Harvard Westlake Chaudhary Neg
| Tournament | Round | Opponent | Judge | Cites | Round Report | Open Source | Edit/Delete |
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| Alta | 1 | Loyola HF | Tim Alderete |
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| Alta | 3 | Karl G Maeser JH | Liz Letak |
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| Alta | 5 | Marlborough GK | Seth Wetsel |
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| Cal | 6 | Lynbrook AP | Ashan Peris |
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| Contact Info | 1 | - | - |
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| Golden Desert | 1 | Brentwood JD | Sean Fee |
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| Golden Desert | 3 | Isidore Newman EP | Scott Nielson |
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| Golden Desert | Doubles | Nueva AK | DeLateur, Korsakov, Torson |
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| Golden Desert | Doubles | Nueva AK | DeLateur, Korsakov, Torson |
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| Golden Desert | Octas | Servite PA | Overing, Kaya, Bond |
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| Golden Desert | Octas | Servite PA | Overing, Kaya, Bond |
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| Grapevine | 1 | Greenhill BZ | Kris Wright |
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| Grapevine | 1 | Greenhill BZ | Kris Wright |
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| Grapevine | 1 | Greenhill BZ | Kris Wright |
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| Grapevine | 4 | Colleyville MS | Hank Stolte |
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| Grapevine | 4 | Colleyville MS | Hank Stalte |
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| Grapevine | 4 | Colleyville MS | Hank Stalte |
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| Meadows | 3 | Loyola JN | Kathy Bond |
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| Meadows | 1 | Loyola NT | Sierra Inglet |
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| NDCA | 1 | Quarry Lane SK | Nadia Hussein |
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| St Marks | 1 | Evanston LT | Rodrigo Paramo |
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| St Marks | 4 | Lynbrook NS | David Dosch |
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| St Marks | 4 | Lynbrook NS | David Dosch |
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| St Marks | 4 | Lynbrook NS | David Dosch |
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| St Marks | 6 | Evanston HS | Rebecca Kuang |
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| St Marks | Doubles | Mountain View DZ | Dosch, Stevens, Castillo |
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| TOC | 1 | X | X |
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| TOC | 2 | Cedar Park MG | Preston Stolte |
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| TOC | 3 | Millard North PK | Chris Randall |
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| TOC | 3 | Millard North PK | Chris Randall |
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| USC | 2 | Loyola AO | Leo Kim |
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| Voices | 1 | Mission San Jose PB | David Dosch |
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| Voices | 1 | Mission San Jose | David Dosch |
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| Voices | 1 | Mission San Jose PB | David Dosch |
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| Voices | 3 | University JC | Sean Fee |
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| Voices | Doubles | Peninsula JL | Bistagne, Go, Dada |
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| Voices | 5 | Loyola NT | Karen Qi |
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| Tournament | Round | Report |
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| Alta | 1 | Opponent: Loyola HF | Judge: Tim Alderete 1AC - Border Patrol |
| Alta | 3 | Opponent: Karl G Maeser JH | Judge: Liz Letak 1AC - Racism Police State |
| Alta | 5 | Opponent: Marlborough GK | Judge: Seth Wetsel 1AC - Accountability |
| Cal | 6 | Opponent: Lynbrook AP | Judge: Ashan Peris 1AC - Militarism |
| Contact Info | 1 | Opponent: - | Judge: - Contact Info |
| Golden Desert | 1 | Opponent: Brentwood JD | Judge: Sean Fee 1AC - Protests |
| Golden Desert | 3 | Opponent: Isidore Newman EP | Judge: Scott Nielson 1AC - Marketplace of Ideas |
| Golden Desert | Doubles | Opponent: Nueva AK | Judge: DeLateur, Korsakov, Torson 1AC - Constitutivism |
| Golden Desert | Doubles | Opponent: Nueva AK | Judge: DeLateur, Korsakov, Torson 1AC - Constitutivism |
| Golden Desert | Octas | Opponent: Servite PA | Judge: Overing, Kaya, Bond 1AC - Militarism |
| Golden Desert | Octas | Opponent: Servite PA | Judge: Overing, Kaya, Bond 1AC - Militarism |
| Grapevine | 1 | Opponent: Greenhill BZ | Judge: Kris Wright 1AC - Environmental Racism 1NC - SSD CP Elections DA T - Generics 2NR - T Elections |
| Grapevine | 1 | Opponent: Greenhill BZ | Judge: Kris Wright 1AC - Environmental Racism 1NC - SSD CP Elections DA T - Generics 2NR - T DA |
| Grapevine | 1 | Opponent: Greenhill BZ | Judge: Kris Wright 1AC - Environmental Racism 1NC - SSD CP Elections DA T-Generics 2NR - T Elections |
| Grapevine | 4 | Opponent: Colleyville MS | Judge: Hank Stolte 1AC - Hauntology 1NC - T-Framework Wynter K Decadence K 2NR - FW |
| Grapevine | 4 | Opponent: Colleyville MS | Judge: Hank Stalte 1AC - Hauntology 1NC - T-Framework Wynter K Decadence K 2NR - FW |
| Grapevine | 4 | Opponent: Colleyville MS | Judge: Hank Stalte 1AC - Hauntology 1NC - T-Framework Wynter K Decadence K 2NR - FW |
| Meadows | 3 | Opponent: Loyola JN | Judge: Kathy Bond 1AC - India (Colonialism Radiation Meltdowns Indo-Pak War Indo-China War) 1NC - T-Plural Indo-Pak Security K India MSR CP India Desal DA 2NR - MSR Desal |
| Meadows | 1 | Opponent: Loyola NT | Judge: Sierra Inglet 1AC - Cap |
| NDCA | 1 | Opponent: Quarry Lane SK | Judge: Nadia Hussein 1AC - Queer Killjoy |
| St Marks | 1 | Opponent: Evanston LT | Judge: Rodrigo Paramo 1AC - Settler Colonialism (Waste Dumping) |
| St Marks | 4 | Opponent: Lynbrook NS | Judge: David Dosch 1AC - Ukraine |
| St Marks | 4 | Opponent: Lynbrook NS | Judge: David Dosch 1AC - Ukraine |
| St Marks | 4 | Opponent: Lynbrook NS | Judge: David Dosch 1AC - Ukraine |
| St Marks | 6 | Opponent: Evanston HS | Judge: Rebecca Kuang 1AC - Orientalism |
| St Marks | Doubles | Opponent: Mountain View DZ | Judge: Dosch, Stevens, Castillo 1AC - India |
| TOC | 1 | Opponent: X | Judge: X X |
| TOC | 2 | Opponent: Cedar Park MG | Judge: Preston Stolte 1AC - Butler |
| TOC | 3 | Opponent: Millard North PK | Judge: Chris Randall 1AC - Habeas Viscus |
| TOC | 3 | Opponent: Millard North PK | Judge: Chris Randall 1AC - Habeas Viscus |
| USC | 2 | Opponent: Loyola AO | Judge: Leo Kim 1AC - Cap |
| Voices | 1 | Opponent: Mission San Jose PB | Judge: David Dosch 1AC - Whole Res Util (Warming BioD Terror Meltdowns Prolif) 1NC - Elections DA v2 Multi-Plank CP Case 2NR - Everything |
| Voices | 1 | Opponent: Mission San Jose | Judge: David Dosch 1AC - Whole Res Util (Warming BioD Nuke Terror Meltdowns Prolif) 1NC - Election DA v2 Multi-Plank CP Case 2NR - Everything |
| Voices | 1 | Opponent: Mission San Jose PB | Judge: David Dosch 1AC - Whole res Util (Warming BioD Terror Meltdowns Prolif) 1NC - Elections DA v2 Multi-Plank CP 2NR - Everything |
| Voices | 3 | Opponent: University JC | Judge: Sean Fee 1AC - Tribal Nations Ban 1NC - Natives Epistemology K 2NR - K |
| Voices | Doubles | Opponent: Peninsula JL | Judge: Bistagne, Go, Dada 1AC - Japan 1NC - T-Plural Japan Politics DA Japan Shift DA 2NR - Shift DA |
| Voices | 5 | Opponent: Loyola NT | Judge: Karen Qi 1AC - Cap |
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
| Entry | Date |
|---|---|
0 - Contact InfoTournament: Contact Info | Round: 1 | Opponent: - | Judge: - Facebook: Vishan Chaudhary Email: vchaudhary1@hwemail.com | 9/10/16 |
1 - Cap K QueerTournament: NDCA | Round: 1 | Opponent: Quarry Lane SK | Judge: Nadia Hussein 1NC – KThey misdiagnose the problem – Heteronormativity is a symptom of the capitalist mode of production which causes alienation and violence – in locating resistance in the individual the queer ideology of the 1AC is an elitist politics of the ivory tower which destroys coalition-building and emancipatory changeKirsch in '00 "The Embrace of Negation" – The rejection of all contemporary norms is the ultimate in nihilistic acceptance of oppression – the 1AC creates new space for reactionary violence and is itself an endorsement of gay bashingMitchell and Olafimihan in '92 Unified action is crucial - individual politics in flux are easily crushed by capitalism. Ahmad 97Ahmad, Professorial Fellow at the Centre of Contemporary Studies, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi and is visiting Professor of Political Science at York University, 1997 (Aijaz, Culture, Nationalism, And the Role of Intellectuals in In defense of history). NS from file Cap is the root cause – it necessitates excluding queer bodies to the margins of society to maintain populations which makes queer oppression inevitable. Kinsman 07Kinsman and Irving 7 Dan Irving is a trans activist and teacher. In 2005, he completed his PhD thesis in Political Science at York University on Trans Activism and Alliances with Labour, Feminist and Gay and Lesbian Organizations. In his work, Irving combines a fierce dedication to trans struggles with a commitment to a Marxist class analysis. He has been an active member of CUPE 3903 at York University, a contract faculty member in the Sexual Diversity Studies program at the University of Toronto, as well as an event organizer and community-based researcher within trans communities. Dan Irving currently lives, writes and struggles in Toronto. Gary Kinsman interviewed him in the spring of 2007, "Trans Politics and Anti-Capitalism: An Interview with Dan Irving", Upping the Anti, 2007. NS Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2) Even if they solve, it turns case – neoliberalism depends on the nuclear family and binary gender roles to extract profit. Miles 14Miles 14 (Laura – UCU activist and SWP member, "Transgender oppression and resistance," in International Socialism, 1-9-14, Issue 141, http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=944)** The alt is a class-based critique of the system - pedagogical spaces are the key staging ground to keep socialism on the horizon. McLaren 04McLaren, Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof, and Scatamburlo-D'Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, '4 (Peter and Valerie, "Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of 'difference'," Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199). NS from file The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid.Neoliberalism is a conceptual framework that has to be challenged at the level of scholarship. Godrej 14Farah Godrej ~Department of Political Science University of California-Riverside ~"neoliberalism, Militarization, and the Price of dissent Policing Protest at the University of California "Edited by Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. The Imperial University. University of Minnesota Press, 2014. | 4/8/17 |
1 - Decadence KTournament: Grapevine | Round: 4 | Opponent: Colleyville MS | Judge: Hank Stalte The AFF’s performance of _ discounts evidence – they destroy the pursuit of knowledge by propagating decadence. Gordon 06Lewis Gordon—professor at philosophy, African and Judiac Studies at University of Connecticut Storrs—2006 (Disciplinary Decadence: Living Thought in Trying Times, p 28-29) The AFF’s decadence stops us from from various ways of knowing the world and ontologizes _ as the constitutive foundation of the world. Gordon 06Lewis Gordon—professor of philosophy, African and Judiac Studies at the University of Connecticut—2014 (“Disciplinary Decadence and the Decolonization of Knowledge,” Africa Development 39.1: 81-92, 86-88). Decadence destroys the possibility of a decolonized ethics of the oppressed to overturn. Gordon 14Lewis Gordon—professor of philosophy, African and Judiac Studies at the University of Connecticut—2014 (“Disciplinary Decadence and the Decolonization of Knowledge,” Africa Development 39.1: 81-92, 88). | 9/10/16 |
1 - Habeas Viscus Method PICTournament: TOC | Round: 3 | Opponent: Millard North PK | Judge: Chris Randall 1NC – KWe advocate the entirety of the 1AC except their use of assemblage theory and their framing of the world being controlled through White supremacist ableist cisheteropatriarchal capital. Instead, we center our discussion solely on the concrete nature of anti-blacknessBlack men are regarded as non-human – this makes endless violence inevitable. Curry 14President of Philosophy born of struggle and Prof of Philosophy @ Texas AandM 14 Tommy; "Michael Brown and the Need for a Genre Study of Black Male Death and Dying" http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v017/17.3S.curry.html First is their intersectionality arguments – Multiculturalism is a strategy of leftist academia to gloss over the paradigm of anti blackness and maintain a state of emergency from blacks. Wilderson 08Frank Wilderson, Red White and Black, 2008. NS Second is assemblages – Assemblages are inaccessible to blacks – blackness in a static identity imposed on bodies by their structural location. Douglass and Wilderson 13(Patrice, Patrice Douglass is a PhD candidate at the University of California, Irvine, Her work explores the relationship between sexual violence and black subjection under slavery as a theoretical framework to think through the position of blackness within contemporary political theory. Frank B. Wilderon III is a professor of African-American studies and drama at the University of California, Irvine – straight up shot racists, "The Violence of Presence: Metaphysics in a Blackened World." The Black Scholar, Vol. 43, No. 4, Special Issue: Role of Black Philosophy (Winter 2013), Pages 117-123. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5816/blackscholar.43.4.0117)** Third is becoming – Deleuzian becoming is parasitic on the black body – it assumes a flexibility that allows you to abandon your identity. The black body continually denied this flexibility. Massa 14Note – Massa ultimately disagrees with Wilderson's analysis of ontology, but believes that if Wilderson is correct, then this arg about Deleuze is true. Becoming grants whiteness potentiality which denies the history of racism. Curry 13Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013. NS We should destroy the current postmodern template of humanity in favor of an anti-ethical stance. Curry 13Dr. Tommy Curry, In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical, Academia.edu, 2013. NS | 5/7/17 |
1 - T-FrameworkTournament: Grapevine | Round: 4 | Opponent: Colleyville MS | Judge: Hank Stolte Interpretation - The AFF may only garner offense from hypothetical enactment of the resolutionThis does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role of the judge — only that the topic should determine the debate’s subject matter. Solves their method good offense – they can read as a framework argument to justify a topical plan, there’s no reason voting off it is key.==== Merriam-Webster defines production as:Merriam-Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary, “production.” West’s Encyclopedia of American Law defines nuclear power as:"Nuclear Power." West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. 2008. The Gale Group 16 Aug. 2016 http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Nuclear+Power Resolved reflects policy passage before a legislative body. Parcher 01(Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html) (1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at *Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question. Violation:Standards:1. Engagement – there are infinite non topical AFFs - a precise and predictable point of difference is key to effective dialogue. Steinberg and Freeley 13Steinberg and Freeley 13, * David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, Argumentation and Debate, Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 121-4. NS from file Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state¬ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec¬tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci¬sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam¬ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise¬ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi¬ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis¬course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta-tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro¬vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden¬tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca¬demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri¬ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some¬thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca¬demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu¬nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless¬ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen¬tation. If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effec¬tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web¬site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo¬cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided Outweighs: | 9/10/16 |
1 - Theory - Disclose New AffsTournament: TOC | Round: 1 | Opponent: X | Judge: X 1.Clash | 4/29/17 |
1 - Wynter KTournament: Grapevine | Round: 4 | Opponent: Colleyville MS | Judge: Hank Stalte It is impossible to solve colonization within a European body of knowledge – their foundation recreate every problem they criticizes. Wynter 06- Impact – can’t solve antiblackness if you work within antiblack disciplines since that consciousness will always invade “radical” thought – just like you couldn’t explain to someone in the medival era why some planets seemed to move backwards because the planetary model was geocentric, you can’t explain to someone who uses western phil a true liberation strategy for black people Syliva Wynter 6—2006 ( “Interview with Syliva Wynter,ProudFlesh Interview: New Afrikan Journal of Culture, Politics and Consciousness, Issue 4). NS PROUD FLESH: At this point in your life’s work, who could think of your writing without thinking of its critical thesis on “humanism,” of Western humanism, or what it calls “Man,” which also raises critical questions of “consciousness,” does it not? And other questions, too, of course. SYLVIA WYNTER: Such as, “Why does this meaning have to be put on being Black—this meaning of non-being?” These are the kinds of questions that you guys are going to ask. I beg you guys to go back and read about Copernicus, Galileo and so on. The Darwinian thing was a bit of a struggle, but not as much--strangely enough . . . PROUD FLESH: Yes, you consistently show how “the Copernican revolution” was one enabled by imperialist exploration-cum-exploitation or conquest. For undergraduates in Western universities, in particular, they simply stick the Copernicus issue in the anthology of “modern Western philosophy,” as a lesser textual concern, without dealing with it or its significance; I mean, with no context or explanation. SYLVIA WYNTER: They never even wanted to write about it! And why? Because I think they are aware of the implications, if taken seriously. That’s how they took over the world. We have to take it all seriously. YOU CANNOT SOLVE THE ISSUE OF “CONSCIOUSNESS” IN TERMS OF THEIR BODY OF “KNOWLEDGE.” You just can’t. Just as within the medieval order of knowledge there was no way in which you could explain why it is that certain planets seemed to be moving backwards. Because you were coming from a geocentric model, right? So you had to “know” the world in that way. Whereas from our “Man-centric” model, we cannot solve “consciousness” because “Man” is a purely ontogenetic/purely biological conception of being, who then creates “culture.” So if we say “consciousness” is “constructed,” who does the constructing? You see? Whereas in Fanon’s understanding of ontogeny-and-sociogeny, there’s no problem. Do you see what I mean? The alternative is radical decolonization that challenges the AFF’s overrepresentation of Western Man. Wynter 03- Alt - basically do the AFF (burn everything down, end the world, whatever) without their use of western phil concepts – like pic out of psychoanalysis, western ontology focus, and social death focus Sylvia Wynter—2003 (“Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 3, Number 3,257-337). NS The argument proposes that the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves. Because of this overrepresentation, which is defined in the first part of the title as the Coloniality of Being/ Power/Truth/Freedom, any attempt to unsettle the coloniality of power will call for the unsettling of this overrepresentation as the second and now purely secular form of what Aníbal Quijano identifies as the "Racism/ Ethnicism complex," on whose basis the world of modernity was brought into existence from the fifteenth/sixteenth centuries onwards (Quijano 1999, 2000), 2 and of what Walter Mignolo identifies as the foundational "colonial difference" on which the world of modernity was to institute itself (Mignolo 1999, 2000). 3 The correlated hypothesis here is that all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources (20 percent of the world's peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of End Page 260 earth's peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South 4 )—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle. Central to this struggle also is the usually excluded and invisibilized situation of the category identified by Zygmunt Bauman as the "New Poor" (Bauman 1987). That is, as a category defined at the global level by refugee/economic migrants stranded outside the gates of the rich countries, as the postcolonial variant of Fanon's category of les damnés (Fanon 1963)—with this category in the United States coming to comprise the criminalized majority Black and dark-skinned Latino inner-city males now made to man the rapidly expanding prison-industrial complex, together with their female peers—the kicked-about Welfare Moms—with both being part of the ever-expanding global, transracial category of the homeless/the jobless, the semi-jobless, the criminalized drug-offending prison population. So that if we see this category of the damnés that is internal to (and interned within) the prison system of the United States as the analog form of a global archipelago, constituted by the Third- and Fourth-World peoples of the so-called "underdeveloped" areas of the world—most totally of all by the peoples of the continent of Africa (now stricken with AIDS, drought, and ongoing civil wars, and whose bottommost place as the most impoverished of all the earth's continents is directly paralleled by the situation of its Black Diaspora peoples, with Haiti being produced and reproduced as the most impoverished nation of the Americas)—a systemic pattern emerges. This pattern is linked to the fact that while in the post-sixties United States, as Herbert Gans noted recently, the Black population group, of all the multiple groups comprising the post-sixties social hierarchy, has once again come to be placed at the bottommost place of that hierarchy (Gans, 1999), with all incoming new nonwhite/non-Black groups, as Gans's fellow sociologist Andrew Hacker (1992) earlier pointed out, coming to claim "normal" North American identity by the putting of visible distance between themselves and the Black population group (in effect, claiming "normal" human status by distancing themselves from the group that is still made to occupy the nadir, End Page 261 "nigger" rung of being human within the terms of our present ethnoclass Man's overrepresentation of its "descriptive statement" Bateson 1969 as if it were that of the human itself), then the struggle of our times, one that has hitherto had no name, is the struggle against this overrepresentation. As a struggle whose first phase, the Argument proposes, was first put in place (if only for a brief hiatus before being coopted, reterritorialized Godzich 1986) by the multiple anticolonial social-protest movements and intellectual challenges of the period to which we give the name, "The Sixties." The further proposal here is that, although the brief hiatus during which the sixties' large-scale challenge based on multiple issues, multiple local terrains of struggles (local struggles against, to use Mignolo's felicitous phrase, a "global design" Mignolo 2000) erupted was soon to be erased, several of the issues raised then would continue to be articulated, some in sanitized forms (those pertaining to the category defined by Bauman as "the seduced"), others in more harshly intensified forms (those pertaining to Bauman's category of the "repressed" Bauman 1987). Both forms of "sanitization" would, however, function in the same manner as the lawlike effects of the post-sixties' vigorous discursive and institutional re-elaboration of the central overrepresentation, which enables the interests, reality, and well-being of the empirical human world to continue to be imperatively subordinated to those of the now globally hegemonic ethnoclass world of "Man." This, in the same way as in an earlier epoch and before what Howard Winant identifies as the "immense historical rupture" of the "Big Bang" processes that were to lead to a contemporary modernity defined by the "rise of the West" and the "subjugation of the rest of us" (Winant 1994)—before, therefore, the secularizing intellectual revolution of Renaissance humanism, followed by the decentralizing religious heresy of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of the modern state—the then world of laymen and laywomen, including the institution of the political state, as well as those of commerce and of economic production, had remained subordinated to that of the post-Gregorian Reform Church of Latin-Christian Europe (Le Goff 1983), and therefore to the "rules of the social order" and the theories "which gave them sanction" (See Konrad and Szelenyi guide-quote), as these rules were articulated by its theologians and implemented by its celibate clergy (See Le Goff guide-quote). The role of the ballot is to challenge the representations of the 1AC legitimated through a Western philosophical worldview. Their cultural framing is a prior question to their advocacy – they do not get to weigh the method. Wynter 92- discourse and the cultural background of a theory help construct it and can’t be separated form the theory itself since they’re woven in to how it’s interpreted (by the judge for example), how it’s justified, and what political efficacy it has. They don’t get to weigh “ending the world” against the alt since their justification shape how their method works and are thus a prior question Sylvia Wynter 92—1992 (“Beyond the Categories of the Master Conception: The Counterdoctrine of the Jamesian Poiesis,” in C.L.R. James Caribbean, eds. Paget Henry and Paul Buhle, 63-91). NS To be effective systems of power must be discursively legitimated. This is not to say that power is originally a set of institutional structures that are subsequently legitimated. On the contrary, it is to suggest the equiprimordiality of structure and cultural conceptions in the genesis of power. These cultural conceptions, encoded in language and other signifying systems, shape the development of political structures and are also shaped by them. The cultural aspects of power are as original as the structural aspects; each serves as a code for the other's development. It is from these elementary cultural conceptions that complex legitimating discourses are constructed. | 9/10/16 |
