Tournament: Colleyville | Round: Finals | Opponent: Maya is a maya shes a maya im a maya | Judge: idk but they were dank
1AC Kalinka
A spectre is haunting the resolution

The resolution is just a new iteration of the same question posed by the authoritarian regime: Do we arbitrarily allow certain methods of speech to be forcibly restricted, setting us on the path to neoliberal control, OR do we stand idle to the proliferation of racist voices and cede public discourse to the white hegemonic order; Both options are infected in the will of the technocratic elite
The 1AC is the 3rd option:  Use the resolution as an opportunity to rethink our positionality as subjects in relation to the war machine of capitalism   
ICC 15'
"Charlie Hebdo and "Freedom of Speech" in Capitalism", International Communist Current, January 8, 2015 http://en.internationalism.org/forum/1056/jamal/11786/charlie-hebdo-freedom-speech-capitalism
The ICC was founded in January 1975 by different political groups which had arisen in the wake of the historic revival of the working class at the end of the 1960s.

As a left communist just wanted to say a few things...There's a lot of debate around these shootings regarding the "freedom of speech" of the cartoonists. Everyone is in agreement that - sure - these guys have the "right" to draw whatever they want. At a certain level this makes sense. But like everything else in capitalist society there are class implications of all these things, and surprise, surprise, they are the only things being left out of the popular discourse on the Charlie Hebdo murders right now. All the terms I've just written that one normally glosses over - freedom, rights, etc. - these are all privileges handed down by the bourgeoisie to everyone else. So when we talk about "freedom of speech" in capitalist society, we're just talking about the privilege to talk about things the ruling class is cool with us talking about. This "right" disappears very quickly in many situations, which is why I call it a privilege. So how to deal with this? I think as communists we have to reject the notion of "free speech" entirely. Not all speech is free. Some speech is meant to be oppressive and we should oppose it. This is the framework for saying, "fuck no nazis dont deserve the right to march freely in the streets", and also "yes people can draw whatever they want" as long as it isn't repressive to others. Yes, what is repressive and isn't will always be a matter of controversy, but I would hope that in an internationalist society without cut throat imperialist and class tensions that these issues could be solved with intelligent discussion and words instead of bullets.====

Welcome to Orientation

Understanding capitalism requires that we undergo an assessment of how it has co-opted our ideas, dreams, desires, the very way we assign value and evaluate ethics. Life, death and even reality itself has been altered by the commodification of labor. Join me in dawning a pair of critical ideological lenses in search of a third option in the face of the resolution's double-binding authoritarianism. This is how capitalism operates, making our choices seem binary and limited.  The time has come to traverse this fantasy.
Zizek
Bracketed for Gendered Language
Slavoj Zizek, researcher at the institute of sociology at the University of Ljubljana, The Plague of Fantasies, 1997. Preface xi-xiii EM, fackin orange juice, ideology and sho on and sho on *sniff*, Slavoj Zizek: fucking badass, legendary commieboy, holy comrade l33t
In caring for his own household, the city of Bucharest, Ceaujescu made a
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is - we are 'naturally' in ideology, our natural sight is ideological. 

Quantitative methods of studying oppression limit our analysis to myopic modes of understanding exploitation; only qualitative analysis of the resolution allows us to enact new methods of deconstruction, allowing us to light to embers of revolution. Rather than widespread communication, we need focused micropolitical projects that activate our agency.
Packer 11'
http://www.mathcs.duq.edu/~~packer/Packer20book_intro.pdf
Packer M. J. (2011). "The Science of Qualitative Research" Cambridge University Press. Martin Packer is a developmental psychologist who works within the theoretical framework of cultural psychology, conducting research with an interpretive logic of inquiry.
But participation in the practices of a form of life can lead not to understanding
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. This is the excitement, and the importance, of qualitative research.

This necessitates understanding how capitalism has corrupted our method of learning, acting and speaking in the world; this means that all other epistemological framing mechanisms collapse to mine. Absent breaking free of labor hypnotism, any attempts to formulate knowledge become tainted.
Deleuze and Guattari 72':
Deleuze, Gilles. Guattari, Felix, "Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia." 1972. Gilles Deleuze was a French philosopher who, from the early 1960s until his death, wrote on philosophy, literature, film, and fine art, Felix Guattari was a schizoanalyst who specialized in understanding human identity, they were both fucking badass and this card is dope as hell.
Capital is indeed the body without organs of the capitalist, or rather of the capitalist being. But as such, it is not only the fluid and petrified substance of money, for it will give to the sterility of money the form whereby money produces money. It produces surplus value, just as the body without organs reproduce itself, puts forth shoots, and branches out to the farthest corners of the universe. It makes the machine responsible for producing a relative surplus value, while embodying itself in the machine as fixed capital. Machines and agents cling so closely to capital that their very functioning appears to be matriculated by it. Everything seems objectively to be produced by capital as quasi cause. As Marx observes, in the beginning capitalists are necessarily conscious of the opposition between capital and labor, and of the use of capital as a means of extorting surplus labor. But a perverted, bewitched world quickly comes into being, as capital increasingly plays the role of a recording surface that falls back on (se rabat sur) all of production. (Furnishing or realizing surplus value is what establishes recording rights.) "With the development of relative surplus-value in the actual specifically capitalist mode of production, whereby the productive powers of social labour are developed, these productive powers and the social interrelations of labor in the direct labor-process seem transferred from labor to capital. Capital thus becomes a very mystic being since all of labor's social productive forces appears to be due to capital, rather than labour as such, and seem to issue from the womb of capital itself."  What is specifically capitalist here is the role of money and the use of capital as a full body to constitute the recording or inscribing surface. But some kind of full body, that of the earth or the despot, a recording surface, an apparent objective movement, a fetishistic, perverted, bewitched world are characteristic of all types of society as a constant of social reproduction. The body without organs now falls back on (se rabat sur) desiring-production, attracts it, and appropriates it for its own. The organ-machines now cling to the body without organs as though it were a fencer's padded jacket, or as though these organ-machines were medals pinned onto the jersey of a wrestler who makes them jingle as he starts toward his opponent. An attraction-machine now takes the place, or may take the place, of a repulsion-machine: a miraculating-machine succeeding the paranoiac machine. ====

Vote Affirmative to endorse Micropolitical Marxism as a method of traversing the capitalist fantasy embodied by the resolutional question of free speech restrictions on college campuses. The 1AC is a method of un-congealing that attempts to resolve the antagonistic spectere which haunts the resolution, questions of free speech, praxis on college campuses, and ultimately our positionality as workers within the system of labor value.  
Tumino '1
http://redcritique.org/spring2001/whatisorthodoxmarxism.htm jss
Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, "What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before," Red Critique, Spring 2001, http://redcritique.org/spring2001/whatisorthodoxmarxism.htm jss
Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produced an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provided lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shapes the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory. Finally, it is only Orthodox Marxism that recognizes the inevitability and also the necessity of communism—the necessity, that is, of a society in which "from each according to their ability to each according to their needs" (Marx) is the rule.

Only through engaging in micropolitical methods of knowledge proliferation can we truly make productive social advances within academic spaces. Micropolitical spaces are the starting ground through which we can question the way that our subjectivities have been co-opted, and start to uproot oppressive ideology.
Empirics prove the 1AC-
Environmentalism, Feminism, Civil Rights and Communism all started out as epistemic movements that centered on micropolitical knowledge creation.
Bullis and Houde in '99:
Lincoln Bullis, Professor of Comunications at Southwestern College, and Connie Houde, Associate Professor of Communications at the University of Utah, "Ecofeminist Pedagogy: An Exploratory Case", Ethics and the Environment, Volume 4, Number 2, 1999, pp. 143-174 (Article)
A position of differential and tactical subjectivity questions hegemonic discourses within text-audience interactions
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now to describing how this philosophy was, and may be, enacted.

The Role of the Ballot is to endorse the debater who best activates micropolitical agency as an avenue of resisting the capitalist war machine.
Micropolitical strategies are the only way we as students can productively change society. Policy reform can never expect to solve for systemic grievances unless we invigorate the political with innovative methodologies. The election of a white supremacist proves that jerking off to the magic of policy fiat doesn't do jack shit until we re-conceptualize our orientation to power structures. Only the 1AC's microstrategic method can revive the graveyard of democracy.     
Giroux in '12:====
Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, "Beyond the Politics of the Big Lie: The Education Deficit and the New Authoritarianism", 19 June 2012
The democratic deficit is not, as many commentators have argued, reducible to the
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making education central to organized politics and the quest for a radical democracy.

The AFF doesn't suddenly implement a bloody anti-capitalist revolution nor does it defend some kind of magical, idealized, post-fiat advocacy where everyone just sporadically abandons the state. Rather, the 1AC is a method of interjecting new methods of analysis and intellectualism into academic spheres, be it college campuses, discursive opportunities or the debate space.
We allow the proliferation of Marxist pedagogy to liberate the proletariat from capital hypnotism and we embrace whatever erupts from this newfound class consciousness.  
Slaughter
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/slaughte.htm
Cliff Slaughter "Marxism and the Class Struggle", 1975 Slaughter was born 1928 and was a British socialist activist and writer. His best-known works are Coal is our life and Marxism, Ideology and Literature; Index Books published his "Not without a storm: towards a communist manifesto for the age of globalisation in 2006" .  publ. by New Park Publications. ====

