Dulles Do Aff
| Tournament | Round | Opponent | Judge | Cites | Round Report | Open Source | Edit/Delete |
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| Colleyville Heritage | 2 | Any | Any |
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| Colleyville Heritage | 1 | any | any |
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| Contact Info | Finals | the Other | You |
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| Isidore Newman | 1 | Woodlands DY | Shields, Jhari |
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| TFA | 1 | im sorry im disclosing now | this is for yohan |
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| University of Houston | 1 | ALL | ALL |
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To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Cites
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Contact InfoTournament: Contact Info | Round: Finals | Opponent: the Other | Judge: You | 12/10/16 |
JF- Plastic Memories ACTournament: University of Houston | Round: 1 | Opponent: ALL | Judge: ALL Finally, to recognize ... law and theory Material conditions come first Matsuda The multiple consciousness ... law and theory Theories that can’t create material change in the real world are counter-productive and threaten actual solutions to oppression. Despite the pronouncement ... contemporary moral parameters. The state is inevitable- speaking the language of power through policymaking is the only way to create social change in debate. An important concern ... in America today. Inherency Colleges restrict constitutionally protected speech in the status quo. Moore ‘16 The first amendment ... Saxe V. State College Area School District, 2001). Especially unique for teachers - Teachers are dissuaded from teaching rape law due to a culture of fear surrounding political correctness PEN America, the literary ... abundance of caution. Harms Lack of rape law education hurts survivors of sexual assault – they won’t win court cases Students seem more ... travesty of justice. Stunts sexual assault activism on campus and reduces awareness of the issue One criminal law ... intellectual exploration,” she said. Thus the plan: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech for professors and faculty memebers. Jenkins 14 I’m not denying ... pretended to be. Solvency Free speech prepares students for the real world by reducing academic insulation. "It is not the proper role of the University ... statement at the time. An atmosphere of academic openness is a prerequisite to knowledge. Mill held that ... protection from criticism. Spillover effect – challenging oppression in everyday discussions is key to shaping larger cultural landscapes. Much of what we call ... audience for that claim. Professors have high influences on students after college/the real world. Jaschik 13 Maybe it’s much more simple: ... in the classroom," he said. (analytics) | 1/20/17 |
JF- Plastic Memories AC V2Tournament: Colleyville Heritage | Round: 1 | Opponent: any | Judge: any Added another inherency card: Professors on public college campuses use trigger warnings constantly. This school year... about their use. Added Solvency Cards: Trigger warning suggestions and requirements are currently chilling freedom of expression on campus- aff solves A current threat... exercise of autonomy. A consensus of psychologists agree exposure is good and trigger warnings are bad. Trigger warnings cause more trauma than they’re meant to prevent. | 2/4/17 |
MA- Veterans ACTournament: TFA | Round: 1 | Opponent: im sorry im disclosing now | Judge: this is for yohan Current housing is too expensive for veterans. Fischer 14 In 2009, the Obama Administration set... Plan text: The United States ought to guarantee the right to housing for military veterans. Walker 11 During the mid-1960s I served... ROTB
An important concern... 2. The 1AC acknowledges the state is bad in many ways. However, the aff uses state as heuristic which doesn’t affirm its legitimacy but allows enhanced governmental resistance. By questioning substantialist... Advantage One: Mental Illness Many discharged veterans face homelessness and develop mental illness. Meshad 13 What’s this got... Homelessness only leads to a development of mental illness. Housing gives them a chance to deal with the issue. Jackson 13 Mental health issues... This creates a better economic stability. Westover 15 When we think... Studies show that veterans have a better quality of life when they are housed. O’Connell 16 Participants were primarily... Framework The standard is minimizing oppression The crucial common... Material conditions come first Matsuda The multiple consciousness... Underview ANALYTIC Legal debates are key to short-term survival of oppressed populations. Whether the law is good or bad, legal education is crucial to empowerment. While agenda-setting... Critique is useless without a concrete policy option that solves for your harms. Unfortunately, the academic... | 3/13/17 |
ND- PopALockeACTournament: Isidore Newman | Round: 1 | Opponent: Woodlands DY | Judge: Shields, Jhari A: Means state structures inevitable- fear of uncertainty means individuals will always band into a social order to maintain homeostasis- that order is what we call the state. B: Sets a lithmus test for state action- if the state oversteps its boundaries or violates its citizens unduly, then it is illegitimate and citizens have the right to reform the system to keep it in line. This entails:
2. Ensuring that citizens have access to proper recourse against government injustices. The result is a joint social contract, whereby each person recognizes the liberties of every other person to act freely in the pursuit of happiness. Thus, my value criterion is preserving the lockean social contract. Part two is Accountability Unjust violence only continues to increase because police officers are protected by qualify immunity. Limiting is the only way to hold them accountable. Lindsey Qualified immunity doesn’t just mean that victims go without compensation–the "clearly established" right clause means courts can continue to avoid clarifying the scope of the law which prevents the law from ever becoming clearly established. Chen 15. Critics of qualified immunity point out that the breadth of the doctrine’s protection means that people like Savana Redding whose rights have been violated will go without compensation. Contrary to Marbury’s admonition, their rights can be violated, but they will receive no remedy. But there are broader social costs associated with qualified immunity as well. Because of the way the doctrine is structured, courts can decide an official is entitled to qualified immunity by concluding that They he or she have not violated a “clearly established” right without ever answering the question of whether his or her conduct did, in fact, violate the Constitution. This means that courts can dismiss constitutional rights claims without precisely clarifying the scope of the law. Constitutional doctrine, like the common law, evolves and is refined through series of court decisions. But qualified immunity interferes with this law-pronouncing function of the federal courts and reduces the amount of guidance about the meaning of the Constitution for both government officials and the public at large . John C. Jeffries Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87, 99–100 (1999). To address this concern, the Court at one point instructed lower courts to order their decision making so that they first addressed whether the official’s conduct violated the Constitution before deciding whether They he or she had immunity from suit. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). Thus, as in Savana Redding’s case, while she might not have benefited from the articulation of the relevant constitutional rule, at least similarly situated future plaintiffs could have benefited. But just a few years later, the Court reversed course and restored the lower courts’ discretion to determine in which order to decide those questions. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009). There was some skepticism about how often lower courts addressed the merits question first, even under the Saucierregime, Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. Rev. 889, 927 n.247 (2010), or if, when they did, they recognized a previously unarticulated constitutional right. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 Pepp . L. Rev. 667, 692– 93 (2009). In any event, lower courts now have a green light to avoid the “harder” constitutional law question and simply decide that defendants are entitled to immunity whether or not they violated the Constitution. What this means is that in cases involving cutting-edge issues of constitutional law, qualified immunity may itself prevent the law from ever becoming clearly established. A couple of examples will help illustrate this phenomenon. One area of First Amendment doctrine that is not yet fully developed is whether or not citizens have a right to surreptitiously record police officers during the course of their duties. In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 2010), the court reviewed the First Amendment claim of an automobile passenger who attempted to videotape a police officer during a traffic stop. After discovering the passenger’s conduct, the officer arrested him and confiscated his camera. Id. at 251–52. Rather than address the merits of the passenger’s First Amendment claim, the Third Circuit instead found that the right to record police officers was not clearly established and affirmed the officer’s claim that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 262. Other federal courts have followed this same practice, thus failing to clarify or advance the relevant First Amendment law. See Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852, 852–53 (4th Cir. 2009). In trying to decide whether a constitutional right is “clearly established,” courts should first determine whether the official’s actions were obviously unconstitutional. If so, the inquiry should end, and qualified immunity should not be available.193 If not, the court should consider the following factors: (1) Has the particular constitutional right ever been announced in binding precedent?;194 (2) If binding precedent has not pronounced such a constitutional right, has a consensus of cases (more than one or two) from federal circuit courts or the pertinent state court of last resort195 announced the particular constitutional right?;196 (3) Was the right pronounced as a broad statement of principle, or was the pronouncement closely tied to the particularized facts of the prior case?;197 (4) How recently was the constitutional right pronounced? Part three is solvency A second suggestion would be to change the doctrinal formula for qualified immunity. Rather than asking whether the defendant violated a ―clearly established‖ right, I would ask whether the defendant‘s conduct was ―clearly unconstitutional.