JAN-FEB Anti-Ethics KTournament: Golden Desert | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Nueva AK | Judge: DeLateur, Korsakov, Torson 1NC – KThe 1AC perpetuates the exact abstraction that recreates anti-black violence by ignoring the underlying antagonism inherent to its structure – asking historically racist institutions to try and fix problems is blind optimism that dooms them to recreate anti-blackness. Curry 13Dr. Tommy J. Curry 13, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Texas AandM, "In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical", 2013. CC Their framework arguments are another link – their ethics are colorblind and abstract from reality in a way in a way that is inaccessible to oppressed bodies – they serve as another hoop to jump through before we can engage in racism and are exactly what keeps that oppression prevalent. Curry 13Dr. Tommy J. Curry 13, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Texas AandM, "In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical", 2013. CC The aff's attempt to whitewash history by ignoring the racist foundations that underlie their theory allows for racial domination to remain invisible – you as a judge must reject the aff's epistemology and acknowledge the reality of oppression. That's a voting issue. Leonardo 02Leonardo, Zeus. "The souls of white folk: Critical pedagogy, whiteness studies, and globalization discourse." Race, ethnicity and education 5.1 (2002): 29-50. CC The fragmenting effects of the global economy work in tandem with the fragmenting tendencies The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best challenges anti-blackness. Fiat is illusory so they don't get to weigh the case.Debate is a speech act – debaters should be held accountable for their discourse in round. Vincent 13Chris Vincent, Re-Conceptualizing our Performances: Accountability in Lincoln Douglas Debate, Vbriefly, 2013. NS | 2/18/17 |
JAN-FEB Anti-Ethics KTournament: Golden Desert | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Nueva AK | Judge: DeLateur, Korsakov, Torson 1NC – KThe 1AC perpetuates the exact abstraction that recreates anti-black violence by ignoring the underlying antagonism inherent to its structure – asking historically racist institutions to try and fix problems is blind optimism that dooms them to recreate anti-blackness. Curry 13Dr. Tommy J. Curry 13, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Texas AandM, "In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical", 2013. CC Their framework arguments are another link – their ethics are colorblind and abstract from reality in a way in a way that is inaccessible to oppressed bodies – they serve as another hoop to jump through before we can engage in racism and are exactly what keeps that oppression prevalent. Curry 13Dr. Tommy J. Curry 13, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Texas AandM, "In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical", 2013. CC The aff's attempt to whitewash history by ignoring the racist foundations that underlie their theory allows for racial domination to remain invisible – you as a judge must reject the aff's epistemology and acknowledge the reality of oppression. That's a voting issue. Leonardo 02Leonardo, Zeus. "The souls of white folk: Critical pedagogy, whiteness studies, and globalization discourse." Race, ethnicity and education 5.1 (2002): 29-50. CC The fragmenting effects of the global economy work in tandem with the fragmenting tendencies The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best challenges anti-blackness. Fiat is illusory so they don't get to weigh the case.Debate is a speech act – debaters should be held accountable for their discourse in round. Vincent 13Chris Vincent, Re-Conceptualizing our Performances: Accountability in Lincoln Douglas Debate, Vbriefly, 2013. NS | 2/18/17 |
JAN-FEB CRT KTournament: Golden Desert | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Nueva AK | Judge: DeLateur, Korsakov, Torson 1NC – KRhetoric propagating free speech as the answer to social ills directly trades off with our ability to fight injustice. Free speech is a tool that courts wield in colorblind ways against people. Delgado and Stefancic '92Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., U. California-Berkeley, 1974. and Jean Stefancic - Technical Services Librarian, University of San Francisco School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989. "IMAGES OF THE OUTSIDER IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE: CAN FREE EXPRESSION REMEDY SYSTEMIC SOCIAL ILLS?" Cornell Law Review. September 1992. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571andcontext=clr JJN And, more speech is not better – speech tends to reinscribe power relations rather than break them down. Delgado and Yun '94Richard Delgado - Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974, University of California, Berkeley. David H. Yun – Member of the Colorado Bar. J.D. 1993, University of Colorado. "Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation." California Law Review. 1994. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1712andcontext=californialawreview JJN Turns the case – hate speech does real violence to people of color and necessarily locks in relationships of domination. Delgado and Stefacic '09Richard Delgado - University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974, University of California, Berkeley. Jean Stefancic – Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989, University of San Francisco. "FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH." WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW. 2009. http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Delgado_LawReview_01.09.pdf Anti-Blackness is the root cause of white supremacy and social oppression. It outweighs the case. Heitzeg 15Heitzeg, Nancy A ~a Professor of Sociology and Director of the interdisciplinary Critical Studies of Race/Ethnicity Program at St. Catherine University, St. Paul, MN.~. "On The Occasion Of The 50th Anniversary Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: Persistent White Supremacy, Relentless Anti-Blackness, And The Limits Of The Law." Hamline J. Pub. L. and Pol'y 36 (2015): 54. The alternative is to embrace the demand of abolitionism – we must recognize that whiteness operates subtly through hands-off policies that preserve the status quo. We choose to challenge the university system at the grassroots intersection with other liberation movements. Oparah 14Oparah, Julia. ~Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice~ "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014). The role of the ballot is to interrogate the scholarship of the AFF. This makes the passage of the plan irrelevant since fiat is illusory, so they should not get to weigh the case.First, their refusal of minority voices is a conscious choice. Delgado 84Delgado, Richard. "The imperial scholar: Reflections on a review of civil rights literature." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132.3 (1984): 561-578. Second, a focus on political action assumes a kind of democratic liberalism that is inaccessible to marginalized voices. Refuse their demand for concrete state action. Lopez 03López, Gerardo R. ~University of Utah, Salt Lake City~ "The (racially neutral) politics of education: A critical race theory perspective." Educational Administration Quarterly 39.1 (2003): 68-94. | 2/18/17 |
JAN-FEB Cap KTournament: Golden Desert | Round: 1 | Opponent: Brentwood JD | Judge: Sean Fee 1NC – KReform within the corporatized university is impossible – the university is built to make speech seem effective, when in reality the university plays a central role in the knowledge is turned into a commodity. Only a direct and unflinching critique of class can solve. The critique turns the case - Monzó 14Monzó, Lilia D ~Chapman University, California, United States~. "A critical pedagogy for democracy: Confronting higher education's neoliberal agenda with a critical Latina feminist episteme." Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies (JCEPS) 12.1 (2014): 73-100. Protests are a reactive form of politics that cede political institutions – independently turns the case and takes out the 1AC Sanders ev. Srniceke 15Srnicek, PHD, and Williams, PhD Candidate , 15 Their activism is based on the idea that speaking loud enough will make our voices heard – this solidifies cap, also takes out 1AC Brown ev. Rickford 16Russel Rickford (an associate professor of history at Cornell University. He is the author of We Are an African People: Independent Education, Black Power, and the Radical Imagination. A specialist on the Black Radical Tradition, he teaches about social movements, black transnationalism, and African-American political culture after World War Two). "The Fallacies of Neoliberal Protest". Black Perspectives. September 24, 2016. http://www.aaihs.org/the-fallacies-of-neoliberal-protest/ AGM Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2) The alternative is a relentless class-based politics that works against the university's economic underpinnings – only engaging in a critique that focuses on the economic forces at play in public universities can we resolve capitalism. Oparah 14Oparah, Julia. ~Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College and a founding member of Black Women Birthing Justice~ "Challenging Complicity: The Neoliberal University and the Prison–Industrial Complex." The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (2014). And, reject the demand for a plan - neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan – takes out the 1AC Giroux ev. Blalock, JD, 2015(Corinne, "NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY", Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file | 2/4/17 |
JAN-FEB Cap K v2Tournament: USC | Round: 2 | Opponent: Loyola AO | Judge: Leo Kim 1NC – KThe problem of the neoliberal status quo is not a lack of communication, but rather the fetishization of speech. Our society has never been more democratic, which is precisely what allows capitalism to operate. Radical politics requires a rejection of democratic institutions readily available – anything short kills class focus. Dean 14Dean, Jodi. "13 After Post-Politics: Occupation and the Return of Communism." The post-political and its discontents: Spaces of depoliticization, spectres of radical politics (2014): 261. Protests are a ruse – they are a reactive form of politics that focuses purely on affect and cedes institutional politics. Srniceke 15Srnicek, PHD, and Williams, PhD Candidate , 15 Turn, protests perpetuate the idea that if you speak loud enough your voice will be heard, which perpetuates capitalism. Rickford 16.
This turns the case – the commodification of speech reflects the capitalist illusion of freedom. It makes speech meaningless and kills value to life. Smith '14R.C. Smith April 24, 2014 "POWER, CAPITAL and THE RISE OF THE MASS SURVEILLANCE STATE: ON THE ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY, ETHICS, DISENCHANTMENT and CRITICAL THEORY" Heathwood Institute and Press http://www.heathwoodpress.com/power-capital-the-rise-of-the-mass-surveillance-state-on-the-absence-of-democracy-ethics-disenchantment-critical-theory/ JJN from file Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2) The alternative is to abandon the affirmative's hope for more discourse in favor of militant class struggle – rather than looking for new ways to dissent, a radical leftist project must begin with reimagining political formations outside of capitalism. The real lesson of the 60's is that activism centered on rights is a failed project that the affirmative tries to reinvent, which will lead to the same result. Hickel 12 The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. | 3/4/17 |
JAN-FEB Cap K v3Tournament: TOC | Round: 2 | Opponent: Cedar Park MG | Judge: Preston Stolte Neoliberalism structures academic freedom in the status quo. It sets limits on what is acceptable behavior to quell dissent and any faculty truly radical enough to challenge corporate hegemony are tossed out before they can pose a real threat. Chatterjee and Maira 14Chatterjee, Piya, and Sunaina Maira. "The Imperial University: race, war, and the nation-state." The imperial university: Academic repression and scholarly dissent (2014): 1-50. The problem of the neoliberal status quo is not a lack of communication, but rather the fetishization of speech. Our society has never been more democratic, which is precisely what allows capitalism to operate. Radical politics requires a rejection of democratic institutions readily available – anything short kills class focus. Dean 14Dean, Jodi. "13 After Post-Politics: Occupation and the Return of Communism." The post-political and its discontents: Spaces of depoliticization, spectres of radical politics (2014): 261. Focus on speech abstracts from material violence and class - the aff fails to correctly situate speech within the correct economic context. Nair 11Nair, Yasmin. "WHO LOVES TEACHING? FREE SPEECH AND THE MYTH OF THE ACADEMY AS A PLACE TO LOVE AND BE THE LEFT." Arab Studies Quarterly 33.3/4 (2011): 204-216. This turns the case – the commodification of speech reflects the capitalist illusion of freedom. It makes speech meaningless and kills value to life.R.C. Smith April 24, 2014 "POWER, CAPITAL and THE RISE OF THE MASS SURVEILLANCE STATE: ON THE ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY, ETHICS, DISENCHANTMENT and CRITICAL THEORY" Heathwood Institute and Press http://www.heathwoodpress.com/power-capital-the-rise-of-the-mass-surveillance-state-on-the-absence-of-democracy-ethics-disenchantment-critical-theory/ JJN from file Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2) The alternative is to abandon the affirmative's hope for more discourse in favor of militant class struggle – rather than looking for new ways to dissent, a radical leftist project must begin with reimagining political formations outside of capitalism. The real lesson of the 60's is that activism centered on rights is a failed project that the affirmative tries to reinvent, which will lead to the same result. Hickel 12 The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan.Neoliberalism operates through a narrow vision of politics that sustains itself through the illusion of pragmatism. We should refuse their demand for a plan. Blalock, JD, 2015(Corinne, "NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF LEGAL THEORY", Duke University, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS Vol. 77:71) MG from file | 4/29/17 |
JAN-FEB Funding DATournament: Golden Desert | Round: 3 | Opponent: Isidore Newman EP | Judge: Scott Nielson 1NC – DAFederal government funding is continuing to grow – there has been a steady increase over 15 years Camera, MA, 16Lauren Camera, Education Reporter, 1-14-2016, "Federal Education Funding: Where Does the Money Go?," US News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2016/01/14/federal-education-funding-where-does-the-money-go VC Previous rulings prove that speech codes are key to federal funding. Bernstein, MA, 03David E. Bernstein, 8-27-2003, "Federal Ruling May Mark End of Speech Codes at Public Universities," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/federal-ruling-may-mark-end-speech-codes-public-universities VC Federal funding is necessary for the success of universities and for future initiatives. Yudof 10Yudof, Mark G. ~Former pres of UC~ Exploring a new role for federal government in higher education. University of California, Office of the President, 2010. Turns case – losses in funding results in increased tuition which directly harms minority and low-income students. Mitchell et al '16Michael Mitchell - Senior Policy Analyst. Michael Leachman - Director of State Fiscal Research. Kathleen Masterson - Research Assistant. "Funding Down, Tuition Up." Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. August 15, 2016. http://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/funding-down-tuition-up JJN Education is key to US Soft power. Nye 05Joseph Nye, Joseph Nye is University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and served as dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government there from 1995 to 2004. Nye also has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and chair of the National Intel- ligence Council. His most recent books include Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), an antholo- gy, Power in the Global Information Age (2004), and a novel, The Power Game: A Washington Novel (2004). 2005, "Soft Power and Higher Education" https://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ffp0502s.pdf MG Soft Power solves multiple extinction scenarios. Nye 07Nye and Armitage, 2007 − Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and President of Armitage International | 2/4/17 |
JAN-FEB Heg DATournament: Cal | Round: 6 | Opponent: Lynbrook AP | Judge: Ashan Peris 1NC – DADespite budget cuts, our military is a beast right now. Patraues and O'Hanlon 16Petraeus, David and Michael O'Hanlon. "The Myth of a U.S. Military 'Readiness' Crisis." Wall Street Journal, Aug 10, 2016, Eastern edition. EE The pursuit of heg is inevitable – it's just a question of effectiveness. Tellis '09,Tellis, senior associate at Carnegie, 9 — Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense and Asian strategic issues, Research Director of the Strategic Asia program at NBR—the National Bureau of Asian Research, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, 2009 ("Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States," Global Asia, Volume 4, Number 1, Available Online at http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue9/Ashley_J._Tellis.pdf, Accessed 09-13-2011, p. 54-55) recut from Woodward Ineffective crisis response guarantees extinction —- a laundry list of threats are on the brinkPaul Miller 11, Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at the National Defense University, former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council, October 17, 2011, "This is no time to cut defense," online: http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/17/this_is_no_time_to_cut_defense** | 2/20/17 |
JAN-FEB Mexican Terror DATournament: Cal | Round: 6 | Opponent: Lynbrook AP | Judge: Ashan Peris 1NC – DASurveillance operations by Predator drones key to Mexico border security-RT '14 (RT, "Drone surge: Predators patrol nearly half of US-Mexico border", http://rt.com/usa/205343-cpb-mexico-border-drone-patrols/, November 13, 2014) Mexican border instability hamstrings US hegemony- destroys military effectivenessKaplan '12 – chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor (Robert D., With the Focus on Syria, Mexico Burns, Stratfor, 3-28-2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/focus-syria-mexico-burns) ISIS threat through Mexico highest ever- qualified experts agree- will shut down the grid - extinctionWND 9/4 (WND, WorldNetDaily News Company, "ISIS THREAT LOOMS OVER U.S. HOMELAND", http://mobile.wnd.com/2014/09/isis-threat-looms-over-u-s-homeland/, September 9, 2014) | 2/20/17 |
JAN-FEB States CPTournament: Golden Desert | Round: Octas | Opponent: Servite PA | Judge: Overing, Kaya, Bond 1NC – CPCP Text: The 50 State Legislatures should pass legislation to prohibit restrictions on constitutionally protected speech that criticizes the military's policies in public universities and colleges. Kurtz et al 1-30STANLEY KURTZ, JAMES MANLEY, AND JONATHAN BUTCHER, CAMPUS FREE SPEECH: A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL, 1-30-17, Goldwater Institute, https://goldwater-media.s3.amazonaws.com/cms_page_media/2017/1/30/_Campus20Free20Speech20Paper.pdf VC Free speech has reached a crisis point – legislation trickles down and affects colleges – means we solve the case. Kurtz 1/24Stanley Kurtz, 1-24-17, "Restoring Campus Free Speech", National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/444167/restoring-campus-free-speech VC A concrete plan is key – administration and faculty have forsaken ideals of free speech which means only the counterplan solves. Kurtz 15Stanley Kurtz, 12-7-15, "A Plan to Restore Free Speech on Campus", National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/444167/restoring-campus-free-speech VC The ball's already started rolling – some states have already jumped on, means empirical solvency for the CP. Turner 16Daniel Turner, 1-11-2016, "What State Legislatures are Doing to Protect Academic Freedom," No Publication, https://www.alec.org/article/what-state-legislatures-are-doing-to-protect-academic-freedom/ VC | 2/18/17 |
JAN-FEB T-Public CollegesTournament: Cal | Round: 6 | Opponent: Lynbrook AP | Judge: Ashan Peris 1NC – TA. Interp: The aff must defend that no public colleges or universities in the United States restrict any constitutionally protected speech. To clarify, they can't specify a school or certain kind of school.Counterplans that say all public colleges or universities except for one restrict any constitutionally protected speech are theoretically illegitimate.Generic nouns such as "colleges" without an article are the most common type of generalization, used in all contexts of writing and speech. Byrd"Generic Meaning," Georgia State University, Transcript of lecture given by Pat Byrd (Department of Applied Linguistics and ESL). Determining semantics comes before other standards:A. It's the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there's no way to use ground if debaters aren't prepared to defend it. B. Grammar is the most objective since it doesn't rely on arbitrary determinants of what constitutes the best type of debate – it's the only impact you can evaluate. C. The AFF isn't topical regardless of fairness or education since it doesn't affirm the text - we wouldn't debate rehab again just because it was a good topic.B. Violation: They specify military academies 1. Limits: They allow way too many affs. Trade schools, Culinary schools, military academies, law schools and literally thousands more. Selingo 15Jeffrey J. Sellingo, How many colleges and universities do we really need?, The Washington Post, July 20 2015 EE That explodes neg prep burden and predictability which kills fairness and engagement. Procedurally, if I can't access their education it doesn't matter. T version of the AFF solves their offense – they can read advantages in any topic area which ensures NEG responses.2. Core Controversy: They shift the topic from core issues like hate speech and coddling to militarism good/bad which kills access to generics and gives them an arbitrary prep advantage. We're better off having nuanced discussion about the topic then shallow ones about _ in their aff.D. Vote on substantive engagement: otherwise we're speaking without debating and there's nothing to separate us from dueling oratory. It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics.Drop the debater on T: | 2/20/17 |
