels by more than 20 feet; and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, which has enough ice to raise sea levels by at least 10 feet. Regional tipping points could hasten the ill effects of climate change more quickly than currently projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Computer hacking. The computer industry has already made it possible for computers to handle a variety of tasks without human intervention. Autonomous computers, using techniques formerly known as artificial intelligence, have begun to exert control in virtually every sphere of our lives. Cars, for instance, can now take action to avoid collisions. To do this, a car has to make decisions: When does it take control? How much braking power should be applied, and to which wheels? And when should the car allow its reflex-challenged driver to regain control? Cars that drive themselves, currently being field tested, could hit dealer showrooms in a few years. Autonomous computers can make our lives easier and safer, but they can also make them more dangerous. A case in point is Stuxnet, the computer worm designed by the US and Israel to attack Iran's nuclear fuel program. It is a watershed in the brief history of malware -- the Jason Bourne of computer code, designed for maximum autonomy and effectiveness. Stuxnet's creators gave their program the best training possible: they stocked it with detailed technical knowledge that would come in handy for whatever situation Stuxnet could conceivably encounter. Although the software included rendezvous procedures and communication codes for reporting back to headquarters, Stuxnet was built to survive and carry out its mission even if it found itself cut off. The uranium centrifuges that Stuxnet attacked are very similar in principle to the generators that power the US electrical grid. Both are monitored and controlled by programmable-logic computer chips. Stuxnet cleverly caused the uranium centrifuges to throw themselves off-balance, inflicting enough damage to set the Iranian nuclear industry back by 18 months or more. A similar piece of malware installed on the computers that control the generators at the base of the Grand Coulee Dam would likewise cause them to shake, rattle, and roll -- and eventually explode. If Stuxnet-like malware were to insinuate itself into a few hundred power generators in the United States and attack them all at once, the damage would be enough to cause blackouts on the East and West Coasts. With such widespread destruction, it could take many months to restore power to the grid. It seems incredible that this should be so, but the worldwide capacity to manufacture generator parts is limited. Generators generally last 30 years, sometimes 50, so normally there's little need for replacements. The main demand for generators is in China, India, and other parts of rapidly developing Asia. That's where the manufacturers are -- not in the United States. Even if the United States, in crisis mode, put full diplomatic pressure on supplier nations -- or launched a military invasion to take over manufacturing facilities -- the capacity to ramp up production would be severely limited. Worldwide production currently amounts to only a few hundred generators per year. The consequences of going without power for months, across a large swath of the United States, would be devastating. Backup electrical generators in hospitals and other vulnerable facilities would have to rely on fuel that would be in high demand. Diabetics would go without their insulin; heart attack victims would not have their defibrillators; and sick people would have no place to go. Businesses would run out of inventory and extra capacity. Grocery stores would run out of food, and deliveries of all sorts would virtually cease (no gasoline for trucks and airplanes, trains would be down). As we saw with the blackouts caused by Hurricane Sandy, gas stations couldn't pump gas from their tanks, and fuel-carrying trucks wouldn't be able to fill up at refueling stations. Without power, the economy would virtually cease, and if power failed over a large enough portion of the country, simply trucking in supplies from elsewhere would not be adequate to cover the needs of hundreds of millions of people. People would start to die by the thousands, then by the tens of thousands, and eventually the millions. The loss of the power grid would put nuclear plants on backup, but how many of those systems would fail, causing meltdowns, as we saw at Fukushima? The loss in human life would quickly reach, and perhaps exceed,  After eight to 10 days, about 72 percent of all economic activity, as measured by GDP, would shut down, according to an analysis by Scott Borg, a cybersecurity expert.

Case
A2 Impact
The disad outweighs the case – 

Disad turns the case – campus terror results in massive neoliberalism. 

Immediacy – attacks coming now and getting held off, terror results in mass extinction; social change of the AFF takes time. 

They only get really minor access to their impacts – they can’t solve all of neoliberalism. Their impact is about global cap

Tournament: Golden Desert | Round: 3 | Opponent: Brentwood ELi | Judge: Sean Fee
1NC

Off

1NC – K

Reform within the corporatized university is impossible – the university is built to make speech seem effective, when in reality the university plays a central role in the knowledge is turned into a commodity. Only a direct and unflinching critique of class can solve. The critique turns the case - Monzó 14

Monzó, Lilia D Chapman University, California, United States. "A critical pedagogy for democracy: Confronting higher education’s neoliberal agenda with a critical Latina feminist episteme." Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies (JCEPS) 12.1 (2014): 73-100.

In this contradictory version of Freirian thought, praxis becomes civic engagement that focuses¶ solely on reforms that increase opportunities within the existing capitalist system. Such efforts¶ alone obfuscate the role of class and unwittingly support the existing structure by treating¶ capitalism as a proverbial and impermeable reality or suggesting that minimizing inequalities is¶ both possible and sufficient to creating a just society. Within this liberal agenda, terms such as¶ liberation and freedom index narrow political conceptions such as freedom of speech and¶ freedom of the press – ideologies associated with “democratic” advanced capitalist societies that¶ while important do not address the most fundamental human right – the freedom from necessity¶ and from alienation. A socialist democracy that emphasizes freedom and participation among all¶ citizens, regardless of gender, race, or other social positioning is untenable within a capitalist¶ economy. The extreme and widening gap between the wealthy and the poor, the focus on labor¶ power as opposed to real power, the extortion of surplus value off the poor to maximize profits¶ for the wealthy, the relegation of poverty and a hyper exploitation of racialized communities and especially women of color in the U.S. and across the world, and the alienation experienced by all¶ human beings are incompatible with a democratic way of life.¶ Revolutionary critical pedagogy as developed by Paula Allman, Peter McLaren, and others¶ reinserts a fundamental Marxist emphasis on interrogating and transforming the totalizing nature¶ of capitalism that engulfs humanity through not only political economy but social and cultural¶ relations. These scholars reject and critique the liberal trend to reform, recognizing these as¶ unable to stop the destruction that is inherent in the labor capital social relation calling instead¶ for creating the conditions for revolutionary change that would transform the forces of¶ production outside of capital’s value form. Revolutionary critical pedagogues call for a¶ “collective struggle” across racial, ethnic, gender, and national lines (Darder, 2014). They¶ understand that while racism and patriarchy must be fought these struggles alone will not end¶ human suffering and exploitation. As Darder and Torres (2004) argue, as long as there exists a¶ need for a mass of exploited workers as is needed under capitalism, these will undoubtedly be¶ made of predominantly racialized minorities who have been made thus in order to preserve the¶ dominance of an elite white transnational capitalist class. Racism is not an accident but an¶ orchestrated material reality that hides the role of the capitalist class and sets up workers of “said¶ working class and middle class sectors” to compete with each other for presumed less¶ exploitative jobs, educational opportunities, and a myriad of other social and economic resources¶ all the while the capitalists who own the bulk of the worlds resources are rarely considered in the¶ equation, must less confronted. Likewise, struggles against patriarchy cannot be forged without¶ forging a struggle against capitalism since the exploitation of women in the U.S. and across the¶ world is an important source of capital accumulation of transnational corporations. Thus, while I¶ champion struggles that confront racial and gender oppression and also work to mitigate¶ conditions of exploitation, I also argue that these struggles must be simultaneously accompanied¶ by and conjoined with broader struggles against the capitalist class that aim to transform existing¶ social relations of production. I reject the domesticated version of critical pedagogy discussed¶ earlier in favor of a Marxist revolutionary critical pedagogy that is based on developing clarity¶ rather than charity in which human beings are liberated from wage slavery through a process that¶ necessitates – demands – revolution (Freire, 1970). According to Freire (1970), the oppressed are tasked with forging this revolution because they¶ have insights into the nature of oppression that are necessarily hidden from the dominant group.¶ Thus, the participation of non-dominant groups in the decision-making of our society is a critical¶ component of advancing democracy. If democracy embodies the notion that the diverse¶ perspectives of different individuals and groups add to our collective understanding of society¶ and to moving us forward as human beings, then we must recognize the need to bring the diverse¶ epistemes of women, people of color and other marginalized groups into the spaces that¶ legitimize knowledge – specifically, the university. The university plays a central role in the production of legitimate knowledge. While some have¶ celebrated its historical role in the “advancement” of society through teaching and scholarship,¶ others have called it an “ivory tower” espousing to a presumed superior Eurocentric episteme¶ and positioned outside the sphere of the commons (Basole, 2009). Miller (2009) points out that¶ the university, since inception, has been complicit with the state in promoting cultural¶ imperialism and supporting research that responded to the state’s economic and political ends.¶ Yet in so far as its rhetoric of “academic freedom” must be maintained in order to suppress its¶ relationship to capital interests, it provides the spaces for dissent among faculty and students.¶ Indeed one of the fundamental functions of the university is social critique. University students,¶ energized by their newfound critical acumen, have often been the first in society to vociferously¶ exclaim their outrage in protests and other rebellions (Zill, 2011).¶ The rise of neoliberalism, however, has led to the corporatization of the university and to what is¶ being called “knowledge capitalism,” which has strengthened existing ties between universities¶ and capital interests and dangerously undermining the role of the university as the context with¶ the greatest potential to address social problems and equality. Mike Peters (2011) points out that¶ universities are increasingly clamoring to join the game of marketization, selling themselves to¶ students and investors with consequences to program development, curriculum, and research.¶ Indeed many university presidents now sit on boards of corporations, which could mean conflicts¶ of interest with respect to what the university’s goals are in terms of either advancing the ideals¶ of democracy or corporate interests. It would seem that the latter is winning out. Rather than a social service to society, education is increasingly seen as a highly lucrative commodity¶ purchased by students at grotesquely huge tuitions that will leave students in debt for years to¶ come. Students are, thus, seen as a large source of revenue for banks and other financial¶ institutions.¶ The neoliberal emphasis on privatization, standardization, and accountability is increasingly¶ witnessed at both structural levels and in programmatic and curriculum planning. Similar to the¶ dehumanizing ethic of many transnational corporations that have moved their factories to the so¶ called “third world” to maximize their profits through cheap labor, a number of U.S. universities¶ are seeking new markets for exploitation in the “developing” world where local faculty are often¶ hired at very low wages and as part timers without job security (Ross, 2009). While some may¶ argue that providing university education to students in these countries is a moral imperative, an¶ important concern is how this “offshoring” may result in further distribution of western¶ knowledge systems in non-western countries. In a similar vein, we are also seeing fewer tenure¶ line positions and an increase of poorly paid adjunct positions in U.S. campuses.¶ Faculty research and other scholarly projects are increasingly being reshaped to become more¶ palatable to the business community or boards of trustees. Further impacting faculty are the¶ increasing demands for increased productivity in the form of publications in specialized¶ academic journals, closely tied to tenure and promotion decisions. This increased output and¶ competition are creating a proliferation of journals and articles for consumption that do not¶ necessarily strengthen quality and instead put tremendous pressure and increased workloads on¶ faculty. The standardization of productivity that facilitates accountability has led to a narrowing¶ of what counts as knowledge, with a return to notions of objective and measurable research being¶ considered more rigorous and scientific than qualitative and participatory approaches.¶ The corporate university necessarily functions to prepare students and society to participate in a¶ market economy. However, while the university does prepare citizens to fill jobs it must also¶ engage students in questioning and critiquing the existing structures of society, to recognize and¶ confront policies and practices that are undemocratic, and to learn to imagine and conceive of¶ alternatives that may bring greater equality and a new social order. When what is taught and learned becomes significantly determined through business interests it is difficult for the¶ university to retain autonomy toward these ends as they prove to be in direct conflict to capital¶ interests (Giroux, 2009).

Protests are a reactive form of politics that cede political institutions – independently turns the Sanders 1AC ev. Srniceke 15
Srnicek, PHD, and Williams, PhD Candidate , 15
(Nick, PhD IR @LSE, Alex, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a world without work)
Today it appears that the greatest amount of effort is needed to achieve the smallest degree of change. Millions march against the Iraq War, yet it goes ahead as planned. Hundreds of thousands protest austerity, but unprecedented budget cuts continue. Repeated student protests, occupations and riots struggle against rises in tuition fees, but they continue their inexorable advance. Around the world, people set up protest camps and mobilise against economic inequality, but the gap between the rich and the poor keeps growing. From the alter-globalisation struggles of the late 1990s, through the antiwar and ecological coalitions of the early 2000s, and into the new student uprisings and Occupy movements since 2008, a common pattern emerges: resistance struggles rise rapidly, mobilise increasingly large numbers of people, and yet fade away only to be replaced by a renewed sense of apathy, melancholy and defeat. Despite the desires of millions for a better world, the effects of these movements prove minimal. A FUNNY THING HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO THE PROTEST Failure permeates this cycle of struggles, and as a result, many of the tactics on the contemporary left have taken on a ritualistic nature, laden with a heavy dose of fatalism. The dominant tactics - protesting, marching, occupying, and various other forms of direct action - have become part of a well established narrative, with the people and the police each playing their assigned roles. The limits of these actions are particularly visible in those brief moments when the script changes. As one activist puts it, of a protest at the 2001 Summit of the Americas: On April 20, the first day of the demonstrations, we marched in our thousands towards the fence, behind which 34 heads of state had gathered to hammer out a hemispheric trade deal. Under a hail of catapult-launched teddy bears, activists dressed in black quickly removed the fence’s supports with bolt cutters and pulled it down with grapples as onlookers cheered them on. For a brief moment, nothing stood between us and the convention centre. We scrambled atop the toppled fence, but for the most part we went no further, as if our intention all along had been simply to replace the state's chain-link and concrete barrier with a human one of our own making.1 We see here the symbolic and ritualistic nature of the actions, combined with the thrill of having done something - but with a deep uncertainty that appears at the first break with the expected narrative. The role of dutiful protestor had given these activists no indication of what to do when the barriers fell. Spectacular political confrontations like the Stop the War marches, the now-familiar melees against the G20 or World Trade Organization and the rousing scenes of democracy in Occupy Wall Street all give the appearance of being highly significant, as if something were genuinely at stake.2 Yet nothing changed, and long-term victories were traded for a simple registration of discontent. To outside observers, it is often not even clear what the movements want, beyond expressing a generalised discontent with the world. The contemporary protest has become a melange of wild and varied demands. The 2009 G20 summit in London, for instance, featured protestors marching for issues that spanned from grandiose anti-capitalist stipulations to modest goals centred on more local issues. When demands can be discerned at all, they usually fail to articulate anything substantial. They are often nothing more than empty slogans - as meaningful as calling for world peace. In more recent struggles, the very idea of making demands has been questioned. The Occupy movement infamously struggled to articulate meaningful goals, worried that anything too substantial would be divisive.5 And a broad range of student occupations across the Western world has taken up the mantra of ‘no demands’ under the misguided belief that demanding nothing is a radical act.4 When asked what the ultimate upshot of these actions has been, participants differ between admitting to a general sense of futility and pointing to the radicalisation of those who took part. If we look at protests today as an exercise in public awareness, they appear to have had mixed success at best. Their messages are mangled by an unsympathetic media smitten by images of property destruction - assuming that the media even acknowledges a form of contention that has become increasingly repetitive and boring. Some argue that, rather than trying to achieve a certain end, these movements, protests and occupations in fact exist only for their own sake.5 The aim in this case is to achieve a certain transformation of the participants, and create a space outside of the usual operations of power. While there is a degree of truth to this, things like protest camps tend to remain ephemeral, small-scale and ultimately unable to challenge the larger structures of the neoliberal economic system. This is politics transmuted into pastime - politics-as-drug experience, perhaps - rather than anything capable of transforming society. Such protests are registered only in the minds of their participants, bypassing any transformation of social structures. While these efforts at radicalisation and awareness-raising are undoubtedly important to some degree, there still remains the question of exactly when these sequences might pay off. Is there a point at which a critical mass of consciousness-raising will be ready for action? Protests can build connections, encourage hope and remind people of their power. Yet, beyond these transient feelings, politics still demands the exercise of that power, lest these affective bonds go to waste. If we will not act after one of the largest crises of capitalism, then when? The emphasis on the affective aspects of protests plays into a broader trend that has come to privilege the affective as the site of real politics. Bodily, emotional and visceral elements come to replace and stymie (rather than complement and enhance) more abstract analysis. The contemporary landscape of social media, for example, is littered with the bitter fallout from an endless torrent of outrage and anger. Given the individualism of current social media platforms - premised on the maintenance of an online identity - it is perhaps no surprise to see online ‘politics’ tend towards the selfpresentation of moral purity. We are more concerned to appear right than to think about the conditions of political change. Yet these daily outrages pass as rapidly as they emerge, and we are soon on to the next vitriolic crusade. In other places, public demonstrations of empathy with those suffering replace more finely tuned analysis, resulting in hasty or misplaced action - or none at all. While politics always has a relationship to emotion and sensation (to hope or anger, fear or outrage), when taken as the primary mode of politics, these impulses can lead to deeply perverse results. In a famous example, 1985's Live Aid raised huge amounts of money for famine relief through a combination of heartstring-tugging imagery and emotionally manipulative celebrity-led events. The sense of emergency demanded urgent action, at the expense of thought. Yet the money raised actually extended the civil war causing the famine, by allowing rebel militias to use the food aid to support themselves.6 While viewers at home felt comforted they were doing something rather than nothing, a dispassionate analysis revealed that they had in fact contributed to the problem. These unintended outcomes become even more pervasive as the targets of action grow larger and more abstract. If politics without passion leads to cold-hearted, bureaucratic technocracy, then passion bereft of analysis risks becoming a libidinally driven surrogate for effective action. Politics comes to be about feelings of personal empowerment, masking an absence of strategic gains. Perhaps most depressing, even when movements have some successes, they are in the context of overwhelming losses. Residents across the UK, for example, have successfully mobilised in particular cases to stop the closure of local hospitals. Yet these real successes are overwhelmed by larger plans to gut and privatise the National Health Service. Similarly, recent anti-fracking movements have been able to stop test drilling in various localities - but governments nevertheless continue to search for shale gas resources and provide support for companies to do so.7 In the United States, various movements to stop evictions in the wake of the housing crisis have made real gains in terms of keeping people in their homes.8 Yet the perpetrators of the subprime mortgage debacle continue to reap the profits, waves of foreclosures continue to sweep across the country, and rents continue to surge across the urban world. Small successes - useful, no doubt, for instilling a sense of hope - nevertheless wither in the face of overwhelming losses. Even the most optimistic activist falters in the face of struggles that continue to fail. In other cases, well-intentioned projects like Rolling Jubilee strive to escape the spell of neoliberal common sense.9 The ostensibly radical aim of crowdsourcing money to pay the debts of the underprivileged means buying into a system of voluntary charity and redistribution, as well as accepting the legitimacy of the debt in the first place. In this respect, the initiative is one among a larger group of projects that act simply as crisis responses to the faltering of state services. These are survival mechanisms, not a desirable vision for the future. What can we conclude from all of this? The recent cycle of struggles has to be identified as one of overarching failure, despite a multitude of smallscale successes and moments of large-scale mobilisation. The question that any analysis of the left today must grapple with is simply: What has gone wrong? It is undeniable that heightened repression by states and the increased power of corporations have played a significant role in weakening the power of the left. Still, it remains debatable whether the repression faced by workers, the precarity of the masses and the power of capitalists is any greater than it was in the late nineteenth century. Workers then were still struggling for basic rights, often against states more than willing to use lethal violence against them.10 But whereas that period saw mass mobilisation, general strikes, militant labour and radical women’s organisations all achieving real and lasting successes, today is defined by their absence. The recent weakness of the left cannot simply be chalked up to increased state and capitalist repression: an honest reckoning must accept that problems also lie within the left. One key problem is a widespread and uncritical acceptance of what we call ‘folk-political’ thinking. (5-9) 

Their activism is based on the idea that speaking loud enough will make our voices heard – this solidifies cap also takes out 1AC Brown ev.. Rickford 16
Russel Rickford (an associate professor of history at Cornell University. He is the author of We Are an African People: Independent Education, Black Power, and the Radical Imagination. A specialist on the Black Radical Tradition, he teaches about social movements, black transnationalism, and African-American political culture after World War Two). “The Fallacies of Neoliberal Protest”. Black Perspectives. September 24, 2016. http://www.aaihs.org/the-fallacies-of-neoliberal-protest/  AGM

Fallacy Number Three: The Myth of the Disembodied Voice. Part of capitalism’s response to grassroots opposition is to assure the distressed that their “voice” is heard. That the authorities who “hear” you also enable your brutalization is immaterial. The point is to convince you of your continued stake in the system. It is to guide you toward the politics of representation and away from the politics of resistance. Of course, there are other fallacies employed by the oppressor to confuse the oppressed. The fallacy of inclusion v. transformation, for example. Or the fallacy of “diversity” v. genuine antiracism. We are taught to be patriotic, to be patient, to strive to embody the very values of peace and goodwill that this society defiles. These and other myths only perpetuate the system. They leave intact our society’s basic power relations. And they cause us to police ourselves and to seek interpersonal reconciliation rather than confront structural racism and oppression. Truth is, we don’t need “diversity” training. We don’t need focus groups. We don’t need consultants and experts. We don’t need the apparatus of our oppression—racial capitalism itself—to rationalize and regulate our dissent. The logic and techniques of the corporate world won’t end the slaughter of black people, or the dispossession and degradation of indigenous people, or the transformation of the entire Global South into a charred landscape of corpses and refugees. We need an uncompromising, multiracial, grassroots movement against white supremacy, endless war, and vicious corporate capitalism. We need to build solidarity with the resistance in Charlotte, Standing Rock, and Puerto Rico. We need to join the rebellions of workers and the colonized all over the world.This is a human rights struggle. And it will be waged in the streets, not in boardrooms, the halls of Congress, or other strongholds of global capital.

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return. 

The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Oparah 14
Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).
¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization  of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets.

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid.
And, reject the demand for a plan - neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan – takes out the 1AC Giroux ev. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file
RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. A. Prescription: More Politics The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor, 137 many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s marginalization. B. Prescription: More Normativity Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a number of pitfalls. The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the “distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the societal pie and redistribution is about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain of discourse or ideology. Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like Hayek’s theory, “law and economics is full of stories about how liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it instead folds them into one another: “The Law and Economics movement is rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive communitarian ideal will win.150 Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by her capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for her own needs and service her own ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152 If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as “undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be countered differently. More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. C. Prescription: Acceptance The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in “taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be “self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce the momentum to move forward. VII CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate the practice of critique within the legal academy. A. Why Critique Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: critique. Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies them. Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no alternative.
1NC – DA

 New terror regulations stop campus attacks but OSU attack prove rising risk of campus terror. Bernstein 11/29
“Terror attack at Ohio State University prompts Senators to rethink 'extreme vetting,'” Leandra Bernstein, 11/29/16, KBOI2 (Associated Press).  
The violent attack at Ohio State University (OSU) on Monday, being investigated as an act of terror by a Somali refugee living legally in the United States, has led some in Congress to look favorably at the policies of the incoming Donald Trump administration, including the "extreme vetting" of individuals seeking entry to the country.¶ On Monday, an Ohio State student identified as Abdul Razak Ali Artan, drove his car into a group of people on the main campus in Columbus before attacking bystanders with a butcher knife. Artan was subdued by an Ohio State police officer who fatally shot him after he had injured 11 people.¶ As the event was unfolding on Monday, Trump issued a brief message of support to the students and faculty at OSU and first responders. As information about the apparently radicalized Somali-born suspect came in, it prompted many to reflect on Trump's campaign promises to strengthen the vetting of individuals coming to the country and also initiate a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States." Prior to Trump's early campaign statement calling for an end to Muslim immigration to the United States (until U.S. representatives "can figure out what is going on"), Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) introduced a bill to officially pause the resettlement of refugees entering the United States from 33 terror-prone countries, including Somalia. The bill also proposed strengthening the system of background checks.¶ On Tuesday, Paul told Sinclair Broadcast Group, "I am still for putting a pause" on resettlement. He explained that the pause should relate to specific goals, including putting in place a better system to monitor individuals who come into the country as immigrants or on a U.S. visa.¶ Even though his proposal to block terrorists from taking advantage of the U.S. visa and immigration system was defeated back in December 2015, Paul now sees an opportunity to revisit the proposal under a new administration that is "more inclined" to enforce laws that prevent the abuse of immigration and visa laws.¶ "Trump talked about 'extreme vetting,' and I think there needs to be more significant vetting of those who want to come to our country," Paul insisted. "We need to get a better handle on this." Former Trump rival, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) reacted to the the incident at Ohio State University, saying it is a reminder that the United States government "should not be letting people in this country who are security risks." Cruz noted that unlike the Obama administration, the incoming Trump administration is likely to work harder to prevent terrorists from entering the United States.¶ "I am optimistic that the new administration will put, as a far higher priority, keeping this country safe and protecting us against radical Islamic terrorism," Cruz said.¶ For Senate Homeland Security Committee chairman, Ron Johnson (R-Wis.), Trump's pledge to secure the border is even more important than implementing a stricter vetting process for refugees.¶ "I am far more concerned about Islamic terrorists potentially coming through our incredibly porous southern border" Johnson said. "Which is why I am completely supportive of President-elect Trump's commitment to secure the border."¶ With little information about the suspect in the Ohio State University attack, now is not the time prejudge the incident or make broad-reaching policy decisions, according to some lawmakers.¶ Only 24 hours after the attack, it is just too soon to jump to conclusions about the suspect, says Ohio Democrat, Sherrod Brown.¶ "These attacks are always a tragedy for our community," he stated. "I want to know more about this young man's journey to the U.S., and his background... before making a judgment," Brown added. For others, like Georgia Senator Johnny Isakson (R), now is also not the right time to be reactive or push major policy changes. Although Isakson supported previous legislative efforts to curb refugee resettlement from Syria and Iraq, he advised on Tuesday not to let one incident determine changes in existing policy. ¶ The OSU attack "certainly raises the question about Somali refugees," Isakson noted, but the overall policy towards refugees should be reexamined on "an ongoing basis," not just in response to particular events.¶ Law enforcement officials have indicated that they are still a long way from establishing Artan's motives in carrying out the Monday assault. According to media reports, prior to carrying out the attack, Artan posted an anti-American rant on Facebook, where he praised the U.S. citizen turned Islamist cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, as a "hero," and referred to American officials' inability to stop "lone wolf attacks."¶ Law enforcement officials have not made any official findings connecting Artan to the Islamic State, but in a Tuesday internet posting, ISIS claimed the attacker was a "soldier" of the terrorist group. Earlier this month, ISIS issued instructions to its adherents abroad to carry out attacks using knives and cars. Preliminary reports indicate that Artan was born in Somalia and lived there until 2007, when he and his family resettled in Pakistan. Around 2014, the family arrived in the United States as refugees, staying in Dallas temporarily before relocating to Columbus, Ohio, a city with a sizable Somali community. Artan attended Columbus State Community College and graduated last spring before enrolling at OSU.¶ As the identity of the Ohio State attacker was revealed by state law enforcement officials, Ohio's openness to refugees, particularly of Somali origin, came under fire. Even though the states have little power to control refugee flows into their borders, many took to social media to blame Ohio Governor John Kasich, saying that the attack “is on you.” Though critical of the Obama administration's plan to accept additional Syrian refugees into the United States, Kasich has generally spoken favorably about integrating new citizens into his state. According to the Somali Association of Ohio, there are at least 38,000 Somali immigrants and refugees living in the Columbus metropolitan area, with an addition 200 immigrants expected to arrive monthly within the next four years.¶ Earlier this year, the Obama administration announced new targets for resettling refugees after settling 85,000 in FY 2016 and aiming for 110,000 in 2017. Obama's announcement followed on the heels of a heated reaction from the public and lawmakers to revelations that one of the suspects in the Nov. 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris has reportedly entered Europe as a refugee.¶ The Paris attack, which left 130 civilians dead, triggered U.S. officials to begin rethinking federal policies, it prompted changes in visa waiver laws, and a reconsideration of visa-free travel from Europe. It also led to dozens of state governors openly rejecting the resettlement of Syrian refugees in their states.¶ In a prescient testimony before the Senate Homeland Security Committee in 2015, national security analyst Peter Bergen warned that acts of violence perpetrated by homegrown extremists posted "a more immediate challenge" than the threat of foreign terrorists. He warned that the "more likely threat" to the United States came from individuals inspired by ISIS or other militant groups, and who may never even come into direct contact with these groups.¶ The threat of homegrown extremism prompted Obama's Department of Homeland Security to work on a new phase of domestic counter-terrorism efforts. In 2016, DHS stood up a number of community engagement programs, designed to work with members of at-risk communities, including American-Muslim communities, to identify and redirect potential lone wolf attackers, or individuals who could be heading down the path of radicalization. 

