Tournament: Alta | Round: 2 | Opponent: Oakwood AW | Judge:
First, the rule of law animates democracy- its crucial to rights protections and reducing all forms of violence
Rummel 91 – Professor of Political Science @ University of Hawaii R.J. Rummel, THE RULE OF LAW:TOWARDS ELIMINATING WAR AND DEMOCIDE, S peech given to the ABA National Security Conference on "The Rule of Law in United States Foreign Policy and the New World Order. Washington, D.C., October 10-11, 1991. pg. http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/ABA.SPEECH.HTM
Obviously we are all riding a democratic wave. The technology of the mass media has brought us all together (and who can forget watching the coup and its defeat unfolding in Moscow) and in its universal availability and content it has carried implicitly the message of democracy and freedom. And freedom and the rule of law itself has become the most universally accepted political idea. The components of this idea are clear in broad brush although the details, as always, are subject to academic dispute. These are political rights, such as to compete and choose one's candidates for political power, equal and secret ballot, and freedom to organize and protest against office holders; and civil rights, such as freedom of religion, organization, and speech. Often we collectively refer to these rights by the term Rule of Law, a basic constitutional order that protects these rights and that lies above the whims of government, groups, and individuals. But in our enthusiasm for the global movement toward democracy we should ask ourselves why we support it. A century and more ago the answer would have been almost automatic, as it was for the writers of the American Constitution. It is a natural law, an inalienable right, a self-evident principle that people should be free. But natural law is no longer intellectually popular and indeed the idea is now so strange that journalists cannot understand the references to it by conservative nominees to the Supreme Court. They classify it along with such sayings as, "God wills it." A currently more respectable justification for democracy is that freedom is a fundamental human value and desire. People want to live their own lives, pursue their own interests as free from the meddling of others as possible. If such intrusion is necessary, they want to play a role in determining the who, what, and when of it. And since this is what people universally want it is what they should have. Although the non sequitur in this argument is glaring--one cannot derive a "should" from a "want" or "desire" alone--it at least can be made respectable by reference to the Social Contract Theory of justice. That is, if we argue that a just social system is one whose fundamental principles people would universally choose if they were blind to their selfish interests (if they had no knowledge of where they would end up in that system--rich or poor, tall or fat, black or white), then persuasive is the argument that people would choose as their first principle freedom under the Rule of Law. But this approach to justifying democracy has been unsatisfactory to many. We live in a utilitarian age and it is hardly strange that the major justification for democracy should be in terms of its consequences. Particularly, that where people are free under law that is fair and equally applied to all, they are most happy. Of course, this utilitarian justification itself is subject to question. What is happiness? Although people prefer happiness to sadness, grief, and pain, do they really know what will make them happy? The democrat argues that we really do not know what makes people happy in general and that this is something that only they can decide for themselves, and if for some issues it must be determined generally, as with regard to pollution or public education, it should be through publicly elected representatives under law. And the democratic individualist has argued further with their democratic socialist friends that the free market is a necessary mechanism through which individuals have the greatest choice as to what will make them happy, both in the relative diversity and cheapness of goods and in the creation and dissemination of wealth. This utilitarian argument for democracy is what has now won the battle for the minds of men. Democracy, it is widely believed, assures the happiness of the greatest number because it provides freedom and wealth (through economic development). There is much to quibble about this, as can be seen in the arguments between Democrats and Republicans and among liberals and conservatives of both parties, and I do not intend to get into these debates. But leaving these details aside, I think that we can accept this as the general argument of the American, Soviet, or Chinese democrat (even those who favor social democracy no longer mean full-scale socialism but now mean a free market qualified by government welfare, safety nets, regulation, and limited government ownership of basic services and production, such as in the public health sector). But those who make this utilitarian argument for democracy have missed perhaps the strongest possible justification. Democracy preserves human life. In theory and fact, the more democratic two states, the less deadly violence between them; and if they are both democratic, lethal violence is precluded altogether. That is, democratic states do not make war on each other. Moreover, the less democratic two states, the more probable war between them. And also, the less democratic a state, the more likely will occur internal warfare. This is not all. Perhaps least surprising is that the less democratic a government, the more likely that it will murder its own citizens in cold blood, independent of any foreign or domestic war. Now, war is not the most deadly form of violence. Indeed, I have found that while about 37,000,000 people have been killed in battle in all foreign and domestic wars in our century, government democide (genocide and mass murder) have killed over 150,944,000 million more, and I am still counting. And over 85 percent of these were killed by totalitarian governments. Table 1 lists the partial data (these data are still in the process of being collected) on "mega-murderers"--governments that have killed a million or more people outside of warfare. These megamurderers form, of course, an elite group. The list of regimes--kilomurderers--murdering "only" in the thousands is much longer and would include, for example, communist Afghanistan, Angola, Laos, Ethiopia, North Korea, and Rumania, as well as authoritarian Argentina, Burundi, Chile, Croatia (1941-44), Czechoslovakia (1945-46), Indonesia, Iran, Rwanda, Spain, Sudan, and Uganda. There is no case of democratic central governments killing en masse their own citizens. The point is this. If a utilitarian justification for democracy is to be given, then in addition to the happiness that follows from freedom and the from wealth produced by the free market, democracy preserves and extends human life. It does this through the life extending benefits of the market (as in food production). But most important, it does this through the reduction of deadly violence. Democracy is the successful institutionalization of the forces, culture, and techniques of non-violence. This is also what we should be shouting from the roof tops. This is also what should be the substance of our utilitarian justification for democracy. Yes, freedom. Yes, development. Yes, happiness. But yes, also life for those saved from murder by their own governments and death from war. Nothing is certain about the future, but this is true of all predictions based on past events, natural or social. Within this limitation think about this. By fact and theory we appear to have within the power of democracy the opportunity to end war, genocide, and mass murder, and minimize revolutionary and civil violence. And the epochal movement of our times is toward universal democracy. 

