Tournament: HW | Round: 4 | Opponent: - | Judge: -
a. Interpretation: Any means every
Definition of ANY. (2016). Merriam-webster.com. Retrieved 14 December 2016, from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/any
b :  every —used to indicate one selected without restriction any child would know that

Tournament: Harvard-Westlake | Round: 2 | Opponent: Beckman KM | Judge: Paras Kumar

Free Speech encourages weak slavish resistance as a conduit for the slave morality. Its transition in the past 50 years puts the modern academy at a dangerous delusion: that a call for increased agonism a viable strategy for any resistance

Libertas 17 ~David, Liberty.me, https://libertas.liberty.me/free-speech-nietzsche-and-the-morality-of-the-left/, accessed 1/11/17~CS
As the story of ancient Israel progresses, their kingdom fractures and loses power,
AND
example. The above behaviors can be found in people of all stripes. 

Protests cement the link—they serve to only codify the position of the protester as grounded in slave morality by grounding a human other as an evaluative mechanism and legitimizing the state as a neutral arbiter of injury

Brown 95, ~Wendy, Professor of Women's Studies @ UC Santa Cruz, 1995, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity pg. 26-27~ CS
in the ensuing reflections on contemporary forms of political life. His thought is useful
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and the positivist rhetoric of bureaucratic discourse highly specified identities and the injuries contingently 

This sets up the 1ac as a framework for how to best capitulate to the master—we always orient our strategies to create the best way to persuade the dominant ideology to make concessions to us. This engenders ressentiment and makes their framework devoid from any possibility life affirming codes

Newman 2K ~Saul, "Anarchism and the politics of ressentiment", p: Muse, accessed: March 16 06~ CS
 In this way the slave revolt in morality inverted the noble system of values and began to equate good with the lowly, the powerless — the slave. This inversion introduced the pernicious spirit of revenge and hatred into the creation of values. Therefore morality, as we understand it, had its roots in this vengeful will to power of the powerless over the powerful — the revolt of the slave against the master. It was from this imperceptible, subterranean hatred that grew the values subsequently associated with the good — pity, altruism, meekness, etc. Political values also grew from this poisonous root. For Nietzsche, values of equality and democracy, which form the cornerstone of radical political theory, arose out of the slave revolt in morality. They are generated by the same spirit of revenge and hatred of the powerful. Nietzsche therefore condemns political movements like liberal democracy, socialism, and indeed anarchism. He sees the democratic movement as an expression of the herd-animal morality derived from the Judeo-Christian revaluation of values.~6~ Anarchism is for Nietzsche the most extreme heir to democratic values — the most rabid expression of the herd instinct. It seeks to level the differences between individuals, to abolish class distinctions, to raze hierarchies to the ground, and to equalize the powerful and the powerless, the rich and the poor, the master and the slave. To Nietzsche this is bringing everything down to level of the lowest common denominator — to erase the pathos of distance between the master and slave, the sense of difference and superiority through which great values are created. Nietzsche sees this as the worst excess of European nihilism — the death of values and creativity.
The impact is mastery, control, and violence as a justification for achieving the
AND
philosophical foundation. As such, it is neither factual nor beyond critique.

And, the alternative is to affirm the will to power through the diceroll. You should take the risk of exposing yourself to violent impacts, abandon the desire for mastery, and embrace the unknown and unfamiliar aspects of life by refusing to engage the 1ac. This risks danger but your mortality is something that is certain anyway. The alternative is the only way to live life eventfully and adventurously, through a rolling of the dice.

Deleuze 83 ~Gilles, "Nietzsche and Philosophy", pg. 25-27~ CS
The game has two moments which are those of a dicethrow — the dice that
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the repetition of a dicethrow by the nature of the fatally obtained number.

Tournament: College Prep | Round: 2 | Opponent: Albany | Judge: Shania Hunt
European conceptions of reason/body dualism posit non-white people – especially women – as irrational and closer to nature, and therefore dominable and exploitable
Quijano 2000 (Anibal, Professor of sociology at Binghamton University, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” http://www.unc.edu/~aescobar/wan/wanquijano.pdf, 2000)
With Descartes the mutation of the ancient dualist approach to¶ the bodyand the nonbodytook place.23 What was a permanent copresence¶ of both elements in each stage of the human being, with Descartes came a¶ radical separation between reason/subject and body. Reason was not only a¶ secularization of the idea of the soul in the theological sense, but a mutation¶ into a new entity, the reason/subject, the only entity capable of rational¶ knowledge. The body was and could be nothing but an object of knowledge.¶ From this point of view the human being is, par excellence, a being¶ gifted with reason, and this gift was conceived as localized exclusively in the¶ soul. Thus the body, by definition incapable of reason, does not have anything¶ that meets reason/subject. The radical separation produced between¶ reason/subject and body and their relations should be seen only as relations¶ between the human subject/reason and the human body/nature, or between¶ spirit and nature. In this way, in Eurocentric rationality the body was fixed¶ as object of knowledge, outside of the environment of subject/reason.¶ Without this objectification of the body as nature, its expulsion¶ from the sphere of the spirit (and this is mystrong thesis), the “scientific”¶ theorization of the problem of race (as in the case of the comte de Gobineau¶ 1853–57 during the nineteenth century) would have hardly been¶ possible. From the Eurocentric perspective, certain races are condemned¶ as inferior for not being rational subjects. They are objects of study, consequently bodies closer to nature. In a sense, they became dominable and¶ exploitable. According to the myth of the state of nature and the chain of¶ the civilizing process that culminates in European civilization, some races—¶ blacks, American Indians, or yellows—are closer to nature than whites.24¶ It was only within this peculiar perspective that non-European peoples¶ were considered as an object of knowledge and domination/exploitation by¶ Europeans virtually to the end of World War II.¶ This new and radical dualism affected not only the racial relations¶ of domination, but the older sexual relations of domination as well. Women,¶ especially the women of inferior races (“women of color”), remained stereotyped¶ together with the rest of the bodies, and their place was all the more inferior for their race, so that they were considered much closer to nature or¶ (as was the case with black slaves) directly within nature. It is probable (although¶ the question remains to be investigated) that the new idea of gender¶ has been elaborated after the new and radical dualism of the Eurocentric¶ cognitive perspective in the articulation of the colonialityof power.¶ Furthermore, the new radical dualism was amalgamated in the¶ eighteenth century with the new mystified ideas of “progress” and of the¶ state of nature in the human trajectory: the foundational myths of the Eurocentric¶ version of modernity. The peculiar dualist/evolutionist historical¶ perspective was linked to the foundational myths. Thus, all non-Europeans¶ could be considered as pre-European and at the same time displaced on a¶ certain historical chain from the primitive to the civilized, from the rational¶ to the irrational, from the traditional to the modern, from the magic-mythic¶ to the scientific. In other words, from the non-European/pre-European to¶ something that in time will be Europeanized or modernized.Without considering¶ the entire experience of colonialism and coloniality,this intellectual¶ trademark, as well as the long-lasting global hegemonyof Eurocentrism,¶ would hardlyb e explicable. The necessities of capital as such alone do not¶ exhaust, could not exhaust, the explanation of the character and trajectory¶ of this perspective of knowledge.

