Tournament: all | Round: 1 | Opponent: all | Judge: all
jeffreyzhang1999@gmail.com
2816507296

Tournament: University of Houston Cougar Classic | Round: 2 | Opponent: Tess Welch | Judge: Rebbeca Gelfer
I value morality as the term ought in the resolution entails a moral obligation.

Moral obligations have to be universal and undeniable. In order for these obligations to exist functionally, the authority behind them can’t be subverted or avoided. In order for this to be true, their authority must be derived by virtue of their existence
Velleman 1, Professor of Philosophy, Bioethics; Director of Undergraduate Studies, Ph.D., Princeton, 1983, 2006
(J. David, “A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN ETHICS,” 2006, accessed Dec. 1, GS)

A duty, to begin with, is a practical requirement—a requirement to do something or not to do something. But there are many practical requirements that aren't duties. If you want to read Kant in the original, you have to learn German: there's a practical requirement. Federal law requires you to make yourself available to serve on a jury: there's another practical requirement. But these two requirements have features that clearly distinguish them from moral obligations or duties.  The first requires you to learn German only if you want to read Kant in the original. This requirement is consequently escapable: you can gain exemption from it by giving up the relevant desire. Give up wanting to read Kant in the original and you can forget about this requirement, since it will no longer apply to you. The second requirement is also escapable, but it doesn't point to an escape hatch so clearly, since it doesn't contain an "if" clause stating a condition by which its application is limited. Nevertheless, its force as a requirement depends on the authority of a particular body—namely, the U.S. Government. Only if you are subject to the authority of the U.S. Government does this requirement apply to you. Hence you can escape the force of this requirement by escaping the authority of the Government: immunity to the authority of the body entails immunity to its requirements. Now, Kant claimed—plausibly, I think—that our moral duties are inescapable in both of these senses. If we are morally obligated to do something, then we are obligated to do it no matter what our desires, interests, or aims may be. We cannot escape the force of the obligation by giving up some particular desires, interests, or aims. Nor can we escape the force of an obligation by escaping from the jurisdiction of some authority such as the Government. Kant expressed the inescapability of our duties by calling them categorical as opposed to hypothetical.  According to Kant, the force of moral requirements does not even depend on the authority of God. There is a simple argument for denying this dependence. If we were subject to moral requirements because they were imposed on us by God, the reason would have to be that we are subject to a requirement to do what God requires of us; and the force of this latter requirement, of obedience to God, could not itself depend on God's authority. (To require obedience to God on the grounds that God requires it would be viciously circular.) The requirement to obey God's requirements would therefore have to constitute a fundamental duty, on which all other duties depended; and so God's authority would not account for the force of our duties, after all. Since this argument will apply to any figure or body conceived as issuing requirements, we can conclude that the force of moral requirements must not depend on the authority of any figure or body by which they are conceived to have been issued.  

1. The source of normativity is reason. To be moral is to be in line with reason. To be immoral is to be in violation of reason.
   Velleman 2, Professor of Philosophy, Bioethics; Director of Undergraduate Studies, Ph.D., Princeton, 1983, 2006
   (J. David, “A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN ETHICS,” 2006)
    As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, however, we can hear something odd in our question. To ask "Why should I?" is to demand a reason; and so to ask "Why should I act for reasons?" is to demand a reason for acting for reasons.  This demand implicitly concedes the very authority that it purports to questions—namely, the authority of reasons.  Why would we demand a reason if we didn't envision acting for it?  If we really didn't feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so certainly wouldn't help.  So theres is something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons.
   Reason is universal; a reason for you must be a reason for me.
   Velleman 3, Professor of Philosophy, Bioethics; Director of Undergraduate Studies, Ph.D., Princeton, 1983, 2006
   (J. David, “A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN ETHICS,” 2006,)
   In Kant's view, being a person consists in being a rational creature, both cognitively and practically.  And Kant thought that our rationality gives us a glimpse of—and hence an aspiration toward—a perspective even more inclusive than that of our persisting individual selves.  Rational creatures have access to a shared perspective, from which they not only see the same things but can also see the visibility of those things to all rational creatures.  Consider, for example, our capacity for arithmetic reasoning.  Anyone who adds 2 and 2 sees, not just that the sum is 4, but also that anyone who added 2 and 2 would see that it's 4, and that such a person would see this, too, and so on.  The facts of elementary arithmetic are thus common knowledge among all possible reasoners, in the sense that every reasoner knows them, and knows that every reasoner knows them, and knows that every reasoner knows that the every reasoner knows them, and so on. As arithmetic reasoners, then, we have access to a perspective that is constant not only across time but also between persons.  We can compute the sum of 2 and 2 once and for all, in the sense that we would only get the same answer on any other occasion; and each of us can compute the sum of 2 and 2 one for all, in the sense that the others would only get the same answer.  What's more, the universality of our perspective on the sum of 2 and 2 is evident to each of us from within that very perspective. In computing the sum of 2 and 2, we are aware of computing it for all, from a perspective that's shared by all arithmetic reasoners.  In this sense, our judgment of the sum is authoritative, because it speaks for the judgment of all. This shared perspective is like a vantage point overlooking the individual perspectives of reasoners, a standpoint from which we not only see what everyone sees but also see everyone seeing it.  And once we glimpse the availability of this vantage point, we cannot help but aspire to attain it.  We are no longer satisfied with estimating or guessing the sum of two numbers, given the possibility of computing it once for all: we are ineluctably drawn to the perspective of arithmetic reason. Note that the aspect of arithmetic judgments to which we are drawn in this case, resembles the authority that we initially regarded as definitive of moral requirements: it's the authority of being inescapable. We can compute the sum of 2 and 2 once for all because the answer we reach is the answer that would be reached from any perspective and is therefore inescapable. We can approach the sum of 2 and 2 from wherever we like, and we will always arrive at the same answer. The case of arithmetic reasoning shows that inescapability can in fact appeal to us, because it is the feature in virtue of which judgments constitute a stable and all-encompassing point-of-view. Perhaps, then, the authority of moral judgments, which consists in their inescapability, can appeal to us in similar fashion, by offering an attractive vantage point of some kind.
   2. Actions are expressions of an agent’s reasoning from their end to the means, which unifies their action into a cohesive movement as opposed to fragmented steps. ROEDL:
   Sebastian Roedl.  Prof. Of Philosophy, University of Leipzig.  “Two Forms of Practical Knowledge and Their Unity” in  Ford and Hornsby, Eds. Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 239.

   “We can give a more specific description of the consciousness of temporal unity that constitutes that unity: it is an act of reasoning. For example, she who is crossing the street because she is getting bread reasons in this way: wanting to get bread, she thinks the fact that the bakery is across the street is a reason to cross the street. She reasons from her end (getting bread) to the means (crossing the street). The unity of the movement represented in “She is doing A” is constituted by reasoning of this form: she is doing A by holding together in one consciousness her idea of doing A and her idea of doing B, being conscious of her nexus.”
   For example, the end of reaching the bakery unifies the individual actions necessary for that end, like crossing the street; otherwise the individual steps would not have any meaning. Thus, contradictory ends would never yield an action because willing A and not A would not allow you to unify the necessary steps to achieve that end. And, this also proves an intent foresight distinction. If consequences were relevant, we would have to will the possibility of contradictory ends since an action can have different and conflicting results, which wouldn't allow you to unify your will.  
   2. Non-contradictions are constraints because a principle cannot be true and false at the same time otherwise it yields incompatible obligations, so the form of the will to abide any moral theory must first will it as universal.
   3. Thus, morality must be based on pure principle, which entails universalizability since the only coherent moral principles are ones that could exist as moral principles; but a contradictory maxim doesn’t make sense as a principle and thus couldn’t be morally obligatory.