Second, Rule of law is a gateway to every disad impact
RHYNE 1958 – FORMER PRESIDENT AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
LAW DAY SPEECH, VOICE OF AMERICA, http://www.abanet.org/publiced/lawday/rhyne58.html)
The rule of law has been the bulwark of our democracy. It has afforded protection to the weak, the oppressed, the minorities, the unpopular; it has made it possible to achieve responsiveness of the government to the will of people. It stands as the very antithesis of Communism and dictatorship. When we talk about “justice” under our rule of law, the absence of such justice behind the Iron Curtain is apparent to all. When we talk about “freedom” for the individual, Hungary is recalled to the minds of all men. And when we talk about peace under law—peace without the bloodbath of war—we are appealing to the foremost desire of all peoples everywhere. The tremendous yearning of all peoples for peace can only be answered by the use of law to replace weapons in resolving international disputes. We in our country sincerely believe that mankind’s best hope for preventing the tragic consequences of nuclear-satellite-missile warfare is to persuade the nations of the entire world to submit all disputes to tribunals of justice for all adjudication under the rule of law. We lawyers of America would like to join lawyers from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so appealing that sentiment will compel its general acceptance. Man’s relation to man is the most neglected field of study, exploration and development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most important basic fact of our generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology has forced increased international relationships in a shrunken and indivisible world. Men must either live together in peace or in modern war we will surely die together. History teachers that the rule of law has enabled mankind to live together peacefully within nations and it is clear that this same rule of law offers our best hope as a mechanism to achieve and maintain peace between nations. The lawyer is the technician in man’s relationship to man. There exists a worldwide challenge to our profession to develop law to replace weapons before the dreadful holocaust of nuclear war overtake our people. It is said that an idea can be more powerful than an atom because strength today resides in man’s mind—not his muscle. We lawyers of the world must take the idea of peace under the rule of law and make it a force superior to weapons and thus outlaw wars of weapons. Law offers the best hope for order in a disordered world.  The law of force or the force of law will rule the world. In the field of human conduct the law has never confessed failure. The struggle for a world ruled by law must go on with increased intensity. We must prove that the genius of man in the field of science and technology has not so far outstripped his inventiveness in the sphere of human relations as to make catastrophe inevitable. If man can conquer space he can also solve the need for legal machinery to insure universal and lasting peace.

Third, the rule of law requires the protection of individual civil rights
Novak, 2005 Michael, former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Commission and to the Bern Round of the Helsinki Talks, holds the George F. Jewett Chair in Religion and Public Policy at the American Enterprise Institute, “Global Liberty,” National Review, 1/20, p. Lexis

30. The rights of the individual cannot be alienated from him by any other individual or institution or earthly power. But such rights are only mere words--air through lips--unless they are protected by a democratic regime. On this point, Sakharov and Sharansky and many other moral heroes of the past century gave witness. It is in the nature of dictators to use individuals as means and to abuse their rights. It is also their nature to seek enemies, in order to keep their subjects in fear.By contrast, democracies rooted in the rule of law and committed to honoring both individual rights and the consent of the governed tend toward peace. When the governed must give consent to war, they tend to count the costs, and agree only as a last resort. Thus, in our time, democracy has become the new word for peace. And it has also become the new word for personal dignity. For the institutions that constitute democracy rightly understood--the rule of law, the separation of powers, the protection of individual rights, limited government, and the like--provide the best ecology in which rights can actually be exercised, talents developed, and personal dignity respected.