ANY philosophical project that relies on rationality as a universal ethical principle justifies colonialism by treating their narrow vision of reason as an absolute strategy to judge others against
Minnich 1900 Elizabeth Kamarck, Senior Scholar, the Association of American Colleges and Universities. Transforming Knowledge. 1900. Pg. 115-16
The responses to such questions that are suggested by these books may and may not be adequate, of course. It has frequently been suggested that the effort to say what women are like risks perpetuating the old errors resulting from faulty universalization (or essentialism). All women are by no means alike, after all, not only across but within cultures, and subcultures. That is one problem. Another is that the ways of reasoning, of knowing, of judging, depicted in these books, precisely insofar as they may be general (if no; universal), may derive from the general oppression of women. That is, what we find by studying "the woman's voice" now may not only not be the woman's voice, but may specifically not be the, or a, voice that we would hear had women not been oppressed so systematically for so long. The debate around these works is complex and important, but I wish here only to note that their popularity tells us that many of us are deeply hungry for public recognition of ways of thought different from the few that have been in the ascendancy for so long. I would also note that, as Sara Ruddick demonstrates in Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace,14 we may indeed need to find the suppressed voices not just to make ourselves feel better, or to change education, or even to enrich our understanding of 'rationality/ but to make the peace we must have if we are to survive on this earth. For that essential effort, nonexclusive universals may indeed be helpful--again, not as things we can know, but as ideas we can think, as we can think but never know the idea of justice, as justice is approached but never realized in any particular set of laws, institutions, or practices.15 It is the circular, self-referential and sell-justifying meaning of reason that needs to be particularized if we are to think more freely about thinking, about knowing. Bui many respond to the effort to particularize as if reason-itself were under attack. It is only under attack as long as one persists in claiming for a particular version of it the totality of human reason rather than a particular share or mode of expression of that infinitely rich gift, which can always overleap itself and so cannot catch itself in any of its particular constructions. By including reason in this discussion of mystified concepts, I am suggesting that the narrow view of reason we can find functioning in (rather than consciously held by) many academics (among others) has served some purposes. Among other things, it has worked quite effectively to allow the dominant few in the Western tradition to brand others "irrational.” And that, in a tradition that has taken rationality to be the characteristic of the truly and fully human, has had very serious consequences. As Aristotle said, slaves and in different ways 'free' women, being less rational than free men, need to be ruled--and, the tradition added, "the Dark Continent" needs to have enlightenment brought to it. Conquest, rule, mastery, are all served well by a notion of reason that is both narrow and absolutized. When one has said, "That's an irrational idea,” one has not only exempted oneself from asking whether it is true, but also from considering whether or not it is expressive of some real experience or is indicative of someone's good-faith effort to remedy a situation--from asking whether that which presently seems "irrational" is, perhaps, born of an "intuition" of a "new world/'16 The irrational, judged as such against a narrow (or even an adequate) definition of "rational," is not the same as the anti-rational.
Rationality has historically been a tool used by Western thinkers to invent fundamental differences between Europe and the rest of humanity in order to justify the inferiority of non-white peoples.
Eze 97 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze African philosophy: an anthology. “Modern Western Philosophy and African Colonialism.”1997
When Western philosophy speaks of "reason." It is not just speaking of "science" and "knowledge" and "method," and "critique," or even "thought." In and through these codes it is more fundamentally the question of the "anthropos," of the human, that is at stake, for questions of knowledge and identity, logos and anthropos, always hang together. It is within this background of anthropos as logikos the interlacing of human understanding and the understanding of the human, that Europeans originally introduced the notion of a difference in kind between themselves and Africans as a way of justifying unspeakable exploitation and denigration of Africans.

Link 2: Kant
Kantianism is tainted by racist assumptions. To Kant only Europeans count as fully human, all others must be forced to conform.  
Eze 97 Emmanuel Chukwudi, Prof. Philosophy DePaul University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Color of Reason.”  Pg. 130-31 “It should be…of human nature.”
It should be obvious that what is at stake in our critique of Kant is, as Lucius Outlaw pointedly stales, the "struggle over the meaning of man,"140 or the project of defining what it means to be(come) human. In 1765 Kant wrote:  “If there is any science man really needs, ii is the one 1 teach, of how to fulfill properly that position in creation which is assigned to man, and from which he is able to learn what one must be m order to be a man.” It is clear that what Kant settled upon as the "essence" of humanity, that which one ought to become in order to deserve human dignity, sounds very much like Kant himself: "white," European, and male.'4* More broadly speaking, Kant's philosophical anthropology reveals itself as the guardian of Europe's self-image of itself as  superior and the rest of the world as barbaric. Behind Kant's anthropology is what Tsenay Serequeberhan characterizes as "the singular and grounding metaphysical belief that European humanity is properly speaking isomorphic with the humanity of the human as such. This universalist conjunction of metaphysics and anthropology is made possible by a philosophy which understands itself as the lieu of logos so that philosophical anthropology becomes the logocentric articulation of an ahisiorical, universal, and unchanging essence of "man." The so-called primitives surely ought to be wary of such Kantian universalist-humanoid abstraction, which colonizes humanity by grounding the particularity of the European self as center even as it denies the humanity of others. And lest it be forgotten, nothing that I have said here is particularly new. Friedrich Gentz, who studied with Kant at Konigsberg In between 1783 and 1786, pointed out that, if the goal of Kant's anthropological theories were realized, it would "compact the whole species into one and the same form," a dangerous situation which would destroy diversity and the "free movement of the spirit" for anyone who disagreed with Kant's compact would be treated as a rebel against fundamental principles of human nature.

