Tournament: all | Round: 1 | Opponent: all | Judge: all
jeffreyzhang1999@gmail.com
2816507296

Tournament: University of Houston Cougar Classic | Round: 2 | Opponent: Tess Welch | Judge: Rebbeca Gelfer
I value morality as the term ought in the resolution entails a moral obligation.

Moral obligations have to be universal and undeniable. In order for these obligations to exist functionally, the authority behind them can’t be subverted or avoided. In order for this to be true, their authority must be derived by virtue of their existence
Velleman 1, Professor of Philosophy, Bioethics; Director of Undergraduate Studies, Ph.D., Princeton, 1983, 2006
(J. David, “A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN ETHICS,” 2006, accessed Dec. 1, GS)

A duty, to begin with, is a practical requirement—a requirement to do something or not to do something. But there are many practical requirements that aren't duties. If you want to read Kant in the original, you have to learn German: there's a practical requirement. Federal law requires you to make yourself available to serve on a jury: there's another practical requirement. But these two requirements have features that clearly distinguish them from moral obligations or duties.  The first requires you to learn German only if you want to read Kant in the original. This requirement is consequently escapable: you can gain exemption from it by giving up the relevant desire. Give up wanting to read Kant in the original and you can forget about this requirement, since it will no longer apply to you. The second requirement is also escapable, but it doesn't point to an escape hatch so clearly, since it doesn't contain an "if" clause stating a condition by which its application is limited. Nevertheless, its force as a requirement depends on the authority of a particular body—namely, the U.S. Government. Only if you are subject to the authority of the U.S. Government does this requirement apply to you. Hence you can escape the force of this requirement by escaping the authority of the Government: immunity to the authority of the body entails immunity to its requirements. Now, Kant claimed—plausibly, I think—that our moral duties are inescapable in both of these senses. If we are morally obligated to do something, then we are obligated to do it no matter what our desires, interests, or aims may be. We cannot escape the force of the obligation by giving up some particular desires, interests, or aims. Nor can we escape the force of an obligation by escaping from the jurisdiction of some authority such as the Government. Kant expressed the inescapability of our duties by calling them categorical as opposed to hypothetical.  According to Kant, the force of moral requirements does not even depend on the authority of God. There is a simple argument for denying this dependence. If we were subject to moral requirements because they were imposed on us by God, the reason would have to be that we are subject to a requirement to do what God requires of us; and the force of this latter requirement, of obedience to God, could not itself depend on God's authority. (To require obedience to God on the grounds that God requires it would be viciously circular.) The requirement to obey God's requirements would therefore have to constitute a fundamental duty, on which all other duties depended; and so God's authority would not account for the force of our duties, after all. Since this argument will apply to any figure or body conceived as issuing requirements, we can conclude that the force of moral requirements must not depend on the authority of any figure or body by which they are conceived to have been issued.  