SCOTUS ruled in Saucier V Katz that a duplicative “double reasonableness” standard must be applied in 4th amendment cases. This has disrupted the balance of immunity jurisprudence tilting the playing field overwhelmingly in favor of police gutting section 1983 and civil rights protections broadly
Brown, JD, 03
(Peter A., - Qualified Immunity Illogically Applies to Excessive Force Claims Suffolk University Law Review 2003 36 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 607 )
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court considered whether the duplicative objective reasonableness analysis is necessary to protect law enforcement in civil rights cases alleging excessive force. n32 The Court upheld the application of qualified immunity in excessive force complaints, thereby providing an additional layer of protection to law enforcement. n33 Declaring qualified immunity protects reasonable mistakes of both fact and law, the Court concluded that the mere application of Graham's factor test would not sufficiently address the goals underlying qualified immunity. n34 Surprisingly, the Court never addressed whether a Fourth Amendment violation actually occurred in this case. n35 Due to its procedural posture, the Court presumed a constitutional deprivation and continued to clarify the proper analysis for qualified immunity. n36 Concerned over the Ninth Circuit's approach, which enables section 1983 cases to get to trial whenever there is a material dispute of fact, the Court emphatically reinforced the policies behind the doctrine and reversed the denial of summary judgment. n37 In Saucier, the Court blatantly sacrificed policy for sound legal reasoning while attempting to protect law enforcement officials from frivolous lawsuits. n38 *613 The Court created an incoherent qualified immunity analysis, which undoubtedly will contribute to ongoing confusion. n39 Specifically, the Court's decision may chill future claims, significantly hindering the ability of individuals to vindicate constitutional violations. n40 Most importantly, Saucier neglected Graham's extensive protection of law enforcement. n41 Graham contained sufficient protections to law enforcement, and as such, the Court in Saucier did not confront any legitimate concerns that officers would be liable for conduct that they did not know violated the law. n42 Additionally, the Court's mistake of fact versus mistake of law distinction is inapposite, because Graham provides for a fact-specific analysis pertaining to the deprivation element. n43 The Court focused heavily on the effect that the Ninth Circuit's approach would have had on otherwise dismissed claims. n44 This insubstantial concern lacks merit because lower courts consistently dismiss excessive force cases based on the Fourth Amendment, never reaching qualified immunity. n45 Saucier ignored precedent by sacrificing, rather than balancing, the competing policy interests and covertly altering section 1983 litigation in excessive force cases. n46 *614 In Saucier v. Katz, the Court considered the role of qualified immunity in excessive force cases. The Court foreclosed its prior attempts to strike a fair balance between competing interests by favoring a judicially created defense over civil rights remedies. Rejecting the strength of its own decision in Graham, the Saucier Court created an illogical and undue hurdle for civil rights plaintiffs attempting to vindicate constitutional violations.
The 4th amendment already provides broad protection for police conduct-Saucier goes too far in protecting police at the expense of civil rights through duplicative legal sleight of hand
Shapiro, JD, et al, 01
(Steven R. Shapiro American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street New York, New York 10004 (212) 549-2500 Alan L. Schlosser American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California 1663 Mission Street San Francisco, California 94103 (415) 621-2488 William Goodman Center for Constitutional Rights 666 Broadway New York, New York 10012 (212) 614-6464 David Rudovsky (Counsel of Record) 924 Cherry Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107 (215) 925-4400 Michael Avery Suffolk Law School 41 Temple Street Boston, Massachusetts 02114 (617) 573-8551 Ruth E. Harlow Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund 120 Wall Street, Suite 1500 New York, New York 10005 (212) 809-8585 2001 WL 173522 (U.S.) (Appellate Brief) United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief. Donald SAUCIER, Petitioner, v. Elliot M. KATZ and In Defense of Animals, Respondents. No. 99-1977. October Term, 2000. February 16, 2001. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT )
The qualified immunity defense is not applicable to claims of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The standard for determining whether excessive force has been used in a particular case is identical to the standard for determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for a Fourth Amendment violation. To prove a Fourth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer acted in an objectively unreasonable manner and, in determining reasonableness, the fact-finder must make “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). As the courts have consistently recognized, the Fourth Amendment itself provides the officer with a wide zone of protection. The officer can use a range of force in response to perceived danger and need not use the least force necessary under the circumstances. *6 Once it is determined that the force that was used was objectively unreasonable, a defense of qualified immunity is logically inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment determination because it is measured by the same “objective reasonableness” standard. A police officer cannot have an objectively reasonable belief that the force used was necessary (thus entitling him to qualified immunity) when it has already been determined that an objectively reasonable officer could not have believed that the force used was necessary (thus establishing a Fourth Amendment violation). Any such findings would be irreconcilable. At the very least, the two inquiries merge into a single analytic question. Qualified immunity is available in probable cause determinations because of the difficult legal issues that may be presented in any particular decision to arrest or search. No such difficult legal issues are presented in the excessive force context: the sole question for the officer is whether force is necessary to effect an arrest or other police action, or to defend oneself or others from harm. Given the broad protection the officer has under Graham, no officer who acts unreasonably for Fourth Amendment purposes could be said to act reasonably in terms of qualified immunity. The existence of such broad protection in the Fourth Amendment itself, moreover, eliminates any fear that officers will be unreasonably chilled from acting in the absence of a separate qualified immunity defense. Petitioner's suggested standard for determining qualified immunity in the context of an excessive force claim demonstrates the duplicative nature of such an enterprise. According to petitioner, where a court has determined that the force used was objectively unreasonable, it would still have to ask whether this fact would be “obvious” to the officer. But in reaching the conclusion that the force was unreasonable in the first place under the Graham standard, the court will have considered this fact and already decided that it would *7 have been apparent to an objectively reasonable officer that the force was excessive.