Marxism is not a 'sociology'. It only appears to be so, because, from the point of view of every other particular section of the intellectual division of labour-philosophy, economics, history, history of ideas, etc.-Marxism goes beyond their defined subject-matter, insisting that the real content of each of them is to be found in the contradictory totality of social economic relations from which flow the forms of activity and thought to which the separate disciplines address themselves. Political economy, for example, is 'negated' by Marxism, in the Hegelian sense. Marx's treatment of political economy takes to their limit the contradictory developments of classical political economy. To do this requires the explanation of political economy's concepts and their real content as the 'alienated' consciousness of the development of bourgeois society itself. Thus we find in the Critique of Political Economy and in Capitalitself a negation of political economy, which is demonstrated as being an adequate reflection of the sphere of exchange values and their behaviour. But this sphere is shown to be the real world of appearances or illusions as necessarily created by a historically limited social order, capitalism. Marx's rejection of bourgeois philosophy is a similar materialist critique. His analysis of political and historical thought and their material sources was the third element of the synthesis achieved by Marx. Why then do we say that Marxism only appears to be a sociology? Because sociology originated and developed, not as the dialectical negation, the overcoming of the contradictions, of each of the alienated spheres of thought, but as their definition anew in relation to some supposedly more 'general' science of the 'the social as such' (Durkheim's 'le social en soi' and 'social facts' constitute the acme of this approach). Comte, first to use the term 'sociology', invented the word in order to indicate: '. . . under one single heading that integral part of natural philosophy which concerns itself with the positive study of the totality of fundamental laws proper to social phenomena.' Instead of the dynamic synthesis constituted by Marx's negation of the separated and alienated fields of philosophy, political economy and history (class struggle), we have the static and uncritical synthesis of Comte, to be followed by a century of sterile debate in sociology about 'metaphysics or empiricism', 'generalisation or specialised monographs', 'system or action'. Instead of the consistent materialism made possible by Marx's historical or dialectical approach, we have the pseudo-scientific reliance on 'experience', which in Comte's case ended in the purest mysticism, since his 'spiritual' experience was granted just as much validity as any other. Bourgeois sociology in the 20th century is tied, philosophically and methodologically, to the pragmatism of the ruling class. Sociology continues to oscillate between idealism and mechanical materialism: 'social facts as things' on the one hand, freedom of the individual on the other; the classical dichotomy of bourgeois ideology. Instead of social analysis in terms of the contradictory development and struggle of opposites in each specific, historically limited, socioeconomic formation, we have in sociology the search for general principles or sociological laws which transcend specific historical stages. Talcott Parsons' rejection of Marxism, on the grounds that it is a series of 'genetic' explanations, sums up this functionalist barrenness. These aspects of the split in social theory between Marxism and sociology since the second quarter of the last century are of course inseparably linked with the fact that, as against Marx and Marxism's concern with capitalist society, Comte is the father (though he himself is only the bastard son of Saint-Simon in this and many other respects) of the sociologists' insistence that they are concerned with 'industrial' or 'modern' society. This is only a 'sociological' version of the political economists' recognition of the 'natural' character of the laws of capitalist economy, which they could not accept as only the laws of a definite and historically limited socio-economic formation. When Marx insisted on the 'social' dimension of all spheres of activity and thought, it was with a dual emphasis: first, to grasp each sphere as only one 'moment' of a contradictory social whole; second, to put an end to the alienation resulting from exploitation, to give a new life to each activity by making it the conscious activity of the associated producers in a classless society; for this, theory must unite with and develop in unity with the proletarian revolution. Sociology, by contrast, accepts and describes the alienation and even dignifies it by presenting it systematically as the 'differentiation and integration of roles' and the 'structuring of orientations'. A Marxist analysis of sociology would demonstrate in what way these supposedly 'general' social phenomena and mechanisms are but an ideological reflection of the surface of capitalist society itself. The revolutionary political orientation of Marxist social theory, as contrasted with the professed 'value-freedom' of sociology, is fundamental to Marxism. And the perennial pleas for separating Marx's politics from his sociological 'insights' are as absurdity misplaced as the similar attempts to cleanse Marx's social theories of philosophy. Marxism is then the dialectical negation of the highest developments in bourgeois thought, and through this of the reality from which that thought flows and of which it forms a necessary part. It is this conception which lies behind Lenin's famous dictum: The workers can acquire political consciousness only from without, i.e., only outside of the economic struggle, outside of the sphere of relations between workers and employers. The sphere from which alone it is possible to obtain this knowledge is the sphere of relationships between all classes and the state and the government-the sphere of the interrelations between all classes. (Lenin, What is to be Done?) Here Lenin expresses politically (i.e. in conflict with political opponents who based themselves on the supposed 'spontaneous' development of socialist consciousness from the experience of the working class) the implications for working-class consciousness of the discoveries of Marx. Scientific thought (in the philosophy of Hegel) had arrived at the point where it must accept the conclusion that it could advance further only by grasping activity its real place in the struggle to end the conditions of its own alienated character; this was only possible, Marx said, by grasping the nature of the working class as the agent of the necessary revolutionary change. The working class itself, however, could arrive at the necessary consciousness and thereby the unity necessary for social revolution only by understanding the full historical implications of its role in production and its capacity for abolishing class society. Besides the conclusion that the economic structure is 'basic', and that the class struggle of the proletariat is an objective necessity creating the conditions for socialist revolution, there was necessary the whole theory of historical materialism, the understanding of social development as a unified process, with revolutionary consciousness seizing hold of the meaning of the contradictions at the base of society in order to overthrow it. This body of theory could not come from the working class but only 'from the outside, from bourgeois intellectuals'. From that point on, the development of Marxism takes definite forms in relation to the struggle of the working class, its internal political conflicts, strategy, tactics and organisation, nationally and internationally. While Marx and Engels themselves made great contributions in this field, it has of course been most enriched in the twentieth century, above all by the work of Lenin and Trotsky. Marx and Engels began their communist political careers with a series of thoroughgoing polemics against other schools of socialism (e.g., in The Comnunist Manifesto). Immediately after the 1848 revolutions they combated the impatience and what amounted to rejection of theory by those who wanted to continue an insurrectionist struggle in unfavourable conditions. They never ceased to participate in and advise the labour movement in every country with which they could establish contact. They insisted - for example, in correspondence with Russian and North American socialists - on a very close and detailed attention to the specific conditions of the history, economy and working-class movement of each particular country. But they always were vigilant against eclecticism and attempts to put aside the theoretical conquests they had made. Writing to Bebel and other leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party in 1879, Marx and Engels returned to a theme which had concerned them as long ago as 1848: the role of bourgeois intellectuals in the revolutionary movement. Then, in the Manifesto, they had written: ' . . . a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class . . . in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists.' Now, in 1879, they make a very different emphasis, and one which shows that Lenin was not inconsistent when he combined his insistence on the decisive importance of intellectuals in the development of revolutionary theory with an implacable struggle against every manifestation of revisionism and intellectual light-mindedness with theory. Marx and Engels go out of their way to warn Bebel and the party leaders that bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intellectuals joining the movement must show that they are willing to learn from the party its theory of scientific socialism in the first place. If this is not done, then they inevitably bring with them elements of the now decaying and disintegrating German bourgeois culture and philosophy. (In other words, what could be gained from bourgeois development before 1848 was the opposite of what flowed from it in 1789.) Lenin stressed that the fight against revisionism (so called after the celebrated controversy in the German Social Democracy over Bernstein's criticisms of Marx in the 1890s) was a recurring and inevitable one. He explained that not only individual thinkers in the working class or the revolutionary Marxist party were affected by particular aspects of bourgeois ideology, but that the development of capitalism constantly modified the relations between the proletariat and the middle classes, the latter carrying into the former their ideas, the ideas of capitalism. Revisionism in the labour movement reflected these class pressures. The nearer a revolutionary situation, the more these ideological differences would be expressed in political and organisational differences. Hence the vital importance in a pre-revolutionary period of consciously combating revisionism. This theoretical fight is the anticipation of all the problems and divisions which the working class will have to overcome in its actual struggle for power. The problem of proletarian class-consciousness is often discussed in a very abstract and general manner, instead of through the analysis of the actual historical process by which the Marxist movement and the working-class movement have developed. These are not two distinct processes: the conscious building of revolutionary parties is the highest form of the process by which the proletariat becomes a class 'for itself'. In the proper place, there is needed a critical analysis of all those writings on the working class and its consciousness which rely on concepts lie 'affluence', 'prosperity', 'embourgeoisement', 'social mobility', and so on; and this analysis would have to deal with all the superficially very different and 'radical' approaches of writers like Marcuse. For the Marxist, such an analysis is of interest as an insight into the ideology of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, reflecting their own historical situation and its changes, but it would at the same time be important in relation to the development of Marxism itself, because it bears directly on the most characteristic 'revision' of Marxism in our epoch: the rejection of the revolutionary role of the working class and of the need for revolutionary parties. Class, for Marx, is rooted in social relations of production, and cannot be referred in the first place to relations of distribution and consumption or their ideological reflections. In considering the class consciousness of the proletariat, Marxists are therefore not concerned with the ideas of individual workers about their position in society (no matter how many examples are collected and classified) so much as with the following series of categories: relations of production (sale of labour-power, exploitation); conflict of workers and employers on this basis (economic struggles, trade unions, elementary political battles for economic ends); conflict at the level of class (economic struggles which merge into the conflict between classes, which is organised through the political parties and the struggle for state power); the theoretical and practical struggle to build revolutionary parties of the working class, in conflict with non-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary tendencies in the class and their reflection inside the revolutionary party. Thus, for example, a worker in the motor car industry will move through his elemental experience to an understanding of the gap between his own standard of life, income and conditions of work, on the one hand, and the mass of wealth to whose production he contributes, on the other. He will recognise an identity of interest, on this basis, with other wage-workers. 'Combinations' or trade unions are the adequate expression of this level of consciousness. To this 'trade union consciousness' may correspond other ideological, critical views on various aspects of capitalist society: for example, such consciousness can easily co-exist with that view which lays all the stress on differences or similarities in patterns of consumption; thus, elementary socialistic propaganda of the moralising type, and modern pessimistic speculation about the workers' consciousness being dulled by the abundance of consumer goods, are types of consciousness which do not penetrate to the basis of class differences and class struggle and therefore cannot facilitate the development of political consciousness. More 'sophisticated' socialist views of class-consciousness often refer to a process of more or less spontaneous political maturing through a series of economic struggles which take on greater and greater magnitude, finally posing demands which the system cannot meet. Here again the same basic error, from the Marxist standpoint, is made. In all such approaches, the class and its consciousness are seen in terms of a pre-Marxist theory of knowledge and of history. Those who put forward these ideas are unable to escape from a conception in which the separate individuals in the class move from their own working and other everyday experience to a higher level of consciousness, in this case political consciousness. In point of fast an individual worker does not arrive through his own experience at a scientific consciousness of the actual relationships at work, let alone the political relationships. It u only when a worker comes into contact with the products, in political programme and action, of Marxist theory in politics - i.e., with the outcome of theoretical works produced in the first place by non-proletarian - that he can conceive of even his own working experience in terms which go beyond those of the prevailing bourgeois ideology. These works take the essence of the experience of the proletariat as well as all developments in economy, politics, science, the arts, etc. Only a historical view of the working class and of the theory of Marxism, in their mutual interrelations, can produce a theory of class consciousness. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Marx and Engels, working on various fields of learning, as well as analysing the experience of the struggle of the working class to that date, elaborated their theory of socialism. The theory is henceforth the essential component of the process by which the working class becomes a class 'for itself'. As a theory, it had first to penetrate beneath the day-to-day phenomenal form of capitalist society to the social relations of production. It demonstrated that production under capitalism continues, and society develops, not through any conscious plan, but through the drive to produce surplus value, consequent upon the reduction of labour-power to a commodity, to units of 'abstract labour'. This is the essence of the worker's exploitation, rather than the fact, say, that he does not own the cars he produces. What he produces is essentially surplus value, the augmentation of that same capital which oppresses him. From these basic relationships, Marx demonstrated the reality of the history of capitalism, the way in which private ownership came to a revolutionary clash with the further development of the forces of production. For a political or socialist consciousness of the struggle against the capitalist class, there is necessary the understanding of this historical tendency of the capitalist system. This means not just an abstract knowledge of the theory of historical materialism, but the concrete analysis of, and active engagement in, the development of the class struggle in all its forms and at all levels, in the period of capitalism's historical decline. It was" Lenin's major special contribution to Marxism to elaborate this theory of leadership and the revolutionary party, first of all in What is to be Done? and One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. But the whole of Lenin's work is an expression of this central concern. Later, Trotsky devoted a series of books and articles to the defence and development of the ideas worked out by Lenin (cf. particularly his In Defence of Marxism and Lessons of October). Gramsci also worked on important aspects of the relationship between Marxist theory and class consciousness, and developed further the critique of notions of spontaneity. We have seen that even though the mass of workers experience capitalist exploitation, it is necessary for a struggle to take place between their existing consciousness, on the one hand, and Marxism on the other. This struggle is conducted, as part of the struggle of material forces, by the revolutionary Marxist party. The socialist revolution, like every social revolution, occupies an entire epoch. Its outcome is decided by a series of battles in every country, requiring requires the developed strategy and tactics of revolutionary parties and a revolutionary international whose whole outlook and experience is guided by the theoretical foundations laid by Marx. Through the socialist revolution, men will enter 'the realm of freedom', says Marx. Consciousness will then not be the distorted ideology of oppressive social relations, resulting from the product's domination over the producer, but will be the expression of the scientifically-orientated will of the collective producers, of 'socialised humanity'. 'The free development of each will be the condition of the free development of all.' Already the struggle of the working class against capitalism raises this fundamental question of the relation between subject and object, thus bringing Marx to say that philosophy can realize itself only through the proletariat. Capitalism poses the question in generalised from for the whole class in its relation to the rest of society, and thus demands nothing less than a revolutionary solution: '... the labour employed on the products appears here as the value of those products, au a material quality possessed by them.' (Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme'). This 'reification', the value-form, in which a social relation between men in their most fundamental activity is transformed into a 'thing' standing outside and against men, is specific to the way in which the capitalist system continues the enslavement of man by man. This 'topsy-turvy world' becomes in sociology a world of 'social facts', of 'roles', faithfully recorded as the necessary framework of experience. Just as the working class in its struggle must reject this split between subject and object as a threat to its very humanity, so must Marxist theory penetrate beneath it and point the way to its internal contradictions and historical fate. The real relation between the working class and its product is obscured in the first place by the fact that the labour appears to have been paid for in wages, and that there the matter ends. Marx says that this illusion of wages as the proper reward for labour is the key to all the ideology of capitalism (Capital, Vol . I, p. 550). Marx exploded this illusion in theory, and thus opened the path for its being exploded in practice. That path leads from trade union consciousness (a fair day's pay for a fair day's work!) to socialist consciousness. Working-class consciousness is then, for Marxists, the comprehending in struggle of the process through which the proletariat develops from its identity as formed by capitalism (the mass of exploited wage-labourers, the class 'in itself') to the working class organised as a revolutionary force for the taking of power and the building of socialism (the class 'for itself'). This process must be grasped dialectically, i.e., as a conflict of opposites, a real conflict between the class as it is and as the Marxist movement fights for it to be, on the basis of analysing the objective developments in society. It is the failure to recognise and to begin from this conflict which restricts, for example, the work of Lukacs in his History and Class Consciousness (1923-1924). Lukacs cannot get beyond the concept of 'adjudged' or 'adequate' consciousness, which is abstracted by the investigator according to his scientific estimation of the needs of the class historically. This remains at the level of the type of concepts developed by bourgeois sociology (particularly Max Weber), and fails to reach the level of dialectical materialism, at the centre of which is the unity of theory and practice as a contradictory process. Lukacs' own subsequent capitulation to Stalinism, whatever other causes it had, was rooted in this static and essentially idealist conception of class consciousness, imported from neo-Kantian philosophy. It helped him in a very crude way to accept and become an apologist for Stalinist orthodoxy in the communist movement. Lukacs asserted that the central concept of dialectics is 'totality'; and here again he shows the inadequacy of his outlook for a theory of class consciousness. For Marx, the struggle, the unity and the interpenetration of opposites is the essence of dialectics, and this dialectic is materialist, so that for Marxists the notion of totality must have a meaning different from that presented by Lukacs. 'The unity of the world consists in its materiality,' wrote Engels. It is characteristic of Lukacs' agnosticism on the question of the objective nature of the external world (in History and Class Consciousness) that he must take 'totality' and the proletariat's grasp of this totality as an abstraction. Only a view of the 'unity' or 'totality' of the objective world of nature and society which sees this unity as arising continuously from a changing conflict of material opposites can form the basis of 'revolutionary practice', the sine qua non of Marx's theory of knowledge. Henri Lefebvre (in his The Sociology of Marx, 1968, and elsewhere) has criticised Lukacs for his stress on 'totality' and has argued that 'the conflict of opposites' is in fact the core of dialectics. However, in Lefebvre's work this correct criticism remains purely abstract, and leads him eventually to Utopianism. He starts from the concept of a struggle of opposites, but leaves it at the level of the very general concepts of praxis and alienation. These terms, taken from Marx's early work, enable Lefebvre to make often penetrating exposés of capitalist culture, but they remain altogether too abstract for a revolutionary theory of class consciousness. The theory remains purely critical, aloof from practice, i.e., from the activity of the class and the fight for a working-class leadership on a Marxist basis. Lefebvre criticises, for example, Lucien Goldmann, because the latter, developing the work of Lukacs, over-emphasises the phenomenon of 'reification' so much that his argument amounts to a virtual acceptance, rather than a criticism, of the forms of objectivity imposed on consciousness by capitalist society. But this criticism is inadequate, and needs in the end to be turned against Lefebvre himself. Goldmann in the period between 1957 and his death in 1973, expressed complete scepticism about the revolutionary role of the working class under modern capitalism. He did so on the grounds that, besides certain economic and political changes in the capitalist system, such as the part played by state intervention in the economy, the ability of capitalism to supply an ever-increasing amount of consumer goods had eroded working class consciousness. This suggests immediately that Goldmann's original reasons for accepting the revolutionary character of the proletariat were unsound, from the Marxist standpoint (see his articles in Les Temps Modernes for 1957 and 1958, reprinted in Recherches Dialectiques, Paris, 1959). Goldmann conceives of ideas and ideologies as mental translations of economic and social patterns, rather than as the outcome of the struggles of the class at all levels of social reality (see chapter VI above), and this has provided an avenue for him to accept the fashionable 'structuralist' school of idealism in France. The actual contradictory process of the struggle for revolutionary consciousness, the conflicts between theory and practice, between party and class and, concretely, the struggle of tendencies within the labour movement and within the revolutionary party, and the class bases of these struggles-all these are almost completely lacking in any of the often interesting commentaries of these writers, whose works appeal so much to those who look for some pure or 'restored' Marxism, rediscovered by removing all the results of a century and more of bitter struggle as the theory has taken on flesh and blood. The 'young Marx' is the usual gospel of this faith. It would be in the spirit of Marx himself to aim for a Marxism which is rich and concrete, and at the same time warlike, having worked over and 'negated' all the contradictory developments in the proletarian revolution, and above all in the communist movement itself. For the various 'schools' of Marxism in France and their faint echoes outside, the issue is indeed presented much more concretely than they would like: to really develop the Marxist method and concepts for the analysis of modern capitalist society and of the USSR, it is necessary to start from a conscious reintegration with the whole actual past struggle for Marxism against the social democrats and then the Stalinists and revisionists who distorted it. That means an identification with the continuity of the fight for Marxism of Lenin and Trotsky, and in particular against the Stalinist domination of working-class politics and of 'Marxism' in France. In the most fundamental theoretical terms, Lefebvre has missed out what was potentially correct in Lukacs' insistence on 'totality': the struggle of opposites in society must be taken as first and foremost a class conflict, at the level of the social whole. To analyse, and to start in all social analyses from this, requires of course a concentration on the specific contradictions of capitalism and of the development of the working class and its revolutionary consciousness within capitalism. Marx himself developed his ideas from the general notions of praxis and alienation of humanity in his early works to the specific analysis of the historically developing social relations of capitalism, out of which grew all the 'praxis' and 'alienation' of modern man. By returning to the early Marx for the key to capitalist society today, Lefebvre opens the door to a reformist and Utopian critique of culture, instead of a consistent and revolutionary theory and practice, in conflict with the Stalinist distortion of Marxism in every field. His works Critique de la Vie Quotidienne (Vol II, 1960, Editions de L'Arche) and Introduction a la Modernite (Editions de Minuit, 1962) reveal this tendency very clearly: a searching for a 'poetic' quality in particular aspects of life, a contrast between creative and repetitive actions which is made a more general and important distinction than the specific historical contradictions of capitalism and the tasks of revolutionary transformation which they pose to the working class and to Marxists. Our argument here does not simplify the question of class consciousness. On the contrary, it opens up a prospect which cannot be settled purely by words. Theory must become conscious of its real relationship with its subject-matter, and consciously guide the revolutionary struggle to transform it. This is the essence of dialectical materialism in Marx's work. For the working class to become a class 'for itself' requires not simply the absorption of the experience of capitalist society, but the critical struggle against this experience by a party armed with the whole theory of Marxism. Party and class are two interpenetrating opposites at one level (the class 'for itself' and the class 'in itself'). These two poles at the same time constitute a whole (the working class) which itself is one pole as against its opposite (the capitalist class) in another contradictory whole (capitalist society). Society confronts nature as its 'opposite'. The working class must realize itself, against capitalism, subsuming all the historical gains for humanity made by capitalism at the same time as overthrowing it. This it can do only when the outlook, strategy and tactics of a Marxist party predominate in the actions of the class as a class, in revolutionary struggles. A similar process is necessary within the party: only if it can study, unify and transform through struggle all the experiences of the class can its theory be saved from one-sidedness, dogma and idealism. Within the Marxist party, once again we have a struggle of opposites, a struggle for the development of Marxist theory and its application to the struggles of the proletariat, in constant struggle against every mode of adaptation to the existing position of the working class, its disunity, fragmentation, etc., those aspects of its situation which predispose it towards acceptance of its oppression. Then theory itself must also be considered as a struggle of opposites. We have seen that at every level, each pole of a unity of opposites contains a recapitulation of the total opposition within itself (e.g. the party has both its own essence and its opposite within it and not only as an external opposite, etc.). Marxist theory develops by proving the 'concreteness' of its abstractions against the apparent concreteness (really abstractness, because abstracted from the changing forces which produce them) of uncritically accepted empirical reality. It does this through a struggle to change that reality, capitalism, by placing itself politically in a relation of political consciousness, leadership, with the working class. That means the struggle to build revolutionary parties able to lead the working class to power. Marxism is this struggle: it is not a sociology or an abstract theoretical system of any kind.

