Tournament: tfa state | Round: 5 | Opponent: all | Judge: all
Empirics fail to guide action:

1. Evaluations of how we ought to act can’t be based on empirical standards because only looking to end states leads to contradictory obligations, if an action leads to a good end in one situation and a bad end in another, there’s no way to determine if that action ought to be taken because it would have been both good and bad, so we have to look at the underlying principle of the action, else obligations wouldn’t make sense.
   2. Inductive reasoning fails, so looking to consequences can’t be accurate when creating moral codes — it’s illogical to use empirics as indicative of anything.
   Hume
   Hume, David Scottish philosopher. “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.” 1748. http://18th.eserver.org/hume-enquiry.html#4. ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would forever retain their certainty and evidence. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should , in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of so important an enquiry, may be the more excusable; whisle we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful, by exciting curiosity, and destroying that implicit faith and security, which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry. The discovery of defects in the common philosophy, if any such there be, will not, I presume, be a discouragement, but rather an incitement, as is usual, to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public. All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a person, why she believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France; she would give you a reason; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person: Why? because these are the effects of the human make and fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is merely neither near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other.
   In a society, everyone owns property, however, property is an extension of each individual’s “circle of freedom,” and thus A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH HOUSING MUST EXIST
   Professor of Philosophy and Law Arthur Ripstein explains in 2009
   Ripstein, Arthur (Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Toronto). “Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy.” Harvard University Press. 2009.

Although Kant does not put the point in these terms, a spatial formulation of the argument makes it more vivid. If all land is privately held, then any person who does not own land could only be entitled to be anywhere at all with the permission of the person who did own the land. The innate right to occupy space, which is the basis of all further rights, would be is totally surrendered in such a situation. We saw in the last chapter that the spatiality of private property requires that there be roads joining any two parcels of land, and various other forms of public space are certainly possible. The possibility of walking the King’s Highways, as beggars did in Britain in earlier centuries, is no solution for people lacking land, because, as we also saw, blocking a public road is inconsistent with public right. If private owners are entitled to exclude from their land, and nobody is allowed to live on public highways, the poor could find themselves with no place to go, in the sense that they would do wrong simply by being wherever they happened to be, They would be entirely subject to the choice of those who owned land. Free persons lack the moral power to join with others to give themselves laws that create such a possibility, even if there were reasons to think it unlikely it would ever happen. The person who is entirely dependent on the grace of another to occupy space, or to use physical objects, is not merely lacking in self-determination, or somehow on the losing end of the bargain that makes up the social contract, having perhaps given up more than he gained. The contract cannot be represented as a bargain that the parties enter into in the expectation of an advantage, and the poverty-stricken person as opting out because it is not advantageous enough. Instead, the person who can only occupy space with the permission of others has no capacity to set and pursue his own purposes. As such, the person in need is like a slave, and the contract creating such a situation is, like a slave contract, is incoherent. The spatial version of the problem illuminates actual cases of poverty and need because the juridical significance of biological survival is that it consists in a person’s keeping control of his or own person. Death, as such, is of no direct significance to right; your own person, like everything else, is subject to natural deterioration. But if another person is entitled to determine whether you will maintain control of your own person, you are subject to that person’s choice in exactly the same way as the person who cannot occupy space except through the grace of another. Each is entirely subject to the choice of another. The spatial version of the problem also illustrates its systematic structure: those who have no place to go without the permission of another are not merely frustrated in the pursuit of some specific purpose, not even the purpose of self-preservation. All property rights prevent people from doing things that they might have otherwise been free to do, because a property right entitles the owner to determine how the object in question will be used. The sort of factual dependence that is thereby created raises no issues of right. Poverty, as Kant conceives it, is systematic: a person cannot use his or her own body, or even so much as occupy space, without the permission of another. The problem is not that some particular purpose depends on the choices of others, but that the pursuit of any purpose does.20 If all purposiveness depends on the grace of others, the dependent person is in the juridical position of a slave or serf.

Tournament: University of Houston Cougar Classic | Round: 1 | Opponent: Alan George | Judge: Tyler Gamble
Framework
Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech.

I value morality.

First, to evaluate ethical judgments we must interrogate ontologies of exclusion to filter out ethical biases.
Butler 09. Judith Butler, “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Jan 1st 2009, Pg.138, http://books.google.com/books/about/Frames_of_War.html?id=ga7hAAAAMAAJ
We ask such normative questions as if we know what we mean by the subjects even as we do not always know how best to represent or recognize various subjects. Indeed, the “we” who asks such questions for the most part assumes that the problem is a normative one, namely, how best to arrange political life so that recognition and representation can take place. And though surely this is a crucial, if not the most crucial, normative question to ask, we cannot possibly approach an answer if we do not consider the ontology of the subject whose recognition and representation is at issue. Moreover, any inquiry into that ontology requires that we consider another level at which the normative operates, namely, through norms that produce the idea of the human who is worthy of recognition and representation at all. That is to say, we cannot ask and answer the most commonly understood normative questions, regarding how best to represent or recognize such subjects, if we fail to understand the differential of power at work that distinguishes between those subjects who will be eligible for recognition and those who will not.

Morality mandates expression of all voices, which necessarily prohibits structural oppression.
Young 74. Iris Marion Young, Professor in Political Science at the University of Chicago since 2000, masters and doctorate in philosophy in 1974 from Pennsylvania State University. “Justice and the Politics of Difference”. Princeton University Press, 1990, Digital Copy.
Group representation, third, encourages the expression of individual ¶ and group needs and interests in terms that appeal to justice, that transform an "I want" into an "I am entitled to," in Hannah Pitkin's words. In ¶ Chapter 4 I argued that publicity itself encourages this transformation ¶ because a condition of the public is that people call one another to account. Group representation adds to such accountability because it serves as an antidote to self-deceiving self-interest masked as an impartial or general interest. Unless confronted with different perspectives on social relations and events, different values and language, most people tend to assert their perspective as universal. When social privilege allows some group perspectives to dominate a public while others are silent, such universalizing of the particular will be reaffirmed by many others. Thus the test of whether a claim upon the public is just or merely an expression of self interest is best made when those making it must confront the opinion of ¶ others who have explicitly with different, though not necessarily conflicting, ¶ experiences, priorities, and needs (cf. Sunstein, 1988, p. 1588). As a person of social privilege, I am more likely to go outside myself and have ¶ regard for social justice when I must listen to the voice of those my privilege otherwise tends to silence.

Thus the standard is combatting structural violence.
Prefer consequence-based frameworks because only naturalism is epistemically accessible
Papinaeu 11 David Papineau, “Naturalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007
Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.

Advantage 1: Oppression
Free speech eliminates structures of oppression –

1. It allows us to identify racists so that we can persuade them otherwise; this solves the root cause of oppression.
   ACLU 16. American Civil Liberties Union. For almost 100 years, the ACLU has worked to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States., “Hate Speech on Campus”, ACLU, 2016. https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus//AD
   Many universities, under pressure to respond to the concerns of those who are the objects of hate, have adopted codes or policies prohibiting speech that offends any group based on race, gender, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation. That's the wrong response, well-meaning or not. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects speech no matter how offensive its content. Speech codes adopted by government-financed state colleges and universities amount to government censorship, in violation of the Constitution. And the ACLU believes that all campuses should adhere to First Amendment principles because academic freedom is a bedrock of education in a free society. How much we value the right of free speech is put to its severest test when the speaker is someone we disagree with most. Speech that deeply offends our morality or is hostile to our way of life warrants the same constitutional protection as other speech because the right of free speech is indivisible: When one of us is denied this right, all of us are denied. Since its founding in 1920, the ACLU has fought for the free expression of all ideas, popular or unpopular. That's the constitutional mandate. Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that more speech -- not less -- is the best revenge. This is particularly true at universities, whose mission is to facilitate learning through open debate and study, and to enlighten. Speech codes are not the way to go on campuses, where all views are entitled to be heard, explored, supported or refuted. Besides, when hate is out in the open, people can see the problem. Then they can organize effectively to counter bad attitudes, possibly change them, and forge solidarity against the forces of intolerance. College administrators may find speech codes attractive as a quick fix, but as one critic put it: "Verbal purity is not social change." Codes that punish bigoted speech treat only the symptom: The problem itself is bigotry. The ACLU believes that instead of opting for gestures that only appear to cure the disease, universities have to do the hard work of recruitment to increase faculty and student diversity; counseling to raise awareness about bigotry and its history, and changing curricula to institutionalize more inclusive approaches to all subject matter.
   2. Restrictions on hate speech fail – they’ll just repackage the message using a dog-whistle.
   Malik 12 (Kenan Malik, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. My latest book is The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics, “why hate speech should not be banned”, April 12, 2012, https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/)
   Kenan Malik: I am not sure that ‘hate speech’ is a particularly useful concept. Much is said and written, of course, that is designed to promote hatred. But it makes little sense to lump it all together in a single category, especially when hatred is such a contested concept. In a sense, hate speech restriction has become a means not of addressing specific issues about intimidation or incitement, but of enforcing general social regulation. This is why if you look at hate speech laws across the world, there is no consistency about what constitutes hate speech. Britain bans abusive, insulting, and threatening speech. Denmark and Canada ban speech that is insulting and degrading. India and Israel ban speech that hurts religious feelings and incites racial and religious hatred. In Holland, it is a criminal offense deliberately to insult a particular group. Australia prohibits speech that offends, insults, humiliates, or intimidates individuals or groups. Germany bans speech that violates the dignity of, or maliciously degrades or defames, a group. And so on. In each case, the law defines hate speech in a different way. One response might be to say: Let us define hate speech much more tightly. I think, however, that the problem runs much deeper. Hate speech restriction is a means not of tackling bigotry but of rebranding certain, often obnoxious, ideas or arguments as immoral. It is a way of making certain ideas illegitimate without bothering politically to challenge them. And that is dangerous.
   3. Spillover effect – challenging oppression in everyday discussions is key to shaping larger cultural landscapes.
   Malik 2 (Kenan Malik, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. My latest book is The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics, “why hate speech should not be banned”, April 12, 2012, https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/)
   Much of what we call hate speech consists, however, of claims that may be contemptible but yet are accepted by many as morally defensible. Hence I am wary of the argument that some sentiments are so immoral they can simply be condemned without being contested. First, such blanket condemnations are often a cover for the inability or unwillingness politically to challenge obnoxious sentiments. Second, in challenging obnoxious sentiments, we are not simply challenging those who spout such views; we are also challenging the potential audience for such views. Dismissing obnoxious or hateful views as not worthy of response may not be the best way of engaging with such an audience. Whether or not an obnoxious claim requires a reply depends, therefore, not simply on the nature of the claim itself, but also on the potential audience for that claim.
   This solves – empirics prove you can’t eliminate bigotry by banning it.
   Malik 3 (Kenan Malik, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. My latest book is The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics, “why hate speech should not be banned”, April 12, 2012, https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/)
   And in practice, you cannot reduce or eliminate bigotry simply by banning it. You simply let the sentiments fester underground. As Milton once put it, to keep out ‘evil doctrine’ by licensing is ‘like the exploit of that gallant man who thought to pound up the crows by shutting his Park-gate’. Take Britain. In 1965, Britain prohibited incitement to racial hatred as part of its Race Relations Act. The following decade was probably the most racist in British history. It was the decade of ‘Paki-bashing’, when racist thugs would seek out Asians to beat up. It was a decade of firebombings, stabbings, and murders. In the early 1980s, I was organizing street patrols in East London to protect Asian families from racist attacks. Nor were thugs the only problem. Racism was woven into the fabric of public institutions. The police, immigration officials – all were openly racist. In the twenty years between 1969 and 1989, no fewer than thirty-seven blacks and Asians were killed in police custody – almost one every six months. The same number again died in prisons or in hospital custody. When in 1982, cadets at the national police academy were asked to write essays about immigrants, one wrote, ‘Wogs, nignogs and Pakis come into Britain take up our homes, our jobs and our resources and contribute relatively less to our once glorious country. They are, by nature, unintelligent. And can’t at all be educated sufficiently to live in a civilised society of the Western world’. Another wrote that ‘all blacks are pains and should be ejected from society’. So much for incitement laws helping create a more tolerant society. Today, Britain is a very different place. Racism has not disappeared, nor have racist attacks, but the open, vicious, visceral bigotry that disfigured the Britain when I was growing up has largely ebbed away. It has done so not because of laws banning racial hatred but because of broader social changes and because minorities themselves stood up to the bigotry and fought back. Of course, as the British experience shows, hatred exists not just in speech but also has physical consequences. Is it not important, critics of my view ask, to limit the fomenting of hatred to protect the lives of those who may be attacked? In asking this very question, they are revealing the distinction between speech and action. Saying something is not the same as doing it. But, in these post-ideological, postmodern times, it has become very unfashionable to insist on such a distinction. In blurring the distinction between speech and action, what is really being blurred is the idea of human agency and of moral responsibility. Because lurking underneath the argument is the idea that people respond like automata to words or images. But people are not like robots. They think and reason and act on their thoughts and reasoning. Words certainly have an impact on the real world, but that impact is mediated through human agency. Racists are, of course, influenced by racist talk. It is they, however, who bear responsibility for translating racist talk into racist action. Ironically, for all the talk of using free speech responsibly, the real consequence of the demand for censorship is to moderate the responsibility of individuals for their actions. Having said that, there are clearly circumstances in which there is a direct connection between speech and action, where someone’s words have directly led to someone else taking action. Such incitement should be illegal, but it has to be tightly defined. There has to be both a direct link between speech and action and intent on the part of the speaker for that particular act of violence to be carried out. Incitement to violence in the context of hate speech should be as tightly defined as in ordinary criminal cases. In ordinary criminal cases, incitement is, rightly, difficult legally to prove. The threshold for liability should not be lowered just because hate speech is involved.
   4. Perceived assault on free speech drives voters to the right wing – that’s how Trump got elected president.
   Soave 16 (Robby Soave, Associate editor at Reason.com, enjoys writing about college news, education policy, criminal justice reform, and television, “Trump Won Because Leftist Political Correctness Inspired a Terrifying Backlash”, Nov. 9, 2016, http://reason.com/blog/2016/11/09/trump-won-because-leftist-political-corr
   Trump won because of a cultural issue that flies under the radar and remains stubbornly difficult to define, but is nevertheless hugely important to a great number of Americans: political correctness. More specifically, Trump won because he convinced a great number of Americans that he would destroy political correctness. I have tried to call attention to this issue for years. I have warned that political correctness actually is a problem on college campuses, where the far-left has gained institutional power and used it to punish people for saying or thinking the wrong thing. And ever since Donald Trump became a serious threat to win the GOP presidential primaries, I have warned that a lot of people, both on campus and off it, were furious about political-correctness-run-amok—so furious that they would give power to any man who stood in opposition to it. I have watched this play out on campus after campus. I have watched dissident student groups invite Milo Yiannopoulos to speak—not because they particularly agree with his views, but because he denounces censorship and undermines political correctness. I have watched students cheer his theatrics, his insulting behavior, and his narcissism solely because the enforcers of campus goodthink are outraged by it. It's not about his ideas, or policies. It's not even about him. It's about vengeance for social oppression. Trump has done to America what Yiannopoulos did to campus. This is a view Yiannopoulos shares. When I spoke with him about Trump's success months ago, he told me, "Nobody votes for Trump or likes Trump on the basis of policy positions. That's a misunderstanding of what the Trump phenomenon is." He described Trump as "an icon of irreverent resistance to political correctness." Correctly, I might add. What is political correctness? It's notoriously hard to define. I recently appeared on a panel with CNN's Sally Kohn, who described political correctness as being polite and having good manners. That's fine—it can mean different things to different people. I like manners. I like being polite. That's not what I'm talking about. The segment of the electorate who flocked to Trump because he positioned himself as "an icon of irreverent resistance to political correctness" think it means this: smug, entitled, elitist, privileged leftists jumping down the throats of ordinary folks who aren't up-to-date on the latest requirements of progressive society. Example: A lot of people think there are only two genders—boy and girl. Maybe they're wrong. Maybe they should change that view. Maybe it's insensitive to the trans community. Maybe it even flies in the face of modern social psychology. But people think it. Political correctness is the social force that holds them in contempt for that, or punishes them outright. If you're a leftist reading this, you probably think that's stupid. You probably can't understand why someone would get so bent out of shape about being told their words are hurtful. You probably think it's not a big deal and these people need to get over themselves. Who's the delicate snowflake now, huh? you're probably thinking. I'm telling you: your failure to acknowledge this miscalculation and adjust your approach has delivered the country to Trump. There's a related problem: the boy-who-cried-wolf situation. I was happy to see a few liberals, like Bill Maher, owning up to it. Maher admitted during a recent show that he was wrong to treat George Bush, Mitt Romney, and John McCain like they were apocalyptic threats to the nation: it robbed him of the ability to treat Trump more seriously. The left said McCain was a racist supported by racists, it said Romney was a racist supported by racists, but when an actually racist Republican came along—and racists cheered him—it had lost its ability to credibly make that accusation. This is akin to the political-correctness-run-amok problem: both are examples of the left's horrible over-reach during the Obama years. The leftist drive to enforce a progressive social vision was relentless, and it happened too fast. I don't say this because I'm opposed to that vision—like most members of the under-30 crowd, I have no problem with gender neutral pronouns—I say this because it inspired a backlash that gave us Trump. My liberal critics rolled their eyes when I complained about political correctness. I hope they see things a little more clearly now. The left sorted everyone into identity groups and then told the people in the poorly-educated-white-male identity group that that's the only bad one. It mocked the members of this group mercilessly. It punished them for not being woke enough. It called them racists. It said their video games were sexist. It deployed Lena Dunham to tell them how horrible they were. Lena Dunham! I warned that political-correctness-run-amok and liberal overreach would lead to a counter-revolution if unchecked. That counter-revolution just happened. There is a cost to depriving people of the freedom (in both the legal and social senses) to speak their mind. The presidency just went to the guy whose main qualification, according to his supporters, is that he isn't afraid to speak his.