‖ By ―clearly unconstitutional,‖ I mean to signal that borderline violations would not trigger damages liability (though of course other remedies would be unaffected). This basic proposition aligns with current law, and in many circumstances, there would be no difference between the formulations. If, for example, there were a change or development in the law, until the new rule was settled, the law would not be ―clearly established‖ and conduct violating it would not be ―clearly unconstitutional.‖ This is the strongest case for qualified immunity, and it would be covered equally well by either formulation. The same would be true when the validity of a particular rule or doctrine is simply unresolved. Pearson v. Callahan is an example. ―Consent once removed‖ as a justification for warrantless searches had been approved by other circuits but not by the Tenth. Unless and until the Tenth Circuit ruled, a ―consent once removed‖ search would not violate a ―clearly established‖ right nor would it be ―clearly unconstitutional.‖ Qualified immunity would be upheld under either formulation. In other circumstances, restating qualified immunity would make a difference. Asking whether conduct violates a ―clearly established‖ right directs one‘s attention to the search for factually similar precedent and to the kind of ―lawyer‘s notice‖ that technical legal sources provide.79 Asking whether conduct is ―clearly unconstitutional‖ is less tied to precedent and less technical. Most importantly, it incorporates the notion of common social duty. Conduct would be clearly unconstitutional if it contravened factually specific precedent, as is currently true, or if it clearly and unambiguously contravened constitutional principles. The nature of the constitutional violation would matter, whether or not it had previously arisen on closely similar facts. The Fifth Circuit has said the fact ―that we are ‗morally outraged‘, or the ‗fact that our collective conscience is shocked‘ by the alleged conduct does not mean necessarily that the officials should have realized that it violated a constitutional right . . . .‖ 80 The statement is narrowly correct. Moral outrage does not necessarily mean that officers should have known they were acting unconstitutionally—but neither is it irrelevant. If the conduct does violate a constitutional right, outrageousness should preclude qualified immunity, whether or not the specific misconduct has been adjudicated before. Thus, for example, I would part company from the Fifth Circuit‘s decision in Doe v. Louisiana, where defendant social workers engaged in a ―nightmarish‖ ―witch hunt‖ of a father alleged (by them) to have sexually abused his daughter. The defendants suppressed reports of medical examinations, misrepresented the results of those examinations, used deception in obtaining a court order, and knowingly presented false information to prosecutors. Their charges were completely unfounded.81 Concurring in the judgment upholding qualified immunity, Judge Carolyn Dineen King said, ―That the actions of which Doe complains are egregious, however, does not mean that he has asserted the violation of a federally protected right . . . .‖82 Again, the statement is technically correct. Egregiousness does not establish unconstitutionality, but neither should it be irrelevant to damages liability. In my view, truly appalling unconstitutional misconduct should not be protected by qualified immunity. Egregiousness may be irrelevant in the search for ―clearly established‖ law,83 but it would not be irrelevant in determining whether conduct is ―clearly unconstitutional.‖ 84 Civil lawsuits spur systemic reform through investigations and public outcry–also, even if there’s indemnity that doesn’t answer our offense because victims still get REPARATIONS and RECOMPENSE. Cheh 96 By contrast, the civil law, because of its greater flexibility and scope, has the potential to serve as the instrument of systemic reform. In adjusting rights and set-tling wrongs, civil remedies generally offer distinct advantages over criminal sanc-tions. First, a victim of police misconduct can sue on his or her own behalf and need not await the government’s decision to go forward. Second, an injured party need not overcome the heightened procedural protections afforded the criminally accused. For example, a plaintiff can prevail under a preponderance of evidence standard rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, although the civil law, like the criminal law, can punish via its potential for imposition of punitive damages, the civil law provides compensation to victims who have been harmed by police misconduct. Recompense is beneficial in itself, and damage awards can spur reform if the costs of misbehavior are high. Fourth, civil lawsuits permit broad discovery of information and may provide a means to uncover police mis-behavior and stir public reaction. Finally, the civil law offers various possibilities for framing relief which go beyond punishment or compensation and include re-mediation. That is, the civil law offers equitable relief, via court injunction and specific orders, that can force a deficient department not only to pay for harm caused but to reform so that the harm is not likely to be repeated. | 1/6/17 |
Open Source
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