Tournament: Harvard | Round: Triples | Opponent: Ollie Sus | Judge: asd

1AC Deleuzian Graffiti

 
https://www.fastcocreate.com/1682808/coldplay-tastefully-rocks-comic-book-fans-faces-off-with-mylo-xyloto
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We begin with a story set in a Mark Osborne's "Silencia", a world without color ruled by Major Minus, a cruel dictator who controls the population through media and propaganda. Using an army of grey "silencers", his is aim is to take color off the streets, contorting society into believing only evil can come through expression and difference. The story follows Mylo, a soldier in an army tasked to hunt and track down "sparkers", people who have the power to project light and embed the ashen streets with color and vibrance.  He encounters Xyloto, the sparker most wanted by Major Minus and his dark regime. Deciding not to capture him out of curiosity, Mylo discovers his own sparker abilities and is compelled to leave the police force. Feeling alone for all of his life, he now finds solace through the imprinting of luminous graffiti on the walls otherwise destined to be colorless. Along with Xyloto he joins the Sparker movement and discovers meaning and value in fighting against an oppressive regime. With each stroke of light, he falls in love with himself and his creation. The graffiti becomes more than art, it represents peace; a chance at a new future. It represents freedom. The government struggles to hold back his masterpieces. 

Although his present is bleak, dead, and without hope, every luminous imprint brings new colors into the world. With each handstroke, a dream of revolution is painted.

With each passing day, the story of Mylo Xyloto seems less like a comic-book fiction and more and more like an ominous prophesy. Militarized police, profit warfare, government tracking and the silencing of whistleblowers constitute the lived experience of an incapacitated population. The Orwellian state depicted in the story bursts from the graphic novel and becomes a gloomy foreshadowing of a future reality. Havens 15'
Ali Havens
"17 Ways The Government Exceeds Orwell's Fears About Big Brother" December 31, 2015
Ali Havens was weekly co-host for the nationally-syndicaded, pro-liberty talk show Free Talk Live, and worked as a writer and co-host for Adam Vs. The Man. Her projects include ALP, a Liberty Radio Network podcast, and she has 4 years as a Free State Project participant in New Hampshire
http://libertyupward.com/ways-the-us-government-equals-or-exceeds-george-orwells-fears-about-big-brother/
George Washington said ... private facilities increased between 2002 and 2009

In this world of constant surveillance, we can't stay visibly active. The government is watching our every move, conceding the right to revolt to the technocratic elite marks the end of freedom, in this world, we need secret forms political agency that provide new subcultures with avenues of resistance
Tsianos explains Deleuze and Guattari  
Vassilis, teaches sociology at the University of Hamburg, Germany, Dimitris Papadopoulos teaches social theory at Cardiff University, Niamh Stephenson teaches social science at the University of New South Wales. "Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century" Pluto Press

In this sense imperceptible politics does not necessarily differ from or oppose other prevalent forms of politics, such as state-oriented politics, micropolitics, identity politics, cultural and gender politics, civil rights movements, etc. And indeed imperceptible politics connects with all these various forms of political engagement and intervention in an opportunistic way: it deploys them to the extent that they allow the establishment of spaces outside representation; that is, spaces which do not primarily focus on the transformation of the conditions of the double-R axiom (rights and representation) but on the insertion of new social forces into a given political terrain. In the previous chapter we called this form of politics outside politics: the politics which opposes the representational regime of policing. Imperceptibility is the everyday strategy which allows us to move and to act below the overcoding regime of representation. This everyday strategy is inherently anti-theoretical; that is, it resists any ultimate theorisation, it cannot be reduced to one successful and necessary form of politics (such as state-oriented politics or micropolitics, for example). Rather, imperceptible politics is genuinely empiricist, that is it is always enacted as ad hoc practices which allow the decomposition of the representational strategies in a particular field and the composition of events which cannot be left unanswered by the existing regime of control. If imperceptible politics resists theorisation and is ultimately empiricist, what then are the criteria for doing imperceptible politics? There are three dimensions which characterise imperceptible politics: objectlessness, totality, trust. Firstly, imperceptible politics is objectless, that is it performs political transformation without primarily targeting a specific political aim (such as transformation of a law or institution, or a particular claim for inclusion, etc). Instead imperceptible politics proceeds by materialising its own political actions through contagious and affective transformations. The object of its political practice is its own practices. In this sense, imperceptible politics is non-intentional - and therein lies its difference from state-oriented politics or the politics of civil rights movements, for example - it instigates change through a series of everyday transformations which can only be codified as having a central political aim or function in retrospect. Secondly, imperceptible politics addresses the totality of an existing field of power. This seems to be the difference between imperceptible politics and micropolitics or other alternative social movements: imperceptible politics is not concerned with containing itself to a molecular level of action; it addresses the totality of power through the social changes which it puts to work in a particular field of action. The distinction between molar and molecular (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 275) has only analytical significance from the perspective of imperceptible politics. In fact imperceptible politics is both molar and molecular, because by being local situated action it addresses the whole order of control in a certain field. Imperceptible politics is located at the heart of a field of power and at the same time it opens a way to move outside this field by forcing the transformation of all these elements which are constitutive of this field. In this sense, imperceptible politics is a driving force which is simul¬taneously both present and absent. We described this in the previous chapter by exploring the importance of speculative figurations for the practice of escape. On the everyday level of escape (a level we called in this chapter imperceptible politics) speculative figuration can be translated into trust. This is the third characteristic of imperceptible politics; it is driven by a firm belief in the importance and truthfulness of its actions, without seeking any evidence for, or conducting any investigation into its practices. This is trust. Imperceptible politics is driven by trust in something which seems to be absent from a particular situation. Imperceptible politics operates around a void, and it is exactly the conversion of this void into everyday politics that becomes the vital force for imperceptible politics.====

In educational spaces that allow for new, radical ideas and their contestation, resistance through key — the role of the judge is to be a critical intellectual and endorse the debater whose praxis best challenges power structures.  
Rabinow explains Foucault

Rabinow, Paul, "Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 202" University of Chicago Press Hence, we must return again, one last time, to the problem of the analyst.  For surely these dramatically new characterizations of power relations must put the analyst in a different position from that of the traditional intellectual or philosopher.  Foucault has provided some indications of how he sees the problem.  He has systematically criticized the self-proclaimed master of truth and justice, the intellectual who claimed to speak truth to power and thereby resist power's supposed repressive effect.  The "speaker's benefit" was revealed as a component in the advance of bio-power.  Foucault generalizes this point.  He advises intellectuals to abandon their universal prophetic voice.  He urges them to drop their pretensions about predicting the future and, even more, their self-proclaimed legislative role.  "The Greek wise man, the Jewish prophet, the Roman legislator are still models that haunt those, who today, practice the profession of speaking and writing."  In more recent times, our model of the intellectuals has been the writer-jurist who claims to be outside of partisan interest, to speak in the universal voice, to represent either God's law or that of the state, to make known the universal dictates of reason.  The exemplary figure in the Classical Age was perhaps Voltaire-proclaiming the rights of humanity, unveiling deceit and hypocrisy, attacking despotism and false hierarchies, combating injustices and inequalities.  The function of the modern intellectual is to bring the truth to articulate clarity. Today the supposedly free subject, the universal intellectual, can offer us little guidance.  But this does not mean that those who seek to understand human beings and to change society are either outside of power or powerless.  Rather, as Foucault's account of the rise and spread of bio-power makes clear, knowledge is one of the defining components for the operation of power in the modern world.  Knowledge is not in a superstructural relationship to power; it is an essential condition for the formation and further growth of industrial, technological society.  To take only the example we most recently discussed, that of the prisons, the categorizing and individualizing of prisoners was an essential component for the operation of this field of power; this disciplinary technology could not have taken the form it had, achieved the spread it did, or produced delinquents in the way it did, if power and knowledge were merely external to one another.  But power and knowledge are not identical with each other either.  Foucault does not seek to reduce knowledge to a hypothetical base in power ~but~ nor to conceptualize power as an always coherent strategy.  He attempts to show the specificity and materiality of their interconnections.  They have a correlative, not a causal relationship, which must be determined in its historical specificity.  This mutual production of power and knowledge is one of Foucault's major contributions.  The universal intellectual plays power's game because he fails to see this point.  Foucault is not claiming to be outside of these practices of power; at the same time, he is not identical to them.  First, when he shows that the practices of our culture have produced both objectification and subjectification, he has already loosened the grip, the seeming naturalness and necessity these practices have.  The force of bio-power lies in defining reality as well as producing it.  This reality takes the world to be composed of subjects and objects and their totalizing normalization.  Any solution that takes these terms for granted-even if it is to oppose them-will contribute to the hold of bio-power.  Through interpretive analytics, Foucault has been able to reveal the concrete, material mechanisms which have been producing this reality, while he describes with minute detail the transparent masks behind which these mechanisms are hidden.
That outweighs- ethical subjects are constructed by structures of power that demarcate recognition. Without breaking down structures- obligations can't be imposed because they are based in normalized desires that have no basis. This means my framing is a pre-requisite to ethics. 

As the world steps further toward authoritarian control, subaltern populations find themselves alone, demoralized and suffering. In the face of this misery, graffiti culture cultivates close bonds and connections forged through mutual suffering and love of art. These spaces become key survival strategies for minority voices.
Halsey and Young
Mark Halsey and Alison Young "'Our desires are ungovernable' Writing Graffiti in Urban Space" University of Melbourne, Australia Mark Halsey teaches in the Department of Criminology, University of Melbourne, and is an adjunct senior lecturer, School of Law, Flinders University of South Australia.. Mark is the author of Deleuze and Environmental Damage (published by Ashgate) and his work has appeared in such journals as Punishment and Society, British Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice.  Alison Young teaches in the Department of Criminology, University of Melbourne. She is the author of Femininity in Dissent (1990), Imagining Crime (1996) and Judging the Image (2005) and has published numerous articles on the intersections of law, crime and culture. She is currently working on a book examining cinematic images of violence and justice. Her research on graffiti was funded by a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council. The research has more recently been extended to examine stencil artists and street artists, and graffiti writers' narratives of cultural belonging.

Reasons for writing For many who catch sight of a tag or a mural on a wall, their glance leads quickly to speculation as to why someone wrote that word or drew an image in such a place. Commonplace assumptions include the writer's supposed boredom, or the writer's desire to damage and deface, or the writer's lack of respect for others' property. Many of these assumptions also drive municipal graffiti management policies.7 One of the aims animating our research was a desire to go beyond such assumptions in order to discover writers' motivations for engaging in graffiti and for their involvement in graffiti culture. Interviewees overwhelmingly indicated that their original involvement in graffiti derived from a combination of its aesthetic appeal for them and a sense that it was a gregarious activity through which they might make friends with others (in much the same way as other young people are drawn to dance venues or the football team for social interactions).8 Once immersed in graffiti culture, continuing to write was characterized by several factors viewed in highly positive ways by the respondents and describing ~describe~ powerful emotional and physical sensations in the act of writing (a dimension of writing we have called affective or visceral). These sensations include pride, pleasure, the enjoyment derived from sharing of an activity with friends, as well as the recognition obtained from the writing community. Subsidiary motivations related to less positive sensations of boredom and rebelliousness (these were mentioned by fewer writers). Pride relates to the sense of accomplishment writers experience upon completing a piece because, for the writer, it is art, and because it has taken a great deal of their labour: AL felt pride when he looked at a completed piece because 'it's a piece of artwork that I did' (4: 17), and W endorsed that view, stating 'when I stand back and look at a piece I feel proud of myself . . . 'cos I put a lot of hard work into it' (25: 21). Many attribute a desire for recognition as a motivation for graffiti writing, as one police officer commented: 'They want to be recognized, they want to be praised within their circle of friends.' 9 Our research did bear out the notion that recognition is important: the sense of publicity that graffiti can provide for writers is another important reason for participating in the culture. AG stated, '~Y~ou get a mention, you know, people know you, you get well known and that. . . . I thought, "Oh yeah, you know, I'd like to be well known"' (2: 20). Writers refer most often to the importance of recognition by other writers (in relation to their style, their prolific tagging or for getting up in inaccessible places). According to AR: I don't know, it's just getting to have your name well known all around the place . . . They'll be like, they'll see your tag and they'll be like, that's good . . . and they'll be like, I know who writes that, I'm his friend . . . he's heaps cool. (7: 30) Some writers rejected the idea that graffiti was mainly about getting recognition: Researcher: So who do you piece for? Interviewee: Me. Researcher: You did them for you? Interviewee: I don't have to prove anything. I don't want to make anyone else happy. It makes me happy, that's all I care about. (6: 20) Still, this individualism of approach was often situated within an acknowledgement of the importance of the writing community. And for some, the writing community was so significant that it came to stand in for their families or for the wider community: Interviewee: It is related to a, a recognition and a self-affirmation, it's like at home I got no attention like, you know, no praise for whatever I did, everything I did was criticized, I was, you know, there was tension at home, there was violence, I was kicked out of home age 15, um, my friends were very important to me . . . Through this connection with graffiti I found a new family on the street . . . I found a new form of recognition . . . A new form, my ego was nourished and . . . Um my god it felt good to, ah you know, put up my tag and then friends to say, yeah I saw, yeah I saw your piece on the weekend, yeah and whatever . . . Sort of like it's, it was, it was a communication amongst the family on the street um so . . . Yep, it was, it was, yeah for a kid with bloody low self-esteem and I speak for most teenagers, um they're finding a form of yeah, a form of self-esteem amongst their peers, and recognition amongst their peers. (AL, 8: 12, emphases added) It should be noted that discussions of graffiti which cite the desire for peer recognition as a factor in graffiti writing can tend to imply that such a desire is a product of adolescence, of the need for affirmation experienced by an immature psyche. Such an approach seems unnecessary. Taking pleasure in publicity about one's activities and desire for affirmation by one's peers (and acknowledgement of the importance of peer recognition) animate many individuals and activities, such as awards ceremonies, citation indexes for academic journals, the pleasure of seeing one's name in print. Compartmentalizing such pleasures as adolescent in relation to graffiti writing would seem to be an unfortunately blinkered approach to what is, after all, a very commonplace pleasure. Regarding graffiti writers as all-too-human in this respect may help to defuse some of the more negative archetypes that coalesce around the body of the writer. The sociality of shared peer activity is another important reason why writers are attracted to graffiti culture. AQ was motivated to begin graffiti through the encouragement of friends: 'Friends going, c'mon man, it's heaps good, people can see it and everything like, it's out there' (AQ, 4: 15). It is crucial to emphasize that this is not a question of peer pressure whereby individuals give in to demands to participate in something that they otherwise would avoid (only one writer, U, described his experience in those terms). Rather, it is a matter of developing activities that can be enjoyed by a group of friends as a group. The gregarious nature of graffiti culture is hence enormously significant: participants share knowledge of safe or exciting locations to write, discuss websites, display their photographs and go on group writing expeditions. Few respondents represented their involvement in graffiti in terms that would be part of the conventional stereotype of the graffiti writer. Boredom and rebellion were the only negative motivating factors mentioned. AQ speculated that boredom was an impetus for other writers (as did W and U) although none saw boredom as a factor in their own involvement.10 The desire to rebel was seen as important by AR (21: 5) and admitted by AI, who stated 'I wanted to be a bad little rebel kid' (2: 13). Thus, the overwhelming results of the research, in terms of writers' reasons for writing, is that graffiti is a positive, pleasurable experience for them, on the whole unrelated to deliberate, 'anti-social' or negative motivations. Many of the affective or visceral elements of writing that encourage writers to continue with graffiti come together in the notion of pleasure. Writers derived pleasure from many aspects of writing, but particularly from the physical experience of writing (that is, holding the spray can, seeing the finished work, feeling a bodily thrill and so on). Writers often simply expressed this as 'fun' (AR, AB, Z, N). Taking pleasure in the aesthetic was recounted by T: If I'm pleased with it it's . . . a pretty good feeling really, like I've gone home a few times with big smiles on my face, it's just, oh yeah I'm hell chuffed cos I've just done this, like, big thing that looks pretty cool. The degree of excitement is demonstrated by AN's comment, ~I~t's just like you're winning a grand final, . . . just like you just wanna scream out and say, 'Yeah', you know, like you just actually done something good and then you know that you're not supposed to be able to do it, which is even better, I s'pose . . . (4: 28) And such pleasure is intensely physical, as AC makes clear: Interviewee: I tried and I tried and I tried and I kept on getting better every time and it feels good because, like, you know, with my hand it feels really good . . . Researcher: So, do you get a sensation from it through your . . . Interviewee: Yeah, yeah from my hand. Researcher: . . . your body, or your hand when you're doing the actual tag itself? Interviewee: Yep. Researcher: Right. Can you describe that sensation to me? Interviewee: Feels, like, good like, cos just doing it like slow motion, it relaxes you . . . (2: 14) The physical act of writing the tag delivers a corporeal pleasure to the writer. Writing, with pen or spray can, and seeing the word or image take shape on the selected surface is thus a powerful physical experience for the writer. Since many discussions of graffiti assume that its main motivational pleasure for writers is the sight of its effects or knowledge of the annoyance that it might bring about for property owners, there has been little discussion of the pleasures derived for writers through the act of writing: seeing the can or pen in the hand, seeing the words take shape, feeling a connection between their control of the implement and the writing as it appears on the surface. That this pleasure is powerful should not be mistaken: many writers described graffiti as a physical thrill (AL, B), or as an 'adrenaline rush' (B, AR, AK, AN, U). U expressed this in the strongest terms, likening the pleasures of graffiti to that obtained from drug use: When you start out in graffiti you don't think of ~fights between writers~ and by the time that you sort of catch on to that sort of thing happens, you're pretty much, you, it's like a drug, you're pretty much hooked on it . . . (7: 15) To that extent, graffiti can deliver pleasure that is similar to that derived from extreme sports (such as bungee jumping) or by other physically demanding activities such as skateboarding. Its illicit nature probably overlays the actual activity with a further charge, making it similar to  joyriding for its ability to deliver more pleasure than would be expected from the simple physical acts (writing on a wall, driving a car). Graffiti's pleasurability thus is complex and multiple: writers take emotional satisfaction in evidence of their increasing skills as they command more ability to write more complicated lettering; they obtain a physiologically potent rush of adrenaline from its illegality (and sometimes from attempting graffiti in inaccessible or dangerous locations); and, perhaps most importantly, something in the act of writing feels 'right' to graffiti writers. This last aspect is perhaps the hardest for a non-writer to grasp, and is certainly related to the fact that writers perceive the urban landscape very differently from nonwriters (writers see the landscape as a series of surfaces waiting to be written on, of which more later). It is this 'rightness' that motivates most writers to continue in the activity, in the face of possible arrest, security dogs and possible injury.