Kant’s central premise that some races, namely white people, are inherently superior to the “uncivilized savages” of Africa, Asia, and the Americas is the driving force behind the ideology of colonialism – that civilization must be imposed on the savage for their own good.
Eze 97 Emmanuel Chukwudi, Prof. Philosophy DePaul University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Color of Reason.”  Pg. 130-31 “It should be…of human nature.”
To be sure, the answer to the question of whose humanity is at stake in Kant’s conception of the Enlightenment is rather simple. Two decades prior to “What is Enlightenment?” (1784), Kant had given his categorical response to this question in his precritical work, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. In this work, Kant unequivocally affirms that The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above trifling. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praise-worthy quality, even though among the whites some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the world. So fundamental is the difference between these two races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color. Much could be written on the “enlightened” and “enlightening” remarks. Kant, who never left the security and cultural ambiance of his country and native city of Konigsberg, makes light of being “transported elsewhere.” Kant, who, as Hannah Arendt has noted, valued highly “one’s community sense, one’s sensus communis” and saw it as the source of one’s humanity and critical capacity to judge and communicate, makes light of being uprooted (i.e., the experience of enslavement) when this catastrophe befalls the “Negroes of Africa. But to return to our main point: Kant recognizes a “fundamental” “difference” and correlates “mental capacities” to the “color” of “these two races.” For him the distance between the “mental capacities” of “these two races” is as radically and quantitatively different (in the spectrum of colors) as between white (the absence of color) and black (the complete absorption of the same). It should be noted, furthermore, that it is not only the “Negroes of Africa” that are castigated in this manner. The passage is too long to quote; it includeinges all of the non-European peoples that Kant could have known about —the Arabs, the Persians, the Japanese, the Indians, the Chinese, an the “savages” of North America. The differing non-european peoples listed are described in an extremely pejorative manner, and a few are “complimented” by being compared with Europeans. The Arabs and the Persians are the Spaniards and the French of the Orient respectively, and the Japanese are the Englishmen of this exotic place! The “Negroes of Africa,” on the other hand, stand at the highest point of this negative pinnacle, precisely because they are assuredly “quite black from head to foot.” From all of this, the, it follows that, insofar as the project of the Enlightenment is concerned with “the totality of men united socially on earth into peoples” and is aimed at establishing the “humanity of human beings” in terms of and by reference to the use of a free and autonomous self-reflexive reason, the “Negroes of Africa” and the differing shades of the rest of humanity are and must be beyond the pale of such a project. In as much as enlightenment is see as “man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage” and is thus self-reflexive and self-reflective project of critical and rational emancipation, it cannot – on its terms – be inclusive of non-European peoples and most distinctly of Negro Africans. This is so precisely because, according to Kant, reason and rationality are not indigenous to these, and in particular black African, peoples. Indeed, Kant says as much in his “Idea for a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view,” published in the same year (1784) as “What is Enlightenment?” If one starts with Greek history…if one follows the influence of Greek history on the…Roman state…then the Roman influence on the barbarians…if one adds episodes from the national histories of other peoples insofar as they are known from the history of the enlightened European nations, one will discover a regular progress in constitution of states on our continent (which will probably give law, eventually, to all others). The “other” (non-Europeans) will receive the Law of Reason from Europe or, in Kant’s words, “our continent…will probably give law, eventually, to all the others.” Those who cannot reason – and, as Foucault points out, the word for “reason” that Kant uses is rasonieren (i.e. “to reason for reasoning’s sake”) – cannot be expected to affect “man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage.” Since they lack the faculty for this human possibility. Thus, Europe has to give the “law” to “all the others.” Indeed, de facto, we of the present – Europeans and non-Europeans alike – exist in a world in which Europe has bestowed the “law” by means of conquest and violent hegemony. This is the case even if this act of “bestowing” abrogates  in the very act of giving – the Enlightenment’s own notion of the self-liberating capacity of human reason. What we need to examine next is how Kant legitimizes this de facto (i.e. historical and thus contingent) globalization of Europe and makes of the de jure actualization of the Idea.
By basing moral worth on a narrow and exclusionary notion of rationality Kantianism demands the conquering of those who do not conform. Kantianism is the moral justification for colonialism
Serequeberhan 97 Tsenay, Prof. Philosophy. Morgan State University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Critique of Eurocentrism.” Pg. 150-52
The same Kant, however, does express the view that "if the happy inhabitant of Tahiti, never visited by more civilized nations, were destined to live in their quiet indolence for thousands of centuries/* one could not give a satisfactory answer to the question "why they bothered to exist at all, and whether it would not have been just as well that this island should have been occupied by happy sheep and cattle as by happy men engaged in mere pleasure?"44 The force of Kant’s rhetorical question is directed at stressing what he calls "the value of existence itself,45 which is not, in his view, manifested in the placid, sedate or idle pursuit of "mere pleasure." As we shall see, for Kant, "the value of existence itself," which is ontologically and/or metaphysically proper to human life, is manifested in the rational control of nature, both in the human being and in nature as such,4*1 It is interesting and 1 think significant to note further that Kant sees a similarity between the Tahitians (and the rest of non-Europeans humanity by extension) and sheep because - if one is to judge by the illustrations he uses - sheep, for him, typify the paradigmatic example of a passive resource to be exploited. In his "Conjectural beginning of human history" (1786), Kant, freely utilizing the story of Genesis, lists the four likely steps by which reason extracts man from instinct and his original abode in the garden of paradise. The fourth "and final step which reason took," he writes, to raise man "altogether above community with animals," occurred when man realized that he himself was the "true end of nature.1147 As Kant depicts it: “The first time he ever said to the sheep, "nature has given you the skin you wear for my use, not yours"; the first lime he ever took that skin and put it upon himself . . .that time he became aware of the way in which his nature privileged and raised him above all animals. And from then on he looked upon them, no longer as fellow creatures, hut as mere means and tools lo whatever ends he pleased.” In the following page in his remarks on the above -leaving allegory and sheepish examples aside - Kant states bluntly that reason separates man from instinct/nature by establishing total dominion over the natural realm “Man’s departure from that paradise which his reason represents as the first abode of his species was nothing but the transition from an uncivilized merely animal condition to the state of humanity, from bondage to to instinct to rational control in a word, from the tutelage of nature to the state of freedom.” In other words, those whose humanness - by its lack of differentiation from and dominion over nature - resembles the placid and carefree existence of sheep, cattle, and animals in general, are still within the realm of instinct and have not yet ascended to "the state of freedom" which reason makes possible. Thus, if “what is good for the goose is good for the gander," then those who have made the "transitioned" from "merely an animal condition" can treat those who have not the animalistic "gander" of non-European humanity - "no longer as fellow creatures i.e. human beings worthy of respect, but as mere means and tools to whatever ends" they - Europeans – see fit. Indeed, as we saw earlier, this is precisely how Said describes the project and practice of European imperialism and colonialism, which is undertaken in "an air of normality.”  This too is what Kant finds reprehensible in the European contact with and conduct towards non-European peoples.52 And yet, as we have seen thus far, he himself is one of the most important constructors of the Idea or "general philosophy1* behind this brutish practice: that is, the “pre-text" that ensures the confident and self-possessed "normality" of European conquest. It is important at this point to emphasize that by "reason” Kant means exclusively the instrumental and calculative control {i.e., "rational control") of the natural environment and of the human person as a being of nature with the possibility for rational freedom, or the "state of humanity" beyond the "lawless freedom" of non-European "savages."'1 Now, within the context of European history this "rational control" is established by the proper utilization/control of reason in its public and private domains* For as Kant confidently puts it, in "What is Enlightenment?": "Men work themselves gradually out of barbarity if only intentional artifices arc not made to hold them in it."54 This is the play of the unsocial sociability" of human nature within the confines of European history, which Kant wants to assist in its unhampered unfolding,'1 even if it means establishing "a sort of contract - what might be called the contract of rational despotism with free reason."1*'  This, to be sure, is the core concern of “What is Enlightenment?" which clearly has Europe and Kant's own “contemporary reality alone"5" as its direct object of reflection. This is what Kant refers to and designates as the "age of enlightenment" What then of non-European humanity? How is it to achieve "progress" and 'enlightenment"? it is here that the idea of "unsocial sociability" comes into its own and, beyond the formal niceties and distinctions that Kant makes, presents itself in all of its awesome ferocity. As already noted, for Kant, the non-European world is incapable of engaging in the self-reflexive and self-reflective project of enlightenment on its own terms, since it is beyond the pale of reason; just as the Tahitians, had they not been "benefited" by European contact/conquest would be little different than sheep or cattle in their existence. Thus, the non-European has to be civilized or enlightened from the outside And for this purpose, nature utilizes man's "unsocial sociability," just as Heraclitus tells us that u(c very beast is driven to pasture by a blow. In other words, Kant cannot he candid in his critique of the imperialistic practices of European states (i.e., "the inhospitable actions of civilized ... states," see note 43 for the full citation), since he himself thinks that the Tahitians are "nothing, but mere sheep. He is hard pressed, "to give a satisfactory answer to the question why they bothered to exist at all" except for the fact that they were "visited by more civilized European nations.” As noted earlier, Kant's historicopolitical texts metaphysically substantiate the very attitude he finds reprehensible in Europe's contact with the rest of us. 