JAN-FEB Tax Cuts Politics DATournament: Golden Desert | Round: Octas | Opponent: Servite PA | Judge: Overing, Kaya, Bond 1NC – DATax cuts don't pass now – Trump needs more to get Brady on his side. Blade 1-25Rachael Bade, 1-25-2017, "Trump's team floats tax cuts that aren't paid for," POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-tax-cuts-deficits-234143 VC The plan is controlled by the federal government – even if universities are the actor, they do the aff because Trump told them to. Kolowich 16Steve Kolowich, 10-20-2016, "Trump Said He Would 'End' Political Correctness on Campuses. Could a President Do That?," Chronicle of Higher Education, http://www.chronicle.com/article/Trump-Said-He-Would-End-/238124 VC The CP avoids the link – Trump is sending messages to campus administrators, not state legislatures. Brown 2-3Sarah Brown, 2-3-17, "Trump Can't Cut Off Berkeley's Funds by Himself. His Threat Still Raised Alarm.," Chronicle of Higher Education, http://www.chronicle.com/article/Trump-Can-t-Cut-Off/239100 VC The plan is super popular with the House Ways and Means committee – they view it as bipartisan and consider it important. Jagoda 16NAOMI JAGODA , 3-2-2016, "House Republican concerned about colleges stifling students' speech," http://thehill.com/policy/finance/271499-house-republican-concerned-about-colleges-stifling-students-speech VC The bill literally adds trillions of dollars to the deficit – prefer our estimates since they include the tax cuts effect on the economy. Gleckman 1-19Howard Gleckman, 1-19-2017, "Memo To Steven Mnuchin: Trump's Tax Plan Would Add $7 Trillion To The Debt Over 10 Years," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2017/01/19/memo-to-steven-mnuchin-trumps-tax-plan-would-add-7-trillion-to-the-debt-over-10-years/~~#389a686d623b VC Public debt tanks the economy and causes slow growth for decades. Swedroe 12Larry Swedroe, 11-12-2012, "How our national debt hurts our economy," No Publication, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-our-national-debt-hurts-our-economy/ VC Econ collapse leads to escalating instability and nuke war. Harris and Burrows 09Harris and Burrows, 9 – *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, member of the NIC's Long Range Analysis Unit "Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis", Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf) | 2/18/17 |
JAN-FEB Terror DATournament: Golden Desert | Round: 1 | Opponent: Brentwood JD | Judge: Sean Fee 1NC – DANew terror regulations stop campus attacks but OSU attack prove rising risk of campus terror. Bernstein 11/29"Terror attack at Ohio State University prompts Senators to rethink 'extreme vetting,'" Leandra Bernstein, 11/29/16, KBOI2 (Associated Press). FS zones k2 prevent campus terrorist attacks – it allows law enforcement to defend and prevent better – the specific link is the 1AC Herold ev. Zeiner 05Zoned Out! Examining Campus Speech Zones, Carol L. Zeiner (Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami Gardens, Florida; former College Attorney for Miami-Dade Community College (now Miami-Dade College)), Louisiana Law Review (Volume 66, No. 1), Fall 2005. Campus terror sends an ideological message globally – it encourages more terror and threatens education. Flanagin 15"Why terrorists target schools and universities," Jake Flanagin, 04/02/2015, The Quartz. Turns and outweighs case: terrorism reinscribes neoliberalism and militarism into education due to fear and backlash. Di Leo et al 14This excerpt from the chapter titled, "Twelve Theses on Education's Future in the Age of Neoliberalism and Terrorism," is taken from the book, Neoliberalism, Education, Terrorism: Contemporary Dialogues, by Jeffrey R. Di Leo, Henry A. Giroux, Kenneth J. Saltman and Sophia A. McClennen
False claims of responsibility cause cyber terrorism to escalate into nuclear war. Fritz 09.Jason Fritz, (Bond University IR Masters) , "Hacking Nuclear Command and Control", July 2009http:www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf | 2/4/17 |
JAN-FEB Util NCTournament: Golden Desert | Round: 3 | Opponent: Isidore Newman EP | Judge: Scott Nielson The standard is minimizing existential RiskEpistemic modesty breaks any tie and answers all AC pre-emptsNick Bostrom, Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority, 2012. NS Extinction justifies moral loopholesBok, 1988 (Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy, Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, 1988) Disregarding foreseeable harm reifies structures of dominationMcCluskey 12 – JSD @ Columbia, Professor of Law @ SUNY-Buffalo | 2/4/17 |
NOV-DEC Cap KTournament: Alta | Round: 1 | Opponent: Loyola HF | Judge: Tim Alderete Blanket rejection of sovereignty is a neoliberal fantasy- only state borders restrict the flow of capital. The aff cedes sovereignty to the right, our critique advances a mode of progressive, non-national sovereigntyGerbaudo, Sociology @King's College, 11-4-16 All politics is class politics. The AC framing of police violence as "racialized" is a professional managerial class (PMC) politics that emphasizes diversity over effectiveness and sanitizes neoliberalismReed, PhD, 9-16-16 Attempting to save the economy from disaster is a neoliberal excuse for intervention, reshaping the world for capitalist production. Neocleous 08Neocleous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 Critique of Security, p.101-105 This turns the aff – police violence is a direct result of neoliberalism. A failure to recognize that makes violence inevitable. Lane 7/21
Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2) Capitalism is the root cause of oppression, especially contemporary racism – our kritik is a prerequisite to the affMcLaren et al., 4 – Distinguished Professor, Critical Studies, Chapman University (Peter and Valerie Scatamburlo-D'Annibale, "Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of 'difference'," Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, April, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2004.00060.x/full)// JJN from file The alternative is an embrace of class-consciousness as a method of critiquing neoliberalism's grip on policing. LaVenia 15Peter A. LaVenia ~PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, SUNY. He is the Secretary of the NY State Green Party and manages Matt Funiciello's campaign for Congress.~ JANUARY 16, 2015 "Police Behavior and Neoliberalism" http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/01/16/police-behavior-and-neoliberalism/** The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan. Fiat is illusory so they do not get to weigh the case. | 12/2/16 |
NOV-DEC Cap K v2Tournament: Alta | Round: 3 | Opponent: Karl G Maeser JH | Judge: Liz Letak 1NC – KOur system of policing is no accident – it is a direct result of economic policies keep to put poor and disenfranchised people on the margins with no political power. . Potter 15
The affirmative's legalistic approach to police violence brings us further away from recognizing the economic forces at work that makes police violence inevitable. Lane 7/21.ALYCEE LANE JULY 21, 2016 "Violence, Death and Our Neoliberal Police" http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/07/21/violence-death-and-our-neoliberal-police/** Blaming violence on 'bad individual's through civil suits replicates neoliberalism – it deflects blame on to individuals whose actions are predetermined by neoliberalism. Smith 15Robert C. Smith ~The author of several books and over 100 academic articles, Robert is a Teaching-Scholar at the Cooperative Institute of Transnational Studies. He is also the founder of Heathwood Institute and Press~Heathwood Institute and Press AN INSTITUTION OF OPPRESSION OR FOR PUBLIC WELL-BEING AND CIVIL RIGHTS? REFLECTIONS ON THE INSTITUTION OF POLICE AND A RADICAL ALTERNATIVE May 4, 2015 http://www.heathwoodpress.com/an-institution-of-oppression-or-for-public-well-being-and-civil-rights-reflections-on-the-institution-of-police-and-a-radical-alternative-r-c-smith/** This turns the aff – police violence is a direct result of neoliberalism. A failure to recognize that makes violence inevitable. Lane 7/21
Our critique independently outweighs the case - neoliberalism causes extinction and massive social inequalities – the affs single issue legalistic solution is the exact kind of politics neolib wants us to engage in so the root cause to go unquestioned. Farbod 15 ( Faramarz Farbod , PhD Candidate @ Rutgers, Prof @ Moravian College, Monthly Review, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/farbod020615.html, 6-2) The alternative is an embrace of class-consciousness as a method of critiquing neoliberalism's grip on policing. LaVenia 15Peter A. LaVenia ~PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, SUNY. He is the Secretary of the NY State Green Party and manages Matt Funiciello's campaign for Congress.~ JANUARY 16, 2015 "Police Behavior and Neoliberalism" http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/01/16/police-behavior-and-neoliberalism/** The role of the judge is to be a critical analyst testing whether the underlying assumptions of the AFF are valid. This is a question of the whether the AFF scholarship is good – not the passage of the plan.First, neoliberalism sustains itself by operating by propagating a narrow lens of what it means to be 'political.' We situate the judge as a critical educator who steps back to evaluate the frames through which we view policy first. Blalock, JD, 2015 | 12/3/16 |
NOV-DEC SCOTUS CPTournament: Alta | Round: 5 | Opponent: Marlborough GK | Judge: Seth Wetsel 1NC1NCCP Text: The Supreme Court of the United States ought to limit qualified immunity by removing the "clearly established" standard.SCOTUS is the only possible topic actorStokes, PhD Candidate, 15 Only the court can create clearly established immunity law- vote neg on presumption because congressional action is ignoredKinports, Law @Penn, Winter 16 No override – interest groups ensure that Congress doesn't override Supreme Court decisionsEskridge, 91 – Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School (William N., "Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions", 101 Yale L.J. 331 1991-1992, 19991, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4816andcontext=fss_papers)//TT The net benefit is Judicial IndependenceTrump is challenging the Court's legitimacy – threatens judicial independence and checks on power. Beinart 16Peter Beinart, 6-1-2016, "The Problem With a Presidential Candidate Who Goes After Judges," Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/the-gop-front-runner-takes-aim-at-the-independent-judiciary/485087/ QI is SCOTUS jurisdiction – that's the Stokes and Kinsport ev on the CPLack of independent judiciary lets Trump do whatever he wants. Liptak 16Adam Liptak, 6-3-2016, "Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, Scholars Say," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-trump-constitution-power.html?_r=0 VC Even a fraction of Trump's agenda triggers global war. Bell 15Matthew Bell, 9-7-2015, "'If he did 1/10th of what he's planning, he would trigger a global trade war'," Public Radio International, http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-09-07/if-he-were-president-donald-trump-says-world-would-respect-america-and-fear-it VC Trump nukes ISIS – results in massive civilian casualties and Middle East destabilization. Hobbus 15R. Hobbus 15, J.D., investigative journalist specializing in international politics, "Trump: I Will Absolutely Use A Nuclear Weapon Against ISIS," 8/10, Real News Right Now, http://realnewsrightnow.com/2015/08/trump-i-will-absolutely-use-a-nuclear-weapon-against-isis/** ME war goes nuclear – causes extinction. Russel 9Russell 9 – Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs @ Naval Postgraduate School Democratic transitions are coming now but will fail absent Supreme Court leadership – each decision is keySuto 11, Research Associate at Tahrir Institute and J.D. Democracy prevents global warsKagan '15 | 12/3/16 |
NOV-DEC T-Police Officers Border PatrolTournament: Alta | Round: 1 | Opponent: Loyola HF | Judge: Tim Alderete 1NCInterpretation: The aff may only defend the limiting of qualified immunity for police officers.A police officer is a sworn member of a local police department who performs police duties. SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT 05(EDWARD GENESKY v. TOWN OF EAST LYME (SC 17152) SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT 275 Conn. 246; 881 A.2d 114; 2005 Conn. LEXIS 331 October 18, 2004, Argued August 30, 2005, Officially Released) Violation:A) They enforce different laws and have different responsibilities. My Pursuithttp://www.mypursuit.com/article-250/The_Differences_Between_a_Border_Patrol_and_a_Police_Officer_Career.html** B) Extra T - The Hernandez v Mesa decision they overturn is more than just qualified immunity. We will isolate 2 extra topical planks of the plan. Scotusbloghttp://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/hernandez-v-mesa/** Extra T is a voting issue – they get to pick a plank that coopts the best neg offense. That kills engagement because the best neg arguments get fiated away by the extra plank. Also makes it impossible to negate because they pigeon hole us into the worst args against their aff.Standards1. Limits: Their interp allows any governmental body which justifies firefighters or the secret service aff. That explodes neg prep burden and kills predictability, which controls the internal link to advocacy skills because they never have to defend their aff against well researched objections. Your education isn't valuable if it isn't accessible which means T outweighs K offense. Generics don't solve because you're functionally debating a different topic, and even if there is ground against your specific aff, your interp justifies unanswerable affs so it's still net worse.And, under our itnerp the neg can't read PICS of border control because those aren't competitive under our interp. 2. Precision – our interp isolates crucial distinctions between different types of enforcement agencies with different responsibilities. The attorney general is different from local police, border patrol is different from Sandy Utah City Police, and prison guards aren't the same as FBI agents. They all have different responsibilities, which means their interp is lazy and can't account for crucial differences within the topic lit. Kills engagement because they divorce the topic from the precise definition within topic literature. Our definition comes from a court case, which frames what ground the aff is entitled to. So our interp is key to a clear and predictable stasis point to clash on.D. Vote on substantive engagement: otherwise we're speaking without debating and there's nothing to separate us from dueling oratory. It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics.Drop the debater on T:A. Hold them accountable for their interp – a topical advocacy frames the debate - drop the arg lets them jump ship to a new layer killing NEG ground. No RVIsA. Topicality is a prima facie burden for the AFF. You wouldn't vote for them just because they didn't speak over their time limits and you shouldn't vote for them for following the most basic rule of debate. | 12/2/16 |
SEPT-OCT Africa PICTournament: Voices | Round: 5 | Opponent: Loyola NT | Judge: Karen Qi Plan text: All countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear excluding countries across the continent of Africa. These countries will retain a choice over whether to prohibit, expand, or maintain nuclear power. Net benefits: Nuclear power is key to expand electricity in Africa and spur economic growth. Luke 15 South African nuclear energy policy gets modeled – sub-Saharan countries follow their example. Barber 14. Poverty is a conflict multiplier and causes massive structural violence and unrest across the continent. Aigbe 14 South African nuclear power is key to desalination and solving water shortages. Theletsane 16. South African water shortages cause failed harvests and jeopardize food security. VOA 16 Food insecurity causes failed states and causes extinction. Brown 09 The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis. For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization. I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever. As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding see sidebar at left. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk. States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy. Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six). Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself. Turns the case – food shortages create massive structural violence and a non-human environment. Cribb 10 Some observers also claim a link between food insecurity and terrorism, pointing out that hungry countries are among those most likely to furnish terrorism recruits. In 2002, heads of state from fifty countries met at a development summit in Mexico where they discussed the role of poverty and hunger as a breeding ground for terrorism. “No-one in this world can feel comfortable or safe while so many are suffering and deprived,” UN secretary general Kofi Annan told them. The president of the UN General Assembly, Han Seung-Soo, added that the world’s poorest countries were a breeding ground for violence and despair. The Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo added, “To speak of development is to speak also of a strong and determined fight against terrorism.” 10 Around the world many guerrilla and insurgent causes—such as Shining Path, the Tamil Tigers, and Abu Sayyaf—have claimed injustice in land ownership and use as one of their motivating causes. A lack of water is a key factor in encouraging terrorism. Mona El Kody, the chair of the National Water Research Unit in Egypt told the Third World Water Forum that living without an adequate level of access to water created a “non-human environment” that led to frustration, and from there to terrorism. “A non-human environment is the worst experience people can live with, with no clean water, no sanitation,” she said, adding that this problem was at its most acute in the Middle East, where 1 percent of the world’s freshwater is shared by 5 percent of the world’s population. Ms. El Kody added that inadequate water resources had the additive effect of reducing farming and food production, thereby increasing poverty—another factor that can lead to terrorism. 11 Most of the “new” conflicts are to be found in Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia—the result of a cycle of constant famine, deprivation, and periodic violence, leading in inevitable sequence to worse hunger, greater deprivation, and more vicious fighting. Food and economic insecurity and natural resource scarcities . . . can be major sources of conflict. When politically dominant groups seize land and food resources, deny access to other culturally or economically marginalized groups, and cause hunger and scarcities, violence often flares. In Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Sudan, food crises resulting from drought and mismanagement of agriculture and relief and development aid led to rebellion and government collapse, followed by even greater food shortfalls in ensuing years of conflict. Denial of the right to food has been linked to uprisings and civil war in Central America and Mexico. Food insecurity is also integral to civil conflicts in Asia. Competition for resources has generated cycles of hunger and hopelessness that have bred violence in Sri Lanka as well as Rwanda. 12 These afflicted regions are generally places disconnected from the global economic mainstream, where strong-man governments arise and just as quickly crumble, having only political quicksand on which to build a foundation for stability and progress. This is vital to an understanding of what is going wrong with global food production: in nearly all these countries, food is of the first importance, and only after you have enough food can you form a government stable enough to deliver water, health care, education, opportunity for women, justice, and economic development. By neglecting or reducing support for basic food production— as many have during the past twenty-five years—in order to spread aid across these equally deserving causes, the world’s aid donors may unintentionally have laid the foundation for future government failure and conflict. CHUNG, ALEX H. "Postcolonial Perspectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation." (2014).TF Nuclear weapons were introduced to the world over 65 years ago by the United States with¶ the purpose of winning a war against the Axis powers of Japan and Germany (Daadler and¶ Lodal 2008, p. 80). The destructive nature of nuclear weapons presents a tremendous¶ existential threat to the safety and security of the world. In the words of Rajiv Gandhi,¶ addressing the UN General Assembly on 9 June 1988, “Nuclear war will not mean the death¶ of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four¶ thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth,” (Shultz et al. 2007, p. 2).¶ Accordingly, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of nuclear¶ weapons, as the most universally accepted arms control agreement with 189 state members,¶ by recognising five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) – the US, Russia, China, France, and¶ Britain (Peterson 2010). In return for the promise by all NWS states to completely disarm,¶ and assistance in the acquisition of civilian nuclear energy technology, all Non-Nuclear¶ Weapon States (NNWS) forever forego obtaining nuclear weapons, thereby preventing¶ horizontal proliferation with the stated goal of complete global nuclear disarmament¶ (Gusterson 1999, p. 113). It is significant to note that international institutions such as the¶ UN and the nuclear non-proliferation regime “are largely the product of interstate diplomacy¶ dominated by Western great powers,” (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, p. 331). The five NWS states¶ also hold the five permanent member seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),¶ leading some to criticise the NPT for legitimising and institutionalising nuclear power at the¶ hands of the very few, and at the same time prohibiting the pursuit of nuclear security by the¶ rest of the world (Biswas 2001, p. 486; Biswas, forthcoming 2012). While there have been symbolic reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of the NWS states via bilateral and multilateral¶ treaties, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995 continues to legitimise¶ the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the NWS/P-5, allowing them to modernise¶ their nuclear arsenals, and engage in vertical nuclear proliferation without interference from¶ the international community (Singh 1998, p. 41).¶ The exclusive nature of the NPT and the alignment of NWS status with the UNSC P-5 is¶ indicative of an international regime that perpetuates logics of colonial violence, oppression,¶ and inequity as represented by the emblematic clash between nuclear “haves” and nuclear¶ “have-nots” (Biswas 2001, p. 486; Peterson 2010). As such, the institutionalised demarcation¶ of NWS and NNWS states has led to accusations of “nuclear apartheid” (Biswas 2001, p.¶ 486; Singh 1998, p. 48). Put simply, “nuclear apartheid” highlights the material inequalities¶ in the distribution of global nuclear resources – “inequities that are written into,¶ institutionalised, and legitimised through some of the major arms-control treaties, creating an¶ elite club of nuclear ‘haves’ with exclusive rights to maintain nuclear arsenals that are to be¶ denied to the vast majority of nuclear ‘have nots’,” (Biswas 2001, p. 486). This is evidenced¶ by the United States having “worked diligently to preserve its nuclear supremacy” since¶ 1945; by attempting to keep the nuclear “secret” in perpetuity, by limiting America’s¶ European allies’ ability to command atomic weapons independently, and endeavouring,¶ unsuccessfully, to keep the Middle East and South Asia free of nuclear weapons (Maddock¶ cited in Rotter 2011, p. 1175). The 1AC’s prohibition on African nuclear power is a representation of fear of lack of Western control and is an act of colonial violence. Hecht 10 Gabrielle Hecht, The Power of Nuclear Things, January 2010, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40646990.pdf VC The salience of "uranium from Africa" - both in the lead-up to the war and in subsequent opposition to it - traded on three sets of fears and assumptions widespread in the American public sphere: • the fear of nuclear weapons, and the assumption that acquiring "uranium" is tantamount to building an atomic bomb; • the fear of "Africa" as a dark, corrupt continent, and the assumption that actions there are ultimately unknowable or incomprehensible; • the fear of any nuclear materials not within direct Western control, and the assumption that the difference between licit and illicit nuclear trade is clear-cut. Commentators on the Iraq war spilled a lot of ink on the first of these, very little on the second, and only a bit more on the third. But they largely missed the complex technological and political threads that bind these three outlooks together. In this essay I attempt to break these restraints by offering three genealogies for "uranium from Africa." First, I consider the problem of when uranium counts as a "nuclear" thing, when it doesn't, and what Africa has to do with it. Before "uranium" becomes weapons-usable, it must be mined as ore, processed into yellowcake, converted into uranium hexafluoride, enriched, and pressed into bomb fuel. At what stage in this process does it come to count as a "nuclear material"? The answer, I argue, has depended on time, place, purpose, and markets. Second, I excavate the phrase's more specific rendition, displaying fragments of a history of "yellowcake from Niger." Places matter. Niger is not merely an avatar for global threats, but a nation with its own politics, priorities, and conflicts, all of which have significant bearing on the production and distribution of its uranium. Third, I examine another moment when African provenance of uranium was geopolitically contested: the flow of Namibian uranium to the U.S., Japan, and Europe during the height of international sanctions against apartheid. In this instance, licit trade and black markets were materially entwined in ways that made African things invisible The symbolism of nuclear power is uniquely key – it’s the only path towards respect for black nations. Johnston 15 Franklin JOHNSTON strategist, project manager and advises the minister of education Friday, July 10, 2015 “Racism thrives because black nations fail” Jamaica Observer Racism exists wherever there are black people. Why? In Jos, Nigeria, blacks just killed 42 blacks and we do not blink, yet we're rabid when police kill one black youth in the USA. Recall 300 virgins taken a year ago? Silence! Is it that we expect savagery of blacks but not whites? You racist!