FS zones k2 prevent campus terrorist attacks – it allows law enforcement to defend and prevent better – the specific link is the 1AC Herold ev. Zeiner 05
Zoned Out! Examining Campus Speech Zones, Carol L. Zeiner (Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami Gardens, Florida; former College Attorney for Miami-Dade Community College (now Miami-Dade College)), Louisiana Law Review (Volume 66, No. 1), Fall 2005.
Unfortunately, the possibility of terrorist acts must be¶ considered as well as more general concerns under the heading of¶ campus safety and security. As pointed out in Part II.D,27 there¶ are risks posed by international and domestic terrorist groups.278¶ Obviously, large gatherings constitute a particularly attractive¶ target for terrorists, although any site on a university campus might¶ be considered attractive by those bent on attacking the American¶ way of life. On the one hand, this would seem to suggest that¶ campus speech zones enable terrorists to know which areas of¶ campus might be likely targets and suggests that campus speech¶ zones should be eliminated so that free speech events could occur¶ spontaneously anywhere on campus, and terrorists would not have¶ time to plan an attack. However, it does not take much advance¶ planning to carry a weapons-laden knapsack into a crowd. Thus,¶ perhaps it is more important for security personnel to have the¶ benefit of advance planning. Moreover, security features could be¶ designed into the physical characteristics of designated speech¶ zones more practically than could be accomplished if large¶ gatherings for speech activities could occur anywhere on campus.¶ 

Campus terror sends an ideological message globally – it encourages more terror and threatens education. Flanagin 15
“Why terrorists target schools and universities,” Jake Flanagin, 04/02/2015, The Quartz.
One reason that “terrorist organizations might choose to target educational institutions is that schools and school children act as powerful symbolic targets,” wrote Emma Bradford and Margaret A. Wilson, forensic psychologists at the University of Liverpool, in a 2013 analysis for the Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology. “Attacks on these targets evoke a strong emotional response.”¶ “Schools and other educational institutions represent ‘soft targets,’” they added. “A soft target is a relatively unguarded site where people congregate, normally in large numbers, thus offering the potential for mass casualties.” But practicalities aside, there are also specific, political and cultural reasons a terrorist cell might target a school or university. And this is where such acts diverge from the usual modes of modern terror.¶ Though bombing public transport takes months, if not years of intensive planning, it is intended to make the act appear random—anyone could become a victim by passing through at the wrong time. The terrifying power of this particular terror tactic is, after all, its unpredictability. An ideological message is usually announced in the aftermath.¶ Attacking schools, however, is predictable because the act is the message. Terrorists who attack schools intend to deplete the number of institutions disseminating philosophies ostensibly contradictory to their worldview; “Boko Haram,” roughly translated from the Hausa language means “Western education is forbidden.”¶ “They’re attacking what they see as the institutions of culture, and in particular the institutions of Western culture,” Ebrahim Moosa, professor of Islamic studies at the University of Notre Dame, told The Christian Science Monitor following the attacks in Peshawar. “They see that the process of Westernization begins at school, so schools that violate strict Islamic education become targets.”¶ It’s not difficult to see why Garissa was targeted. Kenyan schools consistently rank toward the best in the region, and the overall Kenyan population demonstrates one of the highest literacy rates on the continent. It is also a highly diverse place, with regards to religion and ethnicity, not unlike many African countries occupying the borderlands between Muslim-dominated North Africa and the Christian-dominated south. Consequently, Kenyan schools and universities are well-positioned for the maximal exchange of cultures, politics, and ideas—a concept that stands in direct opposition to the rigid ideologies of groups like al-Shabab.¶ Al-Shabab has a history of interfering in local education. In areas of Somalia under the group’s control, once co-ed schools have been gender segregated, with the majority of girls being intimidated against enrolling, if not forcibly removed from schools all together. Whole classes of boys have been pulled out of schools and conscripted into its ranks.¶ In an audio message released following the attack at Garissa, Ali Mohamoud Raghe, a spokesperson for al-Shabab, said, “the university had been targeted because it was educating many Christian students in ‘a Muslim land under colony,’” according to The New York Times, “a reference to the large ethnic Somali population in a part of Kenya that Somalia once tried to claim. He called the university part of Kenya’s ‘plan to spread their Christianity and infidelity.’” Which makes al-Shabab’s objective crystal-clear, and all too familiar: to wipe out a generation of ideological non-adherents.

Turns and outweighs case: terrorism reinscribes neoliberalism and militarism into education due to fear and backlash. Di Leo et al 14  
This excerpt from the chapter titled, "Twelve Theses on Education's Future in the Age of Neoliberalism and Terrorism," is taken from the book,  Neoliberalism, Education, Terrorism: Contemporary Dialogues, by Jeffrey R. Di Leo, Henry A. Giroux, Kenneth J. Saltman and Sophia A. McClennen

1. Neoliberalism is one of the greatest threats to the future of progressive education in the United States.¶ The goal of neoliberal education policies is not to improve education, but rather to increase the profits of private corporations. Profit-driven models for education directly contrast the goals of progressive educators. The goal of progressive education is to educate students to be productive participants in democratic culture and to engage actively in critical citizenship. Such goals are not supported by neoliberal educational policy mainstays such as teaching to the test and standardized testing. Because neoliberal education policy tends to be data-driven it works against the development of a student's ability to think critically, thereby undermining the formative culture and values necessary for a democratic society. As long as the United States continues to view educational policy and practice through the lens of market-based values, there is little hope that progressive education, with its aim of educating students for critical citizenship and social and economic justice, will survive.¶ 2. The war on terror and the discourse on terrorism have intensified the militarization of education.¶ The military–industrial complex should not be the driving force of education in the United States. However, the reaction to the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, has become yet another excuse to allow the military-academic complex to drive United States educational policies, practices, and funding. Not only has funding been diverted from public education to support the war on terror, but there has also been a push to understand America and the world in a way that supports American imperial ambitions. The militarization of education encourages the rationalization of state-sanctioned violence as a social and political value and supports educational practices that validate this violence. The celebration of war as a sign of power and knowledge by the military-industrial complex obliterates the democratic values of equality, public debate of political problems, and respect for diversity. The militarized society eschews reasoned political resolutions to public problems in favor of eradication of the designated enemy/other. Hence, the war on terror is a war on democracy, difference, and thinking. Critical citizenship and democratic culture as the major goals of education cannot survive in a culture dominated by extreme fear and a war waged against an emotion, namely, terror.
   False claims of responsibility cause cyber terrorism to escalate into nuclear war. Fritz 09.
   Jason Fritz, (Bond University IR Masters) , “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, July 2009http:www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf
   This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.
   Case

A2 Impact
The disad outweighs the case –
No try or die – alt flips it

Disad turns the case – campus terror results in massive neoliberalism which allows for administrators to continue to censor.

Tournament: Golden Desert | Round: 6 | Opponent: Brentwood LR | Judge: Ryan Fink
1NC – K

Reform within the corporatized university is impossible – the university is built to make speech seem effective, when in reality the university plays a central role in the knowledge is turned into a commodity. Only a direct and unflinching critique of class can solve. The critique turns the case - Monzó 14

Monzó, Lilia D Chapman University, California, United States. "A critical pedagogy for democracy: Confronting higher education’s neoliberal agenda with a critical Latina feminist episteme." Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies (JCEPS) 12.1 (2014): 73-100.

In this contradictory version of Freirian thought, praxis becomes civic engagement that focuses¶ solely on reforms that increase opportunities within the existing capitalist system. Such efforts¶ alone obfuscate the role of class and unwittingly support the existing structure by treating¶ capitalism as a proverbial and impermeable reality or suggesting that minimizing inequalities is¶ both possible and sufficient to creating a just society. Within this liberal agenda, terms such as¶ liberation and freedom index narrow political conceptions such as freedom of speech and¶ freedom of the press – ideologies associated with “democratic” advanced capitalist societies that¶ while important do not address the most fundamental human right – the freedom from necessity¶ and from alienation. A socialist democracy that emphasizes freedom and participation among all¶ citizens, regardless of gender, race, or other social positioning is untenable within a capitalist¶ economy. The extreme and widening gap between the wealthy and the poor, the focus on labor¶ power as opposed to real power, the extortion of surplus value off the poor to maximize profits¶ for the wealthy, the relegation of poverty and a hyper exploitation of racialized communities and especially women of color in the U.S. and across the world, and the alienation experienced by all¶ human beings are incompatible with a democratic way of life.¶ Revolutionary critical pedagogy as developed by Paula Allman, Peter McLaren, and others¶ reinserts a fundamental Marxist emphasis on interrogating and transforming the totalizing nature¶ of capitalism that engulfs humanity through not only political economy but social and cultural¶ relations. These scholars reject and critique the liberal trend to reform, recognizing these as¶ unable to stop the destruction that is inherent in the labor capital social relation calling instead¶ for creating the conditions for revolutionary change that would transform the forces of¶ production outside of capital’s value form. Revolutionary critical pedagogues call for a¶ “collective struggle” across racial, ethnic, gender, and national lines (Darder, 2014). They¶ understand that while racism and patriarchy must be fought these struggles alone will not end¶ human suffering and exploitation. As Darder and Torres (2004) argue, as long as there exists a¶ need for a mass of exploited workers as is needed under capitalism, these will undoubtedly be¶ made of predominantly racialized minorities who have been made thus in order to preserve the¶ dominance of an elite white transnational capitalist class. Racism is not an accident but an¶ orchestrated material reality that hides the role of the capitalist class and sets up workers of “said¶ working class and middle class sectors” to compete with each other for presumed less¶ exploitative jobs, educational opportunities, and a myriad of other social and economic resources¶ all the while the capitalists who own the bulk of the worlds resources are rarely considered in the¶ equation, must less confronted. Likewise, struggles against patriarchy cannot be forged without¶ forging a struggle against capitalism since the exploitation of women in the U.S. and across the¶ world is an important source of capital accumulation of transnational corporations. Thus, while I¶ champion struggles that confront racial and gender oppression and also work to mitigate¶ conditions of exploitation, I also argue that these struggles must be simultaneously accompanied¶ by and conjoined with broader struggles against the capitalist class that aim to transform existing¶ social relations of production. I reject the domesticated version of critical pedagogy discussed¶ earlier in favor of a Marxist revolutionary critical pedagogy that is based on developing clarity¶ rather than charity in which human beings are liberated from wage slavery through a process that¶ necessitates – demands – revolution (Freire, 1970). According to Freire (1970), the oppressed are tasked with forging this revolution because they¶ have insights into the nature of oppression that are necessarily hidden from the dominant group.¶ Thus, the participation of non-dominant groups in the decision-making of our society is a critical¶ component of advancing democracy. If democracy embodies the notion that the diverse¶ perspectives of different individuals and groups add to our collective understanding of society¶ and to moving us forward as human beings, then we must recognize the need to bring the diverse¶ epistemes of women, people of color and other marginalized groups into the spaces that¶ legitimize knowledge – specifically, the university. The university plays a central role in the production of legitimate knowledge. While some have¶ celebrated its historical role in the “advancement” of society through teaching and scholarship,¶ others have called it an “ivory tower” espousing to a presumed superior Eurocentric episteme¶ and positioned outside the sphere of the commons (Basole, 2009). Miller (2009) points out that¶ the university, since inception, has been complicit with the state in promoting cultural¶ imperialism and supporting research that responded to the state’s economic and political ends.¶ Yet in so far as its rhetoric of “academic freedom” must be maintained in order to suppress its¶ relationship to capital interests, it provides the spaces for dissent among faculty and students.¶ Indeed one of the fundamental functions of the university is social critique. University students,¶ energized by their newfound critical acumen, have often been the first in society to vociferously¶ exclaim their outrage in protests and other rebellions (Zill, 2011).¶ The rise of neoliberalism, however, has led to the corporatization of the university and to what is¶ being called “knowledge capitalism,” which has strengthened existing ties between universities¶ and capital interests and dangerously undermining the role of the university as the context with¶ the greatest potential to address social problems and equality. Mike Peters (2011) points out that¶ universities are increasingly clamoring to join the game of marketization, selling themselves to¶ students and investors with consequences to program development, curriculum, and research.¶ Indeed many university presidents now sit on boards of corporations, which could mean conflicts¶ of interest with respect to what the university’s goals are in terms of either advancing the ideals¶ of democracy or corporate interests. It would seem that the latter is winning out. Rather than a social service to society, education is increasingly seen as a highly lucrative commodity¶ purchased by students at grotesquely huge tuitions that will leave students in debt for years to¶ come. Students are, thus, seen as a large source of revenue for banks and other financial¶ institutions.¶ The neoliberal emphasis on privatization, standardization, and accountability is increasingly¶ witnessed at both structural levels and in programmatic and curriculum planning. Similar to the¶ dehumanizing ethic of many transnational corporations that have moved their factories to the so¶ called “third world” to maximize their profits through cheap labor, a number of U.S. universities¶ are seeking new markets for exploitation in the “developing” world where local faculty are often¶ hired at very low wages and as part timers without job security (Ross, 2009). While some may¶ argue that providing university education to students in these countries is a moral imperative, an¶ important concern is how this “offshoring” may result in further distribution of western¶ knowledge systems in non-western countries. In a similar vein, we are also seeing fewer tenure¶ line positions and an increase of poorly paid adjunct positions in U.S. campuses.¶ Faculty research and other scholarly projects are increasingly being reshaped to become more¶ palatable to the business community or boards of trustees. Further impacting faculty are the¶ increasing demands for increased productivity in the form of publications in specialized¶ academic journals, closely tied to tenure and promotion decisions. This increased output and¶ competition are creating a proliferation of journals and articles for consumption that do not¶ necessarily strengthen quality and instead put tremendous pressure and increased workloads on¶ faculty. The standardization of productivity that facilitates accountability has led to a narrowing¶ of what counts as knowledge, with a return to notions of objective and measurable research being¶ considered more rigorous and scientific than qualitative and participatory approaches.¶ The corporate university necessarily functions to prepare students and society to participate in a¶ market economy. However, while the university does prepare citizens to fill jobs it must also¶ engage students in questioning and critiquing the existing structures of society, to recognize and¶ confront policies and practices that are undemocratic, and to learn to imagine and conceive of¶ alternatives that may bring greater equality and a new social order. When what is taught and learned becomes significantly determined through business interests it is difficult for the¶ university to retain autonomy toward these ends as they prove to be in direct conflict to capital¶ interests (Giroux, 2009).

Protests are a reactive form of politics that cede political institutions – independently turns the case and takes out the 1AC Sanders ev. Srniceke 15
Srnicek, PHD, and Williams, PhD Candidate , 15
(Nick, PhD IR @LSE, Alex, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a world without work)
Today it appears that the greatest amount of effort is needed to achieve the smallest degree of change. Millions march against the Iraq War, yet it goes ahead as planned. Hundreds of thousands protest austerity, but unprecedented budget cuts continue. Repeated student protests, occupations and riots struggle against rises in tuition fees, but they continue their inexorable advance. Around the world, people set up protest camps and mobilise against economic inequality, but the gap between the rich and the poor keeps growing. From the alter-globalisation struggles of the late 1990s, through the antiwar and ecological coalitions of the early 2000s, and into the new student uprisings and Occupy movements since 2008, a common pattern emerges: resistance struggles rise rapidly, mobilise increasingly large numbers of people, and yet fade away only to be replaced by a renewed sense of apathy, melancholy and defeat. Despite the desires of millions for a better world, the effects of these movements prove minimal. A FUNNY THING HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO THE PROTEST Failure permeates this cycle of struggles, and as a result, many of the tactics on the contemporary left have taken on a ritualistic nature, laden with a heavy dose of fatalism. The dominant tactics - protesting, marching, occupying, and various other forms of direct action - have become part of a well established narrative, with the people and the police each playing their assigned roles. The limits of these actions are particularly visible in those brief moments when the script changes. As one activist puts it, of a protest at the 2001 Summit of the Americas: On April 20, the first day of the demonstrations, we marched in our thousands towards the fence, behind which 34 heads of state had gathered to hammer out a hemispheric trade deal. Under a hail of catapult-launched teddy bears, activists dressed in black quickly removed the fence’s supports with bolt cutters and pulled it down with grapples as onlookers cheered them on. For a brief moment, nothing stood between us and the convention centre. We scrambled atop the toppled fence, but for the most part we went no further, as if our intention all along had been simply to replace the state's chain-link and concrete barrier with a human one of our own making.1 We see here the symbolic and ritualistic nature of the actions, combined with the thrill of having done something - but with a deep uncertainty that appears at the first break with the expected narrative. The role of dutiful protestor had given these activists no indication of what to do when the barriers fell. Spectacular political confrontations like the Stop the War marches, the now-familiar melees against the G20 or World Trade Organization and the rousing scenes of democracy in Occupy Wall Street all give the appearance of being highly significant, as if something were genuinely at stake.2 Yet nothing changed, and long-term victories were traded for a simple registration of discontent. To outside observers, it is often not even clear what the movements want, beyond expressing a generalised discontent with the world. The contemporary protest has become a melange of wild and varied demands. The 2009 G20 summit in London, for instance, featured protestors marching for issues that spanned from grandiose anti-capitalist stipulations to modest goals centred on more local issues. When demands can be discerned at all, they usually fail to articulate anything substantial. They are often nothing more than empty slogans - as meaningful as calling for world peace. In more recent struggles, the very idea of making demands has been questioned. The Occupy movement infamously struggled to articulate meaningful goals, worried that anything too substantial would be divisive.5 And a broad range of student occupations across the Western world has taken up the mantra of ‘no demands’ under the misguided belief that demanding nothing is a radical act.4 When asked what the ultimate upshot of these actions has been, participants differ between admitting to a general sense of futility and pointing to the radicalisation of those who took part. If we look at protests today as an exercise in public awareness, they appear to have had mixed success at best. Their messages are mangled by an unsympathetic media smitten by images of property destruction - assuming that the media even acknowledges a form of contention that has become increasingly repetitive and boring. Some argue that, rather than trying to achieve a certain end, these movements, protests and occupations in fact exist only for their own sake.5 The aim in this case is to achieve a certain transformation of the participants, and create a space outside of the usual operations of power. While there is a degree of truth to this, things like protest camps tend to remain ephemeral, small-scale and ultimately unable to challenge the larger structures of the neoliberal economic system. This is politics transmuted into pastime - politics-as-drug experience, perhaps - rather than anything capable of transforming society. Such protests are registered only in the minds of their participants, bypassing any transformation of social structures. While these efforts at radicalisation and awareness-raising are undoubtedly important to some degree, there still remains the question of exactly when these sequences might pay off. Is there a point at which a critical mass of consciousness-raising will be ready for action? Protests can build connections, encourage hope and remind people of their power. Yet, beyond these transient feelings, politics still demands the exercise of that power, lest these affective bonds go to waste. If we will not act after one of the largest crises of capitalism, then when? The emphasis on the affective aspects of protests plays into a broader trend that has come to privilege the affective as the site of real politics. Bodily, emotional and visceral elements come to replace and stymie (rather than complement and enhance) more abstract analysis. The contemporary landscape of social media, for example, is littered with the bitter fallout from an endless torrent of outrage and anger. Given the individualism of current social media platforms - premised on the maintenance of an online identity - it is perhaps no surprise to see online ‘politics’ tend towards the selfpresentation of moral purity. We are more concerned to appear right than to think about the conditions of political change. Yet these daily outrages pass as rapidly as they emerge, and we are soon on to the next vitriolic crusade. In other places, public demonstrations of empathy with those suffering replace more finely tuned analysis, resulting in hasty or misplaced action - or none at all. While politics always has a relationship to emotion and sensation (to hope or anger, fear or outrage), when taken as the primary mode of politics, these impulses can lead to deeply perverse results. In a famous example, 1985's Live Aid raised huge amounts of money for famine relief through a combination of heartstring-tugging imagery and emotionally manipulative celebrity-led events. The sense of emergency demanded urgent action, at the expense of thought. Yet the money raised actually extended the civil war causing the famine, by allowing rebel militias to use the food aid to support themselves.6 While viewers at home felt comforted they were doing something rather than nothing, a dispassionate analysis revealed that they had in fact contributed to the problem. These unintended outcomes become even more pervasive as the targets of action grow larger and more abstract. If politics without passion leads to cold-hearted, bureaucratic technocracy, then passion bereft of analysis risks becoming a libidinally driven surrogate for effective action. Politics comes to be about feelings of personal empowerment, masking an absence of strategic gains. Perhaps most depressing, even when movements have some successes, they are in the context of overwhelming losses. Residents across the UK, for example, have successfully mobilised in particular cases to stop the closure of local hospitals. Yet these real successes are overwhelmed by larger plans to gut and privatise the National Health Service. Similarly, recent anti-fracking movements have been able to stop test drilling in various localities - but governments nevertheless continue to search for shale gas resources and provide support for companies to do so.7 In the United States, various movements to stop evictions in the wake of the housing crisis have made real gains in terms of keeping people in their homes.8 Yet the perpetrators of the subprime mortgage debacle continue to reap the profits, waves of foreclosures continue to sweep across the country, and rents continue to surge across the urban world. Small successes - useful, no doubt, for instilling a sense of hope - nevertheless wither in the face of overwhelming losses. Even the most optimistic activist falters in the face of struggles that continue to fail. In other cases, well-intentioned projects like Rolling Jubilee strive to escape the spell of neoliberal common sense.9 The ostensibly radical aim of crowdsourcing money to pay the debts of the underprivileged means buying into a system of voluntary charity and redistribution, as well as accepting the legitimacy of the debt in the first place. In this respect, the initiative is one among a larger group of projects that act simply as crisis responses to the faltering of state services. These are survival mechanisms, not a desirable vision for the future. What can we conclude from all of this? The recent cycle of struggles has to be identified as one of overarching failure, despite a multitude of smallscale successes and moments of large-scale mobilisation. The question that any analysis of the left today must grapple with is simply: What has gone wrong? It is undeniable that heightened repression by states and the increased power of corporations have played a significant role in weakening the power of the left. Still, it remains debatable whether the repression faced by workers, the precarity of the masses and the power of capitalists is any greater than it was in the late nineteenth century. Workers then were still struggling for basic rights, often against states more than willing to use lethal violence against them.10 But whereas that period saw mass mobilisation, general strikes, militant labour and radical women’s organisations all achieving real and lasting successes, today is defined by their absence. The recent weakness of the left cannot simply be chalked up to increased state and capitalist repression: an honest reckoning must accept that problems also lie within the left. One key problem is a widespread and uncritical acceptance of what we call ‘folk-political’ thinking. (5-9) 

Their activism is based on the idea that speaking loud enough will make our voices heard – this solidifies cap, also takes out 1AC Brown ev. Rickford 16
Russel Rickford (an associate professor of history at Cornell University. He is the author of We Are an African People: Independent Education, Black Power, and the Radical Imagination. A specialist on the Black Radical Tradition, he teaches about social movements, black transnationalism, and African-American political culture after World War Two). “The Fallacies of Neoliberal Protest”. Black Perspectives. September 24, 2016. http://www.aaihs.org/the-fallacies-of-neoliberal-protest/  AGM

Fallacy Number Three: The Myth of the Disembodied Voice. Part of capitalism’s response to grassroots opposition is to assure the distressed that their “voice” is heard. That the authorities who “hear” you also enable your brutalization is immaterial. The point is to convince you of your continued stake in the system. It is to guide you toward the politics of representation and away from the politics of resistance. Of course, there are other fallacies employed by the oppressor to confuse the oppressed. The fallacy of inclusion v. transformation, for example. Or the fallacy of “diversity” v. genuine antiracism. We are taught to be patriotic, to be patient, to strive to embody the very values of peace and goodwill that this society defiles. These and other myths only perpetuate the system. They leave intact our society’s basic power relations. And they cause us to police ourselves and to seek interpersonal reconciliation rather than confront structural racism and oppression. Truth is, we don’t need “diversity” training. We don’t need focus groups. We don’t need consultants and experts. We don’t need the apparatus of our oppression—racial capitalism itself—to rationalize and regulate our dissent. The logic and techniques of the corporate world won’t end the slaughter of black people, or the dispossession and degradation of indigenous people, or the transformation of the entire Global South into a charred landscape of corpses and refugees. We need an uncompromising, multiracial, grassroots movement against white supremacy, endless war, and vicious corporate capitalism. We need to build solidarity with the resistance in Charlotte, Standing Rock, and Puerto Rico. We need to join the rebellions of workers and the colonized all over the world.This is a human rights struggle. And it will be waged in the streets, not in boardrooms, the halls of Congress, or other strongholds of global capital.

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return. 

The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Oparah 14
Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).
¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization  of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets.