Advantage 2: Sexual Assault
Teachers are dissuaded from teaching rape law due to a culture of fear surrounding political correctness
Fisher 16 (Anthony L. Fisher, Dec 13, 2016, “Opposition to “offensive” speech on campuses will ultimately burn dissidents”, http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/13/13931524/free-speech-pen-america-campus-censorship)
PEN America, the literary and human rights association that lists as one of its core principles a commitment to "protect open expression in the United States and worldwide," set out to explore the state of free speech on the nation’s campuses — re-examining several high-profile incidents and controversies. While not comprehensive, the report, published this fall, is impressively thorough, treating much of its content as teachable case studies, rather than a set of self-affirming anecdotes. Some press coverage, however, suggested that the PEN America report — titled “And Campus For All: Diversity, Inclusion, and Freedom of Speech at U.S. Universities" — had exonerated campuses from the charge that they insufficiently protect free speech, and that it sided with students who think "cries of ‘free speech’ are too often used as a cudgel against them,” as the New York Times put it. The report itself contributes in a small way to this confused take, largely due to a single line in its conclusion which (improbably) asserts that there is no “pervasive ‘crisis’ for free speech on campus.” But that same report exhaustively details dozens of cases where certain speech was inappropriately muted on campus. More examples: Skidmore College’s Bias Response Group determined that the posting of Donald Trump's official campaign motto "Make America Great Again" in classrooms where women and people of color worked constituted "racialized, targeted attacks." A tenured associate professor at Louisiana State University, Teresa Buchanan, was dismissed for the offenses of using off-color language (including "fuck no”) in class, and off campus (where she said “pussy” in a conversation with another teacher). Like the University of Colorado’s Adler, Buchanan was deemed to have created a "hostile learning environment." The authors write of the "chilling effect" such administrative actions have on professors who fear reprisals for unintentional offense, and as a result, will avoid certain subjects, including rape law and even some aspects of Greek mythology, out of an abundance of caution.
Two impacts:

1. Lack of rape law education hurts survivors of sexual assault – they won’t win court cases
   Soave 14 (Robby Soave, Dec. 16, 2014, “Profs Have Stopped Teaching Rape Law Now That Everything 'Triggers' Students”, http://reason.com/blog/2014/12/16/profs-have-stopped-teaching-rape-law-now)
   Students seem more anxious about classroom discussion, and about approaching the law of sexual violence in particular, than they have ever been in my eight years as a law professor. Student organizations representing women’s interests now routinely advise students that they should not feel pressured to attend or participate in class sessions that focus on the law of sexual violence, and which might therefore be traumatic. These organizations also ask criminal-law teachers to warn their classes that the rape-law unit might “trigger” traumatic memories. Individual students often ask teachers not to include the law of rape on exams for fear that the material would cause them to perform less well. One teacher I know was recently asked by a student not to use the word “violate” in class—as in “Does this conduct violate the law?”—because the word was triggering. Some students have even suggested that rape law should not be taught because of its potential to cause distress. Suk—who is one of the signatories on this statement of opposition to Harvard's illiberal sexual assault policy—goes on to note that the very real, terrible consequence of not teaching rape law will be the proliferation of lawyers ill-equipped to deal with such matters. Victims of sexual assault deserve competent legal representation; the legal system needs prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges who have vigorously studied the nuances of rape adjudication. Social progress on all these fronts will be rolled back if law professors stop educating students about rape. That would be a travesty of justice.
   2. Stunts sexual assault activism on campus and reduces awareness of the issue
   Baker 15 (Katie J.M. Baker, Apr. 3, 2015, “Teaching Rape Law In The Age Of The Trigger Warning”, https://www.buzzfeed.com/katiejmbaker/teaching-rape-law-in-the-age-of-the-trigger-warning?utm_term=.par3Gy4V7#.gcKwr03L4)
   One criminal law professor at the college was so upset that she told the administration she would rather not teach rape law at all than be forced to teach it in a manner based on one student’s “deeply held personal feelings.” The professor, who would only speak anonymously, has decades of experience studying rape law and said she planned to discuss everything from the effects of trauma to campus rape activism. Instead, she spent class time reassuring students that she would not treat rape differently than other sensitive subjects. Some of her students were thankful for the email, she said, but others were confused since it came out of nowhere and was endorsed by the school. One distraught student told the professor that she was a rape survivor and now had no idea if she would be able to handle whatever was coming next. Some professors told BuzzFeed News that they had no problem incorporating their students’ concerns. Brooklyn Law professor Bennett Capers said he begins his section on rape law by reminding students that it’s a particularly sensitive subject and providing them with sexual assault statistics. “On the first day, a lot of students are reluctant to engage on the subject, but by the second, we have some of the most rewarding conversation I’ve had all semester,” he said. Capers also tells his students that rape law is a particularly fascinating area because it’s currently evolving. “They can push the law in new directions as they become lawyers,” he said. Deborah Tuerkheimer, a former sex crimes prosecutor and professor at Northwestern Law School, said she believes it’s up to the professor to manage the class well. She’s never had any problems. “I think students can make comments that have the potential to be deeply upsetting, but that can be navigated,” she said. Other professors aren’t as quick to bend to students’ requests for sensitivity. Professor Suk told BuzzFeed News that she wrote her New Yorker piece because she was hearing about more students who objected to or absented themselves from the classroom discussion on rape law than ever before. “I wanted to reflect on why, just at a time when sexual assault, particularly on campus, is getting so much attention, we might see a shrinking away from classroom discussion of these topics,” she told BuzzFeed News. Suk said she thinks the shift is indicative of a new form of “social suffering” as classroom experience that goes beyond the pain of individual victims of sexual violence. “The social designation of topics and forms of discussion as ‘traumatic’ has real consequences for classroom intellectual exploration,” she said.
    

Advantage 3: Education
A Rights Precedent: restrictions on free speech creates a dangerous slippery slope. Universities should not be the arbiters of communication.
*Climate change NC, Sustainability Florida
Fisher 16 (Anthony L. Fisher, Dec 13, 2016, “Opposition to “offensive” speech on campuses will ultimately burn dissidents”, http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/13/13931524/free-speech-pen-america-campus-censorship)
In perhaps the most cogent line of the entire report, the authors write: “Overreaction to problematic speech may impoverish the environment for speech for all.” In the name of social justice, some students are demanding administrators become the arbiters of what speech is legitimate and what isn’t. These students don’t seem to grasp that by granting authority figures the power to adjudicate which speakers have the right to be heard, they will inevitably find their own speech silenced when opponents claim offense, fear, or discomfort. Calls for crackdowns on “offensive” speech inevitably boomerang It’s already happening. Just ask the Palestinian activists whose boycott campaigns against Israel have been deemed hate speech by a number of public universities, and whose future political activities could be endangered by an act of Congress. Just this month, the Senate unanimously passed the "Anti-Semitism Awareness Act,” which directs the Department of Education to use the bill's contents as a guideline when adjudicating complaints of anti-Semitism on campus. Among the speech-chilling components of the bill, the political (and subjective) act of judging Israel by an "unfair double standard" could be considered hate speech. To cite other examples of unintended consequences of the crackdown on “offensive” speech, a black student at the University of Michigan was punished for calling another student “white trash,” and conservative law students at Georgetown claimed they were “traumatized” when an email critical of deceased Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia landed in their inboxes. The PEN America report also notes the Foundation for Individual Rights’ analysis of hundreds of campuses with “severely restrictive” speech codes. While a number of these campuses don't aggressively enforce their speech codes, the rules remain on the books; more than a dozen such codes have been overturned in the courts. What’s even more concerning is the increasingly popular notion that some ideas, such as opposition to abortion, should simply be “non-platformed" — that is, deemed unworthy of even being heard on campus. Although the trend of denying contentious speakers such as former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice or refugee-turned-Dutch politician and critic of Islam Ayaan Hirsi Ali public platforms by "disinviting" them from campus is disconcerting, it is not censorship. However, a pro-choice group physically blocking the display of a pro-life group on the campus of the University of Georgia is a form of censorship. As is the case of University of California-Santa Barbara professor Mireille Miller-Young, who assaulted a young woman holding a pro-life placard including graphic imagery in a "free speech" zone on campus and stole her sign. When the young woman objected to the theft of her property, Miller-Young replied, "I may be a thief, but you're a terrorist." Like it or not, almost half of all Americans consider themselves pro-life. Banning their perspective from campus won't win over converts, and it’s both immoral and counterproductive to declare completely legitimate political perspectives beyond the pale. Think of anti-war protests or demonstrations in support of integration when both causes were broadly unpopular, and then try to consider a majority on campus declaring their school a "safe space" from such "offensive" expressions of free speech.