¶ It was a liberal dream that, with education, laws, and cultural exchange racism would die. But it did not. They love our jazz, ladies, entertainers, athletes, tennis aces, yet racism is as in days of Jim Crow or Enoch Powell's "river of blood" speech. Mixed marriages, integrated schools, black MPs, black president, did racism die? No way!¶ So, let's go back to first principles. Is racism normal? Are species wired to prefer their own? Are blacks fighting a losing battle? So let's deconstruct racism.¶ Old theories of racism and solutions don't work, nor do set asides and quotas; what next? What fuels racism? Some say slavery caused racism. But it is dead, and despite multi-hued slaves only black racism grows. Most ethnic groups are racist to blacks, and we equally so! Racist Africa expelled Asians (UK took them) as Dom Rep does Haitians today. Our racists target Indian, Chinese using derogatory names and belittle their success as "yuh see 'ow all a dem pack up inna on 'ouse, an a calaloo and rice dem eat an dem av money; mi haffi eat meat!" Many envy success, live a hedonist party life, and avoid hard graft. Blacks love talk of descending from African kings and love titles, but how does living in the past help today? Quite a racist conundrum. So, what really is racism?¶ Racism is about power not race. Black power was good, but misguided. One black man's success is no use as racism is not about personal power. Racism is about nation power. The day one black nation has top military, space and nuclear capability, racism goes into immediate remission. We can then dump goody-goody projects, empowerment seminars and basket weaving. Blacks will have power and get respect!¶ No black nation colonised a white one or other -- not ever! They had no power. Many black nations exist, but none prospers. That slavery is the root of racism or the cause of black poverty is a cleverly crafted subterfuge by lazy-brained blacks; rip-off reparations and back-to-Africa scams. Racism against "Gooks" died with Japan's prosperity; the Chinese blew it away with cash and WMDs. India (remember we dissed Coolie man?) is gone clear with technology, space and nuclear arms. African is the only major population to be universally disrespected, even here; why? They have no prosperous, potential menacing nation. Others ask: Can they make the grade? Maybe, but with no proof of concept, let's stick it to blacks!¶ Racism is rife in black nations. Small Jamaica is up front with big Nigeria as having great potential but mired in ennui, corruption and racism. China, USA, Russia, Europe call the shots and back it with cash or nukes! Racism in America will wane when we stop our minstrel show and build Jamaica. Global racism will fade when rich Nigeria goes nuclear and is seated at the top table. We may change hearts, but the ability to say "or else" is the power the world respects. Black nations fail and this feeds global racism. We are our worst enemies.¶ Did capitalism cause racism? Marcus Garvey was on track with economic and military plans. The best capitalists were colour blind African, Arab and later European men who founded offshore slavery; and I am open to reparations from all of them. But I would like to put a lick on 'Cudjoe' in West Africa for selling my grandfather of the fifth power to white people. I do not forgive Africa.¶ Racism is not of slavery and rich blacks can't stanch racism as it's not personal it's national. Whites are powerful for eons; other races got there later. Blacks are powerless victims and purveyors of racism. Black power was good but misguided. To riot in white man's country can't help us as it is still his land; riot in your own and build it fool! Only a prosperous black country with the fearsome trappings of WMDs can halt racism. When China was communist -- known for laundries and food; and it was dissed -- it built economic success, WMDs and got respect. Other races ordered their folks, scientists invented, stole or borrowed technology and got to a point where they could destroy the world -- welcome to the head table! Every black nation is a satrapy. Ours, with the best brand, shames the new world negro; rich, big Nigeria shames itself and black people everywhere! Blacks can end racism but we will not apply ourselves! Taking nuclear technology away from South Africa is founded upon the racist legacy of apartheid. TNO 13. | 10/29/16 |
SEPT-OCT Bioweapons DATournament: St Marks | Round: 6 | Opponent: Evanston HS | Judge: Rebecca Kuang A single illustration of the lethality of biological weapons will clarify why the U.S. capability to deter regional challengers is of paramount importance: a single undeterred attacker employing as little as 20 kilograms of dispersed anthrax drifting downwind could, under the proper conditions, cause the deaths of 50 percent of the unprotected population in an area of more than 150 square miles. Such a biological attack against the unprotected populations of ten large U.S. urban areas could kill on the order of 20 million Americans. To risk understatement, deterrence is not less important in this post-Cold War period. In the absence of a revived great power competition, the most taxing likely role for U.S. deterrence policy will be deterring the use of WMD by hostile regional powers. What is the future role for nuclear weapons in regional deterrence? There are numerous recent confident assertions by prominent persons that U.S. conventional forces can reliably replace nuclear forces for deterrence of all but nuclear threats. Consequently, they conclude that nuclear weapons are largely unnecessary for regional deterrence. Such assertions ring hollow; they are speculative and unsupported by actual evidence. The evidence that does exist, including recent history, suggests strongly that when a challenger is highly motivated, and cost- and risk- tolerant, nuclear weapons can be essential to deterring WMD attacks. What, for example, was the value of nuclear weapons for deterrence in the Gulf War? By Iraqi accounts, nuclear deterrence prevented Iraq's use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) that could have inflicted horrendous civilian and military casualties on us and our allies. Senior Iraqi wartime leaders have explained that while U.S. conventional threats were insufficient to deter, implicit U.S. nuclear threats did deter Saddam Hussein's use of chemical and biological weapons. As the then-head of Iraqi military intelligence, Gen. Waffic al Sammarai, has stated, Saddam Hussein did not use chemical or biological weapons during the war, "because the warning was quite severe, and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be too dear and too high." Immediately following the Gulf War many prominent U.S. military commentators, such as former Secretary of Defense McNamara, claimed that nuclear weapons were "incredible" and therefore "irrelevant" to the war.1 This assessment-that U.S. nuclear weapons are irrelevant to regional challengers-is at the heart of the various nuclear disarmament proposals; it also is gravely mistaken. The continuing proliferation of CBW can only increase our need for nuclear deterrence. The United States has given up chemical and biological weapons, and has thus given up the option of deterring chemical and biological threats with like capabilities. In some tough cases conventional forces alone are likely to be inadequate to deter CBW threats. Consequently, as CBW proliferates our nuclear capabilities become more, not less important for regional deterrence. Biowar comparatively outweighs– It’s cheaper, kills more people, undetectable, and we have no defense. Stirling 07 We have been conditioned, by seeing films of mushroom clouds and images of nuclear destruction in Japan at the end of WWII, to have some understanding of the horrific effects of a nuclear war. We have NOT been conditioned to understand the effects of Twenty-first Century advanced biological war. The kill numbers are very similar, just with biowar you don't get the "big bangs", the mushroom clouds, the nuclear bombers, the ICBMs, etc. Just sub-microscopic genetically engineered super killer viruses that we have absolutely no defense against, delivered in secret, with a slow horrifying unstoppable migration through the global human population. All the fear of a naturally mutated form of "bird flu" that might kill tens of millions is simply "child's play" compared to multiple designer military viruses that are built to kill in the many hundreds of millions to billions of people globally.¶ It costs approximately US$1 million to kill one person with nuclear weapons-of-mass destruction but only approximately US$1 to kill one person with biological weapons-of-mass destruction. Bioweapons are truly the "poor man's nukes". The Iranians are known to have a biological weapons program and they, and their allies, certainly have the means to deliver biowar agents into the Israeli and European and North American homelands. Bioweapons do not have to be dispersed via missiles or bombs, they are perfect for non-traditional normally non-military delivery systems. Being very small (there are, for example, typically approximately 40 million bacterial cells in every gram of soil and massively more viruses in the same gram), they lend themselves to an enormous variety of non-detectable methodologies for delivery and use in war, both regionally and globally.¶ What is being missed here, with all the talk of Iran developing nuclear weapons or not (depending on one's viewpoint), is that Iran is already a state that possesses WMD. HELLO, ANY WAR WITH IRAN IS HIGHLY APT TO INVOLVE LARGE SCALE DEATHS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN WMD THREAT. Hello again, this means that YOU...the person reading this...is apt to die from biowar in event of a war with Iran! We are in a MAD....mutually assured destruction....pre-war state with Iran, just as we are with Russia and to a lesser extent with China when it comes to nuclear weapons. A famous line from the movie "Wargames" (referring to engaging in nuclear war and the odds of "winning" such a war) is "the only winning move is not to play". Sad to say, this does not seem to have any bearing on the apocalyptic strategy of the neocon push for war with Iran.¶ The nature of biowar is that it is a "gift that keeps on giving". Once released, advanced recombination DNA based viral bioweapons will continue to spread and kill and kill ....regardless if Iran (and its ally Syria) are but a sea of green radioactive glass devoid of all life. With advanced biowar agents, it is not the quantity that counts but the quality; humans themselves become the vectors and delivery systems of the bioweapons. It does not require large amounts of weapons running into the millions or billions of tons of high explosives; nor does it require ICBMs and cruise missiles and $100 million dollar warplanes to deliver the bioweapons. A very small group of human assets, prepositioned with small amounts of easily hidden biowar weapons (submicroscopic viruses), in the Middle East, Europe, Canada, and America can begin the process that will result in the deaths of hundreds of millions or even billions of human beings. When you get right down to it, does it matter if you die from some exotic bioengineered hemorrhagic fever or from radiation poisoning/nuclear blast .......dead is still dead. ¶ To begin to understand the truly horrific nature of the biowar threat, one only has to look to history for some "mild" examples. The Black Death bubonic pandemic, believed caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis, is estimated to have killed between a third and two-thirds of Europe's population after it spread to Europe in 1347 from South-western/Central Asia. ¶ Yersinia pestis, being a bacteria is massive when compared to a virus, and is easily treated with modern antibiotics. However, the Soviet Union's Biopreparat organization turned Black Death from a medieval plague into a 20th Century bioweapon. The Yersinia pestis bacteria was exposed to every then-known antibiotic, in a process that any advanced high school or early undergraduate college level biology class student could undertake, and the resulting antibiotic resistant Y. pestis was bred and loaded into a small number of Soviet ICBMs aimed at America. The resistant Y. pestis had also been exposed to various levels of radiation to "radiation harden" the bacteria. The intent was to hit American survivors of a nuclear war with a new and untreatable form of Black Death that itself could survive the effects of nuclear fallout. ¶ As frighting as a totally antibiotic resistant Yersinia pestis bacteria is, it remains "child's play" compared to the more advanced recombination DNA technology used in most biowar programs. This typically involves the recombining of viral DNA into new virus, "designer virus". The Soviets, years ago, engineered a new virus that combined elements of Smallpox and Ebola. With the genetic engineering of viruses those doing the "designing" can engineer into the virus a wide number of different characteristics. For instance, an advanced hemorrhagic fever can be designed to be: airborne (capable of being transmitted via sneezing), with a very small amount of viral material required to infect a human host, with a incubation period of 14 days or longer, with most of the incubation period that is both highly contagious and at best looks like a mild version of the common cold, with the resulting hemorrhagic fever having a mortality of 90 or more.¶ The same technology can be used to create a large number of different viruses which can all be released on a target population at the same time, vastly complicating detection and containment and treatment programs. In fact the normal research and development process used in genetic engineering results in a large number of different new viruses. ¶ Those nations not directly involved in a strike upon Iran, that is most of the rest of the world, will nevertheless face massive deaths within their nations...they will lose more of their citizens to the war, that we are about to unleash, than they lost in World War II and ALL THE OTHER WARS IN HISTORY COMBINED. Needless to say, this will have a profound effect on their actions towards those nations who have started the mess in the first place. The global military, political, economic, and medical chaos resulting from global biowar will make the use of nuclear weapons a likely outcome as America, the United Kingdom, France and other nations starting the war will be seen as out-of-control "mad dogs" who have unleashed World War III. The Book of Revelations speaks of one-third of the world dying, in the Final Battle, from plague ....biowar; and another one-third of the world dying from "wormwood"....which we now know to be nuclear war effects ...Chernobyl, which comes from the Ukrainian word "chornobyl", translates into wormwood (or its close relative mugwort). (Chernobyl is the site of a massive uncontrolled nuclear meltdown disaster in the Ukraine on the 26th of April 1986). ¶ We are in a period of extreme danger to us all. Even more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis of the 60s. Yet far too many people are so uneducated as to the real dangers from advanced Twenty-first Century biowar that they are totally blind to the profound risk to their own lives. | 10/16/16 |
SEPT-OCT Cap KTournament: Meadows | Round: 1 | Opponent: Loyola NT | Judge: Sierra Inglet MacNeil '12 Robert, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the PhD degree in Political Science School of Political Studies Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ottawa © Robert MacNeil, Ottawa, Canada, 2012 "Neoliberal Climate Policy in the United States: From Market Fetishism to the Developmental State" http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/en/bitstream/handle/10393/23587/Macneil_Robert_2012_thesis.pdf?sequence=1 On the pull side, the project looks at four particularly prominent selectivities used by actors to implement greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation, in cluding the use of a) sub national regulation within the fifty states, b) civil litigation to impose structural legal requirements upon the federal government to impose climate regulation c) favourable tax policies and government subsidies through appropriations riders, and d) the use of executive authority by the administration to create and enforce new emissions laws outside of Congress. On the push side, the project argues that the actors pushing for developmental state policies have also been forced to heed alternative implementation strategies because of the harsh neoliberal climate . The main way that this has been accomplished is by building the developmental state as a radically decentralized entity. That is, u nlike the developmental states o f East As ia and Western Europe – referred to as Developmental Bureaucratic States – which are often housed in a single location , with a single agency title, and a single budget, Washington has established what is commonly referred to as a Developmental Network State. This form of developmental apparatus is, by contrast, highly decentralized, with its activities being carried out across literally thousands of labs, coordinated across a labyrinth of hundreds of different office s and state level agencies, and its budge ts being extremely diffuse . This decentralization has helped to render the American developmental state considerably less visible than others found in Western Europe and East Asia, and has allowed it to develop and mature throughout the heart of neoliberal ism’s ideological ascendency. Following in this tradition, much of the alternative energy innovation policy in question has been forced to adopt this somewhat ‘hidden’ or stealthy characteristic in order to avoid political scrutiny. Finally, the project attempts to demonstrate that, in spite of their continued progress, the policies and institutions that promote and underpin this state led development of alternative technologies are always rather precarious and fragile, and that as these two competing logics continue to do battle with each other, the future of a technology centric American climate policy remains highly uncertain. The project thus traces the ebb and flow of this political battle over the past three decades, with a particular focus on the dev elopments taking place since 2009. Contributions to the existing literature In undertaking this type of analysis, the thesis aims to make at least three important contributions to the existing literature. The first is a critical rethinking of the implications of conceptualizing climate policy (and perhaps environmental policy more generally, though I do not extend the empirics beyond climate policy in this work) in terms of neoliberalism’s influence. By focusing specifically on neoliberalism’s tenuous relationship with the state’s broad requirement to foster accumulation, the project attempts to walk back the common depiction of neoliberal climate policy as being either anti state in its orientation, or otherwise solely focused on markets in abstract environmental commodities. In so doing, it further aims to generally reframe the common conception of the neoliberal state as an ‘absentee state’, and underscore the extent to which these pressure to promote accumulation may serve to enhance state capacity under conditions of market fundamentalism. Second, this thesis appears to be the first body of work to focus on conceptualizing US climate policy in terms of a developmental state logic. In so doing, it seeks to provide a new understanding of the federal government’s role in promoting and acting upon a technology centric climate policy, as well as contribute to the limited existing literature on the American developmental state. Finally, as there are actually very few book length studies of US climate policy from any perspective, the project aims to make an important contribution to stud ies of American climate policy in general, particularly underscoring the increasingly dynamic and robust shape of the country’s climate policy arena. Methods The policy process within large states (the US federal government not least of which) is a profoun dly complex subject of analysis, and thus direct and/or unambiguous relationships between objects and variables are extremely difficult to determine with certainty. As this body of work is largely an analysis of how existing structures shape the strategies of actors within the climate policy process, there are, in effect, three primary research tasks. The first is to develop an understanding of the historical evolution of the structures and selectivities in question and how they have come to play the roles that they have within the policy process. This has been accomplished through critical analysis of a range of secondary texts focused on each of the structures and selectivities in question. With regard to the developmental network state apparatus, Chapter 4 is the primary site of this analysis, while the four primary alternative policy pathways used to execute this logic are taken up primarily in Chapter 6 . In so doing, I am attempting to understand the factors that helped to consolidate them over time, as well as how and why actors within the policy process have felt compelled to recursively reselect for them. Beyond the use of secondary texts, government documents and reports (particularly from the Committee for Climate Change Science and Technology Integr ation) have been used to obtain and incorporate additional contemporary developments related to these structures. The second task is to attempt to understand the specific role of these structures and selectivities in the development of contemporary climate policies – specifically how they have shaped, refracted, and facilitated the goal of fostering accumulation under conditions of neoliberalism. With regard to the four specific alternative pathways, this task is taken up in Chapter 6, while the research on the developmental state is subject of Chapter 7. This has been accomplished through analysis of a combination of governmental documents (Congressional reports, federal agency reports and budgets, Congressional Research Service primers and reports , docume nts disclosed by federal RandD programs and agencies – particularly the National Climate Change Technology Initiative and Climate Change Technology Program), laboratory reports from the Federal Laboratory Consortium and Department of Energy National Laborato ry Network (budgets, objectives, project manifests, etc.), and the limited existing secondary academic literature on these structures and selectivities. Finally, I am attempting to understand how these structures and selectivities can be subject to change and alteration in the context of anti regulationist ideology and the changing strength of neoliberal actors in the policy process. This task shifts the analysis into the contemporary moment , as it assesses the major rollbacks that unfolded between 2010 an d 2012 as anti regulationist actors enhanced their relative positions in the policy process and sought to reshape the selectivities used to achieve progressive climate policy. This task, which is the subject of Chapter 8, relies primarily on analysis of US newspapers, Congressional bill proposals , policy platforms, and (in particular) analysis of the 2012 budget passed by the Republican controlled House of Representatives, formally titled The Path to Prosperity: Restoring America’s Promise. Pl an of the dissertation In Chapter 2, the existing literature against which the project situates itself is laid out and described in detail. The chapter is concerned specifically with the three main bodies of literature briefly described above – those focus ed on the so called ‘neoliberalization’ of contemporary environmental and climate policy, and the ‘Ecological Modernization’ literature’s assumptions regarding the political and legislative conditions necessary for progressive socio technical transitions w ithin a given polity. In so doing, the chapter attempts to set the predicate for understanding why these frameworks have largely misdiagnosed neoliberalism’s influence on American climate policy (as later suggested by this project’s empirical findings), and suggest why the theoretical framework presented in the subsequent chapter provides a more accurate starting place for thinking about the relationship between neoliberalism and climate policy. Chapter 3 then delineates the project’s main theoretical sup positions. This framework aims to both offset the claims of the existing literature, as well as provide a theoretical rationale for the empirical evidence presented in subsequent chapters. This section takes the form of four main theses which seek to provide both a synoptic understanding of the role