You cannot universally will a violation of freedom as a maxim because doing so presupposes that you had freedom to bring about that the violation in the first place. This entails an Omnilateral will or a higher authority to deal with rights conflicts.
Ripstein, Arthur. “Kant on Law and Politics.” University of Toronto Law School. http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Ripstein/Kant_on_law.pdf.
Kant’s point about disputes is not just a reiteration of Locke’s familiar claim that people often disagree about the application of principles to particular situations, especially when their interests are at stake. Unilateral judgment is a problem because of the two dimensions of the innate right of humanity. The innate right to freedom demands that people be able to acquire things as their means without the explicit leave of others. Rightful honor requires people to stand up for their rights, and so that no person defer to any other private person’s judgment in cases of dispute about what either is permitted to do. If you think that you have performed an act establishing a right, you are entitled to stand by your claim in the face of all who contest it, but those who contest it are no less entitled to stand by their claims. Rightful honor requires that each party accept no standard other than “what seems right and good” to him.”24 The only reason to defer is because you can’t win. Might makes right, regardless of how "good and law-abiding" you or the person who disputes your claim might be. The solution to disputes about rights is to make the omnilateral will institutional. Disputes can be resolved in a way that is consistent with rightful honor if the parties to it are subject to the authority of an impartial judge, and an enforcer who can carry out the decision. The state is a generalized version of this structure. It is a common authority, charged with making, applying, and enforcing law. It is legitimate because it makes it possible for people to resolve disputes about rights in a way that is consistent with the rightful honour of all. Legitimacy flows from what the state does, and so does not require an explicit act of instituting it.

Thus the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will
AND Rectification of justice is key to the framework.
Arthur Ripstein (Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto) “Force and Freedom” Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England, Harvard University Press, 2009,
Normatively, the law survives any wrong against it. In the world of space and time, however, the wrong has an effect, and the only way to restore that supremacy of law is to restore its effectiveness, so that the violation is without legal effect. The wrongdoer violated the law by violating some particular prohibition; to restore the supremacy of the law, that very prohibition must be upheld. The crime is an illicit exemption from an aspect of the law’s supremacy; the punishment excludes the criminal from that very aspect of its protection. The thief ’s spe cific maxim—the spe cific way in which she uses prohibited means—must be turned against her because an individually asserted unilateral exemption from the law is juridically impossible: a per- son cannot act so as to exempt herself from the law. Instead, she must be taken to have chosen something else. Her maxim is one that is contrary to freedom under public law. The only way the state can recognize and respond to her maxim is by must treating it as its own mirror image, as the criminal’s exclusion of herself from the very same public law. The thief ’s specific maxim is of the form “all property is entirely subject to my choice,” that is, “there is no property to me.” The punishment inverts the maxim from a challenge to the authority of public law to an exclusion from it: the thief is held to the implications of her own maxim, and so is excluded from the system of property: there is property, but not for her. Property persists, because the criminal cannot eliminate it unilaterally, but she can exclude herself from it through her unilateral act. In willing that the property of another be subject to her choice, the criminal is taken to have willed that there be no property for her, since her maxim is inconsistent with the possibility of property. The use of force that responds to this must be the objectification of the maxim, the turning of the criminal’s maxim against itself. The criminal wants to be exempt from the rule of property by making the law of property nothing to others; the punishment exempts her in a different sense by making the law of property nothing to her. She makes a rule only for herself; the law responds by limiting its application to her alone. Her hindrance to freedom is thus hindered by sealing it off.

Contention 1 is hate speech

Hate speech is protected by the First amendment, And Federal Courts have continued to support this interpretation
Eugene Volokh May 7, 2015 Eugene Volokh teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law, where he has also often taught copyright law, criminal law, and a seminar on firearms regulation policy.
The Washington Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/

I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) The same is true of the other narrow exceptions, such as for true threats of illegal conduct or incitement intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal conduct (i.e., illegal conduct in the next few hours or maybe days, as opposed to some illegal conduct some time in the future). Indeed, threatening to kill someone because he’s black (or white), or intentionally inciting someone to a likely and immediate attack on someone because he’s Muslim (or Christian or Jewish), can be made a crime. But this isn’t because it’s “hate speech”; it’s because it’s illegal to make true threats and incite imminent crimes against anyone and for any reason, for instance because they are police officers or capitalists or just someone who is sleeping with the speaker’s ex-girlfriend.

Defamation attempts inherent in hate speech and racist statements are logically inconsistent with the conception of equal freedoms under the omnilateral will
Varden, Helga Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010 Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech 

What about defamation, how does it involve coercion? Attempts at defamation also constitute attempts non-consensually to deprive others of what is theirs, namely their good reputations as determined by their actions. Corresponding to a person’s innate right to freedom, Kant argues, is that person’s duty to “Be an honourable human being… Rightful honour… consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others” (6: 236). To defend one’s rightful honor is to defend one’s right to be recognized by others solely by the deeds one has performed. Indeed, one’s reputation, Kant explains, “is an innate external belonging” (6: 295); it can originally belong only to the person whose deeds are in question. If others spread falsehoods about the life she has lived, then she has the right and duty to challenge their lies publicly, for her reputation belongs only to her and to no one else. A person’s reputation is not a means subject to other people’s choice; it is not a means others have a right to manipulate in order to pursue their own ends. To permit this, Kant argues, would be to permit others to use your person as their own means, or to “make yourself a mere means for others” rather than also being “at the same time an end for them” (6: 236). Let me say briefly how this account of rightful honor analyzes cases like Holocaust-denial. Part of what makes denying the Holocaust different from other types of defamation is that it involves people who are no longer alive. On the Kantian approach I am advancing, one’s reputation is seen as intimately connected with how one has interacted normatively with others (6: 291). To interact normatively is to be capable of normativity or capable of interacting qua ‘noumena’, as Kant says, and not merely ‘qua phenomena’ or as embodied beings governed by laws of nature. It is qua noumena that we are capable of deeds or of having actions imputed to us. And it is qua noumena that we can still be defamed long after we are dead.3 Because right tracks normative relations, that one is no longer alive is beside the point. What is more, anyone – “relatives or strangers” – can challenge the lies told by another on behalf of the dead. Indeed, the one challenging the defamation does so in virtue of her own duty to ensure the conditions under which we can have rightful honor (6: 295). The reason is that those who spread such lies do not only express an unwillingness to respect those they defame in particular, but also they display a general unwillingness to interact in a way compatible with the rightful honor of everyone. The absence of defamation is necessary for public opinion to be reconcilable with each person’s right to freedom and the corresponding duty to be an honorable being. By defaming the dead, a person aims to falsify the public opinion, upon which everyone is dependent for rightful honor. Consequently, every member of the public has a right to challenge such lies on behalf of the dead.
This reifies the historical failures of the state to recognize certain marginalized groups as equal in moral standing, which is the duty of the omnilateral will.
Varden 2 , Helga Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010 Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech
On the Kantian view I have been developing, hate speech and speech amounting to harassment are not outlawed because they track private wrongdoing as such, but rather because they tracks the state’s historical and current inability to provide some group(s) of citizens with rightful conditions of interaction. This type of public law tries to remedy the fact that some citizens have been and still are ‘more equal than others’. Hence, if the state finds that it is still unable successfully to provide conditions under which protection and for the empowerment of its historically oppressed, and thus vulnerable, are secured, then it is within its rightful powers to legally regulate speech and harassment to improve its ability to do so. By putting its weight behind historically the oppressed and vulnerable citizens, the state seeks to overcome the problems caused by its lack of recognition in the past and its current failure to provide conditions in which its citizens interact with respect for one as free and equal. Therefore, whether or not any instance of speech actually achieves insult is inconsequential, for that is not the justification for the state’s right to outlaw it. Rather, laws regulating speech and harassment track the state’s systemic inability to provide rightful interaction for all of its citizens. Note that this argument does not, nor must it, determine which particular usages of hate speech and speech amounting to harassment should be banned. It only explains why certain kinds and circumstances of speech and harassment can and should be outlawed and why public law, rather than private law, is the proper means for doing so. Determining which types and how it should be banned is matter for public debate and reflection followed by public regulation on behalf of all citizens.