Link 3: Color-blindness
Theories must take into account their historical and social conditions – anything else fails since it assumes the wrong starting point for a moral theory. Theories that are colorblind don’t take into account the social background that all theories are embedded in – a social background of racism – this makes their theories a tool of racism
Walsh 4 (Kenneth, Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal) “COLOR-BLIND RACISM IN GRUTTER AND GRATZ” Boston College Third World Law Journal, Volume 24 No 2, 2004. Review of RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES. By Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 2003. Pp. 213. AT
In his book, Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva alerts readers to the danger that a color-blind ideology will soon pervade discussions of race in the United States.157 The mechanisms of color-blind racism allow whites to advance positions that assure the perpetuation of white privilege.158 Under this color-blind guise, the arguments opposing affirmative action sound reasonable and moral.159 Yet individuals employ the frames, style, and story lines of color-blind racism to mask the fact that blacks still hold a second-class status and in America.160 Thus, color-blind racism facilitates the perpetuation of racial inequality by obscuring the fact that there is even a problem to fix.161
More generally, colorblind theories ignore the way their claims are always understood within a context of racial inequality. Sustained historical critique—revealing the ways universal claims are invoked to justify racism—is necessary to reclaim abstract theories
McCarthy 1 (Thomas, Distinguished Professor of the Humanities at Northwestern Univ) “Political Philosophy and Racial Injustice: From Normative to Critical Theory” AT
In interpreting the languages of political thought, normative theorists too often take abstract formulations at their word, as if what were left out of the saying were left out of the meaning; they neglect to attend to how key terms actually function in the multiplicity of contexts in which authors and their audiences put them to use, or to what in practice are regarded as conditions of satisfaction and acceptability for claims employing them. They tend also to disregard that general norms are always understood and justified with an eye to some range of standard situations and typical cases assumed to be appropriate, and that if that range shifts, then so too do the understandings and justifications of those norms, the conceptual interconnections and warranting reasons considered relevant to them. On the other hand, recognizing that ideals and principles of justice, however abstract their form, always come with contentful preunderstandings that derive from their locations not only in systems of thought but also in forms of life, does not in itself commit us to sheer localism. In the case in point of liberalism’s complicity with racial slavery, for instance, many of the ideas implicated in the justifications of slavery were also given more inclusive interpretations in the same cultural contexts as the dominant exclusionary versions highlighted in section I above. That is to say, those contexts also provided resources for arguments against slavery on religious or philosophical grounds, including arguments to the effect that the basic rights possessed by all human beings as such forbade it. One could say, then, that there were competing meanings -- networks of inferential connections, ranges of standard situations and typical cases -- which partly overlapped and partly diverged, but which were sufficiently interlinked to make disagreements real disagreements and not just incommensurable mutterings. And one might then understand the work of critics -- and critical theorists -- as an ongoing effort to reweave those connections and redefine those ranges so as to promote more genuinely inclusive versions. In doing so, they adopt the internal perspective of reflective participants and invoke the context-transcending validity claims of putatively universal ideals to argue that they have been betrayed, that existing formulations, though expressed in formally universal terms, are actually exclusionary.27 On this view, the search for a genuinely inclusive theory of justice is a never ending, constantly renewed effort to rethink supposedly universal basic norms and reshape their practical and institutional embodiments to include what, in their limited historical forms, they unjustly exclude. What generally drives this effort are struggles for recognition by those whom the norms in their established versions fail to recognize.28 And the intellectual form it takes is the ongoing contestation of essentially contestable articulations of the universal demands of justice. Judith Butler puts the point this way: “the provisional and parochial versions of universality” encoded in law at any given time never exhaust “the possibilities of what might be meant by the universal.”29 Contestation by subjects excluded under existing definitions and conventions are crucial to “the continuing elaboration of the universal itself,” for “they seize the language of the universal and set into motion a ‘performative contradiction,’ claiming to be covered by it and thereby exposing the contradictory character” of conventional formulations.30 Butler here captures the important idea that the possibility of challenging putatively universal representations is inherent in those representations themselves, or more precisely, in their context-transcending claims, and that historically that possibility has been exploited to greatest effect by groups who, though not entitled under existing formulations of the universal, nevertheless appeal to it in formulating more inclusive conceptions of justice. Viewed in this light, as a part --albeit a reflective part -- of historical processes of emancipation, normative theory is clearly not “freestanding” in any fundamental sense. And, as the shock-effects of Foucault’s genealogies have made clear, the familiar enlightenment metanarratives of universal principles discovered at the birth of modernity fail to acknowledge the impurity of the demands that have historically been made in the name of pure reason. Accordingly, there is a need for critical “histories of the present,” the aim of which is to alter our self-understandings by examining the actual genealogies of accepted