1. The source of normativity is reason. To be moral is to be in line with reason. To be immoral is to be in violation of reason.
   Velleman 2, Professor of Philosophy, Bioethics; Director of Undergraduate Studies, Ph.D., Princeton, 1983, 2006
   (J. David, “A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN ETHICS,” 2006)
    As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, however, we can hear something odd in our question. To ask "Why should I?" is to demand a reason; and so to ask "Why should I act for reasons?" is to demand a reason for acting for reasons.  This demand implicitly concedes the very authority that it purports to questions—namely, the authority of reasons.  Why would we demand a reason if we didn't envision acting for it?  If we really didn't feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so certainly wouldn't help.  So theres is something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons.
   Reason is universal; a reason for you must be a reason for me.
   Velleman 3, Professor of Philosophy, Bioethics; Director of Undergraduate Studies, Ph.D., Princeton, 1983, 2006
   (J. David, “A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN ETHICS,” 2006,)
   In Kant's view, being a person consists in being a rational creature, both cognitively and practically.  And Kant thought that our rationality gives us a glimpse of—and hence an aspiration toward—a perspective even more inclusive than that of our persisting individual selves.  Rational creatures have access to a shared perspective, from which they not only see the same things but can also see the visibility of those things to all rational creatures.  Consider, for example, our capacity for arithmetic reasoning.  Anyone who adds 2 and 2 sees, not just that the sum is 4, but also that anyone who added 2 and 2 would see that it's 4, and that such a person would see this, too, and so on.  The facts of elementary arithmetic are thus common knowledge among all possible reasoners, in the sense that every reasoner knows them, and knows that every reasoner knows them, and knows that every reasoner knows that the every reasoner knows them, and so on. As arithmetic reasoners, then, we have access to a perspective that is constant not only across time but also between persons.  We can compute the sum of 2 and 2 once and for all, in the sense that we would only get the same answer on any other occasion; and each of us can compute the sum of 2 and 2 one for all, in the sense that the others would only get the same answer.  What's more, the universality of our perspective on the sum of 2 and 2 is evident to each of us from within that very perspective. In computing the sum of 2 and 2, we are aware of computing it for all, from a perspective that's shared by all arithmetic reasoners.  In this sense, our judgment of the sum is authoritative, because it speaks for the judgment of all. This shared perspective is like a vantage point overlooking the individual perspectives of reasoners, a standpoint from which we not only see what everyone sees but also see everyone seeing it.  And once we glimpse the availability of this vantage point, we cannot help but aspire to attain it.  We are no longer satisfied with estimating or guessing the sum of two numbers, given the possibility of computing it once for all: we are ineluctably drawn to the perspective of arithmetic reason. Note that the aspect of arithmetic judgments to which we are drawn in this case, resembles the authority that we initially regarded as definitive of moral requirements: it's the authority of being inescapable. We can compute the sum of 2 and 2 once for all because the answer we reach is the answer that would be reached from any perspective and is therefore inescapable. We can approach the sum of 2 and 2 from wherever we like, and we will always arrive at the same answer. The case of arithmetic reasoning shows that inescapability can in fact appeal to us, because it is the feature in virtue of which judgments constitute a stable and all-encompassing point-of-view. Perhaps, then, the authority of moral judgments, which consists in their inescapability, can appeal to us in similar fashion, by offering an attractive vantage point of some kind.
   2. Actions are expressions of an agent’s reasoning from their end to the means, which unifies their action into a cohesive movement as opposed to fragmented steps. ROEDL:
   Sebastian Roedl.  Prof. Of Philosophy, University of Leipzig.  “Two Forms of Practical Knowledge and Their Unity” in  Ford and Hornsby, Eds. Essays on Anscombe's Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 239.

   “We can give a more specific description of the consciousness of temporal unity that constitutes that unity: it is an act of reasoning. For example, she who is crossing the street because she is getting bread reasons in this way: wanting to get bread, she thinks the fact that the bakery is across the street is a reason to cross the street. She reasons from her end (getting bread) to the means (crossing the street). The unity of the movement represented in “She is doing A” is constituted by reasoning of this form: she is doing A by holding together in one consciousness her idea of doing A and her idea of doing B, being conscious of her nexus.”
   For example, the end of reaching the bakery unifies the individual actions necessary for that end, like crossing the street; otherwise the individual steps would not have any meaning. Thus, contradictory ends would never yield an action because willing A and not A would not allow you to unify the necessary steps to achieve that end. And, this also proves an intent foresight distinction. If consequences were relevant, we would have to will the possibility of contradictory ends since an action can have different and conflicting results, which wouldn't allow you to unify your will.  
   2. Non-contradictions are constraints because a principle cannot be true and false at the same time otherwise it yields incompatible obligations, so the form of the will to abide any moral theory must first will it as universal.
   3. Thus, morality must be based on pure principle, which entails universalizability since the only coherent moral principles are ones that could exist as moral principles; but a contradictory maxim doesn’t make sense as a principle and thus couldn’t be morally obligatory.

