Tournament: westerns | Round: 1 | Opponent: | Judge:
SBU 4:15
The USFG is reliant on government-funded university research for national defense developments, but 9/11 and the Anthrax attacks proves those are vulnerable to terrorist cooption, absent censorship which violates the First Amendment.
Jacobs 5 (Leslie Gielow Jacobs – Professor of Law at the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, “A Troubling Equation in Contracts for Government Funded Scientific Research: “Sensitive But Unclassified” = Secret But Unconstitutional”, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/06_JACOBS_REPLACEMENT_PAGES.pdf, pgs. 113 – 115, EmmieeM)
Breakthrough science can lead both to great good and to great evil. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the anthrax letter attacks that followed highlight the fact that our enemies may use our own advanced science and technology against us. When the dissemination of scientific information might jeopardize national security, the federal government’s primary response has always been to try to control the spread of that information. In a variety of ways, the government has long restricted public access to scientific information in the government’s possession. Since September 11, the government has further tightened access to its own information, withholding from public view not just classified data but also so-called “sensitive” information, the release of which it says could pose a danger to national security. Even with the new security precautions in place, however, the government fears that it cannot keep the nation safe if it is able to control only its own information. That is because some potentially dangerous scientific information is produced by scientists at universities and in industry. Yet the dissemination of privately funded, privately produced scientific information is a form of private speech protected by the Constitution, and the government’s ability to restrict such speech, even when it might pose a danger to national security, is limited. The government cannot “classify” or otherwise prevent the sharing of such information without a court order, and orders of this sort are available only in the most extreme circumstances. Between the extremes of private and government information sits information produced by private scientists with government funding. Contract clauses that restrict the ability of funded scientists to disseminate information related to government-sponsored research occupy an ambiguous middle ground in constitutional doctrine. Can the government restrict the flow of scientific information produced with government funding in the same way that it can control its own information, or do the constitutional limits that protect private speech apply? This question has become increasingly urgent in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Since that time, the government has sought to expand the secrecy it imposes on funded private research beyond “classified” information to include information that is merely “sensitive.” Although contract clauses that restrict the release of classified information are an accepted part of the government/scientist research funding relationship, clauses to protect “sensitive but unclassified” (SBU) information are new. The clause is aimed not only at information contained in a contract’s work product that a scientist delivers to the government, however. It applies also to the scientist’s other publications and communications, which may include or refer to work done with government funding, but which are separate and distinct from the contract “deliverable.” These “releases” may include scholarly papers, conference presentations, email messages, and even telephone or laboratory conversations. What constitutes SBU information is not well understood, nor is it clear when particular information “pertains” to a research contract.
This speech is constitutionally protected, especially in a college setting – the AFF would allow for information exchange about “sensitive but unclassified” research
Jacobs 5 (Leslie Gielow Jacobs – Professor of Law at the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, “A Troubling Equation in Contracts for Government Funded Scientific Research: “Sensitive But Unclassified” = Secret But Unconstitutional”, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/06_JACOBS_REPLACEMENT_PAGES.pdf, pgs. 155 – 156, EmmieeM)
The university plays a special role in preserving and promoting speech free of government influence. The Supreme Court has emphasized the role of the university as a “vital center for the Nation’s intellectual life” that should be free from “the chilling of individual thought and expression.” The Court has noted this special role of the university in the context of both created forums and other funding conditions. In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court explicitly cautioned that its decision upholding an abortion counseling restriction on family planning funds was “not to suggest that funding by the Government, even when coupled with the freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the Government-funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify Government control over the content of expression.” The government’s imposition of SBU secrecy clauses raises additional constitutional concerns in the university setting. The government has broad power to keep its own information secret and to require its employees to keep that information secret. It can conduct scientific research intramurally, and it can exercise great control over dissemination of the resulting information. But the structure of such internal controls makes a difference under the Constitution, because it leaves the government politically accountable for its actions, at least to some degree. This consideration suggests that SBU secrecy controls that reach into university discourse pose a particular danger because of the special role of the university in promoting innovation and expression outside of government control, and because, with respect to scientific information in particular, the university has a special role in conducting research for the purpose of expansion and dissemination of knowledge. Although the government shapes expression on university campuses in many ways, the expectation is that expression not identified as the government’s will be unconstrained. The special role of the university thus must weigh in the constitutional balance.