Duplicative immunity is a threat to freedom- it eviscerates the 4th amendment by allowing illogical exceptions
Shapiro, JD, et al, 01
(Steven R. Shapiro American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street New York, New York 10004 (212) 549-2500 Alan L. Schlosser American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California 1663 Mission Street San Francisco, California 94103 (415) 621-2488 William Goodman Center for Constitutional Rights 666 Broadway New York, New York 10012 (212) 614-6464 David Rudovsky (Counsel of Record) 924 Cherry Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107 (215) 925-4400 Michael Avery Suffolk Law School 41 Temple Street Boston, Massachusetts 02114 (617) 573-8551 Ruth E. Harlow Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund 120 Wall Street, Suite 1500 New York, New York 10005 (212) 809-8585 2001 WL 173522 (U.S.) (Appellate Brief) United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief. Donald SAUCIER, Petitioner, v. Elliot M. KATZ and In Defense of Animals, Respondents. No. 99-1977. October Term, 2000. February 16, 2001. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT )
The Supreme Court has justified immunity doctrines as approximating of the scope of public-official liability that prevailed when §1983 was enacted. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 402-07, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed. 2d 504 (1992). Fair enough in many parts of the law, but not when dealing with the fourth amendment. Until this century police faced absolute liability (in trespass or battery) for their acts; probable cause and reasonableness were defenses, and immunity (on top of these defenses) was unheard of. … All the great early opinions defining the scope of freedom from official intrusion resolve damages claims, without a hint that if the officers behaved unreasonably they might still be immune from liability. Thus a general doctrine of official immunity, independent of legal uncertainty, is not only anti-textual but also anti-historical in fourth amendment cases. 234 F.3d at 356. Allowing a qualified immunity defense in this type of case will serve no legitimate purpose and can only serve to eviscerate the protections of the Fourth Amendment's proscription against excessive force.

1983 is crucial to the rule of law- it’s the lynchpin of rights protections
Pittman, JD candidate, 12
(Nathan R., UNINTENTIONAL LEVELS OF FORCE IN § 1983 EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS William and Mary Law Review William and Mary Law Review May, 2012 William and Mary Law Review 53 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 2107)
The evolution of § 1983 has transformed the statute that was once almost a dead letter into the preeminent vehicle for the vindication of constitutional rights. Section 1983 has become more than just a tort statute, and the normative values that underlie it speak to society's promise to protect constitutional rights and uphold the rule of law. To facilitate this end, the Supreme Court has expunged subjective intent from the excessive force analysis, instead relying on objective reasonableness to assess a plaintiff's claims. The vindication of the right to be free from excessive force, however, is constrained by vagueness in the excessive force doctrine and the development of the qualified immunity standard, which stretches toward absolute immunity. This concern is heightened in unintentional level of force cases, because the misuse of the reasonable mistake standard, even in egregious cases in which qualified immunity has been denied, invites the same errors that qualified immunity can create. By relying on reasonable mistake analysis, courts abdicate their role under § 1983 to protect constitutional rights.

Successful civil rights challenges to police misconduct are crucial to challenging cultural militarism
Tom Carter – WSWS Legal Correspondent, a lawyer (https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/24/cart-f24.html). “US Supreme Court Expands Immunity for Killer Cops.” Center for Research on Globalization. November 12, 2015. http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-supreme-court-expands-immunity-for-killer-cops/5488366 JJN
When a civil rights case is summarily dismissed by a judge on the grounds of “qualified immunity,” the case is legally terminated. It never goes to trial before a jury and is never decided on its constitutional merits. In March of 2010, Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Chadrin Mullenix climbed onto an overpass with a rifle and, disobeying a direct order from his supervisor, fired six shots at a vehicle that the police were pursuing. Mullenix was not in any danger, and his supervisor had told him to wait until other officers tried to stop the car using spike strips. Four shots struck Israel Leija, Jr., killing him and causing the car, which was going 85 miles per hour, to crash. After the shooting, Mullenix boasted to his supervisor, “How’s that for proactive?” The Luna v. Mullenix case was filed by Leija’s family members, who claimed that Mullenix used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights. The district court that originally heard the case, together with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, denied immunity to Mullenix on the grounds that his conduct violated clearly established law. The Supreme Court intervened to uphold the Mullenix’s entitlement to immunity—a decision that will set a precedent for the summary dismissal of civil rights lawsuits against police brutality around the country. This is the Supreme Court’s response to the ongoing wave of police mayhem and murder. The message is clear: The killings will continue. Do not question the police. If you disobey the police, you forfeit your life. So far this year, more than 1,000 people have been killed by the police in America. Almost every day, there are new videos posted online showing police shootings, intrusions into homes and cars, asphyxiations, beatings and taserings. Last week, two police officers in Louisiana opened fire on Jeremy Mardis, a six-year-old autistic boy, and his father Chris Few. The boy’s father had his hands up during the shooting and is currently hospitalized with serious injuries. His son succumbed