You cannot universally will a violation of freedom as a maxim because doing so presupposes that you had freedom to bring about that the violation in the first place. This entails an Omnilateral will or a higher authority to deal with rights conflicts.
Ripstein, Arthur. “Kant on Law and Politics.” University of Toronto Law School. http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Ripstein/Kant_on_law.pdf.
Kant’s point about disputes is not just a reiteration of Locke’s familiar claim that people often disagree about the application of principles to particular situations, especially when their interests are at stake. Unilateral judgment is a problem because of the two dimensions of the innate right of humanity. The innate right to freedom demands that people be able to acquire things as their means without the explicit leave of others. Rightful honor requires people to stand up for their rights, and so that no person defer to any other private person’s judgment in cases of dispute about what either is permitted to do. If you think that you have performed an act establishing a right, you are entitled to stand by your claim in the face of all who contest it, but those who contest it are no less entitled to stand by their claims. Rightful honor requires that each party accept no standard other than “what seems right and good” to him.”24 The only reason to defer is because you can’t win. Might makes right, regardless of how "good and law-abiding" you or the person who disputes your claim might be. The solution to disputes about rights is to make the omnilateral will institutional. Disputes can be resolved in a way that is consistent with rightful honor if the parties to it are subject to the authority of an impartial judge, and an enforcer who can carry out the decision. The state is a generalized version of this structure. It is a common authority, charged with making, applying, and enforcing law. It is legitimate because it makes it possible for people to resolve disputes about rights in a way that is consistent with the rightful honour of all. Legitimacy flows from what the state does, and so does not require an explicit act of instituting it.

Thus the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will
AND Rectification of justice is key to the framework.
Arthur Ripstein (Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto) “Force and Freedom” Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England, Harvard University Press, 2009,
Normatively, the law survives any wrong against it. In the world of space and time, however, the wrong has an effect, and the only way to restore that supremacy of law is to restore its effectiveness, so that the violation is without legal effect. The wrongdoer violated the law by violating some particular prohibition; to restore the supremacy of the law, that very prohibition must be upheld. The crime is an illicit exemption from an aspect of the law’s supremacy; the punishment excludes the criminal from that very aspect of its protection. The thief ’s spe cific maxim—the spe cific way in which she uses prohibited means—must be turned against her because an individually asserted unilateral exemption from the law is juridically impossible: a per- son cannot act so as to exempt herself from the law. Instead, she must be taken to have chosen something else. Her maxim is one that is contrary to freedom under public law. The only way the state can recognize and respond to her maxim is by must treating it as its own mirror image, as the criminal’s exclusion of herself from the very same public law. The thief ’s specific maxim is of the form “all property is entirely subject to my choice,” that is, “there is no property to me.” The punishment inverts the maxim from a challenge to the authority of public law to an exclusion from it: the thief is held to the implications of her own maxim, and so is excluded from the system of property: there is property, but not for her. Property persists, because the criminal cannot eliminate it unilaterally, but she can exclude herself from it through her unilateral act. In willing that the property of another be subject to her choice, the criminal is taken to have willed that there be no property for her, since her maxim is inconsistent with the possibility of property. The use of force that responds to this must be the objectification of the maxim, the turning of the criminal’s maxim against itself. The criminal wants to be exempt from the rule of property by making the law of property nothing to others; the punishment exempts her in a different sense by making the law of property nothing to her. She makes a rule only for herself; the law responds by limiting its application to her alone. Her hindrance to freedom is thus hindered by sealing it off.

Contention 1 is hate speech

Hate speech is protected by the First amendment, And Federal Courts have continued to support this interpretation
Eugene Volokh May 7, 2015 Eugene Volokh teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law, where he has also often taught copyright law, criminal law, and a seminar on firearms regulation policy.
The Washington Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/

I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) The same is true of the other narrow exceptions, such as for true threats of illegal conduct or incitement intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal conduct (i.e., illegal conduct in the next few hours or maybe days, as opposed to some illegal conduct some time in the future). Indeed, threatening to kill someone because he’s black (or white), or intentionally inciting someone to a likely and immediate attack on someone because he’s Muslim (or Christian or Jewish), can be made a crime. But this isn’t because it’s “hate speech”; it’s because it’s illegal to make true threats and incite imminent crimes against anyone and for any reason, for instance because they are police officers or capitalists or just someone who is sleeping with the speaker’s ex-girlfriend.