B Free speech prepares students for the real world by reducing academic insulation.
Vivanco 16 (Leonor Vivanco, August 25th, 2016, “U. of C. tells incoming freshmen it does not support 'trigger warnings' or 'safe spaces'”, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-university-of-chicago-safe-spaces-letter-met-20160825-story.html3
"It is not the proper role of the University to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive," the report states. "Although the University greatly values civility, and although all members of the University community share in the responsibility for maintaining a climate of mutual respect, concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members of our community." The university is preparing students for the real world and would not be serving them by shielding them from unpleasantness, said Geoffrey Stone, chair of the committee, law professor and past provost at the U. of C. "The right thing to do is empower the students, help them understand how to fight, combat and respond, not to insulate them from things they will have to face later," Stone said. While the university doesn't support, require or encourage trigger warnings, it does not prohibit them, he added. Professors are still free to alert students to certain material if they choose to do so. Jane Kirtley, a media ethics and law professor at the University of Minnesota, called U. of C.'s move "refreshing." She said colleges should resist setting limits on what views and opinions are acceptable to air in open forum and should encourage students to discuss things they find uncomfortable. "If universities are not providing platforms for people to be offensive, then I don't think that they're doing part of their job," Kirtley said. "If listening to Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton is going to make your blood pressure go up 400 points, then fine, don't listen to them. But that doesn't mean you can say we can't have Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton speaking on campus because it would be offensive to even know they were talking." Another Midwestern institution has followed the University of Chicago's lead. In 2015, the board of trustees at Purdue University in Indiana endorsed the principles articulated in the U. of C. report. "Our commitment to open inquiry is not new, but adopting these principles provides a clear signal of our pledge to live by this commitment and these standards," board Chairman Tom Spurgeon said in a statement at the time.
Three impacts:

1. Preparation for the real world gives students the tools necessary to fight oppression for life; that outweighs in the long run.
   2. An atmosphere of academic openness is a prerequisite to knowledge.
   Jacobson 16 (Daniel Jacobson (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan). “Freedom of Speech under Assault on Campus.” Cato Institute. 30 August 2016. https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/freedom-speech-under-assault- campus#full
   Mill held that an atmosphere of intellectual freedom not only cultivates genius but is also a prerequisite for even commonplace knowledge. For our beliefs to be justified, we must be able to respond to the best arguments against them. Yet people naturally dislike what Mill called adverse discussion—that is, exposure to opposing arguments—and tend to avoid it. Hence, they are led to argue against straw men as much from ignorance as dishonesty. For those reasons and others, Mill defended freedom of speech in uncom- promising terms: “There ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine,” regardless of its falsity, immorality, or even harmfulness.4 Mill’s arguments for free speech anticipated several psychological phenomena that are now widely recognized: epistemic closure, group polarization, and confirmation bias, as well as simple conformism. Epistemic closure is the tendency to restrict one’s sources of information, including other people, to those largely in agreement with one’s views, thereby avoiding adverse discussion. Group polarization describes how like-minded people grow more extreme in their beliefs when unchecked by the presence of dissenters. (Whence Nietzsche: “Madness is rare in individuals—but in groups, parties, nations, and ages it is the rule.”5) Confirmation bias is the tendency to focus on evidence that supports what we already believe and to discount contrary evidence. These phenomena are widespread and well documented, and they all tend to undermine the justification of our beliefs. Hence, the toleration of unpopular opinions constitutes a prerequisite for knowledge. Yet such toleration amounts only to its immunity to punishment, not its protection from criticism.
   3. Lack of counter-narratives produce echo-chambers that sustains existing power structures whilst deluding liberals otherwise.
   Sunstein 12 (Cass R. Sunstein. Sep 17, 2012. “Breaking up the echo”. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/opinion/balanced-news-reports-may-only-inflame.html?_r=0)
   It is well known that when like­minded people get together, they tend to end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before they started to talk. The same kind of echo­chamber effect can happen as people get news from various media. Liberals viewing MSNBC or reading left­of­center blogs may well end up embracing liberal talking points even more firmly; Conservative fans of Fox News may well react in similar fashion on the right. The result can be a situation in which is that beliefs do not merely harden but migrate toward the extreme ends of the political spectrum. As current events in the Middle East demonstrate, discussions among like­minded people can ultimately produce violence. What explains this? The answer is called “biased assimilation,” which means that people assimilate new information selectively in a selective fashion. When people get endorsing information that supports what they initially thought, they give it considerable weight. When they get and dismissing information that undermines their initial beliefs, they tend to dismiss it. In this light, it is understandable that when people begin with opposing initial beliefs on, say, the death penalty, balanced information can heighten their initial disagreement. Those who tend to favor capital punishment credit the information that supports their original view and dismiss the opposing information. The same happens on the other side. As a result, divisions widen. This natural human tendency explains why it’s so hard to dislodge false rumors and factual errors. Corrections can even be self­defeating, leading people to stronger commitment to their erroneous beliefs. The news here is not encouraging. In the face of entrenched social divisions, there’s a risk that presentations that carefully explore both sides will be counterproductive. And when a group, responding to false information, becomes more strident, efforts to correct the record may make things worse. Can anything be done? There is no simple term for the answer, so let’s make one up: surprising validators. However People tend to dismiss information that would falsify their convictions. But they may reconsider their views if the information comes from a like-minded source they cannot dismiss. People are most likely to find a source credible if they closely identify with it or begin in essential agreement with it. In such cases, their reaction is not, “how predictable and uninformative that someone like that would think something so evil and foolish,” but instead, they say “if someone like that disagrees with me, maybe I had better rethink.” Our initial convictions are more apt to be shaken if it’s not easy to dismiss the source as biased, confused, self­interested or simply mistaken. This is one reason that seemingly irrelevant characteristics, like appearance, or taste in food and drink, can have a big impact on credibility. Such characteristics can suggest that the validators are in fact surprising — that they are “like” the people to whom they are speaking. It follows that turncoats, real or apparent, can be immensely persuasive. If civil rights leaders oppose affirmative action, or if well­known climate change skeptics say that they were wrong, people are more likely to change their views. Here, then, is a lesson for all those who provide information. What matters most may be not what is said, but who, exactly, is saying it.

Advantage 4: Democracy
Restrictions on free speech threaten democracy and exposure of abuse of power
Maloney 16. Cliff Maloney Jr Executive Director at Young Americans for Liberty, “Colleges Have No Right to Limit Students’ Free Speech”, TIME, 10/13/16, http://time.com/4530197/college-free-speech-zone///AD
America is a free-speech zone, period In grade school, I learned that debate is defined as “a discussion between people in which they express different opinions about something.” Such open discourse was historically encouraged on our college campuses. Universities exemplified intellectual discussion and debate in America. No one voiced their opinions louder than students, professors and administrators. They pushed society’s limits by admitting women and people of color, and by encouraging diversity of thought amongst the college community. Historically, young people flocked to universities to learn more about the world around them, to encounter people from different backgrounds, to expand their minds and to form their own opinions. Unfortunately, things have changed. Recently on college campuses, our open discourse has been threatened, particularly when discussing politics. While the current presidential election represents polarizing wings of both the Democratic and Republican parties, we should be able to openly debate their policies and the direction in which they plan to take our country if elected. We should be able to discuss the abuse of power within our government and the consistent violations of our Bill of Rights. We should be able to participate in the free market of ideas. But our students are being silenced. University campuses are now home to a plethora of speech restrictions. From sidewalk-sized “free-speech zones” to the criminalization of microaggressions, America’s college campuses look and feel a lot more like an authoritarian dictatorship than they do the academic hubs of the modern free world. When rolling an inflated free-speech ball around campus, students at the University of Delaware were halted by campus police for their activities. A Young Americans for Liberty leader at Fairmont State University in West Virginia was confronted by security when he was attempting to speak with other students about the ideas he believes in. A man at Clemson University was barred from praying on campus because he was outside of the free-speech zone. And a student at Blinn College in Texas abolished her campus’ free-speech zone in a lawsuit after administrators demanded she seek special permission to advocate for self-defense. How have we let this happen in America, the land of the free? It’s because of what our universities have taught a generation of Americans: If you don’t agree with someone, are uncomfortable with an idea, or don’t find a joke funny, then their speech must be suppressed. Especially if they don’t politically agree with you. Instead of actually debating ideas that span topics from the conventional to the taboo, a generation of American students don’t engage, they just get enraged. In doing so, many students believe that they have a right to literally shut other people up. This is not only a threat to the First Amendment, but also to American democracy. In their manifestation, safe spaces and free-speech zones at public universities enable prejudice against unfavorable ideologies. Guised as progressive measures to ensure inclusion, these often unconstitutional policies exclude new and competing ideas, and are antithetical to a free academia. In excluding different ideologies, supposedly progressive campus speech codes do one thing: prevent the progression of ideas. Restrictive campus speech codes are, in fact, regressive. With over 750 chapters nationwide at Young Americans for Liberty, we are fighting against public universities that stifle free speech. We’ve launched the national Fight for Free Speech campaign to reform unconstitutional speech codes and abolish these so-called free-speech zones on college campuses. By hosting events such as large free speech balls, YAL chapters across the country are petitioning their campuses to adopt the University of Chicago’s principles on freedom of expression—the hallmark of campus speech policies. Our members have geared up with First Amendment organizations to ensure that their free speech rights on campus are protected. America is a land rooted in the ideas of a free society: the freedom to be who you are, to speak your mind and to innovate. By silencing our students and young people, we have started down a slippery slope. It is up to us to fight back to ensure that our First Amendment rights remain protected—not just on college campuses, but everywhere in America.
Democracy prevents massive death, terrorism and ecological collapse – we need to protect the constitution at all costs
*democratic openness - accountability
*single violation creates a slippery slope – need rule of law to make deals
Diamond 95 (Larry, Sr fellow at the Hoover instiution) A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,” pg. Online/
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built