of the state in the response to climate and energy crisis, as well as an on the ground explanation of how such policies are developed within neoliberal states like the US. Upon making the argument that states aim first and foremost to foster economic accumulation and self legitimacy, the role of neoliberal ideology is reconceptualized as an incidental (if highly influential) element of this much broader process – one which operates in tension with these first principle objectives. The concept of neoliberalism is, moreover, highly disaggregated in an attempt to both walk back its essentialist and homogenous depiction in much of the literature, as well as understand its dialectical relationship with the policy process. The 1AC is a privatization of the planning process of energy production via laissez-faire decentralization -- that is par excellence the idea of neoliberalism at work. Their aversion to central planning is part and partial of an ideological preference for "de-centralized" or, more accurately market-based solutions MacNeil '12 Robert, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the PhD degree in Political Science School of Political Studies Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ottawa © Robert MacNeil, Ottawa, Canada, 2012 "Neoliberal Climate Policy in the United States: From Market Fetishism to the Developmental State" http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/en/bitstream/handle/10393/23587/Macneil_Robert_2012_thesis.pdf?sequence=1 A second and related preoccupation in the literature focuses on increased efforts to privatize and deregulate forms of environmental and resource management previously governed as common public utilities under the state (e.g. Bakker 2003; Robertson 2000, 2004; Mansfield 2004). As McCarthy and Prudham (2004) note, the intensification of efforts to privatize environmental management over the past three decades can be understood as part of a broader attack on the state-based regulatory approach to environmental protection developed and entrenched throughout the Keynesian welfare-state era. The result has been dramatic increases in “socially produced scarcity, growing inequality, and often accelerated depletion or degradation of the very resources market mechanisms were supposed to protect” (McCarthy 2005: 9). Authors in this tradition have focused primarily on the ways in which these efforts serve to undermine democratic accountability, ecological sustainability, and basic processes of social reproduction. Specific examples of this include water ownership and provision (Smith 2004; Swyngedouw 2005; Bakker 2003), wetlands (Robertson 2000, 2004), fisheries (St. Martin 2001; Mansfield 2004), wildlife (Robbins and Luginbuhl 2005); and forests (Correia 2005; McCarthy 2005). Neoliberalism and climate governance Extending the general logic outlined above, critical political economy literatures attempting to explain neoliberalism’s influence on climate policy have generally followed the neoliberal environments literature’s intense focus on the rise of privatization and commodification policies over the past few decades. Indeed, the primary theme in this literature is that, having emerged as a major political issue in the midst of neoliberalism’s ideological ascendency, policy responses to climate change have naturally been framed in terms of neoliberal ideology’s preference for market mechanisms and aversion to command-and-control policies (Liverman 2004; Newell and Paterson 2010; Lohmann 2005, 2006; Smith et al. 2005; Brunnengraber 2007; Bond and Data 2004; Begg et al. 2005). As Newell and Paterson describe, From early on, the debate about climate policy reflected the broad shift in the global economy towards the power of neoliberal ideology. In environmental policy debates more generally, there were changes during the 1980s towards the idea of using economic analysis and markets to achieve environmental goals… Cost-benefit analysis, it was argued, could allow governments to weigh the pros and cons of particular paths to pollution control and allocate values to them accordingly… promoting the idea that rather than develop policies which specified what technologies business and individuals must use, or to simply ban particular substances or processes (so-called ‘command and control’ policies) it would be better to use ‘market mechanisms’ to achieve environmental goals (2010: 24). State policy aimed at private increases of alternative energy only function to preserve the unequal logic of accumulation at the heart of neoliberal ideology MacNeil '12 Robert, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the PhD degree in Political Science School of Political Studies Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ottawa © Robert MacNeil, Ottawa, Canada, 2012 "Neoliberal Climate Policy in the United States: From Market Fetishism to the Developmental State" http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/en/bitstream/handle/10393/23587/Macneil_Robert_2012_thesis.pdf?sequence=1 Most salient with regard to regulatory modes, however, is the role of access to energy as a condition of growth in capitalist economies. While much can be said on this topic, it should suffice to note that not only did the harnessing of inexpensive fossil energy launch the Industrial Revolution in its earliest days, but the course of economic growth and capitalist development ever since has been intimately tied to cheap energy access. This access to evercheap energy has served not only to increase the productivity of labour and surplus value more than any other commodity in human history – thus liberating capital from its dependence on human labour and accumulation strategies based on absolute surplus value26 – but has also underpinned the massive increases in standards of living and consumerism that form the backbone of contemporary capitalism’s economic growth and social legitimacy. As O’Connor (1991) notes, if a capitalist economy loses access to stable energy inputs, it effectively grinds to a halt in a classic instance of underproduction crisis. “Without such access, there is no productivity, no growth, no markets, no jobs, and no profits. There is no capitalism as we know it. This cannot be said of any other commodity or industry” (1991: 54). As Austin and Phoenix (2005) note, it is this endless hunt for energy resources to fuel domestic economic expansion that has historically led states to actively involve themselves in energy policy.27 In the US, this pattern dates back as far as the mid-nineteenth century when federal policymakers nurtured the fossil fuel industry by, for example: propping up prices for coal and petroleum to support producers in their early years; not allowing too much product into the market at any one time; protecting property and drilling rights through creative proration and utilization rules28; and later providing massive subsidies and deploying aggressive foreign policies designed to keep stable, secure, and cheap fossil energy resources flowing (Tomain 2010; Clark 1987). Yet with the combined prospect of a) total US energy consumption increasing from 100 quadrillion British Thermal Units (QBtu) in 2004 to in excess of 130 QBtu by 2030; b) world energy consumption growing from 447 QBtu to 702 QBtu over the same time period (USEIA 2011); c) the need to import greater quantities of petrol from politically unstable regions (Center for American Progress 2011); and d) the looming specter of global peak oil creating consistently high and unstable barrel prices29 and geopolitical rivalries over remaining resources, the notion that a stable regime of accumulation can continue to rest on the assumption of cheap and secure access to fossil energy has largely disappeared, and the search for new modes of regulation for energy provision become a key driving logic of climate policy.30 Sectoral accumulation: creating new markets through climate policy While regulation theory provides a helpful framework for understanding how the promotion of accumulation implies state intervention in a macro sense, the same logic of accumulation further informs the development of the specific policies used to create these new regulatory modes, as states have consistently sought to use climate policy as a means to promote growth in specific economic sectors. This is largely because, as discussed in Chapter 1, neoliberalism has helped to change the rationale of environmental policy broadly over the past three decades by reframing the relationship between ecological sustainability and economic growth as a non- zero sum game (Bailey 2003).31 In this context, policies designed to protect the earth’s climate are only viewed as legitimate if they are framed in terms of their capacity to promote economic growth in a given sector. State intervention, in this context, does not aim toward the simple regulation or reduction of GHG emissions, but rather the creation of novel markets in sectors like financial services (stemming initially from emissions trading and offset schemes themselves, but also from the development of futures and options markets in emissions allowances, as well as downstream markets in insurance where contracts between permit buyers and sellers are insured), or new markets in alternative energy technologies and industrial processes (Paterson 2001; Matthews and Paterson 2005; Cromwell and Levene 2007; Newell and Paterson 1998; Fletcher 2009; Rauch 2007).32 We must entirely withdraw the logic of capital—individual criticism is key to solve. They can’t win a permutation—my link arguments say the aff uniquely coopts this movement. Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Zizek's recent writings isn't a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Zizek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance (Zizek, 2001d, pp 22-23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Zizek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of "magic," that is, the belief in money's social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance's powers. The "external" obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, "internally" believe in it. | 10/29/16 |
SEPT-OCT Conventional War DATournament: St Marks | Round: 6 | Opponent: Evanston HS | Judge: Rebecca Kuang
Weapons and strategies change the situation of states in ways that make them more or less secure, as Robert Jervis has brilliantly shown. If weapons are not well suited for conquest, neighbours have more peace of mind. According to the defensive-deterrent ideal, we should expect war to become less likely when weaponry is such as to make conquest more difficult, to discourage pre-emptive and preventive war, and to make coercive threats less credible. Do nuclear weapons have those effects? Some answers can be found by considering how nuclear deterrence and how nuclear defence may improve the prospects for peace. First, wars can be fought in the face of deterrent threats, but the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. Wars between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that.states will want to draw back. Not escalation but de-escalation becomes likely. War remains possible. but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. If states can score only small gains because large ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight. Second, states act with less care if the expected costs of war are low and with more care if they are high. In 1853 and 1854, Britain and France expected to win an easy victory if they went to war against Russia. Prestige abroad and political popularity at home would be gained. if not much else. The vagueness of their plans was matched by the carelessness of their acts. In blundering into the Crimean War they acted hastily on scant information, pandered to their people's frenzy for war, showed more concern for an ally's whim than for the adversary's situation, failed to specify the changes in behaviour that threats were supposed to bring. and inclined towards testing strength first and bargaining second. In sharp contrast, the presence of nuclear weapons makes States exceedingly cautious. Think of Kennedy and Khruschev in the Cuban missile crisis. Why fight if you can't win much and might lose everything? Third, the question demands a negative answer all the more insistently when the deter rent deployment of nuclear weapons contributes more to a country's security than does conquest of territory. A country with a deter-rent strategy does not need the extent of territory required by a country relying on a conventional defence in depth. A deterrent strategy makes it unnecessary for a country to fight for the sake of increasing its security, and this removes a major cause of war. Fourth, deterrent effect depends both on one's capabilities and on the will one has to use them. The will of the attacked, striving to preserve its own territory, can ordinarily be presumed stronger than the will of the attacker striving to annex someone else's territory. Knowing this, the would-be attacker is further inhibited. Conventional wars are more common and more catastrophic than nuclear war. Johnson 99. | 10/16/16 |
SEPT-OCT Elections DATournament: Grapevine | Round: 1 | Opponent: Greenhill BZ | Judge: Kris Wright Clinton has a safe lead for now but undecided voters or a Trump push could sway the election. Silver 9/6Nate Silver “Election Update: Clinton’s Lead Keeps Shrinking” FiveThirtyEight SEP 6, 2016. Clinton’s ahead, by a margin of about 3 percentage points in an average of national polls, or 4 points in our popular vote composite, which is based on both national polls and state polls. While the race has tightened, be wary of claims that the election is too close to call — that isn’t where the preponderance of the evidence lies, at least for the moment. If one candidate is ahead by 3 or 4 percentage points, there will be occasional polls showing a tied race or her opponent narrowly ahead, along with others showing the candidate with a mid- to high single-digit lead. We’ve seen multiple examples of both of those recently.¶ In swing states, the race ranges from showing Trump up by 1 point in Iowa to a Clinton lead of about 6 points in her best states, such as Virginia. That’s a reasonably good position for Clinton, but it isn’t quite as safe as it might sound. That’s because the swing states tend to rise and fall together. A further shift of a few points in Trump’s favor, or a polling error of that magnitude, would make the Electoral College highly competitive.¶ 2. What’s the degree of uncertainty?¶ Higher than people might assume. Between the unusually early conventions and the late election — Nov. 8 is the latest possible date on which Election Day can occur — it’s a long campaign this year. But just as important, many voters — close to 20 percent — either say they’re undecided or that they plan to vote for third-party candidates. At a comparable point four years ago, only 5 to 10 percent of voters fell into those categories.¶ High numbers of undecided and third-party voters are associated with higher volatility and larger polling errors. Put another way, elections are harder to predict when fewer people have made up their minds. Because FiveThirtyEight’s models account for this property, we show a relatively wide range of possible outcomes, giving Trump better odds of winning than most other statistically based models, but also a significant chance of a Clinton landslide if those undecideds break in her favor.¶ 3. What’s the short-term trend in the polls?¶ It’s been toward Trump over the past few weeks. Clinton’s lead peaked at about 8.5 percentage points in early August, according to our models, and Trump has since sliced that figure roughly in half. Of Trump’s roughly 4-point gain since then, about 2 points come from Trump’s having gained ground, while the other 2 points come from Clinton’s having lost ground — possibly a sign that her lofty numbers in early August were inflated by a convention bounce. Public popularity supports nuclear energy despite the Fukushima disaster – best polls prove | 9/10/16 |
SEPT-OCT Elections DA v2Tournament: Voices | Round: 1 | Opponent: Mission San Jose PB | Judge: David Dosch Cohn 10/4 Nate Cohn, 10-4-2016, "Better Polling for Clinton, but Trump Is Keeping Core Support," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/upshot/better-polling-for-clinton-but-trump-is-still-in-striking-distance.html Public popularity supports nuclear energy despite the Fukushima disaster – best polls prove Riffkin 15 WASHINGTON, D.C. -- A slim majority of Americans (51) now favor the use of nuclear energy for electricity in the U.S., while 43 oppose it. This level of support is similar to what Gallup found when it last measured these attitudes two years ago, but it is down from the peak of 62 five years ago. Current support is on the low end of what Gallup has found in the past 20 years, with the 46 reading in 2001 the only time that it sank lower. The high point in support for the use of nuclear power, in 2010, was recorded shortly after President Barack Obama announced that the federal government would provide loan guarantees for the construction of two nuclear reactors, the first to be built in the U.S. in three decades. Support has generally dropped since then. However, between 2011 and 2012, support was stable, with 57 favoring nuclear energy. This is notable given that Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster took place shortly after polling in 2011. Trump strongly supports nuke power. Follett 16 The real estate mogul has made strong public statements supporting nuclear power, but tends to favor further development of natural gas. In the aftermath of the 2011 Japan Fukushima nuclear disaster, Trump told Fox News “nuclear is a way we get what we have to get, which is energy.” “I’m in favor of nuclear energy, very strongly in favor of nuclear energy,” Trump said. “If a plane goes down people keep flying. If you get into an auto crash people keep driving.” The permitting process for nuclear power needs to be reformed, Trump explained. He qualified this statement saying “we have to be careful” because nuclear power “does have issues.” Trump specified that he favored the development of natural gas over nuclear energy in the same interview: “we’re the Saudi Arabia times 100 of natural gas, but we don’t use it.” And, nuclear energy would become the key spinning factor for Republicans because of Clinton’s lack of support and Obama’s current policy – Republicans will pit nuclear power policy against Clinton regardless of her actual policy. Plan fractures democrats. Siciliano 16 The presidential election may offer hope for a resurgence of interest in nuclear energy. And if a Republican wins the White House, it's more likely that the centerpiece of that effort, a controversial nuclear waste site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, will move forward. Republicans stand for what they call the "law of the land," referring to the fact that Congress chose Yucca Mountain to be the nation's nuclear waste dump, and that has not changed despite President Obama's and congressional Democrats' success in upending the project and focusing instead on wind and solar power. But even with a president who favors nuclear energy, it will still prove difficult to build the site to take radioactive waste from nearly 100 power plants. Nuclear power is one of the cleanest forms of electricity, yet the question of what to do with waste continues to fester. Many people see Yucca Mountain as the answer, but opponents say it's unsafe. But both sides agree that building more nuclear plants hinges on waste disposal. It pits the administration against lawmakers and exposes a rift between the pro-nuke and anti-nuke wings of the environmental movement. A big barrier to the nuclear option is price. Ben Zycher, senior energy fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, said new nuclear reactors cost far too much, especially since natural gas is so cheap. That could sideline nuclear energy and Yucca Mountain this election year. Yucca Mountain's main adversary, Nevada Democrat Harry Reid, is retiring from Congress at the end of the year, but Zycher said other Nevada officials will step into the breach. "It may be a case without Reid in the Senate the path would be eased, but that's not particularly obvious," he said. David McIntyre, spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, charged with licensing the dump, agrees, saying it "would be immensely difficult" to start back up after so many years of administration stalling. And Democratic presidential front-runner Hillary Clinton is "not going to endorse it," Zycher said. Litigation and 2016 Rod McCullum, the Nuclear Energy Institute's director of used fuel issues, calls managing nuclear waste the "most technically simple, but politically complicated things we do." It might arise in the presidential election because President Obama has stalled longstanding nuclear waste policy, defying Congress, many states and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which designates Yucca Mountain as America's long-term nuclear waste repository. Obama's efforts to hamstring Yucca during his first term helped keep Reid loyal. But both are leaving Washington, and federal courts have ruled that the administration could not kill the Yucca project without congressional consent and while continuing to collect money from utilities and states to build it. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 2013 dealt a blow to the administration by ordering the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to complete its work on licensing the facility, which it recently did despite Reid having choked off the commission's funding. McCullum said the commission has been "eeking" along. Trump win means he will nuke ISIS – results in massive civilian casualties and Middle East destabilization. Hobbus 15 ME war goes nuclear – causes extinction. Russel 9 The next president is make it or break it for warming – its real and anthropogenic – GOP victory kills any possible progress. Neuhauser 15 | 10/8/16 |
SEPT-OCT India Desal DATournament: St Marks | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Mountain View DZ | Judge: Dosch, Stevens, Castillo There’s high demand for desal to curb drought – it’s rising significantly now. Chennai 10 NP key to India desal – it’s highly effective and tech here now. Stephan 12 Turns the case – water shortages create massive structural violence and a non-human environment. Cribb 10 Some observers also claim a link between food insecurity and terrorism, pointing out that hungry countries are among those most likely to furnish terrorism recruits. In 2002, heads of state from fifty countries met at a development summit in Mexico where they discussed the role of poverty and hunger as a breeding ground for terrorism. “No-one in this world can feel comfortable or safe while so many are suffering and deprived,” UN secretary general Kofi Annan told them. The president of the UN General Assembly, Han Seung-Soo, added that the world’s poorest countries were a breeding ground for violence and despair. The Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo added, “To speak of development is to speak also of a strong and determined fight against terrorism.” 10 Around the world many guerrilla and insurgent causes—such as Shining Path, the Tamil Tigers, and Abu Sayyaf—have claimed injustice in land ownership and use as one of their motivating causes. A lack of water is a key factor in encouraging terrorism. Mona El Kody, the chair of the National Water Research Unit in Egypt told the Third World Water Forum that living without an adequate level of access to water created a “non-human environment” that led to frustration, and from there to terrorism. “A non-human environment is the worst experience people can live with, with no clean water, no sanitation,” she said, adding that this problem was at its most acute in the Middle East, where 1 percent of the world’s freshwater is shared by 5 percent of the world’s population. Ms. El Kody added that inadequate water resources had the additive effect of reducing farming and food production, thereby increasing poverty—another factor that can lead to terrorism. 11 Most of the “new” conflicts are to be found in Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia—the result of a cycle of constant famine, deprivation, and periodic violence, leading in inevitable sequence to worse hunger, greater deprivation, and more vicious fighting. Food and economic insecurity and natural resource scarcities . . . can be major sources of conflict. When politically dominant groups seize land and food resources, deny access to other culturally or economically marginalized groups, and cause hunger and scarcities, violence often flares. In Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Sudan, food crises resulting from drought and mismanagement of agriculture and relief and development aid led to rebellion and government collapse, followed by even greater food shortfalls in ensuing years of conflict. Denial of the right to food has been linked to uprisings and civil war in Central America and Mexico. Food insecurity is also integral to civil conflicts in Asia. Competition for resources has generated cycles of hunger and hopelessness that have bred violence in Sri Lanka as well as Rwanda. 12 These afflicted regions are generally places disconnected from the global economic mainstream, where strong-man governments arise and just as quickly crumble, having only political quicksand on which to build a foundation for stability and progress. This is vital to an understanding of what is going wrong with global food production: in nearly all these countries, food is of the first importance, and only after you have enough food can you form a government stable enough to deliver water, health care, education, opportunity for women, justice, and economic development. By neglecting or reducing support for basic food production— as many have during the past twenty-five years—in order to spread aid across these equally deserving causes, the world’s aid donors may unintentionally have laid the foundation for future government failure and conflict. Bad relations with Pakistan and need for water means India cancels the IWT treaty – multiple impacts, turns Indo-Pak war. Kugelman 9/30 | 10/28/16 |