Defamation attempts inherent in hate speech and racist statements are logically inconsistent with the conception of equal freedoms under the omnilateral will
Varden, Helga Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010 Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech 

What about defamation, how does it involve coercion? Attempts at defamation also constitute attempts non-consensually to deprive others of what is theirs, namely their good reputations as determined by their actions. Corresponding to a person’s innate right to freedom, Kant argues, is that person’s duty to “Be an honourable human being… Rightful honour… consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others” (6: 236). To defend one’s rightful honor is to defend one’s right to be recognized by others solely by the deeds one has performed. Indeed, one’s reputation, Kant explains, “is an innate external belonging” (6: 295); it can originally belong only to the person whose deeds are in question. If others spread falsehoods about the life she has lived, then she has the right and duty to challenge their lies publicly, for her reputation belongs only to her and to no one else. A person’s reputation is not a means subject to other people’s choice; it is not a means others have a right to manipulate in order to pursue their own ends. To permit this, Kant argues, would be to permit others to use your person as their own means, or to “make yourself a mere means for others” rather than also being “at the same time an end for them” (6: 236). Let me say briefly how this account of rightful honor analyzes cases like Holocaust-denial. Part of what makes denying the Holocaust different from other types of defamation is that it involves people who are no longer alive. On the Kantian approach I am advancing, one’s reputation is seen as intimately connected with how one has interacted normatively with others (6: 291). To interact normatively is to be capable of normativity or capable of interacting qua ‘noumena’, as Kant says, and not merely ‘qua phenomena’ or as embodied beings governed by laws of nature. It is qua noumena that we are capable of deeds or of having actions imputed to us. And it is qua noumena that we can still be defamed long after we are dead.3 Because right tracks normative relations, that one is no longer alive is beside the point. What is more, anyone – “relatives or strangers” – can challenge the lies told by another on behalf of the dead. Indeed, the one challenging the defamation does so in virtue of her own duty to ensure the conditions under which we can have rightful honor (6: 295). The reason is that those who spread such lies do not only express an unwillingness to respect those they defame in particular, but also they display a general unwillingness to interact in a way compatible with the rightful honor of everyone. The absence of defamation is necessary for public opinion to be reconcilable with each person’s right to freedom and the corresponding duty to be an honorable being. By defaming the dead, a person aims to falsify the public opinion, upon which everyone is dependent for rightful honor. Consequently, every member of the public has a right to challenge such lies on behalf of the dead.
This reifies the historical failures of the state to recognize certain marginalized groups as equal in moral standing, which is the duty of the omnilateral will.
Varden 2 , Helga Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010 Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech
On the Kantian view I have been developing, hate speech and speech amounting to harassment are not outlawed because they track private wrongdoing as such, but rather because they tracks the state’s historical and current inability to provide some group(s) of citizens with rightful conditions of interaction. This type of public law tries to remedy the fact that some citizens have been and still are ‘more equal than others’. Hence, if the state finds that it is still unable successfully to provide conditions under which protection and for the empowerment of its historically oppressed, and thus vulnerable, are secured, then it is within its rightful powers to legally regulate speech and harassment to improve its ability to do so. By putting its weight behind historically the oppressed and vulnerable citizens, the state seeks to overcome the problems caused by its lack of recognition in the past and its current failure to provide conditions in which its citizens interact with respect for one as free and equal. Therefore, whether or not any instance of speech actually achieves insult is inconsequential, for that is not the justification for the state’s right to outlaw it. Rather, laws regulating speech and harassment track the state’s systemic inability to provide rightful interaction for all of its citizens. Note that this argument does not, nor must it, determine which particular usages of hate speech and speech amounting to harassment should be banned. It only explains why certain kinds and circumstances of speech and harassment can and should be outlawed and why public law, rather than private law, is the proper means for doing so. Determining which types and how it should be banned is matter for public debate and reflection followed by public regulation on behalf of all citizens.