Restrictions on this speech are crucial to prevent bioterror from modified viruses
Knezo 6 (Genevieve J. Knezo – Specialist in Science and Technology Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division + this is a CRS Report for Congress, pgs. 36 – 53, “Controls on Unclassified Biological Research Information”, “’Sensitive But Unclassified’ Information and Other Controls: Policy and Options for Scientific and Technical Information”, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL33303.pdf, EmmieeM)
Traditionally, open communication of biological information fosters the conduct of research and development. Also, emergency preparedness requires exchange of information to inform local health officials “... of what agents are being studied in their jurisdictions so they can prepare for any unlikely future events.”156 However, some biological information and data could pose a domestic or international security threat, which has led to federal controls.157 For instance, a 2006 National Academies report described a variety of biotechnology agents and specific genetic advances that could be used in research and could increase the potential for biowarfare.158 It also inventoried some dual-use biological agents and research developments that could be used malevolently. For example, “The same reverse genetic technologies that can be used to develop new vaccines against RNA viruses could also be used to construct modified viruses, including possibly viruses that express heterologous virulence factors that result in more lethal disease.”159 Ominously, it observed that in the past, dual-use concerns have focused on pathogens and on the challenges associated with controlling dangerous pathogens. As already emphasized, this committee’s deliberations have indicated that the problem will be far broader and more profound in the future. For example, advances in neurobiology may make it possible to manipulate behavior and thought processes, while gene expression technologies just now coming to fruition will make it possible to activate endogenous molecules in the body — with possibly wide ranging and everlasting effects. Advances in synthetic biology and nanotechnology will offer similar rich opportunities for dual use. Nanodevices that may be used to unplug blocked arteries could instead be employed to interfere with circulatory function. Advanced drug delivery technologies and pharmacogenomics knowledge could be used to develop and deliver with greater efficiency new bioweapons, perhaps even selectively targeting certain racial or ethnic groups.”160 To deal with concerns like these, some types of biological sciences information have already been controlled and proposals have been made to develop other types of governmental or nongovernmental systems to control access to information before research is conducted or in the prepublication phase. These proposals, which are discussed next, are not without controversy. The federal government’s regulation requiring the registration of laboratories that transferred certain “select agents” — organisms and toxins identified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as potentially useful in bioterrorist activities — began in 1996.161 Registration of laboratories that possess such agents was mandated by P.L. 107-188, “The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,” enacted after the 9/11 attacks. The law requires coordination between the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to identify and regulate the use and transfer of such agents that pose a risk to public health, crops or livestock; registration of all facilities that use such agents; minimum safety requirements for registered facilities; background screening of persons using such agents; and a national database of such users. The USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56 prohibits access to select agents by certain persons, including certain immigrants, and persons with criminal or drug use history and other factors. Interim final regulations implementing these laws were issued in December 2002.162 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. A National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the “Dual Use” Dilemma, published in 2004 and dubbed the “Fink” report after the committee chairman, called for greater self-regulation by scientists, use of institutional biosafety committees at academic and research institutions to monitor research that could possibly aid terrorism, NIH review of certain types of research reports before they are published, and use of screening criteria in a prepublication review. Regarding private scientific publishing, the Fink report largely left it up to journal publishers to make decisions about prepublication review procedures for articles involving biological agents. The Fink report also urged creation of a new federal advisory board to guide nongovernmental researchers and to develop responsibility among scientists to control flows of biodefense information. But it did not propose governmental control of such research. In March 2004, the DHHS announced its intent to create a National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which became funded in 2005. It is managed and staffed by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The NSABB is chartered to have 25 voting nongovernmental members with a broad range of expertise in molecular biology, microbiology, infectious diseases, biosafety, public health, veterinary medicine, plant health, national security, biodefense, law enforcement, scientific publishing, and related fields. The NSABB also includes nonvoting ex officio members from 15 federal agencies and departments. It is supposed to advise federal departments and agencies regarding oversight of dual-use nonclassified biological research. The board’s charter also includes work to develop national policies to communicate and publish sensitive research results, a code of conduct for life sciences researchers, training programs and materials to educate the community about biosecurity, and strategies to foster international collaboration to oversee dual-use life sciences research. NIH aims to use the committee’s guidance to develop policies to require performer institutions that it funds to use Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBC), to educate researchers, to issue guidance, and to review and advise on specific experiments that might be misused or pose a threat to the public health or national security. Policy guidance will flow from the federal board to the institutional committees if there is uncertainty or disagreement regarding denial of an experiment. The NSABB met several times in 2005 and 2006; it will meet next on January 31 to February 2, 2007. During its first meeting, the board established five working groups to develop criteria to identify dual-use research; criteria to communicate results of dual-use research; a life sciences code of conduct; international perspectives on dual-use research; and guidance on chemical synthesis of bacterial and viral genomes.163 Some discussants proposed that biologists should be licensed to conduct sensitive biological research, that codes of conduct would need to be certified, and that methods of assuring compliance among research institutions would need to be developed.164 Some contended that if the scientific community did not develop methods of monitoring and protecting sensitive research, policy makers might develop and try to enforce more stringent controls that ultimately might prove to be unacceptable.165 During the July 2006 meeting, NSABB recommended in draft guidelines released for public comment that authors, institutional reviewers, and journal editors conduct a risk-benefit analysis as part of “formal procedures to presecreen the publication of findings from...dual-use projects” that might be useful to terrorists.166 During its October 25, 2006 meeting,167 which addressed the topic of synthetic biology, among other things, the Board adopted draft