Contention 2 is Seditious Speech

Second, the AFF allows for seditious speech, which delegitimizes the omnilateral will.
Varden, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010
Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech - MG
To understand Kant’s condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does consider seditious speech a public crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the government or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as seditious, the speaker’s intention must be to encourage and support efforts to subvert the government or to instigate its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might. Since the state is the only means through which right can replace might, the state outlaws it. And since it is a crime that “endangers the commonwealth” rather than citizens qua private citizens, it is a public crime (6: 331).

Tournament: Colleyville | Round: 1 | Opponent: Westwood AD | Judge: Long phil
The right to set ends must exist, otherwise ethics becomes incoherent, this is because Ethical theories are predicated on the notion that individuals have to deliberate between multiple courses of action. If agents are incapable of setting their own ends ethics cannot prescribe action

The ability to will your actions necessarily requires a right to property
Buck '87 (Wayne, Yale, "Kant's Justification of Private Property." In New Essays on Kant. Ed. den Ouden, 227-244.) -OS
Because human beings have the right to pursue their ends (i.e. they have the right to external freedom) they have a right to act in those ways necessary for achieving any ends at all. When we act to attain some end, in many cases our action involves manipulating or transforming some material object. When I eat an apple, I use the object for sustenance. When I paint, I use a brush and oils to transform a piece of canvas. Manipulation of objects is thus one of the means necessary to achieving ends in general. Hence the right to use external things is a necessary condition of the right to external freedom. As Kant puts it, if reason were to forbid the use of physical objects, external freedom would come into contradiction with itself, or "freedom would be robbing itself of the use of its Willkur" (MEJ, 52 354). Simply put, external freedom would in effect be forbidden by reason and morally impossible. (2) So far Kant has established the inherent right to use external objects. But this is not yet to establish the Juridical Postulate, which claims that individuals have the inherent right to own things. Kant makes this second step from the right to use things to owning them by means of an analysis of the concept of "possession." The 'subjective' condition of the possibility of actually manipulating a thing is physical possession. I am not able to use an axe unless I have it in hand, and I am not able to build a cabin unless I am standing on the spot where it is to be. These kinds of possession Kant usually calls "empirischer Besitz" and "Inhabung." I will call them "custody." Possession in this sense, then, is the subjective condition of the possibility of actually using a thing. "Possession," however, cannot just mean custody. Suppose that my right to the use of a thing lasted only as long as no one prevented me from using it as I desired. Thus if someone wrests the thing from my control to use as she pleases, my right to use it would end. But losing the right to an object merely because another grabbed it from me is precisely the situation in which I did not have a right to use it in the first place. Therefore, my having a right to the use of a thing presupposes that I can justifiably complain if anyone interferes with my using it as I please, and that I am justified in preventing anyone who tries to do so. If I have rights to something there must be some circumstances in which I retain those rights even though I have lost custody of the object (MEJ, 5 4 356). Custody is neither necessary nor sufficient for possession in this sense. So "possession" must have a second meaning, distinct from custody, if having rights to things is to be possible. This sort of possession must be a relation between an individual and a thing that obtains independently of their spatial relations. Since "possession" in this sense cannot denote a sensible relation between persons and things, Kant calls it "intelligibler Besitz." When there is such a relation between me and some object, I have "authority" (Gewalt) over the object regardless of whether I have custody (MEJ, 61-6 4 362-365). Let us call this intelligible or 'noumenal' relation "ownership.
Property rights requires the existence of the general will—rights in the state of nature are provisional, insofar as disputes could only be resolved through unilateral coercion. That means the state is the only legitimate authority in coercively enforcing rights claims
Korsgaard '08 (Christine, "Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution," in The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology)-OS
Brackets are in original text
Kant also believes that there is a sense in which we have rights in the state of nature. We have a natural right to our freedom (MPJ 6:237), and, Kant thinks, the Universal Principle of Justice allows us to claim rights in land and, more generally, in external objects, in property. Kant argues that it would be inconsistent with freedom to deny the possibility of property rights, on the grounds that unless we can claim rights to objects, those objects cannot be used (MPJ 6:246).⁷ This would be a restriction on freedom not based in freedom itself, which we should therefore reject, and this leads us to postulate that objects may be owned. But unlike Locke, Kant argues that in the state of nature these rights are only ‘‘provisional’’ (MPJ 6:256). In this, Kant is partly following Rousseau. In contrast to Locke, Rousseau argues that rights are created by the social contract, and, in a sense, relative to it. My possessions become my property, so far as you and I are concerned, when you and I have given each other certain reciprocal guarantees: I will keep my hands off your possessions if you will keep your hands off mine.⁸ Rights are not acquired by the metaphysical act of mixing one’s labor with the land, but instead are constructed from the human relations among people who have made such agreements.⁹ Kant adopts this idea, at least as far as the executive authority associated with a property right is concerned. I may indeed coercively enforce my rights. But if my doing so is to be consistent with the Universal Principle of Justice, it cannot be an act of unilateral coercion. To claim a right to a piece of property is to make a kind of law; for it is to lay it down that all others must refrain from using the object or land in question without my permission. But to view my claim as a law I must view it as the object of a contract between us, a contract in which we reciprocally commit ourselves to guaranteeing each other’s rights. It is this fact that leads us to enter—or, more precisely, to view ourselves as already having entered—political society. In making this argument, Kant evokes Rousseau’s concept of the general will. He argues that a general will to the coercive enforcement of the rights of all concerned is implicitly involved in every property claim. Now, with respect to an external and contingent possession, a unilateral Will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone, since that would be a violation of freedom in accordance with universal laws. Therefore, only a Will binding everyone else— that is, a collective, universal (common), and powerful Will—is the kind of Will that can provide the guarantee required. The condition of being subject to general external (that is, public) legislation that is backed by power is the civil society. Accordingly, a thing can be externally yours or mine that is, can be property only in a civil society. (MPJ 6:256) It is because the idea of the general will to the reciprocal enforcement of rights is implicit in any claim of right that Kant argues that rights in the state of nature are only provisional. They are provisional because this general will has not yet been instituted by setting up a common authority to enforce everyone’s rights. The act that institutes the general will is the social contract. Kant concludes from this argument that when the time comes to enforce your rights coercively, in the state of nature, the only legitimate way to do that is by joining in political society with those with whom you are in dispute. In fact, you enforce your right by first forcing them to join in political society with you so that the dispute can be settled by reciprocal rather than unilateral coercion: If it must be de jure possible to have an external object as one’s own, then the subject must also be allowed to compel everyone else with whom he comes into conflict over the question of whether such an object is his to enter, together with him, a society under a civil constitution. (MPJ 6:256) Suppose we are in the state of nature and we get into a dispute about rights. My goat has kids, and I take them to be mine because I was caring for the mother goat when they were born. However, one of them escaped, and you found it wandering around apparently unowned in the state of nature, took possession of it, fed it and cared for it for many years. Now we have discovered the matter, and each of us thinks she has a right to this particular goat. Since I think I have a right, I also think I may prosecute my right by coercive action. And you think the same. So what can we do? Perhaps I have a gun and you do not, so I can simply take the goat away from you. However, there are two ways to understand my action. One is: I am using unilateral force to take the goat away from you. Such an action would be illegitimate, a use of violence which interferes with your freedom. I cannot regard my action as an enforcement of my right without acknowledging that you have rights too, which also must be enforced. So if I am to claim that what I am doing is enforcing my right, I must understand my own action differently. The other way to understand the action is that I am forcing you to enter into political society with me. That gets us to the first step; the act of enforcing my right involves the establishment of a juridical condition (rechtlicher Zustand) between us and so establishes civil society. The second step, of course, is to settle the particular dispute in question in some lawful way. This means that Kant’s conception is different from Locke’s in important ways. According to Kant a juridical condition—a condition in which human rights are upheld and enforced—can only exist in political society. And therefore existence in political society is not merely, as Locke had it, in our interest. It is a duty of justice to live in political society. That is to say, others have the right to require this of you, because that is the form that their authority to enforce their own rights takes. And you, reciprocally, have the right to require membership in political society of others with whom you might have such disputes. Since we will that our rights be enforced, reciprocal coercion, and therefore political society, can be seen as the object of a general will.
The actor is the state—public colleges and universities are founded and operated by the state.
Thus the standard is maintaining a system of equal outer freedoms
Abstraction is great.
Farr '02
Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). "Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?" JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. JDN.

Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed first. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I find this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for self-determination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very significant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without first exploring its emancipatory potential.

C1 Hate speech

Hate speech is protected by the First amendment, And Federal Courts have continued to support this interpretation
Eugene Volokh May 7, 2015 Eugene Volokh teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law, where he has also often taught copyright law, criminal law, and a seminar on firearms regulation policy.
The Washington Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/

I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) The same is true of the other narrow exceptions, such as for true threats of illegal conduct or incitement intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal conduct (i.e., illegal conduct in the next few hours or maybe days, as opposed to some illegal conduct some time in the future). Indeed, threatening to kill someone because he’s black (or white), or intentionally inciting someone to a likely and immediate attack on someone because he’s Muslim (or Christian or Jewish), can be made a crime. But this isn’t because it’s “hate speech”; it’s because it’s illegal to make true threats and incite imminent crimes against anyone and for any reason, for instance because they are police officers or capitalists or just someone who is sleeping with the speaker’s ex-girlfriend.

Hate speech is inconsistent with a system of outer freedoms, banning it promotes more equal freedom
Varden 1 , Helga Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010 Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech
On the Kantian view I have been developing, hate speech and speech amounting to harassment are not outlawed because they track private wrongdoing as such, but rather because they tracks the state’s historical and current inability to provide some group(s) of citizens with rightful conditions of interaction. This type of public law tries to remedy the fact that some citizens have been and still are ‘more equal than others’. Hence, if the state finds that it is still unable successfully to provide conditions under which protection and for the empowerment of its historically oppressed, and thus vulnerable, are secured, then it is within its rightful powers to legally regulate speech and harassment to improve its ability to do so. By putting its weight behind historically the oppressed and vulnerable citizens, the state seeks to overcome the problems caused by its lack of recognition in the past and its current failure to provide conditions in which its citizens interact with respect for one as free and equal. Therefore, whether or not any instance of speech actually achieves insult is inconsequential, for that is not the justification for the state’s right to outlaw it. Rather, laws regulating speech and harassment track the state’s systemic inability to provide rightful interaction for all of its citizens. Note that this argument does not, nor must it, determine which particular usages of hate speech and speech amounting to harassment should be banned. It only explains why certain kinds and circumstances of speech and harassment can and should be outlawed and why public law, rather than private law, is the proper means for doing so. Determining which types and how it should be banned is matter for public debate and reflection followed by public regulation on behalf of all citizens.

Next independent reason-Defamation attempts are logically inconsistent with the conception of equal freedoms under the omnilateral will
Varden2 , Helga Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010 Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech 

What about defamation, how does it involve coercion? Attempts at defamation also constitute attempts non-consensually to deprive others of what is theirs, namely their good reputations as determined by their actions. Corresponding to a person’s innate right to freedom, Kant argues, is that person’s duty to “Be an honourable human being… Rightful honour… consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others” (6: 236). To defend one’s rightful honor is to defend one’s right to be recognized by others solely by the deeds one has performed. Indeed, one’s reputation, Kant explains, “is an innate external belonging” (6: 295); it can originally belong only to the person whose deeds are in question. If others spread falsehoods about the life she has lived, then she has the right and duty to challenge their lies publicly, for her reputation belongs only to her and to no one else. A person’s reputation is not a means subject to other people’s choice; it is not a means others have a right to manipulate in order to pursue their own ends. To permit this, Kant argues, would be to permit others to use your person as their own means, or to “make yourself a mere means for others” rather than also being “at the same time an end for them” (6: 236). Let me say briefly how this account of rightful honor analyzes cases like Holocaust-denial. Part of what makes denying the Holocaust different from other types of defamation is that it involves people who are no longer alive. On the Kantian approach I am advancing, one’s reputation is seen as intimately connected with how one has interacted normatively with others (6: 291). To interact normatively is to be capable of normativity or capable of interacting qua ‘noumena’, as Kant says, and not merely ‘qua phenomena’ or as embodied beings governed by laws of nature. It is qua noumena that we are capable of deeds or of having actions imputed to us. And it is qua noumena that we can still be defamed long after we are dead.3 Because right tracks normative relations, that one is no longer alive is beside the point. What is more, anyone – “relatives or strangers” – can challenge the lies told by another on behalf of the dead. Indeed, the one challenging the defamation does so in virtue of her own duty to ensure the conditions under which we can have rightful honor (6: 295). The reason is that those who spread such lies do not only express an unwillingness to respect those they defame in particular, but also they display a general unwillingness to interact in a way compatible with the rightful honor of everyone. The absence of defamation is necessary for public opinion to be reconcilable with each person’s right to freedom and the corresponding duty to be an honorable being. By defaming the dead, a person aims to falsify the public opinion, upon which everyone is dependent for rightful honor. Consequently, every member of the public has a right to challenge such lies on behalf of the dead.
C2 Seditious speech

Second, the AFF allows for seditious speech, which entails the ability to will the destruction the omnilateral will which is inconsistent with the existence of freedom.
Varden 3, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010
Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech - AG
To understand Kant’s condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does consider seditious speech a public crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the government or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as seditious, the speaker’s intention must be to encourage and support efforts to subvert the government or to instigate its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might. Since the state is the only means through which right can replace might, the state outlaws it. And since it is a crime that “endangers the commonwealth” rather than citizens qua private citizens, it is a public crime (6: 331).
Seditious speech is constitutionally protected.

Justia n.d. Justia, "Seditious Speech and Seditious Libel", http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-01/41-seditious-speech.html~ AG
Seditious Speech and Seditious Libel.—Opposition to government through speech alone has been subject to punishment throughout much of history under laws proscribing “seditious” utterances. In this country, the Sedition Act of 1798 made criminal, inter alia, malicious writings which defamed, brought into contempt or disrepute, or excited the hatred of the people against the Government, the President, or the Congress, or which stirred people to sedition.966 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,967 the Court surveyed the controversy surrounding the enactment and enforcement of the Sedition Act and concluded that debate “first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.... Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history .... That history reflects a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.” The “central meaning” discerned by the Court, quoting Madison’s comment that in a republican government “the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people,” is that “the right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government.”

Tournament: TFA state | Round: 1 | Opponent: Colleyville Heritage AS | Judge: Cameron Conaway
Morality requires respecting humanity as an end in itself: 

1.Analytic
2.Analytic

3rd Our over-arching obligations as Humans are the condition of moral force of particulars obligations we have formed like those that we have to family. ENGSTROM : In addition to the idea of universal legislation as the form of practical cognition, there’s a related idea guiding Kant’s thinking about the constraints of pure practical reason that needs to be borne in mind when we consider how they apply in choice and action. Since the exercise of practical reason proceeds from the universal to the particular, the application of the formula of universal law should proceed in this direction as well. Thus in attempting to determine what obligations to other persons this principle of universality might support, we should first consider its application in the most primitive, or fundamentals, exercise of the will, and to do this we will need to consider the most basic practical self-conception of a particular human person.11 It would be inappropriate, for example, to begin with duties that presuppose particular relations between the persons involved, such as the ties between citizens, family members, or friends. Such obligations, important though they are, depend upon specific, contingent conditions of action, whereas the cases we should consider first are those of duties that attach to us most fundamentally, merely in virtue of our standing as human persons, or subjects with wills, sharing the power of practical reason.

And practical identity – like parent, teacher, or debater – require valuing our human identity first. KORSGAARD :  The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

Impact:
To attach value to any identity means you must value yourself as someone who needs reasons to act and live. You can shed every identity except your human identity

Second, claims of goodness are filtered. Something is only good because certain identities ascribe goodness to it.