Contention 2 is Seditious Speech

Second, the AFF allows for seditious speech, which delegitimizes the omnilateral will.
Varden, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010
Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech - MG
To understand Kant’s condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does consider seditious speech a public crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the government or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as seditious, the speaker’s intention must be to encourage and support efforts to subvert the government or to instigate its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might. Since the state is the only means through which right can replace might, the state outlaws it. And since it is a crime that “endangers the commonwealth” rather than citizens qua private citizens, it is a public crime (6: 331).

Tournament: Colleyville | Round: 1 | Opponent: Westwood AD | Judge: Long phil
The right to set ends must exist, otherwise ethics becomes incoherent, this is because Ethical theories are predicated on the notion that individuals have to deliberate between multiple courses of action. If agents are incapable of setting their own ends ethics cannot prescribe action

The ability to will your actions necessarily requires a right to property
Buck '87 (Wayne, Yale, "Kant's Justification of Private Property." In New Essays on Kant. Ed. den Ouden, 227-244.) -OS
Because human beings have the right to pursue their ends (i.e. they have the right to external freedom) they have a right to act in those ways necessary for achieving any ends at all. When we act to attain some end, in many cases our action involves manipulating or transforming some material object. When I eat an apple, I use the object for sustenance. When I paint, I use a brush and oils to transform a piece of canvas. Manipulation of objects is thus one of the means necessary to achieving ends in general. Hence the right to use external things is a necessary condition of the right to external freedom. As Kant puts it, if reason were to forbid the use of physical objects, external freedom would come into contradiction with itself, or "freedom would be robbing itself of the use of its Willkur" (MEJ, 52 354). Simply put, external freedom would in effect be forbidden by reason and morally impossible. (2) So far Kant has established the inherent right to use external objects. But this is not yet to establish the Juridical Postulate, which claims that individuals have the inherent right to own things. Kant makes this second step from the right to use things to owning them by means of an analysis of the concept of "possession." The 'subjective' condition of the possibility of actually manipulating a thing is physical possession. I am not able to use an axe unless I have it in hand, and I am not able to build a cabin unless I am standing on the spot where it is to be. These kinds of possession Kant usually calls "empirischer Besitz" and "Inhabung." I will call them "custody." Possession in this sense, then, is the subjective condition of the possibility of actually using a thing. "Possession," however, cannot just mean custody. Suppose that my right to the use of a thing lasted only as long as no one prevented me from using it as I desired. Thus if someone wrests the thing from my control to use as she pleases, my right to use it would end. But losing the right to an object merely because another grabbed it from me is precisely the situation in which I did not have a right to use it in the first place. Therefore, my having a right to the use of a thing presupposes that I can justifiably complain if anyone interferes with my using it as I please, and that I am justified in preventing anyone who tries to do so. If I have rights to something there must be some circumstances in which I retain those rights even though I have lost custody of the object (MEJ, 5 4 356). Custody is neither necessary nor sufficient for possession in this sense. So "possession" must have a second meaning, distinct from custody, if having rights to things is to be possible. This sort of possession must be a relation between an individual and a thing that obtains independently of their spatial relations. Since "possession" in this sense cannot denote a sensible relation between persons and things, Kant calls it "intelligibler Besitz." When there is such a relation between me and some object, I have "authority" (Gewalt) over the object regardless of whether I have custody (MEJ, 61-6 4 362-365). Let us call this intelligible or 'noumenal' relation "ownership.
Property rights requires the existence of the general will—rights in the state of nature are provisional, insofar as disputes could only be resolved through unilateral coercion. That means the state is the only legitimate authority in coercively enforcing rights claims
Korsgaard '08 (Christine, "Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution," in The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology)-OS
Brackets are in original text