recommendations, published for comment, that the government “regulate potentially dangerous gene sequences instead of a list of known pathogens” since the current rules for select agents identify a finite list of organisms, and do not account for biological entities that can be synthetically engineered.168 The board “...also wants the government to require companies to screen orders for synthetic DNA against the genomes of select agents and to maintain a record of purchase orders. Neither procedure is currently mandated by law.”169 Topics for subsequent NSABB meetings include developing oversight plans and implementation processes for these guidelines in academia and in government. It is likely that some scientists will object to guidelines requiring prepublication review.170 Views on Adequacy of Biosecurity Protection Policies. Some critics say existing biosecurity protections are inadequate to prevent terrorists from obtaining and using biological information and suggest that stronger measures should be taken, such as creation of a network that interacts closely with intelligence and military agencies to prevent misuse of biological information.171 Related to this, a 2006 National Academies report, concerned about how new developments in the life sciences coupled with rapidly advancing fields such as nanotechnology and materials science could prove to threatening, endorsed the free and open change of information in the life sciences to the maximum extent possible. However, it also recommended, ! creating statutorily an independent advisory group in the security community to strengthen scientific and technical expertise within the intelligence and security communities; ! adopting and promoting a “common culture of awareness and a shared sense of responsibility within the global communities of life scientists,” including development of codes of ethics; and ! establishing, “... a decentralized, globally distributed network of informed concerned scientists who have the capacity to recognize when knowledge or technology is being used inappropriately or with the intent to cause harm”172 and whose interventions could take the form of counseling or “... reporting such activity to national authorities when its appears potentially malevolent in intent.”173 Other shortcomings in current policy have been identified. For instance, the scope of the DHHS’s NSABB board has been faulted because it does not extend to privately funded research nor harmonize international standards.174 Others criticize the select agent rules as inadequate and say federal regulations should be expanded to prevent unauthorized persons from possessing the DNA components of a select agent.175 George Church, a genetics professor at Harvard, reportedly “is organizing a consortium of researchers and academics to push the federal government to license anyone interested in purchasing DNA segments for agents of bioterror.”176 Similarly, John Steinbruner and colleagues at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), in a 2005 report, advocated mandatory licensure of researchers and institutions that conduct biodefense research. Three levels of independent review — at the institutional, national, and international level — would monitor risks and benefits of research proposals and would issue approval or disapproval for conduct of researchers and publications.177 Nongovernmental professional groups have explored the use of codes of conduct or self-policing policies178 for research topics and publications. Some publishers adopted a set of voluntary, risk-based publishing principles, called “Statement of Scientific Publication and Security,” 2003; but this, reportedly, has resulted in changes in only very few articles before publication.179 In June 2005, the American Society for Microbiology drafted a code of ethics for its members and urged them to report to “appropriate authorities” misuses of microbiology information.180 The Interacademy Panel on International Issues, consisting of most of the world’s national science academies, issued a set of principles that urged scientists to take responsibility to prevent misuse of their work.181 Two researchers, Margaret A. Somerville of McGill University and Ronald M. Atlas, President of the American Society for Microbiology, proposed an international code of ethics to prevent bioterrorism.182 Adherents to the code would refuse to conduct work that could be used in bioterrorism and would seek to restrict access of those they believe could use information maliciously. It was noted above in the section on “Nongovernmental Experts’ Recommendations To Use Risk Analysis To Identify and Control Sensitive Information,” that proposals have been made to instill in researchers a culture that discourages research that could be used malevolently, that professional peer reviews should be conducted before publication of work that should be protected, and that the federal government should define policy controls for these activities. In addition, J. Gaudioso and R. M. Salerno proposed a biosecurity risk assessment process that would restrict the use of agents that have the potential to be weaponized and that could serve as the basis for international standards. This process would involve using four Biosecurity levels: low, moderate, high, and extreme risk. The overwhelming majority of pathogens and toxins would fall into the low-risk category (requiring practices such as locking unattended laboratories and maintenance of documentation of agents used), and most select agents would be placed in the moderate-risk category (requiring additional safeguards such as access controls and personnel checks). The security measures for low-and moderate-risk categories should pose reasonable costs and largely rely on existing biosafety measures. Very few agents would be designated high risk (requiring more stringent security measures and a dedicated Biosecurity officer). Perhaps only variola major, because it is no longer found in nature would be considered an extreme risk, requiring the most stringent protections (such as comprehensive background investigations and an on-site guard force). Higher security than that currently mandated by federal regulations would only be applied for those very few agents that represent true weapon threats. Biosecurity levels should be developed and vetted by experts in biological weapons, microbiology, security, and public and agricultural health. This would help federal agencies apply uniform criteria to grantees and could form the basis for standardizing biosecurity internationally.183Brian J. Gorman proposed a risk-based alternative approach for prepublication peer review. He called for a risk-based process called “Due Process Vetting System” (DPVS) together with “... a Risk Assessment Scale RAS and a Least Restrictive Classification System for the communication, assessment, and disposition of sensitive life science research in a manner consistent with national security interests.”184 The process would be overseen by a new agency called the Biologic Regulatory Commission, modeled after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The vetting process would be triggered at the request of an author or peer reviewer if an article attained a predetermined score on the RAS set by the BRC. “The RAS surveys opinions of informed reviewers including the author of the article, the author’s Institutional Review Board or Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), and finally the journal interested in publishing the article.”185 The DPVS would safeguard highrisk articles by providing the government with a mechanism to identify “potentially dangerous articles before they reach the presses,”186 would avoid the “deleterious effects of censorship,”187 and would make articles available only to a “select academy of biodefense researchers after the authors, the publishing journal and others, reach a consensus with the government through cooperative vetting of the article in question.”188 Gorman proposed expanding the academy to a qualified body