to the police bullets while still buckled into the front seat of the car. The Supreme Court’s decision reflects the fact that in the face of rising popular anger over police killings, the entire political apparatus—including all of the branches of government—is closing ranks behind the police. This includes the establishment media, which has largely remained silent about Monday’s pro-police Supreme Court decision. The police operate with almost total impunity, confident that no matter what they do, they will have the backing of the state. Two weeks ago, a South Carolina grand jury refused to return an indictment against the officer who was caught on video killing 19-year-old Zachary Hammond. This follows the exoneration of the police who killed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, Eric Garner in New York City and Tamir Rice in Cleveland. The Obama administration’s position regarding the surge of police violence was most clearly and simply articulated by FBI director James Comey in aspeech on October 23. “May God protect our cops,” Comey declared. He went on to accuse those who film the police of promoting violent crime. Meanwhile, in virtually every police brutality case that has come before the federal courts, the Obama administration has taken the side of the police. On Monday, the Supreme Court went out of its way to cite approvingly anamicus curiae (friend of court) brief filed by the National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO), which defended Mullenix. With this citation, notwithstanding its ostensible role as a neutral arbiter and guarantor of the Constitution, the Supreme Court sent a clear signal as to which side it is on. During the imposition of de facto martial law in Ferguson last year, NAPO issued statements vociferously defending Michael Brown’s killer, labeling demonstrators as “violent outsiders,” and denouncing “the violent idiots on the street chanting ‘time to kill a cop!’” “Qualified immunity” is a reactionary doctrine invented by judges in the later part of the 20th century to shield public officials from lawsuits. As a practical matter, this doctrine allows judges to toss out civil rights cases without a jury trial if, in the judge’s opinion, the official misconduct in question was not “plainly incompetent” or a “knowing violation of clearly established law.” Over recent decades, the doctrine has been stretched to Kafkaesque proportions to shield police officers from accountability. In the landmark case ofTennessee v. Garner (1985), the Supreme Court held that it violates the Constitution to shoot an “unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect,” and required an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury before the police could open fire. But the Supreme Court in its decision on Monday dismissed this language as constituting a “high level of generality” that was not “particular” enough to “clearly establish” any particular constitutional rights. Since cases that are dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity do not result in decisions on the constitutional issues, this circular pseudo-logic ensures that no rights will ever be “clearly established.” It also ensures that, instead of the democratic procedure of a jury trial, cases involving the police will be decided by judges. The Supreme Court issued Monday’s decision without full briefing or oral argument, designating it “per curiam,” i.e., in the name of the court, not any specific judges. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, displaying his trademark sophistry. According to Scalia, Mullenix did not use “deadly force” within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s prior cases, since he was shooting at a car, not a person. (Four bullets struck Leija, but none of the six shots struck the engine block at which Mullenix was supposedly aiming.) Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed the sole dissent, noting that this decision “renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow,” and sanctions a “shoot first, think later” approach to policing. However, Sotomayor wrote that she would have used a “balancing” analysis instead, in which a “particular government interest” would need to be “balanced” against the use of deadly force. This “balancing” rhetoric mirrors the Obama administration’s justifications for assassination and domestic spying, according to which national security is balanced against democratic rights. The Bill of Rights itself—that old, yellow, forgotten piece of paper—does not make itself contingent on the subjective mental states of police officers, “clearly established law,” or the “balancing” of “government interests.” America confronts a massive social crisis. Decades of endless war and occupations abroad, the degradation of wages and living conditions at home, the enrichment of a tiny layer of financial criminals at the expense of the rest of the society, rampant speculation and corruption at the highest levels—these factors contribute to mounting social tensions and the danger, from the standpoint of the ruling class, of the growth of social opposition. Such opposition can already be seen, in its earliest stages, in the struggle by autoworkers against the sellout contract being imposed by the United Auto Workers union. Like the tyrant who proposes to solve the problem of hunger by imposing a hefty fine on everyone who starves, the Supreme Court’s decision Monday confirms that the entire social system has nothing to offer by way of a solution to the crisis except more of the same. The abrogation of democratic rights, torture, military commissions, drone assassinations, unlimited surveillance, the lockdown of entire cities, internment camps, beatings, murder, martial law, war—this is how the ruling class plans to deal with the social crisis. Notwithstanding the epidemic of police violence, the flow of unlimited cash and military hardware to police departments from the Department of Homeland Security and the Pentagon continues unabated. The buildup of the police as a militarized occupation force operating outside the law, pumped up and ready to kill, must be seen as a part of preparations by the ruling class for mass repression and dictatorship in response to the growth of working class opposition.