Third, if an agent regards their purpose as important, they must regard the means as important, one of which is freedom. To deny that freedom is important would deny the purpose was important.

One can never restrict the ends a subject can set as their means, because to be human is to autonomously set the ends. To treat humanity as an end requires one to respect the legislative right of agents to use their means as they see fit free of domination. RIPSTEIN : You are independent if you are the one who decides what ends you will use your powers to pursue, as opposed to having someone else decide for you. You may still mess up, decide badly, or betray your true self. You may have limited options. You remain independent if nobody else gets to tell you what to do. Each of us is independent if neither of us gets to tell the other what to do. This interest in independence is not a special case of a more general interest in being able to set and pursue your purposes. Instead, it is a distinctive aspect of your status as a person, entitled to set your own purposes, and not required to act as an instrument for the pursuit of anyone else’s purposes. You are sovereign because nobody else gets to tell you what to do; you would be their subject if they did. Once freedom is understood in terms of people’s respective independence, one person’s freedom doesn’t conflict with another’s. Each person is free to use his or her own powers to set and pursue his or her own purposes, consistent with the freedom of others to use their powers to set their purposes. A system of equal freedom demands that nobody use their own powers in a way that will deprive another of theirs, or uses another person’s powers without their permission. 

The standard is respecting liberty. Impact calc:
a)analytic
b)analytic
First, a right to housing unjustly restricts the ends to which individuals, both tenants and landowners can choose to pursue. JONNY:  One of the fundamental tenets of libertarianism is the idea of voluntarism: that parties should be free to engage in contracts between each other without requiring permission from a third party. This is a natural outgrowth of the non-aggression principle, which states that the initiation of force or violence is inherently immoral. When a third party prohibits all or part of a contractual agreement that does not concern that party, they are initiating force against the contract’s participants. As was explained previously in the article, parties will only engage in contractual agreements or transactions in which both parties believe they are better off. If we assume that neither party is threatening or defrauding the other, then while there may be unknown alternative transactions that would be preferred by one party or the other, there can be nothing immoral about the transaction. 

Second, We force people to provide housing for others and take from them to fund it. A right to housing would require an inordinate number of taxes on property owners. Josle Huang writes LA proposes taxing pot to fund housing for homeless. March 23,2016. SCPR.org

The idea that would create the most funds is a proposed $1 billion bond issue which would need the backing of two-thirds of voters to pass. The city would pay back the loan back investors over 30 years through property taxes. The cost to home owners? That would add about $51 to the tax bill for a $328,000 home in Los Angeles. What all the proposals have in common is that they would be new funding sources. L.A. Chief Administrative Officer Miguel Santana told council members Wednesday that's the only way the city can provide enough housing for city's homeless population, which has climbed 12 percent in two years "Even as our economy improves, we do not anticipate to have an additional $1.78 billion over the next 10 years to dedicate for this purpose," Santana said. What's also clear is that, given the size of the city's homelessness crisis, a combination of resources is needed. A couple proposals need only the approval of the Council and the mayor. Among them: a one-time payment that developers would make on new project, which would go toward building below-market-rate housing. This so-called "housing linkage" fee will be the subject of a $500,000 study that the city is planning to undertake this year.

A right to housing is an overstep of governmental authority
Hospers ‘74
John Hospers, “What Libertarianism Is,” in The Libertarian Alternative, ed. by Tibor R. Machan. 1974KOHS-AG
“In the following essay, John Hospers both defines and defends the libertarian view. Central to libertarianism, he says, is the doctrine that by right every individual is the master of his own life. We all have the right to live as we choose, as long as we don’t infringe on the rights of others to live as they choose. In particular, we have the rights to life, liberty, and property, and each of these rights serves as a ‘no trespassing’ sign against interference by governments as well as other individuals. The only proper role of government is to protect those rights. In discussing the right to property, Hospers calls it the most misunderstood and unappreciated of all rights, and the right most violated by governments. It is not, he says, the right to take property but the right to obtain it without coercion. When people claim other property rights, such as the right to welfare or the right to housing at others’ expense, they are claiming rights that don’t exist. The political philosophy that is called libertarianism (from the Latin libertas, liberty) is the doctrine that every person is the owner of his own life, and that no one is the owner of anyone else’s life; and that consequently every human being has the right to act in accordance with his own choices, unless those actions infringe on the equal liberty of other human beings to act in accordance with their choices. There are several other ways of stating the same libertarian thesis: 1. No one is anyone else’s master, and no one is anyone else’s slave. Since I am the one to decide how my life is to be conducted, just as you decide about yours, I have no right (even if I had the power) to make you my slave and be your master, nor have you the right to become the master by enslaving me. Slavery is forced servitude, and since no one owns the life of anyone else, no one has the right to enslave another. Political theories past and present have traditionally been concerned with who should be the master (usually the king, the dictator, or government bureaucracy) and who should be the slaves, and what the extent of the slavery should be. Libertarianism holds that no one has the right to use force to enslave the life of another, or any portion or aspect of that life. 2. Other men’s lives are not yours to dispose of. I enjoy seeing operas; but operas are expensive to produce. Opera-lovers often say,’ The state (or the city, etc.) should subsidize opera, so that we can all see it. Also it would be for people’s betterment, cultural benefit, etc.’ But what they are advocating is nothing more or less than legalized plunder. They can’t pay for the productions themselves, and yet they want to see opera, which involves a large number of people and their labor; so what they are saying in effect is, ‘Get the money through legalized force. Take a little bit more out of every worker’ s paycheck every week to pay for the operas we want to see.’ But I have no right to take by force from the workers’ pockets to pay for what I want. Perhaps it would be better if he did go to see opera - then I should try to convince him to go voluntarily. But to take the money from him forcibly, because in my opinion it would be good for him, is still seizure of his earnings, which is plunder. Besides, if l have the right to force him to help pay for my pet projects, hasn’t he equally the right to force me to help pay for his? Perhaps he in turn wants the government to subsidize rock-and-roll, or his new car, or a house in the country? If I have the right to milk him, why hasn’t he the right to milk me? If I can be a moral cannibal, why can’t he too? We should beware of the inventors of utopias. They would remake the world according to their other human beings. Is it someone’s utopian vision that others should build pyramids to beautify the landscape? Very well, then other men should provide the labor; and if he is in a position of politic power, and he can’t get men to do it voluntarily, then he must compel them to ‘cooperate’ - i.e. he must enslave them. A hundred men might gain great pleasure from beating up or killing just one insignificant human being; but other men’s lives are not theirs to dispose of. ‘In order to achieve the worthy goals of the next five-year-plan, we must forcibly collectivize the peasants ...’; but other men’s lives are not theirs to dispose of. Do you want to occupy rent-free, the mansion that another man has worked for twenty years to buy? But other men’s lives are not yours to dispose of. Do you want operas so badly that everyone is forced to work harder to pay for their subsidization through taxes? But other men’s lives are not yours to dispose of. Do you want to have free medical care at the expense of other people, whether they wish to provide it or not? But this would require them to work longer for you whether they want to or not, and other men’s lives are not yours to dispose of. … 3. No human being should be a nonvoluntury mortgage on the life of another. I cannot claim your life, your work, or the products of your effort as mine. The fruit of one man’s labor should not be fair game for every freeloader who comes along and demands it as his own. The orchard that has been carefully grown, nurtured, and harvested by its owner should not be ripe for the plucking for any bypasser who has a yen for the ripe fruit. The wealth that some men have produced should not be fair game for looting by government, to be used for whatever purposes its representatives determine, no matter what their motives in so doing may be. The theft of your money by a robber is not justified by the fact that he used it to help his injured mother. It will already be evident that libertarian doctrine is embedded in a view of the rights of man. Each human being has the right to live his life as he chooses, compatibly with the equal right of all other human beings to live their lives as they choose. All man’s rights are implicit in the above statement. Each man has the right to life: any attempt by others to take it away from him, or even to injure him, violates this right, through the use of coercion against him. Each man has the right to liberty: to conduct his life in accordance with the alternatives open to him without coercive action by others. And every man has the right to property: to work to sustain his life and the lives of whichever others he chooses to sustain, such as his family) and to retain the fruits of his labor. People often defend the rights of life and liberty but denigrate property rights, and yet the right to property is as basic as the other two; indeed, without property rights no other rights are possible. Depriving you of property is depriving you of the means by which you live.”
Public housing causes community issues: crime, unemployment, poverty
Husock 2003 Howard; Vice President, Research and Publications, Contributing Editor, City Journal, “How Public Housing Harms Cities”, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2003 http://www.city-journal.org/html/how-public-housing-harms-cities-12410.html
Public housing spawns neighborhood social problems because it concentrates together welfare-dependent, single-parent families, whose fatherless children disproportionately turn out to be school dropouts, drug users, non-workers, and criminals. These are not, of course, the families public housing originally aimed to serve. But as the U.S. economy boomed after World War II, the lower-middle-class working families for whom the projects had been built discovered that they could afford privately built homes in America’s burgeoning suburbs, and by the 1960s, they had completely abandoned public housing. Left behind were the poorest, most disorganized, non-working families, almost all of them headed by single women. Public housing then became a key component of the vast welfare-support network that gave young women their own income and apartment if they gave birth to illegitimate kids. As the fatherless children of these women grew up and went astray, many projects became lawless places, with gunfire a nightly occurrence and murder commonplace.