of world scientists, an approach he said is superior to the ASM model and ad hoc approaches undertaken by the majority of U.S. biosciences journals.189 Some scientists disagree with the types of aforementioned restrictions. Existing controls on “select agents,” reportedly, have caused “ ... many researchers ... to discontinue or not pursue research on regulated biological agents, rather than implement the new security regulations and bear the associated financial burden. Reportedly, the CDC expected 817 entities to register under the new select agent rule. Instead, only 323 facilities are registered with the CDC, which indicated that many institutions have discontinued their work with select agents.”190 There are also complaints that U.S. “select agent” rules can hinder cooperation from foreign scientists who cannot afford security controls and that many foreign laboratories do not meet the standards for conducting such research demanded by the U.S. government. As a result, foreign partners, some charge, may be forced to become “mere sample exporters,” and criminal sanctions might be applied to the U.S. partner in a foreign collaboration if the foreigner partner’s laboratory does not meet U.S. research security standards.191 Complaints about the CDC’s “information security” manual have led to concern by influenza researchers that the CDC is not releasing databases of virus sequences and other data needed to develop flu vaccines, thereby potentially damaging the development of public health protections.192 In addition, at the first NSABB meeting, some members suggested that instead of formal restrictions, ethics education for researchers would suffice to deal with potential problems.193 Others suggest that controls on biological research information could constrain the exchange of information needed to develop effective defenses against dangerous pathogens.194 A National Academies report, Seeking Security; Pathogens, Open Access and Genomic Data Bases, published in 2004, that had been requested by the National Science Foundation and the Central Intelligence Agency, concluded that there should be no change in current policies that allow scientists and the public unrestricted access to genome data on microbial pathogens. Access, it concluded, improves the nation’s ability to fight both bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious diseases.195 Open access to raw sequence data is unlikely to help bioterrorists develop weapons, and preventing distribution of such information could hurt research to prevent bioterrorism and emerging diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Genomic information about most dangerous pathogens is already available, it said, and if the government wants to restrict distribution of information in the future, such information should be classified. The report concluded that security against bioterrorism would be achieved best by policies that facilitate, not limit, the free flow of this information. In May 2005, the DHHS attempted to prevent the National Academy of Sciences from publishing an article in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences on how the U.S. milk supply could be tainted with botulism and control measures to prevent it. The Academy published it on the grounds that the benefits of publishing the paper giving biodefense guidance outweighed any threats.196 Other nations and international scientific groups have addressed this issue. For instance, reportedly a December 13, 2004 paper issued jointly by the United Kingdom’s Royal Society and the Wellcome Trust urged caution on government intervention. The joint paper said “government should ask scientific societies and funding institutions to take more responsibility for vetting and preventing the dissemination of risky technical details. The paper suggested that grant review forms could include a check box for bioterror issues to ensure that they are considered.”197 Also, at a meeting in June 2005 in Geneva, life scientists from several countries sought to develop a code of conduct. Biosafety in life sciences research was also a topic of discussion at an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) International “futures” program meeting in September 2004, and the National Academies held an International Forum on Biosecurity in Como, in March 2005 to discuss convergence on codes of conduct and oversight of biosecurity research.198 Issues Dealing with Geospatial Information There is considerable controversy about providing access to certain types of geospatial information, including satellite imagery and maps depicting ordinary geographic features, buildings, sensitive facilities, hazardous materials storage facilities, and so forth. Supporting more open access to such information, in March 2004, the RAND Corporation released a study recommending that the federal government should not remove geospatial information such as maps and imagery from public availability because much of it is not current enough to meet terrorists’ needs, terrorists can obtain such information from other sources, and the public benefits from access to much federal geospatial information. Instead, it recommended that the federal government develop an analytical process to assess the potential homeland security sensitivity of specific publicly available geospatial information using three filters: usefulness, uniqueness, and societal benefits and costs.199 Subsequently, in June 2005, the Homeland Security Group of the Federal Geographic Data Committee, an 18-member federal interagency group that coordinates geospatial data, issued for consideration interim200 and then final guidelines for public, private, and nonprofit organizations that originate and publicly disseminate geospatial data.201 The guidelines seek to balance “security risks and the benefits of geospatial data dissemination” and suggest how organizations can use risk-based procedures to provide access to data while protecting sensitive information. The group observed that safeguarding is justified only for data that contain sensitive information that is difficult to observe and not available from open sources, that are the unique source of the sensitive information, and for which the security risk outweighs the societal benefit of dissemination. Two options were offered to handle sensitive data before public release — changing it to remove or modify the sensitive information by summarizing it, blurring details, and so forth; or restricting the data but maintaining it in original form and making it available to those who need it, such as first responders.202 Congressional action in 2004 tightened controls on some geospatial information. Section 914 of P.L. 108-375, the Defense Authorization Act FY2005, signed on October 28, 2004, authorized a new FOIA exemption three category permitting the withholding from public disclosure of land remote sensing information prohibited from sale to nongovernment or government-approved customers for reasons of national security and under license as described by the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, (15 U.S.C. Section 5601 et seq.). Such information may not be exempted from disclosure to Congress; information disclosed to state or local government may not be made available to the public; and agencies are required to protect such information from disclosure. On November 18, 2004, the DOD’s National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) announced that for security reasons, as well as for reasons of potential intellectual property rights violations for information gathered commercially in other countries, it would “... remove its Flight Information Publications (FLIP), Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF), and related aeronautical safety of navigation digital and hardcopy publications from public sale and distribution.”203 After the review of comments was completed in November 2005,204 the agency implemented its plan. However, its rationale for removal of information focused exclusively on the