Discourse focus bad
Restrictions on free speech open the door for section 1983 lawsuits
Piper 16. Greg Piper, 6-9-2016, "RULING: Public universities can't yank funding from students in retaliation for their speech," College Fix, http://www.thecollegefix.com/post/27770/ AD
One of the surest ways for student government leaders, campus administrators and university boards to silence and intimidate student groups is by taking away the money they are budgeted. Such speech retaliation is the basis for two student newspapers’ lawsuits against their universities – The Koala‘s at the University of California-San Diego and the University Daily Kansan‘s at the University of Kansas. Thanks to an appeals-court decision last week, students’ right to speak without losing their funding “privileges” appears to be secure, at least in the case of the shock-rag Koala. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers California, ruled that the Arizona Students Association, which lobbies for students in the state’s three public universities, can continue suing the Arizona Board of Regents for First Amendment retaliation. The ASA had campaigned for a 2012 ballot measure to increase public-education funding, which upset the board enough that it voted to halt its collection of a per-student fee that funds the ASA. Later the board adopted an “opt-in” model under which students must explicitly state that they want to fund the ASA, and it started charging the ASA the cost of collecting those opt-in fees. The 9th Circuit rebuked the lower court for throwing out the case, saying the ASA’s main error was suing the board itself rather than its officers. While constitutionally it can’t get “retrospective relief” – namely, one semester’s collected fees that the board never handed over – the ASA can still obtain an injunction going forward, said the ruling. Board officials can be targeted under what’s known as a Section 1983 claim “alleging that public officials, acting in their official capacity, took action with the intent to retaliate against, obstruct, or chill the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights,” the appeals court said. All that’s needed for a plaintiff to prevail is to show that a defendant “intended to interfere” with its protected speech and that it “suffered some injury as a result.” The ASA has clearly alleged that it engaged in “core political speech” – the most protected category – by advocating for the ballot measure, and that the board’s “retaliatory policy modification” chilled its speech and continues to inhibit the ASA from participating in its prior advocacy. The appeals panel goes on at length about why this is so problematic, in language that will probably show up in The Koala‘s UCSD suit: Significantly, the ASA and ABOR’s the board’s dispute is more than a disagreement between similarly situated political rivals. ABOR represents the State’s most powerful authority in determining the policies, delivery, governance, management, and accessibility of Arizona’s public higher education. The ASA is composed entirely of public university students, and it represents the collective voice of those students. The disparity in power between ABOR and Arizona’s public university students is vast. According to the ASA, ABOR leveraged that power to punish the ASA for participating in core political speech and, further, to attempt to bankrupt the ASA to prevent it from exercising its free-speech rights in the future. Given the inherent power asymmetry between the Board and students, as well as the severe impact of ABOR’s actions on the ASA, it is highly likely that the Board’s alleged retaliation would chill and discourage a student or student organization of similar fortitude and conviction from exercising its free-speech rights. It doesn’t matter that the ASA has “no independent or affirmative right” to have the board collect and remit the fees that fund it – the board has allegedly attacked the ASA’s freedom of speech by denying it a “valuable government benefit” because of its speech activity: ABOR had no affirmative obligation to collect or remit the ASA fee, but having done so for fifteen years at no cost, ABOR could not deprive the ASA of the benefit of its fee collection and remittance services in retaliation for the ASA’s exercise of its First Amendment rights. Frank LoMonte of the Student Press Law Center sees this ruling as giving “additional legal ammunition” to student outlets that have been stripped of funding “because of unflattering content”: Had that lower-court ruling held up, student media organizations facing the removal of university financial support would have had an essentially impossible burden to challenge even the most blatant cause-and-effect cases of retaliation. LoMonte compares the yanking of funding in response to unflattering content to a governor sending “the highway patrol door-to-door to confiscate the driver licenses of people who give speeches opposing the governor just because ‘driving is a privilege, not a right.'” The University Daily Kansan is likely to cite this ruling, even though it’s in the wrong circuit, to defeat its university’s motion to dismiss the case, LoMonte says. (UCSD hasn’t yet filed a motion to dismiss, and it may have no grounds to do so now.) Whatever else might result from this ruling, you can be confident that “the worst in collegiate journalism” (The Koala‘s slogan) will continue publishing horribly offensive content that the easily triggered activists of UCSD keep reading for some reason.

Underview

1. Discourse focus trades off with and actively subverts a politics of substantive material resistance.
   Jay 16 (Scott Jay, Legendary analyst, Jan 5 2016, “The postmodern left and the success of neoliberalism”, http://libcom.org/library/postmodern-left-success-neoliberalism) YS 2.6.16
   Simulation hits reality SYRIZA played out like a simulation of Marxist theory. The collapse of social democracy required a new electoral force to take its place. In stepped SYRIZA, an electoral alliance that assured everyone that they were actually going to take on the financial powers in Europe. Marxists around the world who have documented in detail how social democracy has flailed and decayed for decades suddenly believed that yes, this electoral reform project would succeed, and no, there was no reason why it was any different than the failures of the past. Without a “fake” Marxist Left–the Stalinists, reformists and other revisionists of the past–the “real” Marxist Left stepped in to take its place, heralding the dawn of a new age in Europe, for a few exciting months anyway. It can seem impossible at times to tell the difference between the real and the fake, the simulation and reality, but ultimately we do not live in a postmodern world. We simply live in a world where so many on the Left act as though it is. Nonetheless, all of these simulations do eventually confront the brute material forces of reality, and suddenly the complete inadequacy of the simulated Left–not just in SYRIZA but across the board–is laid bare for all to see. Eventually, a Ferguson or a Baltimore revolts and the irrelevance of the Postmodern Left to the project of organizing working class resistance is made completely clear. If there is any way out of this rut, it is to reject the spectacle and the simulation in favor of substantive material resistance. The feel good moment of triumph with a hollow center, the exuberant meetings and chants that people remember for the rest of their lives, just might be an obstacle toward building something with actual power. The image of revolt, and even talk of socialism and–hold onto your seats!–“political revolution” coming from the Bernie Sanders campaign for President will go nowhere. It is the courageous act of resistance and the rein of terror that it must face in response from the neoliberal state that transforms a class into a force for rebellion. In short, if social movements do not directly hurt the people in power–and not just mildly embarrass them–or empower the exploited and oppressed–and not just temporarily mobilize them–then it may not be a worthwhile strategy. It may simply feel like one. In other words, if it feels good, don’t do it. We may struggle to see past the illusions from our current vantage point. No doubt, we will find ourselves in the trenches of class war, only to look outside and realize that the entire spectacle has been constructed by a charlatan. This will continue to happen, so long as neoliberal capitalism provides career opportunities for charlatans, as it no doubt will. There is a great need, then, to breakdown the facade, to no longer allow the false images of resistance that surreptitiously enable neoliberalism and distract from the fundamental project of resistance. The SYRIZAs of the world They will insist that this is counterproductive to their project. And that is exactly the point.

Tournament: Colleyville | Round: 2 | Opponent: Hebron AA | Judge: Telfer, Garret
Framework
First, the purpose of debate education should be to train youth to challenge oppressive structures, not perpetuate them,
Bohmer 91  “Teaching Privileged Students about Gender, Race, and Class Oppression.” Teaching Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April, 1991) pp. 154-163.
Our a strong emphasis on institutional oppression is not only due to our sociological approach to social psychology; it is also an outcome of our interactions with students. Let us repeat that mostly of our students are white and middle class students, with limited exposure to group diversity. Much of the material we present is new to them and often difficult to absorb. One of their major problems lies in moving from individualistic explanations to a sociological analysis. Teaching in this setting, we have found that a focus on micro-level processes is fruitful only after we have addressed the concept of institutional oppression. Without an understanding of institutional aspects students decontextualize social interactions; they equate prejudice with oppression and argue that members of privileged groups are also oppressed. This position, of course, is untenable if we want the concept to remain useful for an analysis of class, race, and gender relations in our society. Even while we emphasize institutional barriers for members of oppressed groups, we do not deny human agency by portraying oppressed individuals as trapped entirely by the confines of society. Balancing the two perspectives, however, is difficult, and the outcome depends strongly on our audience. With primarily white, middle-class students, who tend to advance individualistic explanations and who seem largely unaware of the institutional nature of oppression, we believe it is appropriate to stress barriers and limitations. If we taught a more diverse population we are certain that our discussion of oppression would focus more sharply on human agency as a potential for change. It can be both trying and challenging to integrate considerations of race, gender, and class into an introductory course on social psychology. We have experienced resistance, guilt, anger, and denial from many of our privileged students. Our greatest frustration is that students are reinforced in their resistance and denial because they experience little follow-up in other classes and have little ongoing exposure to the concepts we have introduced. We believe, however, that exposure to the concept of oppression in our classes helps at least some students to gain a greater understanding and appreciation for those who are different from themselves. Such exposure also leads some students to raise questions in other courses that do not take race, gender, and class into account. These students, who we hope will apply their knowledge to their everyday interactions with members of other groups, and encourage us to find new ways of introducing race, gender, and class into the sociology curriculum.
Second, discussions cannot be based on ideal theory- we must engage in policy discussions but those discussion mean nothing unless they change the values to the people they affect
Curry 14 Dr. Tommy J; “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century”, Victory Briefs, 2014
Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); since ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, it is set against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations.
Impacts

1. Neg frameworks assume a starting position of equality, grounding their framework as if everyone could engage in ethics. This starting point is flawed – if their justifications take into account unequal social orders they would require rectifying these inequalities since it’s a prerequisite to ethical justification.
   2. Minorities can’t access idealized frameworks or ideas- means 1AC is a form of praxis to understand those ideas.  This also implies comparative worlds- because it addresses tangible and real conditions instead of truths of words which are inaccessible.
   3. Non idealized frameworks that account for oppression are more accurate. the dominant standpoint precludes meaningful discussion of how morality is constructed because it ignores oppression – examining ethical problems from the oppressed is key
   Jaggar 83 Alison M. Jaggar, professor of philosophy and women studies at University of Colorado - Boulder, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.  1983
   The standpoint of the oppressed is not just different from that of the ruling class; it is also epistemologically advantageous. It provides the basis for a view of reality that is more impartial than that of the ruling class and also more comprehensive.  It is more impartial because it comes closer to representing the interests of society as a whole; whereas the standpoint of the ruling class reflects the interests only of one section of the population, the standpoint of the oppressed represents the interests of the totality in that historical period.  Moreover, whereas the condition of the oppressed groups is visible only dimly to the ruling class, the oppressed are able to see more clearly the ruled as well as the rulers and the relation between them. Thus, the standpoint of the oppressed includes and is able to explain the standpoint of the ruling class.
   Impact Calc:
2. Intent is a code word for privilege and ignorance – consequences outweigh
   Utt 13 (Jamie Utt, July 30, 2013, “Intent vs. Impact: Why Your Intentions Don’t Really Matter”, http://everydayfeminism.com/2013/07/intentions-dont-really-matter/ YS 8.8.16)
   From Paula Deen to Alec Baldwin to your annoying, bigoted uncle or friend, we hear it over and over again: “I never meant any harm…” “It was never my intent…” “I am not a racist…” “I am not a homophobe…” “I’m not a sexist…” I cannot tell you how often I’ve seen people attempt to deflect criticism about their oppressive language or actions by making the conversation about their intent. At what point does the “intent” conversation stop mattering so that we can step back and look at impact? After all, in the end, what does the intent of our action really matter if our actions have the impact of furthering the marginalization or oppression of those around us? In some ways, this is a simple lesson of relationships. If I say something that hurts my partner, it doesn’t much matter whether I intended the statement to mean something else – because my partner is hurting. I need to listen to how my language hurt my partner. I need to apologize. And then I need to reflect and empathize to the best of my ability so I don’t do it again. But when we’re dealing with the ways in which our identities intersect with those around us – and, in turn, the ways our privileges and our experiences of marginalization and oppression intersect – this lesson becomes something much larger and more profound. This becomes a lesson of justice. What we need to realize is that when it comes to people’s lives and identities, the impact of our actions can be profound and wide-reaching. And that’s far more important than the question of our intent. We need to ask ourselves what might be or might have been the impact of our actions or words. And we need to step back and listen when we are being told that the impact of our actions is out of step with our intents or our perceptions of self. Identity Privilege and Intent For people of identity privilege, this is where listening becomes vitally important, for our privilege can often shield us from understanding the impact of our actions. After all, as a person of privilege, I can never fully understand the ways in which oppressive acts or language impact those around me. What I surely can do is listen with every intent to understand, and I can work to change my behavior. Because what we need to understand is that making the conversation about intent is inherently a privileged action. The reason? It ensures that you and your identity (and intent) stay at the center of any conversation and action while the impact of your action or words on those around you is marginalized. So if someone ever tells you to “check your privilege,” what they may very well mean is: “Stop centering your experience and identity in the conversation by making this about the intent of your actions instead of their impact.” That is: Not everything is about you.
   2. Critical theory demands that Particularity is the best standard- this means they should specifically explain how root cause claims cause the aff impacts, why the RoB is uniquely unacceptable, etc. Instead of saying capitalism is the root cause of everything.
   Price 98 (RICHARD PRICE is a former prof in the Department of Anthropology at Yale University. Later, he moved to Johns Hopkins University to found the Department of Anthropology, where he served three terms as chair. A decade of freelance teaching (University of Minnesota, Stanford University, Princeton University, University of Florida, Universidade Federal da Bahia), ensued. This article is co-authored with CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT – Monash University – European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 1998 via SAGE Publications – http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/PriceReusSmithCriticalInternatlTheoryConstructivism.pdf)
   One of the central departures of critical international theory from positivism is the view that we cannot escape the interpretive moment. As George (1994: 24) argues, ‘the world is always an interpreted “thing”, and it is always interpreted in conditions of disagreement and conflict, to one degree or another’. For this reason, ‘there can be no common body of observational or tested data that we can turn to for a neutral, objective knowledge of the world. There can be no ultimate knowledge, for example, that actually corresponds to reality per se.’ This proposition has been endorsed wholeheartedly by constructivists, who are at pains to deny the possibility of making ‘Big-T’ Truth claims about the world and studiously avoid attributing such status to their findings. This having been said, after undertaking sustained empirical analyses of aspects of world politics constructivists do make ‘small-t’ truth claims about the subjects they have investigated. That is, they claim to have arrived at logical and empirically plausible interpretations of actions, events or processes, and they appeal to the weight of evidence to sustain such claims. While admitting that their claims are always contingent and partial interpretations of a complex world, Price (1995, 1997) claims that his genealogy provides the best account to date to make sense of anomalies surrounding the use of chemical weapons, and Reus-Smit (1997) claims that a culturalist perspective offers the best explanation of institutional differences between historical societies of states. Do such claims contradict the interpretive ethos of critical international theory? For two reasons, we argue that they do not. First, the interpretive ethos of critical international theory is driven, in large measure, by a normative rejection of totalizing discourses, of general theoretical frameworks that privilege certain perspectives over others. One searches constructivist scholarship in vain, though, for such discourses. With the possible exception of Wendt’s problematic flirtation with general systemic theory and professed commitment to ‘science’, constructivist research is at its best when and because it is question driven, with self-consciously contingent claims made specifically in relation to particular phenomena, at a particular time, based on particular evidence, and always open to alternative interpretations. Second, the rejection of totalizing discourses based on ‘big-T’ Truth claims does not foreclose the possibility, or even the inevitability, of making ‘small-t’ truth claims. In fact, we would argue that as soon as one observes and interacts in the world such claims are unavoidable, either as a person engaged in everyday life or as a scholar. As Nietzsche pointed out long ago, we cannot help putting forth truth claims about the world. The individual who does not cannot act, and the genuinely unhypocritical relativist who cannot struggles for something to say and write. In short, if constructivists are not advancing totalizing discourses, and if making ‘small-t’ truth claims is inevitable if one is to talk about how the world works, then it is no more likely that constructivism per se violates the interpretive ethos of critical international theory than does critical theory itself.
   To evaluate ethical judgments we must interrogate ontologies of exclusion to filter out ethical biases.
   Butler 09. Judith Butler, “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Jan 1st 2009, Pg.138, http://books.google.com/books/about/Frames_of_War.html?id=ga7hAAAAMAAJ
   We ask such normative questions as if we know what we mean by the subjects even as we do not always know how best to represent or recognize various subjects. Indeed, the “we” who asks such questions for the most part assumes that the problem is a normative one, namely, how best to arrange political life so that recognition and representation can take place. And though surely this is a crucial, if not the most crucial, normative question to ask, we cannot possibly approach an answer if we do not consider the ontology of the subject whose recognition and representation is at issue. Moreover, any inquiry into that ontology requires that we consider another level at which the normative operates, namely, through norms that produce the idea of the human who is worthy of recognition and representation at all. That is to say, we cannot ask and answer the most commonly understood normative questions, regarding how best to represent or recognize such subjects, if we fail to understand the differential of power at work that distinguishes between those subjects who will be eligible for recognition and those who will not.