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid.
And, reject the demand for a plan - neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan – takes out the 1AC Giroux ev. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file
RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. A. Prescription: More Politics The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor, 137 many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s marginalization. B. Prescription: More Normativity Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a number of pitfalls. The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the “distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the societal pie and redistribution is about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain of discourse or ideology. Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like Hayek’s theory, “law and economics is full of stories about how liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it instead folds them into one another: “The Law and Economics movement is rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive communitarian ideal will win.150 Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by her capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for her own needs and service her own ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152 If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as “undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be countered differently. More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. C. Prescription: Acceptance The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in “taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be “self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce the momentum to move forward. VII CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate the practice of critique within the legal academy. A. Why Critique Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: critique. Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies them. Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no alternative.
1NC – DA

 New terror regulations stop campus attacks but OSU attack prove rising risk of campus terror. Bernstein 11/29
“Terror attack at Ohio State University prompts Senators to rethink 'extreme vetting,'” Leandra Bernstein, 11/29/16, KBOI2 (Associated Press).  
The violent attack at Ohio State University (OSU) on Monday, being investigated as an act of terror by a Somali refugee living legally in the United States, has led some in Congress to look favorably at the policies of the incoming Donald Trump administration, including the "extreme vetting" of individuals seeking entry to the country.¶ On Monday, an Ohio State student identified as Abdul Razak Ali Artan, drove his car into a group of people on the main campus in Columbus before attacking bystanders with a butcher knife. Artan was subdued by an Ohio State police officer who fatally shot him after he had injured 11 people.¶ As the event was unfolding on Monday, Trump issued a brief message of support to the students and faculty at OSU and first responders. As information about the apparently radicalized Somali-born suspect came in, it prompted many to reflect on Trump's campaign promises to strengthen the vetting of individuals coming to the country and also initiate a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States." Prior to Trump's early campaign statement calling for an end to Muslim immigration to the United States (until U.S. representatives "can figure out what is going on"), Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) introduced a bill to officially pause the resettlement of refugees entering the United States from 33 terror-prone countries, including Somalia. The bill also proposed strengthening the system of background checks.¶ On Tuesday, Paul told Sinclair Broadcast Group, "I am still for putting a pause" on resettlement. He explained that the pause should relate to specific goals, including putting in place a better system to monitor individuals who come into the country as immigrants or on a U.S. visa.¶ Even though his proposal to block terrorists from taking advantage of the U.S. visa and immigration system was defeated back in December 2015, Paul now sees an opportunity to revisit the proposal under a new administration that is "more inclined" to enforce laws that prevent the abuse of immigration and visa laws.¶ "Trump talked about 'extreme vetting,' and I think there needs to be more significant vetting of those who want to come to our country," Paul insisted. "We need to get a better handle on this." Former Trump rival, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) reacted to the the incident at Ohio State University, saying it is a reminder that the United States government "should not be letting people in this country who are security risks." Cruz noted that unlike the Obama administration, the incoming Trump administration is likely to work harder to prevent terrorists from entering the United States.¶ "I am optimistic that the new administration will put, as a far higher priority, keeping this country safe and protecting us against radical Islamic terrorism," Cruz said.¶ For Senate Homeland Security Committee chairman, Ron Johnson (R-Wis.), Trump's pledge to secure the border is even more important than implementing a stricter vetting process for refugees.¶ "I am far more concerned about Islamic terrorists potentially coming through our incredibly porous southern border" Johnson said. "Which is why I am completely supportive of President-elect Trump's commitment to secure the border."¶ With little information about the suspect in the Ohio State University attack, now is not the time prejudge the incident or make broad-reaching policy decisions, according to some lawmakers.¶ Only 24 hours after the attack, it is just too soon to jump to conclusions about the suspect, says Ohio Democrat, Sherrod Brown.¶ "These attacks are always a tragedy for our community," he stated. "I want to know more about this young man's journey to the U.S., and his background... before making a judgment," Brown added. For others, like Georgia Senator Johnny Isakson (R), now is also not the right time to be reactive or push major policy changes. Although Isakson supported previous legislative efforts to curb refugee resettlement from Syria and Iraq, he advised on Tuesday not to let one incident determine changes in existing policy. ¶ The OSU attack "certainly raises the question about Somali refugees," Isakson noted, but the overall policy towards refugees should be reexamined on "an ongoing basis," not just in response to particular events.¶ Law enforcement officials have indicated that they are still a long way from establishing Artan's motives in carrying out the Monday assault. According to media reports, prior to carrying out the attack, Artan posted an anti-American rant on Facebook, where he praised the U.S. citizen turned Islamist cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, as a "hero," and referred to American officials' inability to stop "lone wolf attacks."¶ Law enforcement officials have not made any official findings connecting Artan to the Islamic State, but in a Tuesday internet posting, ISIS claimed the attacker was a "soldier" of the terrorist group. Earlier this month, ISIS issued instructions to its adherents abroad to carry out attacks using knives and cars. Preliminary reports indicate that Artan was born in Somalia and lived there until 2007, when he and his family resettled in Pakistan. Around 2014, the family arrived in the United States as refugees, staying in Dallas temporarily before relocating to Columbus, Ohio, a city with a sizable Somali community. Artan attended Columbus State Community College and graduated last spring before enrolling at OSU.¶ As the identity of the Ohio State attacker was revealed by state law enforcement officials, Ohio's openness to refugees, particularly of Somali origin, came under fire. Even though the states have little power to control refugee flows into their borders, many took to social media to blame Ohio Governor John Kasich, saying that the attack “is on you.” Though critical of the Obama administration's plan to accept additional Syrian refugees into the United States, Kasich has generally spoken favorably about integrating new citizens into his state. According to the Somali Association of Ohio, there are at least 38,000 Somali immigrants and refugees living in the Columbus metropolitan area, with an addition 200 immigrants expected to arrive monthly within the next four years.¶ Earlier this year, the Obama administration announced new targets for resettling refugees after settling 85,000 in FY 2016 and aiming for 110,000 in 2017. Obama's announcement followed on the heels of a heated reaction from the public and lawmakers to revelations that one of the suspects in the Nov. 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris has reportedly entered Europe as a refugee.¶ The Paris attack, which left 130 civilians dead, triggered U.S. officials to begin rethinking federal policies, it prompted changes in visa waiver laws, and a reconsideration of visa-free travel from Europe. It also led to dozens of state governors openly rejecting the resettlement of Syrian refugees in their states.¶ In a prescient testimony before the Senate Homeland Security Committee in 2015, national security analyst Peter Bergen warned that acts of violence perpetrated by homegrown extremists posted "a more immediate challenge" than the threat of foreign terrorists. He warned that the "more likely threat" to the United States came from individuals inspired by ISIS or other militant groups, and who may never even come into direct contact with these groups.¶ The threat of homegrown extremism prompted Obama's Department of Homeland Security to work on a new phase of domestic counter-terrorism efforts. In 2016, DHS stood up a number of community engagement programs, designed to work with members of at-risk communities, including American-Muslim communities, to identify and redirect potential lone wolf attackers, or individuals who could be heading down the path of radicalization. 

FS zones k2 prevent campus terrorist attacks – it allows law enforcement to defend and prevent better – the specific link is the 1AC Herold ev. Zeiner 05
Zoned Out! Examining Campus Speech Zones, Carol L. Zeiner (Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami Gardens, Florida; former College Attorney for Miami-Dade Community College (now Miami-Dade College)), Louisiana Law Review (Volume 66, No. 1), Fall 2005.
Unfortunately, the possibility of terrorist acts must be¶ considered as well as more general concerns under the heading of¶ campus safety and security. As pointed out in Part II.D,27 there¶ are risks posed by international and domestic terrorist groups.278¶ Obviously, large gatherings constitute a particularly attractive¶ target for terrorists, although any site on a university campus might¶ be considered attractive by those bent on attacking the American¶ way of life. On the one hand, this would seem to suggest that¶ campus speech zones enable terrorists to know which areas of¶ campus might be likely targets and suggests that campus speech¶ zones should be eliminated so that free speech events could occur¶ spontaneously anywhere on campus, and terrorists would not have¶ time to plan an attack. However, it does not take much advance¶ planning to carry a weapons-laden knapsack into a crowd. Thus,¶ perhaps it is more important for security personnel to have the¶ benefit of advance planning. Moreover, security features could be¶ designed into the physical characteristics of designated speech¶ zones more practically than could be accomplished if large¶ gatherings for speech activities could occur anywhere on campus.¶ 

Campus terror sends an ideological message globally – it encourages more terror and threatens education. Flanagin 15
“Why terrorists target schools and universities,” Jake Flanagin, 04/02/2015, The Quartz.
One reason that “terrorist organizations might choose to target educational institutions is that schools and school children act as powerful symbolic targets,” wrote Emma Bradford and Margaret A. Wilson, forensic psychologists at the University of Liverpool, in a 2013 analysis for the Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology. “Attacks on these targets evoke a strong emotional response.”¶ “Schools and other educational institutions represent ‘soft targets,’” they added. “A soft target is a relatively unguarded site where people congregate, normally in large numbers, thus offering the potential for mass casualties.” But practicalities aside, there are also specific, political and cultural reasons a terrorist cell might target a school or university. And this is where such acts diverge from the usual modes of modern terror.¶ Though bombing public transport takes months, if not years of intensive planning, it is intended to make the act appear random—anyone could become a victim by passing through at the wrong time. The terrifying power of this particular terror tactic is, after all, its unpredictability. An ideological message is usually announced in the aftermath.¶ Attacking schools, however, is predictable because the act is the message. Terrorists who attack schools intend to deplete the number of institutions disseminating philosophies ostensibly contradictory to their worldview; “Boko Haram,” roughly translated from the Hausa language means “Western education is forbidden.”¶ “They’re attacking what they see as the institutions of culture, and in particular the institutions of Western culture,” Ebrahim Moosa, professor of Islamic studies at the University of Notre Dame, told The Christian Science Monitor following the attacks in Peshawar. “They see that the process of Westernization begins at school, so schools that violate strict Islamic education become targets.”¶ It’s not difficult to see why Garissa was targeted. Kenyan schools consistently rank toward the best in the region, and the overall Kenyan population demonstrates one of the highest literacy rates on the continent. It is also a highly diverse place, with regards to religion and ethnicity, not unlike many African countries occupying the borderlands between Muslim-dominated North Africa and the Christian-dominated south. Consequently, Kenyan schools and universities are well-positioned for the maximal exchange of cultures, politics, and ideas—a concept that stands in direct opposition to the rigid ideologies of groups like al-Shabab.¶ Al-Shabab has a history of interfering in local education. In areas of Somalia under the group’s control, once co-ed schools have been gender segregated, with the majority of girls being intimidated against enrolling, if not forcibly removed from schools all together. Whole classes of boys have been pulled out of schools and conscripted into its ranks.¶ In an audio message released following the attack at Garissa, Ali Mohamoud Raghe, a spokesperson for al-Shabab, said, “the university had been targeted because it was educating many Christian students in ‘a Muslim land under colony,’” according to The New York Times, “a reference to the large ethnic Somali population in a part of Kenya that Somalia once tried to claim. He called the university part of Kenya’s ‘plan to spread their Christianity and infidelity.’” Which makes al-Shabab’s objective crystal-clear, and all too familiar: to wipe out a generation of ideological non-adherents.

Turns and outweighs case: terrorism reinscribes neoliberalism and militarism into education due to fear and backlash. Di Leo et al 14  
This excerpt from the chapter titled, "Twelve Theses on Education's Future in the Age of Neoliberalism and Terrorism," is taken from the book,  Neoliberalism, Education, Terrorism: Contemporary Dialogues, by Jeffrey R. Di Leo, Henry A. Giroux, Kenneth J. Saltman and Sophia A. McClennen

1. Neoliberalism is one of the greatest threats to the future of progressive education in the United States.¶ The goal of neoliberal education policies is not to improve education, but rather to increase the profits of private corporations. Profit-driven models for education directly contrast the goals of progressive educators. The goal of progressive education is to educate students to be productive participants in democratic culture and to engage actively in critical citizenship. Such goals are not supported by neoliberal educational policy mainstays such as teaching to the test and standardized testing. Because neoliberal education policy tends to be data-driven it works against the development of a student's ability to think critically, thereby undermining the formative culture and values necessary for a democratic society. As long as the United States continues to view educational policy and practice through the lens of market-based values, there is little hope that progressive education, with its aim of educating students for critical citizenship and social and economic justice, will survive.¶ 2. The war on terror and the discourse on terrorism have intensified the militarization of education.¶ The military–industrial complex should not be the driving force of education in the United States. However, the reaction to the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, has become yet another excuse to allow the military-academic complex to drive United States educational policies, practices, and funding. Not only has funding been diverted from public education to support the war on terror, but there has also been a push to understand America and the world in a way that supports American imperial ambitions. The militarization of education encourages the rationalization of state-sanctioned violence as a social and political value and supports educational practices that validate this violence. The celebration of war as a sign of power and knowledge by the military-industrial complex obliterates the democratic values of equality, public debate of political problems, and respect for diversity. The militarized society eschews reasoned political resolutions to public problems in favor of eradication of the designated enemy/other. Hence, the war on terror is a war on democracy, difference, and thinking. Critical citizenship and democratic culture as the major goals of education cannot survive in a culture dominated by extreme fear and a war waged against an emotion, namely, terror.
   False claims of responsibility cause cyber terrorism to escalate into nuclear war. Fritz 09.
   Jason Fritz, (Bond University IR Masters) , “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, July 2009http:www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf
   This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.
   Case

A2 Impact
The disad outweighs the case –
No try or die – alt flips it

Disad turns the case – campus terror results in massive neoliberalism which allows for administrators to continue to censor. 

Immediacy – attacks coming now and getting held off, terror results in mass extinction; social change of the AFF takes time.

Tournament: Grapevine | Round: 2 | Opponent: Cy-Fair KA | Judge: Kris Wright
SSD CP, Warming DA, Elections DA

See Open Source

Tournament: Grapevine | Round: 4 | Opponent: Collegiate DM | Judge: Paul Gravley
Must spec one country theory, Orientalism K, case answers to nuke propoganda

See Open Source

Tournament: Holy Cross | Round: 2 | Opponent: Prosper EH | Judge: Craig Wall
MSR CP, Warming DA, case answers to indigenous

See Open Source

Tournament: Holy Cross | Round: 3 | Opponent: Katy Taylor CR | Judge: Jonathan Alston
T - Generics, Japan Econ DA, Japan Regulations CP, case answers

See Open Source

Tournament: Holy Cross | Round: 6 | Opponent: Prosper MK | Judge: Clement Agho Otoghile
Oppression (Mills) FW and Africa PIC

Tournament: St Marks | Round: 2 | Opponent: Lynbrook SZ | Judge: Rodrigo Paramo
T - Plural, Ukraine DA, Heg Impact Turn, Terrorism case D

See Open Source

Tournament: St Marks | Round: 3 | Opponent: Immaculate Heart MC | Judge: Neel Yerneni
T - Plural, MSR CP, Warming DA, India-Russia Relations DA, 2 impact d cards

See Open Source

Tournament: St Marks | Round: 5 | Opponent: Cedar Park MT | Judge: Bekah Boyer
Armenia PIC, Russia-Armenia Relations DA, Econ DA, PIC Theory Pre-empt

See Open Source

Tournament: Stanford | Round: 1 | Opponent: Gig Harbor AH | Judge: Katya Brooun
Neoliberalism is a mafia protection racket – it defunds schools of private funding and makes them come to corporations for funding. This logic structures what speech and knowledge are free in the first place. The aff misdiagnoses the problem and lets neoliberalism slip through the cracks. Bagakis 11/15/16

Gus Bagakis retired philosophy instructor at San Francisco State University and author of "Seeing Through The System: The Invisible Class Struggle in America,"  October 15, 2016 “Neoliberalism's Decades-Long Attack on Public Universities”

One aspect of the project of neoliberalism was to reshape the population's understanding of the purpose of public institutions, such as schools and universities, to fit the corporate model. This transformation was part of a larger cultural shift that began in the '70s and '80s, when policy-makers started to see higher education more as a private (rather than public) good.¶ The plan to transform the higher education system to meet the needs of neoliberalism can be most clearly seen in a memo sent by Lewis Powell, a future member of the Supreme Court, to the US Chamber of Commerce in 1971. The memo was a response to some setbacks that befell the business community, ranging from government regulations on the environment to occupational safety and consumer protection laws. The memo presented a framework for the conservative reaction.¶ Powell stated:¶ One of the bewildering paradoxes of our time is the extent to which the enterprise system tolerates, if not participates in, its own destruction.¶ The campuses from which much of the criticism emanates are supported by  tax funds generated largely from American business, and (ii) contributions from capital funds controlled or generated by American business. The boards of trustees of our universities overwhelmingly are composed of men and women who are leaders in the system.¶ Further, he argued that¶ ... it is essential that spokesmen for the enterprise system -- at all levels and at every opportunity -- be far more aggressive than in the past ... There should be no hesitation to attack the Naders, the Marcuses and others who openly seek destruction of the system. There should not be the slightest hesitation to press vigorously in all political arenas for support of the enterprise system. Nor should there be reluctance to penalize politically those who oppose it.¶ The Powell memo's plan was to: a) defund public higher education; b) then "save" the universities with ideologically focused corporate funding friendly to "free enterprise;" c) turn universities into corporations; and d) turn the students into consumers who became educated labor products.¶ Neoliberal Plan for Defunding Universities ¶ States provide much of the funds for higher education but need to balance their budgets. So when tax revenues fall, higher education suffers, since it is a lower priority than Medicare, prisons and K-12 education. In addition, large corporations often pay little or no state income tax in states where they have large operations. In a 2011 report, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities concluded that at least 46 states have imposed cuts in the funding of higher education.¶ The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) -- a nationwide association of state legislators and corporations -- best expressed the neoliberal perspective. It successfully lobbied both the states and the federal government to reduce corporate taxes and, in effect, deprive public universities of the state and federal funds they needed.¶ In an Americans for Tax Fairness fact sheet on corporate tax rates, we can see that:¶ The corporate share of federal tax revenue has dropped by two-thirds in 60 years.¶ General Electric, Boeing, Verizon and 23 other profitable Fortune 500 firms paid no federal income taxes.¶ US corporations dodge $90 billion a year in income taxes.¶ US corporations officially hold $2.1 trillion in profits offshore.¶ Tax avoidance, plus lobbying that reduced corporate taxes, diminished the revenue for social programs, especially education. This reduced funding was coordinated with a public relations campaign claiming that public schools were failing, and that they should be privatized and would be improved if they were turned into profit-making ventures. The project is already running for K-12 education with the charter school movement, and now it's being used in higher education, as federal and state governments have gradually reduced funding.¶ The least discussed reason for reduced state revenue for social programs is our ever-growing defense budget. The Pentagon spends more on war than all 50 states combined spend on health, education, welfare and safety. Even prior to the arrival of neoliberalism, military adventures drained money from the social budget. In 1935, Gen. Smedley Butler wrote a book titled, War Is a Racket, in which he exposed greedy profit-making corporations as instigators of imperialism and war. In 1961, President Eisenhower warned of the military industrial complex as a hidden force in US politics. But the military budget is higher today than at any point since the Eisenhower administration.¶ We now have a new neoliberal-inspired military industrial complex consisting of companies, agencies, militarized policing, hidden budgets, a "deep state," private mercenaries and lobbyists that make Eisenhower's warning mild by comparison. Our budget priorities keep the country on a war footing, and our economy allows for military and homeland departments to be virtually untouchable. The current excuse for funds is "terrorism," but under neoliberalism, the actual purpose is to control the world's resources for American capitalism and to stop other countries from competing with us. As Colonel Wilkerson, echoing general Butler, stated recently: "We've privatized the ultimate public function: war ... In many respects it is now private interests that benefit most from our use of military force." A few universities are beneficiaries of war spending through their research for the war machine, but most are losers due to the financial and educational effects of the loss of funding, while the war machine grows.¶ "Saving" Defunded Universities With Corporate Funding¶ A partial replacement for the loss of public funds comes from corporate and philanthropic "gifts" and industry contracts for universities. Groups of conservative millionaires like the Koch brothers have created institutions to push the corporate agenda. They have infiltrated universities and introduced the neoliberal worldview through think tanks and programs designed to give "assistance" to those institutions that would accept their money and programs. These groups, with the combined help of the corporate controlled press and a sophisticated public relations campaign, eased the transition to the corporatization of universities.¶ Turning Universities Into Corporations¶ A 2014 Institute for Policy Studies report finds that the outcome of treating education as a commodity has led to universities mimicking business models. Presidents, chief executives and a layer of bureaucrats earning excessive salaries were established, while the earnings of the faculty declined, largely because tenured and tenure-track faculty were replaced by adjuncts (part-time faculty) and temporary faculty. Instead of giving primary focus to education, scholarship and research, colleges and universities began marketing themselves as products worth purchasing by the consumer. Science and humanities faculty were encouraged to become entrepreneurs and seek ways to profit directly from their intellectual and technical pursuits.¶ Mark Yudof, former president of the University of California, conceded that the university needed to stop viewing itself as a public institution and consider itself a "hybrid" university, bridging the divide between private and public institutions. In a time of scarce resources, privatization has emerged as a potential replacement for the historic model of community support of public universities. The danger is that when corporations fund universities, they get influence over studies and analysis produced by universities, as well as influence over the perspectives and career paths of large numbers of students. They also get use of vast resources for private gain and tax breaks associated with making donations.¶ Students as Consumers and Educated Labor Products¶ Fifty years ago, students often pursued their favorite high school subjects in college, assuming that the degree itself would guarantee a job. Not so today, as living expenses and tuition have risen. Students and their families paying the bill see themselves more as consumers of a commodity rather than engaging in a learning process. Because there is no guarantee of a good job after graduation, universities increasingly connect learning with the skills needed for the hard-to-enter job force. Education more and more becomes job training, and students become educated labor products.¶ By ensuring the need for outside sources of funding, neoliberalism set the context that led to the growth of tuition. When the federal government opened its student loan service to profit-making corporations, profit dominated. The privatized loan industry, through predatory lending schemes, offered loans to all students -- even to those who sometimes could not afford them. Their profit motive, combined with the laws passed by a highly lobbied Congress, eventually made the $1.3 trillion student debt the worst kind of debt for students, but the best for banks and debt collectors. Currently, all involved in the student loan industry make money from student debt: banks, private investors and even the federal government. This action has led to the rise of for-profit colleges whose goal was often to exploit the poor who couldn't afford to enter higher education in the first place. And finally, as Kenneth Saltman pointed out, "Shifting the costs of higher education onto students represents a kind of debt spending by youth to fund the military and corporations."¶ Resisting Neoliberalism¶ Even though neoliberalism is in decline due to the 2008 depression and weak recovery, its values and accomplishments have staying power. By using rhetoric like "individual freedom," "liberty," "personal responsibility," "privatization" and the "free market," it was able to undo much of the New Deal and restore corporate power, and in the case of higher education, be responsible for the rise in tuitions and decline in educational quality.¶ The neoliberal plan for public universities is to defund, then refund with strings attached, corporatize them into profit-makers, and turn the students into educated labor products that would fit into the economy. Its effects are most clearly expressed by Grover Norquist's quote about government: "I don't want to abolish government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub." Neoliberalism doesn't want to abolish universities; it simply wants to turn them into profitable corporations that will maintain and promote the neoliberal version of capitalism.

Free speech is an illusion propagated by corporatists – their model of rights assumes an equal playing field analogous to free market economists view of capital. The promotion of free speech perpetuates the idea that speech is a commodity, which strengthens neoliberalism’s hold on the academy. Brown 15
Brown, Wendy. Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism's stealth revolution. MIT Press, 2015.
At times, kennedy raises the pitch in Citizens United to depict limits on corporate funding of PAC ads as “an outright ban on speech”;19 at other times, he casts them merely as inappropriate government inter- vention and bureaucratic weightiness.20 But beneath all the hyperbole about government’s chilling of corporate speech is a crucial rhetorical move: the figuring of speech as analogous to capital in “the political marketplace.” on the one hand, government intervention is featured throughout the opinion as harmful to the marketplace of ideas that speech generates.21 Government restrictions damage freedom of speech just as they damage all freedoms. on the other hand, the unfettered accumulation and circulation of speech is cast as an unqual- ified good, essential to “the right of citizens to inquire...hear... speak...and use information to reach consensus itself a precondi- tion to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”22 not merely corporate rights, then, but democracy as a whole is at stake in the move to deregulate speech. Importantly, however, democ- racy is here conceived as a marketplace whose goods—ideas, opinions, and ultimately, votes—are generated by speech, just as the economic market features goods generated by capital. In other words, at the very moment that Justice kennedy deems disproportionate wealth irrele- vant to the equal rights exercised in this marketplace and the utili- tarian maximization these rights generate, speech itself acquires the status of capital, and a premium is placed on its unrestricted sources and unimpeded flow.¶ What is significant about rendering speech as capital? economiza- tion of the political occurs not through the mere application of market principles to nonmarket fields, but through the conversion of political processes, subjects, categories, and principles to economic ones. This is the conversion that occurs on every page of the kennedy opinion. If everything in the world is a market, and neoliberal markets con- sist only of competing capitals large and small, and speech is the capital of the electoral market, then speech will necessarily share cap- ital’s attributes: it appreciates through calculated investment, and it advances the position of its bearer or owner. Put the other way around, once speech is rendered as the capital of the electoral marketplace, it is appropriately unrestricted and unregulated, fungible across actors and venues, and existing solely for the advancement or enhancement of its bearer’s interests. The classic associations of political speech with freedom, conscience, deliberation, and persuasion are nowhere in sight.¶ How, precisely, is speech capital in the kennedy opinion? How does it come to be figured in economic terms where its regulation or restriction appears as bad for its particular marketplace and where its monopolization by corporations appears as that which is good for all? The transmogrification of speech into capital occurs on a number of levels in kennedy’s account. First, speech is like capital in its tendency to proliferate and circu- late, to push past barriers, to circumvent laws and other restrictions, indeed, to spite efforts at intervention or suppression.23 speech is thus rendered as a force both natural and good, one that can be wrongly impeded and encumbered, but never quashed.¶ second, persons are not merely producers, but consumers of speech, and government interference is a menace—wrong in prin- ciple and harmful in effect—at both ends. The marketplace of ideas, kennedy repeats tirelessly, is what decides the value of speech claims. every citizen must judge the content of speech for himself or herself; it cannot be a matter for government determination, just as govern- ment should not usurp other consumer choices.24 In this discussion, kennedy makes no mention of shared deliberation or judgment in politics or of voices that are unfunded and relatively powerless. He is focused on the wrong of government “commanding where a per- son may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, using censorship to control thought.”25 If speech generates goods consumed according to individual choice, govern- ment distorts this market by “banning the political speech of millions of associations of citizens” (that is, corporations) and by paternal- istically limiting what consumers may know or consider. Again, if speech is the capital of the political marketplace, then we are polit- ically free when it circulates freely. And it circulates freely only when corporations are not restricted in what speech they may fund or promulgate.¶ Third, kennedy casts speech not as a medium for expression or dialogue, but rather as innovative and productive, just as capital is. There is “a creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expres- sion” that intersects in a lively way with “rapid changes in technol- ogy” to generate the public good.26 This aspect of speech, kennedy argues, specifically “counsels against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”27 Again, the dynamism, innovativeness, and generativity of speech, like that of all capital, is dampened by government intervention.¶ Fourth, and perhaps most important in establishing speech as the capital of the electoral marketplace, kennedy sets the power of speech and the power of government in direct and zero-sum-game opposition to one another. Repeatedly across the lengthy opinion for the majority, he identifies speech with freedom and government with control, cen- sorship, paternalism, and repression.28 When free speech and govern- ment meet, it is to contest one another: the right of speech enshrined in the First Amendment, he argues, is “premised on mistrust of gov- ernmental power” and is “an essential mechanism of democracy because it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”29 Here are other variations on this theme in the opinion:¶ The First Amendment was certainly not understood by the framers to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media. It was understood as a response to the repression of speech.30¶ When Government seeks to use its full power, including criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.... The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.31 This reading of the First Amendment and of the purpose of political speech positions government and speech as warring forces parallel to those of government and capital in a neoliberal economy.