Independent of civil rights protections an incoherent, government biased QI system undercuts law enforcement and the rule of law broadly
Pittman, JD candidate, 12
(Nathan R., UNINTENTIONAL LEVELS OF FORCE IN § 1983 EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS William and Mary Law Review William and Mary Law Review May, 2012 William and Mary Law Review 53 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 2107)
Qualified immunity has distorted other values in the legal system and provided perverse incentives to law enforcement officers. First, as Evan Mandery argues, qualified immunity "departs from the commonly accepted maxim that all citizens are to be held strictly liable for knowledge of the law." n138 That is, law enforcement officers can escape liability by being ignorant of the law. Of course, one might respond to Mandery's criticism by pointing to Harlow's requirement that ignorance is excused only when a reasonable person would not have known. n139 Mandery's stronger criticism is that because qualified immunity holds officers to a low standard for their knowledge of the law, n140 they have no incentive to learn it and thus provide enforcement more consistent with the Constitution. n141 Mandery argues that this creates particular problems in the context of excessive force cases, in which victims of police misconduct are often powerless to mitigate that conduct because the level of care that victims take to comply with the law is often irrelevant. n142 In response, Mandery suggests that strict liability might be applied to § 1983 cases, a beneficial move that would remove uncertainty about which rights the statute will vindicate and would fully expunge subjective criteria from *2128 liability. n143 The public policy justifications of qualified immunity n144 would, of course, require that strict liability be packaged with a mandatory indemnification scheme or a respondeat superior theory of liability for municipalities, n145 and Mandery admits that such packaging has been explicitly rejected by the Court. n146 Another criticism leveled at qualified immunity is that, in general, it widens the gap between rights and their remedies. This is the argument taken up by John Jeffries, who argues that "doctrines that curtail individual redress thus not only deny full remediation to some victims; they also call into question the adequacy of the overall structure of constitutional enforcement." n147 Jeffries explains that this gap is particularly wide in § 1983 claims. n148 This is not to say that Jeffries disregards the policy arguments for qualified immunity; his argument is that although society must tolerate some gaps, it should not come to believe that such gaps are anything more than a necessary evil whose social value should be carefully evaluated. n149 The chief benefit that Jeffries identifies in such a gap is that it "facilitates constitutional change by reducing the costs of innovation." n150 Jeffries is concerned that, if government had to bear the true cost of constitutional violations, then courts would be reluctant to develop new rights. n151 Jeffries is careful to point out that his framework views the proper role of qualified immunity as shielding government actors from liability, not as an endorsement of current law. n152 Diana Hassel is one of the most strident critics of qualified immunity. She argues that qualified immunity is essentially a smoke *2129 screen that "obscures the choices that are being made on the fundamental and divisive issues of what constitutional wrongs should be compensated." n153 In practice, the veil of qualified immunity allows judges to exercise their policy preferences on a case-by-case basis. n154 This system, Hassel argues, leads toward a qualified immunity doctrine that is both highly uncertain n155 and inappropriately focused on government interests n156 rather than the violation of constitutional rights. n157 Hassel's critique suggests that qualified immunity returns civil rights analysis to the sort of methodology that Justice Frankfurter advocated in Rochin. n158 Judges, using their own sound discretion, determine what "shocks the conscience" to the point that judicial intervention is warranted. n159 A return to this jurisprudence vests judges with the power to decide which rights will be vindicated. n160 Although judges may already exercise this power, Hassel's argument is that this method hides the policy choices behind which rights will be enforced, contributing to an impoverished doctrine. n161

The Supreme Court ought to limit qualified immunity in excessive force cases 

The aff is goldilocks- it protects officers while eliminating judicial confusion and bias
Sheng, JD with Distinction @Brigham Young, 11
(Philip, B.A., Stanford University, John Arrillaga Scholar. An "Objectively Reasonable" Criticism of the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cas-es Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 BYU Journal of Public Law 2011 The BYU Journal of Public Law 26 BYU J. Pub. L. 99)
In light of the confusion after Saucier, Hope, and Brosseau, the Court should consider reformulating the doctrine of qualified immunity, at least in the context of excessive force cases. The Ninth Circuit's approach in Saucier was persuasive - recognizing that Harlow and Graham are substantially the same inquiry and denying qualified immunity in favor of the jury deciding the question of reasonableness. Apparently however, the Supreme Court felt that this approach did not provide law enforcement officers with sufficient protection for reasonable mistakes. One explanation could be that the Court is wary of juries having to apply a constitutional standard on a consistent basis. n82 If that is the case, the following approach could be a reasonable alternative to qualified immunity in excessive force cases. A better approach might be to eliminate qualified immunity altogether in excessive force cases; but rather than create a whole new test, the Court should remove the question of reasonableness from the jury and allow judges to decide whether the use of force was objectively reasonable. Under this approach, jury interaction would remain much the same, except that after all the facts are resolved, the judge would decide the ultimate constitutional question of reasonableness based on the jury's findings. While this would be a departure from settled practice, it appears to have an adequate basis in the law. For instance, trial court judges already decide the question of reasonableness on motions for summary judgment whenever facts are undisputed or viewed in the light most *109 favorable to the plaintiff. n83 Moreover, appellate judges routinely decide the question of reasonableness every time an excessive force case goes on appeal. n84 Judges are well-equipped, yet it seems odd that the constitutional question of reasonableness only goes to the judge when facts are not in dispute, but at all other times, is entrusted to the jury. It would perhaps make better sense to have the jury resolve the facts, and have the judge decide the question of reasonableness based on those facts. There are several benefits to this approach. First, it would eliminate the need for line drawing between Hope and Brosseau, and courts would not have to worry about clearly established law. Second, the Court could retreat from its "irreducibly murky" n85 distinction between Graham and Harlow. If applied judiciously, Graham alone provides law enforcement officers with adequate protection for reasonable mistakes. Third, even though they would be denied qualified immunity, law enforcement officers would benefit by having judges decide the constitutional question of reasonableness. Judges are in a better position to decide constitutional questions, having been trained in the law and having developed expertise through experience. This approach would also eliminate potential jury bias. While jury bias can cut both ways, n86 consider the case of Jared Massey, a YouTube sensation and public hero after being Tasered by a Utah Highway Patrol officer in 2007. n87 Despite an internal investigation clearing the officer, the state settled for $ 40,000 rather than risk a jury awarding more. n88 Fourth, the approach would serve the same purposes as qualified immunity by allowing claims to be decided early on summary judgment. If no material issues of fact remain in an excessive force case, instead of looking to see whether there is a clearly established law, the judge would simply decide the case. This would not be an unprecedented expansion of judicial power; as mentioned above, our legal system already allows judges to do this in a variety of circumstances. Lastly, the approach would keep judges honest by holding them to the Fourth Amendment standard. Granted there is still flexibility for judges to decide cases based on their own personal *110 ideologies, but the amount of discretion is far less than what the current doctrine of qualified immunity allows. n89 In conclusion, the doctrine of qualified immunity is incompatible with excessive force cases. Both qualified immunity and the Fourth Amendment constitutional standard focus on reasonableness, and the Supreme Court's attempts to distinguish the two have made qualified immunity cases near impossible to predict. Under Brosseau, a plaintiff will be hard-pressed to find case law that is materially similar in a world of "limitless factual circumstances." n90 Under Hope, law enforcement officers arguably have fair warning of everything. The difficulty is fashioning a rule that balances these two extremes, something the Supreme Court has not been able to do. Asking whether the constitutional violation is "obvious," as suggested in Brosseau, is no more helpful than asking whether the constitutional violation is clearly established. The reality that it is possible for law enforcement officers to "reasonably act unreasonably" is evidence that the doctrine of qualified immunity needs to be eliminated from excessive force cases, or the Supreme Court needs to fashion a whole new test.