Liberating Tolerance
Empirics prove- Repressive Tolerance is high now as the alt right is energized in the status quo—limits on free speech are just being used to sustain white supremacy
Harkinson 12/6 (Josh, reporter @ mother jones, “The Push to Enlist "Alt-Right" Recruits on College Campuses,” December 6, 2016, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/12/richard-spencer-alt-right-college-activism//LADI)
How much support is there for the loose-knit coalition of white nationalists and other far-right extremists known as the "alt-right"? Despite a spike in media coverage for the movement in the wake of Donald Trump's victory, a recent conference hosted by white nationalist Richard Spencer, who coined the term "alt-right," drew only about 275 attendees in Washington, DC. And after a video from the event went viral, showing audience members giving Nazi salutes to Spencer's cry of "hail Trump," the movement faced a fierce backlash. Although Trump named alt-right hero Stephen Bannon as his chief White House strategist, the president-elect went on to disavow the alt-right—in general terms, at least—in an interview with the New York Times. The movement gained momentum online in 2016 but is no longer just about social media, says Spencer; he sees a need to prove that the alt-right can attract supporters in the real world. And he says the best place to do that is on college campuses, starting with a speech he plans to deliver on Tuesday on the campus of Texas AandM University. "People in college are at this point in their lives where they are actually open to alternative perspectives, for better and for worse," Spencer says. "I think you do need to get them while they are young. I think rewiring the neurons of someone over 50 is effectively impossible." Recruiting on college campuses has long been a goal for "academic racists" such as Jared Taylor and Peter Brimelow, a white nationalist whom Spencer helped bring to Duke University for an event in 2007, when Spencer was a student there. In May, Spencer and other white nationalists set up a "safe space" on the University of California-Berkeley's Sproul Plaza to discuss "how race affects people of European heritage." He claims that he will be giving two more speeches about the alt-right at universities in California. "The left just owns academia through and through," Spencer says, "so I think it is important to go to the belly of the beast and not let them own it." In recent months, Breitbart News pundit Milo Yiannopoulos' "Dangerous Faggot Tour" drew crowds at college campuses around the country. Several colleges canceled scheduled talks by Yiannopoulos because of "security concerns." Yiannopoulos does not label himself "alt-right" but has characterized the movement as a legitimate response to political correctness. He often describes white males as victims of "reverse discrimination" and speaks euphemistically of defending "Western values." A talk that he gave on the alt-right at the University of Houston in September drew cheers and a chant invoking the name of the alt-right mascot Pepe the Frog. "That was a revelation for me," Spencer said about Yiannopoulos' talk. "What we are doing is known to people, it's edgy and dangerous, it's cool and hip. It's that thing our parents don't want us to do. So that was definitely a huge inspiration." University campuses historically have incubated a range of social movements, from Marxism to multiculturalism on the left to right-wing movements such as neoliberalism and fascism, including Nazism in Germany (and in the United States). More recently, several groups sympathetic to the alt-right have cropped up on some college campuses: Identity Evropa Identity Evropa describes itself as "a generation of awakened Europeans who have discovered we are part of the great peoples, history, and civilization that flowed from the European continent" and who "oppose those who would defame our history and rich cultural heritage." Founded in February by 30-year-old ex-Marine Nathan Damigo, a junior social science major at California State University-Stanislaus, the group has been active on several California campuses. Its supporters have plastered campuses and downtown areas with posters featuring slogans such as "Let's Become Great Again" and "Serve Your People" superimposed over images or European Renaissance art. Most college professors who teach classes about race and identity "haven't done their homework," says Damigo, who, like Spencer, promotes pseudoscientific theories about cognitive differences between the races. Most of his members, he says, are recent college graduates who discovered racialist ideas on their own and now aim to "mentor" younger students while "waging a culture war" on the ivory tower: "We want to have a constant presence there," he says. "We want to normalize our ideas and get to the point where we can push faculty into incorporating this literature into the lectures and into the educational program." In November, Damigo and more than two dozen Identity Evropa members attended Spencer's conference.
This outweighs- even if day to day racism might be lower, these ideologies have become politically instituted into the mainstream. This means it’s try or die- hate speech is incredibly high now, it’s just a question of engagement from the other side. This is a super important argument
Roberts 16 (Stephen, writer @ political storm, “The Alt-Right: the Good, the Bad, the Ugly,” December 2, 2016, http://www.politicalstorm.com/alt-right-good-bad-ugly///LADI)
The ugly. There is also a virulent strain of white supremacism at work within the alt-right. Nationalism, when coupled with ethnicity, becomes downright racism. We must display caution here (in a way that many in the alt-right do not): not all of the alt-right are white supremacists.  It would be supremely unfair to loop President-elect Trump in with this group simply because they supported him. Even Steve Bannon—former Breitbart editor and current Trump advisor—should not be called a white supremacist for expressing sympathy toward some of alt-rights aims, like nationalism. At the same time, we cannot entirely decouple Bannon and others from the more virulent strains. When popular pundits like Ann Coulter can peddle in the language of the alt-right—using terms like “cuckservative,” for example—she is peddling those virulent views into the mainstream. By providing outlets for elements of this movement that are far beyond the paleoconservative pale, figures like Coulter are generating greater publicity and acceptance for it. The GOP, in particular, must be especially concerned about this movement. It lends itself to the outdated stereotype of the GOP as the racist, misogynistic party. There is nothing wrong with being a nationalist—in fact, renewed patriotism and concern for our national well-being should be strongly encouraged. One can be an anti-PC iconoclast, however, without engaging in the same level of mockery that one would typically expect of the elites. The GOP should carefully distinguish between the populist movement, which swept Trump into power, and the alt-right—and then excise the latter.
Free speech develops ‘liberating tolerance’ to counter ‘repressive tolerance’, which is necessary to resist oppression
William 16, Bryant. "The Counterrevolutionary Campus: Herbert Marcuse And The Suppression Of Student Protest Movements: N." Routledge Taylor And Francis. September 14, 2016. Web. December 08, 2016. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07393148.2016.1228580?needAccess=tru e.
Repressive tolerance is deployed to silence dissenters and prevent those who, by class position, have material interests aligning with emancipatory movements from joining them. In essence, repressive tolerance becomes a counterrevolutionary tool, turning potential allies into ardent enemies. The attempt to silence protestors is an attempt to disrupt solidarity. Thus, we can observe that the relevance of Marcuse in the twenty-first century is located not just in the usefulness of his concepts and the persistence of the same processes and patterns of injustice he observed. He also offered a tactical solution: liberating tolerance. For Marcuse, liberating tolerance is the only promising alternative (and indeed the only peaceful one with a hope of success) to the ‘natural right’ to violent resistance to oppression.61 Liberating tolerance is a tool not a goal: liberating tolerance is not a tolerance to base a new, just society on; it is a tolerance to allow the possibility of establishing a new, just society. It is a partisan tolerance for a certain historical conjuncture when liberal tolerance (1) lacks the foundational sources of its legitimacy in the informed, free thinking, self-reflective autonomous character of the citizenry, and (2) allows regression and intolerance to consistently prevail. In other words, when the citizenry generally lacks the capacity to recognize the fascist nature of intolerance, and intolerance becomes more persuasive than tolerance, justice and freedom on such a massive scale that tolerance, justice and freedom are institutionally threatened, liberal tolerance no longer serves as protection against intolerance.62 Liberating tolerance resists the perversion of tolerance by the forces of intolerance. It is a thoughtful yet visceral rejection of intolerance, regression and injustice. As Marcuse himself made clear, liberating tolerance is a refusal to tolerate the intolerable and a refusal to castigate those who are speaking out against institutionally and historically supported forms of oppression and suppression, not the illegalization of certain kinds of speech or constitutionally protected organizing; it is a new way of thinking about tolerance that actually resuscitates the original goal of (liberal) tolerance—the ability of all people to have their voices heard, especially those that are speaking out against oppression and intolerance
Impacts:
A) Constrains criticisms of axiom institutions like the state and capitalism, we must create a framework to allow alternate views to be heard.
William 16, Bryant. "The Counterrevolutionary Campus: Herbert Marcuse And The Suppression Of Student Protest Movements: N." Routledge Taylor And Francis. September 14, 2016. Web. December 08, 2016. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07393148.2016.1228580?needAccess=tru e.
Importantly, we must not limit ourselves to merely critiquing existing oppressions, or just suggest principled radical reforms that could move us towards an emancipated, just (global) society. As many on the Left have attempted, though sadly without much wider recognition, we need to start building these alternative futures in the counterrevolutionary present wherever and whenever possible. This means first building racially, sexually and gender inclusive communicative and organizational bridges between both nascent and longer established social movements and class-based organizations, including the too often forgotten Left political parties.69 Liberating tolerance could tear open avenues for the development of the ‘new sensibility’ Marcuse heralds in his late work. We see this as crucial for the possibility of a new society, a free, just, and rational society antipodal and antithetical to the unfree, unjust, and irrational confines of neoliberal capitalism. College campuses have, since Marcuse’s time been a potentially key environment for the cultivation of this ‘new sensibility’—a sensibility, a mentality, oriented towards care, compassion, love, justice, cooperation and indeed active disgust at their inverses.70 BLM and BDS and other less well-known organized movements offer us a new hope and opportunity to revitalize a youthful emancipatory disposition with sustainability. Liberating tolerance against repressive tolerance has the potential to open up the material and ideological space for precisely these developments, against every wish of the counterrevolutionary forces that militate against progress through the silencing of the exuberant dissent we are witnessing across college campuses in the United States and around the world. We write in support of these students and their rejection of white supremacy, racial injustice (on campus and beyond), police brutality as standard practice, especially against minorities, and their calls for an egalitarian educational experience, including the extension of that experience for all people in the United States and around the world. Beyond Herbert Marcuse’s words, we have his emancipatory democratic impetus—we hope to have embodied that impetus here and shown it to be more relevant than ever.
B) Echo Chambers kill coalitional politics- means ideologies won’t work together.
Sunstein 12 (Cass R. Sunstein. Sep 17, 2012. “Breaking up the echo”. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/opinion/balanced-news-reports-may-only-inflame.html?_r=0)  
It is well known that when like­minded people get together, they tend to end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before they started to talk. The same kind of echo­chamber effect can happen as people get news from various media. Liberals viewing MSNBC or reading left­of­center blogs may well end up embracing liberal talking points even more firmly; Conservative fans of Fox News may well react in similar fashion on the right. The result can be a situation in which is that beliefs do not merely harden but migrate toward the extreme ends of the political spectrum. As current events in the Middle East demonstrate, discussions among like­minded people can ultimately produce violence. What explains this? The answer is called “biased assimilation,” which means that people assimilate new information selectively in a selective fashion. When people get endorsing information that supports what they initially thought, they give it considerable weight. When they get and dismissing information that undermines their initial beliefs, they tend to dismiss it. In this light, it is understandable that when people begin with opposing initial beliefs on, say, the death penalty, balanced information can heighten their initial disagreement. Those who tend to favor capital punishment People credit the information that supports their original view and dismiss the opposing information. The same happens on the other side. As a result, divisions widen. This natural human tendency explains why it’s so hard to dislodge false rumors and factual errors. Corrections can even be self­defeating, leading people to stronger commitment to their erroneous beliefs. The news here is not encouraging. In the face of entrenched social divisions, there’s a risk that presentations that carefully explore both sides will be counterproductive. And when a group, responding to false information, becomes more strident, efforts to correct the record may make things worse. Can anything be done? There is no simple term for the answer, so let’s make one up: surprising validators. However People tend to dismiss information that would falsify their convictions. But they may reconsider their views if the information comes from a like-minded source they cannot dismiss. People are most likely to find a source credible if they closely identify with it or begin in essential agreement with it. In such cases, their reaction is not, “how predictable and uninformative that someone like that would think something so evil and foolish,” but instead, they say “if someone like that disagrees with me, maybe I had better rethink.” Our initial convictions are more apt to be shaken if it’s not easy to dismiss the source as biased, confused, self­interested or simply mistaken. This is one reason that seemingly irrelevant characteristics, like appearance, or taste in food and drink, can have a big impact on credibility. Such characteristics can suggest that the validators are in fact surprising — that they are “like” the people to whom they are speaking. It follows that turncoats, real or apparent, can be immensely persuasive. If civil rights leaders oppose affirmative action, or if well­known climate change skeptics say that they were wrong, people are more likely to change their views. Here, then, is a lesson for all those who provide information. What matters most may be is not what is said, but who, exactly, is saying it.
C) Re-captures the poltical- neg policies get rejected unless the administration changes (don’t read this against K teams)
Soave 16 (Robby Soave, Associate editor at Reason.com, enjoys writing about college news, education policy, criminal justice reform, and television, “Trump Won Because Leftist Political Correctness Inspired a Terrifying Backlash”, Nov. 9, 2016, http://reason.com/blog/2016/11/09/trump-won-because-leftist-political-corr
Trump won because of a cultural issue that flies under the radar and remains stubbornly difficult to define, but is nevertheless hugely important to a great number of Americans: political correctness. More specifically, Trump won because he convinced a great number of Americans that he would destroy political correctness. I have tried to call attention to this issue for years. I have warned that political correctness actually is a problem on college campuses, where the far-left has gained institutional power and used it to punish people for saying or thinking the wrong thing. And ever since Donald Trump became a serious threat to win the GOP presidential primaries, I have warned that a lot of people, both on campus and off it, were furious about political-correctness-run-amok—so furious that they would give power to any man who stood in opposition to it. I have watched this play out on campus after campus. I have watched dissident student groups invite Milo Yiannopoulos to speak—not because they particularly agree with his views, but because he denounces censorship and undermines political correctness. I have watched students cheer his theatrics, his insulting behavior, and his narcissism solely because the enforcers of campus goodthink are outraged by it. It's not about his ideas, or policies. It's not even about him. It's about vengeance for social oppression. Trump has done to America what Yiannopoulos did to campus. This is a view Yiannopoulos shares. When I spoke with him about Trump's success months ago, he told me, "Nobody votes for Trump or likes Trump on the basis of policy positions. That's a misunderstanding of what the Trump phenomenon is." He described Trump as "an icon of irreverent resistance to PC political correctness." Correctly, I might add. What is political correctness? It's notoriously hard to define. I recently appeared on a panel with CNN's Sally Kohn, who described political correctness as being polite and having good manners. That's fine—it can mean different things to different people. I like manners. I like being polite. That's not what I'm talking about. The segment of the electorate who flocked to Trump because he positioned himself as "an icon of irreverent resistance to political correctness" think it means this: smug, entitled, elitist, privileged leftists jumping down the throats of ordinary folks who aren't up-to-date on the latest requirements of progressive society. Example: A lot of people think there are only two genders—boy and girl. Maybe they're wrong. Maybe they should change that view. Maybe it's insensitive to the trans community. Maybe it even flies in the face of modern social psychology. But people think it. Political correctness is the social force that holds them in contempt for that, or punishes them outright. If you're a leftist reading this, you probably think that's stupid. You probably can't understand why someone would get so bent out of shape about being told their words are hurtful. You probably think it's not a big deal and these people need to get over themselves. Who's the delicate snowflake now, huh? you're probably thinking. I'm telling you: your failure to acknowledge this miscalculation and adjust your approach has delivered the country to Trump. There's a related problem: the boy-who-cried-wolf situation. I was happy to see a few liberals, like Bill Maher, owning up to it. Maher admitted during a recent show that he was wrong to treat George Bush, Mitt Romney, and John McCain like they were apocalyptic threats to the nation: it robbed him of the ability to treat Trump more seriously. The left said McCain was a racist supported by racists, it said Romney was a racist supported by racists, but when an actually racist Republican came along—and racists cheered him—it had lost its ability to credibly make that accusation. This is akin to the political-correctness-run-amok problem: both are examples of the left's horrible over-reach during the Obama years. The leftist drive to enforce a progressive social vision was relentless, and it happened too fast. I don't say this because I'm opposed to that vision—like most members of the under-30 crowd, I have no problem with gender neutral pronouns—I say this because it inspired a backlash that gave us Trump. My liberal critics rolled their eyes when I complained about political correctness. I hope they see things a little more clearly now. The left sorted everyone into identity groups and then told the people in the poorly-educated-white-male identity group that that's the only bad one. It mocked the members of this group mercilessly. It punished them for not being woke enough. It called them racists. It said their video games were sexist. It deployed Lena Dunham to tell them how horrible they were. Lena Dunham! I warned that political-correctness-run-amok and liberal overreach would lead to a counter-revolution if unchecked. That counter-revolution just happened. There is a cost to depriving people of the freedom (in both the legal and social senses) to speak their mind. The presidency just went to the guy whose main qualification, according to his supporters, is that he isn't afraid to speak his.