The right to housing traps people into bad housing and poverty- fosters complacency
Husock 16 Husock, Howard. "How Public Housing Harms Cities." City Journal. N.p., Winter 2003. Web. 05 July 2016. Vice President for research and publications at the Manhattan Institute, director of its Social Entrepreneurship Initiative JZ
Most policy experts agree these days that big public housing projects are noxious environments for their tenants. What’s less well understood is how noxious such projects are for the cities that surround them. Housing projects radiate dysfunction and social problems outward, damaging local businesses and neighborhood property values. They hurt cities by inhibiting or even preventing these rundown areas from coming back to life by attracting higher-income homesteaders and new business investment. Making matters worse, for decades cities have zoned whole areas to be public housing forever, shutting out in perpetuity the constant recycling of property that helps dynamic cities generate new wealth and opportunity for rich and poor alike.

Tournament: colley | Round: 3 | Opponent: Lake travis TW | Judge: Boyd
Current protections against hate speech are working – on campus harrassment is decreasing nationally now.  Sutton 16  
Sutton 16 Halley Sutton, Report shows crime on campus down across the country, Campus Security Report 13.4 (2016), 9/9/16,http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/casr.30185/full LADI
A recent report released by the National Center for Education Statistics found an overall decrease in crimes at educational institutions across the country since 2001. The overall number of crimes reported by postsecondary institutions has dropped by 34 percent, from 41,600 per year in 2001 to 27,600 per year in 2013. The report, titled Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2015, covers higher education campuses as well as K–12 schools and includes such topics as victimization, teacher injury, bullying and cyberbullying, use of drugs and alcohol, and criminal incidents at postsecondary institutions. The report found significant decreases in instances of bullying, harassment due to sexual orientation, and violent crime at all levels of education. The number of on-campus crimes reported at postsecondary institutions in 2013 was lower than in 2001 for every category except forcible sex offenses and murder.
Removing restrictions on free speech allows hate speech – hate speech IS free speech
Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh,No, There’s No “hate Speech” Exception to the First Amendment, The Washington Post, 5/7/15, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.05cfdd01dea4 LADI
I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.)
Hate speech leads to a genocidal increase in crimes against marginalized groups.  
Greenblatt 15 Jonathan Greenblatt, When Hateful Speech Leads to Hate Crimes: Taking Bigotry Out of the Immigration Debate, Huffington Post, 8/21/15, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-greenblatt/when-hateful-speech-leads_b_8022966.html LADI
When police arrived at the scene in Boston, they found a Latino man shaking on the ground, his face apparently soaked in urine, with a broken nose. His arms and chest had been beaten. One of the two brothers arrested and charged with the hate crime reportedly told police, “Donald Trump was right — all these illegals need to be deported.” The victim, a homeless man, was apparently sleeping outside of a subway station in Dorchester when the perpetrators attacked. His only offense was being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The brothers reportedly attacked him for who he was — simply because he was Latino. In recent weeks anti-immigrant — and by extension anti-Latino — rhetoric has reached a fever pitch. Immigrants have been smeared as “killers” and “rapists.” They have been accused of bringing drugs and crime. A radio talk show host in Iowa has called for enslavement of undocumented immigrants if they do not leave within 60 days. There have been calls to repeal the 14th Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship to people born in the United States, with allegations that people come here to have so-called “anchor babies.” And the terms “illegal aliens” and “illegals” — which many mainstream news sources wisely rejected years ago because they dehumanize and stigmatize people — have resurged. The words used on the campaign trail, on the floors of Congress, in the news, and in all our living rooms have consequences. They directly impact our ability to sustain a society that ensures dignity and equality for all. Bigoted rhetoric and words laced with prejudice are building blocks for the pyramid of hate. Biased behaviors build on one another, becoming ever more threatening and dangerous towards the top. At the base is bias, which includes stereotyping and insensitive remarks. It sets the foundation for a second, more complex and more damaging layer: individual acts of prejudice, including bullying, slurs and dehumanization. Next is discrimination, which in turn supports bias-motivated violence, including apparent hate crimes like the tragic one in Boston. And in the most extreme cases if left unchecked, the top of the pyramid of hate is genocide. Just like a pyramid, the lower levels support the upper levels. Bias, prejudice and discrimination — particularly touted by those with a loud megaphone and cheering crowd — all contribute to an atmosphere that enables hate crimes and other hate-fueled violence. The most recent hate crime in Boston is just one of too many. In fact, there is a hate crime roughly every 90 minutes in the United States today. That is why last week ADL announced a new initiative, #50StatesAgainstHate, to strengthen hate crimes laws around the country and safeguard communities vulnerable to hate-fueled attacks. We are working with a broad coalition of partners to get the ball rolling.

Violence and oppression become the templente of violence through which all other forms of suffering occur- creating oppression puts us on a one way track to global suffering and turmoil
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois -- Nancy and Philippe, Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn, Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22 (MI)

These are "invisible" genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu's partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of "normal" social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression. Similarly, Basaglia's notion of "peacetime crimes" - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibil- ity that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on "illegal aliens" versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee "Trail of Tears." Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal "stability" is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied "strangle-holds." Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic "peace" possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindusrrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man. the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the "normative" socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among Otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participa- tion in genocidal acts and policies possible {under adverse political or economic conditions). perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dchumamzjtion. depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and rcification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin's view of late modem history as a chronic "state of emergency" (Taussig, Chapter 31). We arc trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Krving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twcnricth-ccntury radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other "total institutions." Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce gcnocidal-likc crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to "pseudo- speciation" as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human-a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes thai precede the sudden, "seemingly unintelligible" outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Schcper-Hughes Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of "angel-babies,"' and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by "symbolic violence," the violence that is often "mis-recognized" for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls "terror as usual." All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and "peace-time crimes." Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies "mcconnaissancc" as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family- farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42: see also Schcper Hughes, 2000b; Favrct-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of "controlling processes" (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reificarion, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early "warning signs" (Charncy 1991), the "priming" (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the "genocidal continuum" (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable "social parasites" (the nursing home elderly, "welfare queens," undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security.