SEPT-OCT India Shift DATournament: St Marks | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Mountain View DZ | Judge: Dosch, Stevens, Castillo Dana Nuccitelli 8/15/16 “Climate urgency: we've locked in more global warming than people realize” https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2016/aug/15/climate-urgency-weve-locked-in-more-global-warming-than-people-realize So far humans have caused about 1°C warming of global surface temperatures, but if we were to freeze the level of atmospheric carbon dioxide at today’s levels, the planet would continue warming. Over the coming decades, we’d see about another 0.5°C warming, largely due to what’s called the “thermal inertia” of the oceans (think of the long amount of time it takes to boil a kettle of water). The Earth’s surface would keep warming about another 1.5°C over the ensuing centuries as ice continued to melt, decreasing the planet’s reflectivity.¶ To put this in context, the international community agreed in last year’s Paris climate accords that we should limit climate change risks by keeping global warming below 2°C, and preferably closer to 1.5°C. Yet from the carbon pollution we’ve already put into the atmosphere, we’re committed to 1.5–3°C warming over the coming decades and centuries, and we continue to pump out over 30 billion tons of carbon dioxide every year.¶ The importance of reaching zero or negative emissions¶ We can solve this problem if, rather than holding the amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide steady, it falls over time. As discussed in the above video, Earth naturally absorbs more carbon than it releases, so if we reduce human emissions to zero, the level of atmospheric carbon dioxide will slowly decline. Humans can also help the process by finding ways to pull carbon out of the atmosphere and sequester it.¶ Scientists are researching various technologies to accomplish this, but we’ve already put over 500 billion tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Pulling a significant amount of that carbon out of the atmosphere and storing it safely will be a tremendous challenge, and we won’t be able to reduce the amount in the atmosphere until we first get our emissions close to zero.¶ There are an infinite number of potential carbon emissions pathways, but the 2014 IPCC report considered four possible paths that they called RCPs. In one of these (called RCP 2.6 or RCP3-PD), we take immediate, aggressive, global action to cut carbon pollution, atmospheric carbon dioxide levels peak at 443 ppm in 2050, and by 2100 they’ve fallen back down to today’s level of 400 ppm. In two others (RCPs 4.5 and 6.0) we act more slowly, and atmospheric levels don’t peak until the year 2150, then they remain steady, and in the last (RCP8.5) carbon dioxide levels keep rising until 2250. As the figure below shows, in the first scenario, global warming peaks at 2°C and then temperatures start to fall toward the 1.5°C level, meeting our Paris climate targets. In the other scenarios, temperatures keep rising centuries into the future We don’t know what technologies will be available in the future, but we do know that the more carbon pollution we pump into the atmosphere today, the longer it will take and more difficult it will be to reach zero emissions and stabilize the climate. We’ll also have to pull that much more carbon out of the atmosphere. ¶ It’s possible that as in three of the IPCC scenarios, we’ll never get all the way down to zero or negative carbon emissions, in which case today’s pollution will keep heating the planet for centuries to come. Today’s carbon pollution will leave a legacy of climate change consequences that future generations may struggle with for the next thousand years.¶ Five years ago, the Australian government established a Climate Commission, which published a report discussing why we’re in the midst of the ‘critical decade’ on climate change:¶ The risks of future climate change – to our economy, society and environment – are serious, and grow rapidly with each degree of further temperature rise. Minimising these risks requires rapid, deep and ongoing reductions to global greenhouse gas emissions. We must begin now if we are to decarbonise our economy and move to clean energy sources by 2050. This decade is the critical decade.¶ Our is the first generation to understand the problems our carbon pollution is causing, and the last that can take the necessary action to prevent them from causing a climate destabilization. In addition to the Australian Climate Commission, 31 major scientific organizations recently warned policymakers that:¶ To reduce the risk of the most severe impacts of climate change, greenhouse gas emissions must be substantially reduced.¶ We have no excuse for inaction or complacency; the experts have clearly warned us. If we refuse to urgently act on this information, future generations will suffer the consequences of our failures today. Empirically proven in japan a ban on nuclear triggered a shift to coal. Follett 16 An analysis published Monday by Bloomberg states that coal power will become the largest source of electricity in Japan due to an effective ban on nuclear power. Nuclear power provided 29 percent of Japan’s total power output before 2011, but will decline to 13.6 percent by 2023 and 1.2 percent by 2040, according to the report. Japan got 24 percent of its electricity from coal in 2010 and the country plans to get more than a third of its power from coal by 2040. Specifically in India nuclear is key. Bhoje 00 India is a rising source of CO2 emissions and a global leader on climate change, proven at the Paris climate talks. Worland 15 MSR Reactors pave the way for nuclear innovation and cut Co2 emissions Cala 16 Warming causes extinction. McCoy 14 Independently coal causes millions of deaths from radiation – our evidence is directly comparative between coal and nuclear. Kharecha and Hansen 13 Kharecha, Pushker A., and James E. Hansen NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Columbia University Earth Institute. "Prevented mortality and greenhouse gas emissions from historical and projected nuclear power." Environmental science and technology 47.9 (2013): 4889-4895. Mortality. We calculate a mean value of 1.84 million human¶ deaths prevented by world nuclear power production from¶ 1971 to 2009 (see Figure 2a for full range), with an average of¶ 76 000 prevented deaths/year from 2000 to 2009 (range 19¶ 000−300 000). Estimates for the top five CO2 emitters, along¶ with full estimate ranges for all regions in our baseline historical¶ scenario, are also shown in Figure 2a. For perspective, results¶ for upper and lower bound scenarios are shown in Figure S1¶ (Supporting Information). In Germany, which has announced¶ plans to shut down all reactors by 2022 (ref 2), we calculate¶ that nuclear power has prevented an average of over 117 000¶ deaths from 1971 to 2009 (range 29 000−470 000). The large¶ ranges stem directly from the ranges given in Table 1 for the¶ mortality factors.¶ Our estimated human deaths caused by nuclear power from¶ 1971 to 2009 are far lower than the avoided deaths. Globally,¶ we calculate 4900 such deaths, or about 370 times lower than¶ our result for avoided deaths. Regionally, we calculate¶ approximately 1800 deaths in OECD Europe, 1500 in the¶ United States, 540 in Japan, 460 in Russia (includes all 15¶ former Soviet Union countries), 40 in China, and 20 in India.¶ About 25 of these deaths are due to occupational accidents,¶ and about 70 are due to air pollution-related effects (presumably fatal cancers from radiation fallout; see Table 2 of¶ ref 16).¶ However, empirical evidence indicates that the April 1986¶ Chernobyl accident was the world’s only source of fatalities¶ from nuclear power plant radiation fallout. According to the¶ latest assessment by the United Nations Scientific Committee¶ on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR),17 43 deaths¶ are conclusively attributable to radiation from Chernobyl as of¶ 2006 (28 were plant staff/first responders and 15 were from the¶ 6000 diagnosed cases of thyroid cancer). UNSCEAR17 also¶ states that reports of an increase in leukemia among recovery¶ workers who received higher doses are inconclusive, although¶ cataract development was clinically significant in that group;¶ otherwise, for these workers as well as the general population,¶ “there has been no persuasive evidence of any other health¶ effect” attributable to radiation exposure.17¶ Furthermore, no deaths have been conclusively attributed (in¶ a scientifically valid manner) to radiation from the other two¶ major accidents, namely, Three Mile Island in March 1979, for¶ which a 20 year comprehensive scientific health assessment was¶ done,18 and the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident. While¶ it is too soon to meaningfully assess the health impacts of the¶ latter accident, one early analysis19 indicates that annual¶ radiation doses in nearby areas were much lower than the¶ generally accepted 100 mSv threshold17 for fatal disease¶ development. In any case, our calculated value for global¶ deaths caused by historical nuclear power (4900) could be a¶ major overestimate relative to the empirical value (by 2 orders¶ of magnitude). The absence of evidence of large mortality from¶ past nuclear accidents is consistent with recent findings20,21 that¶ the “linear no-threshold” model used to derive the nuclear¶ mortality factor in Table 1 (see ref 22) might not be valid for¶ the relatively low radiation doses that the public was exposed to¶ from nuclear power plant accidents.¶ For the projection period 2010−2050, we find that, in the all¶ coal case (see the Methods section), an average of 4.39 million¶ and 7.04 million deaths are prevented globally by nuclear power¶ production for the low-end and high-end projections of IAEA,6¶ respectively. In the all gas case, an average of 420 000 and 680¶ 000 deaths are prevented globally (see Figure 2b,c for full¶ ranges). Regional results are also shown in Figure 2b,c. The Far¶ East and North America have particularly high values, given¶ that they are projected to be the biggest nuclear power¶ producers (Figure S2, Supporting Information). As in the¶ historical period, calculated deaths caused by nuclear power in¶ our projection cases are far lower (2 orders of magnitude) than¶ the avoided deaths, even taking the nuclear mortality factor in¶ Table 1 at face value (despite the discrepancy with empirical¶ data discussed above for the historical period).¶ The substantially lower deaths in the projected all gas case¶ follow simply from the fact that gas is estimated to have a¶ mortality factor an order of magnitude lower than coal (Table¶ 1). However, this does not necessarily provide a valid argument¶ for such large-scale “fuel switching” for mitigation of either¶ climate change or air pollution, for several reasons. First, it is¶ important to bear in mind that our results for prevented¶ mortality are likely conservative, because the mortality factors¶ in Table 1 do not incorporate impacts of ongoing or future¶ anthropogenic climate change.16 These impacts are likely to¶ become devastating for both human health and ecosystems if¶ recent global GHG emission trends continue.1,3 Also, potential¶ global natural gas resources are enormous; published estimates¶ for technically recoverable unconventional gas resources¶ suggest a carbon content ranging from greater than 700¶ GtCO2 (based on refs 23 and 24) to greater than 17 000¶ GtCO2 (based on refs 24 and 25). While we acknowledge that¶ natural gas might play an important role as a “transition” fuel to¶ a clean-energy era due to its lower mortality (and emission)¶ factor relative to coal, we stress that long-term, widespread use of natural gas (without accompanying carbon capture and¶ storage) could lead to unabated GHG emissions for many¶ decades, given the typically multidecadal lifetime of energy¶ infrastructure, thereby greatly complicating climate change¶ mitigation efforts. | 10/28/16 |
SEPT-OCT Indo-Pak War Security KTournament: Meadows | Round: 3 | Opponent: Loyola JN | Judge: Kathy Bond Threats are constructed – their security discourse creates a self fulfilling prophecy that makes true understanding of structural causes behind “threats” impossible. Mack 91 Dr. Mack, professor at Harvard Medical School, 1991, (John E., “The Psychodynamics of International Relationships” Vol 1 p. 58-59) Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with an argument that, reduced to its essentials , goes something like this: “It’s very well to psychologize but my enemy is real. The Russians (or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans) are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real struggles between us and them and differing national interests: competition over oil, land or scarce resources and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations (or political systems) It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance of superiority of (military and political) power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness.” This argument is neither wrong nor right, but instead simply limited. It fails to grapple with a critical distinction that informs the entire subject. Is the threat really generated by the enemy as it appears to be at any given moment, or is it based on one’s own contribution to the threat, derived from distortion of perception by provocative words and actions in a cycle of enmity and externalization of responsibility? In sum, the enemy IS real, but we have not learned to identify our own role in creating that enemy or in elaborating the threatening image we hold of the other group or country and its actual intentions or purposes. “we never see our enemy’s motives and we never labor to asses his will with anything approaching objectivity.” Security is an ontological condition based on the desire to control and manage states of being – this makes endless violence inevitable and destroys value to life. Burke 07 Burke 7 — Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory and Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE) This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22 The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made. The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political. Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the limitless resort to strategic violence without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28 The conceptual template for such an image of national security state can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, with his influential conception of the political community as a tight unity of sovereign and people in which their bodies meld with his own to form a 'Leviathan', and which must be defended from enemies within and without. His image of effective security and sovereignty was one that was intolerant of internal difference and dissent, legitimating a strong state with coercive and exceptional powers to preserve order and sameness. This was a vision not merely of political order but of existential identity, set off against a range of existential others who were sources of threat, backwardness, instability or incongruity.29 It also, in a way set out with frightening clarity by the theorist Carl Schmitt and the philosopher Georg Hegel, exchanged internal unity, identity and harmony for permanent alienation from other such communities (states). Hegel presaged Schmitt's thought with his argument that individuality and the state are single moments of 'mind in its freedom' which 'has an infinitely negative relation to itself, and hence its essential character from its own point of view is its singleness': Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others...this negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something external.30 Schmitt is important both for understanding the way in which such alienation is seen as a definitive way of imagining and limiting political communities, and for understanding how such a rigid delineation is linked to the inevitability and perpetuation of war. Schmitt argued that the existence of a state 'presupposes the political', which must be understood through 'the specific political distinction...between friend and enemy'. The enemy is 'the other, the stranger; and it sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible'.31 The figure of the enemy is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.32 Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist: Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict...to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.33 Schmitt links this stark ontology to war when he states that the political is only authentic 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to the whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship...in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction'.34 War, in short, is an existential condition: the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.35 Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.36 When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification. This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy; because the very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action. Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.38 Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues thAT: ...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury...39 Identity, even more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare (or, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanisation of the other, by mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide). However anathema to a classical realist like Morgenthau, for whom prudence was a core political virtue, these have been influential ways of defining national security and defence during the twentieth century and persists into the twenty-first. They infused Cold War strategy in the United States (with the key policy document NSC68 stating that 'the Soviet-led assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and ... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere')40 and frames dominant Western responses to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and like groups (as Tony Blair admitted in 2006, 'We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we didn't. We chose values.')41 It has also become influential, in a particularly tragic and destructive way, in Israel, where memories of the Holocaust and (all too common) statements by Muslim and Arab leaders rejecting Israel's existence are mobilised by conservatives to justify military adventurism and a rejectionist policy towards the Palestinians. On the reverse side of such ontologies of national insecurity we find pride and hubris, the belief that martial preparedness and action are vital or healthy for the existence of a people. Clausewitz's thought is thoroughly imbued with this conviction. For example, his definition of war as an act of policy does not refer merely to the policy of cabinets, but expresses the objectives and will of peoples: When whole communities go to war -- whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples -- the reason always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.42 Such a perspective prefigures Schmitt's definition of the 'political' (an earlier translation reads 'war, therefore, is a political act'), and thus creates an inherent tension between its tendency to fuel the escalation of conflict and Clausewitz's declared aim, in defining war as policy, to prevent war becoming 'a complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence'.43 Likewise his argument that war is a 'trinity' of people (the source of 'primordial violence, hatred and enmity'), the military (who manage the 'play of chance and probability') and government (which achieve war's 'subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone') merges the existential and rationalistic conceptions of war into a theoretical unity.44 The idea that national identities could be built and redeemed through war derived from the 'romantic counter-revolution' in philosophy which opposed the cosmopolitanism of Kant with an emphasis on the absolute state -- as expressed by Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bismarkian Realpolitik and politicians like Wilhelm Von Humbolt. Humbolt, a Prussian minister of Education, wrote that war 'is one of the most wholesome manifestations that plays a role in the education of the human race', and urged the formation of a national army 'to inspire the citizen with the spirit of true war'. He stated that war 'alone gives the total structure the strength and the diversity without which facility would be weakness and unity would be void'.45 In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel made similar arguments that to for individuals to find their essence 'Government has from time to time to shake them to the very centre by war'.46 The historian Azar Gat points to the similarity of Clausewitz's arguments that 'a people and a nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction' to Hegel's vision of the ethical good of war in his Philosophy of Right.47 Likewise Michael Shapiro sees Clausewitz and Hegel as alike in seeing war 'as an ontological investment in both individual and national completion...Clausewitz figures war as passionate ontological commitment rather than cool political reason...war is a major aspect of being.'48 Hegel's text argues that war is 'a work of freedom' in which 'the individual's substantive duty' merges with the 'independence and sovereignty of the state'.49 Through war, he argues, the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so the corruption in nations would be the product of a prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace.50 Hegel indeed argues that 'sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is a substantial tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal duty...if the state as such, if its autonomy, is in jeopardy, all its citizens are duty bound to answer the summons to its defence'.51 Furthermore, this is not simply a duty, but a form of self-realisation in which the individual dissolves into the higher unity of the state: The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of mind is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualise this end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality. This form of experience thus contains the harshness of extreme contradictions: a self-sacrifice which yet is the real existence of one's freedom; the maximum self-subsistence of individuality, yet only a cog playing its part in the mechanism of an external organisation; absolute obedience, renunciation of personal opinions and reasonings, in fact complete absence of mind, coupled with the most intense and comprehensive presence of mind and decision in the moment of acting; the most hostile and so most personal action against individuals, coupled with an attitude of complete indifference or even liking towards them as individuals.52 A more frank statement of the potentially lethal consequences of patriotism -- and its simultaneously physical and conceptual annihilation of the individual human being -- is rarely to be found, one that is repeated today in countless national discourses and the strategic world-view in general. (In contrast, one of Kant's fundamental objections to war was that it involved using men 'as mere machines or instruments'.53) Yet however bizarre and contradictory Hegel's argument, it constitutes a powerful social ontology: an apparently irrefutable discourse of being. It actualises the convergence of war and the social contract in the form of the national security state. Strategic Reason and Scientific Truth By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features. These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55 Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56 At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61 We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66 Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71 By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good. Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth. Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter. This tells us much about the enduring power of crude instrumental versions of strategic thought, which relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical strategies that see, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, force as an 'instrument of policy short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that figures like the Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy, and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.79 In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'.80 Similarly a retired Israeli army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land.'81 Conclusion: Violent Ontologies or Peaceful Choices? I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought? The alternative is to reject the AFF’s security representations as a critical intellectual labor that makes imagination of a more peaceful future possible. Neocleous 08 Neocleous 8 — Prof of Government @ Brunel University; London (Mark, Critique of Security, pg. 184-5) Anyone well versed in history or with experience of university life will know about the shameful ways in which large numbers of academics have elevated venality into the cardinal academic virtue, complying with the demands of those in power and the wishes of those with money: witness the political scientists, historians, anthropologists, geographers, cartographers, sociologists, linguists and many others who reworked their disciplines according to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, of fascism.' 'Academic life under fascism', notes Christopher Hutton, 'is a dismal ... episode in an unedifying story of relations between the modem academic and the state, and between academics and power both within and outside the university. But this part of the history of fascism is merely the worst moment in the wider and equally unedifying story of relations between academics and the state more generally, merely one way m which intellectuals have kowtowed to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, concerning security and the state. Spouting the jargon of security and enthralled by the trappings of power, their intellectual labour consists of nothing less than attempts to write hand-books for the princes of the new security state. The death of countless numbers in a more 'efficient' bombing of a city, the stationing of troops halfway around the World in order to bring to an end any attempt at collective self-determination, the use of military machines against civilians, the training of police forces in counter-insurgency practices, but more than anything the key concepts and categories used to explain and justify these things - all defended, supported and even ‘improved” by security intellectuals for whom, ultimately, intelIecua1 labour boils down to little more than the question of the most efficient manner. In which to achieve the security demanded by the state and bourgeois order. In rationalizing the political and corporate logic of security, the security intellectual conceals the utter irrationality of the system as a whole. The security intellectual then is nothing less than the security ideologue, peddling the fetish of our time. The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up, That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do, but it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end - constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,” dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state, and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modem politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that securitizing an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift. The role of the ballot is to critically interrogate the 1AC’s security representations – that’s a pre requisite to evaluating the consequences of the plan so they do not get to weigh the case:
Crawford 02 — Neta, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, p. 19-21 Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument. 2. Fiat is illusory – the plan does not actually pass so there’s no urgent reason to vote AFF – only our critical interrogation has a real world effect | 10/28/16 |
SEPT-OCT Japan Politics DATournament: Voices | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Peninsula JL | Judge: Bistagne, Go, Dada And, Article 9 change leads to prolif. Siegel 07 | 10/14/16 |
SEPT-OCT Japan Shift DATournament: Voices | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Peninsula JL | Judge: Bistagne, Go, Dada Without nuclear power, it’s only going to get worse. Follett 16 An analysis published Monday by Bloomberg states that coal power will become the largest source of electricity in Japan due to an effective ban on nuclear power. Nuclear power provided 29 percent of Japan’s total power output before 2011, but will decline to 13.6 percent by 2023 and 1.2 percent by 2040, according to the report. Japan got 24 percent of its electricity from coal in 2010 and the country plans to get more than a third of its power from coal by 2040. Japan previously shut down all of its nuclear reactors in the aftermath of the 2011 magnitude 9.0 earthquake, which triggered the Fukushima disaster. The country has since transitioned away from nuclear power. Prior to the disaster, Japan operated 54 nuclear power plants and the government planned to build enough reactors to provide 50 percent of the country’s electricity power. After the disaster, Japan pledged to effectively abandon nuclear power by the 2030s, replacing it mostly with wind or solar power, causing the price of electricity to rise by 20 percent. The transition to green energy hasn’t gone well and the country likely won’t meet its goals, according to the report. Japan remains a top importer of oil, coal and natural gas and the government estimated that importing fuel costs the country more than $40 billion annually. Japan’s current government sees a revival of nuclear power as critical to supporting economic growth and slowing an exodus of Japanese manufacturing to lower-cost countries, but has faced incredible pushback. Prefer our evidence: Shift to coal makes it impossible to fight climate change. Kharecha and Hansen 13 Kharecha, Pushker A., and James E. Hansen NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Columbia University Earth Institute. "Prevented mortality and greenhouse gas emissions from historical and projected nuclear power." Environmental science and technology 47.9 (2013): 4889-4895. GHG Emissions. We calculate that world nuclear power¶ generation prevented an average of 64 gigatonnes of CO2-¶ equivalent (GtCO2-eq), or 17 GtC-eq, cumulative emissions¶ from 1971 to 2009 (Figure 3a; see full range therein), with an¶ average of 2.6 GtCO2-eq/year prevented annual emissions from¶ 2000 to 2009 (range 2.4−2.8 GtCO2/year). Regional results are¶ also shown in Figure 3a. Our global results are 7−14 lower¶ than previous estimates8,9 that, among other differences,¶ assumed all historical nuclear power would have been replaced¶ only by coal, and 34 higher than in another study10 in which¶ the methodology is not explained clearly enough to infer the¶ basis for the differences. Given that cumulative and annual¶ global fossil fuel CO2 emissions during the above periods were¶ 840 GtCO2 and 27 GtCO2/year, respectively,11 our mean¶ estimate for cumulative prevented emissions may not appear¶ substantial; however, it is instructive to look at other¶ quantitative comparisons.¶ For instance, 64 GtCO2-eq amounts to the cumulative CO2¶ emissions from coal burning over approximately the past 35¶ years in the United States, 17 years in China, or 7 years in the¶ top five CO2 emitters.11 Also, since a 500 MW coal-fired power¶ plant typically emits 3 MtCO2/year,26 64 GtCO2-eq is¶ equivalent to the cumulative lifetime emissions from almost¶ 430 such plants, assuming an average plant lifetime of 50 years.¶ It is therefore evident that, without global nuclear power¶ generation in recent decades, near-term mitigation of¶ anthropogenic climate change would pose a much greater¶ challenge.¶ For the projection period 2010−2050, in the all coal case, an¶ average of 150 and 240 GtCO2-eq cumulative global emissions¶ are prevented by nuclear power for the low-end and high-end¶ projections of IAEA,6 respectively. In the all gas case, an average¶ of 80 and 130 GtCO2-eq emissions are prevented (see Figure¶ 3b,c for full ranges). Regional results are also shown in Figure¶ 3b,c. These results also differ substantially from previous¶ studies,9,10 largely due to differences in nuclear power¶ projections (see the Supporting Information).¶ To put our calculated overall mean estimate (80−240¶ GtCO2-eq) of potentially prevented future emissions in¶ perspective, note that, to achieve a 350 ppm CO2 target near¶ the end of this century, cumulative “allowable” fossil CO2¶ emissions from 2012 to 2050 are at most ∼500 GtCO2 (ref 3).¶ Thus, projected nuclear power could reduce the climate-change¶ mitigation burden by 16−48 over the next few decades¶ (derived by dividing 80 and 240 by 500). This causes millions of death and outweighs harms from radiation – our evidence is directly comparative between coal and nuclear. Kharecha and Hansen 13 Kharecha, Pushker A., and James E. Hansen NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Columbia University Earth Institute. "Prevented mortality and greenhouse gas emissions from historical and projected nuclear power." Environmental science and technology 47.9 (2013): 4889-4895. Mortality. We calculate a mean value of 1.84 million human¶ deaths prevented by world nuclear power production from¶ 1971 to 2009 (see Figure 2a for full range), with an average of¶ 76 000 prevented deaths/year from 2000 to 2009 (range 19¶ 000−300 000). Estimates for the top five CO2 emitters, along¶ with full estimate ranges for all regions in our baseline historical¶ scenario, are also shown in Figure 2a. For perspective, results¶ for upper and lower bound scenarios are shown in Figure S1¶ (Supporting Information). In Germany, which has announced¶ plans to shut down all reactors by 2022 (ref 2), we calculate¶ that nuclear power has prevented an average of over 117 000¶ deaths from 1971 to 2009 (range 29 000−470 000). The large¶ ranges stem directly from the ranges given in Table 1 for the¶ mortality factors.¶ Our estimated human deaths caused by nuclear power from¶ 1971 to 2009 are far lower than the avoided deaths. Globally,¶ we calculate 4900 such deaths, or about 370 times lower than¶ our result for avoided deaths. Regionally, we calculate¶ approximately 1800 deaths in OECD Europe, 1500 in the¶ United States, 540 in Japan, 460 in Russia (includes all 15¶ former Soviet Union countries), 40 in China, and 20 in India.¶ About 25 of these deaths are due to occupational accidents,¶ and about 70 are due to air pollution-related effects (presumably fatal cancers from radiation fallout; see Table 2 of¶ ref 16).¶ However, empirical evidence indicates that the April 1986¶ Chernobyl accident was the world’s only source of fatalities¶ from nuclear power plant radiation fallout. According to the¶ latest assessment by the United Nations Scientific Committee¶ on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR),17 43 deaths¶ are conclusively attributable to radiation from Chernobyl as of¶ 2006 (28 were plant staff/first responders and 15 were from the¶ 6000 diagnosed cases of thyroid cancer). UNSCEAR17 also¶ states that reports of an increase in leukemia among recovery¶ workers who received higher doses are inconclusive, although¶ cataract development was clinically significant in that group;¶ otherwise, for these workers as well as the general population,¶ “there has been no persuasive evidence of any other health¶ effect” attributable to radiation exposure.17¶ Furthermore, no deaths have been conclusively attributed (in¶ a scientifically valid manner) to radiation from the other two¶ major accidents, namely, Three Mile Island in March 1979, for¶ which a 20 year comprehensive scientific health assessment was¶ done,18 and the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident. While¶ it is too soon to meaningfully assess the health impacts of the¶ latter accident, one early analysis19 indicates that annual¶ radiation doses in nearby areas were much lower than the¶ generally accepted 100 mSv threshold17 for fatal disease¶ development. In any case, our calculated value for global¶ deaths caused by historical nuclear power (4900) could be a¶ major overestimate relative to the empirical value (by 2 orders¶ of magnitude). The absence of evidence of large mortality from¶ past nuclear accidents is consistent with recent findings20,21 that¶ the “linear no-threshold” model used to derive the nuclear¶ mortality factor in Table 1 (see ref 22) might not be valid for¶ the relatively low radiation doses that the public was exposed to¶ from nuclear power plant accidents.¶ For the projection period 2010−2050, we find that, in the all¶ coal case (see the Methods section), an average of 4.39 million¶ and 7.04 million deaths are prevented globally by nuclear power¶ production for the low-end and high-end projections of IAEA,6¶ respectively. In the all gas case, an average of 420 000 and 680¶ 000 deaths are prevented globally (see Figure 2b,c for full¶ ranges). Regional results are also shown in Figure 2b,c. The Far¶ East and North America have particularly high values, given¶ that they are projected to be the biggest nuclear power¶ producers (Figure S2, Supporting Information). As in the¶ historical period, calculated deaths caused by nuclear power in¶ our projection cases are far lower (2 orders of magnitude) than¶ the avoided deaths, even taking the nuclear mortality factor in¶ Table 1 at face value (despite the discrepancy with empirical¶ data discussed above for the historical period).¶ The substantially lower deaths in the projected all gas case¶ follow simply from the fact that gas is estimated to have a¶ mortality factor an order of magnitude lower than coal (Table¶ 1). However, this does not necessarily provide a valid argument¶ for such large-scale “fuel switching” for mitigation of either¶ climate change or air pollution, for several reasons. First, it is¶ important to bear in mind that our results for prevented¶ mortality are likely conservative, because the mortality factors¶ in Table 1 do not incorporate impacts of ongoing or future¶ anthropogenic climate change.16 These impacts are likely to¶ become devastating for both human health and ecosystems if¶ recent global GHG emission trends continue.1,3 Also, potential¶ global natural gas resources are enormous; published estimates¶ for technically recoverable unconventional gas resources¶ suggest a carbon content ranging from greater than 700¶ GtCO2 (based on refs 23 and 24) to greater than 17 000¶ GtCO2 (based on refs 24 and 25). While we acknowledge that¶ natural gas might play an important role as a “transition” fuel to¶ a clean-energy era due to its lower mortality (and emission)¶ factor relative to coal, we stress that long-term, widespread use of natural gas (without accompanying carbon capture and¶ storage) could lead to unabated GHG emissions for many¶ decades, given the typically multidecadal lifetime of energy¶ infrastructure, thereby greatly complicating climate change¶ mitigation efforts. The Cuomo card on the case is the impact – warming causes massive violence against marginalized groups Also, warming causes extinction. McCoy 14 | 10/14/16 |
SEPT-OCT MSR CPTournament: St Marks | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Mountain View DZ | Judge: Dosch, Stevens, Castillo The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the International Energy Agency, the United Nations, the Obama Administration and even over 70 of climate scientists agree that we must ramp up nuclear power if we are going succeed in dealing with climate change. Because of its exceptional safety and low cost, perhaps MSR technology is a nuclear technology that most everyone can embrace. And, MSRs use up existing stockpiles of nuclear waste, decreasing the amount available for terrorist purposes. MSR waste cannot be used in weapons. Williams 16 No nuclear reactor can be made proliferation proof, but MSRs have some significant advantages for proliferation resistance. First, the waste from MSRs is not useful for use in nuclear weapons since MSRs fission almost all actinides. Second, MSRs can use up existing stockpiles of nuclear waste from conventional reactors as well as existing stockpiles of plutonium, making these materials unavailable for use in nuclear weapons. MSRs are feasible in India – they’re in future plans, India has the most thorium globally, and align with India’s non-prolif foreign policy. Ghoshal 6/15 | 10/28/16 |
SEPT-OCT Multi-Plank CPTournament: Voices | Round: 1 | Opponent: Mission San Jose PB | Judge: David Dosch -CP Text: Countries ought to | 10/8/16 |
SEPT-OCT Natives Epistemology KTournament: Voices | Round: 3 | Opponent: University JC | Judge: Sean Fee Subpoint A: We’ll isolate 2 reasons the AC is colonialism in disguise 1- Epistemology The 1AC is based on an opposition between western and indigenous peoples and epistemologies that is rooted in essentialism. This form of criticism reinforces colonialism by reinforcing hierarchical difference 2nd- Paternalism The aff attempt to “save” indigenous people is a recasting of whiteman’s burden- it relies on the belief that indigenous groups are too primitive to make their own economic decisions The affirmative has a one size fits all solution – allowing each group to decide is the best solution Subpoint B: Our Critique turns and outweighs the case
4. The external impact outweighs the case- their AC framing promotes fascism that causes global imperialism 5. No aff offense- racism and romanticism are two sides of the same coin- their turns don’t grapple with the critical distinction between essentialized and nuanced conceptions of native identity Our alternative embraces epistemological pluralism- it recognizes the diversity and density of native communities instead of homogenizing them as a collective group of noble savages bamboozled by the nuclear industry. Emphasizing density instead of absolute difference avoids throwing out the baby with the bathwater | 10/9/16 |
SEPT-OCT SSD CPTournament: Grapevine | Round: 1 | Opponent: Greenhill BZ | Judge: Kris Wright CP Text: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should designate sub-seabed disposal as the sole candidate for its permanent nuclear waste repository. Wilson 14Wilson, founder of BuildingGreen, Inc. and executive editor of Environmental Building News, founded the Resilient Design Institute Alex, "Safe Storage of Nuclear Waste", Green Building Advisor, www.greenbuildingadvisor.com/blogs/dept/energy-solutions/safe-storage-nuclear-waste SP The big question now is how long it will be until the plant can be decommissioned and what to do with the large quantities of radioactive waste that are being stored onsite. Terrorism risks with nuclear power My concern with nuclear power has always been more about terrorism than accidents during operation or storage. I continue to worry that terrorists could gain entry to nuclear plant operations and sabotage plants from the inside — disabling cooling systems and causing a meltdown. There is also a remote risk of unanticipated natural disasters causing meltdowns or radiation release, as we saw so vividly with the Fukushima Power Plant catastrophe in Japan in March, 2011. For more than 30 years, the nuclear industry in the U.S. and nuclear regulators have been going down the wrong path with waste storage — seeking a repository where waste could be buried deep in a mountain. Nevada’s Yucca Mountain was the place of choice until… it wasn’t. Any time we choose to put highly dangerous waste in someone’s backyard, it’s bound to cause a lot of controversy, even in a sparsely populated, pro-resource-extraction place like Nevada. NIMBY opposition can be boosted by people in powerful places, and in the case of Yucca Mountain, Nevada senator Harry Reid has played such a role. (He has been the Senate Majority Leader since 2006 and served prior to that as the Minority Leader and Democratic Whip.) Aside from NIMBYism, the problem with burying nuclear waste in a mountain (like Yucca Mountain) or salt caverns (like New Mexico’s Carlsbad Caverns — an earlier option that was pursued for a while in the 1970s) is that the maximum safety is provided at Day One, and the margin of safety drops continually from there. The safety of such storage sites could be compromised over time due to seismic activity (Nevada ranks fourth among the most seismically active states), volcanism (the Yucca Mountain ridge is comprised mostly of volcanic tuff, emitted from past volcanic activity), erosion, migrating aquifers, and other natural geologic actions. A better storage option I believe a much better solution for long-term storage of high-level radioactive waste is to bury it deep under the seabed in a region free of seismic activity where sediment is being deposited and the seafloor getting thicker. In such a site, the level of protection would increase, rather than decrease, over time. In some areas of seabed, more than a centimeter of sediment is being deposited annually. Compacted over time, such sediment deposition could be several feet in a hundred years, and in the geologic time span over which radioactive waste is hazardous, hundreds to thousands of feet of protective sedimentary rock would be formed. The oil and gas industry — for better or worse — knows a lot about drilling deep holes beneath a mile or two of ocean. I suspect that the deep-sea drilling industry would love such a growth opportunity to move into seabed waste storage, and I believe the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or other agencies could do a good job regulating such work. The waste could be placed in wells extending thousands of feet below the seabed in sedimentary rock in geologically stable regions. Let's say a 3,000-foot well is drilled beneath the seabed two miles beneath the surface of the ocean. Waste could be inserted into that well to a depth of 1,000 feet, and the rest of the well capped with 2,000 feet of concrete or some other material. Hundreds of these deep-storage wells could be filled and capped, and such a sub-seabed storage field could be designated as forever off-limits. Industry or the Department of Energy would have to figure out how to package such waste for safe handling at sea, since the material is so dangerous, but I believe that is a surmountable challenge. For example, perhaps the radioactive waste could be vitrified (incorporated into molten glass-like material) to reduce leaching potential into seawater should an accident occur at sea, and that waste could be tagged with radio-frequency emitters so that any lost containers could be recovered with robotic submarines in the event of such accidents. While I’m not an expert in any of this, I’ve looked at how much money taxpayers and industry have already poured into Yucca Mountain — about $15 billion by the time the Obama Administration terminated federal funding for it in 2010, according to Bloomberg News — and the estimates for how much more it would take to get a working waste storage facility of that sort operational had risen to about $96 billion by 2008, according to the U.S. Department of Energy at the time. I believe that sub-seabed storage would be far less expensive. Solves the aff ssd is able to isolate any radioactive nuclear waste from humans. Bala 2014Amal Bala, Sub-Seabed Burial of Nuclear Waste: If the Disposal Method Could Succeed Technically, Could It Also Succeed Legally?, 41 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 455 (2014),SP In general, two related methods of underwater disposal of SNF exist: dumping containers of radioactive waste into the ocean, and sub-seabed disposal. 92 The purpose of underwater disposal of SNF is the same as any other type of SNF disposal, which is to isolate radioactive waste from human contact and the environment long enough for any release of radiation to become harmless.93 The potential advantages of certain types of underwater SNF disposal for the United States could include effective containment of the waste and avoiding the controversy of a land-based national repository, such as the failed project at Yucca Mountain. 94 Underwater disposal of SNF, specifically subseabed disposal, could occur far from the coast of any state or nation and could thereby avoid the NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) syndrome, but this result is not guaranteed considering existing laws and a popular belief that Earth’s oceans are a global commons | 9/10/16 |
SEPT-OCT T-GenericsTournament: Grapevine | Round: 1 | Opponent: Greenhill BZ | Judge: Kris Wright A. Interp: The aff must defend that all countries prohibit the production of nuclear power. To clarify, they can’t advocate that a certain country or subset of countries prohibit nuclear power.Counterplans that prohibit nuclear power for all countries except for one country or a subset of countries are theoretically illegitimate.==== Generic nouns such as “countries” without an article are the most common type of generalization, used in all contexts of writing and speech. Byrd Determining semantics comes before other standards: | 9/10/16 |
SEPT-OCT T-Nuclear PowerTournament: St Marks | Round: 6 | Opponent: Evanston HS | Judge: Rebecca Kuang B: The define nuclear weapons – a) doesn’t defend electrical power and b) weapons aren’t used as power. C. Standards
Legal definition controls the i/l into critique because having debates about concepts in the way they don’t get applied makes us lazy advocates where our theories and advocacy can’t affect change in the world. Engagement controls the I/l to any education or advocacy skills offense - Galloway 07 Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007) Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy. Also bad for procedural fairness because it makes the debate unpredictable and removes discussion from the way it’s discussed in the topic, which pidegon wholes the neg into a self-serving discussion where we only get generics. 2. Core Controversy - Contemporary debates separate the two – the debate about nuclear power is about. Debates about nuclear power are about energy. Herbst 07 Key to engagement because the central controversy of the topic is what the most literature and pre round prep centers on, so we have better ways to engage the aff. They also skew any preround prep, which means their discussion is bad. 3. Limits – they explode the topic by letting the aff tangentially defend anything, makes it impossible for the neg to prep. 4. Topical version of the AFF – defend energy and say that the criticism spills over D. Vote on substantive engagement: otherwise we’re speaking without debating and there’s nothing to separate us from dueling oratory. It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics. Drop the debater on T: A. Hold them accountable for their interp – a topical advocacy frames the debate - drop the arg lets them jump ship to a new layer killing NEG ground. Competing interps since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation. No RVIs - They incentivize debaters to go all in in theory and bait it with abusive practices, killing substantive clash on other flows | 10/16/16 |