We affirm the political methodology of the Graffeteur 

Thus the Advocacy: Public Colleges and Universities in the United States ought not restrict constitutionally protected free speech performed through tagging spaces with graffiti.

This form of expression ceases to be physical, and begins to register on an spiritual plane. Mapping the way that the body, the paint, the surface and the atmosphere interact reveals unique characteristics about this new form of counter-cartography. Tagging is no longer a spray-paint adventure, it is an affective transformation that turns the body into a vessel of urban resistance and allows becoming.
Halsey, Massumi and Young
Mark Halsey and Alison Young "'Our desires are ungovernable' Writing Graffiti in Urban Space" University of Melbourne, Australia Mark Halsey teaches in the Department of Criminology, University of Melbourne, and is an adjunct senior lecturer, School of Law, Flinders University of South Australia.. Mark is the author of Deleuze and Environmental Damage (published by Ashgate) and his work has appeared in such journals as Punishment and Society, British Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice.  Alison Young teaches in the Department of Criminology, University of Melbourne. She is the author of Femininity in Dissent (1990), Imagining Crime (1996) and Judging the Image (2005) and has published numerous articles on the intersections of law, crime and culture. She is currently working on a book examining cinematic images of violence and justice. Her research on graffiti was funded by a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council. The research has more recently been extended to examine stencil artists and street artists, and graffiti writers' narratives of cultural belonging.

Image, sign, affect: writing the corporeal Graffiti writers—at least those interviewed during our research—recognize their works form a critical part of the plane of signification investing urban landscapes. Moreover, writers know that writing graffiti is far from a static or two-dimensional activity involving simply the application of paint to a surface. Instead, most understand graffiti writing to be ~it is~ an affective process that does things to writers' bodies (and the bodies of onlookers) as much as to the bodies of metal, concrete and plastic, which typically compose the surfaces of urban worlds. In short, where graffiti is often thought of as destructive, we would submit that it is affective as well. The concept of affect has only recently been given serious attention within criminological scholarship (see Freiberg, 2001; De Haan and Loader, 2002; Karstedt, 2002; Sherman, 2003). Our main criticism of such work is that most commentators merge the idea of affect with emotion (terms which are in no way interchangeable).4 We do not intend to offer an extended theoretical overview of the development and deployment of the notion of affect in various arenas. Instead, we invoke the work of Brian Massumi (1992, 2002a, 2002b) who in turn draws on such authors as Baruch Spinoza, Henri Bergson as well as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.5 Massumi writes that affect is akin to the 'ways in which the body can connect with itself and with the world' (1992: 93). Elaborating, he remarks, In affect, we are never alone. That's because affects . . . are basically ways of connecting, to others and to other situations. They are our angle of participation in processes larger than ourselves. With intensified affect comes a stronger sense of embeddedness in a larger field of life—a heightened sense of belonging, with other people and to other places. (Massumi, 2002a: 214) Affect, therefore, has to do with intensity rather than identity. This is important because it allows questions to be asked not only of writers (what does it feel like to write illicitly?) but of those who name or respond to graffiti in various ways (what feelings emerge from encountering graffiti? How do these relate to the politico-cultural and legal factors which limit what it is possible to say and do about a particular image?). It allows questions to be asked of these bodies on the understanding that one is ~are~ never just 'a writer', or 'an observer', or 'a young person', or 'an outraged citizen', so much as locales of potential whose subjectivities are made and remade according to the (social) roles ascribed to them as well as the desire which invests various networks (familial, residential, pedagogical, cultural and so on). To side with affect is to admit that graffiti connects bodies known and unknown through the proliferation of images. The connection might be a minor or substantial interruption to one's sense of the proper, or it might be a reinforcement of one's view of 'the sad state of the youth of today', or of the 'vibrancy' of counter culture, or of the failure of zero tolerance and rapid response removal policies. Whatever the case, graffiti as image connects bodies. But graffiti also forges connections in a way that is largely unremarked by those thinking and writing about its occurrence. Specifically and critically, graffiti connects the writer to the city through the very act of writing since it is this act which places quite strict demands on writers' bodies (whether intellectually in terms of having to transfer a design to a less than ideal surface, whether physically in terms of having to put up with cold, dark or generally inclement conditions for several hours while writing, whether culturally in terms of feeling the pressure to execute a good piece that will not be marked up by rival writers, whether legally in terms of the omnipresent threat of getting busted, whether financially in terms of what the writer forwent in order to be able to afford quality paint in the right range of colours and so forth). In the act of writing—that is, by using the aerosol can and the felt tip marker as key prosthetics for connecting 'self' and 'world' (but also as a means of collapsing such distinctions)—graffiti writers connect themselves to all the possible reactions the city can muster with respect to a particular image or set of images produced over time.6 Graffiti, therefore, should not be divorced from the event of writing illicitly. And, more directly, it should not be equated to the cultivation or search for identity. Fame (attaining the status or identity of a king) is in many instances important, but, as explained later, pleasure (the intensity of feeling which, for instance, accompanies the motioning of the aerosol can) is equally significant. Indeed, our conversations with graffiti writers indicate that writing induces a series of singular moments where identity is put asunder through the performance of what Deleuze and Guattari have called becomings-immanent (denoting moments where a body—for whatever period—inhabits space and time in ways which resist subjective and objective attempts to classify, name or order events). Our contention is that illicit writing cannot be adequately described in binary terms (good versus bad art, criminal versus legal activity, creative versus destructive images, etc.). Instead, graffiti needs to be considered in a both/and manner. Certainly graffiti will always tend to be a target for debates about good and bad art or appropriate versus inappropriate placement. But graffiti also involves something beyond this—something intangible, something which resists attempts to capture its meaning, its purpose, its 'final' referent. This intangible, is, for want of a better term, the passing of affect. As Massumi puts it, 'Affect as whole, then, is the virtual co-presence of potentials' (2002a: 213). Beginning with motivation for writing, we offer in the following an account of these potentials as relayed by writers themselves.

The 1AC is a method of "nomadic grammatology", speech that exists in an affective dimension un-diagnosable to external power structures but coherent communication to the hidden subaltern. We give minoritarian voices a way to articulate themselves without revealing them to state writ large
Fieni
David Fieni "What A Wall Wants, Or How Graffiti Thinks Nomad Grammatology In The French Banlieue" '13 David Fieni teaches at Sarah Lawrence College. He has also published on Jean Genet, Ernest Renan, and Algerian women writers. He is currently editing a special issue of Expressions maghrébines on the work of Abdelkébir Khatibi, and an issue of The Journal of Postcolonial Writ-ing , entitled "The Global Checkpoint.

The populist rage that Sarkozy articulated by using the term racaille (rabble, scum) received most of the attention, including an essay in Le Monde that explored the word's etymology (intended as a lesson in the politics of language for the French interior minister).3 It is the Kärcher reference, however, that most interests me here. Kärcher, a company based in Germany, whose own website touts it as "the most recognized and trusted name in high-pressure cleaning equipment," manufactures machines used to clean city walls and public latrines. By proclaiming that he wanted to "kärcherize" the "racaille," Sarkozy evoked a specific technology of urban cleansing that vividly illustrates the increasingly brutal approach to the banlieue that marks French urban policy since the 1980s. The Kärcher water blaster is not a mere metaphor, but an actual machine used to scour graffiti from a variety of hard-to-clean surfaces. Sarkozy's comments thus equate banlieue youth (la racaille) with their signs of passage through urban space (le graff, as graffiti is often called). The young banlieusards themselves become illegible signs on the new smooth spaces of the HLM housing estates. The rhetorical dehumanization of young people from "troubled neighborhoods," combined with hostility to graffiti, reveals the neo-logocentrism operative in the penal republican state that reiterates colonialism's pseudo-scientific rationale for depriving supposedly illiterate peoples of history, reason, and even the very capacity for thought, a rationale that ultimately justifies their exclusion from the entire chain of civilizational benefits and rights attendant upon literacy and reason. One piece of anti-Sarkozy graffiti in Brest near the port de commerce, depicting Sarkozy as the national cop wielding a billy club, displays an explicit awareness of this interpretation of what nettoyer au Kärcher means (fig. 1). Text accompanying the cartoonish caricature reads, "Article 1: Nettoyage des graffitis au Kärcher" (Article 1: Cleaning graffiti with a Kärcher).4 It would be an error, however, to suggest that the category, "banlieue youth," exists independent of the statements that construct it as an identifiable group. Mustafa Dikeç's recent demonstration of the way that French urban policy "produces" the banlieue as a space to be policed and contained also extends to the way that specific groups within these spaces are produced through the media, statistics, law, and other techniques.5 The 74 DIACRITICS  2012  40.2 act of naming the racaille effectively produces them as a social category precisely at the same moment that the necessity of cleansing their living inscription from the cité is asserted. I am calling this nettoyage or erasure of these groups "neo-logocentric" because part of its target is graffiti, which, as I hope to demonstrate, represents an important emerging global practice of inscription that produces multiple transnational connections among ghettoized spaces around the world. Graffiti functions as a kind of alternative literacy that operates within a plane that connects with literacy in the narrow sense of the term,1 but remains independent from it. The strong reactions that graffiti elicits, as adduced by Sarkozy's remarks (and one could cite dozens of other examples), suggest that the new technologies of thought, mobility, and inscription that graffiti engineers are what make it so dangerous to its detractors. These new forms of writing that graffiti produces are dismissed as mere vandalism; the situational critiques of power, space, and law that graffiti traces are instead seen as unreadable marks of defilement and delinquency. It is in this context of graffiti—understood as a critical practice of writing, defined primarily by its illegality, its ephemerality, and its public positioning against the logocentric state apparatus— that what I am calling "nomad grammatology" comes into play. By graffiti, I intend a heterogeneous critical concept that intersects with the variety of phenomena commonly called tags, graffiti, graffiti art, pieces, murals, and stencils, but which does not exhaust their potential. Not all actually existing graffiti does the things I suggest graffiti can do, even less does all graffiti think in the same way. That most ambivalent of urban signs, graffiti indicates either urban decay or youthful creativity; it evokes both the illegible signs of gang violence and the sublimation of art. The word "graffiti" in a contemporary context can refer to almost any kind of marking. Even a cursory taxonomy of its forms would prompt a rather long list of styles, techniques, and schools. There are the supposedly "lower forms," not easily commodified, such as quickly done tags, indicating just the pseudonym of a gang, a crew, or an individual; the more stylized hip-hop paintings or "pieces," often emphasizing the shape and outline of the letters; stencils, stickers, and posters of various kinds; and even the writing in bathroom stalls that Alan Dundes has termed "latrinalia."6 Then there are the assimilated or commodified "higher forms," such as graffiti art hung in galleries (I Figure 1. Graffiti depicting Nicolas Sarkozy with a billy club Brest, France, 2005 Photo: Mathieu Gonnet What a Wall Wants, or How Graffiti Thinks  David Fieni 75 refer you to "Le TAG au Grand Palais," at the Palais de Tokyo in Paris in spring 2009, featuring over 300 works by graffitists from around the world, or the exhibition at the Fondation Cartier, "Né dans la rue," also in 2009); sponsored public art installations such as murals; and the use of graffiti-style fonts or typography in advertising and merchandise. In order to think about the specific potential in graffiti most relevant to the question of walls, sovereignty, and ghettoized spaces, my use of the term will highlight three elements of graffiti's field of writing-production in particular: its illegality, anonymity, and ephemerality. As understood in this paper, graffiti is a fugitive set of illegal operations performed by semi-anonymous interacting bodies in motion. To see graffiti from this perspective is also a way of underscoring the specific position of the letters of graffiti in relation to the letter of the law; by definition, the graffitist positions him or herself ~themselves~ outside the law, while also writing on the very material surfaces of the law (property, the walls built by the state); graffiti does not simply stand outside or against the state, but always links up with the state, disfigures the representatives of the state, and becomes barred by state science (what Deleuze and Guattari call "royal science"7 ). Graffiti decodes the performances walls enact as a theatrical disavowal of the porousness of sovereignty—by deforming, inflating, playing with letters, making them something you can see but cannot necessarily read. Graffiti would have the letter of the law succumb to a liquefaction of its own material ontological guarantee as public writing, at least at the moment of the encounter with graffiti, at the moment of inscription or viewing.
The 1AC  allows us to activate our agency through the creation of subaltern spaces of
AND
and define the grafitiscape within the context of the archaeograph (Figure 105)

Standard normative theories are rooted in the same ressentiment that the 1AC fights- and under the ruse of being "ethical" or "good" we impose personal interpretations of morality on people as a method of universalizing our own hatred at life. This leads to widespread self-denial and acceptance of weakness; controls the internal link to oppression arguments because forcing normative ideas onto individuals regardless of perspective is the root cause of oppression, so breaking down non-pluralistic forms of ethics comes first- Takes out universal ethics because the only way to understand right and wrong is fluid re-orientation and evauluation of morality. The 1AC is a method of painting graffiti on ethics.

Nietzsche 1
~Friedrich Nietzsche, German philosopher, "The Man Who Killed God", all around one badass motherfucker, On the Genealogy of Morals, Translated by Carol Deithe~
The beginning of the slaves' revolt in morality occurs when ressentiment itself turns creative and
AND
copy and counterpart, the 'good one' – himself! . . .

Tournament: Strake | Round: 1 | Opponent: Cedar Ridge MT | Judge:
I affirm and value morality because ought implies a moral obligation. 

Notions of normativity and laws constantly shift through time. All decisions are made with the knowledge that time may change them. Martin Hagglund writes.
Martin Hagglund. The Necessity of Discrimination Disjoining Derrida and Levinas. Project Muse. Diacritics 34.1:40-71.
“Once again, it is... has been prescribed.”

Every ethical decision inevitably excludes other perspectives and is haunted by those “specters.” Hagglund 2

 “In effect, every attempt... thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call “lesser violence.” END QUOTE

The deconstructive concept of ethics is the only way to recognize these excluded beings and create meaningful political or ethical change. It is precisely because justice can open to interpretation, that it can be changed to always be better. Hagglund 3

“Hence, Derrida argues that the ... is more or less discriminating and open to new attacks or conflicting demands.”

Thus, the standard is embracing transformative justice.  

I contend protecting a right to free speech allows for a justice to come. 

Asserting you are right without defending your opinion makes dialogue impossible. It creates an us-them dichotomy which makes practical solutions inaccessible. Foucault: Foucault, Michel French post-structuralist. “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations.” In Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984. Ed. Paul Rabinow. 1 Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. The New Press. 1998.

The polemicist, on ...surrenders or disappears.