Kant also believes that there is a sense in which we have rights in the state of nature. We have a natural right to our freedom (MPJ 6:237), and, Kant thinks, the Universal Principle of Justice allows us to claim rights in land and, more generally, in external objects, in property. Kant argues that it would be inconsistent with freedom to deny the possibility of property rights, on the grounds that unless we can claim rights to objects, those objects cannot be used (MPJ 6:246).⁷ This would be a restriction on freedom not based in freedom itself, which we should therefore reject, and this leads us to postulate that objects may be owned. But unlike Locke, Kant argues that in the state of nature these rights are only ‘‘provisional’’ (MPJ 6:256). In this, Kant is partly following Rousseau. In contrast to Locke, Rousseau argues that rights are created by the social contract, and, in a sense, relative to it. My possessions become my property, so far as you and I are concerned, when you and I have given each other certain reciprocal guarantees: I will keep my hands off your possessions if you will keep your hands off mine.⁸ Rights are not acquired by the metaphysical act of mixing one’s labor with the land, but instead are constructed from the human relations among people who have made such agreements.⁹ Kant adopts this idea, at least as far as the executive authority associated with a property right is concerned. I may indeed coercively enforce my rights. But if my doing so is to be consistent with the Universal Principle of Justice, it cannot be an act of unilateral coercion. To claim a right to a piece of property is to make a kind of law; for it is to lay it down that all others must refrain from using the object or land in question without my permission. But to view my claim as a law I must view it as the object of a contract between us, a contract in which we reciprocally commit ourselves to guaranteeing each other’s rights. It is this fact that leads us to enter—or, more precisely, to view ourselves as already having entered—political society. In making this argument, Kant evokes Rousseau’s concept of the general will. He argues that a general will to the coercive enforcement of the rights of all concerned is implicitly involved in every property claim. Now, with respect to an external and contingent possession, a unilateral Will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone, since that would be a violation of freedom in accordance with universal laws. Therefore, only a Will binding everyone else— that is, a collective, universal (common), and powerful Will—is the kind of Will that can provide the guarantee required. The condition of being subject to general external (that is, public) legislation that is backed by power is the civil society. Accordingly, a thing can be externally yours or mine that is, can be property only in a civil society. (MPJ 6:256) It is because the idea of the general will to the reciprocal enforcement of rights is implicit in any claim of right that Kant argues that rights in the state of nature are only provisional. They are provisional because this general will has not yet been instituted by setting up a common authority to enforce everyone’s rights. The act that institutes the general will is the social contract. Kant concludes from this argument that when the time comes to enforce your rights coercively, in the state of nature, the only legitimate way to do that is by joining in political society with those with whom you are in dispute. In fact, you enforce your right by first forcing them to join in political society with you so that the dispute can be settled by reciprocal rather than unilateral coercion: If it must be de jure possible to have an external object as one’s own, then the subject must also be allowed to compel everyone else with whom he comes into conflict over the question of whether such an object is his to enter, together with him, a society under a civil constitution. (MPJ 6:256) Suppose we are in the state of nature and we get into a dispute about rights. My goat has kids, and I take them to be mine because I was caring for the mother goat when they were born. However, one of them escaped, and you found it wandering around apparently unowned in the state of nature, took possession of it, fed it and cared for it for many years. Now we have discovered the matter, and each of us thinks she has a right to this particular goat. Since I think I have a right, I also think I may prosecute my right by coercive action. And you think the same. So what can we do? Perhaps I have a gun and you do not, so I can simply take the goat away from you. However, there are two ways to understand my action. One is: I am using unilateral force to take the goat away from you. Such an action would be illegitimate, a use of violence which interferes with your freedom. I cannot regard my action as an enforcement of my right without acknowledging that you have rights too, which also must be enforced. So if I am to claim that what I am doing is enforcing my right, I must understand my own action differently. The other way to understand the action is that I am forcing you to enter into political society with me. That gets us to the first step; the act of enforcing my right involves the establishment of a juridical condition (rechtlicher Zustand) between us and so establishes civil society. The second step, of course, is to settle the particular dispute in question in some lawful way. This means that Kant’s conception is different from Locke’s in important ways. According to Kant a juridical condition—a condition in which human rights are upheld and enforced—can only exist in political society. And therefore existence in political society is not merely, as Locke had it, in our interest. It is a duty of justice to live in political society. That is to say, others have the right to require this of you, because that is the form that their authority to enforce their own rights takes. And you, reciprocally, have the right to require membership in political society of others with whom you might have such disputes. Since we will that our rights be enforced, reciprocal coercion, and therefore political society, can be seen as the object of a general will.
The actor is the state—public colleges and universities are founded and operated by the state.
Thus the standard is maintaining a system of equal outer freedoms
Abstraction is great.
Farr '02
Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). "Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?" JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32. JDN.

Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed first. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I find this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions. It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for self-determination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings. Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves. Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very significant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without first exploring its emancipatory potential.

C1 Hate speech

Hate speech is protected by the First amendment, And Federal Courts have continued to support this interpretation
Eugene Volokh May 7, 2015 Eugene Volokh teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law, where he has also often taught copyright law, criminal law, and a seminar on firearms regulation policy.
The Washington Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/

I keep hearing about a supposed “hate speech” exception to the First Amendment, or statements such as, “This isn’t free speech, it’s hate speech,” or “When does free speech stop and hate speech begin?” But there is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal aliens, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or Socialism or Democrats or Republicans. To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. (And, notwithstanding CNN anchor Chris Cuomo’s Tweet that “hate speech is excluded from protection,” and his later claims that by “hate speech” he means “fighting words,” the fighting words exception is not generally labeled a “hate speech” exception, and isn’t coextensive with any established definition of “hate speech” that I know of.) The same is true of the other narrow exceptions, such as for true threats of illegal conduct or incitement intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal conduct (i.e., illegal conduct in the next few hours or maybe days, as opposed to some illegal conduct some time in the future). Indeed, threatening to kill someone because he’s black (or white), or intentionally inciting someone to a likely and immediate attack on someone because he’s Muslim (or Christian or Jewish), can be made a crime. But this isn’t because it’s “hate speech”; it’s because it’s illegal to make true threats and incite imminent crimes against anyone and for any reason, for instance because they are police officers or capitalists or just someone who is sleeping with the speaker’s ex-girlfriend.

Hate speech is inconsistent with a system of outer freedoms, banning it promotes more equal freedom
Varden 1 , Helga Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010 Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech
On the Kantian view I have been developing, hate speech and speech amounting to harassment are not outlawed because they track private wrongdoing as such, but rather because they tracks the state’s historical and current inability to provide some group(s) of citizens with rightful conditions of interaction. This type of public law tries to remedy the fact that some citizens have been and still are ‘more equal than others’. Hence, if the state finds that it is still unable successfully to provide conditions under which protection and for the empowerment of its historically oppressed, and thus vulnerable, are secured, then it is within its rightful powers to legally regulate speech and harassment to improve its ability to do so. By putting its weight behind historically the oppressed and vulnerable citizens, the state seeks to overcome the problems caused by its lack of recognition in the past and its current failure to provide conditions in which its citizens interact with respect for one as free and equal. Therefore, whether or not any instance of speech actually achieves insult is inconsequential, for that is not the justification for the state’s right to outlaw it. Rather, laws regulating speech and harassment track the state’s systemic inability to provide rightful interaction for all of its citizens. Note that this argument does not, nor must it, determine which particular usages of hate speech and speech amounting to harassment should be banned. It only explains why certain kinds and circumstances of speech and harassment can and should be outlawed and why public law, rather than private law, is the proper means for doing so. Determining which types and how it should be banned is matter for public debate and reflection followed by public regulation on behalf of all citizens.