Our critique independently outweighs the case -  neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15
 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2)
Global capitalism is the 800-pound gorilla. The twin ecological and economic crises, militarism, the rise of the surveillance state, and a dysfunctional political system can all be traced to its normal operations. We need a transformative politics from below that can challenge the fundamentals of capitalism instead of today's politics that is content to treat its symptoms. The problems we face are linked to each other and to the way a capitalist society operates. We must make an effort to understand its real character. The fundamental question of our time is whether we can go beyond a system that is ravaging the Earth and secure a future with dignity for life and respect for the planet. What has capitalism done to us lately? The best science tells us that this is a do-or-die moment. We are now in the midst of the 6th mass extinction in the planetary history with 150 to 200 species going extinct every day, a pace 1,000 times greater than the 'natural' extinction rate.1 The Earth has been warming rapidly since the 1970s with the 10 warmest years on record all occurring since 1998.2 The planet has already warmed by 0.85 degree Celsius since the industrial revolution 150 years ago. An increase of 2° Celsius is the limit of what the planet can take before major catastrophic consequences. Limiting global warming to 2°C requires reducing global emissions by 6 per year. However, global carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2008.3 Capitalism has also led to explosive social inequalities. The global economic landscape is littered with rising concentration of wealth, debt, distress, and immiseration caused by the austerity-pushing elites. Take the US. The richest 20 persons have as much wealth as the bottom 150 million.4 Since 1973, the hourly wages of workers have lagged behind worker productivity rates by more than 800.5 It now takes the average family 47 years to make what a hedge fund manager makes in one hour.6 Just about a quarter of children under the age of 5 live in poverty.7 A majority of public school students are low-income.8 85 of workers feel stress on the job.9 Soon the only thing left of the American Dream will be a culture of hustling to survive. Take the global society. The world's billionaires control $7 trillion, a sum 77 times the debt owed by Greece to the European banks.10 The richest 80 possess more than the combined wealth of the bottom 50 of the global population (3.5 billion people).11 By 2016 the richest 1 will own a greater share of the global wealth than the rest of us combined.12 The top 200 global corporations wield twice the economic power of the bottom 80 of the global population.13 Instead of a global society capitalism is creating a global apartheid. What's the nature of the beast? Firstly, the "egotistical calculation" of commerce wins the day every time. Capital seeks maximum profitability as a matter of first priority. Evermore "accumulation of capital" is the system's bill of health; it is slowdowns or reversals that usher in crises and set off panic. Cancer-like hunger for endless growth is in the system's DNA and is what has set it on a tragic collision course with Nature, a finite category. Secondly, capitalism treats human labor as a cost. It therefore opposes labor capturing a fair share of the total economic value that it creates. Since labor stands for the majority and capital for a tiny minority, it follows that classism and class warfare are built into its DNA, which explains why the "middle class" is shrinking and its gains are never secure. Thirdly, private interests determine massive investments and make key decisions at the point of production guided by maximization of profits. That's why in the US the truck freight replaced the railroad freight, chemicals were used extensively in agriculture, public transport was gutted in favor of private cars, and big cars replaced small ones. What should political action aim for today? The political class has no good ideas about how to address the crises. One may even wonder whether it has a serious understanding of the system, or at least of ways to ameliorate its consequences. The range of solutions offered tends to be of a technical, legislative, or regulatory nature, promising at best temporary management of the deepening crises. The trajectory of the system, at any rate, precludes a return to its post-WWII regulatory phase. It's left to us as a society to think about what the real character of the system is, where we are going, and how we are going to deal with the trajectory of the system -- and act accordingly. The critical task ahead is to build a transformative politics capable of steering the system away from its destructive path. Given the system's DNA, such a politics from below must include efforts to challenge the system's fundamentals, namely, its private mode of decision-making about investments and about what and how to produce. Furthermore, it behooves us to heed the late environmentalist Barry Commoner's insistence on the efficacy of a strategy of prevention over a failed one of control or capture of pollutants. At a lecture in 1991, Commoner remarked: "Environmental pollution is an incurable disease; it can only be prevented"; and he proceeded to refer to "a law," namely: "if you don't put a pollutant in the environment it won't be there." What is nearly certain now is that without democratic control of wealth and social governance of the means of production, we will all be condemned to the labor of Sisyphus. Only we won't have to suffer for all eternity, as the degradation of life-enhancing natural and social systems will soon reach a point of no return. 

The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university’s economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Oparah 14
Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).
¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization  of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets.

The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. 

Neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015
(Corinne, “NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY”, Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file
RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. A. Prescription: More Politics The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor, 137 many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s marginalization. B. Prescription: More Normativity Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a number of pitfalls. The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the “distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the societal pie and redistribution is about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain of discourse or ideology. Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like Hayek’s theory, “law and economics is full of stories about how liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it instead folds them into one another: “The Law and Economics movement is rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive communitarian ideal will win.150 Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by her capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for her own needs and service her own ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152 If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as “undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be countered differently. More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. C. Prescription: Acceptance The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in “taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be “self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce the momentum to move forward. VII CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate the practice of critique within the legal academy. A. Why Critique Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: critique. Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies them. Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no alternative. 

Case

The marketplace of ideas is terrible – government influence creates a chilling effect, it acts as a palliative for broader reform, and shuts dissent into endless debate instead of action – the aff opens a procedural can of worms that makes change impossible. Inbger 84
Stanley Ingber, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: A LEGITIMIZING MYTH, Duke Law Review, February 1984 EE
The clear and present danger test presupposes that market imperfections sometimes give speakers an unacceptable level of advantage in influencing others. Because information opposing the speaker's viewpoint cannot be transmitted instantaneously to all market participants, the real market substantially departs from the theoretical one.80 Therefore, emergency situations are exempted from first amendment coverage. As long as sufficient time remains for the marketplace's process of deliberation to persist, however, and as long as lawless action is not imminent, no emergency exists and all speech must be protected. Yet the goal of free speech is not merely to have citizens enjoy participating in an effete truth-seeking process. Instead, citizens seek truth through free speech precisely to influence choice and behavior. Recognizing that beliefs are important primarily because those who hold them are likely to act accordingly, Holmes conceded that "every idea is an incitement. '81 Ironically, however, Holmes's "clear and present danger" formula allows government officials to prohibit expression precisely when such speech threatens to incite action.82 An interpretation of the first amendment that permits the state to cut off expression as soon as it comes close to being effective essentially limits the amendment's protection to encompass only abstract or innocuous communication. 83 Consequently, speech is constitutionally protected under the clear and present danger test as long as it is either ineffective84 or insignificant. 85 In either instance the test creates an establishment bias. Other factors peculiar to the clear and present danger test accentuate this bias. The test is both ad hoc and vague. Speakers receive no warning whether their contemplated speech extends beyond the parameters of constitutional protection. The test is totally contextual, giving little guidance to either the speaker or the official censor who must predict the impact of the expression. 6 For the speaker, this lack of notice fosters continuous uncertainty and thus may chill a risk-averse speaker who desires to minimize his personal legal peril.87 Such a person may censor himself by intentionally avoiding those messages he perceives as approaching the fringe of official acceptability. The official, in turn, must decide when the expression is clearly dangerous and when insufficient time exists for a full and fair hearing of responsive expression that would allow good counsel to defeat bad.88 The censor's evaluation involves a two-tiered decision. First, the official must evaluate the speech ideologically to determine whether it is good or evil, because if the speech is good the lack of sufficient time for response is irrelevant. 89 But under the market model, only the marketplace can accurately separate good from evil; therefore, no criteria can exist to determine whether speech is sufficiently evil to warrant exclusion from the market. Second, the official must calculate the seriousness of the speech's evil, because the market requires greater response time for more serious evils. This requirement forces the official to differentiate without any guidelines between evil counsel that is about to lead an insufficiently educated public astray, and good counsel that merely has convinced an adequately informed public of its "rightness." Under a test with such elasticity, speakers who proclaim any radical political doctrine may expect to receive little or no protection because they will always appear as a threat to the nation and, thus, embody the most serious of all possible evils. 90 The establishment bias is again obvious. The clear and present danger test also encourages prolonging debate indefinitely. According to Brandeis, expression may not be prohibited so long as debate remains ongoing. 91 Thus, only the process of truth-seeking is fully protected; decisions and actions predicated upon truths once discovered are protected not at all.92 Brandeis's approach to the marketplace of ideas accordingly encourages prolonged discussion and, therefore, the delay of decisions that might lead to actions contrary to society's generally accepted "truths." There is, however, little value in the discovery of truth that cannot be used as a basis of choice and behavior. Brandeis's focus on procedural aspects of the market rather than on the substantive actions it triggers also fosters delay in implementing any ideas that challenge the status quo perspective. Disputes over the best solutions for societal problems are converted into disputes over proper marketplace processes. For example, rather than focusing on whether the military draft should be reinstated, the debate may well center on whether antidraft groups should be allowed to stage a massive demonstration in a business district. Such procedural concerns divert attention from the substantive issue so that the status quo is more easily preserved. Through this process of transforming substantive conflicts into procedural debates, challengers to the status quo may be placated with a procedural victory while their overt threat is defused.93 This shift in focus helps to insulate society from the trauma of having to reconsider its accepted values while at the same time it allows the protesting individual and his supporters to believe that they have a fair opportunity to win popular support for their position.94 If freedom of expression only gives protection as long as decisions are not yet made, actions are not yet taken, and debate is still in progress, then there is little threat to established norms

Arguing minorities should engage in a dialogue with aggressors is rooted in paternalism, ineffective, and puts the oppressed further at risk. Delgado 94.  
Richard Delgado. David H. Yun. “Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: AN Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation”. California Law Review. July 1994. AGM
Defenders of the First Amendment sometimes argue that minorities should talk back to the aggressor. .FNSS Nat Hentoff, for example, writes that antiracism rules teach black people to depend on whites for protection, while talking back clears the air, emphasizes selfireliance, and strengthens one’s self-image as an active agent in charge of one’s own destiny. FN86 The "talking back" solution to campus racism draws force from the First Amendment principle of "more speech,” according to which additional dialogue is always a preferred response to speech that some find troubling. FN 87 '884 Proponents of this approach oppose hate speech rules, then, not so much because they limit speech, but because they believe that it is good for minorities to learn to speak out. A few go on to offer another reason: that a minority who speaks out will be able to educate the speaker who has uttered a racially hurtful remark. FN88 Racism, they hold, is the product of ignorance and fear. If a victim of racist hate speech takes the time to explain matters, he or she may succeed in altering the speaker’s perception so that the speaker will no longer utter racist remarks. FN89 How valid is this argument? Like many paternalistic arguments, it is offered blandly, virtually as an article of faith. In the nature of paternalism, those who make the argument are in a position of power, and therefore believe themselves able to make things so merely by asserting them as true. FN90 They rarely offer empirical proof of their claims, because none is needed. The social world is as they say because it is their world: they created it that way. FN91 In reality, those who hurl racial epithets do so because they feel empowered to do so. FN92 Indeed, their principal objective is to reassert and reinscribe that power. One who talks back is perceived as issuing a direct challenge to that power. The action is seen as outrageous, as calling for a forceful response. Often racist remarks are delivered in several-on-one situations, in which responding in kind is foolhardy. FN93 Many highly publicized cases of racial homicide began in just this fashion. A group began badgering a black person. The black person talked back, and paid with his life. FN94 Other racist remarks are delivered in a cowardly fashion, by means of graffiti scrawled on a campus wall late at night or on a poster placed outside of a black student’s dormitory door. FNQS in these situations, more speech is, of course, impossible. 885 Racist speech is rarely a mistake, rarely something that could be corrected or countered by discussion. What would be the answer to ”Nigger, go back to Africa. You don’t belong at the University“? "Sir, you misconceive the situation. Prevailing ethics and constitutional interpretation hold that I, an African American, am an individual of equal dignity and entitled to attend this university in the same manner as others. Now that I have informed you of this, I am sure you will modify your remarks in the future”? FN96 The idea that talking back is safe for the victim or potentially educative for the racist simply does not correspond with reality. it ignores the power dimension to racist remarks, forces minorities to run very real risks, and treats a hateful attempt to force the victim outside the human community as an invitation for discussion. 

There are institutional checks to their claims. O’Loughlin 15
Bridget O’Loughlin, Campaign Coordinator of the No Hate Speech Movement for the Council of Europe, Where should the limits to freedom of speech be set?, 04/06/2015, debateingeurope.eu EE
I think this is an extremely pertinent question, and it’s certainly one that many people have been grappling with for some time now… Clearly, you have to be very, very careful because repressive governments have been known to use issues like hate speech to shut down social media and websites without just cause… This is something we need to guard against, and is why we need to look to instruments like the European Convention on Human Rights, and the way it’s been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, which has a lot of jurisprudence, a lot of case law, on the limits to freedom of speech in terms of hate speech, or incitement to criminal action or racism, etc. As soon as you’re speaking or writing in the public domain – be that speaking on a soap box in the street corner, or writing an article in a newspaper, or writing a blog which is sent out to millions of people on the internet – you’re in a public area and there have to be some limits on what you are or are not allowed to say… But, clearly, we also have to protect freedom of speech and not let this fight against hate speech be used as an excuse, which I think it is sometimes, to limit freedom of expression.

The slippery slope argument is non-sense, history and basic logic are on our side.  Muravchik 10
Joshua Muravchik has been recognized by the Wall Street Journal as “maybe the most cogent and careful of the neoconservative writers on foreign policy.” He is a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies and formerly a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He has published more than three hundred articles on politics and international affairs, Free Speech and the Myth of the Slippery Slope, World Affairs Journal, October 15, 2010 EE
Moreover, a wealth of political history suggests that the slippery slope is a phantom. Almost all European countries ban “hate speech” and many ban Holocaust-denial. This goes against the American grain, but those countries have not sacrificed any other freedoms as a result. Or consider West Germany. The Americans and Germans who framed the Basic Law of the Bonn Republic worked in the terrible shadow of Hitler’s destruction of the Weimar Republic, Germany’s only prior democratic experiment. They were also in uncomfortable proximity to Soviet-run East Germany. So they banned both the Nazi and Communist Parties on the grounds that they were totalitarian movements, aiming to destroy democracy itself. Far from turning into a slippery slope, under this system freedom took hold in Germany at long last and apparently forever. What about America’s experience? The ambit of tolerated speech has grown relentlessly wider. In the realm of obscenity standards, we have gone from Lady Chatterly, to bare breasts, to full frontal, to pictorial gynecology. If there is any slippery slope, it seems to be tilted in the opposite direction from the one invoked by conventional wisdom. Were the court to uphold some constraints on speech, that would merely put us back to some earlier point in the unfolding of American free speech standards. When we were at that point, whatever and whenever it was, we did not slide downward to dictatorship but forward to where we stand today. Where is the danger? I can think of no example in which rights disappeared down a slippery slope. Yes, the Communists used “salami tactics” in subjugating Eastern Europe, but the progressive loss of freedom was scarcely unforeseen. The Kremlin was bent on imposing its model of totalitarianism one way or another on the countries its troops occupied; the salami slices merely made the going smoother. The slippery slope peril is a myth, much like the libertarian bogeyman that the welfare state will lead to dictatorship. In practice, European and other countries have infringed economic freedom without any loss of political freedoms. And they have also constrained speech in ways that most Americans (including me) wouldn’t do but with no further loss of freedom. A sovereign, self-governing people is capable of drawing lines. To argue by imagery and analogy, as does the conventional wisdom apotheosized by the Times, rather than by logic and history, is, you might say, to step onto a slippery slope at the bottom of which lies lots of freedom of thought but very little thinking.

Vagueness cuts both ways - arbitrary and vague obscenity determinations mean the government can call whatever it wants non-constitutionally protected. Ingber.
Stanley Ingber, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: A LEGITIMIZING MYTH, Duke Law Review, February 1984 EE
Obscenity. In a society allegedly seeking the true or best style of living, all pertinent ideas deserve due consideration. "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance. . . have... full protection ..... 101 The Supreme Court, however, in the 1957 decision in Roth v. United States,10 2 viewed obscenity as not deserving societal attention because the Court considered obscenity to be "utterly without redeeming social importance."'10 3 Consequently, according to Roth, the government does not engage in content discrimination if it bans obscene material because obscenity is outside the Constitution's protection.: 4 Yet the "redeeming social value" standard is inherently problematic. To whom must the communication be "redeeming"?105 Surely the obscene material has social value to people who willingly pay money to obtain it.t06 The Court can discount this tautology only by insisting that literature has social value within the marketplace of ideas if it advocates a way of life, and not if it merely entertains those already committed to such a life style. 10 7 In essence, the Court believes that equating the free exchange of political ideas "with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment."' 0 8 The Supreme Court's opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 1 0 9 exposed the flaws in this distinction. In Paris Adult Theatre, the Court held that material could be obscene even though it is exhibited only to consenting adults. The interests the state protects through this prohibition include "the quality of life,. . . the tone of commerce. . . and, possibly, the public safety itself."' 10 States accordingly have the "power to make a morally neutral judgment" that public exhibition of obscene materials, or commerce in the obscene, tends to "injure the community as a whole" by polluting the "public environment.""' The Court stressed most vehemently that to grant access to obscene material "is to affect the world about the rest of us." 2 Thus, although the Court has often said that speech is protected precisely because of its role in "the bringing about of political and social changes,"' " 3 it refused to protect obscene material in Paris Adult Theatre predominantly because such material advocates a kind of society the Court finds objectionable. The Court's defense of government regulation of obscenity is based simply on "unprovable assumptions" about what is good for the people. 114 The Court justifies relying on such unprovable assumptions by comparing them to the assumptions routinely made regarding "good" materials. The Court suggests that because society accepts on faith alone the uplifting quality of good literature and other art forms, so too, states may accept the corresponding assumption that obscenity corrupts and debases. 1I5 But the Court's comparison is misplaced, for the state does not and could not compel its adult citizens to read, watch, or listen to such good works."16 Official determination of what social change is unacceptable and should not be contemplated is just as antithetical to an open search for truth as is official determination of truth itself.

Tournament: Stanford | Round: 4 | Opponent: Oakwood LB | Judge: Arjun Tambe
1

A focus on a priori reason and conceptual abstraction forces oppressed people to divorce themselves from the material conditions caused by whiteness and imagine a world in which whiteness is good.  Curry 13

Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013.  NS

The potentiality of whiteness—the proleptic call of white anti-racist consciousness— is nothing more than the fiat of an ahistorical dream. A command ushered before thought engages racism, before awareness of the world becomes aware of what is actual. This is forced upon accounts of racism where whiteness is morally obscured from being seen as is.  Whiteness as is partly determined by what could be, since what is was a past potentiality—a could be. The appeal to the sentimentality, morality, the moral abstraction/distraction of equality—both as a political command and its anthropological requisite—complicate the most obvious consequence of anti-Black racism, namely violence. This moral apriorism urges the Black thinker to conceptualize racism as an activist project rooted in the potential of a world filled with non-racists, a world where the white racist is transformed by Black activity into the white anti-racist.  But this project supposes an erroneous view of the white racist which occludes the reality of white supremacy and anti-Black racism. As Robert F. Williams argues in Negroes with Guns, “the racist is a man crazed by hysteria at the idea of coming into equal contact with Negroes. And this mass mental illness called racism is very much a part of the ‘American way of Life.’” The white racist is not seen as the delusional individual ostracized from society as a result of their abhorrent social pathologies of racist hate. Rather the white racist is normal—the extended family, the spouse, the sibling, the friend of the white individual—the very same entities upon which the inter/intrasubjectivity nexus of the white self is founded. The white he experiences no punishment for his longing for Black servitude and his need to exploit and divest the Black worker here and then of his wealth. The white she has no uneasiness about her raping of—the destruction of generations of Black selves—mothers, children, and men—and today usurps the historical imagery of “the nigger,” to politically vacate Blackness and demonize niggers as beyond political consideration. She rewrites history, pens morality, and embodies the post-racial civil rights subject. As such, racism, the milieu of the white racist is not the exposed pathological existence of the white race, but rather valorized in white individuality, the individuality that conceptualizes their racism as a normative aspiration of what the world should look like, and even more damning, an aspiration that can be supported and propagated in the world. The white racist recognizes the deliberateness of the structures, relations, and systems in a white supremacist society and seeks like their colonial foreparents to claim them as their own. 

And, we should be having a debate about what to do about oppression, not what constitutes oppression – debates are 45 minutes long so endless academic moralizing is circular and gets no where, forgoing the opportunity for real world solutions.
Their philosophy preaches that everyone is equal – this colorblind ideology perpetuates anti blackness under the myth of American liberalism.  Curry 13

Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013.  NS

Despite the rhetorical strategies adopted by both Black and white political theorists which urge Blacks and whites alike to demand Americans to continue their allegiance to the foundational de-racialized ethos of the post-Civil Rights era, the reality of the American racism—its sheer recurring violence against Black people—demands more than symbolic rhetorical allusion. To seriously grasp the reality of racist oppression and the sempiternal machinations of anti-Blackness throughout American society be it in its institutions like the prison industrial complex, its policies like Affirmative action, or its manipulation of Black social degradation and economic disadvantage to support pathological theses about disasters like Katrina or cultural deviance as in the death of Trayvon Martin, Darius Simmons, or Jordan Davis, the study of the matter itself—racism—must be a study of a conceptual disengagement with the myth of racial equality and the “automatic progressivism” of the American liberal project. This disengagement is not simply the refusal to accept the idealism of civil rights myth held beyond the realm of fact, but the disengagement with the illusions of democracy and equality that continue to ignore the role that violence has played and continues to play in the subjugation, incarceration, and vilification of Black life. As Dr. A.J. William Myers reveals in his work groundbreaking work entitled Destructive Impulses, ¶ Until at such time white America (and Black America) is openly willing to confront a historical legacy of its own violence (perpetrated against an American people of color), any venture into and/ or expository on race relations becomes an exercise in futility…As a result, therefore, white violence, confined to the subliminal recesses of the American psyche, continues to prevent the transition necessary for the country to move beyond the idea of race. ¶ In America, Blackness and the racism that continues to condemn those historical racialized peoples is violence—it is the forceful and coercion enclosing of human beings to an inferior social, political, and economic status of which their own humanity exceeds. This dehumanizing relegation of the raced citizen is not a gradual or incremental debasement, but rather the historically immediate condition of inferiority that presents progress to be attainable by the cyclical degrees of physical violence against the racialized population. For these racially oppressed peoples, violence is the permanent fixture of existence in America, since it is the vitiation of their humanity that rationalizes the varying techniques of their cultural erasure, birthing the emergent symbolic associations of degradation that replace their invisibility, and empowering the intentional enforcements of their societal exclusions. In fact, it is precisely this triumvirate that gauges what we take to be the negation of the necessity of revolutionary change--since the raced is taken to be present, as a result of a critical redefining of humanity, integrated into society.