intellectual property rights issue, not the security dimensions.205 In contrast to restraining information, legislation has been introduced to expand use and applications of federal remote sensing data. During the 109th Congress, H.R. 426, “Remote Sensing Applications Act of 2005,” reported favorably on June 27, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-157), would, among other things, direct the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to establish a program of grants for pilot projects to explore the integrated use of sources of remote sensing and other geospatial information to address state, local, regional, and tribal agency needs. It requires the Administrator, when awarding grants, to give preference to specified types of projects. The bill did not contain language constraining use of data. No further action occurred. The Department of Homeland Security’s SBU Directives The DHS issued an internal management directive (MD 11042) on “Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information” on May 11, 2004, to safeguard SBU information within DHS. Such information would be labeled For Official Use Only (FOUO)206 and would be defined “to identify unclassified information of a sensitive nature, not otherwise categorized by statute or regulation the unauthorized disclosure of which could adversely impact a person’s privacy or welfare, the conduct of Federal programs, or other programs or operations essential to the national interest.” Portions of the memorandum generated considerable opposition because of its mandatory and punitive employee and contractor nondisclosure requirements. In January 2005, the controversial requirements were replaced with requirements to educate employees in security practices, and the document was reissued as MD 11042.1.207 Contractors are still required to sign nondisclosure agreements, and DHS employees and contractors are still subject to administrative or disciplinary action for violating the policies.208 The directive identified several types of control labels that could be SBU, including FOUO, CII, and SSI and so forth and 11 types of sensitive unclassified information that can be designated for official use only (FOUO) — a type of SBU — by any DHS employee, consultant, or contractor. The list includes one clearly identifiable technology-related item, which conceivably might include the results of DHS-sponsored or conducted scientific research and development: (k) Developing or current technology, the release of which could hinder the objectives of DHS, compromise a technological advantage or countermeasure, cause a denial of service, or provide an adversary with sufficient information to clone, counterfeit, or circumvent a process or system.209 P.L. 107-296 specified that, if “practicable,” DHS’s research is to be unclassified, but the Presidential signing statement may have mitigated this provision.210 It remains to be seen how this SBU regulation will affect information generated by DHS-funded research and development grants and contracts, and what the response will be of universities that conduct research for DHS under its academic centers of excellence programs. Access to the information covered by the DHS SBU directive is on a “need-toknow” basis, and information can be shared with cleared homeland security personnel at state and local levels. The directive said the use of the FOUO designation did not automatically exempt information from disclosure under FOIA but “information requested by the public under a FOIA request must still be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.” The information would retain the FOUO designation until the originator or other officials determine otherwise. Procedures to protect and disseminate such information outside of DHS were spelled out, including requirements for secure storage and suggestions for encrypted Internet and telephone communications. Some other agencies also require employees to sign nondisclosure agreements in order to protect SBU information.211 (See below in the section labeled “Critique of Nondisclosure Requirements.”) Contentious Issues, Together With Legislative Action and Other Options The need to balance security and access poses a dilemma for policymakers that was captured in the text of a joint report prepared in December 2004 by the Heritage Foundation and Center for Strategic and International Studies. The report noted that “It is necessary to strike the right balances in sharing information with or withholding information from the public. Policies that are either overly neglectful or overzealous ill serve efforts to enhance homeland security.”212 Some critics contend that many government-instituted controls on sensitive information, or on scientific and technical information, may be unwarranted. For instance, OMB Watch, an interest group newsletter that advocates more access to information, maintains an inventory and website that lists information that federal and state agencies have removed from public access for security reasons.213 In March 2005, Steven Aftergood, the editor of Secrecy News, published online by the Federation of American Scientists, catalogued information deleted, sometimes, he contends, inappropriately, from government files or to which public access has been denied. This information includes unclassified technical reports from the Los Alamos National Laboratory, 30- to 50-year old historical records at the National Archives, orbits of Earth satellites, aeronautical maps, and data previously available from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.214 Some of the critiques of information control policies in specific scientific and technical arenas have already been described in this report. In addition, a number of criticisms have been made that cut across sensitive information controls broadly and may influence decisions about balancing security and access to sensitive unclassified information. These criticisms, which are discussed next, focus on allegations that some controls can exacerbate vulnerability or stifle scientific research and technological innovation; vagaries in nondisclosure requirements; the relationship of SBU to FOIA; inconsistency in agencies’ definitions of and processes to identify SBU information; developing a standard definition of SBU information; monitoring agency use of risk-based standards for SBU; and recommendations for better governance of SBU information procedures. These sections also identify legislation that has been introduced and action Congress has taken on some of these issues. Allegations That Some Controls Can Exacerbate Vulnerability and Stifle Scientific Research and Technological Innovation Sensitive information controls may protect vulnerable buildings and public services from terrorist threats, but some critics allege that preventing access to such information can exacerbate vulnerabilities and stifle the development of innovations to enhance protection. According to one critic, A large sign in New York City, indicating the location of a natural pipeline was taken down after a website posted a photograph of the sign.... Although federal regulations require that the location of natural gas lines be made as obvious as possible to the public for safety reasons, the company that owns the pipeline asserted that local laws allowed the sign’s removal. ... The regulations requiring that natural gas pipelines be clearly marked were established to prevent accidental rupture that often causes injuries an deaths to residents, contractors, and energy responders. Ironically, removing such information puts the public in greater danger of lethal accidents.215 Some say that protections on information access and dissemination are especially burdensome to scientific research and academic research and that the scientific community’s potential to generate knowledge and innovations to assist in combating terrorism could be compromised by overzealous information security controls. For instance, “terrorists will obtain knowledge,” one critic emphasized.216 “Our best option is to blunt their efforts to exploit it. Keeping scientists from sharing information damages our ability to respond to terrorism and to natural disease, which is more likely and just as devastating. Our best hope to head off both threats may well be to stay one step ahead.”217 On October 18, 2002, the three presidents of the National Academies issued a statement that sought to balance security and openness in disseminating scientific information. It summarized the policy dilemma by saying that “restrictions are clearly needed to safeguard strategic secrets; but openness also is needed to accelerate the progress of technical knowledge and enhance the nation’s understanding of potential threats.” The statement encouraged the government to reiterate government policy that basic scientific research should not be classified, that nonclassified research reporting should not be restricted, and that vague and poorly defined categories of research information, such as sensitive but unclassified, should not be used. “The inevitable effect is to stifle scientific creativity and to weaken national security.” The statement outlined “action points” for both government and professional societies to consider when developing a dialogue about procedures to safeguard scientific and technical information that could possibly be of use to potential terrorists. An American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report addressing governmental restrictions on science, observed that “the ‘sensitive but unclassified’ and equivalent categories that effectively bar public access to information must be eliminated. All information should either be properly classified or unrestricted.”218 Similarly, the American Association of University Professors recommended, “We should resist or seek to repeal efforts to regulate unduly, or to make secret, the results of lawful research projects under novel uses of the “sensitive but unclassified” rubric.”219 The National Academies held a workshop on this subject early in 2003, in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Subsequently, the CSIS and the Academies established a “Roundtable on Scientific Communication and National Security,” a working group composed of scientific and security leaders that will hold continuing discussions to try to develop a workable publications policy. (For additional information, see the aforementioned CRS Report RL31845.) The National Academies also have a separate Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security (CSCANS), whose purpose is to clarify “the national interest with regard to these issues, and inform the policy debate on the relationship between science and national security.”220 The Academy also established a Committee on a “New University-Government Partnership for Science and Security,” to hold regional meetings that will 1) bring together faculty and research administrators, government officials from research and national security agencies, and congressional members; and 2) focus on a. restrictive clauses in federal contracts and grants; b. dissemination of scientific information; c. sensitive but unclassified information; and d. the management of biological agents in academic research.221 A legal author argued that including SBU information clauses in contracts is “constitutionally suspect,” especially with regard to university-conducted research that is supported as an essential public good. Use of the term SBU raises “... the possibility of government censorship of private speech ... the primary danger addressed by the Free Speech Clause,”222 and imposes “... a prior restraint on private speech,”223 even though there may not be enough of a threshold level of national security danger to overcome the right to free speech. These considerations, ... suggest ... that SBU secrecy controls that reach into university discourse pose a particular danger because of the special role of the university in promoting innovation and expression outside of government control and because, with respect to scientific information in particular, the university has a special role in conducting research for the purpose of expansion and dissemination of knowledge. Although the government shapes expression on university campuses in many ways, the expectation is that expression not identified as the Government’s will be unconstrained. The special role of the university thus must weigh in the constitutional balance.224 According to this author, government may have a legitimate constitutional right to protect SBU information in contracts, if there is sufficient national security reason, if uniform definitions linked to specific levels of national security danger are used, if there are review procedures, and if the method used to control information is the least restrictive necessary to fulfill the government’s legitimate interests.225 Some say that placing controls on unclassified information could negatively affect governmental relations with the private sector and procurement for information technology and other contracts. New ideas for information security technologies, including hard technology, software and biotech-related products, often come from overseas, as do bids for contracts to handle sensitive agency information. Reportedly, foreign vendors will have trouble complying with contracts that need to meet information security standards. It has been reported that requests for proposals (RFPs) coming from the Defense Security Services involving data processing for its SBU information say that employees of potential vendors need to be U.S. citizens, with background checks. DHS and DOT procurement rules involving sensitive information specify background checks for prime or subcontractors and that nondisclosure forms have to be signed.226 There is also the view that scientists who voluntarily agree to pre-research and prepublication reviews of research articles could harm a university’s ability to conduct fundamental research involving foreigners as permitted by National Security Decision Directive-189 (NSDD-189) and related regulations. (For additional information, see a previous section of this report entitled “Summary of Federal Policies to Classify or Control Scientific and Technical Information.” According to Robert Hardy of the nonprofit Council on Governmental Relations ... by placing restrictions on publishing ... the Department of Homeland Security-funded centers of excellence could risk losing the privileges that universities enjoy because they do fundamental research — defined a work whose results are ‘published and shared broadly within the scientific community.’ One important privilege is being able to involve foreign nationals in any research project without obtaining a government license.227
Biowarfare leads to extinction and is the biggest existential threat facing humanity – technological increase checks empirics and generic defense
Smart 4 (John Smart – President of the Institute for the Study of Accelerating Change. 2004
Genetically modified pathogen (GMP) Policy, August 03)