ideas and principles of practical reason.31 This distinguishes critical approaches to moral and political theory from approaches like Rawls’s that seek to construct fundamental norms of justice from the “settled convictions” of our “public political culture” by way of “reflective equilibrium.” Critical histories make evident that the political values from which political liberalism seeks to construct a political conception of justice have always been and still are deeply contested, often fiercely, and usually in connection with matters of power, desire, and interest. And they make us aware that the quite varied, often conflicting ideas, principles, values, and norms that have been taken to express the demands of justice cannot adequately be comprehended or assessed without understanding that and how elements of the contexts and situations in which they were propounded entered into them.32 It is not only this “context of origins” that contemporary normative theory leaves largely unexamined, but the “context of applications” as well. The distinction that Rawls and others draw between ideal and nonideal theory insulates political theorizing, at least initially, from the messiness of political reality. Subsequent forays into nonideal theory are all too often of limited value because of their loose, post hoc connection to empirical work. Specifically, discussions of race following this strategy usually end up as discussions of affirmative action in the broadest sense: since equal citizenship rights are now largely in place, the “unfavorable conditions” at issue are the substantive inequalities that are the enduring legacy of centuries of legalized oppression and discrimination.33 Of course, one then has to judge any proposed remedial measures, policies, and programs from a pragmatic as well as a moral point of view, for they are put forward as practical means to the desired end of eliminating or reducing those inequities. Hence the case for any concrete compensatory measures has to be made not just “in principle” but “all things considered,” that is, it has to take into account empirically likely consequences and side-effects, costs and benefits, comparative advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis possible alternatives, political viability, long-term efficacy, and so on.  Thus nonideal theorizing of this sort turns normative political theory back in the direction of the empirical social reality it began by abstracting and idealizing away from.  But -- and this is my main point here -- there are no theoretical means at hand for bridging the gap between a color-blind ideal theory and a color-coded political reality, for the approach of ideal theory provides no theoretical mediation between  the ideal and the real -- or rather, what mediation it does provide is usually only tacit and always drastically restricted.
Colonialism allows for dehumanization and degradation of the colonized.
Hayes 96 Floyd W. Hayes III Fanon: a critical reader Ed. Lewis Ricardo Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting. “Fanon, Oppression and Resentment: The Black Experience In the United States.” 1996.
Fanon points out that in the colonial situation the primary thrust of the Master in relation to the Slave is not for the sake of recognition but for work. The colonized are dehumanized, their humanity effaced, not simply for the sake of the colonizer's ego satisfaction but for the purpose of the colonized's exploitation (Pn 179 / BS 220). What colonialism seeks to hide from view, to render invisible about itself, is the grounding fact of its possibility: that colonialism is predicated only on force and fraud. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all exemplify their states of nature in terms of non-European states of being. The fact that force and fraud are the only virtues necessary in the Hobbesian state of nature (the state of "warre') reveals rather that a readier representation of the contractualists' "natural state" is not "the savage peoples of the Americas" and the like (Hobbes: ch. 13) but the colonial condition imposed by Europeans (geographically or racially) upon those deemed non-European. Colonialism is operationalized at both the material and the representational levels. Materially colonialism seeks to strengthen domination for the sake of human and economic exploitation. Representationally, it seeks to sustains the identity of the ideological or discursive image it has created of the colonized and of the depreciated image the colonized have of themselves. Colonialism thus undertakes at the latter level to extend and maintain a veiling, to affect a strategic invisibility on the pan of the colonized: to maintain invisibility socially and politically so as to minimize the costs of economic reproduction. and labor enforcement. Through normalization, colonialism is able to hides from view its constitutive forms of domination. and exploitation. By making the relations and practices of dominance seem standard, normal, and given, colonialism creates as "acceptable" its central social expressions of degradation and dehumanization, rendering unseen the fact that it makes people what they are not. Colonialism is quite literally untruth, an untruth which to sustain itself must be hidden from view. Fanon speaks of this as "the lie of the colonial situation" (Sr 115 / ADC 128), a lie that infects the colonized who to survive find that they are "hardly ever truthful before the colonizer" (114 /127). Thus, like modernity more generally, colonialism is a condition of extreme ambivalence, imposing a structure, an order of things, it inevitably is incapable of sustaining. Drawn to an order, a scheme of classification, it at once cannot sustain because it is both mis- and unrepresentative of a people the very being of whom it negates, the colonial condition faces  its impending disorder with differentiation and division, separation and subordination, manipulation and mystification - in short, with fraud and force (sec ch. 4 of Black Skin; see also Bauman). It is in this sense that Fanon sees himself as engaged analytically, critically, in a form of unveiling.
Thus, the (counter) role of the ballot is to evaluate and reject epistemological positions through the context of colonialism. To clarify, scrutinize the way each side presents their arguments, ethics, and epistemology, and choose to reject the position that enhances the strength of colonialism.