The aff’s attempt to whitewash history by ignoring the racist foundations that underlie their theory allows for racial domination to remain invisible – you as a judge must reject the aff’s epistemology and acknowledge the reality of oppression. That’s a voting issue. Leonardo
Leonardo, Zeus. "The souls of white folk: Critical pedagogy, whiteness studies, and globalization discourse." Race, ethnicity and education 5.1 (2002): 29-50. CC

The fragmenting effects of the global economy work in tandem with the fragmenting tendencies of whiteness. As a perspective, whiteness is historicaly fractured in its apprehension of racial formations. In order to ‘see’ the formation in full view, whites have to mobilize a perspective that begins with racial privilege as a central unit of analysis. Since starting from this point would mean whites engage in a thorough historical understanding of ‘how they came to be’ in a position of power, most whites resist such an undertaking and instead focus on individual merit, exception- alism, or hard work. The act of interpreting the totality of racial formations is an apostasy that white students and educators must undertake but one which does not come easy or without costs. The costs are real because it means whites would have to acknowledge their unearned privileges and disinvest in them. This is a different tack from saying that whites benefit from renouncing their whiteness because it would increase their humanity. Whites would lose many of their perks and privileges. So, the realistic appraisal is that whites do have a lot to lose by committing race treason, not just something to gain by forsaking whiteness. This is the challenge. In his discussion of gender and race, Terry Eagleton (1996) provokes a distinction between identity politics and class relations. He calls class position relational in a way that gender and race are not, because possessing a certain skin color or body configuration does not prevent another person from owning such traits. By contrast, a landless laborer occupies a material position because the gentleman farmer owns the land or property. Eagleton goes on to say that being black does not mean one is of a different species from a white person. Pigmentation is not definitive of a general human experience in the same way that freckle-faced people do not constitute an essentialy different human category. In this, Eagleton exposes the racist and patriarchal imagination by highlighting its contradictions and ilogics. However, his analysis leaves out a more powerful explanation of how racism actualy works. Like most oppressive systems, racism functions through an illogical rationalization process. For instance, the one-drop rule, or the Rule of Hypodescent, demarcates blacks from whites by drawing an artiŽ cial and arbitrary line between them in order both to create more slaves and limit people’s power to achieve whiteness. Thus, the power of whiteness comes precisely from its ability to usurp reason and rational thought, and a purely rationalistic analysis limits our understanding of the way it functions. Despite its contradictions, the contours of racism can be mapped out and analyzed and this is what Cheryl Harris (1995) attempts when she compares whiteness to owning property. First, whiteness becomes property through the objectiŽ cation of African slaves, a process which set the precondition for ‘propertizing’ human life (Harris, 1995, p. 279). Whiteness takes the form of ownership, the deŽ ning attribute of free individ- uals which Africans did not own. Second, through the reification and subsequent hegemony of white people, whiteness is transformed into the common sense that becomes law. As a given right of the individual white person, whiteness can be enjoyed, like any property, by exercising and taking advantage of privileges co-extensive with whiteness. Third, like a house, whiteness can be demarcated and fenced off as a territory of white people which keeps Others out. Thus, caling a white person ‘black’ was enough reason, as late as 1957, to sue for character defamation; the same could not be said of a black person being mistaken for ‘white.’ This was a certain violation of property rights much like breaking into someone’s house. In al, whites became the subjects of property, with Others as its objects. As Charles Mils (1997) explains, the Racial Contract is an agreement to misinter- pret the world as it is. It is the implicit consensus that whites frequently enter into, which accounts for their fragmented understanding of the world as it is racialy structured. When confronted with the reality of racial oppression, according to Hurtado, whites respond with: I wil listen to you, sometimes for the Ž rst time, and wil seem engaged. At critical points in your analysis I wil claim I do not know what you are talking about and wil ask you to elaborate ad nauseam. I wil consistently subvert your efforts at dialogue by claiming ‘we do not speak the same language’. (cited in McLaren et al., 2001, pp. 211–212; italics in original) The frequent detours, evasions, and detractions from the circuits of whiteness cripple our understanding of the racio-economic essence of schools and society. It is a distortion of perfect communication in Habermas’s (1984) sense of it which creates what I cal an altogether ‘ideological speech situation.’ That is, communi- cation is ideological to the extent that the ‘ideal speech situation’ is systematicaly distorted, which is different from saying that it is always a bit distorted. As Hurtado plainly describes, radical communication about the Contract meets apathy and indifference, perhaps a bit predictably. Admitting the reality of white racism would force a river of centuries of pain, denial, and guilt that many people cannot assuage. In several instances, both in coleagues’ courses as wel as mine, white students have expressed their emotions and frustrations through tears when white privilege is confronted. In fact, Rains (1997) has described the same event occurring in her courses. Although it might seem cynical or unfeeling to analyze criticaly such an occurrence, it is important to deploy such a critique in the name of political and pedagogical clarity. It is imperative to address the local moment and ‘be there’ for al students but in slicing through the pathos, one also beneŽ ts from re ection on the moment in its larger, global signiŽ cance. The times when I have confronted this scenario can be described as the honest interrogation of racial power engaged by both white and non-white students. At certain moments, some anger has been expressed, sometimes frustration. In general, the milieu is emotional and politicaly charged. How can it not be? In one particular case, I witnessed a situation where a black student interrogated the issue of racial privilege and questioned a white coleague’s comments for failing to do the same. By the end of the exchange, the white student left the room crying and the discussion halted. In another case, an earnest discussion took place about racism and ways to address it in schools. A white student cried because she felt frustrated and a little helpless about how she comes into the fold of becoming an anti-racist educator. After a minute of pause, students of color returned to the discussion at hand, not breaking their stride. In a third instance, in the midst of discussing the importance of building solidarity between teachers against racism, a white student cries and asks her coleagues to remember that they must stay cohesive and support each other as comrades in struggle. A coleague reports a fourth instance where, during a dialogue about the experiences of women of color, a white woman repeatedly insisted that the real issue was class, not race, because her experiences as a woman were similar to the women of color. When a faculty of color informed her that she was monopolizing the discussion and in the process invalidated the voices of women of color, the white woman cried and was unable to continue. In al these cases, we observed the guilt of whiteness prompting the women to cry in shame. Made to recognize their unearned privileges and confronted in public, they react with tears of admission. Discussing (anti)racism is never easy and is frequently suppressed in mainstream classroom conditions. The establishment of the right conditions is precious but often precarious. In the Ž rst case, we must keep in mind that it was the black student who felt dehumanized and subsequently felt enough courage to express her anger about comments she perceived to be problematic. The act of crying by the white student immediately positioned the black student as the perpetrator of a hurt and erased/deraced the power of her charge. A reversal of sorts had just occurred. The white student earned the other students’ sympathy and the professor folowed her to the halway to comfort her white the black student nursed her anger by herself. Likewise, I could not help but feel for the white student. Upon re ection, an important difference needs to be discussed. In the act of crying, the student attenuated the centuries of hurt and oppression that the black student was trying to relay. In the act of crying, the student transformed racism into a local problem between two people. I couldn’t help feeling that other students in the class thought the black person was both wrong and racist, erasing/deracing the institutional basis of what she had to say. The room’s energy suddenly felt funneled to the white student. Clearly, there are more ‘harmonious’ ways of teaching the topic of race and racism. However, they also often forsake radical critique for feelings. Feelings have to be respected and educators can establish the conditions for radical empathy. That said, anger is also a valid and legitimate feeling; when complemented by clear thought, anger is frighteningly lucid. Thus, a pedagogy of politeness only goes so far before it degrades into the paradox of liberal feel-good solidarity absent of dissent, without which any worthwhile pedagogy becomes a democracy of empty forms. White comfort zones are notorious for tolerating only smal, incremental dozes of racial confrontation (Hunter and Nettles, 1999). This does not suggest that educators procure a hostile environment, but a pedagogical situation that fails to address white racism is arguably already the conduit of hostility. It fragments students’ holistic understanding of their identity development through the ability of whiteness to deform our complete picture of the racial formation. It practices violence on the racialized Other in the name of civility and as long as this is the case, racial progress wil proceed at the snail pace of white racial consciousness. White race traitors and progressive Others shal piece together a whole from the fragmentary pieces that whiteness has created out of this world. The Contract challenges educators of the new millennium to explain the untruth of white perspectives on race, even a century after Du Bois’s initial chalenge. Obviously, this does not mean that whites cannot grasp the Contract; many do, but they cannot accomplish this from the white point of view, a world-view which, according to Gibson, projects a ‘delusional world,’ ‘a racial fantasyland,’ and ‘a consensual halucination’ (cited in Mils, 1997, p. 18). With the rise of globalization, education—which prides itself for inculcating into students knowledge about the real world—struggles to represent the world in the most real way possible. White epistemology can be characterized as fragmentary and fleeting because white liveli- hood depends on this double helix. It is fragmentary because in order for whiteness to maintain its invisibility, or its unmarked status, it must by necessity mistake the world as non-relational or partitioned (Dwyer and Jones, III, 2000). This allows the white psyche to speak of slavery as ‘long ago,’ rather than as a legacy which lives today; it minimizes racism toward non-white immigrants today through a convenient and problematic comparison with white immigrants, like the Irish or Jews. It is also fleeting because it must deny the history of its own genesis and the creation of the Other. It can only be concerned with ‘how things are and not how they got to be that way.’ As a socio-spatial epistemology, whiteness sees the world upside-down. Mils (1997) and I agree when he says: Thus on matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologicaly and socialy functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites wil in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made. (p. 18; italics in original) According to Mils, whiteness concerns itself with racial details and misses the totality of the Racial Contract. Like the way it partitions the world according to its own image, whiteness constructs history as separate racial details without coherence. As a result, it fails to provide our students the language to link together California’s Proposition 187 (anti-immigrant), 209 (anti-afŽ rmative action), and 227 (anti-bilin- gualism) as related to white hegemony. With the exception of particular Asian ethnic groups (to which I wil return later), al three legislations limit the rights of students of color. Fortunately, white and non-white activists have countered such measures with unrelenting protests and public organizing because, as Hopson et al. (1998) remind us, ‘Recognizing and valuing language varieties and multiple ways of speaking among students is a precondition to understanding how to teach them’ (p. 5). As a racial epistemology, whiteness is necessarily idealist in order to construct the Other as abstract, rather than concrete. Enslavement, discrimination, and marginalization of the Other work most efficiently when they are constructed as an idea rather than a people. They can be more easily controled, aggregated as the same, or marked as unchanging and constant when textbooks idealize them as inconse- quential to the history and evolution of humankind. In effect, whiteness eggs us on to yoke together different peoples around the globe under the sign of sameness.

2

1NC – K

Rhetoric propagating free speech as the answer to social ills directly trades off with our ability to fight injustice. Free speech is a tool that courts wield in colorblind ways against people. Delgado and Stefancic 92
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. “IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?” Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN
III. How THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION SOMETIMES MAKES MATTERS WORSE Speech and free expression are not only poorly adapted to remedy racism, they often make matters worse-far from being stalwart friends, they can impede the cause of racial reform. First, they encourage writers, filmmakers, and other creative people to feel amoral, nonresponsible in what they do. 18 8 Because there is a marketplace of ideas, the rationalization goes, another film-maker is free to make an antiracist movie that will cancel out any minor stereotyping in the one I am making. My movie may have other redeeming qualities; besides, it is good entertainment and everyone in the industry uses stock characters like the black maid or the bumbling Asian tourist. How can one create film without stock characters? 18 9 Second, when insurgent groups attempt to use speech as an instrument of reform, courts almost invariably construe First Amendment doctrine against them.1 90 As Charles Lawrence pointed out, civil rights activists in the sixties made the greatest strides when they acted in defiance of the First Amendment as then understood. 191 They marched, were arrested and convicted; sat in, were arrested and convicted; distributed leaflets, were arrested and convicted. Many years later, after much gallant lawyering and the expenditure of untold hours of effort, the conviction might be reversed on appeal if the original action had been sufficiently prayerful, mannerly, and not too interlaced with an action component. This history of the civil rights movement does not bear out the usual assumption that the First Amendment is of great value for racial reformers. 19 2 Current First Amendment law is similarly skewed. Examination of the many "exceptions" to First Amendment protection discloses that the large majority favor the interests of the powerful. 19 3 If one says something disparaging of a wealthy and well-regarded individual, one discovers that one's words were not free after all; the wealthy individual has a type of property interest in his or her community image, damage to which is compensable even though words were the sole instrument of the harm. 194 Similarly, if one infringes the copyright or trademark of a well-known writer or industrialist, again it turns out that one's action is punishable. 19 5 Further, if one disseminates an official secret valuable to a powerful branch of the military or defense contractor, that speech is punishable. 19 If one speaks disrespectfully to a judge, police officer, teacher, military official, or other powerful authority figure, again one discovers that one's words were not free;1 9 7 and so with words used to defraud, 198 form a conspiracy, 1 99 breach the peace, 200 or untruthful words given under oath during a civil or criminal proceeding.20 1 Yet the suggestion that we create new exception to protect lowly and vulnerable members of our society, such as isolated, young black undergraduates attending dominantly white campuses, is often met with consternation: the First Amendment must be a seamless web; minorities, if they knew their own self-interest, should appreciate this even more than others. 20 2 This one-sidedness of free-speech doctrine makes the First Amendment much more valuable to the majority than to the minority. The system of free expression also has a powerful after-the-fact apologetic function. Elite groups use the supposed existence of a marketplace of ideas to justify their own superior position. 203 Imagine a society in which all As were rich and happy, all Bs were moderately comfortable, and all Cs were poor, stigmatized, and reviled. Imagine also that this society scrupulously believes in a free marketplace of ideas. Might not the As benefit greatly from such a system? On looking about them and observing the inequality in the distribution of wealth, longevity, happiness, and safety between themselves and the others, they might feel guilt. Perhaps their own superior position is undeserved, or at least requires explanation. But the existence of an ostensibly free marketplace of ideas renders that effort unnecessary. Rationalization is easy: our ideas, our culture competed with their more easygoing ones and won. 20 4 It was a fair fight. Our position must be deserved; the distribution of social goods must be roughly what fairness, merit, and equity call for.20 5 It is up to them to change, not us. A free market of racial depiction resists change for two final reasons. First, the dominant pictures, images, narratives, plots, roles, and stories ascribed to, and constituting the public perception of minorities, are always dominantly negative. 20 6 Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of the sort described in Part I (as well as today's versions) inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. 20 7 Minorities internalize the stories they read, see, and hear every day. Persons of color can easily become demoralized, blame themselves, and not speak up vigorously.208 The expense of speech also precludes the stigmatized from participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas. 20 9 They are often poor-indeed, one theory of racism holds that maintenance of economic inequality is its prime function2 0 -and hence unlikely to command the means to bring countervailing messages to the eyes and ears of others. Second, even when minorities do speak they have little credibility. Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her deserved share? Our very imagery of the outsider shows that, contrary to the usual view, society does not really want them to speak out effectively in their own behalf and, in fact, cannot visualize them doing so. Ask yourself: How do outsiders speak in the dominant narratives? Poorly, inarticulately, with broken syntax, short sentences, grunts, and unsophisticated ideas.21' Try to recall a single popular narrative of an eloquent, self-assured black (for example) orator or speaker. In the real world, of course, they exist in profusion. But when we stumble upon them, we are surprised: "What a welcome 'exception'!" Words, then, can wound. But the fine thing about the current situation is that one gets to enjoy a superior position and feel virtuous at the same time. By supporting the system of free expression no matter what the cost, one is upholding principle. One can belong to impeccably liberal organizations and believe one is doing the right thing, even while taking actions that are demonstrably injurious to the least privileged, most defenseless segments of our society.21 2 In time, one's actions will seem wrong and will be condemned as such, but paradigms change slowly.2 1 3 The world one helps to create-a world in which denigrating depiction is good or at least acceptable, in which minorities are buffoons, clowns, maids, or Willie Hortons, and only rarely fully individuated human beings with sensitivities, talents, personalities, and frailties-will survive into the future. One gets to create culture at outsiders' expense. And, one gets to sleep well at night, too. Racism is not a mistake, not a matter of episodic, irrational behavior carried out by vicious-willed individuals, not a throwback to a long-gone era. It is ritual assertion of supremacy, 214 like animals sneering and posturing to maintain their places in the hierarchy of the colony. It is performed largely unconsciously, just as the animals' behavior is. 2 15 Racism seems right, customary, and inoffensive to those engaged in it, while bringing psychic and pecuniary advantages.21 6 The notion that more speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing can counter this system of oppression is appealing, lofty, romantic-and wrong.

Their notion of the first amendment is colorblind and obscures anti-black violence. Boler 04
Boler, Megan Megan Boler is a Full Professor in the Department of Social Justice Education, at the Ontario Institute of Studies in Education (OISE) at the University of Toronto.. "All Speech Is Not Free: The Ethics of" Affirmative Action Pedagogy"." Counterpoints 240 (2004): 3-13.
On what basis might one justify an affirmative action pedagogy? The first justifica-¶ tion is forwarded by legal scholars in the area of critical race theory. The authors of¶ Words That Wound (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, and Crenshaw, 1993) address the¶ tension between the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The tension arises because,¶ in fact, all people are not equally protected under the law because of the institu-¶ tionalized inequities within our society. This reality complicates the effectiveness¶ of the First Amendment. Scholarship in critical race theory and educational analy-¶ ses document that in recent years, we find incidents of hate speech primarily to be¶ directed at racial, religious, or sexual minorities. Not surprisingly, one finds in turn¶ that invocations of the right to free speech are most often invocations to protect¶ the right of the members of the dominant culture to express their hatred toward¶ members of minority culture. These authors make important legal and historical¶ cases to support their observation that, in practice, while the rhetoric of the First¶ Amendment is a buzz word that makes all of us want to rally for its principle, in¶ practice "the first amendment arms conscious and unconscious racists - Nazis and¶ liberals alike - with a constitutional right to be racist. Racism is just another idea¶ deserving of constitutional protection like all ideas" (Matsuda et al., 1993, p. 15). A¶ scholar from another discipline addresses classroom dynamics and similarly argues¶ that we must "read the appeal to the First Amendment as itself a kind of panic re-¶ sponse in the same order as hate speech itself" (Roof, 1999, p. 45).¶ A second justification for privileging marginalized voices is based on the meas-¶ urement of the psychological effect of hate speech on targeted groups and individ-¶ uals. As one legal scholar explains, hate speech affects its victim in the visceral ex-¶ perience of a "disorienting powerlessness" (Lawrence, 1993, p. 70), an effect¶ achieved because hate speech is comparable to an act of violence. In reaction to¶ hate speech, the target commonly experiences a "state of semishock," nausea, and dizziness, and an inability to articulate a response. This scholar gives an example of a student who is white and gay. The student reports that in an instance where he¶ was called "faggot" he experienced all of the above symptoms. However, when he¶ was called "honky," he did not experience the disorienting powerlessness. As the¶ scholar remarks, "the context of the power relationships in which the speech takes¶ place, and the connection to violence must be considered as we decide how best to¶ foster the freest and fullest dialogue within our communities" (Lawrence, 1993,¶ p. 70).¶ These considerations bring me to another key point: The analysis of utterance¶ in the classroom requires more than rational dialogue. In fact, the critical race¶ theorists argue that because racism is irrational, no amount of rational dialogue¶ will change racist attitudes. I disagree, in part because I am convinced that class-¶ room discussion must recognize the emotions that shape and construct the mean-¶ ings of our claims, our interchange with one another, and our investments in par-¶ ticular worldviews. Thus, a discussion of racism or homophobia cannot rely¶ simply on rational exchange but must delve into the deeply emotional investments¶ and associations that surround perceptions of difference and ideologies. One is po-¶ tentially faced with allowing ones worldviews to be shattered, in itself a pro-¶ foundly emotionally charged experience 

Turns the case – hate speech does real violence to people of color and necessarily locks in relationships of domination. Delgado and Stefacic 09
Richard Delgado - University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. Jean Stefancic – Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989, University of San Francisco. “FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH.” WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW. 2009. http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Delgado_LawReview_01.09.pdf
II. OBSERVATION NUMBER TWO: THE EVALUATION OF HARMS HAS BEEN INCOMPLETE One way, of course, to end the current standoff is for one of the parties to defer to the other’s point of view. Indeed, by pursuing an aggressive campaign of litigation, the free-speech camp has been implicitly urging that the other side do just that.58 One could also argue that a host of campus administrators, by enacting successive versions of hate-speech codes, are attempting to do the same thing, namely, wear the other side down.59 Ordinarily, though, it is the free-speech faction, with a string of lower-court victories to its credit, who urge the other side to “get over it” and toughen its collective hide.60 Yet, a careful weighing of the costs and benefits of speech regulation suggests that the case for it is closer than the ACLU and some courts seem ready to acknowledge. Before addressing the costs of hate-speech regulation versus the opposite, it is advisable to arrive at an understanding of what hate speech is. A Types of Hate Speech Hate speech, including the campus variety, can take a number of forms—direct (sometimes called “specific”) or indirect; veiled or overt; single or repeated; backed by power, authority, or threat, or not.61 One can also distinguish it in terms of the characteristic— such as race, religion, sexual orientation, immigration status, or gender—of the person or group it targets.62 It can isolate a single individual (“Jones, you goddamned X.”) or group (“The goddamned Xs are destroying this country.”). It can be delivered orally, in writing, on the Internet, or in the form of a tangible thing, such as a Confederate flag, football mascot, or monument.63 It can be anonymous, as with graffiti or a leaflet surreptitiously placed on a bulletin board or under a dormitory door, or its author can be plainly identified.64 The object of the speech may be free to leave, or trapped, as in a classroom or workplace.65 B. The Harms of Hate Speech The various forms of hate speech present different kinds and degrees of harm. The face-to-face kind is the most immediately problematic, especially if the target is not in a position to leave and the one delivering it possesses the power to harm. 1. Direct or Face-to-Face Hate Speech Although some courts and commentators describe the injury of hate speech as mere offense,66 the harm associated with the face-toface kind, at least, is often far greater than that and includes flinching, tightening of muscles, adrenaline rushes, and inability to sleep.67 Some victims may suffer psychosocial harms, including depression, repressed anger, diminished self-concept, and impairment of work or school performance.68 Some may take refuge in drugs, alcohol, or other forms of addiction, compounding their misery.69 2. Hate Speech and Children With children, the harms of hate speech may be even more worrisome. A child victimized by racial taunts or browbeating may respond aggressively, with the result that he or she is labeled as assaultive.70 Or, the child can respond by internalizing the harm and pretending to ignore it. Robbed of self-confidence and a sense of ease, such a child can easily become introspective and morose.71 If the child’s parents suffer the same fate at work, they may bring these problems home so that the parents retain even less energy for their families than before.72 Recent scholarship points out how the pathologies associated with social subordination may be transgenerational, lasting for centuries, if not millennia, and include pain, fear, shame, anger, and despair.73 3. General Hate Speech With general hate speech, such as anonymously circulated flyers or speeches to a crowd, the harms, while diffuse, may be just as serious.74 Recent scholarship shows how practically every instance of genocide came on the heels of a wave of hate speech depicting the victims in belittling terms.75 For example, before launching their wave of deadly attacks on the Tutsis in Rwanda, Hutus in government and the media disseminated a drumbeat of messages casting their ethnic rivals as despicable.76 The Third Reich did much the same with the Jews during the period leading up to the Holocaust.77 When the United States enslaved African Americans and killed or removed the Indians, it rationalized that these were simple folk who needed discipline and tutelage, or else bloodthirsty savages who resisted the blessings of civilization.78 When, a little later, the nation marched westward in pursuit of manifest destiny, it justified taking over the rich lands of California and the Southwest on the ground that the indolent Mexicans living on them did not deserve their good fortune.79 Before interning the Japanese during World War II, propagandists depicted the group as sneaky, suspicious, and despotic.80 It is possible that the connection between general hate speech and instances of mass oppression may not be merely statistical and contingent, but conceptual and necessary.81 Concerted action requires an intelligible intention or rationale capable of being understood by others. One cannot mistreat another group without first articulating a reason why one is doing it—otherwise, no one but a sadist would join in.82 Without a softening-up period, early steps toward genocide, such as removing Jews to a ghetto, would strike others as gratuitous and command little support. Discriminatory action of any kind presupposes a group that labors under a stigma of some kind.83 The prime mechanism for the creation of such stigma is hate speech.84 Without it, genocide, imperialism, Indian removal, and Jim Crow could gain little purchase.85 C. The Harms of Speech Regulation If the harms of hate speech are sobering, what lies on the other side? What happens to the hate speaker forced to hold things in? Will he or she suffer psychological injury, depression, nightmares, drug addiction, and a blunted self image?86 Diminished pecuniary and personal prospects?87 Will hate-speech regulation set up the speaker’s group for extermination, seizure of ancestral lands, or anything comparable?88 The very possibility seems far-fetched. And, indeed, regimes, such as Europe’s and Canada’s, that criminalize hate speech exhibit none of these ills.89 Speech and inquiry there seem as free and uninhibited as in the United States, and their press just as feisty as our own.90 What about harm to the hate speaker? The individual who holds his or her tongue for fear of official sanction may be momentarily irritated. But “bottling it up” seems not to inflict serious psychological or emotional damage.91 Early in the debate about hate speech, some posited that a prejudiced individual forced to keep his impulses in check might become more dangerous as a result.92 By analogy to a pressure valve, he or she might explode in a more serious form of hate speech or even a physical attack on a member of the target group.93 But studies examining this possibility discount it.94 Indeed, the bigot who expresses his sentiment aloud is apt to be more dangerous, not less, as a result. The incident “revs him up” for the next one, while giving onlookers the impression that baiting minorities is socially acceptable, so that they may follow suit.95 A recently developed social science instrument, the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), shows that many Americans harbor measurable animus toward racial minorities.96 Might it be that hearing hate speech, in person or on the radio, contributes to that result?97 III. OBSERVATION NUMBER THREE: INTEREST BALANCING MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF RELEVANT FEATURES OF HATE SPEECH If all types of hate speech are apt to impose costs,98 large or small, how should courts and policymakers weigh them? Not every victim of hate speech will respond in one of the ways described above. Some will shrug it off or lash back at the aggressor, giving as good as they got.99 The harm of hate speech is variable, changing from victim to victim and setting to setting.100 By the same token, it is impossible to say with assurance that the cost of hate-speech regulation will always be negligible. Some speakers who might wish to address sensitive topics, such as affirmative action or racial differences in response to medical treatments, might shy away from them.101 The interplay of voices that society relies on to regulate itself may deteriorate. In balancing hate speech versus regulation, two benchmarks may be helpful: a review of current freespeech “exceptions” and attention to the role of incessancy. A. Current Free-Speech Exceptions Not all speech is free. The current legal landscape contains many exceptions and special doctrines corresponding to speech that society has decided it may legitimately punish. Some of these are: words of conspiracy; libel and defamation; copyright violation; words of threat; misleading advertising; disrespectful words uttered to a judge, police officer, or other authority figure; obscenity; and words that create a risk of imminent violence.102 If speech is not a seamless web, the issue is whether the case for prohibiting hate speech is as compelling as that underlying existing exceptions. First Amendment defenders often assert that coining a new exception raises the specter of additional ones, culminating, potentially, in official censorship and Big Brother.103 But our tolerance for a wide array of special doctrines suggests that this fear may be exaggerated and that a case-by-case approach may be quite feasible. How important is it to protect a black undergraduate walking home late at night from the campus library?104 As important as a truthful label on a can of dog food or safeguarding the dignity of a minor state official?105 Neither free-speech advocates nor courts have addressed matters like these, but a rational approach to the issue of hate-speech regulation suggests that they should.106 B. Incessancy and Compounding Two final aspects of hate speech are incessancy—the tendency to recur repeatedly in the life of a victim—and compounding.107 A victim of a racist or similar insult is likely to have heard it more than once. In this respect, a racial epithet differs from an insult such as “You damn idiot driver” or “Watch where you’re going, you klutz” that the listener is apt to hear only occasionally. Like water dripping on stone, racist speech impinges on one who has heard similar remarks many times before.108 Each episode builds on the last, reopening a wound likely still to be raw. The legal system, in a number of settings, recognizes the harm of an act known to inflict a cumulative harm. Ranging from eggshell plaintiffs to the physician who fails to secure fully informed consent, we commonly judge the blameworthiness of an action in light of the victim’s vulnerability.109 When free-speech absolutists trivialize the injury of hate speech as simple offense, they ignore how it targets the victim because of a condition he or she cannot change and that is part of the victim’s very identity. Hate speakers “pile on,” injuring in a way in which the victim has been injured several times before. The would-be hate speaker forced to keep his thoughts to himself suffers no comparable harm. A comparison of the harms to the speaker and the victim of hate speech, then, suggests that a regime of unregulated hate speech is costly, both individually and socially. Yet, even if the harms on both sides were similar, one of the parties is more disadvantaged than the other, so that Rawls’s difference principle suggests that, as a moral matter, we break the tie in the victim’s favor.110 Moreover, the magnitude of error can easily be greater, even in First Amendment terms, on the side of nonregulation. Hate speech warps the dialogic community by depriving its victims of credibility. Who would listen to one who appears, in a thousand scripts, cartoons, stories, and narratives as a buffoon, lazy desperado, or wanton criminal? Because one consequence of hate speech is to diminish the status of one group vis-à-vis all the rest, it deprives the singled-out group of credibility and an audience, a result surely at odds with the underlying rationales of a system of free expression.111

Anti-Blackness is the root cause of white supremacy and social oppression. It outweighs the case. Heitzeg 15

Heitzeg, Nancy A a Professor of Sociology and Director of the¶ interdisciplinary Critical Studies of Race/Ethnicity Program at St. Catherine¶ University, St. Paul, MN.. "On The Occasion Of The 50th Anniversary Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: Persistent White Supremacy, Relentless Anti-Blackness, And The Limits Of The Law." Hamline J. Pub. L. and Pol'y 36 (2015): 54.