Tournament: colley | Round: 3 | Opponent: Lake travis tw | Judge: jane boyd
DA – Funding (1:20)
The affirmative leads to more student lawsuits against universities – it’s a question of perception
Jensen 93 Ejner J. Jensen, Senate Assembly Chair, 2-8-1993, "The pros and cons of a policy covering hate speech," The University Record, http://ur.umich.edu/9293/Feb08'93/8.htm
Universities have a right and duty to provide an educational environment, a climate of civility, where all students can learn and live free from bigotry. 2. A university’s objective is to educate and to instill within students fundamental values of human decency. 3. Numerous responses from students to the rights and responsibilities document last summer indicated that a significant proportion of the harassment experienced by U-M students comes from faculty. They described in-class harassment, racial harassment at a public event, harassment based on ethnic origin, and clear cultural bias in classroom settings. 4. Speech codes publicly announce a university’s support of civil rights and equal dignity of all persons; the failure to adopt a speech code implies that the University condones hate speech. 5. The University may be held liable for damages by persons who were subjected to harassment, if the University knowingly tolerates such conduct. 6. Faculty and staff, as well as students, should be prohibited from violating the rights of other members of the University community. 7. While harassment by faculty may be quite rare, it is important to have a mechanism for dealing with reported incidents and resolving misunderstandings that may be interpreted as harassment.
Increased lawsuits kill university budgets.
Ryman 9 Anne Ryman, 12-20-2009, "Christian group wages fight against censorship on campus," The Arizona Republic, http://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/12/20/20091220alliance1220.html AD
At a sprawling, glass-and-brick office complex in north Scottsdale, a dozen or so attorneys and colleagues gather each morning in a dim, ornate room to pray. The group of Christians is seeking God's guidance in an ongoing quest to preserve family values and freedom of religious expression. The group draws strength from prayers and from a well of assets: a $30 million annual budget, paid and volunteer lawyers across the country, and the organization's years of doing battle in court. That organization, the non-profit Alliance Defense Fund, is now undertaking a special campaign on a familiar front of the culture wars. Armed with a $9.2 million donation from an anonymous family plus its own matching funds, the group is stepping up efforts to combat what it says is widespread and unconstitutional censorship at public colleges. With an estimated three years of funding, the University Project, as it is called, will deploy more attorneys to defend students or student groups that feel they are being prevented from expressing socially conservative or religious views. The 15-year-old Alliance Defense Fund has long been involved in freedom-of-speech cases at universities, but members believe censorship is growing. The new project represents one of many areas in which the group and similar organizations are waging legal fights as a growing enforcement of anti-discrimination laws by governments and schools clashes with religious rights. The Defense Fund now has 55 legal cases in which it either sued a college or is working with student groups to assert their rights. The cases include issues such as students who feel their pro-life views were censored, a student who tangled with a professor over religious views in class, and an independent student newspaper whose distribution bins were removed from campus. The University Project will likely mean dozens more lawsuits at a time when college budgets are stretched thin because of state funding cuts. Some advocacy groups say the organization's effort is misguided because religious students have many opportunities to promote their beliefs on campuses. For their part, universities say their policies are crafted to both protect free speech and ensure a safe, respectful environment. At Arizona State University, for instance, a law professor worked closely with the American Civil Liberties Union to write guidelines to encourage free speech rather than to restrict it, said Nancy Tribbensee, staff attorney for the Arizona Board of Regents. Tribbensee said she hopes the Defense Fund also will seek constructive dialogue with institutions with which the group has concerns before launching into litigation.
Not restricting constitutionally protected speech means the government yanks away funding from institutions.
FIRE 16 Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, 4-25-2016, "Department of Justice: Title IX Requires Violating First Amendment," Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, https://www.thefire.org/department-of-justice-title-ix-requires-violating-first-amendment///AD
The Department of Justice now interprets Title IX to require colleges and universities to violate the First Amendment. In an April 22 findings letter concluding its investigation into the University of New Mexico’s policies and practices regarding sex discrimination, the Department of Justice (DOJ) found the university improperly defined sexual harassment. DOJ flatly declared that “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature”—including “verbal conduct”—is sexual harassment “regardless of whether it causes a hostile environment or is quid pro quo.” To comply with Title IX, DOJ states that a college or university “carries the responsibility to investigate” all speech of a sexual nature that someone subjectively finds unwelcome, even if that speech is protected by the First Amendment or an institution’s promises of free speech. “The Department of Justice has put universities in an impossible position: violate the Constitution or risk losing federal funding,” said Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) President and CEO Greg Lukianoff. “The federal government’s push for a national speech code is at odds with decades of legal precedent. University presidents must find the courage to stand up to this federal overreach.” The shockingly broad conception of sexual harassment mandated by DOJ all but guarantees that colleges and universities nationwide will subject students and faculty to months-long investigations—or worse—for protected speech. In recent years, unjust “sexual harassment” investigations into protected student and faculty speech have generated national headlines and widespread concern. Examples include: Northwestern University Professor Laura Kipnis was investigated for months for writing a newspaper article questioning “sexual paranoia” on campus and how Title IX investigations are conducted. Syracuse University law student Len Audaer was investigated for harassment for comedic articles he posted on a satirical law school blog patterned after The Onion. A female student at the University of Oregon was investigated and charged with harassment and four other charges for jokingly yelling “I hit it first” out a window at a couple. The Sun Star, a student newspaper at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, was investigated for nearly a year for an April Fools’ Day issue of the newspaper and for reporting on hateful messages posted to an anonymous “UAF Confessions” Facebook page. And just two weeks ago, a police officer at the University of Delaware ordered students to censor a “free speech ball”—put up as part of a demonstration in favor of free speech—because it had the word “penis” and an accompanying drawing on it, claiming that it could violate the university’s sexual misconduct policy. DOJ’s rationale would not just legitimize all of the above investigations—it would require campuses to either conduct such investigations routinely or face potential federal sanctions. This latest findings letter doubles down on the unconstitutional and controversial “blueprint” definition of sexual harassment jointly issued by DOJ and the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights in a May 2013 findings letter to the University of Montana. FIRE and other civil liberties advocates at the time warned that the controversial language threatens the free speech and academic freedom rights of students and faculty members. “Requiring colleges to investigate and record ‘unwelcome’ speech about sex or gender in an effort to end sexual harassment or assault on campus is no more constitutional than would be a government effort to investigate and record all ‘unpatriotic’ speech in order to root out treason,” said Robert Shibley, FIRE’s executive director. “Students, faculty, and administrators must not give in to this kind of campus totalitarianism—and FIRE is here to fight alongside them.” In January, FIRE sponsored a lawsuit filed against Louisiana State University (LSU) that challenges the unconstitutional definition of sexual harassment being promulgated by the Departments of Education and Justice in this and in previous letters. Teresa Buchanan, a tenured associate professor of early childhood education in LSU’s acclaimed teacher certification program, was fired for “sexual harassment” under an LSU policy that tracks the federal government’s broad definition. Buchanan’s lawsuit challenges the policy’s constitutionality and its application to her. FIRE is a nonpartisan, nonprofit educational foundation that unites civil rights and civil liberties leaders, scholars, journalists, and public intellectuals from across the political and ideological spectrum on behalf of individual rights, freedom of expression, academic freedom, due process, and freedom of conscience at our nation’s colleges and universities. FIRE’s efforts to preserve liberty on campuses across America can be viewed at thefire.org.
State funding is already down – federal funding key to maintain universities and increasing now.