The aff is key to meaningful challenges to police conduct and legitimacy of the rule of law
Hassel, Law @ Roger Williams, 09
(Diana, JD Rutgers, Excessive Reasonableness The Trustees of Indiana University Indiana Law Review 2009 Indiana Law Review 43 Ind. L. Rev. 117)
Over the past thirty years, courts and litigants have attempted to forge a workable regime for applying qualified immunity in excessive force cases. These attempts have been largely unsuccessful and have led to an increasingly complicated and unsatisfactory set of steps that a district court must execute when these cases arise. Because of its complexity and incoherence, the current system seems to work for no one-not police defendants, not judges, and most particularly not victims of police abuse. It has become apparent that periodic fixes by the Supreme Court will not solve the problem-a more profound rethinking of the doctrine is required. In excessive force cases the qualified immunity defense should be modified to eliminate the reasonableness inquiry, allowing the Fourth Amendment to do the work of assessing reasonableness. This change would go a long way toward simplifying and reforming the defense. Other changes in the doctrine may well also be necessary to create a more usable and rational system. If the current approach is left intact without any profound alternations, the promise of § 1983 as a meaningful remedy to police abuse will be unfulfilled, and judges will be left to dance through a complex set of steps without any music to give it meaning.

QI is the key barrier- counterplans don’t solve the case
Hassel, Law @ Roger Williams, 09
(Diana, JD Rutgers, Excessive Reasonableness The Trustees of Indiana University Indiana Law Review 2009 Indiana Law Review 43 Ind. L. Rev. 117)
Meanwhile, far removed from the debate over doctrinal niceties, the operational problem of how to address the use of unjustified force by police officers persists. The current legal regime has largely failed in its attempt to control excessive police violence. n8 At least in part that failure flows from the difficulty faced by claimants under § 1983 to overcome the insulation from liability that defendants derive from both the Fourth Amendment requirements and the qualified immunity standard. Until the nearly insurmountable barrier to recovery created by excessive reasonableness is somehow relieved, civil actions based on the Fourth Amendment will not effectively deter police violence.
Apply a strict filter to all negative arguments- if they aren’t
A. About the use of excessive force
B. Based on legal reasoning other than Anderson V. Creighton
Then their evidence comes from inaccurate and incoherent legal scholarship and should be ignored
Shapiro, JD, et al, 01
(Steven R. Shapiro American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street New York, New York 10004 (212) 549-2500 Alan L. Schlosser American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California 1663 Mission Street San Francisco, California 94103 (415) 621-2488 William Goodman Center for Constitutional Rights 666 Broadway New York, New York 10012 (212) 614-6464 David Rudovsky (Counsel of Record) 924 Cherry Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107 (215) 925-4400 Michael Avery Suffolk Law School 41 Temple Street Boston, Massachusetts 02114 (617) 573-8551 Ruth E. Harlow Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund 120 Wall Street, Suite 1500 New York, New York 10005 (212) 809-8585 2001 WL 173522 (U.S.) (Appellate Brief) United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief. Donald SAUCIER, Petitioner, v. Elliot M. KATZ and In Defense of Animals, Respondents. No. 99-1977. October Term, 2000. February 16, 2001. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT )
In the rare situation where the standard for qualified immunity and the constitutional claim are identical, qualified immunity cannot be a separate defense to a claim of a constitutional violation. In the excessive force context, once it *10 is determined that an objectively reasonable officer would not have used the force in question, it makes no sense -- indeed it is conceptually incoherent -- to assert that the very same objectively reasonable officer could have believed that the force was reasonable. In other words, a police officer cannot have an objectively reasonable belief that his conduct was lawful when the unlawfulness of that conduct rests on a determination that an objectively reasonable officer would not have acted in the same way in the same circumstances. A significant number of lower federal courts have held that the Fourth Amendment and the qualified immunity doctrine pose precisely the same legal issue and that any differing determinations would be legally irreconcilable. See, e.g., McNair v. Coffey, 234 F.3d 352 (7th Cir. 2000); Frazell v. Flanagan, 102 F.3d 877, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1966) (“once a jury has determined under the Fourth Amendment that the officer's conduct was objectively unreasonable, that conclusion necessarily resolves for immunity purposes whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was lawful”); Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748 (D.C.Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1231 (1997); Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1995); Roy v. City of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691 (1st Cir. 1994); Street v. Parham, 929 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1991); Ramirez v. City of Reno, 925 F.Supp. 681, 687-89 (D.Nev. 1996)(“intrinsic analytical incompatibility of an excessive force claim with a qualified immunity claim” given the objective reasonableness test; the “two lines of inquiry converge”); Landy v. Irizarry, 884 F.Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 4 *11 Petitioner, in arguing for a qualified immunity defense in excessive force cases, relies almost exclusively on Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635. In our view, arguments based on Anderson are significantly misplaced. There, this Court ruled that the qualified immunity doctrine is applicable in cases alleging Fourth Amendment violations for warrantless searches or arrests without probable cause or exigent circumstances. The Court reasoned that where an officer is found to have violated the Fourth Amendment by making an arrest or conducting a search without the requisite cause or suspicion, the officer is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity if an objectively reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed. Anderson is premised on the understanding that the “reasonableness” element of probable cause is different from the “objectively reasonable” standard of qualified immunity. That is because the probable cause determination will often require the drawing of *12 fine legal lines. 