While all communities of color suffer from racism in general¶ and its manifestation in criminal justice in particular, “Black” has¶ been the literal and figurative counterpart of “white”. Anti-black¶ racism is arguably at the very foundation of white supremacy; the¶ two constitute the foundational book-ends for the legal, political and¶ every day constructions of race in the United States.12¶ For this¶ reason, in combination with the excessive over-representation of¶ African Americans in the criminal justice system and the prison¶ industrial complex, this analysis will largely focus on the ways in¶ which the law has been a tool for the oppression of African¶ Americans via the furtherance of white supremacy and antiblackness¶ in both law and practice.¶ While race has never reflected any biological reality, it is¶ indeed a powerful social and political construct. In the U.S. and¶ elsewhere, it has served to delineate “whiteness” as the “unraced”¶ norm – the “unmarked marker” – while hierarchically devaluing¶ “other” racial/ethnic categories with Blackness always as the antithesis.13¶ The socio-political construction of race coincides with the¶ age of exploration, the rise of “scientific” classification schemes, and¶ perhaps most significantly capitalism. In the United States, the¶ solidification of racial hierarchies cannot be disentangled from the capitalist demands for “unfree” labor and expanded private property.¶ By the late 1600s, race had been a marker for either free citizens or¶ slave property, and colonial laws had reified this decades before the¶ Revolutionary War.14 The question of slavery was at the center of¶ debates in the creation of the United States and is referenced no less¶ than ten times.15 By the time of the Constitutional Convention of¶ 1787, the racial lines defining slave and free had already been rigidly¶ drawn – white was “free” and black was “slave” – and the result¶ according to Douglass was this: “assume the Constitution to be what¶ we have briefly attempted to prove it to be, radically and essentially¶ pro-slavery”.¶ 16 The Three-Fifths Clause, the restriction on future¶ bans of the slave trade and limits on the possibility of emancipation¶ through escape were all clear indications of the significance of¶ slavery to the Founders. The legal enouncement of slavery in the¶ Constitution is one of the first of many “racial sacrifice covenants”¶ to come, where the interests of Blacks were sacrificed for the nation.¶ 17¶ The social and constitutional construction of white as free and¶ Black as slave has on-going political and economic ramifications.¶ According to Harris, whiteness not only allows access to property,¶ may be conceived of per se as “whiteness as property”.¶ 18 These¶ property rights produce both tangible and intangible value to those¶ who possess it; whiteness as property includes the right to profit and¶ to exclude, even the perceived right to kill in defense of the borders¶ of whiteness.19 As Harris notes:¶ The concept of whiteness was premised on white¶ supremacy rather than mere difference. “White” was¶ defined and constructed in ways that increased its¶ value by reinforcing its exclusivity. Indeed, just as whiteness as property embraced the right to exclude,¶ whiteness as a theoretical construct evolved for the¶ very purpose of racial exclusion. Thus, the concept¶ of whiteness is built on both exclusion and racial¶ subjugation. This fact was particularly evident¶ during the period of the most rigid racial exclusion,¶ as whiteness signified racial privilege and took the¶ form of status property.20¶ Conversely, Blackness is defined as outside of the margins of¶ humanity as chattel rather than persons, and defined outside of the¶ margins of civil society. Frank Wilderson, in “The Prison Slave as¶ Hegemonys (Silent) Scandal,” describes it like this: “Blackness in¶ America generates no categories for the chromosome of history, and¶ no data for the categories of immigration or sovereignty. It is an¶ experience without analog — a past without a heritage.”¶ 21 Directly¶ condemned by the Constitution in ways that other once excluded¶ groups (American Indians, women, immigrants, LGBTQ) were not,¶ Blackness as marked by slavery– as property not person - creates an¶ outsider status that makes future inclusion a daunting challenge.22

The alternative is to embrace the demand of abolitionism – we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements.  Oparah 14
Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).

¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets. Andrea Smith, in her discussion of native studies, has argued that politi- cally progressive educators often adopt normative, colonial practices in the classroom, using pedagogical strategies and grading practices that rein- scribe the racialized and gendered regulation, policing, and disciplining that PIC abolitionists seek to end.53 In this sense, there could be no “postcarceral” academy. Certainly, sanctions for undergraduate and graduate students and faculty who challenge the university’s regular practices—from failing grades and expulsions to tenure denials and deportation—are systemically distrib- uted, along with rewards for those who can be usefully incorporated. Yet uni- versities and colleges also hold the seeds of a very different possible future, evoked, for example, by the universal admissions movement or by student strikes in Britain and Canada that demand higher education as a right, not a privilege of the wealthy. Rather than seeking to eradicate or replace higher educational institutions altogether, I suggest that we demand the popular and antiracist democratization of higher education.¶ The first step toward this radical transformation is the liberation of aca- demia from the machinery of empire: prisons, militarism, and corporations. Speaking of abolishing the white race, Noel Ignatiev argues that it is neces- sary for white people to make whiteness impossible by refusing the invisible benefits of membership in the “white club.”54 Progressive academics are also members of a privileged “club,” one that confers benefits in the form of a pay- check, health care, and other fringe benefits; social status; and the freedom to pursue intellectual work that we are passionate about. But we can also put our privilege to work by unmasking and then unsettling the invisible, symbi- otic, and toxic relationships that constitute the academic-MPIC.¶ Decoupling academia from its velvet-gloved master would begin the pro- cess of fundamental transformation. Without unfettered streams of income from corporations, wealthy philanthropists, and the military, universities and colleges would be forced to develop alternative fund-raising strategies, relationships, and accountabilities. Can we imagine a college administration aligned with local Occupy organizers to protest the state’s massive spend- ing on prisons and policing and demand more tax money for housing, edu- cation, and health care? Can we imagine a massive investment of time and resources by university personnel to solve the problem of how to decarcerate the nation’s prisons or end the detention of undocumented immigrants in order to fund universal access to higher education? Can we imagine a uni- versity run by and for its constituents, including students, kitchen and gar- den staff, and tenure-track and adjunct faculty? These are the possibilities opened up by academic-MPIC abolition.

The role of the ballot is to interrogate the AFF’s scholarship using the lens of critical race theory.

Their refusal of minority voices is a conscious choice. Delgado 84

Delgado, Richard. "The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132.3 (1984): 561-578.

It does not matter where one enters this universe; one comes to the¶ same result: an inner circle of about a dozen white, male writers who¶ comment on, take polite issue with, extol, criticize, and expand on each¶ other's ideas." It is something like an elaborate minuet.¶ The failure to acknowledge minority scholarship extends even to¶ nonlegal propositions and assertions of fact. W.E. DuBois, deceased¶ Black historian, receives an occasional citation.5 Aside from him, little¶ else rates a mention. Higginbotham's monumental In the Matter of¶ Color' might as well not exist. The same is true of the work of Kenneth¶ Clark,1 Black psychologist and past president of the American¶ Psychological Association, and Alvin Poussaint,8 Harvard Medical¶ School professor and authority on the psychological impact of race. One¶ searches in vain for references to the powerful book by physicians Grier¶ and Cobbs, Black Rage,' or to Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the¶ Earth,10 or even to writings of or about Martin Luther King, Jr.,1¶ "¶ Cesar Chavez, 2 and Malcolm X."3 When the inner circle writers need authority for a factual or social scientific proposition about race they¶ generally cite reports of the United States Commission on Civil¶ Rights1 4 or else each other.1 5¶ A single anecdote may help to illustrate what I mean. Recently a¶ law professor who writes about civil rights showed me, for my edification,¶ a draft of an article of his. It is, on the whole, an excellent article.¶ It extols the value of a principle I will call "equal personhood." Equal¶ personhood is the notion, implicit in several constitutional provisions¶ and much case law, that each human being, regardless of race, creed, or¶ color, is entitled to be treated with equal respect. To treat someone as¶ an outsider, a nonmember of human society, violates this principle and¶ devalues the self-worth of the person so excluded.¶ I have no quarrel with this premise, but, on reading the one hundred-plus¶ footnotes of the article, I noticed that its author failed to cite¶ Black or minority scholars, an exclusion from the community of kindred¶ souls as glaring as any condemned in the paper. I pointed this out¶ to the author, citing as illustration a passage in which he asserted that¶ unequal treatment can cause a person to suffer a withered self-concept.¶ Having just written an article on a related subject, 8 I was more or less¶ steeped in withered self-concepts. I knew who the major authorities¶ were in that area.¶ The professor's authority for the proposition about withered selfconcepts¶ was Frank Michelman, writing in the Harvard Law Review. I pointed out that although Frank Michelman may be a superb scholar¶ and teacher, he probably has relatively little first-hand knowledge¶ about withered self-concepts. I suggested that the professor add references¶ to such works as Kenneth Clark's Dark Ghetto1¶ " and Grier and¶ Cobbs's Black Rage,"' and he agreed to do so. To justify his selection of¶ Frank Michelman for the proposition about withered self-concept, the¶ author explained that Michelman's statement was "so elegant."¶ Could inelegance of expression explain the absence of minority¶ scholarship from the text and footnotes of leading law review articles¶ about civil rights? Elegance is, without question, a virtue in writing, in¶ conversation, or in. anything else in life. If minority scholars write inelegantly¶ and Frank Michelman writes elegantly, then it would not be¶ surprising if the latter were read and cited more frequently, and the¶ former less so. But minority legal scholars seem to have less trouble¶ being recognized and taken seriously in areas of scholarship other than¶ civil rights theory.19 If elegance is a problem for minority scholars, it¶ seems mainly to be so in the core areas of civil rights: affirmative action,¶ the equality principle, and the theoretical foundations of race relations¶ law.¶ In 1971, Judge Skelly Wright wrote an article entitled, Professor¶ Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court.20 In the article,¶ Judge Wright took a group of scholars to task for their bloodless¶ carping at the Warren Court's decisions in the areas of racial justice¶ and human rights. He accused the group of missing the central point in¶ these decisions-their moral clarity and passion for justice-and labelled¶ the group's excessive preoccupation with procedure and institutional¶ role and its insistence that the Court justify every element of a¶ decision under general principles of universal application, a "scholarly tradition."'2 1¶ I think I have discovered a second scholarly tradition. It consists of¶ white scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority¶ scholars from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship. The mainstream¶ writers tend to acknowledge only each other's work. It is even¶ possible that, consciously or not, they resist entry by minority scholars¶ into the field,2 2 perhaps counseling them, as I was counseled, to establish¶ their reputations in other areas of law. I believe that this "scholarly¶ tradition" exists mainly in civil rights; nonwhite scholars in other fields¶ of law seem to confront no such tradition.23

Case

We only have to win 1 time that speech ought to be restricted. Saying anti state things is bad under their framework because it is willing the destruction of the state which his equivalent to willing onself back into the state of nature. 

Focus on intent diverts attention from marginalizing action and doesn’t let us stop oppression.  Utt 13

Jamie Utt  Jamie is the Founder and Director of Education at CivilSchools, a comprehensive bullying prevention program, a diversity and inclusion consultant, and sexual violence prevention educator based in Minneapolis, MN.  July 30, 2013  “Intent vs. Impact: Why Your Intentions Don’t Really Matter”

Intent v. Impact From Paula Deen to Alec Baldwin to your annoying, bigoted uncle or friend, we hear it over and over again: “I never meant any harm…” “It was never my intent…” “I am not a racist…” “I am not a homophobe…” “I’m not a sexist…” I cannot tell you how often I’ve seen people attempt to deflect criticism about their oppressive language or actions by making the conversation about their intent. At what point does the “intent” conversation stop mattering so that we can step back and look at impact? After all, in the end, what does the intent of our action really matter if our actions have the impact of furthering the marginalization or oppression of those around us? In some ways, this is a simple lesson of relationships. If I say something that hurts my partner, it doesn’t much matter whether I intended the statement to mean something else – because my partner is hurting. I need to listen to how my language hurt my partner. I need to apologize. And then I need to reflect and empathize to the best of my ability so I don’t do it again. But when we’re dealing with the ways in which our identities intersect with those around us – and, in turn, the ways our privileges and our experiences of marginalization and oppression intersect – this lesson becomes something much larger and more profound. This becomes a lesson of justice. What we need to realize is that when it comes to people’s lives and identities, the impact of our actions can be profound and wide-reaching. And that’s far more important than the question of our intent. We need to ask ourselves what might be or might have been the impact of our actions or words. And we need to step back and listen when we are being told that the impact of our actions is out of step with our intents or our perceptions of self. Identity Privilege and Intent For people of identity privilege, this is where listening becomes vitally important, for our privilege can often shield us from understanding the impact of our actions. After all, as a person of privilege, I can never fully understand the ways in which oppressive acts or language impact those around me. What I surely can do is listen with every intent to understand, and I can work to change my behavior. Because what we need to understand is that making the conversation about intent is inherently a privileged action. The reason? It ensures that you and your identity (and intent) stay at the center of any conversation and action while the impact of your action or words on those around you is marginalized. So if someone ever tells you to “check your privilege,” what they may very well mean is: “Stop centering your experience and identity in the conversation by making this about the intent of your actions instead of their impact.” That is: Not everything is about you.
Moral tunnel vision is complicit with evil.  Issac 2
—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest) 

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

A desire to ignore the consequences of their advocacy causes failure --- you must evaluate consequences of their proposal
Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African and African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318
Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal but can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." 281 For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

Ideal theory shuts off the ability to critique oppression, has empirically never worked in guiding a society, and allows the oppressor to rationalize oppression. Mills 15
Charles W. Mills (2015) Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy, New Political Science, 37:1, 1-24, DOI: 10.1080/07393148.2014.995491 PVE

For all four philosophers, then, including three former Rawls students, the characterization is indeed meant descriptively. But setting aside the argument from the authority of secondary sources, there is also (and more importantly) the argument from the text itself. It is difficult to make sense of what Rawls goes on to say if “society” is to be read as “ideal society” because he then introduces the further category of a “well-ordered society.” But if we are already in the realm of the ideal, how could there be conceptual room left for further idealization? We would then, weirdly, have the following categories: societies in general, real and hypothetical (and thus presumably including oppressive societies); ideal societies, non-oppressive cooperative ventures, as a subset of societies in general, real and hypothetical; and then well-ordered societies, as a subset of ideal societies (somehow ideally ideal, as against merely ideal). This is odd enough, but it gets more peculiar. Rawls then informs us that: “Existing societies are of course seldom well-ordered in this sense, for what is just and unjust is usually in dispute.”47 How are we to read this use of “society”? Is it society-as-ideal-society? But how could it be? There are no ideal societies on the face of the planet! It is currently a category with no real instantiations. So there are no well-ordered societies either, that ideal ideal subset of the merely ideal. So Rawls has to be using the term here in its everyday sense, society-as-actual-society, which would mean either that he meant it that way all along, or that he has switched without warning from the (putative) idealized, Rawlsian term-of-art sense to the conventional sense. But by standard Gricean “conversational implicature,” one does not make a claim weaker than the facts allow. If the city is suffering a heat wave and the temperature outside is over hundred degrees Fahrenheit, we do not say: “It must be at least sixty degrees outside!” So this suggests that Rawls really believes that existing societies are in general cooperative ventures, if few can be categorized as well-ordered, because otherwise the natural thing for him to have said would be that “Existing societies are of course not cooperative ventures for mutual advantage, and so, a fortiori, are not well-ordered.” Thus we face a dilemma: either Rawls is using “society” in a perverse idiosyncratic way or he was massively ignorant of basic societal realities. But in either case, prescriptions for social justice based on such a conception of society or on such a sociology are going to be problematic to apply in the actual world. I think that the most charitable reading (though even it ultimately fails) is to assume that Rawls really had the modern Western democracies in mind when he spoke of “societies.” These are the societies that come closest to fitting the contract model, which he is trying to update for his theory. Pre-modern feudal and slave societies, modern non-Western dictatorships, clearly do not meet the criterion of genuinely being cooperative ventures, and so are not “societies” in the sense he means. Such a reading does not require comprehensive global historical illiteracy on Rawls’s part, just the kind of Eurocentric and androcentric historical illiteracy typical of his time (admittedly global in its own way). Moreover, this interpretation would be consistent with the later explicit announcement, in the 1980s essays and in the 1993 Political Liberalism, that A Theory of Justice’s seeming generality of normative reference was mistaken, and that he was really articulating a theory for the Western nations, drawing on ideas implicit within the Western tradition. But the problem is, of course, that apart from the feminist critique of Western patriarchy, and the racial subordination of people of color (Amerindian expropriation and genocide, African slavery) in the Western (alleged) democracy of which he was a citizen—which motivated Pierre van den Berghe’s famous alternative characterization of “Herrenvolk democracy”—this conception of society and of social justice excludes the formerly colonized nations from the scope of his principles of justice. Uncontroversially historically characterized by structural oppression, they presumably do not meet the bar for being “cooperative ventures” and thus do not count as “societies” proper of the appropriate normative Western kind. Apart from the absurdity of a theory of social justice that prescinds from dealing with structural social injustice—just stop for a second and think about the bizarreness of that—this partitioned normative cartography severs the very historic connections between “the West and the Rest” that are responsible for the latter’s “non-cooperative” nature in the first place! In their introduction to their edited Colonialism and Its Legacies, Jacob Levy and Iris Marion Young point out how Rawls’s framing of these issues, which projects backwards into the past a national isolation completely untrue to the actual international history, is part of a larger pattern of mystification (starting to change only recently) in contemporary political theory: Modernity—the centuries since 1500—has been at once the era of the European state and the era of the European empires . . . From 1500 through 1950, very nearly all of the inhabited world came under the power of one or another European state, or a European-derived settler state . . . Even if the age of European empires is broken into many discrete events, there are many such events . . . that would rank among the largest-scale conquests in human history. And these events include a substantial share of the greatest political evils ever committed. Yet all of this seemed, for many years, tangential to the story of modernity familiar to political theorists and philosophers.48 Formal decolonization enabled an amnesia about the colonial past and an ignoring of the neo-colonial present, problematic enough in political theory, but even worse in political philosophy: By the time of the revitalization of Anglophone political philosophy with the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971, decolonization had reshaped the political map. The world was, juridically, almost completely a world of sovereign and formally equal states. And the great debates projected back through modern intellectual history were fundamentally debates about the internal governance of such states ... Colonial and imperial relations—relations between metropolitan states and their conquered colonies and territories—figured approximately not at all . . . Contractarianism in particular treats life outside the state—the kind of state we can recognize as the modern European Weberian state— as prepolitical and extrapolitical, outside the core concerns of political philosophy . . . Social contract theory came more and more to be understood as relevant to the politics of one, self-contained and well-defined, state. If the first great work of social contract theory was Grotius’ Rights of War and Peace and the last was Theory of Justice, the contrast could hardly be more stark. The earlier work is nearly all about interpolity relations including imperial relations; the latter takes as the point of departure for political philosophy a self-governing society closed off from the rest of the world, unaffected by it and not affecting it. And Rawlsian questions (or the questions of his libertarian or communitarian critics) were projected backward through time.49 Unsurprisingly, then, nowhere in any of Rawls’s five directly authored books (or the two lecture collections) is there any mention of Native Americans, the Atlantic Slave Trade, European colonialism and imperialism, the genocide of indigenous populations, or the reality of systemic Euro-domination on a global scale.50 These people, these histories, simply cannot be accommodated by the official contract narrative. The “colonial” character of Rawls’s work and the vast, polyglot secondary literature of Rawlsianism is manifest not in racist representations of people of color, but in the simple fact that this whole body of thought takes as a starting-point what, in the period of modernity for which the contract is supposed to be most appropriate, is only true (to the extent that it is true) for the Euro-population, and for the Euro-population conceptually abstracted out of their political relations of domination over populations of color. Denying the past and present relations of colonialism and neocolonialism, which have created both, Rawls offers us a vision of autarkical polities whose respective levels of development are the result not of a transnational and intra- national (for the United States) system of extraction and exploitation, not of empire, but of different national cultures and traditions. The societies of the West get to be “cooperative ventures,” covered by the norms of justice; the societies of the Rest fall into the outer darkness, normatively registering only as “burdened societies” and “outlaw states.” Thus by the very conceptual framing of his theory, he launders colonialism and imperialism, whitewashing them out of his dikailogical framework. It is the viewpoint of the metropole, the colonizer, the white settler— the viewpoint of colonial racial privilege in a nominally post-colonial epoch, its coloniality manifesting itself not in a crude endorsement of colonialism (that would obviously be inappropriate for the postwar world) but, far more effectively, in a total aprioristic conceptual exclusion

Tournament: Stanford | Round: 6 | Opponent: Oakwood AO | Judge: Brian Yang
1

A focus on a priori reason and conceptual abstraction forces oppressed people to divorce themselves from the material conditions caused by whiteness and imagine a world in which whiteness is good.  This takes out Kinsella since we indict the very logic behind that argument Curry 13

Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013.  NS

The potentiality of whiteness—the proleptic call of white anti-racist consciousness— is nothing more than the fiat of an ahistorical dream. A command ushered before thought engages racism, before awareness of the world becomes aware of what is actual. This is forced upon accounts of racism where whiteness is morally obscured from being seen as is.  Whiteness as is partly determined by what could be, since what is was a past potentiality—a could be. The appeal to the sentimentality, morality, the moral abstraction/distraction of equality—both as a political command and its anthropological requisite—complicate the most obvious consequence of anti-Black racism, namely violence. This moral apriorism urges the Black thinker to conceptualize racism as an activist project rooted in the potential of a world filled with non-racists, a world where the white racist is transformed by Black activity into the white anti-racist.  But this project supposes an erroneous view of the white racist which occludes the reality of white supremacy and anti-Black racism. As Robert F. Williams argues in Negroes with Guns, “the racist is a man crazed by hysteria at the idea of coming into equal contact with Negroes. And this mass mental illness called racism is very much a part of the ‘American way of Life.’” The white racist is not seen as the delusional individual ostracized from society as a result of their abhorrent social pathologies of racist hate. Rather the white racist is normal—the extended family, the spouse, the sibling, the friend of the white individual—the very same entities upon which the inter/intrasubjectivity nexus of the white self is founded. The white he experiences no punishment for his longing for Black servitude and his need to exploit and divest the Black worker here and then of his wealth. The white she has no uneasiness about her raping of—the destruction of generations of Black selves—mothers, children, and men—and today usurps the historical imagery of “the nigger,” to politically vacate Blackness and demonize niggers as beyond political consideration. She rewrites history, pens morality, and embodies the post-racial civil rights subject. As such, racism, the milieu of the white racist is not the exposed pathological existence of the white race, but rather valorized in white individuality, the individuality that conceptualizes their racism as a normative aspiration of what the world should look like, and even more damning, an aspiration that can be supported and propagated in the world. The white racist recognizes the deliberateness of the structures, relations, and systems in a white supremacist society and seeks like their colonial foreparents to claim them as their own. 

And, we should be having a debate about what to do about oppression, not what constitutes oppression – debates are 45 minutes long so endless academic moralizing is circular and gets no where, forgoing the opportunity for real world solutions.
Their philosophy preaches that everyone is equal – this colorblind ideology perpetuates anti blackness under the myth of American liberalism.  Curry 13

Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013.  NS

Despite the rhetorical strategies adopted by both Black and white political theorists which urge Blacks and whites alike to demand Americans to continue their allegiance to the foundational de-racialized ethos of the post-Civil Rights era, the reality of the American racism—its sheer recurring violence against Black people—demands more than symbolic rhetorical allusion. To seriously grasp the reality of racist oppression and the sempiternal machinations of anti-Blackness throughout American society be it in its institutions like the prison industrial complex, its policies like Affirmative action, or its manipulation of Black social degradation and economic disadvantage to support pathological theses about disasters like Katrina or cultural deviance as in the death of Trayvon Martin, Darius Simmons, or Jordan Davis, the study of the matter itself—racism—must be a study of a conceptual disengagement with the myth of racial equality and the “automatic progressivism” of the American liberal project. This disengagement is not simply the refusal to accept the idealism of civil rights myth held beyond the realm of fact, but the disengagement with the illusions of democracy and equality that continue to ignore the role that violence has played and continues to play in the subjugation, incarceration, and vilification of Black life. As Dr. A.J. William Myers reveals in his work groundbreaking work entitled Destructive Impulses, ¶ Until at such time white America (and Black America) is openly willing to confront a historical legacy of its own violence (perpetrated against an American people of color), any venture into and/ or expository on race relations becomes an exercise in futility…As a result, therefore, white violence, confined to the subliminal recesses of the American psyche, continues to prevent the transition necessary for the country to move beyond the idea of race. ¶ In America, Blackness and the racism that continues to condemn those historical racialized peoples is violence—it is the forceful and coercion enclosing of human beings to an inferior social, political, and economic status of which their own humanity exceeds. This dehumanizing relegation of the raced citizen is not a gradual or incremental debasement, but rather the historically immediate condition of inferiority that presents progress to be attainable by the cyclical degrees of physical violence against the racialized population. For these racially oppressed peoples, violence is the permanent fixture of existence in America, since it is the vitiation of their humanity that rationalizes the varying techniques of their cultural erasure, birthing the emergent symbolic associations of degradation that replace their invisibility, and empowering the intentional enforcements of their societal exclusions. In fact, it is precisely this triumvirate that gauges what we take to be the negation of the necessity of revolutionary change--since the raced is taken to be present, as a result of a critical redefining of humanity, integrated into society.