Mitchell et al 16 Mitchell, MichaelMichael Mitchell is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Center’s State Fiscal Policy division. Prior to joining the Center, Mitchell worked as a State Policy Fellow for the Washington State Budget and Policy Center, where he conducted research on state taxes and borrowing, the effects of budget cuts on communities of color, and the impacts of the recession on young adults. Mitchell holds a B.A. in Economics and Political Science from the University of Connecticut and an MPA from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University , Michael LeachmanMichael Leachman is Director of State Fiscal Research with the State Fiscal Policy division of the Center, which analyzes state tax and budget policy decisions and promotes sustainable policies that take into account the needs of families of all income levels. Since joining the Center in 2009, Leachman has researched a range of state fiscal policy issues including the impact of federal aid, the debt states owe in their Unemployment Insurance trust funds, and the wisdom of state spending limits. Prior to joining the Center, he was a policy analyst for nine years at the Oregon Center for Public Policy (OCPP), a member of the State Priorities Partnership. His work at OCPP included research on corporate income taxes, reserve funds, spending limits, the Earned Income Tax Credit, food stamps, and TANF. Earlier in his career, Leachman worked as a community organizer in Chicago and, during graduate school, conducted a range of research projects in collaboration with community organizations. Leachman holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Loyola University Chicago, and Kathleen MastersonKathleen Masterson joined the Center as a Research Assistant for the State Fiscal Project in April 2015. Prior to joining SFP, she interned at the Center with the Food Assistance team, primarily tracking the implementation of the community eligibility provision. Masterson has also interned with the Arms Control Association and spent a year teaching English in China. She holds a MPIA from the University of Pittsburgh, and a B.A. in History and Political Science from The College of William and Mary. "Funding Down, Tuition Up." Funding Down, Tuition Up. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 15 Aug. 2016. Web. 11 Dec. 2016. http://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/funding-down-tuition-up//AD
As tuition soared after the recession, federal financial aid also increased. The Federal Pell Grant Program ― the nation’s primary source of student grant aid ― increased the amount of aid it distributed by just over 80 percent between the 2007-08 and 2014-15 school years. This substantial boost has enabled the program not only to reach more students ― 2.7 million more students received Pell support last year than in 2008 ― but also to provide the average recipient with more support. The average grant rose by 21 percent — to $3,673 from $3,028.44 The increase in federal financial aid has helped many students and families cover recent tuition hikes. The College Board calculates that the annual value of grant aid and higher education tax benefits for students at four-year public colleges nationally has risen by an average of $1,410 in real terms since the 2007-08 school year, offsetting about 61 percent of the average $2,320 tuition increase. For community colleges, increases in student aid have more than made up the difference, leading to a drop in net tuition for the average student.45 Since the sticker-price increases have varied so much from state to state while federal grant and tax-credit amounts are uniform across the country, students in states with large tuition increases ¾ such as Arizona, Georgia, and Louisiana ¾ likely still experienced substantial increases in their net tuition and fees, while the net cost for students in states with smaller tuition increases may have fallen. Financial aid provided by states, however — which was far less than federal aid even before the recession — has fallen on average. In the 2007-2008 school year, state grant dollars equaled $740 per student. By 2014, the latest year for which full data is available, that number had fallen to $710, a drop of roughly 4 percent.46
Loss of funding kills quality of education – also makes education inaccessible for many – outweighs and turns case.
Mitchell et al 16 Mitchell, MichaelMichael Mitchell is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Center’s State Fiscal Policy division. Prior to joining the Center, Mitchell worked as a State Policy Fellow for the Washington State Budget and Policy Center, where he conducted research on state taxes and borrowing, the effects of budget cuts on communities of color, and the impacts of the recession on young adults. Mitchell holds a B.A. in Economics and Political Science from the University of Connecticut and an MPA from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University , Michael LeachmanMichael Leachman is Director of State Fiscal Research with the State Fiscal Policy division of the Center, which analyzes state tax and budget policy decisions and promotes sustainable policies that take into account the needs of families of all income levels. Since joining the Center in 2009, Leachman has researched a range of state fiscal policy issues including the impact of federal aid, the debt states owe in their Unemployment Insurance trust funds, and the wisdom of state spending limits. Prior to joining the Center, he was a policy analyst for nine years at the Oregon Center for Public Policy (OCPP), a member of the State Priorities Partnership. His work at OCPP included research on corporate income taxes, reserve funds, spending limits, the Earned Income Tax Credit, food stamps, and TANF. Earlier in his career, Leachman worked as a community organizer in Chicago and, during graduate school, conducted a range of research projects in collaboration with community organizations. Leachman holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Loyola University Chicago, and Kathleen MastersonKathleen Masterson joined the Center as a Research Assistant for the State Fiscal Project in April 2015. Prior to joining SFP, she interned at the Center with the Food Assistance team, primarily tracking the implementation of the community eligibility provision. Masterson has also interned with the Arms Control Association and spent a year teaching English in China. She holds a MPIA from the University of Pittsburgh, and a B.A. in History and Political Science from The College of William and Mary. "Funding Down, Tuition Up." Funding Down, Tuition Up. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 15 Aug. 2016. Web. 11 Dec. 2016. http://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/funding-down-tuition-up//AD
Years of cuts in state funding for public colleges and universities have driven up tuition and harmed students’ educational experiences by forcing faculty reductions, fewer course offerings, and campus closings. These choices have made college less affordable and less accessible for students who need degrees to succeed in today’s economy. YEARS OF CUTS HAVE MADE COLLEGE LESS AFFORDABLE AND LESS ACCESSIBLE FOR STUDENTS.Though some states have begun to restore some of the deep cuts in financial support for public two- and four-year colleges since the recession hit, their support remains far below previous levels. In total, after adjusting for inflation, funding for public two- and four-year colleges is nearly $10 billion below what it was just prior to the recession. As states have slashed higher education funding, the price of attending public colleges has risen significantly faster than the growth in median income. For the average student, increases in federal student aid and the availability of tax credits have not kept up, jeopardizing the ability of many to afford the college education that is key to their long-term financial success. States that renew their commitment to a high-quality, affordable system of public higher education by increasing the revenue these schools receive will help build a stronger middle class and develop the entrepreneurs and skilled workers that are needed in the new century. Of the states that have finalized their higher education budgets for the current school year, after adjusting for inflation:2 Forty-six states — all except Montana, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming — are spending less per student in the 2015-16 school year than they did before the recession.3 States cut funding deeply after the recession hit. The average state is spending $1,598, or 18 percent, less per student than before the recession. Per-student funding in nine states — Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina — is down by more than 30 percent since the start of the recession. In 12 states, per-student funding fell over the last year. Of these, four states — Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, and Vermont — have cut per-student higher education funding for the last two consecutive years. In the last year, 38 states increased funding per student. Per-student funding rose $199, or 2.8 percent, nationally. Deep state funding cuts have had major consequences for public colleges and universities. States (and to a lesser extent localities) provide roughly 54 percent of the costs of teaching and instruction at these schools.4 Schools have made up the difference with tuition increases, cuts to educational or other services, or both. Since the recession took hold, higher education institutions have: Increased tuition. Public colleges and universities across the country have increased tuition to compensate for declining state funding and rising costs. Annual published tuition at four-year public colleges has risen by $2,333, or 33 percent, since the 2007-08 school year.5 In Arizona, published tuition at four-year schools is up nearly 90 percent, while in six other states — Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, and Louisiana — published tuition is up more than 60 percent. These sharp tuition increases have accelerated longer-term trends of college becoming less affordable and costs shifting from states to students. Over the last 20 years, the price of attending a four-year public college or university has grown significantly faster than the median income.6 Although federal student aid and tax credits have risen, on average they have fallen short of covering the tuition increases. Tuition increases have compensated for only part of the revenue loss resulting from state funding cuts. Over the past several years, public colleges and universities have cut faculty positions, eliminated course offerings, closed campuses, and reduced student services, among other cuts. A large and growing share of future jobs will require college-educated workers.7 Sufficient public investment in higher education to keep quality high and tuition affordable, and to provide financial aid to students who need it most, would help states develop the skilled and diverse workforce they will need to compete for these jobs. Sufficient public investment can only occur, however, if policymakers make sound tax and budget decisions. State revenues have improved significantly since the depths of the recession but are still only modestly above pre-recession levels.8 To make college more affordable and increase access to higher education, many states need to supplement that revenue growth with new revenue to fully make up for years of severe cuts. But just as the opportunity to invest is emerging, lawmakers in a number of states are jeopardizing it by entertaining tax cuts that in many cases would give the biggest breaks to the wealthiest taxpayers. In recent years, states such as Wisconsin, Louisiana, and Arizona have enacted large-scale tax cuts that limit resources available for higher education. And in Illinois and Pennsylvania ongoing attempts to find necessary resources after large tax cuts threaten current and future higher education funding.