5 Recognizing that reality, this Court held in Anderson that given the “difficulty of determining whether particular searches or seizures comport with the Fourth Amendment … law enforcement officers whose judgments in making these difficult determinations are objectively legally reasonable … are entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 644 (emphasis added). Thus, in the probable cause context, a police officer might mistakenly violate a citizen's rights without acting unreasonably. The probable cause determination for a search or seizure always requires an officer to decide whether the known facts would warrant a reasonable officer to believe that a crime has been committed or that a search would disclose contraband or material of evidentiary value, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), and must be made pursuant to evolving legal doctrine under the Fourth Amendment. Consider, for example, this Court's jurisprudence concerning investigatory stops or arrests of persons based on information provided by anonymous informants. In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the Court determined that information from an anonymous source would justify an investigatory stop if critical predictive details were corroborated by the police. In Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), the Court declined to extend White to situations where the anonymous source provided information regarding a man with a gun at a certain location, and police investigation led to an observation of a person fitting the general description at that location. In the wake of J.L. (and this Court's opinion in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)), there will no *13 doubt be close cases, depending upon the information received, the observations of the officers and other relevant factors. See, e.g., United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000) (stop based on anonymous informant who personally provided information to police). And in some of these cases, an officer will make a stop on information that a court will later declare to be insufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment; yet, given the lack of a particularized legal standard, the officer may still have acted in an objectively reasonable manner. No such legal difficulties face the officer who must determine how much force to use in a particular incident, whether in self-defense or in effectuating an arrest. This Court ruled in Graham that police officers act consistently with the Fourth Amendment when their conduct is objectively reasonable -- a nontechnical and deferential constitutional doctrine that reflects well established and commonly held judgments on the limits of police force. 6 This standard provides a margin of error, precludes “Monday morning quarterbacking” by a court, permits the officer a wide range of reasonable responses, and does not require the officer to make finely tuned legal determinations. Thus, once it has been determined that an officer has acted in an excessive fashion, it is not possible to claim that an objectively reasonable officer could have thought these actions to be proper. In many “tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving” situations, reasonable force may comprise a range of options or responses that the officer might employ. Different officers in the identical situation, each behaving reasonably, might elect to use a baton, a chemical agent, a take-down hold, or *14 a different technique; and each might use greater or lesser force, within a reasonable range, in employing the chosen technique. 7Recognition that reasonable force may include a range of responses is consistent with this Court's observation in Graham that “the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” 490 U.S. at 396. Understanding that the Fourth Amendment recognizes a range of forcible responses as reasonable also implements this Court's injunction in Graham that there be “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments.” Id. at 396-97. How wide the allowance or range may be “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. at 396. In some cases, the facts and circumstances may be simple enough that the range of permissible options available to the officer will be quite narrow. In some circumstances no use of force is reasonable if none *15 is required. See Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 234 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 821 (1996); Bauer v. Norris, 713 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1983). In others, the difficulties confronting officers making split-second, life and death decisions may raise sufficient problems that the range of responses that should be deemed reasonable may be quite broad. The critical point is that this “zone of protection” in use of force cases is provided as part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard itself. And where, as here, the standard for determining qualified immunity is the same as that for deciding the constitutional question itself, the defense is superfluous. This is not a matter of semantics or linguistic similarity; rather, it is a case of doctrinal identity. In determining whether an officer's use of force was within a range of reasonable options, the jury is also (and necessarily) answering the question whether a reasonable officer “could have believed” his use of force “to be lawful.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 638. Once this question is answered, there is no other inquiry that must be resolved in order to impose liability. 8 The existence of such broad protection in the Fourth Amendment itself, moreover, eliminates any fear that officers will be unreasonably chilled from acting in the absence of a separate qualified immunity defense.