The aff’s attempt to whitewash history by ignoring the racist foundations that underlie their theory allows for racial domination to remain invisible – you as a judge must reject the aff’s epistemology and acknowledge the reality of oppression. That’s a voting issue. Leonardo
Leonardo, Zeus. "The souls of white folk: Critical pedagogy, whiteness studies, and globalization discourse." Race, ethnicity and education 5.1 (2002): 29-50. CC

The fragmenting effects of the global economy work in tandem with the fragmenting tendencies of whiteness. As a perspective, whiteness is historicaly fractured in its apprehension of racial formations. In order to ‘see’ the formation in full view, whites have to mobilize a perspective that begins with racial privilege as a central unit of analysis. Since starting from this point would mean whites engage in a thorough historical understanding of ‘how they came to be’ in a position of power, most whites resist such an undertaking and instead focus on individual merit, exception- alism, or hard work. The act of interpreting the totality of racial formations is an apostasy that white students and educators must undertake but one which does not come easy or without costs. The costs are real because it means whites would have to acknowledge their unearned privileges and disinvest in them. This is a different tack from saying that whites benefit from renouncing their whiteness because it would increase their humanity. Whites would lose many of their perks and privileges. So, the realistic appraisal is that whites do have a lot to lose by committing race treason, not just something to gain by forsaking whiteness. This is the challenge. In his discussion of gender and race, Terry Eagleton (1996) provokes a distinction between identity politics and class relations. He calls class position relational in a way that gender and race are not, because possessing a certain skin color or body configuration does not prevent another person from owning such traits. By contrast, a landless laborer occupies a material position because the gentleman farmer owns the land or property. Eagleton goes on to say that being black does not mean one is of a different species from a white person. Pigmentation is not definitive of a general human experience in the same way that freckle-faced people do not constitute an essentialy different human category. In this, Eagleton exposes the racist and patriarchal imagination by highlighting its contradictions and ilogics. However, his analysis leaves out a more powerful explanation of how racism actualy works. Like most oppressive systems, racism functions through an illogical rationalization process. For instance, the one-drop rule, or the Rule of Hypodescent, demarcates blacks from whites by drawing an artiŽ cial and arbitrary line between them in order both to create more slaves and limit people’s power to achieve whiteness. Thus, the power of whiteness comes precisely from its ability to usurp reason and rational thought, and a purely rationalistic analysis limits our understanding of the way it functions. Despite its contradictions, the contours of racism can be mapped out and analyzed and this is what Cheryl Harris (1995) attempts when she compares whiteness to owning property. First, whiteness becomes property through the objectiŽ cation of African slaves, a process which set the precondition for ‘propertizing’ human life (Harris, 1995, p. 279). Whiteness takes the form of ownership, the deŽ ning attribute of free individ- uals which Africans did not own. Second, through the reification and subsequent hegemony of white people, whiteness is transformed into the common sense that becomes law. As a given right of the individual white person, whiteness can be enjoyed, like any property, by exercising and taking advantage of privileges co-extensive with whiteness. Third, like a house, whiteness can be demarcated and fenced off as a territory of white people which keeps Others out. Thus, caling a white person ‘black’ was enough reason, as late as 1957, to sue for character defamation; the same could not be said of a black person being mistaken for ‘white.’ This was a certain violation of property rights much like breaking into someone’s house. In al, whites became the subjects of property, with Others as its objects. As Charles Mils (1997) explains, the Racial Contract is an agreement to misinter- pret the world as it is. It is the implicit consensus that whites frequently enter into, which accounts for their fragmented understanding of the world as it is racialy structured. When confronted with the reality of racial oppression, according to Hurtado, whites respond with: I wil listen to you, sometimes for the Ž rst time, and wil seem engaged. At critical points in your analysis I wil claim I do not know what you are talking about and wil ask you to elaborate ad nauseam. I wil consistently subvert your efforts at dialogue by claiming ‘we do not speak the same language’. (cited in McLaren et al., 2001, pp. 211–212; italics in original) The frequent detours, evasions, and detractions from the circuits of whiteness cripple our understanding of the racio-economic essence of schools and society. It is a distortion of perfect communication in Habermas’s (1984) sense of it which creates what I cal an altogether ‘ideological speech situation.’ That is, communi- cation is ideological to the extent that the ‘ideal speech situation’ is systematicaly distorted, which is different from saying that it is always a bit distorted. As Hurtado plainly describes, radical communication about the Contract meets apathy and indifference, perhaps a bit predictably. Admitting the reality of white racism would force a river of centuries of pain, denial, and guilt that many people cannot assuage. In several instances, both in coleagues’ courses as wel as mine, white students have expressed their emotions and frustrations through tears when white privilege is confronted. In fact, Rains (1997) has described the same event occurring in her courses. Although it might seem cynical or unfeeling to analyze criticaly such an occurrence, it is important to deploy such a critique in the name of political and pedagogical clarity. It is imperative to address the local moment and ‘be there’ for al students but in slicing through the pathos, one also beneŽ ts from re ection on the moment in its larger, global signiŽ cance. The times when I have confronted this scenario can be described as the honest interrogation of racial power engaged by both white and non-white students. At certain moments, some anger has been expressed, sometimes frustration. In general, the milieu is emotional and politicaly charged. How can it not be? In one particular case, I witnessed a situation where a black student interrogated the issue of racial privilege and questioned a white coleague’s comments for failing to do the same. By the end of the exchange, the white student left the room crying and the discussion halted. In another case, an earnest discussion took place about racism and ways to address it in schools. A white student cried because she felt frustrated and a little helpless about how she comes into the fold of becoming an anti-racist educator. After a minute of pause, students of color returned to the discussion at hand, not breaking their stride. In a third instance, in the midst of discussing the importance of building solidarity between teachers against racism, a white student cries and asks her coleagues to remember that they must stay cohesive and support each other as comrades in struggle. A coleague reports a fourth instance where, during a dialogue about the experiences of women of color, a white woman repeatedly insisted that the real issue was class, not race, because her experiences as a woman were similar to the women of color. When a faculty of color informed her that she was monopolizing the discussion and in the process invalidated the voices of women of color, the white woman cried and was unable to continue. In al these cases, we observed the guilt of whiteness prompting the women to cry in shame. Made to recognize their unearned privileges and confronted in public, they react with tears of admission. Discussing (anti)racism is never easy and is frequently suppressed in mainstream classroom conditions. The establishment of the right conditions is precious but often precarious. In the Ž rst case, we must keep in mind that it was the black student who felt dehumanized and subsequently felt enough courage to express her anger about comments she perceived to be problematic. The act of crying by the white student immediately positioned the black student as the perpetrator of a hurt and erased/deraced the power of her charge. A reversal of sorts had just occurred. The white student earned the other students’ sympathy and the professor folowed her to the halway to comfort her white the black student nursed her anger by herself. Likewise, I could not help but feel for the white student. Upon re ection, an important difference needs to be discussed. In the act of crying, the student attenuated the centuries of hurt and oppression that the black student was trying to relay. In the act of crying, the student transformed racism into a local problem between two people. I couldn’t help feeling that other students in the class thought the black person was both wrong and racist, erasing/deracing the institutional basis of what she had to say. The room’s energy suddenly felt funneled to the white student. Clearly, there are more ‘harmonious’ ways of teaching the topic of race and racism. However, they also often forsake radical critique for feelings. Feelings have to be respected and educators can establish the conditions for radical empathy. That said, anger is also a valid and legitimate feeling; when complemented by clear thought, anger is frighteningly lucid. Thus, a pedagogy of politeness only goes so far before it degrades into the paradox of liberal feel-good solidarity absent of dissent, without which any worthwhile pedagogy becomes a democracy of empty forms. White comfort zones are notorious for tolerating only smal, incremental dozes of racial confrontation (Hunter and Nettles, 1999). This does not suggest that educators procure a hostile environment, but a pedagogical situation that fails to address white racism is arguably already the conduit of hostility. It fragments students’ holistic understanding of their identity development through the ability of whiteness to deform our complete picture of the racial formation. It practices violence on the racialized Other in the name of civility and as long as this is the case, racial progress wil proceed at the snail pace of white racial consciousness. White race traitors and progressive Others shal piece together a whole from the fragmentary pieces that whiteness has created out of this world. The Contract challenges educators of the new millennium to explain the untruth of white perspectives on race, even a century after Du Bois’s initial chalenge. Obviously, this does not mean that whites cannot grasp the Contract; many do, but they cannot accomplish this from the white point of view, a world-view which, according to Gibson, projects a ‘delusional world,’ ‘a racial fantasyland,’ and ‘a consensual halucination’ (cited in Mils, 1997, p. 18). With the rise of globalization, education—which prides itself for inculcating into students knowledge about the real world—struggles to represent the world in the most real way possible. White epistemology can be characterized as fragmentary and fleeting because white liveli- hood depends on this double helix. It is fragmentary because in order for whiteness to maintain its invisibility, or its unmarked status, it must by necessity mistake the world as non-relational or partitioned (Dwyer and Jones, III, 2000). This allows the white psyche to speak of slavery as ‘long ago,’ rather than as a legacy which lives today; it minimizes racism toward non-white immigrants today through a convenient and problematic comparison with white immigrants, like the Irish or Jews. It is also fleeting because it must deny the history of its own genesis and the creation of the Other. It can only be concerned with ‘how things are and not how they got to be that way.’ As a socio-spatial epistemology, whiteness sees the world upside-down. Mils (1997) and I agree when he says: Thus on matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologicaly and socialy functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites wil in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made. (p. 18; italics in original) According to Mils, whiteness concerns itself with racial details and misses the totality of the Racial Contract. Like the way it partitions the world according to its own image, whiteness constructs history as separate racial details without coherence. As a result, it fails to provide our students the language to link together California’s Proposition 187 (anti-immigrant), 209 (anti-afŽ rmative action), and 227 (anti-bilin- gualism) as related to white hegemony. With the exception of particular Asian ethnic groups (to which I wil return later), al three legislations limit the rights of students of color. Fortunately, white and non-white activists have countered such measures with unrelenting protests and public organizing because, as Hopson et al. (1998) remind us, ‘Recognizing and valuing language varieties and multiple ways of speaking among students is a precondition to understanding how to teach them’ (p. 5). As a racial epistemology, whiteness is necessarily idealist in order to construct the Other as abstract, rather than concrete. Enslavement, discrimination, and marginalization of the Other work most efficiently when they are constructed as an idea rather than a people. They can be more easily controled, aggregated as the same, or marked as unchanging and constant when textbooks idealize them as inconse- quential to the history and evolution of humankind. In effect, whiteness eggs us on to yoke together different peoples around the globe under the sign of sameness.

2

1NC – K

Rhetoric propagating free speech as the answer to social ills directly trades off with our ability to fight injustice. Free speech is a tool that courts wield in colorblind ways against people. Delgado and Stefancic 92
Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. “IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?” Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN
III. How THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION SOMETIMES MAKES MATTERS WORSE Speech and free expression are not only poorly adapted to remedy racism, they often make matters worse-far from being stalwart friends, they can impede the cause of racial reform. First, they encourage writers, filmmakers, and other creative people to feel amoral, nonresponsible in what they do. 18 8 Because there is a marketplace of ideas, the rationalization goes, another film-maker is free to make an antiracist movie that will cancel out any minor stereotyping in the one I am making. My movie may have other redeeming qualities; besides, it is good entertainment and everyone in the industry uses stock characters like the black maid or the bumbling Asian tourist. How can one create film without stock characters? 18 9 Second, when insurgent groups attempt to use speech as an instrument of reform, courts almost invariably construe First Amendment doctrine against them.1 90 As Charles Lawrence pointed out, civil rights activists in the sixties made the greatest strides when they acted in defiance of the First Amendment as then understood. 191 They marched, were arrested and convicted; sat in, were arrested and convicted; distributed leaflets, were arrested and convicted. Many years later, after much gallant lawyering and the expenditure of untold hours of effort, the conviction might be reversed on appeal if the original action had been sufficiently prayerful, mannerly, and not too interlaced with an action component. This history of the civil rights movement does not bear out the usual assumption that the First Amendment is of great value for racial reformers. 19 2 Current First Amendment law is similarly skewed. Examination of the many "exceptions" to First Amendment protection discloses that the large majority favor the interests of the powerful. 19 3 If one says something disparaging of a wealthy and well-regarded individual, one discovers that one's words were not free after all; the wealthy individual has a type of property interest in his or her community image, damage to which is compensable even though words were the sole instrument of the harm. 194 Similarly, if one infringes the copyright or trademark of a well-known writer or industrialist, again it turns out that one's action is punishable. 19 5 Further, if one disseminates an official secret valuable to a powerful branch of the military or defense contractor, that speech is punishable. 19 If one speaks disrespectfully to a judge, police officer, teacher, military official, or other powerful authority figure, again one discovers that one's words were not free;1 9 7 and so with words used to defraud, 198 form a conspiracy, 1 99 breach the peace, 200 or untruthful words given under oath during a civil or criminal proceeding.20 1 Yet the suggestion that we create new exception to protect lowly and vulnerable members of our society, such as isolated, young black undergraduates attending dominantly white campuses, is often met with consternation: the First Amendment must be a seamless web; minorities, if they knew their own self-interest, should appreciate this even more than others. 20 2 This one-sidedness of free-speech doctrine makes the First Amendment much more valuable to the majority than to the minority. The system of free expression also has a powerful after-the-fact apologetic function. Elite groups use the supposed existence of a marketplace of ideas to justify their own superior position. 203 Imagine a society in which all As were rich and happy, all Bs were moderately comfortable, and all Cs were poor, stigmatized, and reviled. Imagine also that this society scrupulously believes in a free marketplace of ideas. Might not the As benefit greatly from such a system? On looking about them and observing the inequality in the distribution of wealth, longevity, happiness, and safety between themselves and the others, they might feel guilt. Perhaps their own superior position is undeserved, or at least requires explanation. But the existence of an ostensibly free marketplace of ideas renders that effort unnecessary. Rationalization is easy: our ideas, our culture competed with their more easygoing ones and won. 20 4 It was a fair fight. Our position must be deserved; the distribution of social goods must be roughly what fairness, merit, and equity call for.20 5 It is up to them to change, not us. A free market of racial depiction resists change for two final reasons. First, the dominant pictures, images, narratives, plots, roles, and stories ascribed to, and constituting the public perception of minorities, are always dominantly negative. 20 6 Through an unfortunate psychological mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of the sort described in Part I (as well as today's versions) inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority persons. 20 7 Minorities internalize the stories they read, see, and hear every day. Persons of color can easily become demoralized, blame themselves, and not speak up vigorously.208 The expense of speech also precludes the stigmatized from participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas. 20 9 They are often poor-indeed, one theory of racism holds that maintenance of economic inequality is its prime function2 0 -and hence unlikely to command the means to bring countervailing messages to the eyes and ears of others. Second, even when minorities do speak they have little credibility. Who would listen to, who would credit, a speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoonery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness, and demanding resources beyond his or her deserved share? Our very imagery of the outsider shows that, contrary to the usual view, society does not really want them to speak out effectively in their own behalf and, in fact, cannot visualize them doing so. Ask yourself: How do outsiders speak in the dominant narratives? Poorly, inarticulately, with broken syntax, short sentences, grunts, and unsophisticated ideas.21' Try to recall a single popular narrative of an eloquent, self-assured black (for example) orator or speaker. In the real world, of course, they exist in profusion. But when we stumble upon them, we are surprised: "What a welcome 'exception'!" Words, then, can wound. But the fine thing about the current situation is that one gets to enjoy a superior position and feel virtuous at the same time. By supporting the system of free expression no matter what the cost, one is upholding principle. One can belong to impeccably liberal organizations and believe one is doing the right thing, even while taking actions that are demonstrably injurious to the least privileged, most defenseless segments of our society.21 2 In time, one's actions will seem wrong and will be condemned as such, but paradigms change slowly.2 1 3 The world one helps to create-a world in which denigrating depiction is good or at least acceptable, in which minorities are buffoons, clowns, maids, or Willie Hortons, and only rarely fully individuated human beings with sensitivities, talents, personalities, and frailties-will survive into the future. One gets to create culture at outsiders' expense. And, one gets to sleep well at night, too. Racism is not a mistake, not a matter of episodic, irrational behavior carried out by vicious-willed individuals, not a throwback to a long-gone era. It is ritual assertion of supremacy, 214 like animals sneering and posturing to maintain their places in the hierarchy of the colony. It is performed largely unconsciously, just as the animals' behavior is. 2 15 Racism seems right, customary, and inoffensive to those engaged in it, while bringing psychic and pecuniary advantages.21 6 The notion that more speech, more talking, more preaching, and more lecturing can counter this system of oppression is appealing, lofty, romantic-and wrong.

Their notion of the first amendment is colorblind and obscures anti-black violence. Boler 04
Boler, Megan Megan Boler is a Full Professor in the Department of Social Justice Education, at the Ontario Institute of Studies in Education (OISE) at the University of Toronto.. "All Speech Is Not Free: The Ethics of" Affirmative Action Pedagogy"." Counterpoints 240 (2004): 3-13.
On what basis might one justify an affirmative action pedagogy? The first justifica-¶ tion is forwarded by legal scholars in the area of critical race theory. The authors of¶ Words That Wound (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, and Crenshaw, 1993) address the¶ tension between the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The tension arises because,¶ in fact, all people are not equally protected under the law because of the institu-¶ tionalized inequities within our society. This reality complicates the effectiveness¶ of the First Amendment. Scholarship in critical race theory and educational analy-¶ ses document that in recent years, we find incidents of hate speech primarily to be¶ directed at racial, religious, or sexual minorities. Not surprisingly, one finds in turn¶ that invocations of the right to free speech are most often invocations to protect¶ the right of the members of the dominant culture to express their hatred toward¶ members of minority culture. These authors make important legal and historical¶ cases to support their observation that, in practice, while the rhetoric of the First¶ Amendment is a buzz word that makes all of us want to rally for its principle, in¶ practice "the first amendment arms conscious and unconscious racists - Nazis and¶ liberals alike - with a constitutional right to be racist. Racism is just another idea¶ deserving of constitutional protection like all ideas" (Matsuda et al., 1993, p. 15). A¶ scholar from another discipline addresses classroom dynamics and similarly argues¶ that we must "read the appeal to the First Amendment as itself a kind of panic re-¶ sponse in the same order as hate speech itself" (Roof, 1999, p. 45).¶ A second justification for privileging marginalized voices is based on the meas-¶ urement of the psychological effect of hate speech on targeted groups and individ-¶ uals. As one legal scholar explains, hate speech affects its victim in the visceral ex-¶ perience of a "disorienting powerlessness" (Lawrence, 1993, p. 70), an effect¶ achieved because hate speech is comparable to an act of violence. In reaction to¶ hate speech, the target commonly experiences a "state of semishock," nausea, and dizziness, and an inability to articulate a response. This scholar gives an example of a student who is white and gay. The student reports that in an instance where he¶ was called "faggot" he experienced all of the above symptoms. However, when he¶ was called "honky," he did not experience the disorienting powerlessness. As the¶ scholar remarks, "the context of the power relationships in which the speech takes¶ place, and the connection to violence must be considered as we decide how best to¶ foster the freest and fullest dialogue within our communities" (Lawrence, 1993,¶ p. 70).¶ These considerations bring me to another key point: The analysis of utterance¶ in the classroom requires more than rational dialogue. In fact, the critical race¶ theorists argue that because racism is irrational, no amount of rational dialogue¶ will change racist attitudes. I disagree, in part because I am convinced that class-¶ room discussion must recognize the emotions that shape and construct the mean-¶ ings of our claims, our interchange with one another, and our investments in par-¶ ticular worldviews. Thus, a discussion of racism or homophobia cannot rely¶ simply on rational exchange but must delve into the deeply emotional investments¶ and associations that surround perceptions of difference and ideologies. One is po-¶ tentially faced with allowing ones worldviews to be shattered, in itself a pro-¶ foundly emotionally charged experience 

Turns the case – hate speech does real violence to people of color and necessarily locks in relationships of domination. Delgado and Stefacic 09
Richard Delgado - University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. Jean Stefancic – Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989, University of San Francisco. “FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH.” WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW. 2009. http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Delgado_LawReview_01.09.pdf
II. OBSERVATION NUMBER TWO: THE EVALUATION OF HARMS HAS BEEN INCOMPLETE One way, of course, to end the current standoff is for one of the parties to defer to the other’s point of view. Indeed, by pursuing an aggressive campaign of litigation, the free-speech camp has been implicitly urging that the other side do just that.58 One could also argue that a host of campus administrators, by enacting successive versions of hate-speech codes, are attempting to do the same thing, namely, wear the other side down.59 Ordinarily, though, it is the free-speech faction, with a string of lower-court victories to its credit, who urge the other side to “get over it” and toughen its collective hide.60 Yet, a careful weighing of the costs and benefits of speech regulation suggests that the case for it is closer than the ACLU and some courts seem ready to acknowledge. Before addressing the costs of hate-speech regulation versus the opposite, it is advisable to arrive at an understanding of what hate speech is. A Types of Hate Speech Hate speech, including the campus variety, can take a number of forms—direct (sometimes called “specific”) or indirect; veiled or overt; single or repeated; backed by power, authority, or threat, or not.61 One can also distinguish it in terms of the characteristic— such as race, religion, sexual orientation, immigration status, or gender—of the person or group it targets.62 It can isolate a single individual (“Jones, you goddamned X.”) or group (“The goddamned Xs are destroying this country.”). It can be delivered orally, in writing, on the Internet, or in the form of a tangible thing, such as a Confederate flag, football mascot, or monument.63 It can be anonymous, as with graffiti or a leaflet surreptitiously placed on a bulletin board or under a dormitory door, or its author can be plainly identified.64 The object of the speech may be free to leave, or trapped, as in a classroom or workplace.65 B. The Harms of Hate Speech The various forms of hate speech present different kinds and degrees of harm. The face-to-face kind is the most immediately problematic, especially if the target is not in a position to leave and the one delivering it possesses the power to harm. 1. Direct or Face-to-Face Hate Speech Although some courts and commentators describe the injury of hate speech as mere offense,66 the harm associated with the face-toface kind, at least, is often far greater than that and includes flinching, tightening of muscles, adrenaline rushes, and inability to sleep.67 Some victims may suffer psychosocial harms, including depression, repressed anger, diminished self-concept, and impairment of work or school performance.68 Some may take refuge in drugs, alcohol, or other forms of addiction, compounding their misery.69 2. Hate Speech and Children With children, the harms of hate speech may be even more worrisome. A child victimized by racial taunts or browbeating may respond aggressively, with the result that he or she is labeled as assaultive.70 Or, the child can respond by internalizing the harm and pretending to ignore it. Robbed of self-confidence and a sense of ease, such a child can easily become introspective and morose.71 If the child’s parents suffer the same fate at work, they may bring these problems home so that the parents retain even less energy for their families than before.72 Recent scholarship points out how the pathologies associated with social subordination may be transgenerational, lasting for centuries, if not millennia, and include pain, fear, shame, anger, and despair.73 3. General Hate Speech With general hate speech, such as anonymously circulated flyers or speeches to a crowd, the harms, while diffuse, may be just as serious.74 Recent scholarship shows how practically every instance of genocide came on the heels of a wave of hate speech depicting the victims in belittling terms.75 For example, before launching their wave of deadly attacks on the Tutsis in Rwanda, Hutus in government and the media disseminated a drumbeat of messages casting their ethnic rivals as despicable.76 The Third Reich did much the same with the Jews during the period leading up to the Holocaust.77 When the United States enslaved African Americans and killed or removed the Indians, it rationalized that these were simple folk who needed discipline and tutelage, or else bloodthirsty savages who resisted the blessings of civilization.78 When, a little later, the nation marched westward in pursuit of manifest destiny, it justified taking over the rich lands of California and the Southwest on the ground that the indolent Mexicans living on them did not deserve their good fortune.79 Before interning the Japanese during World War II, propagandists depicted the group as sneaky, suspicious, and despotic.80 It is possible that the connection between general hate speech and instances of mass oppression may not be merely statistical and contingent, but conceptual and necessary.81 Concerted action requires an intelligible intention or rationale capable of being understood by others. One cannot mistreat another group without first articulating a reason why one is doing it—otherwise, no one but a sadist would join in.82 Without a softening-up period, early steps toward genocide, such as removing Jews to a ghetto, would strike others as gratuitous and command little support. Discriminatory action of any kind presupposes a group that labors under a stigma of some kind.83 The prime mechanism for the creation of such stigma is hate speech.84 Without it, genocide, imperialism, Indian removal, and Jim Crow could gain little purchase.85 C. The Harms of Speech Regulation If the harms of hate speech are sobering, what lies on the other side? What happens to the hate speaker forced to hold things in? Will he or she suffer psychological injury, depression, nightmares, drug addiction, and a blunted self image?86 Diminished pecuniary and personal prospects?87 Will hate-speech regulation set up the speaker’s group for extermination, seizure of ancestral lands, or anything comparable?88 The very possibility seems far-fetched. And, indeed, regimes, such as Europe’s and Canada’s, that criminalize hate speech exhibit none of these ills.89 Speech and inquiry there seem as free and uninhibited as in the United States, and their press just as feisty as our own.90 What about harm to the hate speaker? The individual who holds his or her tongue for fear of official sanction may be momentarily irritated. But “bottling it up” seems not to inflict serious psychological or emotional damage.91 Early in the debate about hate speech, some posited that a prejudiced individual forced to keep his impulses in check might become more dangerous as a result.92 By analogy to a pressure valve, he or she might explode in a more serious form of hate speech or even a physical attack on a member of the target group.93 But studies examining this possibility discount it.94 Indeed, the bigot who expresses his sentiment aloud is apt to be more dangerous, not less, as a result. The incident “revs him up” for the next one, while giving onlookers the impression that baiting minorities is socially acceptable, so that they may follow suit.95 A recently developed social science instrument, the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), shows that many Americans harbor measurable animus toward racial minorities.96 Might it be that hearing hate speech, in person or on the radio, contributes to that result?97 III. OBSERVATION NUMBER THREE: INTEREST BALANCING MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF RELEVANT FEATURES OF HATE SPEECH If all types of hate speech are apt to impose costs,98 large or small, how should courts and policymakers weigh them? Not every victim of hate speech will respond in one of the ways described above. Some will shrug it off or lash back at the aggressor, giving as good as they got.99 The harm of hate speech is variable, changing from victim to victim and setting to setting.100 By the same token, it is impossible to say with assurance that the cost of hate-speech regulation will always be negligible. Some speakers who might wish to address sensitive topics, such as affirmative action or racial differences in response to medical treatments, might shy away from them.101 The interplay of voices that society relies on to regulate itself may deteriorate. In balancing hate speech versus regulation, two benchmarks may be helpful: a review of current freespeech “exceptions” and attention to the role of incessancy. A. Current Free-Speech Exceptions Not all speech is free. The current legal landscape contains many exceptions and special doctrines corresponding to speech that society has decided it may legitimately punish. Some of these are: words of conspiracy; libel and defamation; copyright violation; words of threat; misleading advertising; disrespectful words uttered to a judge, police officer, or other authority figure; obscenity; and words that create a risk of imminent violence.102 If speech is not a seamless web, the issue is whether the case for prohibiting hate speech is as compelling as that underlying existing exceptions. First Amendment defenders often assert that coining a new exception raises the specter of additional ones, culminating, potentially, in official censorship and Big Brother.103 But our tolerance for a wide array of special doctrines suggests that this fear may be exaggerated and that a case-by-case approach may be quite feasible. How important is it to protect a black undergraduate walking home late at night from the campus library?104 As important as a truthful label on a can of dog food or safeguarding the dignity of a minor state official?105 Neither free-speech advocates nor courts have addressed matters like these, but a rational approach to the issue of hate-speech regulation suggests that they should.106 B. Incessancy and Compounding Two final aspects of hate speech are incessancy—the tendency to recur repeatedly in the life of a victim—and compounding.107 A victim of a racist or similar insult is likely to have heard it more than once. In this respect, a racial epithet differs from an insult such as “You damn idiot driver” or “Watch where you’re going, you klutz” that the listener is apt to hear only occasionally. Like water dripping on stone, racist speech impinges on one who has heard similar remarks many times before.108 Each episode builds on the last, reopening a wound likely still to be raw. The legal system, in a number of settings, recognizes the harm of an act known to inflict a cumulative harm. Ranging from eggshell plaintiffs to the physician who fails to secure fully informed consent, we commonly judge the blameworthiness of an action in light of the victim’s vulnerability.109 When free-speech absolutists trivialize the injury of hate speech as simple offense, they ignore how it targets the victim because of a condition he or she cannot change and that is part of the victim’s very identity. Hate speakers “pile on,” injuring in a way in which the victim has been injured several times before. The would-be hate speaker forced to keep his thoughts to himself suffers no comparable harm. A comparison of the harms to the speaker and the victim of hate speech, then, suggests that a regime of unregulated hate speech is costly, both individually and socially. Yet, even if the harms on both sides were similar, one of the parties is more disadvantaged than the other, so that Rawls’s difference principle suggests that, as a moral matter, we break the tie in the victim’s favor.110 Moreover, the magnitude of error can easily be greater, even in First Amendment terms, on the side of nonregulation. Hate speech warps the dialogic community by depriving its victims of credibility. Who would listen to one who appears, in a thousand scripts, cartoons, stories, and narratives as a buffoon, lazy desperado, or wanton criminal? Because one consequence of hate speech is to diminish the status of one group vis-à-vis all the rest, it deprives the singled-out group of credibility and an audience, a result surely at odds with the underlying rationales of a system of free expression.111

Anti-Blackness is the root cause of white supremacy and social oppression. It outweighs the case. Heitzeg 15

Heitzeg, Nancy A a Professor of Sociology and Director of the¶ interdisciplinary Critical Studies of Race/Ethnicity Program at St. Catherine¶ University, St. Paul, MN.. "On The Occasion Of The 50th Anniversary Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: Persistent White Supremacy, Relentless Anti-Blackness, And The Limits Of The Law." Hamline J. Pub. L. and Pol'y 36 (2015): 54.