It is possible that with the mobilization of massive logistical resources around the planet, we will prevail over genetically modified and engineered pathogens (GMPs). But I would not bet on it. It would be great to have a sensor network, but with most Health and Human Services offices lacking a basic Internet connection, we have a way to go. From what I can tell, a crash-program in antiviral development may provide a ray of hope (e.g., HDP-cidofovir and some more evolutionarily robust and broad-spectrum host-based strategies). Most importantly, from my random walk through government labs, talks with policy planners, CDC folk and DOD Red Team members, I haven’t seen any policy bifurcation for GMPs (for detection and response). I think there should be distinct policy consideration given to GMPs vs. natural pathogens. The threat from GMPs is much greater than from natural pathogens, and the strategic response would need special planning. For example, the vaccinations that eradicated smallpox last time around may not be effective for IL-4 modified smallpox, and in-situ quarantine may be needed. “Telecommuting” for many forms of work will need to be pre-enabled, especially remote operation of the public utilities and MAE-East andWest and other critical NAP nodes of the Internet. The delicate "virus-host balance" observed in nature (whereby viruses tend not to be overly lethal to their hosts) is a byproduct of biological co-evolution on a geographically segregated planet. And now, both of those limitations have changed. Organisms can be re-engineered in ways that biological evolution would not have explored, nor allowed to spread widely, and modern transportation undermines natural quarantine formation. In evolution, pathogens do not become overly lethal to their host, for that limits their own propagation to a geographically-bound quarantine zone. Evolution may have created 100 lethal pathogens in the past, but those pathogens are now extinct because they killed all of their locally available hosts. A custom-engineered or modified pathogen such as IL-4 Smallpox may not observe that delicate virus-host balance, nor the slow pace of evolutionary time scales, and could engender extinction level events with a rapidity never before seen on Earth. Bottom line, I think a lot more (and more selective) biotech security would be helpful. But I wonder what assumptions go into their model for the rate of spread and the human dynamic among care givers and quarantine enforcers. Using Ro from past pandemics might not be accurate. Self-quarantine would certainly occur, and economic collapse is probably a given. People would not go to work. I guess that’s the best scenario. Let's assume IL-4 mousepox and smallpox have similar effects on their hosts (this is an unknown). The IL-4 splice into mousepox made smallpox 100 lethal to its host, and 60 lethal to mice who had been vaccinated (more than 2 weeks prior). Even with a vaccine, the IL-4 mousepox is twice as lethal as natural smallpox (which killed 30 of unvaccinated people). The last wave of “natural” human smallpox killed over one billion people. Even if we vaccinated everyone, the next wave could be twice as lethal. And, of course, we won’t have time to vaccinate everyone nor can we contain outbreaks with vaccinations. The ratio of those available to enforce quarantine to those contained makes this seem completely infeasible. With unplanned quarantine locations, there is no physical infrastructure to assist in the containment. With some planning, we could think about containment suits (expensive) and accelerating trials of antivirals like HDP cidofovir. Unfortunately, this is just one example, and not a particularly difficult genetic modification. According to Preston in The Demon in the Freezer, a single person in a typical university biolab can splice the IL-4 gene from the host into the corresponding pox virus. The techniques and effects are public information. The gene is available mail order. Every year technology trends are lowering the “barriers to entry” to the world of mass destruction. It used to take a coordinated effort of many people to kill a million people. And a billion people, well, leave that to smallpox. Compare nuclear weapons to bio weapons. Information access, raw material access and popular experience with the techniques differ widely. Biotech knowledge is tightly coupled to economic progress. Commercial interests ensure the availability of materials, know how and trained people. We are entering an era where a single person can design, build and release a weapon of mass destruction. And it does not require a "rocket scientist" any more or an expensive lab. The opening line of his forthcoming book: ”Biological warfare is the largest threat to the human race, a substantially bigger threat than nuclear war.” The reasons pivot on relative ease of access, difficulty in monitoring (vs. radioactive materials), and distributed effects from deployment. Recent bioweapons, such as anthrax, were trivial to manufacture and distribute, but they were the “BB guns” of bioweapons (treatable with antibiotics and non-contagious). Contagious pathogens engender an entirely unique set of social phenomena. A planned release of a contagious pathogen would trigger a massive wave of social isolation and economic collapse. Simply, people would not go to work. And yes, “weaponizing” pathogens for survival in a container (in a rocket for example) and efficiently releasing it at the right altitude with just the right droplet size is difficult. But that’s overkill, so to speak, and reflects a cold war era mentality. Since the terrorists can be among us, they have much easier options. They can let nature run its course by self-infecting and then riding the subways and circulating in airports for days. If they figure out the perfume bottles, they can work on aerosol release on the last day of a pediatrics conference (before everyone flies home). They have many simple options that don’t need a lab. Here is some more detail from Richard Preston on the relative ease of working with bioweapons, in this case IL-4 smallpox: “It was a formula for a superweapon… It's so simple that a grad student could do it… The standard cookbook for engineering a virus is a four-volume series of bright red ring binders entitled Current Protocols in Molecular Biology… it's sold on Amazon... Designing a hotter strain of smallpox is as simple as following a recipe-style protocol outlined in binder four, section 16.15. So long as you have a stock of smallpox, the genes that you'd want to insert can be ordered through the mail. If people are evil enough to use smallpox as a weapon, Mr. Jahrling reasons, surely they would be willing to tweak it to make it more deadly.” Of course, smallpox is just one example, and access to the pathogen is difficult today: “Many experts believe, however, that the smallpox virus is not confined to these 2 official repositories and may be in the possession of states or subnational groups pursuing active biological weapons programs. Of particular importance and concern is the legacy of the former Soviet Union's biological weapons program. It is widely known that the former Soviet Union maintained a stockpile of 20 tons of smallpox virus in its biological weapons arsenal throughout the 1970s, and that, by 1990, they had a plant capable of producing 80 - 100 tons of smallpox per year.” Many of those scientists have since scattered around the globe. The quote comes from the Dark Winter simulation, which predicted millions of infections and the collapse of the U.S. economy within two months, all from 30g of smallpox released in three cities. Bill Joy summarizes that “The risk of our extinction as we pass through this time of danger has been estimated to be anywhere from 30 to 50.”
Absent secrecy, certain cooperative research efforts would be impossible
Downs 4 (DA Downs – The Independent Institute, Oakland and The University of Wiscosin, Madison, “Restoring Free Speech and Liberty on Campus”, pg. xvi, http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5243N.pdf , EmmieeM)
Although this book stresses the threats to academic and intellectual freedom posed by speech codes and related policies, it should be noted that freedom is also threatened by other sources, especially in the post-September II world. To begin, the modern university has long been engaged in industrial and governmental research that coexists uneasily with the university’s erstwhile mission of open discourse. Such research benefits society and brings needed money into the university. But the benefits sometimes come at a price that includes limitations on speech and discourse. This trend has accelerated in recent years as state support has declined while the costs of higher education have escalated. Today, many universities engage in research with government agencies and corporations that require recipients to maintain contexts, the extension of such gag orders poses a challenge to the idea of an open university.