Empirically true- collegiate trends against microaggressions deter meaningful engagement and make violent outburst inevitable. Lukianoff and Haidt Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt (Greg Lukainoff is president and CEO of Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Jonathan Haidt is the Thomas Cooley professor of ethical leadership at NYU Stern. “The Coddling of the American Mind” The Atlantic. 9/15. 

Burns defines magnification ... people the benefit of the doubt?

Only engaging in the public sphere allows for change- we need to learn the tools needed to engage others so we can manage to persuade them of our issues and opinions. If people don’t know why they’re problematic, then calling them problematic does nothing but emblazon them to do whatever they need. Foucault 2: : Foucault, Michel French post-structuralist. “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations.” In Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984. Ed. Paul Rabinow. 1 Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. The New Press. 1998.
It is a question, ... to form a community of action.

Causes spillover to the real world- outside of college is the real world- we need skills to deal with other people- creating an isolated space does nothing. Trump election proves uniqueness for my side- if we don’t actually convince people our issues matter nothing will ever change for the better. Lukianoff and Haidt 2Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt (Greg Lukainoff is president and CEO of Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Jonathan Haidt is the Thomas Cooley professor of ethical leadership at NYU Stern. “The Coddling of the American Mind” The Atlantic. 9/15. 

Attempts to shield students ... diverse faculty—would further serve that goal.

And we need to engage in institutions- withdrawal reifies oppression and causes no change- this means the 1AC is key. Mouffe Chantal, Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, “The Importance of Engaging the State,” What is Radical Politics Today? October 2009, pgs. 233-237
In both Hardt and Negri, ...in my view, is how we should conceive the nature of radical politics.

Empirically true- and controls the internal link to any oppression arguments- maintaining regimes of truth allows oppressive dictates to take control- only discourse allows individuals to challenge norms. Dungey 2k1 (Nicholas, Ph.D. from the University of California, lecturer in Political Science @ University of California, “(Re)Turning Derrida to Heidegger: Being-with-Others as Primordial Politics”, Polity, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Spring, 2001), pp. 455-477, Palgrave Macmillan Journals Stable,

The desire for communal identity ... barbed wire, security zones, racial ghettos, and laws that are designed to separate and isolate.

Tournament: Colleyville | Round: 2 | Opponent: asda | Judge: asd

1AC Universal Aisthesis

I Affirm and value morality

We can never know others objectively, meaning any judgments we make are tainted by our own subjective perspectives. This means ethics must be pluralistic and inclusive of others experiences.
Friedrich NietzscheFriedrich Nietzsche ~German Philosopher~ Human All Too Human. Translated by R.J.Hollingdale. Cambridge University Press. http://archive.org/stream/NietzscheHumanAllTooHuman/Nietzsche-HumanAllTooHuman_djvu.txt. A.S.====
Injustice necessary. - All judgements as to the value of life have evolved  illogically and are therefore unjust. The falsity of human judgement  derives firstly from the condition of the material to be judged, namely  very incomplete, secondly from the way in which the sum is arrived at on  the basis of this material, and thirdly from the fact that every individual  piece of this material is in turn the outcome of false knowledge, and is so  with absolute necessity. Our experience of another person, for example,  no matter how close he stands to us, can never be complete, so that we  would have a logical right to a total evaluation of him; all evaluations are  premature and are bound to be. Finally, the standard~s~ by which we  measure, our own being, is ~are~ not an unalterable magnitude, we are subject  to moods and fluctuations, and yet we would have to know ourselves as a  fixed standard to be able justly to assess the relation between ourself and  anything else whatever. Perhaps it would follow from all this that one  ought not to judge at all; if only it were possible to live without evaluating, without having aversions and partialities! - for all aversion is de-  pendent on an evaluation, likewise all partiality. A drive to something or  away from something divorced from a feeling one is desiring the beneficial or avoiding the harmful, a drive without some kind of knowing  evaluation of the worth of its objective, does not exist in man. We are  from the very beginning illogical and thus unjust beings and can recognize  this: this is one of the greatest and most irresolvable discords of existence.
An external system of ethics that is detached from the ethical agent makes no sense
AND
outside view, but if we are tainted by subjectivity that becomes impossible. 

Therefore, there is no essence to persons. Rather, each agent creates their own ethical norms and identity in relation to themselves. This means that ethical systems must not be focused on creating a certain universal content to impose on all agents- but rather must be amenable to multiple perspectives on what is good and bad.  This entails we must create a system that allows for pluralism in viewpoints. Nietzsche 2  Friedrich Nietzsche. The Genealogy of Morals. Translated by Walter Kaufmann

To renounce belief in one's ego, to deny one's own "reality" — what a triumph! not merely over the senses, over appearance, but a much higher kind of triumph, a violation and cruelty against reason — a voluptuous pleasure that reaches its height when the ascetic self-contempt and self-mockery of reason declares: "there is a realm of truth and being, but reason is excluded from it!"But precisely because we seek knowledge, let us not be ungrateful to such resolute reversals of accustomed perspectives and valuations with which the spirit has, with apparent mischievousness and futility, raged against itself for so long: to see differently in this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation for its future "objectivity" — the latter understood not as "contemplation without interest" (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to control one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject"; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as "pure reason," absolute spirituality," "knowledge in itself": these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity," be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this — what would that mean but to castrate the intellect?
Therefore, the standard is embracing multiple perspectives-
Our thesis and sole contention
AND
neg interps. Just ask me in cross or prep time.

Part Two: Assessment 

Sub-Point A:
Information- In order to engage in critique one must assess the culture of expression- that requires open communication and understanding.  
Franklin. A.Todd Franklin ~Sidney Wertimer Professor of Philosophy and Chair Africana Studies~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 1: Kindred Spirits:Nietzsche and Locke as Progenitors of Axiological Liberation.

Equally concerned about the ways in which value absolutism promotes "authoritarian conformity and subordination,"26 Locke follows Nietzsche in proposing a new critical methodology aimed at demystifying and delegitimizing tyrannical forms of culture. In its earliest formulation, Locke's critical methodology describes the development of a conscientious understanding of any given culture as predicated on first, its analytic and complete description in terms of its own culture-elements, ~and~ second, its organic interpretation in terms of its own intrinsic values as a vital mode of living, combined if possible with an historical account of its development and derivation.27 Basically speaking, Locke avers that in order to truly understand a culture one must first patiently and thoroughly compile a comprehensive catalogue of all of the values, standards, and ideals that uniquely define it. Once this is completed, one must then develop a psychologically and historically sensitive interpretation of the culture that contextualizes it in terms of the peculiar needs, interests, goals, and conditions that give rise to its emergence and evolution. Moreover, as Ernest Mason aptly points out, Locke's organic methodological approach holds that "we must undertake a functional and historical interpretation of values in order to gain some understanding of their validity or appropriateness in the context in which they are employed."28 Emphasizing the pedagogical merits of this organic, or integrative, approach to systems of value, Locke later baptizes it as "critical relativism" and touts its usefulness as a means of promoting a broader recognition and acceptance of diverse cultures and ways of life. Committed to the "humanist ideal and objective of the best possible human and self-understanding," Locke sees his critical relativism as a blueprint for "the concrete study of man in all of his infinite variety."29 True to its name, Locke's critical relativism treats values as historically relative and strives to elucidate~s~ the various ways in which they change and develop while also subjecting them to comparative analyses in an effort to facilitate the development of a broader understanding and appreciation of cultural diversity.30 Detailing the elements of critical relativism more specifically, Locke goes on to characterize it as a powerful methodology that would 1. implement an objective interpretation of values by referring them realistically to their social and cultural backgrounds; 2. interpret values concretely as functional adaptations to these backgrounds, and thus make clear their historical and functional relativity; 3. claim or impute no validity for values beyond this relativistic framework, and so counteract value dogmatism based on regarding them as universals good and true for all times and all places; 4. confine its consideration of ideology to the prime function and real status of being the adjunct rationalization of values and value interests; and 5. trace value development and change as a dynamic process instead of in terms of unrealistic analytic categories, and so eliminating the traditional illusions produced by generalized value terms—viz., static values and fixed value concepts and "ideals."31 Thus constituted, Locke's critical relativism denotes a rigorous methodological strategy that bears a striking resemblance to Nietzsche's genealogy insofar as both endeavor to break the hegemony of recalcitrant expressions of value absolutism by fostering a critical consciousness that recognizes the dynamic, relativistic, and thereby human, all-too-human nature of all prevailing systems of value. The Dawn of Critical Consciousness and the Promise of Axiological Liberation Once enlightened by the dawn of critical consciousness, those who face social coercion and psychological debasement become cognizant of the open possibility of contesting their situation. Having developed a critical awareness of the contingent and dynamic nature of all systems of value, one realizes that one need not revere any particular culture or way of life as sacrosanct and definitive. Quite the contrary, for once one successfully comprehends the provincial and perspectival character of all systems of value, one also begins to realize that no particular system of values is unequivocally binding and absolute. For those whose eyes, "whose suspicion in whose eyes is strong and subtle enough" for such insight, the dawn of their critical consciousness marks the advent of the realization that alternative systems of value are indeed permissible and that this being the case,the horizon is once again free (GS 343). In addition to recognizing the opportunity to chart new systems of value and sail proverbial new seas, those who become critically conscious also concomitantly become cognizant of the fact that they need no longer see themselves in terms of prejudicial and distortive racial perspectives that impugn their character and worth by denouncing their valued idioms, practices, and traditions as crude, shameful, and savage. Throwing off the psychological shackles of a false sense of abject inferiority, these newly freed spirits stand poised to self-confidently assume the task of cultivating and articulating what Locke aptly refers to as one's own racial sense, one's own racial consciousness, and one's own racial tradition.32 At base,what all of these new and liberating forms of enlightenment speak to is the fundamental significance of rigorous and circumspect forms of axiological critique.Looking beyond,or rather beneath,the more obvious ideological differences between Nietzsche and Locke, what one ultimately finds are two kindred spirits whose common aversion for absolute values propels them to develop potent methodological strategies that empower people to consciously reject the objective pretensions of insidious systems of value and in doing so free themselves from the psychological fetters of various forms of axiological oppression.
Impacts: 

A- We need to understand all modalities of expression if
AND
principles work in history which is a tiebreaker argument if they contest this.

Sub-Point B is Subject Position: Whenever we act- we act in relation to an audience. For some bodies that performance is reduced to arbitrary characteristics as opposed to the content of the performance- that causes an internalization of inferiority. DuBois refers to this as the veil of double consciousness. For example, black Americans aren't seen as real Americans by many citizens who have internalized that view. This internalization has manifested in incomplete social demands and a resignation to failure.
Higgins 1
Kathleen Marie Higgins ~Professor of Philosophy @ UT Austin~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 3: Double Consciousness and Second Sight

The self-consciousness that such observation engenders is an internalization of external surveillance. One may choose to defy the pressures imposed by those watching, but one is well aware of them as one's audience. Indeed, one's self-conception comes to involve a sense that one is performing for others. Audience reaction becomes a test of one's success.10 This reactive self-perception takes on a negative cast when the audience is predisposed to respond in a disparaging manner. This is certainly the situation of African Americans, according to DuBois: . . . the facing of so vast a prejudice could not but bring the inevitable self-questioning, self-disparagement, and lowering of ideals which ever accompany repression and breed in an atmosphere of contempt and hate.11 Thus far I have indicated three features of double consciousness: (1) the sense of being identified by virtue of a single trait (skin color), and thus being invisible in one's particularity, (2) the sense of being under the surveillance of parties predisposed to be unsympathetic, and (3) the ~one internalizes~ internalization of the mechanisms of surveillance and the adoption of associated self-disparaging judgments. Double consciousness also involves an awareness of oneself as a mixed being. DuBois emphasized the unreconciled character of one's aspirations, the "two warring ideals in one dark body." This condition obstructs fulfillment of one's human potential and one's participation in societal life. DuBois says of the African American: This, then, is the end of his striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture,to escape both death and isolation,to husband and use his best powers and his latent genius. These powers of body and mind have in the past been strangely wasted, dispersed, or forgotten. And yet it is not weakness—it is the contradiction of double aims.The double-aimed struggle of the black artisan—on the one hand to escape white contempt for a nation of mere hewers of wood and drawers of water,and on the other hand to plough and nail and dig for a poverty-stricken horde — could only result in making him a poor craftsman, for he had but half a heart in either cause.12 Double consciousness easily drains one's energies while this tension remains unresolved. But the inner tension it creates also motivates one to aim at a new synthesis, which Du Bois describes as the African American's "longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self."13 Although painful, the tension wrought by double consciousness provokes the desire for a more integrated self and instigates the self-questioning that might bring it about. The tension within the soul is thus ambivalent. One's duality provides ample resources for the development of a transfigured, comprehensive self, not just the potential for self-interference. In DuBois's characterization, as Byerman observes,"Blacks . . . are not nothing, but two things, both of which are coherent and meaningful; the difficulty is in successfully joining them for a greater self and, by implication, a greater culture."14 Although hopeful, DuBois sees the project of forging a synthetic self as inherently difficult. This difficulty is exacerbated by the temptation to be co-opted. In the Black World, the Preacher and Teacher embodied once the ideals of this people—the strife for another and a juster world,the vague dream of righteousness,the mystery of knowing; but to-day the danger is that these ideals, with their simple beauty and weird inspiration, will suddenly sink to a question of cash and a lust for gold."15 The allure of wealth is particularly dangerous, because riches are a clearer goal than that of forging an integrated self. The quest for gold cultivates the illusion that the deficiencies of one's position can be rectified through fulfilled material ambition. DuBois sees the promise of wealth as a false promise. Even if the aim is achieved, wealth does not eliminate the veil. Although wealth might be envied by individuals on both sides of the color divide, with accommodations from both sides to the person possessing it, wealth cannot resolve the psychological problem of developing a sense of one's own identity.To put it in Hegelian terms, wealth does not compel others to bestow human recognition on its possessor. Moreover, as we observed earlier, DuBois believes that the divided mind that has been cultivated in African Americans interferes with whole-hearted pursuit of any dream. They are therefore at a disadvantage from the start in any effort as competitive as that of amassing wealth. Worst of all, money distracts attention from the goal of selfrealization in a higher sense, which involves the construction of oneself as a harmonious being and self-assertion as a full participant in political and cultural life. The danger that goals of self-development and a sense of dignity will be abandoned is particularly acute at the time DuBois is writing, when Booker T. Washington's "Atlanta Compromise" has become the doctrine of many on both sides of the veil. This compromise is the concession that "In all things purely social we can be as separate as five fingers, and yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress."16 DuBois sees Washington's compromise as capitulation, as a blatant abdication of spiritual and cultural aspirations to secure the satisfaction of African Americans' physical needs. Of Washington he comments, . . . so thoroughly did he learn the speech and thought of triumphant commercialism, and the ideals of material prosperity, that the picture of a lone black boy pouring over a French grammar amid the weeds and dirt of a neglected home soon seemed to him the acme of absurdities. One wonders what Socrates and St. Francis of Assisi would say to this.17 Explicitly abandoned in Washington's program are political power, civil rights, and higher education for African Americans. According to DuBois, the disappearance of these aims from the agenda of black leaders such as Washington risks the permanent consignment of African Americans to a subordinate role within American society and the endless prolongation of unfulfilled inner conflict. Indeed, the abandonment of these goals reinforces the inferiority that African Americans have been taught to feel. DuBois comments: Mr. Washington's programme practically accepts the alleged inferiority of the Negro races.Again,in our own land,the reaction from the sentiment of war times has given impetus to raceprejudice against Negroes, and Mr. Washington withdraws many of the high demands of Negroes as men and American citizens. . . . In the history of nearly all other races and peoples the doctrine preached at such crises has been that manly selfrespect is worth more than lands and houses, and that a people who voluntarily surrender such respect, or cease striving for it, are not worth civilizing.18 DuBois's own view is that the resolution of the inner turmoil of African Americans can only be achieved through self-respect and self-assertion, and any policy that interferes with either should be resisted by all legitimate means. The growing spirit of kindliness and reconciliation between the North and South after the frightful differences of a generation ago ought to be a source of deep congratulation to all, and especially to those whose mistreatment caused the war; but if that reconciliation is to be marked by the industrial slavery and civic death of those same black men, with permanent legislation into a position of inferiority, then those black men, if they are really men, are called upon by every consideration of patriotism and loyalty to oppose such a course by all civilized methods. . . .We have no right to sit silently by while the inevitable seeds are sown for a harvest of disaster to our children,black and white.19
Impacts: 

A- this relationship is inevitable so learning to navigate is key to making any meaningful praxis 