This modern global order of domination is justified by philosophical tradition – from our privileged standpoint we have a choice to sustain and replicate this evil or fight it. Vote neg to choose resistance.
Serequeberhan Tsenay, Prof. Philosophy. Morgan State University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. “The Critique of Eurocentrism.” Pg. 154-57
From all of the above, then, Kant's historicopolitical texts - and, as I have argued elsewhere, the historical thinking of Hegel and Marx 77 and, by extension, the European philosophic tradition as a whole - is grosso modo grounded, minus its "dark horses," on a Eurocentric "pre-text”of the humanity/historicity of human existence as a whole, But why is it necessary to de-structively engage this "pre-text” or Idee? Why is this critical-negative project an indispensable aspect of the contemporary discourse of African philosophy?   To begin with, as Kwame Anthony Appiah has correctly noted, we contemporary African philosophers/ and Westernized Africans in general, share by our training and educational formation, in the intellectual heritage of Europe. Consequently, we "see" ourselves and our contemporary situation, at least partially, through the lenses conferral to us in the transmissions of this heritage. Thus, to explore this shared heritage in regards to how it sees and conceptualizes our lived humanity is a necessary precondition to critically appropriating it. For as Frantz Fanon reminds us - lest we forget! - our sharing in this heritage it rather problematic, since it is transmitted to us through a dour stepmother who "restrains her fundamentally perverse offspring from … giving free rein to its evil instincts" - a harsh "colonial mother11 who "protects her child from itself"7* Today, that part of our heritage which is African - or its residual -is no longer (at least in principle) considered "evil." In order to begin appropriating to ourselves that from which we were thus far protected, it is first necessary to clear the metaphysical grounding of all the evil that was said of us and done to us. It is not enough to say with Kwasi Wiredu that: “Indeed an African needs a certain level headedness to deal with some of these hinkers at all. Neither 1 Hume, nor Marx, displayed much respect for the black man, so whatever partiality the African philosopher may develop for these thinkers must rest mostly on considerations of the truth of their philosophical thought.”   Indeed, to give proper consideration and appreciation to the "philosophical thought" expressed by these and other thinkers in the European tradition presupposes the critical destructive labor of seeing how "the truth" is skewed and skewered by the partiality it justifies and in which it is enmeshed. The necessity for this undertaking, furthermore, is grounded in the fact that today Eurocentrism is the general consciousness of our age. It is not something that merely affects Europeans. As Marx noted in the German ideology, the dominant ideas of the ruling strata in a society are always, at any particular point in time, the dominating ideas of an age or historical period. Today in our global society the dominant ideas are the ideas through which Europe dominates the world. As Jose Rabasa has appropriately noted: “I must emphasize again that by Eurocentrism I do not simply mean a Tradition that places Europe as a universal cultural ideal embodied in what is called The West, but rather a pervasive |metaphysical | condition of thought* It is universal because it affects both Europeans and non-Europeans, despite the specific questions and situations each may address.” To critically engage in a destructive reading of the texts of the Occidental tradition as regards their views on non-European cultures is thus to critically appropriate that part of our own heritage which was violently "bestowed" on us by Europe. Not to do so would be to continue to inhabit a defunct intellectual horizon, whose material embodiments that is, overt imperialism and  colonialism- have already been destroyed by the formerly colonized peoples of the world. Today, in our post colonial present, we face a more covert hegemony which functions and implements global Euro-American domination through the Westernized segments of formerly colonized peoples. For better or for worse, we who belong to the Westernized segments of formerly colonized societies occupy positions of relative power which can be utilized either to replicate Europe or to try and unleash the concrete and suppressed possibilities of our respective histories.10 For example, as 1 Lyotard has correctly observed: "The spread of struggles for independence since the Second World War and the recognition of new national names seem to imply a consolidation of local legitimacies” But this "spread of struggles for independence" only "seems to imply" the "consolidation of local legitimacies;" it is only a semblance, an appearance that hides the actuality that "new 'independent’ governments either fall in line with the market of world capitalism or adopt a Stalinist-style political apparatus.” In a similar vein, Castoriadis tells us that the West asserts "not that it … has. . . discovered the trick of producing more cheaply and more quickly more commodities, but that it. . . has| . . . discovered the way life appropriate to all human society." In making such a grandiose metaphysical assertion, the "unease”1 that "Western ideologues" might have fell is "allayed by the haste with which the 'developing' nations" or, more accurately* the Westernized elites of these nations greedily "adopt the Western 'model’ of society." What both Lyotard and Castoriadis are pointing to is the fact that the hegemonic replication of Europe, in our shared postcolonial present, is carried on by and incarnated in the human residue that is^ the Westernized elites left behind by the retreating colonial empires of Europe. In other words, the "fact that, in some particular domain, and to some particular end i.e., the scientific/technological control of nature,"" the West has achieved considerable success is taken, by the Westernized elites and their metropolitan mentors, as a sign of Europe's absolute metaphysical superiority to the rest of humanity). It is, grosso modo, this domineering theme that constitutes the Eurocentric consciousness of our postcolonial globe and, as we have seen in our reading of Kant, finds its speculative foundation in the Western tradition of philosophy. More than through physical force, Euro-America today rules through its hegemony of ideas, "through its ‘models’ of growth and development, through the statist and other structures which … are today adopted everywhere.” other structures which … are today adopted everywhere.” This is why Fanon concludes Le dames de la terre with a simultaneous call to  leave "old" Europe behind and engage in the concrete inventing and creating of our own lived historicity. But to heed, or even hear, Fanon’s call  requires that we first recognize and de-structure the speculative metaphysical underpinnings of the Eurocentric constraints that have held us and still hold us – in bondage.  This, in my view, is one of the most important and basic tasks of the contemporary discourse of African philosophy; its critical-negative project –the critique of Eurocentrism.
Thus the alternative is to reject their mode of thinking, and engage with radical subjectivity. This involves a recognition that peoples have different lived experiences and ways of understanding the world that are not the white, Eurocentric thinking of the aff.
All Neo-Kantians link because they have failed to expose the traditional thoughts that have echoed through contemporary moral philosophy.
ENYIMBA (MADUKA, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR) RACISM AND PHILOSOPHY: AN EXAMINATION OF HUMAN AND KANTIAN RACIAL THOUGHTS   
*OUR refers to Africans/African thought
It is indeed, a racial prejudice to describe some set of human being as incapable of reasoning, as primitive, and (or) as savages because of their descent, or simply because they are of different race or origin from one. There is indeed no moral, rational or logical justification for such far-reaching conclusion or thinking. Infact, in our opinion, it is the one who is prone to such racial delusion that should be referred to as primitive, inhuman and therefore must not be taken very seriously. This is so because, when human persons refuse to recognize the authentic humanity of their neighbours and fellow human beings, they cease or fail to be human persons themselves. We Africans should desist from worshipping these scholars and from accepting hook line and sinker their ideas and thoughts as canons and apodictic. This must however, not be done as a matter of prejudice, but as a matter of fact, because it is the truth; otherwise we will be falling into the same racial bigotry with them.  As Wiredu rightly pointed out, the Africans indeed posses a high degree of coherent thought. For instance, the west has a lot to learn from our moral thoughts, which are free from superstition. Similarly, Desmond Tutu asserts that “In Africa we say a person is a person through other persons. We can be human only in fellowship. The law of our being is that we have been created for togetherness, for communion; Western philosophy has much to learn from this statement”. (Qtd in Nicholas 52). It is therefore the task of contemporary African philosophers to expose these aspects of traditional thoughts and thereby correct these misconceptions of African thought.
I know what you’re thinking, “Who said Kant?  And surely Korsgaard can’t be a racist! She is a cat lover and is friends with me on the Facebook!”
But she’s still a neo-Kantian.  Pihlstrom:
Sami Pihlstrom, Pragmatic Moral Realism, New York: Rodopi, 2005.
The extent to which both pragmatist and Wittgenstenian forms of moral realism are fundamentally Kantian (transcendental) conceptions of morality, or have one of their key sources in Kant’s thought (although they might prima facie appear to e quite different from Kant’s alleged rationalistic ‘rigorism’), may be further appreciated through a brief comparison with the more explicitly transcendental reflections on the sources of ethical normativity offered by one of the leading contemporary champions of Kantian ethics, Christine Korsgaard.