Continued government funding and support is critical for continued university research programs, which is the lynchpin of innovation and competitiveness
NSB no date (National Science Board, “Research and Development: Essential Foundation For U.S. Competitiveness in a Global Economy”, “Global Competition in Science and Technology: A Strong National Response Required”, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsb0803/start.htm, EmmieeM)
Innovation is a key to economic competitiveness and the technological breakthroughs that improve our lives. Basic research fuels technological innovations and is critical in fostering the vitality of the U.S. science and technology enterprise and the growth of highly-skilled jobs. The scientific and technological advances that have led to our Nation’s remarkable ability to create new industries and jobs, improve the standard of living for people, and provide sophisticated technology that ensures our national security can be traced back to the outcomes of basic research. Although industry funds two-thirds of U.S. RandD, the majority of basic research is conducted by research universities, and the U.S. Government has long recognized the importance of public support for these institutions. The Federal Government established the basis for the Nation’s land grant institutions through the Morrill Acts4 in the second h
alf of the 19th century. During World War II, the wartime success of the partnership between universities and the Federal Government through the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) led to a proposal—requested by the President—from the head of OSRD for public funding for research, specifically basic research, in academic institutions and research institutes. Such funding would encourage the creation of knowledge and employ science and engineering (SandE) for discovery and innovation—and thereby expand national economic growth, increase employment, and improve the quality of life.
This proposal ultimately led to the creation of the National Science Foundation (NSF). Through its support of entities that fund basic research, the U.S. Government helps underwrite our national infrastructure for science and engineering RandD and thereby the global preeminence of the U.S. in SandE innovation. Over time, the Federal Government support for RandD, and the related important efforts of industry, have grown into a complex and changing web. Given the impacts on the national innovation infrastructure of changes in investment patterns, it is imperative that patterns and trends of RandD investments be monitored.
Competitiveness is key to US dominance – we need to keep innovating faster to ensure economic prosperity and hegemony
Segal 04 – Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations
Adam, Foreign Affairs, “Is America Losing Its Edge?” November / December 2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20041101facomment83601/adam-segal/is-america-losing-its-edge.html
The United States' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to develop new technologies and industries faster than anyone else. For the last five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and technological entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity and military power. It was Americans who invented and commercialized the semiconductor, the personal computer, and the Internet; other countries merely followed the U.S. lead. Today, however, this technological edge-so long taken for granted-may be slipping, and the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development (RandD), and preferential policies for science and technology (SandT) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality of their science and ensuring the exploitation of future innovations. The percentage of patents issued to and science journal articles published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising. Indian companies are quickly becoming the second-largest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of software for clients around the world. South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications software. And even China has made impressive gains in advanced technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing. Although the United States' technical dominance remains solid, the globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system. Indeed, as the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological innovation and a significant threat to it. The United States will never be able to prevent rivals from developing new technologies; it can remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster than everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep its privileged position in the world, the United States must get better at fostering technological entrepreneurship at home.
Loss of competitiveness results in great power conflict—retrenchment makes war inevitable and ensures the US would be dragged in – that causes your heg bad impacts
Khalilzad 11 — Zalmay Khalilzad, Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush, served as the director of policy planning at the Defense Department during the Presidency of George H.W. Bush, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, 2011 (“The Economy and National Security,” National Review, February 8th, Available Online at http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/259024, Accessed 02-08-2011)
Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today. The policy question is how to enhance economic growth and employment while cutting discretionary spending in the near term and curbing the growth of entitlement spending in the out years. Republican members of Congress have outlined a plan. Several think tanks and commissions, including President Obama’s debt commission, have done so as well. Some consensus exists on measures to pare back the recent increases in domestic spending, restrain future growth in defense spending, and reform the tax code (by reducing tax expenditures while lowering individual and corporate rates). These are promising options. The key remaining question is whether the president and leaders of both parties on Capitol Hill have the will to act and the skill to fashion bipartisan solutions. Whether we take the needed actions is a choice, however difficult it might be. It is clearly within our capacity to put our economy on a better trajectory. In garnering political support for cutbacks, the president and members of Congress should point not only to the domestic consequences of inaction — but also to the geopolitical implications. As the United States gets its economic and fiscal house in order, it should take steps to prevent a flare-up in Asia. The United States can do so by signaling that its domestic challenges will not impede its intentions to check Chinese expansionism. This can be done in cost-efficient ways. While China’s economic rise enables its military modernization and international assertiveness, it also frightens rival powers. The Obama administration has wisely moved to strengthen relations with allies and potential partners in the region but more can be done. Some Chinese policies encourage other parties to join with the United States, and the U.S. should not let these opportunities pass. China’s military assertiveness should enable security cooperation with countries on China’s periphery — particularly Japan, India, and Vietnam — in ways that complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus. China’s mercantilist policies and currency manipulation — which harm developing states both in East Asia and elsewhere — should be used to fashion a coalition in favor of a more balanced trade system. Since Beijing’s over-the-top reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese democracy activist alienated European leaders, highlighting human-rights questions would not only draw supporters from nearby countries but also embolden reformers within China. Since the end of the Cold War, a stable economic and financial condition at home has enabled America to have an expansive role in the world. Today we can no longer take this for granted. Unless we get our economic house in order, there is a risk that domestic stagnation in combination with the rise of rival powers will undermine our ability to deal with growing international problems. Regional hegemons in Asia could seize the moment, leading the world toward a new, dangerous era of multi-polarity.