B- means imagining away the problems does nothing because oppressive hierarchies will just recreate themselves 

Means rights claims are necessary to operate in society- doing away with them propagates helplessness- However, bodies in these positions have a unique vantage point because they get a "second sight" that lets them understand power relations that shape their lives.
Higgins 2 Kathleen Marie Higgins ~Professor of Philosophy @ UT Austin~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 3: Double Consciousness and Second Sight

Although the pain of inner turmoil makes the temptation to cooption a real danger, the turmoil within the African American's soul nevertheless yields a spiritual advantage, according to DuBois. This is the power of discernment that he calls "second sight."Wald describes DuBois's notion as "a rift between experience and evaluation,"20 and she emphasizes the positive potential of this ability to refrain from giving whole hearted assent to unevaluated surface appearances. "DuBois describes not only the pain of measuring oneself by a contemptuous and pitying world, but also the empowerment that comes with knowing one is doing so." 21 Second sight, for DuBois, involves the ability to see through the debilitating judgments that one has absorbed and to recognize their dubious origins. The second sight that DuBois describes is a function of having a perspective on everyday experience that differs from the majority's. Even if one soul within the African American takes the majority's outlook on most experiences, the second soul provides alternative, modifying insights that are equally part of one's perception. For the person with double consciousness, common opinion cannot be naively accepted.The second sight that DuBois indicates is the multidimensional awareness that emerges from double consciousness, a deeper perspective than that of less complex contemporaries. The ideal is to utilize this more penetrating perception to enhance one's effectiveness in the world. For the African American, awareness of how the white world views things can be useful knowledge, as long as one does not accept this outlook as something to which one should give deference. Moreover, double consciousness can provide the basis for distancing oneself from the contemptuous judgments of others, in that it prevents its possessor from giving simple assent to any judgment encountered. The gap between disparaging judgments that one has absorbed and the assent of one's entire consciousness is a starting point for refusing those judgments. Unfortunately, all too often, the African American's double awareness does not develop into a deeper perspective that is enriched by this duality but instead nurtures feelings of incapacity or inspires self-deception. DuBois reflects: From the double life every American Negro must live, as a Negro and as an American as swept on by the current of the nineteenth while yet struggling in the eddies of the fifteenth century—from this must arise a painful self-consciousness, an almost morbid sense of personality and a moral hesitancy which is fatal to self-confidence.The worlds within and without the Veil of color are changing, and changing rapidly, but not at the same rate, not in the same way; and this must produce a peculiar wrenching of the soul, a peculiar sense of doubt and bewilderment. Such a double life, with double thoughts, double duties, and double social classes, must give rise to double words and double ideals, and tempt the mind to pretence or to revolt, to hypocrisy or to radicalism.22 DuBois's book illustrates with examples the extreme difficulty of this situation and the tragic consequences to which it has led many. It serves as a stirring call to conscience for his readers on either side of the veil. DuBois directs the attention of all of his readers to their obligation to assist the reconstruction of social policies in a way that grants full social and cultural participation to all citizens. He is unswerving in his efforts to reveal the mechanisms by which African Americans are oppressed and the psychological toll that this has taken.At the same time, he rejects stances of submission and victimization, insisting that African Americans must assert their own dignity in order to successfully rectify the situation. He emphasizes the political goals that should be sought and the specific attitudes African Americans should cultivate, as well as some they should shun. DuBois offers hints as to how African Americans' inner distress might be navigated, but these hints remain more suggestive than explicit. The Hegelian goal of the black man "merging his double self into a better and truer self"23 is held out as the ideal. Some of Nietzsche's insights consider similar psychological territory, and I think that they can help clarify both the challenges, the temptations, and the positive potential of double consciousness. Accordingly, at this juncture I will direct the discussion to Nietzsche. In Nietzsche's writings we find a parallel with DuBois's account in his frequent discussions of inner tensions and self-conceptions in conflict. Like DuBois, he describes conditions of being seen in a manner that fails to recognize who he is. Although we can only infer which particular experiences were most crucial to Nietzsche's sense of being an outsider, his works reveal that he did consider himself disconnected from many aspects of the way of life that those around him took for granted. He speaks of himself as "untimely" or "unfashionable" even in early works. The "free spirits" that he often mentions represent his assertion of a positive attitude toward his inability to fit his time and place; his letters, on the other hand, often reveal his disturbance with the same situation. Seemingly, he had ambivalent attitudes toward his sense of distance from the cultural mainstream. His autobiography, Ecce Homo, provides further evidence that Nietzsche considered himself marginalized. He comments that he is not read, that one cannot communicate where there are no ears for what one says, and that it is possible to be born posthumously. The Gay Science also abounds in suggestions that Nietzsche considers himself a member of a misunderstood minority."There is a time for us, too!" he claims exuberantly at the end of the book's first section.24 Elsewhere he insists,"The moral earth, too,has its antipodes.The antipodes,too,have the right to exist"(GS 289). Nietzsche was quite conscious of the discrepancy between his multidimensional sense of himself and the reactions he provoked from other people.In the following passage,he uses humor to express this awareness. We are too prone to forget that in the eyes of people who are seeing us for the first time we are something quite different from what we consider ourselves to be: usually we are nothing more than a single individual trait which leaps to the eye and determines the whole impression we make. Thus the gentlest and most reasonable of men can, if he wears a large moustache, sit as it were in its shade and feel safe there—he will usually be seen as no more than the appurtenance of a large moustache, that is to say a military type, easily angered and occasionally violent—and as such he will be treated.25 A mustache hardly seems to distinguish a person enough to be taken seriously, and Nietzsche seems to be playing with the cliché of using a mustache to go incognito. Nevertheless, Nietzsche draws attention here to his perception of distance from other people.Although he is the outsider, we readers are insiders—we know that Nietzsche is a sensitive philosophical person and what others miss when they see him merely as a man with a mustache. Nietzsche's claims that his ideas (particularly those about morality) marginalize him indicate a difference between his sense of not fitting and that experienced by African Americans. One's ideas are not so obvious to others as one's skin color, and one might think that ideas are somewhat under one's voluntary control. Nietzsche would deny the latter. (He claims, "A thought comes when it wishes, not when 'I' wish."26) Nevertheless, reports of his almost excessive politeness toward acquaintances suggest that Nietzsche aimed to prevent others from noticing what he perceived as a gap between himself and them. In this respect, he was able to stave off to some extent the impact of other people's surveillance in a way that is not available to someone who is judged as suspect on the basis of pigmentation. Nietzsche's comment about the mustache also indicates a major difference between the trait for which he is mistaken and that for which African Americans are mistaken. It was a matter of Nietzsche's own choice that he grew and groomed his mustache as he did (at least until he went mad). Skin color, in contrast, is not selected or varied by the person whose skin it is (except rather trivially through cosmetics and tanning,or more eccentrically through certain extreme forms of surgery); it is assigned, one might say, whether one likes it or not. As for the mustache, Nietzsche apparently wanted to seem a bit eccentric (though one might ask whether his desire to seem eccentric does not reveal a sense of inferiority disguising itself as pride in being nonstandard). Nietzsche seems to have been able to limit or manipulate other's reactions to some degree. Nevertheless, he was aware of the internalization of a sense of being seen and judged by others, and the difficulty of asserting oneself in opposition to the observer's evaluations. For example, he reflects: The reproaches of conscience are weak even in the most conscientious people compared to the feeling:"This or that is against the morals of your society." A cold look or a sneer on the face of those among whom and for whom one has been educated is feared even by the strongest. What is it that they are really afraid of? Growing solitude! This is the argument that rebuts even the best arguments for a person or cause. Thus the herd instinct speaks up in us. (GS 50)

That means you affirm- all speech is necessary- even if some speech is hateful it gives us a vantage position that allows us to navigate the dialectic that orders social relations.
Higgins 3 Kathleen Marie Higgins ~Professor of Philosophy @ UT Austin~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 3: Double Consciousness and Second Sight

There is yet a further way in which Nietzsche's writing may be valuable for furthering DuBois's project, this time with respect to the psychological situation of African Americans themselves. Nietzsche offers guidance for those suffering from double consciousness from the standpoint of one who has been there. He makes suggestions relevant to self-reevaluation that might counter the pressures toward self-hatred arising from those who control the status quo. He also warns against some of the same dangers that DuBois sees for those afflicted by the conflict born of double consciousness, elaborating on the psychological mechanisms involved. Nietzsche offers several strategies for overcoming self-disparagement motivated by the hostile attitudes of those who are comfortably ensconced within mainstream society. First, Nietzsche encourages the marginalized to recognize the limitations of the majority's viewpoint. Like all perspectives, the hegemonic viewpoint is incomplete."We cannot look around our own corner," Nietzsche tells us (GS 374). No one is entitled to claim, as those in the majority are prone to do, that their own outlook is the objective view of things. There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about a matter, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one and the same matter, that much more complete will our "concept" of this matter, our "objectivity" be.34 Those who claim objectivity have less of the only "objectivity" available than those who recognize other perspectives. The perspective of those unfairly advantaged by the status quo is in fact far from dispassionate.Those who are particularly respected within a reigning social structure are easily moved to brutal reactions toward those who would question the legitimacy of the social support they receive. Nietzsche's character Zarathustra challenges the grounds for such individuals' "good" reputations. . . . beware of the good and the just! They like to crucify those who invent their own virtue for themselves — they hate the lonely one. Beware also of holy simplicity! Everything that is not simple it considers unholy; it also likes to play with fire — the stake. And beware also of the attacks of your love! The lonely one offers his hand too quickly to whomever he encounters. To some people you may not give your hand, only a paw: and I desire that your paw should also have claws.35 Zarathustra goes on, however, to point out that the person who would transform society's current ways of valuing should not be surprised to feel inner conflict.While this conflict itself may be unavoidable, Nietzsche urges the individual tormented in this way to resist the temptation to use this as a basis for self-flagellation. Zarathustra proclaims, "I say unto you: One must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star" (Z P 5). He cautions against too much caution, and he indicates that the solution to this inner tension is self-transformation along the lines that DuBois also suggests. But the worst enemy you can encounter will always be you, yourself; you lie in wait for yourself in caves and woods. Lonely, you are going the way to yourself. And your way leads past yourself and your seven devils.You must wish to consume yourself in your own flame: how could you wish to become new unless you had first become ashes! (Z: 1 "The Creator") Instead of viewing tension as a sign that one is doing something wrong, those suffering from marginalization and the inner strife that it occasions should reassess their situation, Nietzsche contends.As he comments in Beyond Good and Evil,"The great epochs of our life come when we gain the courage to rechristen our evil as what is best in us" (BGE 116). Instead of viewing oneself as deficient for not fitting in, one can view oneself as occupying a particularly valuable role. One might see oneself as a pioneer, an adventurer, or a legislator of new values. The last of these is particularly relevant to African Americans who seek a transformation of society's values. Seeing oneself in this manner, one is in a position to heal the self-doubt that typically arises in those who are exceptions to the communal norm. Nietzsche points out that the innovator is necessarily marginalized.Thus one's sense of being outside the mainstream, even of being cast outside it, may be an unavoidable feature of being a cultural pioneer. One also can attempt to interpret one's own position as central to the unfolding development of humanity, even if this centrality is not recognized by those comfortable with their positions within the status quo. Nietzsche argues that each individual's perceptions are limited by virtue of being perspectival but are simultaneously real contributions to human understanding for exactly the same reason. This suggests that individual and minority outlooks represent an enhancement to society generally, the more so because they are not viewpoints taken for granted by the majority. Marginalization, on this view, is a precondition for assuming a particularly significant cultural role. Nietzsche also suggests the possibility of the marginalized person's reversing the sense of separation from others by absorbing what one can from other perspectives. This is a way of developing second sight through double consciousness. Because one is aware that multiple perspectives exist and command one's attention in certain ways, one has an access to their implicit insights that is foreclosed to the literally more simpleminded.
Impacts: 

A- you have to know what the oppressor plans to
AND
impact happens regardless and it becomes value neutral as opposed to being bigoted. 

Sub-Point C is agency. Even if communication persuades no one-it allows agents to  engage in aisthesis – this allows access to an imaginary plain where subjects see themselves as capable of change and gain the capacity to revolt against value systems that demarcate them. Frederick Douglas fought his slave master, and through that experience saw himself in a new light.
Acampora
Christa Davis Acampora ~Associate professor of philosophy at Hunter College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 8:Unlikely Illuminations: Nietzsche and Frederick Douglass on Power, Struggle, and the Aisthesis of Freedom.

In the course of the struggle Douglass does more than seize the standards of measure of the master and apply them to himself. In fighting, in the activity of struggling—of transforming the situation and the outcome—Douglass derives a new sense of justice (and not merely a new route to it for himself).This new sense of justice enables him to see himself not as someone with (the right to) dominion but rather as an agent full of possibilities. It is that which produces the feeling of himself as free—this is what I call the aisthesis of agency. The aisthesis of agency is more than simply a sensation. It is an experience that carries cognitive import—something previously unknown is disclosed, and this opens new possibilities for action and the production of meanings. It is significant that this experience stems from a physical, bodily encounter7 rather than from the intellectual or spiritual labors characteristic of the nineteenth-century Bildungsroman tradition,among which Douglass's writings might be included but from which they should be distinguished. Meaningful freedom is not just a state of mind for Douglass: it is fully embodied; it gives the body new meaning.The occasion of his naissance into freedom was not a contest or game or rite of passage that was abstracted from the ordinary and everyday as in the heroic tradition of ancient Greek literature. What Douglass acquires is not a concept of himself as a person with a claim to power over others but rather the feeling of having forged a path to a new domain—one "as broad as his own manly heart," one characterized not by recognition of autonomy or self-control but rather by possibility and the power to imaginatively create a future. Douglass's fight with Covey provides him entrée to what Drucilla Cornell describes as "the imaginary domain," "that psychic and moral space in which we ~ . . . ~ are allowed to evaluate and represent who we are." 8 She considers how such imaginative resources are crucial for the formation of identity and one's capacity for self-representation. The imaginary domain, she writes, is what "gives to the individual person, and her only, the right to claim who she is through her own representation of her ~ . . . ~ being."9 This capacity, Cornell suggests, is what gives real import to our concerns for autonomy, which she conceives not simply as freedom from others but rather as the power to be the authors of our lives, to be the sources of the lives we live and the ways in which they differ from the lives of others. A new kind of agency is possible in the imaginary domain, and this is particularly significant for those whose situation is utterly abysmal and lacks options for viable action for change. Cornell writes that "the imaginary domain is the space of the 'as if' in which we imagine who we might be if we made ourselves our own end and claimed ourselves as our own person."10 In the imaginary domain, we are free to imaginatively experience not only possible objects of desire but the kind of desire (or the shape of desire) that will animate our actions and orient our larger goals and projects.When, in the fight with Covey, Douglass feels himself to be "a power on earth" rather than merely an agent who either lacks or possesses superior force, he acquires a different sense of human possibility. In this encounter, the intelligible end of the meaning of human being shifts from being cast only in terms of domination— the completion and perfection of which might be total subjection or even annihilation—to being considered in terms of agency that aims chiefly at becoming a creator of ends and the standards by which they might be judged. He moves, in short, from conceiving the good of human reality as power that is realized in terms of possession to defining that good in terms of possessing the possibility of reshaping the good itself. When one is free to be good not merely in terms of values constituted by others but free to participate in the determination of those values oneself, one engages a thoroughly different, and I would argue more powerful, sense of agency than before.As Douglass himself plays a role in defining the terms of his fight with Covey, as he determines for himself what will constitute superior moral character in his resistance, he experiences the felt quality of the imaginary domain in which his freedom positively acquires its significance and meaning. It is an experience that opens a whole new set of possibilities, and it enables him to surmount if not the physical subjection of his body the subjection of his desire that gives that body and all of its actions its meaning and future possibilities. Empowered by the feeling of his freedom, Douglass is enabled to imagine innumerable ways in which it might be further realized, which is not to be free of the demands of others.11 The kind of freedom exercised in the imaginary domain is called "freedom of personality" by Cornell, which "is valuable because it is what lets us make a life we embrace as our own."12 This, I take it, is what Douglass means when he claims "Now I AM A MAN," not that the fight has made him manly or summoned from him manly qualities, or that previously he was somehow deficient in human being, but rather that he had a palpable experience of the felt quality of himself as an agent full of possibility—to exercise restraint, to resist, to vie for determining the terms of his struggle and what its end should be—and that this was a life he could embrace as his own. It does not represent a discovery of a pre-fabricated autonomous, metaphysical self, and it is not just the building of himself as a "self-made man" who achieves his freedom by ruling himself.13 The struggle that marks Douglass's freedom represents a conquest over the anesthetized,mutilated aesthetic issuing from the lived,enslaved body. Why this would be vital emerging from the experience of slavery should be easily understood: the institution of slavery aims to exercise its control, force compliance, and justify itself on the basis of the idea that the slave is merely a thing, his or her body an object of commerce, property of another.The aisthesis of freedom deploys creative resources that enliven and enable the power of human agency.This is what Douglass achieves in his momentous struggle. He becomes, in the words of Simone de Beauvoir,"apprenticed in freedom"and hence enabled and empowered to revolt against the values that reduce his existence to useful property and exclude him from legitimizing human community.14 Slavery cements its hold by effecting transmogrified desire and impairment of any sense of the erotic that would enable one to see oneself as a maker of pleasure and beauty, one who shares and introduces meaningful value in the world.What Douglass acquires in the fight with Covey is a kind of visibility (both a kind of seeing and being seen) activated by what has been called by others "loving perception," a way of seeing the world such that one seizes upon and finds one's ecstasies in the possibilities of what one perceives.1

Cultivation of the self means we have no reason to use violence speech or acts anymore- means 1AC solves- Acampora 2
Christa Davis Acampora ~Associate professor of philosophy at Hunter College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.~ Critical Affinities Nietzsche and African American Thought. Edited by Jacqueline Scott and A.Todd Franklin. Chapter 8:Unlikely Illuminations: Nietzsche and Frederick Douglass on Power, Struggle, and the Aisthesis of Freedom.