While all communities of color suffer from racism in general¶ and its manifestation in criminal justice in particular, “Black” has¶ been the literal and figurative counterpart of “white”. Anti-black¶ racism is arguably at the very foundation of white supremacy; the¶ two constitute the foundational book-ends for the legal, political and¶ every day constructions of race in the United States.12¶ For this¶ reason, in combination with the excessive over-representation of¶ African Americans in the criminal justice system and the prison¶ industrial complex, this analysis will largely focus on the ways in¶ which the law has been a tool for the oppression of African¶ Americans via the furtherance of white supremacy and antiblackness¶ in both law and practice.¶ While race has never reflected any biological reality, it is¶ indeed a powerful social and political construct. In the U.S. and¶ elsewhere, it has served to delineate “whiteness” as the “unraced”¶ norm – the “unmarked marker” – while hierarchically devaluing¶ “other” racial/ethnic categories with Blackness always as the antithesis.13¶ The socio-political construction of race coincides with the¶ age of exploration, the rise of “scientific” classification schemes, and¶ perhaps most significantly capitalism. In the United States, the¶ solidification of racial hierarchies cannot be disentangled from the capitalist demands for “unfree” labor and expanded private property.¶ By the late 1600s, race had been a marker for either free citizens or¶ slave property, and colonial laws had reified this decades before the¶ Revolutionary War.14 The question of slavery was at the center of¶ debates in the creation of the United States and is referenced no less¶ than ten times.15 By the time of the Constitutional Convention of¶ 1787, the racial lines defining slave and free had already been rigidly¶ drawn – white was “free” and black was “slave” – and the result¶ according to Douglass was this: “assume the Constitution to be what¶ we have briefly attempted to prove it to be, radically and essentially¶ pro-slavery”.¶ 16 The Three-Fifths Clause, the restriction on future¶ bans of the slave trade and limits on the possibility of emancipation¶ through escape were all clear indications of the significance of¶ slavery to the Founders. The legal enouncement of slavery in the¶ Constitution is one of the first of many “racial sacrifice covenants”¶ to come, where the interests of Blacks were sacrificed for the nation.¶ 17¶ The social and constitutional construction of white as free and¶ Black as slave has on-going political and economic ramifications.¶ According to Harris, whiteness not only allows access to property,¶ may be conceived of per se as “whiteness as property”.¶ 18 These¶ property rights produce both tangible and intangible value to those¶ who possess it; whiteness as property includes the right to profit and¶ to exclude, even the perceived right to kill in defense of the borders¶ of whiteness.19 As Harris notes:¶ The concept of whiteness was premised on white¶ supremacy rather than mere difference. “White” was¶ defined and constructed in ways that increased its¶ value by reinforcing its exclusivity. Indeed, just as whiteness as property embraced the right to exclude,¶ whiteness as a theoretical construct evolved for the¶ very purpose of racial exclusion. Thus, the concept¶ of whiteness is built on both exclusion and racial¶ subjugation. This fact was particularly evident¶ during the period of the most rigid racial exclusion,¶ as whiteness signified racial privilege and took the¶ form of status property.20¶ Conversely, Blackness is defined as outside of the margins of¶ humanity as chattel rather than persons, and defined outside of the¶ margins of civil society. Frank Wilderson, in “The Prison Slave as¶ Hegemonys (Silent) Scandal,” describes it like this: “Blackness in¶ America generates no categories for the chromosome of history, and¶ no data for the categories of immigration or sovereignty. It is an¶ experience without analog — a past without a heritage.”¶ 21 Directly¶ condemned by the Constitution in ways that other once excluded¶ groups (American Indians, women, immigrants, LGBTQ) were not,¶ Blackness as marked by slavery– as property not person - creates an¶ outsider status that makes future inclusion a daunting challenge.22

The alternative is to embrace the demand of abolitionism – we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements.  Oparah 14
Oparah, Julia. Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014).

¶ In my earlier work on the academic-prison-industrial complex, I suggested that activist scholars were producing and disseminating countercarceral knowledge by bringing academic research into alignment with the needs of social movements and interrogating and reorganizing relationships between prisoners and researchers in the free world.50 Given the history of epistemic and physical violence and exploitation of research subjects by the academy, such a reorganizing of relationships and accountabilities is clearly urgently needed. Yet no matter how radical and participatory our scholarship is, we ultimately fail to dismantle the academic-military-prison-industrial com- plex (academic-MPIC) if we address it only through the production of more knowledge. Since knowledge is a commodity, marketed through books, arti- cles, and conferences as well as patents and government contracts, the pro- duction of “better,” more progressive or countercarceral knowledge can also be co-opted and put to work by the academic-MPIC.¶ An abolitionist lens provides a helpful framework here. Antiprison schol- ars and activists have embraced the concept of abolition in order to draw attention to the unfinished liberation legislated by the Thirteenth Amend- ment, which abolished slavery “except as a punishment for a crime.”51 Aboli- tionists do not seek primarily to reform prisons or to improve conditions for prisoners; instead they argue that only by abolishing imprisonment will we free up the resources and imagine the possibility of more effective and less violent strategies to deal with the social problems signaled by harmful acts. While early abolitionists referred to themselves as prison abolitionists, more recently there has been a shift to prison-industrial complex abolitionism to expand the analysis of the movement to incorporate other carceral spaces— from immigrant detention centers to psychiatric hospitals—and to empha- size the role of other actors, including the police and courts, politicians, corporations, the media, and the military, in sustaining mass incarceration.52¶ How does an abolitionist lens assist us in assessing responses to the academic-MPIC? First, it draws our attention to the economic basis of the academic-MPIC and pushes us to attack the materiality of the militari- zation and prisonization of academia rather than limiting our interventions to the realm of ideas. This means that we must challenge the corporatization of our universities and colleges and question what influences and account- abilities are being introduced by our increasing collaboration with neoliberal global capital. It also means that we must dismantle those complicities and liberate the academy from its role as handmaiden to neoliberal globaliza- tion, militarism, and empire. In practice, this means interrogating our uni- versities’ and colleges’ investment decisions, demanding they divest from the military, security, and prison industries; distance themselves from military occupations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East; and invest instead in community-led sustainable economic development. It means facing allega- tions of disloyalty to our employers or alma maters as we blow the whistle on unethical investments and the creeping encroachment of corporate fund- ing, practices, and priorities. It means standing up for a vision of the liberal arts that neither slavishly serves the interests of the new global order nor returns to its elitist origins but instead is deeply embedded in progressive movements and richly informed by collaborations with insurgent and activ- ist spaces. And it means facing the challenges that arise when our divest- ment from empire has real impact on the bottom line of our university and college budgets. Andrea Smith, in her discussion of native studies, has argued that politi- cally progressive educators often adopt normative, colonial practices in the classroom, using pedagogical strategies and grading practices that rein- scribe the racialized and gendered regulation, policing, and disciplining that PIC abolitionists seek to end.53 In this sense, there could be no “postcarceral” academy. Certainly, sanctions for undergraduate and graduate students and faculty who challenge the university’s regular practices—from failing grades and expulsions to tenure denials and deportation—are systemically distrib- uted, along with rewards for those who can be usefully incorporated. Yet uni- versities and colleges also hold the seeds of a very different possible future, evoked, for example, by the universal admissions movement or by student strikes in Britain and Canada that demand higher education as a right, not a privilege of the wealthy. Rather than seeking to eradicate or replace higher educational institutions altogether, I suggest that we demand the popular and antiracist democratization of higher education.¶ The first step toward this radical transformation is the liberation of aca- demia from the machinery of empire: prisons, militarism, and corporations. Speaking of abolishing the white race, Noel Ignatiev argues that it is neces- sary for white people to make whiteness impossible by refusing the invisible benefits of membership in the “white club.”54 Progressive academics are also members of a privileged “club,” one that confers benefits in the form of a pay- check, health care, and other fringe benefits; social status; and the freedom to pursue intellectual work that we are passionate about. But we can also put our privilege to work by unmasking and then unsettling the invisible, symbi- otic, and toxic relationships that constitute the academic-MPIC.¶ Decoupling academia from its velvet-gloved master would begin the pro- cess of fundamental transformation. Without unfettered streams of income from corporations, wealthy philanthropists, and the military, universities and colleges would be forced to develop alternative fund-raising strategies, relationships, and accountabilities. Can we imagine a college administration aligned with local Occupy organizers to protest the state’s massive spend- ing on prisons and policing and demand more tax money for housing, edu- cation, and health care? Can we imagine a massive investment of time and resources by university personnel to solve the problem of how to decarcerate the nation’s prisons or end the detention of undocumented immigrants in order to fund universal access to higher education? Can we imagine a uni- versity run by and for its constituents, including students, kitchen and gar- den staff, and tenure-track and adjunct faculty? These are the possibilities opened up by academic-MPIC abolition.

The role of the ballot is to interrogate the AFF’s scholarship using the lens of critical race theory.

Their refusal of minority voices is a conscious choice. Delgado 84

Delgado, Richard. "The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132.3 (1984): 561-578.

It does not matter where one enters this universe; one comes to the¶ same result: an inner circle of about a dozen white, male writers who¶ comment on, take polite issue with, extol, criticize, and expand on each¶ other's ideas." It is something like an elaborate minuet.¶ The failure to acknowledge minority scholarship extends even to¶ nonlegal propositions and assertions of fact. W.E. DuBois, deceased¶ Black historian, receives an occasional citation.5 Aside from him, little¶ else rates a mention. Higginbotham's monumental In the Matter of¶ Color' might as well not exist. The same is true of the work of Kenneth¶ Clark,1 Black psychologist and past president of the American¶ Psychological Association, and Alvin Poussaint,8 Harvard Medical¶ School professor and authority on the psychological impact of race. One¶ searches in vain for references to the powerful book by physicians Grier¶ and Cobbs, Black Rage,' or to Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the¶ Earth,10 or even to writings of or about Martin Luther King, Jr.,1¶ "¶ Cesar Chavez, 2 and Malcolm X."3 When the inner circle writers need authority for a factual or social scientific proposition about race they¶ generally cite reports of the United States Commission on Civil¶ Rights1 4 or else each other.1 5¶ A single anecdote may help to illustrate what I mean. Recently a¶ law professor who writes about civil rights showed me, for my edification,¶ a draft of an article of his. It is, on the whole, an excellent article.¶ It extols the value of a principle I will call "equal personhood." Equal¶ personhood is the notion, implicit in several constitutional provisions¶ and much case law, that each human being, regardless of race, creed, or¶ color, is entitled to be treated with equal respect. To treat someone as¶ an outsider, a nonmember of human society, violates this principle and¶ devalues the self-worth of the person so excluded.¶ I have no quarrel with this premise, but, on reading the one hundred-plus¶ footnotes of the article, I noticed that its author failed to cite¶ Black or minority scholars, an exclusion from the community of kindred¶ souls as glaring as any condemned in the paper. I pointed this out¶ to the author, citing as illustration a passage in which he asserted that¶ unequal treatment can cause a person to suffer a withered self-concept.¶ Having just written an article on a related subject, 8 I was more or less¶ steeped in withered self-concepts. I knew who the major authorities¶ were in that area.¶ The professor's authority for the proposition about withered selfconcepts¶ was Frank Michelman, writing in the Harvard Law Review. I pointed out that although Frank Michelman may be a superb scholar¶ and teacher, he probably has relatively little first-hand knowledge¶ about withered self-concepts. I suggested that the professor add references¶ to such works as Kenneth Clark's Dark Ghetto1¶ " and Grier and¶ Cobbs's Black Rage,"' and he agreed to do so. To justify his selection of¶ Frank Michelman for the proposition about withered self-concept, the¶ author explained that Michelman's statement was "so elegant."¶ Could inelegance of expression explain the absence of minority¶ scholarship from the text and footnotes of leading law review articles¶ about civil rights? Elegance is, without question, a virtue in writing, in¶ conversation, or in. anything else in life. If minority scholars write inelegantly¶ and Frank Michelman writes elegantly, then it would not be¶ surprising if the latter were read and cited more frequently, and the¶ former less so. But minority legal scholars seem to have less trouble¶ being recognized and taken seriously in areas of scholarship other than¶ civil rights theory.19 If elegance is a problem for minority scholars, it¶ seems mainly to be so in the core areas of civil rights: affirmative action,¶ the equality principle, and the theoretical foundations of race relations¶ law.¶ In 1971, Judge Skelly Wright wrote an article entitled, Professor¶ Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court.20 In the article,¶ Judge Wright took a group of scholars to task for their bloodless¶ carping at the Warren Court's decisions in the areas of racial justice¶ and human rights. He accused the group of missing the central point in¶ these decisions-their moral clarity and passion for justice-and labelled¶ the group's excessive preoccupation with procedure and institutional¶ role and its insistence that the Court justify every element of a¶ decision under general principles of universal application, a "scholarly tradition."'2 1¶ I think I have discovered a second scholarly tradition. It consists of¶ white scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority¶ scholars from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship. The mainstream¶ writers tend to acknowledge only each other's work. It is even¶ possible that, consciously or not, they resist entry by minority scholars¶ into the field,2 2 perhaps counseling them, as I was counseled, to establish¶ their reputations in other areas of law. I believe that this "scholarly¶ tradition" exists mainly in civil rights; nonwhite scholars in other fields¶ of law seem to confront no such tradition.23

Case

Prefer comparative worlds:
First is Reciprocal Burdens. Truth testing requires one debater to prove a positive truth and the other to disprove it. This is unequal because disproving a statement by casting doubt is always easier than proving one. Debaters who only have to prove their opponent wrong have more options because they can argue any one point in a series of links that their opponent must prove in their entirety. Further, this opens room for pre-resolutional positions that require debaters to prove the existence of resolutional terms prior to debating the resolution. A debater with the burden of proof must be prepared to not only debate all of her case and her opponent’s case, but also beat back an infinitely regressive set of skeptical indictments. Reciprocal burdens are vital to fairness because the debater with an easier burden defenitionally has a better chance at winning. There is greater structural access to the ballot for the debater with more avenues to win. 

A priori only exists in truth testing. No new 1ar justifications for truth testing, necessary part of 1ac if this is an arg they want to go for. 

We only have to win 1 time that speech ought to be restricted. Saying anti state things is bad under their framework because it is willing the destruction of the state which his equivalent to willing onself back into the state of nature. 

Focus on intent diverts attention from marginalizing action and doesn’t let us stop oppression.  Utt 13

Jamie Utt  Jamie is the Founder and Director of Education at CivilSchools, a comprehensive bullying prevention program, a diversity and inclusion consultant, and sexual violence prevention educator based in Minneapolis, MN.  July 30, 2013  “Intent vs. Impact: Why Your Intentions Don’t Really Matter”

Intent v. Impact From Paula Deen to Alec Baldwin to your annoying, bigoted uncle or friend, we hear it over and over again: “I never meant any harm…” “It was never my intent…” “I am not a racist…” “I am not a homophobe…” “I’m not a sexist…” I cannot tell you how often I’ve seen people attempt to deflect criticism about their oppressive language or actions by making the conversation about their intent. At what point does the “intent” conversation stop mattering so that we can step back and look at impact? After all, in the end, what does the intent of our action really matter if our actions have the impact of furthering the marginalization or oppression of those around us? In some ways, this is a simple lesson of relationships. If I say something that hurts my partner, it doesn’t much matter whether I intended the statement to mean something else – because my partner is hurting. I need to listen to how my language hurt my partner. I need to apologize. And then I need to reflect and empathize to the best of my ability so I don’t do it again. But when we’re dealing with the ways in which our identities intersect with those around us – and, in turn, the ways our privileges and our experiences of marginalization and oppression intersect – this lesson becomes something much larger and more profound. This becomes a lesson of justice. What we need to realize is that when it comes to people’s lives and identities, the impact of our actions can be profound and wide-reaching. And that’s far more important than the question of our intent. We need to ask ourselves what might be or might have been the impact of our actions or words. And we need to step back and listen when we are being told that the impact of our actions is out of step with our intents or our perceptions of self. Identity Privilege and Intent For people of identity privilege, this is where listening becomes vitally important, for our privilege can often shield us from understanding the impact of our actions. After all, as a person of privilege, I can never fully understand the ways in which oppressive acts or language impact those around me. What I surely can do is listen with every intent to understand, and I can work to change my behavior. Because what we need to understand is that making the conversation about intent is inherently a privileged action. The reason? It ensures that you and your identity (and intent) stay at the center of any conversation and action while the impact of your action or words on those around you is marginalized. So if someone ever tells you to “check your privilege,” what they may very well mean is: “Stop centering your experience and identity in the conversation by making this about the intent of your actions instead of their impact.” That is: Not everything is about you.
Moral tunnel vision is complicit with evil.  Issac 2
—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest) 

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

A desire to ignore the consequences of their advocacy causes failure --- you must evaluate consequences of their proposal
Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African and African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318
Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal but can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." 281 For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

Ideal theory shuts off the ability to critique oppression, has empirically never worked in guiding a society, and allows the oppressor to rationalize oppression. Mills 15
Charles W. Mills (2015) Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy, New Political Science, 37:1, 1-24, DOI: 10.1080/07393148.2014.995491 PVE

For all four philosophers, then, including three former Rawls students, the characterization is indeed meant descriptively. But setting aside the argument from the authority of secondary sources, there is also (and more importantly) the argument from the text itself. It is difficult to make sense of what Rawls goes on to say if “society” is to be read as “ideal society” because he then introduces the further category of a “well-ordered society.” But if we are already in the realm of the ideal, how could there be conceptual room left for further idealization? We would then, weirdly, have the following categories: societies in general, real and hypothetical (and thus presumably including oppressive societies); ideal societies, non-oppressive cooperative ventures, as a subset of societies in general, real and hypothetical; and then well-ordered societies, as a subset of ideal societies (somehow ideally ideal, as against merely ideal). This is odd enough, but it gets more peculiar. Rawls then informs us that: “Existing societies are of course seldom well-ordered in this sense, for what is just and unjust is usually in dispute.”47 How are we to read this use of “society”? Is it society-as-ideal-society? But how could it be? There are no ideal societies on the face of the planet! It is currently a category with no real instantiations. So there are no well-ordered societies either, that ideal ideal subset of the merely ideal. So Rawls has to be using the term here in its everyday sense, society-as-actual-society, which would mean either that he meant it that way all along, or that he has switched without warning from the (putative) idealized, Rawlsian term-of-art sense to the conventional sense. But by standard Gricean “conversational implicature,” one does not make a claim weaker than the facts allow. If the city is suffering a heat wave and the temperature outside is over hundred degrees Fahrenheit, we do not say: “It must be at least sixty degrees outside!” So this suggests that Rawls really believes that existing societies are in general cooperative ventures, if few can be categorized as well-ordered, because otherwise the natural thing for him to have said would be that “Existing societies are of course not cooperative ventures for mutual advantage, and so, a fortiori, are not well-ordered.” Thus we face a dilemma: either Rawls is using “society” in a perverse idiosyncratic way or he was massively ignorant of basic societal realities. But in either case, prescriptions for social justice based on such a conception of society or on such a sociology are going to be problematic to apply in the actual world. I think that the most charitable reading (though even it ultimately fails) is to assume that Rawls really had the modern Western democracies in mind when he spoke of “societies.” These are the societies that come closest to fitting the contract model, which he is trying to update for his theory. Pre-modern feudal and slave societies, modern non-Western dictatorships, clearly do not meet the criterion of genuinely being cooperative ventures, and so are not “societies” in the sense he means. Such a reading does not require comprehensive global historical illiteracy on Rawls’s part, just the kind of Eurocentric and androcentric historical illiteracy typical of his time (admittedly global in its own way). Moreover, this interpretation would be consistent with the later explicit announcement, in the 1980s essays and in the 1993 Political Liberalism, that A Theory of Justice’s seeming generality of normative reference was mistaken, and that he was really articulating a theory for the Western nations, drawing on ideas implicit within the Western tradition. But the problem is, of course, that apart from the feminist critique of Western patriarchy, and the racial subordination of people of color (Amerindian expropriation and genocide, African slavery) in the Western (alleged) democracy of which he was a citizen—which motivated Pierre van den Berghe’s famous alternative characterization of “Herrenvolk democracy”—this conception of society and of social justice excludes the formerly colonized nations from the scope of his principles of justice. Uncontroversially historically characterized by structural oppression, they presumably do not meet the bar for being “cooperative ventures” and thus do not count as “societies” proper of the appropriate normative Western kind. Apart from the absurdity of a theory of social justice that prescinds from dealing with structural social injustice—just stop for a second and think about the bizarreness of that—this partitioned normative cartography severs the very historic connections between “the West and the Rest” that are responsible for the latter’s “non-cooperative” nature in the first place! In their introduction to their edited Colonialism and Its Legacies, Jacob Levy and Iris Marion Young point out how Rawls’s framing of these issues, which projects backwards into the past a national isolation completely untrue to the actual international history, is part of a larger pattern of mystification (starting to change only recently) in contemporary political theory: Modernity—the centuries since 1500—has been at once the era of the European state and the era of the European empires . . . From 1500 through 1950, very nearly all of the inhabited world came under the power of one or another European state, or a European-derived settler state . . . Even if the age of European empires is broken into many discrete events, there are many such events . . . that would rank among the largest-scale conquests in human history. And these events include a substantial share of the greatest political evils ever committed. Yet all of this seemed, for many years, tangential to the story of modernity familiar to political theorists and philosophers.48 Formal decolonization enabled an amnesia about the colonial past and an ignoring of the neo-colonial present, problematic enough in political theory, but even worse in political philosophy: By the time of the revitalization of Anglophone political philosophy with the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971, decolonization had reshaped the political map. The world was, juridically, almost completely a world of sovereign and formally equal states. And the great debates projected back through modern intellectual history were fundamentally debates about the internal governance of such states ... Colonial and imperial relations—relations between metropolitan states and their conquered colonies and territories—figured approximately not at all . . . Contractarianism in particular treats life outside the state—the kind of state we can recognize as the modern European Weberian state— as prepolitical and extrapolitical, outside the core concerns of political philosophy . . . Social contract theory came more and more to be understood as relevant to the politics of one, self-contained and well-defined, state. If the first great work of social contract theory was Grotius’ Rights of War and Peace and the last was Theory of Justice, the contrast could hardly be more stark. The earlier work is nearly all about interpolity relations including imperial relations; the latter takes as the point of departure for political philosophy a self-governing society closed off from the rest of the world, unaffected by it and not affecting it. And Rawlsian questions (or the questions of his libertarian or communitarian critics) were projected backward through time.49 Unsurprisingly, then, nowhere in any of Rawls’s five directly authored books (or the two lecture collections) is there any mention of Native Americans, the Atlantic Slave Trade, European colonialism and imperialism, the genocide of indigenous populations, or the reality of systemic Euro-domination on a global scale.50 These people, these histories, simply cannot be accommodated by the official contract narrative. The “colonial” character of Rawls’s work and the vast, polyglot secondary literature of Rawlsianism is manifest not in racist representations of people of color, but in the simple fact that this whole body of thought takes as a starting-point what, in the period of modernity for which the contract is supposed to be most appropriate, is only true (to the extent that it is true) for the Euro-population, and for the Euro-population conceptually abstracted out of their political relations of domination over populations of color. Denying the past and present relations of colonialism and neocolonialism, which have created both, Rawls offers us a vision of autarkical polities whose respective levels of development are the result not of a transnational and intra- national (for the United States) system of extraction and exploitation, not of empire, but of different national cultures and traditions. The societies of the West get to be “cooperative ventures,” covered by the norms of justice; the societies of the Rest fall into the outer darkness, normatively registering only as “burdened societies” and “outlaw states.” Thus by the very conceptual framing of his theory, he launders colonialism and imperialism, whitewashing them out of his dikailogical framework. It is the viewpoint of the metropole, the colonizer, the white settler— the viewpoint of colonial racial privilege in a nominally post-colonial epoch, its coloniality manifesting itself not in a crude endorsement of colonialism (that would obviously be inappropriate for the postwar world) but, far more effectively, in a total aprioristic conceptual exclusion