SEPT-OCT T-PluralTournament: Voices | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Peninsula JL | Judge: Bistagne, Go, Dada Countries is definitely plural. Meriam-Webster B. Violation: The plan only prohibits nuclear power in one country C) Standards: 1) Limits: their interp allows for a variety of single country cases as opposed to cases that affect the nuclear power production more broadly. Small cases are bad because of link magnitude – the warming DA doesn’t link hard to the Belgium aff 2) Resolution context: the resolution pluralizes countries for a reason. D) Voting issue: you can’t vote for the aff regardless of fairness or education if they don’t meet the resolutional burden. Hold them accountable for their interp – topical advocacy frames the debate. You are literally not topical Competing interps since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation. You cant be reasonably topical No RVIs: | 10/14/16 |
SEPT-OCT T-Plural v2Tournament: St Marks | Round: 4 | Opponent: Lynbrook NS | Judge: David Dosch Countries is definitely plural. Meriam-Webster B. Violation: The plan only prohibits nuclear power in one country C) The standard is jurisdiction: the resolution they agreed to debate pluralizes countries for a reason. Outweighs all pragmatic standards: 1) Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament, and they should be held to that agreement. Tournament invitation says we are debating September/October – not a different topic. 2) You only have jurisdiction to vote on topical advocacies, you can’t vote affirmative if they haven’t affirmed. 3) Grammar is the most objective since it doesn’t rely on arbitrary determinants of what constitutes the best type of debate – it’s the only impact you can evaluate. This also means ground and education arguments beg the question of what type of ground they are entitled to in the first place. T 4) It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it. D) Voting issue: you can’t vote for the aff regardless of fairness or education if they don’t meet the resolutional burden. Hold them accountable for their interp – topical advocacy frames the debate. Competing interps since A) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation. B) they cant be reasonably topical No RVIs: | 10/16/16 |
SEPT-OCT Ukraine Russia CPTournament: St Marks | Round: 4 | Opponent: Lynbrook NS | Judge: David Dosch Competes – Ukraine doesn’t ban and net benefits. Ukraine moving closer to the EU now. Lies 4/7 Europe likes Ukraine nuclear power – they pay for it. Holovko 10/14 | 10/16/16 |
SEPT-OCT Ukraine Shift DATournament: St Marks | Round: 4 | Opponent: Lynbrook NS | Judge: David Dosch Plan stops that progress and causes a shift to coal. Empirically proven in japan a ban on nuclear triggered a shift to coal. Follett 16 An analysis published Monday by Bloomberg states that coal power will become the largest source of electricity in Japan due to an effective ban on nuclear power. Nuclear power provided 29 percent of Japan’s total power output before 2011, but will decline to 13.6 percent by 2023 and 1.2 percent by 2040, according to the report. Japan got 24 percent of its electricity from coal in 2010 and the country plans to get more than a third of its power from coal by 2040. Japan previously shut down all of its nuclear reactors in the aftermath of the 2011 magnitude 9.0 earthquake, which triggered the Fukushima disaster. The country has since transitioned away from nuclear power. Prior to the disaster, Japan operated 54 nuclear power plants and the government planned to build enough reactors to provide 50 percent of the country’s electricity power. After the disaster, Japan pledged to effectively abandon nuclear power by the 2030s, replacing it mostly with wind or solar power, causing the price of electricity to rise by 20 percent. The transition to green energy hasn’t gone well and the country likely won’t meet its goals, according to the report. Japan remains a top importer of oil, coal and natural gas and the government estimated that importing fuel costs the country more than $40 billion annually. Japan’s current government sees a revival of nuclear power as critical to supporting economic growth and slowing an exodus of Japanese manufacturing to lower-cost countries, but has faced incredible pushback. Nuclear is baseload power, which means it’s best suited to replace coal – it also means renewables can’t replace coal or nuclear – Germany proves. Kharecha and Hansen 13 Kharecha, Pushker A., and James E. Hansen. "Response to Comment on “Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Historical and Projected Nuclear Power”." Environmental science and technology 47.12 (2013): 6718-6719. Sovacool et al.1 begin their critique of our recently published¶ paper2 by claiming that nuclear power is unable to displace¶ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as effectively as energy¶ efficiency measures and renewable energy technologies in the¶ near term. However, much of their rationale reflects the¶ common misconception that the electric energy produced by¶ different electricity sources is interchangeable. For near-term¶ mitigation of climate change and air pollution, fossil fuel¶ sources of base load power such as coal and natural gas (i.e.,¶ those that can provide essentially continuous power) are most¶ effectively replaced by proven alternative base load sources such¶ as nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal, and properly (sustainably)¶ designed biomass energy (e.g., see ref 3). This is rooted in¶ the fact that wind and solar photovoltaic energy sources are¶ inherently variable and therefore cannot provide base load¶ power.¶ These issues are highlighted by the consequences of¶ Germany’s recent decision to phase out its nuclear power¶ production by 2022 following Japan’s Fukushima nuclear¶ accident. Despite a major, laudable expansion of wind and¶ solar power in recent years, Germany’s nuclear phaseout has so¶ far led to an increase in coal burning and an associated increase¶ in national GHG emissions4,5a disappointing outcome, given¶ the government’s stated intentions to reduce GHG emissions.¶ (It has also led to a significant increase in Germany’s electricity¶ rates.4¶ ) While the emissions increase has been modest so far, it¶ could become substantial in the mid- and long-term, due to the¶ typically multidecadal lifetime of fossil fuel-fired power plants.¶ Many of Sovacool et al.’s assertions regarding the various¶ costs of nuclear power rely on their Table 1. With the exception¶ of column two, the values in that table are, at best, misleading.¶ For instance, the 0−4.1 gCO2/kWh range for nuclear power in¶ column four (sourced from coauthor Jacobson6¶ ) represents¶ GHG emissions from the incineration of megacities due to¶ hypothetical nuclear war; this purely speculative estimate¶ appears to reflect the common and irrational conflation of¶ nuclear power with nuclear weapons. More importantly, the¶ “opportunity costs” for nuclear power listed in column three¶ (which substantially exceed the life-cycle emissions listed in¶ column two) are based on another set of highly dubious¶ assumptions by Jacobson6¶ namely, that it takes 10−19 years¶ between planning to operation for a nuclear reactor, and, as a¶ result of this delay, continuing fossil fuel GHG emissions from¶ the electricity sector are assigned to nuclear power. This¶ approach, based solely on the U.S. experience, is immediately¶ undermined by simply considering the example of France: in a¶ period of just 10 years (between 1977−1987), nuclear power¶ production in France experienced a ∼15-fold increase that led¶ to its share of electricity rising from 8.5 to over 70 (based¶ on ref 7). Thus, under the right conditions it is not inevitable¶ that the international construction of nuclear plants will face¶ long delays. Turns the advantage - Natural gas is the worst form of Russian Expansionism. Hermant Hermant, 14 (ABC's Moscow correspondent from 2010-13. He returned in March 2014 to cover the Ukraine crisis from Moscow and Kiev. (Norman, “Russia's natural gas is Vladimir Putin's political and economical weapon,” ABC Australia, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-16/natural-gas-is-putins-political-and-economical-weapon/5394030) IS For Vladimir Putin, natural gas is not just a resource. It is an economic and political weapon.¶ I cannot recall now whether we were heading back to Moscow from Makhachkala, Samara, or Ulyanovsk.¶ But I do remember how we were getting back. There on the tarmac on the side of a Soviet-era Tu-154 jet were the proud words “Газпром Авиа”, or Gazprom Avia. This gas company is so huge it runs its own airline on the side.¶ To understand how energy exports - especially natural gas – have helped fuel Mr Putin's long reign, look no further than Gazprom.¶ Since Mr Putin rose to power in 2000, the energy company has become a colossus.¶ It is an economy within an economy: nearly 400,000 employees, more than $US150 billion in revenues, and $US40 billion in profits heading straight into the hands of the Kremlin.¶ That cash, and billions more from crude oil exports, have allowed Mr Putin to spend vast sums to prop up inefficient industries.¶ It allows the Kremlin to essentially indirectly pay oligarchs to keep the jobless rate down.¶ It provides the money needed to overhaul the armed forces and the security services.¶ Of course, all the way up the pyramid of Russia's elite, entrenched corruption ensures everyone gets their share. Just do not rock the boat.¶ Natural gas is not just another export for Russia. It is a point of national pride.¶ For the Kremlin, it is an economic and political weapon.¶ We have all heard the statistics that the European Union gets about a quarter of its gas from Russia, but that is only part of the story.¶ Twelve European Union (EU) countries rely on Russia for more than 50 per cent of their natural gas. That is nearly half the EU.¶ The Baltic countries and Finland are 100 per cent reliant on Russia. Poland, Austria and Hungary are not far off.¶ Half of that gas makes its way to the EU through pipelines that pass through – you guessed it – Ukraine.¶ The former Soviet republic depends on Russia not only for gas, but also the desperately needed transit fees it earns from the pipelines.¶ When the Kremlin wants to pile the pressure on Kiev, like it did just before the annexation of Crimea, it does not need force. It can just raise the price of gas.¶ This month, Gazprom informed Ukraine's new government the price for its gas was going up 44 per cent. It also warned if Ukraine does not pay a $US1.7 billion bill soon, it could cut off supplies.¶ Kiev said if that happened supplies to Europe might be cut. Even under former president Viktor Yanukovych, Moscow realised the amount of gas passing through Ukraine on the way to Europe made it vulnerable.¶ It is already halfway through a strategy to bypass Ukraine, and cement its European markets.¶ The first step was the Nord Stream pipeline, which carries gas directly from Russia, underneath the Baltic Sea, to Germany.¶ Who was on board to help get that pipeline over the line? None other than Gerhard Schroeder, the former German chancellor.¶ He joined the venture shortly after he left office, and remains the chairman of Nord Stream's shareholder committee. Nord Stream is majority owned by Gazprom.¶ Now Russia is racing to build the South Stream pipeline, which would carry gas under the Black Sea to southern Europe and Turkey.¶ If it succeeds, not only will it make countries like Romania and Greece even more reliant on Russian gas, it will send gas exports away from Ukraine's pipelines and further weaken Kiev's leverage.¶ In fact, many analysts believe Moscow's power play in Ukraine has been softened by one thing Mr Putin cannot do anything about: the seasons.¶ By the time the Kremlin's man in Kiev, Mr Yanukovych, was on his way out, it was nearly March.¶ Winter had already done its worst. If Russia turned off the gas, Ukraine's masses would have been uncomfortable, but they would have lived.¶ The same cannot be said if the confrontation had started in December.¶ European countries seek alternative gas supplies¶ Of course, all of this reliance on Russian gas puts the Kremlin in an interesting spot.¶ It revels in the economic power it derives from the huge role it plays in keeping the heat on in much of Europe.¶ But the episode in Crimea, when Moscow rolled the dice on EU sanctions, has accelerated efforts to undo the very dependence the Kremlin cherishes.¶ Mr Putin bet energy from Russia would trump EU political concerns over Russian expansionism. For now, it seems that he won that wager.¶ But already there is talk of building huge liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals in several locations in Europe to allow for alternative supplies from the Middle East, and possibly even the United States.¶ ¶ However, any serious reduction in Europe's reliance on Russian gas is still years away. Until then, the Kremlin – through Gazprom – will try to make it seem like energy from Russia is simply part of the European fabric.¶ Even if radiation is bad from nuclear, the radiation from coal is worse. Hvistendahl ‘07 | 10/16/16 |
SEPT-OCT Util NCTournament: St Marks | Round: 6 | Opponent: Evanston HS | Judge: Rebecca Kuang This is different from individual morality – the state doesn’t have an intent since policymakers pass laws for different reasons, and doesn’t have the reflexive capacity of individuals so it can’t be valued intrinsically. Policymakers have to use util Goodin My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct. So the standard is minimizing suffering First, we should preserve our future ability to find moral truths. Bostrom 12 These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. 2. Extinction risks outweigh everything else regardless of probability. Matheny 07 MATHENY 7 (Jason, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis, Vol 27, No 5) Even if extinction events are improbable, the expected values of countermeasures could be large, as they include the value of all future lives. This introduces a discontinuity between the CEA of extinction and nonextinction risks. Even though the risk to any existing individual of dying in a car crash is much greater than the risk of dying in an asteroid impact, asteroids pose a much greater risk to the existence of future generations (we are not likely to crash all our cars at once) (Chapman, 2004). The “death-toll” of an extinction-level asteroid impact is the population of Earth, plus all the descendents of that population who would otherwise have existed if not for the impact. There is thus a discontinuity between risks that threaten 99 of humanity and those that threaten 100. 3. Moral tunnel vision is complicit with evil. Issac 2 —Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest) As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. 4. Life is a prerequisite to any other aims – regardless of what people desire or wish to pursue, they need to be alive to pursue it in the first place, so extinction is a pre-requisite to anything else | 10/16/16 |
SEPT-OCT Warming DATournament: St Marks | Round: 1 | Opponent: Evanston LT | Judge: Rodrigo Paramo Warming is anthropogenic and can be stopped if we reduce emissions. Nuccitelli 8/15 Dana Nuccitelli 8/15/16 “Climate urgency: we've locked in more global warming than people realize” https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2016/aug/15/climate-urgency-weve-locked-in-more-global-warming-than-people-realize So far humans have caused about 1°C warming of global surface temperatures, but if we were to freeze the level of atmospheric carbon dioxide at today’s levels, the planet would continue warming. Over the coming decades, we’d see about another 0.5°C warming, largely due to what’s called the “thermal inertia” of the oceans (think of the long amount of time it takes to boil a kettle of water). The Earth’s surface would keep warming about another 1.5°C over the ensuing centuries as ice continued to melt, decreasing the planet’s reflectivity.¶ To put this in context, the international community agreed in last year’s Paris climate accords that we should limit climate change risks by keeping global warming below 2°C, and preferably closer to 1.5°C. Yet from the carbon pollution we’ve already put into the atmosphere, we’re committed to 1.5–3°C warming over the coming decades and centuries, and we continue to pump out over 30 billion tons of carbon dioxide every year.¶ The importance of reaching zero or negative emissions¶ We can solve this problem if, rather than holding the amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide steady, it falls over time. As discussed in the above video, Earth naturally absorbs more carbon than it releases, so if we reduce human emissions to zero, the level of atmospheric carbon dioxide will slowly decline. Humans can also help the process by finding ways to pull carbon out of the atmosphere and sequester it.¶ Scientists are researching various technologies to accomplish this, but we’ve already put over 500 billion tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Pulling a significant amount of that carbon out of the atmosphere and storing it safely will be a tremendous challenge, and we won’t be able to reduce the amount in the atmosphere until we first get our emissions close to zero.¶ There are an infinite number of potential carbon emissions pathways, but the 2014 IPCC report considered four possible paths that they called RCPs. In one of these (called RCP 2.6 or RCP3-PD), we take immediate, aggressive, global action to cut carbon pollution, atmospheric carbon dioxide levels peak at 443 ppm in 2050, and by 2100 they’ve fallen back down to today’s level of 400 ppm. In two others (RCPs 4.5 and 6.0) we act more slowly, and atmospheric levels don’t peak until the year 2150, then they remain steady, and in the last (RCP8.5) carbon dioxide levels keep rising until 2250. As the figure below shows, in the first scenario, global warming peaks at 2°C and then temperatures start to fall toward the 1.5°C level, meeting our Paris climate targets. In the other scenarios, temperatures keep rising centuries into the future We don’t know what technologies will be available in the future, but we do know that the more carbon pollution we pump into the atmosphere today, the longer it will take and more difficult it will be to reach zero emissions and stabilize the climate. We’ll also have to pull that much more carbon out of the atmosphere. ¶ It’s possible that as in three of the IPCC scenarios, we’ll never get all the way down to zero or negative carbon emissions, in which case today’s pollution will keep heating the planet for centuries to come. Today’s carbon pollution will leave a legacy of climate change consequences that future generations may struggle with for the next thousand years.¶ Five years ago, the Australian government established a Climate Commission, which published a report discussing why we’re in the midst of the ‘critical decade’ on climate change:¶ The risks of future climate change – to our economy, society and environment – are serious, and grow rapidly with each degree of further temperature rise. Minimising these risks requires rapid, deep and ongoing reductions to global greenhouse gas emissions. We must begin now if we are to decarbonise our economy and move to clean energy sources by 2050. This decade is the critical decade.¶ Our is the first generation to understand the problems our carbon pollution is causing, and the last that can take the necessary action to prevent them from causing a climate destabilization. In addition to the Australian Climate Commission, 31 major scientific organizations recently warned policymakers that:¶ To reduce the risk of the most severe impacts of climate change, greenhouse gas emissions must be substantially reduced.¶ We have no excuse for inaction or complacency; the experts have clearly warned us. If we refuse to urgently act on this information, future generations will suffer the consequences of our failures today. Empirically proven in japan a ban on nuclear triggered a shift to coal. Follett 16 An analysis published Monday by Bloomberg states that coal power will become the largest source of electricity in Japan due to an effective ban on nuclear power. Nuclear power provided 29 percent of Japan’s total power output before 2011, but will decline to 13.6 percent by 2023 and 1.2 percent by 2040, according to the report. Japan got 24 percent of its electricity from coal in 2010 and the country plans to get more than a third of its power from coal by 2040. Japan previously shut down all of its nuclear reactors in the aftermath of the 2011 magnitude 9.0 earthquake, which triggered the Fukushima disaster. The country has since transitioned away from nuclear power. Prior to the disaster, Japan operated 54 nuclear power plants and the government planned to build enough reactors to provide 50 percent of the country’s electricity power. After the disaster, Japan pledged to effectively abandon nuclear power by the 2030s, replacing it mostly with wind or solar power, causing the price of electricity to rise by 20 percent. The transition to green energy hasn’t gone well and the country likely won’t meet its goals, according to the report. Japan remains a top importer of oil, coal and natural gas and the government estimated that importing fuel costs the country more than $40 billion annually. Japan’s current government sees a revival of nuclear power as critical to supporting economic growth and slowing an exodus of Japanese manufacturing to lower-cost countries, but has faced incredible pushback. Shift to coal makes it impossible to fight climate change. Kharecha and Hansen 13 Kharecha, Pushker A., and James E. Hansen NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Columbia University Earth Institute. "Prevented mortality and greenhouse gas emissions from historical and projected nuclear power." Environmental science and technology 47.9 (2013): 4889-4895. GHG Emissions. We calculate that world nuclear power¶ generation prevented an average of 64 gigatonnes of CO2-¶ equivalent (GtCO2-eq), or 17 GtC-eq, cumulative emissions¶ from 1971 to 2009 (Figure 3a; see full range therein), with an¶ average of 2.6 GtCO2-eq/year prevented annual emissions from¶ 2000 to 2009 (range 2.4−2.8 GtCO2/year). Regional results are¶ also shown in Figure 3a. Our global results are 7−14 lower¶ than previous estimates8,9 that, among other differences,¶ assumed all historical nuclear power would have been replaced¶ only by coal, and 34 higher than in another study10 in which¶ the methodology is not explained clearly enough to infer the¶ basis for the differences. Given that cumulative and annual¶ global fossil fuel CO2 emissions during the above periods were¶ 840 GtCO2 and 27 GtCO2/year, respectively,11 our mean¶ estimate for cumulative prevented emissions may not appear¶ substantial; however, it is instructive to look at other¶ quantitative comparisons.¶ For instance, 64 GtCO2-eq amounts to the cumulative CO2¶ emissions from coal burning over approximately the past 35¶ years in the United States, 17 years in China, or 7 years in the¶ top five CO2 emitters.11 Also, since a 500 MW coal-fired power¶ plant typically emits 3 MtCO2/year,26 64 GtCO2-eq is¶ equivalent to the cumulative lifetime emissions from almost¶ 430 such plants, assuming an average plant lifetime of 50 years.¶ It is therefore evident that, without global nuclear power¶ generation in recent decades, near-term mitigation of¶ anthropogenic climate change would pose a much greater¶ challenge.¶ For the projection period 2010−2050, in the all coal case, an¶ average of 150 and 240 GtCO2-eq cumulative global emissions¶ are prevented by nuclear power for the low-end and high-end¶ projections of IAEA,6 respectively. In the all gas case, an average¶ of 80 and 130 GtCO2-eq emissions are prevented (see Figure¶ 3b,c for full ranges). Regional results are also shown in Figure¶ 3b,c. These results also differ substantially from previous¶ studies,9,10 largely due to differences in nuclear power¶ projections (see the Supporting Information).¶ To put our calculated overall mean estimate (80−240¶ GtCO2-eq) of potentially prevented future emissions in¶ perspective, note that, to achieve a 350 ppm CO2 target near¶ the end of this century, cumulative “allowable” fossil CO2¶ emissions from 2012 to 2050 are at most ∼500 GtCO2 (ref 3).¶ Thus, projected nuclear power could reduce the climate-change¶ mitigation burden by 16−48 over the next few decades¶ (derived by dividing 80 and 240 by 500). Warming leads to extinction – multiple scenarios prove. Roberts ‘13 Climate change threatens indigenous people’s culture and puts them at increasingly lower odds of survival. Baird 08 | 10/15/16 |
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