Thus far my account of how Nietzsche thinks about the use and abuse of power in relation to struggle and its transformative possibilities, leaves unaddressed several serious ways in which Nietzsche diverges from Douglass on these matters, and these concerns have a bearing on the charge of racism mentioned in the introduction. It should be clear that although I do not think Nietzsche is an advocate of cruelty and violence—the evidence for which is his condemnation of antiagonistic views on the grounds that they actually constitute a celebration of cruelty and torture as they shut down opportunities for creative expressions of force as discussed above—Nietzsche is clearly no pacifist, and he acknowledges that there is no ultimate constraint against abusive expressions of power. Nonetheless, Nietzsche thinks we will be less interested, less in need of pursuing a sense of ourselves as agents through violent force if and when we have the opportunity to cultivate a sense of ourselves as powerful in ways that actually enhance the significance of our possibilities generally. Nietzsche's genealogies of slavish moralities highlight well this very concern and render more intelligible his discussion of suffering.29

Sub-point D: Banning words give words power which traps oppression in place and makes agency impossible.
Butler Judith (Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California-Berkeley), Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, Routledge, 1997.

Keeping such terms unsaid and unsayable can also work to lock them in place, preserv~es~ their power to injure, and arrest~s~ the possibility of a reworking that might shift~ing~ their context and purpose. That such language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through the arduous effort it takes to direct the course of its repetition. It may be that trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all. A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life. This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by which we are hailed are rarely the ones we choose (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of ~a~ originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open.
Impacts:

1. Words are used to hurt people because they are given power via
   2. AND
   3. words as opposed to mindsets that allowed words to happen which does nothing. 

Line drawing problem- speech codes become useless.

Gates
Henry Louis Gates, Professor and Director of the Hutchins Center for African and African American Research at Harvard University. Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. New York University Press. 1994.
At the very least, this approach would promise a quick solution to the abuse
AND
group in Chicago will be in plentiful supply; the policeman's grandmother will offer

Tournament: University of Texas | Round: Triples | Opponent: Westwood | Judge: idk

The Probe 1AC

Part One: The Collapse of Modernity

Western metaphysics constructs and categorizes race via relation to the abstract machine of faciality. The machine creates an ideal white model of subjectivity and assigns privilege based on coherence with that model.

Saldanha
Arun Saldanha. Psychadelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race. 

My disagreement is not with Fanon's and Martín Alcoff's insistence on embodiment and emotion
AND
, then, can't be countered with a Hegelian sublation into the universal.

Subjects are constituted via relation to the face- the issue with current analyses is that they assume a dyadic model of either-or instead of realizing that the machine gains power from fixed identities. Bodies are marked in relation to how close they align with the white man face. Brown, yellow, tanned, black- these are all demarcations that are based in proximity as opposed to a totality. Instead of theorizing as race as a static category we have to see it as viscous substance. 

Race as viscosity means analyzing phenotype, discursive regimes, affective influences, ideas, and power structures and understanding their interplay in their construction of identity; only this model of race allows us to understand why violence is done to certain bodies.  ====
Bignall
Simone Bignall. Dismantling the White-Man Face: Racialization, Faciality, and the Palm Island Riot. Deleuze and Race.
The operation of the news media as an ordering device, working through language to
AND
which the mainstream news media is organisationally complicit' (Little 2010: 51)

A traditional model of race would say the Aborigines were targeted because they were colored but the viscous model would say they were targeted because symbolic registers, common perception, their phenotype, and affective moods had designated these bodies as deviant bodies needing correction.  It is precisely because the machine operates as such that we can rupture it. Only through the repositioning of vectors can we create new races; assemblages of queer forces are embodied in beings which sacrifice their ability to enter the system in favor of becoming terrorists to faciality.

Bignall 2
Simone Bignall. Dismantling the White-Man Face: Racialization, Faciality, and the Palm Island Riot. Deleuze and Race.
Through encounters with others an entity is transformed, not necessarily in entirety, but
AND
of social structure in which race does not play a causal formative role.

The role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who best engages in racial unintelligibility. This means you should vote for whoever's praxis best serves as a probe head, allowing for the changing of the viscous nature of race to break down the white machine of faciality. Any form of knowledge production is contingent on our notion of becoming.

Ramey
Joshua Ramey. 2012. The Hermetic Deleuze: Philosophy and spiritual Ordeal.
In this sense,learning centers on problems, not on solutions. The essence
AND
but manifest or ramified over multiple series of iterations (DR , 109).

Part Two: Reorientation

Thus my advocacy: 

I affirm a limitation on qualified immunity as a Deleuzian probehead; an action that alters the vectors that make certain bodies targetable by dilluding the power relations articulated by the state.====
Cheh
Mary M.Cheh 96,~Professor of Law, George Washington University~ "Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?" in William A. Geller and Hans Toch, "Police Violence: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force," Yale University Press, 1996
By contrast, the civil law, because of its greater flexibility and scope,
AND
so that the harm is not likely to be repeated.
This affirms 

A is playing field- limitations put individuals on the same level as cops in regards to the law. Individuals can be punished equally in regards to violations of law which means particular bodies can no longer be privileged in particular manners- even if it doesn't happen all the time it's a question of opening up that possibility.  Law is always seen as benefitting those in power so changing the paradigm changes modalities of power and makes certain bodies seem legitimate as opposed to criminal.

B is compensation- targeted individuals can get compensation to fight the system in some way, means they can empower themselves in new ways that were not available in the past.

C is reform- limits cause reforms two reasons 1- lawsuits mean that behavior is more likely to be uncovered and internal sanctions can be imposed 2- legal disputes are key, debate on whether or not action meets a standard or not forces deliberation and recalibration which is key to changing forces. That in turn can spillover to social change by bringing awareness to certain issues in new lights 3- no standardized rule forces reticulation of the law in particular circumstances – key to highlighting the nature of different modalities of race. 

Certain things are inevitable- but our method is a pragmatic step in the right direction. If the faciality machine grants unequal access to privilege, the a proliferation of race and a restructuring of the certain vectors means that the machine can be destroyed- we should use whiteness against itself- that undoes the natural link between white bodies and the privileged face.

Saldanha 
Arun Saldanha, professor of geography at the University of Minnesota, Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race
 "In no real sense did the hippies become Indians or poor blacks,
AND
woman on Wall Street, between a Peruvian peasant and a Chinese journalist.

Experience is a red herring. Identity doesn't guarantee radical interests, and privilege doesn't necessarily make us clueless. Focus on the substantive political issue is a pre-requisite obtuse criticisms.  Orchestrated Pulse 2014 – leftist magazine based in DC (3/6, "My SkinfolkAin't All Kinfolk: The Left's Problem with Identity Politics", http://www.orchestratedpulse.com/2014/03/problem-identity-politics/)====

Imperial America, murderous America, the America that abused and robbed countries like Bolivia —that America was me. I too was a settler; my Black feet were stained red with blood as I stood on stolen indigenous land. I too benefitted from colonialism, capitalism, and the other facets of White supremacy. I could no longer simply point the finger at White people. My marginalized identity didn't absolve me. I began to think systemically. I had to actually develop a multidimensional worldview and take political stances that drew on more than my lived experiences. When I returned to the United States and became involved in leftist politics, I soon realized that the political scene was, unfortunately, still stuck on personal identity.
WHAT IS IDENTITY POLITICS?
In this age of(misinterpreted) intersectionality,
AND
get there, the Left needs more identity politics, not less.

Tournament: University of Texas | Round: 2 | Opponent: idk | Judge: idr
Wille Zur Macht AC=

Part One: Hatred at Life

The idea of moral and immoral first began in prey and predator; in order for the prey to cope with its own weakness, it portrayed itself as "good" and "virtuous" and its predator as "evil" and "disgusting", but this idea of morality only leads to the embracing of weakness and the creation of ressentiment, hatred at life which forms from internalizing ones inability to change the structures which oppose them.

Friedrich Nietzsche analyzes the lamb and the eagle,
Friedrich Nietzsche, German philosopher, "The man who Killed God" All around one badass motherfucker, "On the Genealogy of Morals" translated by Ian Johnston. http://records.viu.ca/~~johnstoi/nietzsche/genealogy1.htm

– But let us return: the problem of the other origin of '
AND
itself as freedom, and their particular mode of existence as an accomplishment.

Standard normative theories are rooted in this ressentiment, and under the ruse of being "ethical" or "good" we impose personal interpretations of morality on people as a method of universalizing our own hatred at life. This leads to widespread self-denial and acceptance of weakness; controls the internal link to oppression arguments because forcing normative ideas onto individuals regardless of their perspective is the root cause of oppression, so breaking down non-pluralistic forms of ethics comes first.

Nietzsche 2
~Friedrich Nietzsche, German philosopher, "The Man Who Killed God", all around one badass motherfucker, On the Genealogy of Morals, Translated by Carol Deithe~
The beginning of the slaves' revolt in morality occurs when ressentiment itself turns creative and
AND
copy and counterpart, the 'good one' – himself! . . .

Moral statements are intended to be objective truths but we can never know others objectively, meaning any judgments we make are tainted. Overarching ideas of morality will always fail because internal perceptions of right and wrong will always shift based on moral perspectives. For instance, a poor child on the streets may consider stealing food to be moral because it allows him to feed his dad, but the store owner will feel it is immoral because his goods are being stolen. This means that normative moral statements fail because others experiences are inaccessible to us

Nietzsche 3
Friedrich Nietzsche ~German Philosopher~ Human All Too Human. Translated by R.J.Hollingdale. Cambridge University Press.
http://archive.org/stream/NietzscheHumanAllTooHuman/Nietzsche-HumanAllTooHuman_djvu.txt. A.S.
Injustice necessary. - All judgements as to the value of life have evolved
AND

this is one of the greatest and most irresolvable discords of existence. 

Ressentiment and adherence to weakness prevent progression of our own wills and makes it impossible to affirm our own lives because we live in states of regret and frustrations at the flaws we see as unchangeable. Our self-entrapment in forms of slave morality have made it impossible to become self-satisfying subjects, only the rejection of our hatred at life and the embracing of the will to power can defeat the will to nothingness (ressentiment) and bring forth true freedom.

Deleuze
Gilles Deleuze ~French Philosopher~, One Rhiziomatic motherfucker, sick taste in toupees, the goddamn LeBron James of post-modern philosophy, "Nietzsche and Philosophy".1962
From the speculative position to the moral opposition, from the moral opposition to the
AND
reactive forces, these are the two constituent elements of the ascetic ideal.

Thus the standard is consistency with the will to power, defined as embracing a method of being that revolves around individual subjects who take actions based on affirming their own lives as objects of value.

The will to power is when, in the face of overwhelming weakness, one profoundly says "no" to that which oppresses them and affirms their own might and beauty by granting themselves the strength to overcome.
Nietzsche 4
~Friedrich "The Man Who Killed God" Nietzsche, German philosopher, all around badass motherfucker, "On the Genealogy of Morals", Translated by Carol Deithe~
We must be wary of thinking disparagingly about this whole phenomenon because it is inherently
AND
to self-violation provides the precondition for the value of the unegoistic. 

The will to power is tied in every aspect of existence. Even efforts to reject the will to power only end up affirming its importance. All struggle, rebellion, disagreement and confrontation is its affirmation.

Aydin '07
(Aydin, Ciano. Nietzsche on Reality as Will to Power: Toward an "Organization-Struggle" Model. The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 33, Spring 2007, pp.25-48. Project Muse)
There is in Nietzsche's worldview nothing that has existence and meaning outside the "game
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police officer and deconstructing the power relations that constitute the police-public dialectic 

Part Two: Overcoming

I contend that limiting qualified immunity allows individuals to pursue their wills to power by chasing vengeance against those who have harmed them. I affirm a method of overcoming current legal protection and allowing the discursive space between the public and the police to become one where power relations are being contested and broken. The 1AC is an endorsement of individuals fighting to overcome the structures which prevent them from receiving recourse.

Status quo legality fails to allow the victim in cases of police violence the ability to fight for their own value, and instead forces normative qualities onto bodies labeled as deviant. Races and constitutes of power relations are forced into dichotomies of "good" and "bad" as a result of the police always being seen as greater and their victims as lesser, means the 1ACs method of contestation is uniquely key to disrupting normative relations. Courts that function absent individual influence profess police innocence at the cost of victim damnation

Morrison
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014andcontext=njlsp
"Will to Power, Will to Reality, and Racial Profiling: How the White Male dominant Power Structure Creates Itself as Law Abiding Citizen Through the Creation of Black as Criminal" 2007
Professor Steven F. Morrison teaches first year Criminal Law and Constitutional Law, and upper level Criminal Procedure. His principal academic interests include collective criminal responsibility (conspiracy, joint and several liability, RICO, CCE, and the philosophy of collective responsibility), the intersection of the First Amendment and criminal law, and the First Amendment rights of association and assembly. Received his B.A. degree from St. Louis University, M.A. degree from the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom, and his J.D. degree from Boston College Law School. He clerked for Justice Warren M. Silver of the State of Maine Supreme Judicial Court. Prior to arriving at UND Law in 2010, Morrison was a criminal defense attorney in Boston, Massachusetts, and continues to represent indigent criminal defendants under the Criminal Justice Act.:

In language, the ego is conceived.156 When one seeks to become real, one must speak, be heard, and be believed by others. The chain of events is, therefore: discourse (conversation with others about criminality) → truth claim ("black people are mostly criminal") → belief by others ("yes, black people do seem to be criminal") → reality of the subject (black people become Criminal and the speaker becomes the mirror opposite, a Law-Abiding Citizen).157 Only when others believe our truth claims can we become real. It is, therefore, imperative that the dominant power structure convince~s~ society that its Criminals are indeed criminals and its Law Abiding Citizens are truly law abiding. It can do this in racial profiling by (1) having an ostensibly heartfelt and sensitive debate over the validity of racial profiling; (2) declaring racial profiling to be an acceptable and fact-based answer to crime; (3) engaging in racial profiling, thus exposing a higher number of black criminals than white criminals in a given time period and place; (4) arguing that this exposure proves that blacks commit more crimes and bolsters the need for racial profiling; and (5) repeating the cycle until all blacks are Criminal and all whites are Law Abiding Citizens.158 54 The only way to do this The only way to do this is to split races into "good" and "bad." Racial profiling does this well. In one incident, a group of three black and three white friends were riding their bicycles in Manalapan, New Jersey when the police stopped all six of them.159 The police illegally searched the black kids without justification and called them names such as "little punk" and "baby."160 The officers sent the white kids home, telling them that they "don't have to see this."161 55 Bernard Harcourt's cycle of image creation suggests a similar method of "truth" creation.162 Harcourt's human subject starts with an ideology and then searches for images in the real world to expose that ideology as true.163 These images of, say, a black man's mug shot after the man has allegedly just killed a white police officer (who had a family, no less!), impose themselves on society's consciousness and bolster the ideology. The speech in this case declares: "black predators will kill law-abiding whites." The stronger ideology will be better equipped to find new images, and it will do so. This cycle continues, with every revolution divorcing its adherent more and more from objective reality.164 56 The language of race and racial profiling is an attempt to define Black as Criminal and White as Law Abiding, and thereby provide a window through which to view black criminality and have that ideology reinforced. Physical and verbal abuse of blacks is speech that declares white superiority over black criminality. Court rulings declaring that officers' motives do not matter as long as there is a pretext for the traffic stop is speech that declares the officers to be powerful and morally right and black motorists to be at best suspect, and at worst, criminal. The "perpetrator perspective" that claims to be colorblind, in reality, "races" our society to whites' advantage.165 Blacks are targeted more than whites for criminality, thus they are arrested and convicted more.166 They fill our jails more, but since the criminal justice system is declared to be colorblind, blacks must be more prone to criminality than whites. The Bureau of Justice Statistics illustrates this view well. On its cover, it declares America's non-racism proudly: "9 of white drivers were stopped . . . 9 of black drivers were stopped . . . 9 of Hispanic drivers were stopped."167 Crack the spine, however, and find that blacks are statistically more likely than whites to be searched, arrested, injured by police, have force used on them by police, and be handcuffed.168 Given only one of two options, either the existence of unwarranted racial profiling or the biological propensity of blacks to criminal behavior, the Bureau of Justice Statistics advertises the absence of the former and thereby chooses the latter. 