Identification
It allows us to identify racists so that we can persuade them otherwise; this reduces oppression.
ACLU 16. American Civil Liberties Union. For almost 100 years, the ACLU has worked to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States., “Hate Speech on Campus”, ACLU, 2016. https://www.aclu.org/other/hate-speech-campus
Many universities, under pressure to respond to the concerns of those who are the objects of hate, have adopted codes or policies prohibiting speech that offends any group based on race, gender, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation. That's the wrong response, well-meaning or not. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects speech no matter how offensive its content. Speech codes adopted by government-financed state colleges and universities amount to government censorship, in violation of the Constitution. And the ACLU believes that all campuses should adhere to First Amendment principles because academic freedom is a bedrock of education in a free society. How much we value the right of free speech is put to its severest test when the speaker is someone we disagree with most. Speech that deeply offends our morality or is hostile to our way of life warrants the same constitutional protection as other speech because the right of free speech is indivisible: When one of us is denied this right, all of us are denied. Since its founding in 1920, the ACLU has fought for the free expression of all ideas, popular or unpopular. That's the constitutional mandate. Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that more speech -- not less -- is the best revenge. This is particularly true at universities, whose mission is to facilitate learning through open debate and study, and to enlighten. Speech codes are not the way to go on campuses, where all views are entitled to be heard, explored, supported or refuted. Besides, when hate is out in the open, people can see the problem. Then they can organize effectively to counter bad attitudes, possibly change them, and forge solidarity against the forces of intolerance. College administrators may find speech codes attractive as a quick fix, but as one critic put it: "Verbal purity is not social change." Codes that punish bigoted speech treat only the symptom: The problem itself is bigotry.
This Outweighs