Next independent reason-Defamation attempts are logically inconsistent with the conception of equal freedoms under the omnilateral will
Varden2 , Helga Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010 Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech 

What about defamation, how does it involve coercion? Attempts at defamation also constitute attempts non-consensually to deprive others of what is theirs, namely their good reputations as determined by their actions. Corresponding to a person’s innate right to freedom, Kant argues, is that person’s duty to “Be an honourable human being… Rightful honour… consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others” (6: 236). To defend one’s rightful honor is to defend one’s right to be recognized by others solely by the deeds one has performed. Indeed, one’s reputation, Kant explains, “is an innate external belonging” (6: 295); it can originally belong only to the person whose deeds are in question. If others spread falsehoods about the life she has lived, then she has the right and duty to challenge their lies publicly, for her reputation belongs only to her and to no one else. A person’s reputation is not a means subject to other people’s choice; it is not a means others have a right to manipulate in order to pursue their own ends. To permit this, Kant argues, would be to permit others to use your person as their own means, or to “make yourself a mere means for others” rather than also being “at the same time an end for them” (6: 236). Let me say briefly how this account of rightful honor analyzes cases like Holocaust-denial. Part of what makes denying the Holocaust different from other types of defamation is that it involves people who are no longer alive. On the Kantian approach I am advancing, one’s reputation is seen as intimately connected with how one has interacted normatively with others (6: 291). To interact normatively is to be capable of normativity or capable of interacting qua ‘noumena’, as Kant says, and not merely ‘qua phenomena’ or as embodied beings governed by laws of nature. It is qua noumena that we are capable of deeds or of having actions imputed to us. And it is qua noumena that we can still be defamed long after we are dead.3 Because right tracks normative relations, that one is no longer alive is beside the point. What is more, anyone – “relatives or strangers” – can challenge the lies told by another on behalf of the dead. Indeed, the one challenging the defamation does so in virtue of her own duty to ensure the conditions under which we can have rightful honor (6: 295). The reason is that those who spread such lies do not only express an unwillingness to respect those they defame in particular, but also they display a general unwillingness to interact in a way compatible with the rightful honor of everyone. The absence of defamation is necessary for public opinion to be reconcilable with each person’s right to freedom and the corresponding duty to be an honorable being. By defaming the dead, a person aims to falsify the public opinion, upon which everyone is dependent for rightful honor. Consequently, every member of the public has a right to challenge such lies on behalf of the dead.
C2 Seditious speech

Second, the AFF allows for seditious speech, which entails the ability to will the destruction the omnilateral will which is inconsistent with the existence of freedom.
Varden 3, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at University of Illinois, 2010
Helga, “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech”, The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice 3, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1_4, Online: http://www.academia.edu/2006079/A_Kantian_Conception_of_Free_Speech - AG
To understand Kant’s condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does consider seditious speech a public crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the government or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as seditious, the speaker’s intention must be to encourage and support efforts to subvert the government or to instigate its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might. Since the state is the only means through which right can replace might, the state outlaws it. And since it is a crime that “endangers the commonwealth” rather than citizens qua private citizens, it is a public crime (6: 331).
Seditious speech is constitutionally protected.

Justia n.d. Justia, "Seditious Speech and Seditious Libel", http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-01/41-seditious-speech.html~ AG
Seditious Speech and Seditious Libel.—Opposition to government through speech alone has been subject to punishment throughout much of history under laws proscribing “seditious” utterances. In this country, the Sedition Act of 1798 made criminal, inter alia, malicious writings which defamed, brought into contempt or disrepute, or excited the hatred of the people against the Government, the President, or the Congress, or which stirred people to sedition.966 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,967 the Court surveyed the controversy surrounding the enactment and enforcement of the Sedition Act and concluded that debate “first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.... Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history .... That history reflects a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.” The “central meaning” discerned by the Court, quoting Madison’s comment that in a republican government “the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people,” is that “the right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government.”