Current groups are fighting to make police more accountable and demand that officers that kill and harm be brought to justice. Their rebellion affirms life in the face of endless suffering and their separation from state reliance to punish police officers in favor of individual action that is potentialized by the ban of qualified immunity is the embodiment of the will to power's demand for overcoming.

Wright
http://abovethelaw.com/2015/11/want-to-fight-police-misconduct-reform-qualified-immunity/?rf=1
Sam Wright is a dyed-in-the-wool, bleeding-heart public interest lawyer who has spent his career exclusively in nonprofits and government. Worked full-time on environmental issues with lead attorneys. Researched and prepared legal memoranda for distribution on state/federal administrative and environmental law. Drafted petition for a recall of the mandate and writ of mandamus directing the EPA to take action concerning regulation of air emissions from animal feeding operations. Assisted in drafting declarations and affidavits from experts. Cite-checked and proofread court filings.
Recently, police have been killing and otherwise abusing people of color with what seems
AND
want to see justice done, we should push to make it happen.

The 1ACs method of allowing the public to liberate themselves from inability and engage in legalistic reform sets the path for the breaking of concrete power relations and allows for individuals to express their will to power against that which oppresses them. The collapse of power relations is uniquely key as absent the deconstruction of master, there will always be ressentiment created as a result of the slave moralist's inhibitions. Allowing individuals to sue for themselves grants them the ability to pursue their will to power and fight for compensation

Geller
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/155434NCJRS.pdf
"And Justice for All: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force" 1995
David Lester, Edited by William A Geller; Hans Toch
 William "Bill" Geller, director of Geller and Associates, reports on and provides consulting services to support effective and legitimate policing and community action that fosters a free society and safer, stronger communities. Over 33 years, he has worked with numerous police agencies, nongovernmental organizations, the U.S. Justice Department, local and state governments, research and policy organizations, training institutes, and civil rights organizations. He assists clients with leadership, strategic, policy, communications, program implementation and management challenges.
In a volume whose recurring theme is a quest for positive methods of identifying and
AND
to do so grows more urgent in the face of inadequate alternative solutions.

Tournament: Holy Cross | Round: Semis | Opponent: Chakra Jonnalagadda | Judge: Ashish Wadhwani
(analytic)
Western colonialism and the native legend of the dreamcatcher duel violently when the terror that eradicated almost all of native people continues even now. Spectres, haunts, and the ghosts are those bodies, spirits, ideas, and ideologies that have been excluded by dominant interpretations of history. The ghost inevitably returns, and we see history devolve into a cycle of accumulatory violence
THEIR NIGHTMARE ISN’T OVER
https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/93467/content/tmp/package-sHM4ah/Auchter_asu_0010E_11492.pdf
Auchter (1) 14’
Jessica Auchter “Ghostly Politics: Statecraft, Monumentalization, and a Logic of Haunting” Jessica Auchter teaches UHON 3550/3590—Topics in Behavioral and Social Science and Topics in Non-Western Cultures: Global Humanitarianism. Her main research and teaching interests lie in the field of International Relations. She has published articles in Review of International Studies, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Journal of Global Security Studies, Hyperrhiz, Ethnicity Studies, Journal for Cultural Research, andCritical Studies on Security, and several chapters in edited volume projects. Her book, The Politics of Haunting and Memory in International Relations, was published by Routledge in 2014.

Haunting is a ... of the threat.

The specter of the past haunts the present, refusing to listen to it causes gratuitous violence and continued suffering to the body and spirit of the native. The state’s ability to ignore the haunt allows necropolitical control over the distinction between life and death, trapping our dreams in a web of thanatopolitics
https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/93467/content/tmp/package-sHM4ah/Auchter_asu_0010E_11492.pdf
Auchter (2) 14’
Jessica Auchter “Ghostly Politics: Statecraft, Monumentalization, and a Logic of Haunting” Jessica Auchter teaches UHON 3550/3590—Topics in Behavioral and Social Science and Topics in Non-Western Cultures: Global Humanitarianism. Her main research and teaching interests lie in the field of International Relations. She has published articles in Review of International Studies, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Journal of Global Security Studies, Hyperrhiz, Ethnicity Studies, Journal for Cultural Research, andCritical Studies on Security, and several chapters in edited volume projects. Her book, The Politics of Haunting and Memory in International Relations, was published by Routledge in 2014.

Some may argue ... drawing these lines. 

The Role of the ballot is to methodologically and preformatively endorse the debater who best opens the topic and debate space up to hearing the voices of the specters.  
https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/93467/content/tmp/package-sHM4ah/Auchter_asu_0010E_11492.pdf
Auchter (3) 14’
Jessica Auchter “Ghostly Politics: Statecraft, Monumentalization, and a Logic of Haunting” Jessica Auchter teaches UHON 3550/3590—Topics in Behavioral and Social Science and Topics in Non-Western Cultures: Global Humanitarianism. Her main research and teaching interests lie in the field of International Relations. She has published articles in Review of International Studies, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Journal of Global Security Studies, Hyperrhiz, Ethnicity Studies, Journal for Cultural Research, andCritical Studies on Security, and several chapters in edited volume projects. Her book, The Politics of Haunting and Memory in International Relations, was published by Routledge in 2014.

The task here ... and concepts of power.

I contend that nuclear energy is the new iteration of the hauntological suffering felt by the native body. 

No Home: The production of nuclear power has relegated the natives to zones of sacrifice.  In the same way that Columbus demanded that his men clear the lands to build ports and gold mines, the state-backed uranium industry is given the power to impede onto native owned land, forcing them off what little the white man hasn’t already taken  
Nelkin (1) All Nelkin cards bracketed for Grammer
Native Americans and Nuclear Power: Science, Technology, and Human Values, Vol. 6, No. 35 (Spring, 1981) Dorothy Wolfers Nelkin was an American sociologist of science most noted for her work researching and chronicling the unsettled relationship between science and society at large. Program on Science, Technology and Society Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853

It is more ... outside their homes. "
 

No breathing: The modern nuclear industry repeats the pattern hijacking the land of the “savages” and enslaving its’ people, not only co-opting the homes of natives but forcing them to endanger their lives working in the mines; the only other option is for the Indians is starvation
Nelkin (2) file:///C:/Users/Michael20Kurian/Downloads/native-ams-and-nuke.pdf
Native Americans and Nuclear Power: Science, Technology, and Human Values, Vol. 6, No. 35 (Spring, 1981) Dorothy Wolfers Nelkin was an American sociologist of science most noted for her work researching and chronicling the unsettled relationship between science and society at large. Program on Science, Technology and Society Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853

The effect of ... the tribal governments.

No God:  The American capitalist monster is destroying the precious and fragile culture of the native Indians, with the death and overturning of the land for the sake of uranium comes the destruction of the spiritual connection between the native people and the natural world  Nelkin (3)
Native Americans and Nuclear Power: Science, Technology, and Human Values, Vol. 6, No. 35 (Spring, 1981) Dorothy Wolfers Nelkin was an American sociologist of science most noted for her work researching and chronicling the unsettled relationship between science and society at large. Program on Science, Technology and Society Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853

Man is a ... and wantonly destroyed.

And these impacts are globalized- this proves that colonist-native relationship is
matriculated on a global level
Smith   
Nuclear Roulette: The Case against a Nuclear Renaissance. Gar SmithEditor Emeritus of Earth Island Journal. No.5 in the International Forum on Globalization on False Solutions to the global climate crisis. June 2011. 

Having exploited Native ... Declaration on Indigenous Rights.

Thus the advocacy:

I affirm the resolution as a method of monumentalization for entities who have been lost to the effects of western re-writing of history, the 1AC is a call to respect the haunt by affirming a world where it’s being open to an effective past
The AFF is a recognition that Native problems are relevant- any analysis of the topic must take into consideration how different parties relate to nuclear power and the industry it represents in order to form a coherent picture and create genuine praxis.  Nelkin 5
Native Americans and Nuclear Power: Science, Technology, and Human Values, Vol. 6, No. 35 (Spring, 1981) Dorothy Wolfers Nelkin was an American sociologist of science most noted for her work researching and chronicling the unsettled relationship between science and society at large. Program on Science, Technology and Society Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853

These embryonic alliances ... changing technological scene.

The search for the haunt and setting cyclical oppression to rest frees the spectre from the limits of a forgotten history; the AC’s method of haunting and searching for the ghost is the only way to solve. The 1AC is a call to free the good dreams from the bottom of the dreamcatcher, and through specular analysis, create a new avenue of resistance.
Auchter (5) 14’
Jessica Auchter “Ghostly Politics: Statecraft, Monumentalization, and a Logic of Haunting” Jessica Auchter teaches UHON 3550/3590—Topics in Behavioral and Social Science and Topics in Non-Western Cultures: Global Humanitarianism. Her main research and teaching interests lie in the field of International Relations. She has published articles in Review of International Studies, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Journal of Global Security Studies, Hyperrhiz, Ethnicity Studies, Journal for Cultural Research, andCritical Studies on Security, and several chapters in edited volume projects. Her book, The Politics of Haunting and Memory in International Relations, was published by Routledge in 2014.

A project that ... natural to our sensibilities.

Tournament: idk that important one | Round: 1 | Opponent: West Des Moines Valley CT | Judge: Becca

~{TOC~} 1AC Alycxe iyn Wxndyrlxnd

Chapter I: Down the Rabbit Hole

A synopsis of "Alice in Wonderland" and "Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There" by Lewis Carroll 

Eventually, she reaches the end of the board and is promoted to the status of Queen. Alice wakes up and deduces that she was dreaming. But then she recalls the words of the Red King and she considers that it might be her that is the dream and what she dreamed was life indeed. 

Join me now in hearing the tale of the Jabberwock
Carroll 71'

"The Jabberwocky" Lewis Carroll (Charles Lutwidge Dodgson) was an individual who, through his rare and diversified literary gifts and power of communication, left an indelible mark upon the imaginations of children and adults both during his generation and in generations to come. His best-known works, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and Through the Looking-Glass, And What Alice Found There (1872) are still enjoyed by readers throughout the world and have been adapted for radio, television, and motion pictures. 

`Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
…mome raths outgrabe
AND
analytic

Chapter II: The Garden of the Cheshire

Our first guest is the Cheshire cat, a walking mirage who shifts from green, purple, to polka-dots, reflecting and camouflaging with the world around it- We are all shifting like Cheshire Cats, but western metaphysics have hypnotized the masses into believing that being is a stable list of characteristics locked in a structuralist grid. In reality there is no being- existence is a series of becomings, based in feeling, relation, affect and potential.
Haferkamp and Berressem

"Deleuzian Events: Writing History" (2009) Hanjo Berressem and Leyla Haferkamp. Berressem and Haferkamp bring together articles that deal with Gilles Deleuze's concept of "the event," many of them written by leading Deleuze scholars amid discussion of zeta-physics, modern dance and postcolonial history. Hanjo Berressem is professor of American Studies at the University of Cologne and studies poststructuralist thought and literary theory, investigating the notion of subjectivity and the relations between the subject, culture, and language. Leyla Haferkamp is department member at the Aachen University in Sprachenzentrum, Germany who specializes in Aesthetics, Deleuze, and Cybernetics.

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze uses Lewis Carroll's image of the smile
AND
of perception and the ~…~ physico-organic mechanism of excitation or impulsion"

Understanding ontology and linguistics as stable concepts means that bodies are managed according to microfascism. When we understand existence as a grid of traits and difference, traits are used to signify what we demand an object to be, how it should act, what labor it must produce. What remains is the template for political violence- the body is striated and its possibilities blocked-the price of entry into the normal, rational, sensical, western order.

Massumi 1
Massumi in 1992~Brian. A user's guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations
nevertheless demands that the link be made (on the basis of autonomy).
AND

The way we understand the body becomes the template for what humanity should be, how it should think and act. Only an understanding of existence as relations, multiplicity and affect can break free from this and allow new positionalities to be embraced. Like Alice, we must shift from pawn to queen to being to non-being and then everything in between. We must create words without definitions, languages without sense- bodies without organs.

Thanem on Deleuze and Guattari 04 (Torkild, "The body without organs: Nonorganizational desire in organizational life." Culture and Organization 10.3 (2004): 203-217.)
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) diverge from this view
AND
that this oppression can be terminated (see Massumi, 1992: 89). 

Thus the Role of the Ballot  is to endorse the debater who best wonders through Wonderland. 

In order to understand learning, ethics or obligations we must blur the way that linguistics understanding itself as affective constructions, not as grids of solidified meaning. Vote aff to affirm a world of nonsense, intensity, and perspective in contrast to a structured world of definitions based in non-existent objectivity
Lopez 04'

Alan Lopez "Deleuze with Carroll: schizophrenia and simulacrum and the philosophy of Lewis Carroll's nonsense" (2004) Alan Lopez works at the Department of English at the University of Buffalo and studies literature and politics through a postmodern lens.
What we are after in Deleuze's discussion of Alice is thus this characterization of the
AND
cogito by Descartes is exactly what the Alice books ultimately undermine~s~. 

Chapter III: Tea Party with the Mad Hatter

The western metaphysical desire for objectivity has co-opted the way we observe linguistics- it pretends that meaning is stable and that language has universal meaning and representation. In reality, speech is nonsense- based in usage, changing meaning based on context, speaker, setting, time and an infinity of different relations. The 1AC is an affirmation of a use-meaning theory of linguistics, the idea that words transform when they are spoken. What you say is not what your words mean.
Blocher 14'

"Nonsense And The Freedom Of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First Amendment" April 2014 Joseph Blocher is an Associate Professor at the Duke University School of Law. He was a participant in the Free Expression Scholars Conference held at Yale Law School in May 2013 and researches the relationship between linguistics and legality.
The best place to find an alternative to the representational approach associated with Russell and
AND
"a performance by a scantily clad ballet troupe in a theater."258

Thus I affirm the resolution as a form of entering Wonderland and hunting the Jabberwock. The 1AC represents a shift from a representational theory of linguistics to a use-meaning paradigm.

This means understanding words, dialogue, and communication as bodies without organs- empty shells that take in and let go of meanings based on circumstance and relation to the world around them. We can never ban a word or phrase because that assumes a universal grounding for what something means. In reality what we say gains meanings based in usages, not representations.
Welcome to wonderland, a place where language is affective and positional- everything you say is meaningless nonsense, but nonsense means everything.
Lemos 09'

"Language-Games in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: How Language Operates in Carroll's Text to Produce Nonsensical Meanings in Common-Sense References" (December 2009) Marcia Lemos is a member of the Faculty of Letters at the University of Porto in Spain. She holds a MA in Anglo-American studies and has published in different magazines and scholarly journals including E-topia, Papers on Joyce and Revista Atlántida. She is primarily interested in English Literature and Utopian Studies.
Though more than one century has elapsed, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1865)
AND
"It's a pun!" (AAW 121), he screams in despair.