1. Even if certain groups have unequal access to speech, identification forces waves of minorities and allies against the individual in power. Empirically proven when tons of individuals with limited power forced corporations to concede with strikes and protests.
   2. Empirics- Britain proves you can’t reduce bigotry by banning it. It’s forced underground.
   Malik 12 (Kenan Malik, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. My latest book is The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics, “why hate speech should not be banned”, April 12, 2012, https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/)
   And in practice, you cannot reduce or eliminate bigotry simply by banning it. You simply let the sentiments fester underground. As Milton once put it, to keep out ‘evil doctrine’ by licensing is ‘like the exploit of that gallant man who thought to pound up the crows by shutting his Park-gate’. Take Britain. In 1965, Britain prohibited incitement to racial hatred as part of its Race Relations Act. The following decade was probably the most racist in British history. It was the decade of ‘Paki-bashing’, when racist thugs would seek out Asians to beat up. It was a decade of firebombings, stabbings, and murders. In the early 1980s, I was organizing street patrols in East London to protect Asian families from racist attacks. Nor were thugs the only problem. Racism was woven into the fabric of public institutions. The police, immigration officials – all were openly racist. In the twenty years between 1969 and 1989, no fewer than thirty-seven blacks and Asians were killed in police custody – almost one every six months. The same number again died in prisons or in hospital custody. When in 1982, cadets at the national police academy were asked to write essays about immigrants, one wrote, ‘Wogs, nignogs and Pakis come into Britain take up our homes, our jobs and our resources and contribute relatively less to our once glorious country. They are, by nature, unintelligent. And can’t at all be educated sufficiently to live in a civilised society of the Western world’. Another wrote that ‘all blacks are pains and should be ejected from society’. So much for incitement laws helping create a more tolerant society. Today, Britain is a very different place. Racism has not disappeared, nor have racist attacks, but the open, vicious, visceral bigotry that disfigured the Britain when I was growing up has largely ebbed away. It has done so not because of laws banning racial hatred but because of broader social changes and because minorities themselves stood up to the bigotry and fought back. Of course, as the British experience shows, hatred exists not just in speech but also has physical consequences. Is it not important, critics of my view ask, to limit the fomenting of hatred to protect the lives of those who may be attacked? In asking this very question, they are revealing the distinction between speech and action. Saying something is not the same as doing it. But, in these post-ideological, postmodern times, it has become very unfashionable to insist on such a distinction. In blurring the distinction between speech and action, what is really being blurred is the idea of human agency and of moral responsibility. Because lurking underneath the argument is the idea that people respond like automata to words or images. But people are not like robots. They think and reason and act on their thoughts and reasoning. Words certainly have an impact on the real world, but that impact is mediated through human agency. Racists are, of course, influenced by racist talk. It is they, however, who bear responsibility for translating racist talk into racist action. Ironically, for all the talk of using free speech responsibly, the real consequence of the demand for censorship is to moderate the responsibility of individuals for their actions. Having said that, there are clearly circumstances in which there is a direct connection between speech and action, where someone’s words have directly led to someone else taking action. Such incitement should be illegal, but it has to be tightly defined. There has to be both a direct link between speech and action and intent on the part of the speaker for that particular act of violence to be carried out. Incitement to violence in the context of hate speech should be as tightly defined as in ordinary criminal cases. In ordinary criminal cases, incitement is, rightly, difficult legally to prove. The threshold for liability should not be lowered just because hate speech is involved.
   Challenging hate speech as a form of argument means more than just showing its not acceptable, it also sends a message towards perpetrators of hate speech which reduces it.
   Malik 2 (Kenan Malik, I am a writer, lecturer and broadcaster. My latest book is The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics, “why hate speech should not be banned”, April 12, 2012, https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2012/04/19/why-hate-speech-should-not-be-banned/)
   Much of what we call hate speech consists, however, of claims that may be contemptible but yet are accepted by many as morally defensible. Hence I am wary of the argument that some sentiments are so immoral they can simply be condemned without being contested. First, such blanket condemnations are often a cover for the inability or unwillingness politically to challenge obnoxious sentiments. Second, in challenging obnoxious sentiments, we are not simply challenging those who spout such views; we are also challenging the potential audience for such views. Dismissing obnoxious or hateful views as not worthy of response may not be the best way of engaging with such an audience. Whether or not an obnoxious claim requires a reply depends, therefore, not simply on the nature of the claim itself, but also on the potential audience for that claim.
   Protests
   Status quo speech constraints imply that protests are limited to where they’re useless
   Mitchell 03 -  Don Mitchell, Distinguished Professor of Geography at Syracuse’s Maxwell School: 2003 (“The Liberalization of Free Speech: Or, How Protest in Public Space is Silenced” Stanford Agora Vol. 4 p.9-14 Available at agora.stanford.edu/agora/volume4/articles/mitchell/mitchell.pdf Accessed on 12/11/16)IG
   The Gitlow decision, and after it the appeals court decision regarding William Epton,31 referenced Holmes’s words in Schenck, and tried to determine just what constituted a “clear and present danger.” But “the future embraced the Holmes of Abrams rather than the Holmes of Schenck.”32 In his dissent in Abrams, Holmes wrote this:∂ When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by the free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes can safely be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophesy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think therefore we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.33∂ As remarkable and stirring as that passage is, it is also deeply problematic. Its liberal foundation, for example, has no means to recognize differences in power – or even in access to the market, powers that, as we have come to know so well in the current era of media communication, can be absolutely determinant of who can speak and who can be heard.34∂ As importantly, and as I have explored in detail in other work,35 it is problematic because it puts into place – by implication in Holmes’s own words, but later made explicit in a whole series of cases36 – a distinction between speech and conduct. Even “First Amendment absolutists,” like Justice Hugo Black saw nothing wrong with the regulation of peaceful rallies if their conduct interfered with some other legitimate interest.37 This conduct could be widely interpreted.38 For most of the first half of the twentieth century, conduct that could be prohibited included the mere act of picketing. Courts upheld numerous injunctions against picketing on the basis that the conduct it entailed was necessarily either violent or harassing.39 Indeed, in one famous case in the 1920s, Chief Justice William Taft wrote of picketing, that its very “persistence, importunity, following and dogging” offended public morals and created a dangerous nuisance.40 The problem with picketing, Taft thought, was twofold. First, through its combination of action and speech, it tried to convince people not to enter some establishment; second, it tended to draw a crowd.41 To the degree it did both – that is, to the degree that is successfully communicated its message – it interrupted business and, in Taft’s eyes, undermined the business’s property rights, and therefore could be legitimately enjoined.42 Speech was worth protecting to the degree that is was not effective. Not until the 1940s did the Court begin to recognize that there might be an important speech right worth protecting in addition to the unprotected conduct.43∂ There is an additional result of Holmes’s declaration about the value of speech in Abrams. Whereas the First Amendment is silent on why speech is to be protected from Congressional interference,44 Holmes makes it clear that the protection of speech serves a particular purpose: improving the state.45 Indeed, he quickly admits that speech likely to harm the state can be outlawed.46 And neither he nor the Court ever moved away from the “clear and present danger” test of Schenck.47 Speech, Holmes argues, is a good insofar as it helps promote and protect the “truth” of the state.48 There is a large amount of room allowed here for criticism of the state, but it can still be quieted by anything that can reasonably construed as a “legitimate state interest” (like protecting the property rights of a company subject to a strike).49 According to the Gitlow Court (if not Holmes, who did not see in Gitlow’s pamphlet enough of a clear and present danger), any speech that “endangers the foundations of organized government and threatens its overthrow by unlawful means” can be banned.50 Note here that speech does not have to advocate the overthrow of government; rather, it can be banned if through its persuasiveness others might seek to overthrow the government.51 On such grounds all manner of manifestos, and many types of street speaking, may be banned. And more broadly, as evidenced in picketing cases like American Steel Foundries, a similar prohibition may be placed on speech that, again through its persuasiveness (e.g. as to the unjustness of some practice or event) rather than through direct exhortation, may incite people to violence. Of course, speech (and its sister right, assembly), must take place somewhere and it must implicate some set of spatial relations, some regime of control over access to places to speak and places to listen.52 Consequently, the limits to speech, or more accurately the means of limiting speech, become increasingly geographic beginning in utopian. 13∂ 1939 in the case Hague v. CIO, when the Supreme Court finally recognized that public spaces like streets and parks were necessary not only to speech itself but to political organizing.53 The problem is not always exactly what is said, but where it is said. At issue in Hague was whether the rights to speech and assembly extends to the use of the streets and other public places for political purposes, and in what ways that use could be regulated. The Court based its decision in a language of common law, arguing that “wherever the title of the streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”54 But whatever the roots for such a claim may be in common law, it hardly stands historical scrutiny in the United States, where the violent repression of street politics has always been as much a feature of urban life as its promotion.55 That makes Hague v. CIO a landmark decision: it states clearly for the first time that “the use of the streets and parks for the communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all … but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”56 At the same time, the Court made it clear that protected speech in public spaces was always to be “exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order….”57 The question, then, became one of finding the ways to regulate speech (and associated conduct) such that order – and even “general comfort” – was always maintained.∂ The answers to that question were spatial. They were based on a regulation of urban geography in the name of both “good order” and “general comfort” and of the rights to speech and assembly. Speech rights needed to be balanced against other interests and desires. But order and comfort, it ought to go without saying, suggest a much lower threshold than does “clear and present danger.” While recognizing in a new way a fundamental right to speech and assembly, that is, the Hague court in fact found a language to severely limit that right, and perhaps even to limit it more effectively than had heretofore been possible. To put this another way (and as I will argue more fully below), the new spatial order of speech and assembly that the Court began constructing in Hague allowed for the full flowering of a truly liberal speech regime: a regime for which we are all, in fact, the poorer.
   Aff is a against the state, but that doesn’t ethically legitimate it – the state is inevitably a unit of analysis given that it exists now even if we want to move beyond it. Working within a state structure ensures that we get concessions, rather than useless criticisms.
   Frost 96 Mervyn Frost, U of Kent, 1996, Ethics in Int’l Relations, p. 90-1.  
   A first objection which seems inherent in Donelan’s approach is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the system.  This objection is not well founded, by having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them.  As I have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state.  Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus,for example. any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.
   Education
   B Free speech prepares students for the real world by reducing academic insulation.
   Vivanco 16 (Leonor Vivanco, August 25th, 2016, “U. of C. tells incoming freshmen it does not support 'trigger warnings' or 'safe spaces'”, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-university-of-chicago-safe-spaces-letter-met-20160825-story.html3
   "It is not the proper role of the University to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive," the report states. "Although the University greatly values civility, and although all members of the University community share in the responsibility for maintaining a climate of mutual respect, concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members of our community." The university is preparing students for the real world and would not be serving them by shielding them from unpleasantness, said Geoffrey Stone, chair of the committee, law professor and past provost at the U. of C. "The right thing to do is empower the students, help them understand how to fight, combat and respond, not to insulate them from things they will have to face later," Stone said. While the university doesn't support, require or encourage trigger warnings, it does not prohibit them, he added. Professors are still free to alert students to certain material if they choose to do so. Jane Kirtley, a media ethics and law professor at the University of Minnesota, called U. of C.'s move "refreshing." She said colleges should resist setting limits on what views and opinions are acceptable to air in open forum and should encourage students to discuss things they find uncomfortable. "If universities are not providing platforms for people to be offensive, then I don't think that they're doing part of their job," Kirtley said. "If listening to Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton is going to make your blood pressure go up 400 points, then fine, don't listen to them. But that doesn't mean you can say we can't have Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton speaking on campus because it would be offensive to even know they were talking." Another Midwestern institution has followed the University of Chicago's lead. In 2015, the board of trustees at Purdue University in Indiana endorsed the principles articulated in the U. of C. report. "Our commitment to open inquiry is not new, but adopting these principles provides a clear signal of our pledge to live by this commitment and these standards," board Chairman Tom Spurgeon said in a statement at the time.
   Three impacts:
2. Preparation for the real world gives students the tools necessary to fight oppression for life; that outweighs in the long run.
   2. Lack of counter-narratives produce echo-chambers that sustains existing power structures whilst deluding liberals otherwise.
   Sunstein 12 (Cass R. Sunstein. Sep 17, 2012. “Breaking up the echo”. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/opinion/balanced-news-reports-may-only-inflame.html?_r=0)
   It is well known that when like­minded people get together, they tend to end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before they started to talk. The same kind of echo­chamber effect can happen as people get news from various media. Liberals viewing MSNBC or reading left­of­center blogs may well end up embracing liberal talking points even more firmly; Conservative fans of Fox News may well react in similar fashion on the right. The result can be a situation in which is that beliefs do not merely harden but migrate toward the extreme ends of the political spectrum. As current events in the Middle East demonstrate, discussions among like­minded people can ultimately produce violence. What explains this? The answer is called “biased assimilation,” which means that people assimilate new information selectively in a selective fashion. When people get endorsing information that supports what they initially thought, they give it considerable weight. When they get and dismissing information that undermines their initial beliefs, they tend to dismiss it. In this light, it is understandable that when people begin with opposing initial beliefs on, say, the death penalty, balanced information can heighten their initial disagreement. Those who tend to favor capital punishment credit the information that supports their original view and dismiss the opposing information. The same happens on the other side. As a result, divisions widen. This natural human tendency explains why it’s so hard to dislodge false rumors and factual errors. Corrections can even be self­defeating, leading people to stronger commitment to their erroneous beliefs. The news here is not encouraging. In the face of entrenched social divisions, there’s a risk that presentations that carefully explore both sides will be counterproductive. And when a group, responding to false information, becomes more strident, efforts to correct the record may make things worse. Can anything be done? There is no simple term for the answer, so let’s make one up: surprising validators. However People tend to dismiss information that would falsify their convictions. But they may reconsider their views if the information comes from a like-minded source they cannot dismiss. People are most likely to find a source credible if they closely identify with it or begin in essential agreement with it. In such cases, their reaction is not, “how predictable and uninformative that someone like that would think something so evil and foolish,” but instead, they say “if someone like that disagrees with me, maybe I had better rethink.” Our initial convictions are more apt to be shaken if it’s not easy to dismiss the source as biased, confused, self­interested or simply mistaken. This is one reason that seemingly irrelevant characteristics, like appearance, or taste in food and drink, can have a big impact on credibility. Such characteristics can suggest that the validators are in fact surprising — that they are “like” the people to whom they are speaking. It follows that turncoats, real or apparent, can be immensely persuasive. If civil rights leaders oppose affirmative action, or if well­known climate change skeptics say that they were wrong, people are more likely to change their views. Here, then, is a lesson for all those who provide information. What matters most may be not what is said, but who, exactly, is saying it.

Tournament: Tfa State | Round: 2 | Opponent: Westwood AC | Judge: Dino
I affirm. I value morality. We can only act on moral imperatives from duty, which is inescapable; else there isn’t any good in itself. Velleman:
J. David Velleman (Professor of Philosophy at New York University). “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics”. From Self to Self. Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pp. 16-44.
A duty, to begin with, is a practical requirement – a requirement to do something or not to do something. But there are many practical requirements that aren’t duties. If you want to read Kant in the original, you have to learn German: there’s a practical requirement. Federal law requires you to make yourself available to serve on a jury: there’s another practical requirement. But these two requirements have features that clearly distinguish them from moral obligations or duties. The first requires you to learn German only if you want to read Kant in the original. This requirement is consequently escapable: you can gain exemption from it by giving up the relevant desire. Give up wanting to read Kant in the original and you can forget about this requirement, since it will no longer apply to you. The second requirement is also escapable, but it doesn’t point to an escape hatch so clearly, since it doesn’t contain an “if” clause stating a condition by which its application is limited. Nevertheless, its force as a requirement depends on the authority of a particular body – namely, the U.S. Government. Only if you are subject to the authority of the U.S. Government does its laws this requirement apply to you. Hence you can escape their force of this requirement by escaping the U.S. authority of the Government: immunity to the authority of the body entails immunity to its requirements. Now, Kant claimed – plausibly, I think – that our moral duties are inescapable in both of these senses. If we are morally obligated to do something, then we are obligated to do it no matter what our desires, interests, or aims may be. We cannot escape the force of the obligation by giving up some particular desires, interests, or aims. Nor can we escape the force of an obligation by escaping from the jurisdiction of some authority such as the Government. Kant expressed the inescapability of our duties by calling them is categorical as opposed to hypothetical.

Thus, moral duties must be categorically binding. The requirement to act on practical reason is intrinsically authoritative since practical reason just is the ability to mediate between external, causal influences—like desires or inclinations—to act out of respect for a principle that you judge to be correct. Korsgaard:
Christine M. Korsgaard (Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University). “The Sources of Normativity.” THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES. 1992.
“Reason” then means reflective success. So if I decide that my desire is a reason to act, I must decide that on reflection I endorse that desire. And here we find the problem. For but how do I decide that? Is the claim that I look at the desire and see that it is intrinsically normative or that its object is? Then all of the argu- ments against realism await us. does it the desire or its object inherit its normativity from something else? Then we must ask what makes that other thing normative what makes it the source of a reason. And now of course the usual regress threatens. So what brings reflection to an end? Kant described this same problem in terms of freedom. It is because of the reflective structure of the mind that we must act, as he puts it, under the idea of freedom. He says, “We can’t conceive of a reason which consciously responds to a bidding from the outside with respect to in its judgments.”1 If the bidding from outside is desire, then his point is that the reflective mind must endorse the desire before it can act on it — it must say to itself that the desire is a reason. We must, as he puts it, make it our maxim to act on the desire. And this is something we must do of its our own free will. Kant defines a free will as is a rational causality that is effective without being determined by any alien cause. Anything outside of the will counts as an alien cause, including the desires and inclinations of the person. The free will must be entirely self- determining. Yet, because the will is a causality, it must act according to some law or other. Kant says, “Since the concept of a causality entails that of laws . . . it follows that freedom is by no means lawless . . .” 2 Alternatively, we may say that since the will is practical reason, it cannot be conceived as acting and choosing for no reason. Since reasons are derived from principles, the free will must have a principle. 