Tournament: Harvard-Westlake | Round: 2 | Opponent: Beckman KM | Judge: Paras Kumar

Current protections against hate speech are working – on campus harrassment is decreasing nationally now.

Sutton 16 Halley Sutton, Report shows crime on campus down across the country, Campus Security Report 13.4 (2016), 9/9/16,http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/casr.30185/full LADI
A recent report released by the National Center for Education Statistics found an overall decrease
AND
lower than in 2001 for every category except forcible sex offenses and murder.

Removing restrictions on free speech allows hate speech – hate speech IS free speech

Volokh 15 Eugene Volokh,No, There's No "hate Speech" Exception to the First Amendment, The Washington Post, 5/7/15, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-first-amendment/?utm_term=.05cfdd01dea4 LADI
I keep hearing about a supposed "hate speech" exception to the First Amendment
AND
with any established definition of "hate speech" that I know of.) 

Hate speech will be amplified in the face of powerless minorities—it instills terror and destroys education—turns the 1ac because free speech becomes exclusionary

SCU, S. (2016). Campus Hate Speech Codes - Resources - Character Education - Santa Clara University. Scu.edu. Retrieved 11 December 2016, from https://www.scu.edu/character/resources/campus-hate-speech-codes/ AS
Those who advocate hate speech codes believe that the harm codes prevent is more important
AND
free speech, and the just balance between individual rights and group rights.

Hate speech definitively incites violence – empirics prove

Joyce Arthur 11 ~(Joyce Arthur, Founder and Executive Director of the Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada, a national political pro-choice group.) The Limits of Free Speech, Rewire 9-21-2011~ AT
Violent acts of hate are generally preceded by hate speech that is expressed publicly and
AND
and socially—and pays the consequences through increased discrimination and violence.