This law can’t restrict the freedom of the will, which acts only for a priori reasons. A rational agent can’t act without satisfying the condition that there’s a good enough reason to do so. The form of reason’s own law is categorically binding, like that of A =/= A, which endows universally valid reasons with a law-like quality. Engstrom:  
Engstrom, Stephen (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh). “Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge.”
Reason, according to Kant, is the faculty of knowledge from principles, or our capacity to know the particular in the universal (A299–300/B356–57; cf. G 412). In other words, it’s the capacity to reach knowledge about particular things from universal knowledge we already have. Thus—to take an example from the theoretical use of reason—if we know that all tropical storms in the northern hemisphere rotate in a counterclockwise direction, we don’t need to wait for the event to we know that the next hurricane to hit Florida will rotate in this direction; we know this through reason, by applying our universal knowledge to this case in question. This capacity to know the particular in the universal can also be used practically, where the cognition concerns what one should do, or how one should act. If a the prudent shopkeeper Kant describes in his well known example in the Groundwork knows that where there is much trade, one shouldn’t overcharge, but keep a fixed general price for everyone, then she can know through reason that she shouldn’t overcharge when, in such conditions, an inexperienced customer enters her shop. By applying this universal principle of action to the case at hand, the shopkeeper can know by reason what he should do. In both of these examples, the universal cognition depends on experience.

Analytic

You can’t will yourself into a state of nature on pain of contradiction, since that would make the means of your action incompatible with the end. We need the common will to establish public right, which binds all reasoners in a civil constitution. Especially true b/c the resolution is a question of rights which require a conception of the state to exist Kant:
Immanuel Kant (Founding Figure in Analytic Philosophy from 1724 to 1804). “Doctrine of Right” in The Metaphysics of Morals. From The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge University Press. 1996.
When I declare (by word or deed), I will that an external thing is to be mine, I thereby declare that everyone else is under obligation to refrain from it using that object of my choice, an obligation no one would have were it not for this act of mine to establish a right. This claim involves, however, acknowledging that I in turn am under obligation to every other to refrain from using what is eternally his; for the obligation here arises from a universal rule having to do with external rightful relations. I am therefore not under obligation to leave external objects belonging to others untouched unless if everyone else provides me assures that he will behave in accordance with the same principle with regard to what is mine. This assurance does not require a special act to establish a right, but is already contained in the concept of an obligation corresponding to an external right, since the universality, and with it the reciprocity, of obligation arises from a universal rules. Now, a unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone with regard to possession that is external and therefore contingent, since that would infringe upon freedom in accordance with universal laws. So it is only a will putting everyone under obligation, hence only a collective general (common) and powerful will, that can provide everyone this assurance. But the condition of being under a general external (i.e., public) lawgiving accompanied with power is the civil condi- tion. So only in a civil condition can something external be mine or yours. 

Thus, the standard is respecting agents’ external freedom within the civil constitution. Prefer this: 

1. Analytic
   2. Analytic
   And practical identity – like parent, teacher, or debater – require valuing our human identity first. KORSGAARD :  The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of

1. Analytic
   Impact analysis:
2. Analytic
   a. Analytic

I contend that a right to housing is key to respecting people’s equal freedoms.

The right to housing is included in the “circle of freedoms” that need to be defended by the state – otherwise THOSE AGENTS ARE DENIED AGENCY AND BECOME CRIMINALIZED
Chair Commisioner on the American Bar Association Antonia Fasanelli writes in 2013 Antonia Fasanelli Chair Commission on Homelessness and Poverty August 2013.  American Bar Association Adopted by the House of Delegates. August 12-13.
In a 2007 resolution, equally applicable today, the ABA opposed the enactment of laws criminalizing individuals for “carrying out otherwise non-criminal life-sustaining practices or acts in public spaces, such as eating, sitting, sleeping, or camping, when no alternative private spaces are available.”42 Instead of providing adequate alternatives, more communities are increasingly turning to these criminalization policies.43 Criminalization of homelessness, and homelessness itself, injures the dignity and selfworth of the individual, as well as potentially interfering with their health and safety, where individuals are forced into unsafe situations or must face the elements without shelter. Lack of proper identification or generation of a criminal record caused by homelessness may also prevent homeless persons from accessing government support or finding a job.44 Low-income youth facing inadequate housing conditions or lack of housing have poorer educational outcomes due to high mobility, hunger, and health problems, creating a cycle of poverty and homelessness.45 Housing is a critical component of overall health, and homeless persons have an average life span of 42-52 years, compared to 78 years for the general population.46 Indeed, New York City has established a right to housing for those suffering from AIDS, recognizing their “acute needs for safe, clean housing to keep them healthy.” 47 In 2010, 113 attacks, 24 of which led to the death of the victim, were deemed acts of “bias motivated violence” against homeless individuals.48 The National Coalition for the Homeless documented hate crimes against homeless persons for twelve years (1999- 2010) and noted that fatal attacks on homeless individuals were twice as high each year as fatal attacks on all currently protected classes combined.49Although low-income families in affordable housing do not face the “bias motivated violence” perpetrated against those living on the streets, low-income neighborhoods tend to have higher rates of violence than other areas. Students in poor neighborhoods reported fighting in school or the presence of weapons at school twice as often as their wealthier counterparts.50

Rectification of rightful condition is necessary to forming the civil constiution
Arthur Ripstein (Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto) “Force and Freedom” Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England, Harvard University Press, 2009,
Kant’s emphasis on both the innate right of humanity and fundamental principles of private right might seem to place him squarely in Nozick’s Lockean camp, and to leave no space for economic redistribution.5 If the only possible grounds for redistribution presuppose either that the Earth belongs to ev ery one in common or that private rights are tools for achieving desired out comes, Kant would have to oppose redistribution, since he rejects both of those claims. The supposition that a focus on property and freedom of contract reduces the state to just another private actor animates Nozick’s version of Lockean political philosophy, which represents the legitimate state as an organization created by private persons for distinctive private purposes. We saw in Chapters 6 and 7 that Kant’s conception of the social contract is fundamentally different, because he rejects the idea that private rights are conclusive outside of a rightful condition. Nonetheless, the two might be thought to be similar in at least this respect: the state’s normative rationale is rooted in a series of problems regarding private interaction. Institutions charged with making, applying, and enforcing laws are required so that separate persons may enjoy their respective private freedom in a way that forms a consistent set. Problems of exclusive appropriation, assurance, and disagreements about right require distinctive institutions to solve them. We also saw, in Chapter 8, that public institutions and spaces are required to make private rights systematic. Given the private nature of the problems the state is called on to solve, it might seem natural to conclude that the institutions could not possibly do anything more than that; to do so would be to usurp their basic roles. Indeed, if the state is represented as acting for its citizens, its mandate is necessarily limited. Again, even if the state must exercise its police power to secure the systematic conditions of freedom, that role may have redistributive effects, but it has no redistributive purpose. The requirement that it act for its citizens does limit the state’s mandate, but it also generates the duty to support the poor. The key to Kant’s argument for the state focuses on the need for a united legislative will. As we have seen, the idea of a united will not only serves to make unilateral appropriations rightful; more generally, it explains the possibility of one person changing the normative status of another through word or deed. Thus the actions of the executive branch must be authorized by law, because the enforcement of rights, either retrospectively or prospectively, can only be rendered consistent with the rightful honor of those against whom force is used if it issues from an omnilateral standpoint. In the same way, the resolution of disputes could only be consistent with the rightful honor of the parties to the dispute if the arbiter is authorized through an omnilateral will. The state, through its of fi cials, speaks and acts for all. Otherwise it could not solve any of the problems of unilateral choice or judgment that plague the state of nature. Any powers a state has must be traced to its claim to speak and act for all. Both its task of economic redistribution and its guarantee of equality of opportunity can be traced to this claim. The institutions that give effect to a system of equal freedom must be or ga nized so that they do not systematically create a condition of depen dence. Kant argues that provision for the poor follows directly from the very idea of a united will. He remarks that the idea of a united lawgiving will requires that citizens regard the state as existing in perpetuity.6 By this he does not mean to impose an absurd requirement that people live forever, or even the weaker one that it must sustain an adequate population, or make sure that all of its members survive.7 The state does need to maintain its material preconditions, and as we saw in Chapter 7, this need generates its en ti tle ment to “administer the state’s economy and fi nance.”8 The state’s existence in perpetuity, however, is presented as a pure nor mative requirement, grounded in its ability to speak and act for ev ery one. That ability must be able to survive changes in the state’s membership. You are the same person you were a year ago because your normative principle of or ga ni za tion has stayed the same through changes in the matter making you up. As a being entitled to set and pursue your own purposes, you decide what your continuing body will do. That is why your deeds can be imputed to you even after ev ery molecule in your body has changed, and even if you have forgotten what you did. The unity of your agency is created by the normative principle that makes your actions imputable to you.9 In the same way, the state must sustain its basic normative principle of or ganization through time, even as some members die or move away and new ones are born or move in. As we saw in Chapter 7, its unifying principle—“in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of the state”—is the idea of the original contract, through which people are bound by laws they have given themselves through public institutions.10 The state must have the structure that is required in order for every one to be bound by it, so that it can legitimately claim to speak and act for all across time. The requirement of unity across time is clear in the cases of legislation by of fi cials: if the of fi cial’s decision were only binding while a particular human being held of fice, a citizen would be en ti tled to regard laws as void once the of fi cial’s term ended. Because each person is master of him- or herself, one person is only bound by the authority of another through the idea of a united will. So the idea of a united will presupposes some manner in which it exists through time. Past legislation, like past agreement, can only bind those who come after if the structure through which laws are made is one that can bind ev ery one it governs. The solution to this family of problems is a self-sustaining system that guarantees that all citizens stand in the right relation to each other and, in particular, do not stand in any relation inconsistent with their sharing a united will. The most obvious way in which people could fail to share such a will is through relations of private depen dence through which one person is subject to the choice of another. A serf or slave does not share a united will with his or her lord or master, so these forms of relationship are inconsistent with a rightful condition. Yet the same relation of de pendence can arise through a series of rightful actions. The problem of poverty, on Kant’s analysis, is exactly that: the poor are completely subject to the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances
Its moral significance in maintaining the rightful condition necessitates that it be a moral right
Thinking About Imperfect Duties Barbara Herman, UCLA Published by NYU LAW Oct-15-2014
Herman 2

The pieces of explanation come together around that fact that, considered morally, a home is not a mere dwelling-place (a hotel room might be that).  It is an extension of one’s person in civil society – it is our public address and location (a place where we can be reached even when we are not ‘at home’).  It is the public face of both our independence and our common status (as citizen, at least50).  That’s why it is something to which persons are entitled, and why the way it is provided and protected expresses something important.51  Private individuals coming together to build housing can meet some persons’ need for a place to live, but that doesn’t satisfy the entitlement.  Why not?  Surely if I buy housing for you I have put you in possession of a home in the morally relevant sense.  Parents often do this for their children.  What parents do in modern society isn’t simple.  A house is both a market object and a moral object.  Civil society may bet set up so that in gaining one you gain the other (as with motives, civil society has good reason to be more concerned with external actions – here “title” of some sort may be all that matters, and although title can be conveyed, it can’t quite be a gift).  It is an illusion, or a sign of something gone wrong, that we might come to think that what is being bought is the status that, in moral fact, only civil society can provide.52     There are several lessons to draw from this discussion.  Specific property rights are part of a system; not all points in the system are deliberatively equal.  The key deliberative differences are not matters of weight but of value; the values involved can be foundational for the system of property as a whole.  We have rights over, and not merely reasons of use with respect to, a variety of things when authoritative control over a range of resources is necessary for persons to lead independent lives as equals among equals.  Some things over which we have property rights have a special place in the system because they are necessary for our independence and for the exercise of our rights generally.  I don’t think it much matters whether the right to housing is a new right, in some sense, or is an historically contingent elaboration of   the rights of citizenship.  Having an explicit right to housing in the system of duties makes moral sense, and it makes moral sense now to think of it as a human right.  Beyond its contribution to well-being, the right to housing is an element of civic standing, providing a juridical abode.  It recognizes a need we have if we are to be effective citizens.  It is where we are safe to think and speak, to experiment and be creative with forms of living and relationship, to nurture and be nurtured, and to rest.  It cannot be a place where others are free to come and go as they have need for the space and its resources.  None of this is about the home as a large chunk of private property, or a castle.  Where our home and our status are not fragile, we can safely take on a public role to manage an emergency.  But it is also part of due care in taking such measures that they be temporary.