Tournament: Berkeley | Round: 1 | Opponent: - | Judge: -
College campus activism against war undermines morale and forces withdrawal – collapses American presence abroad and causes massive instability that culminates in extinction
Janet Levy 7 (Janet Levy, ) Iraq’s only Similarity to Vietnam: Its Dangerous Anti-War Movement, Accuracy in Media 2-28-2007 AT
Contrary to media reports and the perception of a majority of Americans, the United States was winning the war in Vietnam following the successful watershed battle known as the Tet Offensive.  Sadly, the Vietnam War was not lost on the battlefield.  The carnage and repressive regimes that followed the U.S. exit may have been avoided had the truth been known by the American public.  The United States was defeated by a carefully conceived, multi-pronged propaganda campaign that set the stage for America’s eventual failure in the region. The ingredients for the U.S. defeat consisted of the funding and encouragement of the anti-war movement by Hanoi and Communist splinter groups, enlistment of “useful idiots” in Hollywood to publicize and popularize the movement, media complicity with negative portrayals of the war, anti-American proselytizing by professors and students on American university campuses, denigration and demonizing of the military and, ultimately, withdrawal of support and appropriations by the U.S. Congress. All these factors led to the perceptual reframing of the Vietnam War as an ignoble imperialistic atrocity, a far cry from its launch as a fight to extinguish communism in Southeast Asia. Today, many of these same elements have reappeared as the United States struggles to defeat Islamic terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan and to apprehend a fifth column of jihadists at home. Inherited from the Vietnam experience, they are now evident within the new conflict. This time, the risks to our country’s future are even greater should they succeed. Anti-War Groups As was true during the Vietnam War, today’s anti-war groups hide their anti-Americanism behind the politics of peace. Recruiting others on a platform of “peace,” they ally themselves with radical Islamists, glorify the enemy’s goals and identify themselves as “freedom fighters,” battling an imperialistic world power. In the lead up to the war against Iraq, anti-war activists effectively mobilized some of the largest protests and demonstrations since the Vietnam War. They attacked the war effort abroad and security measures at home, sympathized with Saddam Hussein as a victim of American war-mongering and even served as strategically-placed human shields. Although Operation Iraqi Freedom was welcomed by the vast majority of Iraqis and succeeded in liberating 25 million people from the ravages of a murderous despot, anti-war protestors decried the U.S. “occupation” of Iraq and the alleged subjugation of the Iraqi people. Their steadfast position was that any use of American military power was an attempt to establish American hegemony in the region and exploit Iraq’s oil resources. The discovery of Saddam’s mass graves and torture chambers were ignored by the anti-war movement in the service of demonizing the actions of the evil, American empire. Hollywood Similarly, in the tradition of Hanoi Jane Fonda, Hollywood plays a highly visible role in opposing the Iraq war and in spearheading demonstrations. Fonda is back in the anti-war fray as Jihad Jane joined by actors Susan Sarandon, Tim Robbins, Sean Penn and others. Before the invasion by coalition forces, Penn embarked on a “fact finding mission” in Iraq, where he met with Saddam Hussein. In a propaganda coup for the anti-war movement and the Baathists, Penn proclaimed to the media that the United States had initiated the war effort on false and illegitimate premises and declared that Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction. Since then, the Hollywood anti-war cabal has threatened the political future of elected representatives unwilling to support the recent, nonbinding resolution against the war. As Hollywood stars use their celebrity in their attempts to sabotage the U.S. war effort, they fail to mention Saddam’s rape rooms, gassing of Kurds and murder of children in front of their parents. These movie stars deny the valiant purpose of the U.S. mission and its committed and brave soldiers. Instead, they give aid, comfort and legitimacy to the enemy. Mass Media As in the Vietnam era, the media has become the propaganda machine for the anti-war movement, using the same tactics of the 1960s and 1970s. The overwhelmingly negative and biased reporting of the Vietnam War era is very much in evidence in today’s Iraq coverage. The press continually advances the notion that life was better for the Iraqis under Saddam, minimizes the atrocities committed by Saddam and his henchman, and focuses instead on the U.S. role in “destabilizing” Iraq. The “good news” about economic recovery, business successes, progress made by the Iraqi government and improvements in public services are ignored in favor of stories of civil strife. Every attack on American soldiers and Iraqis is magnified and featured prominently, while successes are largely ignored or reported in passing. Few news stories focus on the heroism and generosity of American troops. Any hint of malfeasance, allegations of combat errors or misconduct on the part of the U.S. military gets center stage. U.S. forces are portrayed as an enemy as dangerous or even more so, than the terrorist groups they fight. U.S. soldiers are portrayed as acting without regard to the rule of law and abusing the rights of captured “insurgents.” Schools Equally reminiscent of the ’60s and ’70s, university and high school campuses are hotbeds for anti-American and anti-war sentiments. Prior to the inception of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the “Books Not Bombs” strike was coordinated on campuses nationwide by the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition, whose members include the Young Communist League, USA, and the Muslim Students’ Association of the U.S. and Canada. This anti-war protest was endorsed by professors in a wide variety of disciplines, from economics to biology, who cancelled classes or assured anti-war students they would not be penalized for absences. Some professors even focused the day’s class material on the potential war. Thus, a majority of institutions of higher education appeared to expect conformity of anti-war opinion and, in some cases, actually imposed the strike on the student population. This behavior continues today as literature and anthropology professors use classroom time to express their opinions against the war and pressure students to toe their ideological line. Often, students who agree with the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq jeopardize their grades by coming forward. They are treated with disdain and even disrespect in the classroom. Returning Iraq war veterans have been insulted, harassed and called “baby killers” in university classrooms. The Military Finally, as was the case during the U.S. fight against communism in Southeast Asia, the mission of the military has been undermined by blatant hostility and blanket condemnations. Venomous slurs have been directed toward the dedicated servicemen and women who toppled a brutal dictator, struggled against radical Islamists, and fought for a better life for the Iraqi people. Politicians have been extremely negative. For example, Illinois senator Barrack Obama referred to the “wasted” lives of our soldiers. Massachusetts Senator John Kerry insulted the intelligence of our armed forces by proclaiming that people end up in the military if they’re not smart or studious. Anti-military groups have tried to stop military recruitment drives and job fair participation in high schools and on college campuses. Even though all recruits today are committed volunteers who believe in the U.S. mission, anti-war activists portray them as victims, mercenaries or butchers. Isolated military improprieties committed by a few soldiers, like the Haditha incident and the Abu Ghraib scandal, receive outsized attention and are portrayed as representative of all military conduct. The slightest hint of misconduct is used to characterize all recruits and to malign the entire military mission. Anti-militarism has even been expressed by sweeping, local government measures. The city of San Francisco has engaged in various actions to rid itself of any relationship whatsoever to the military. Residents recently passed a symbolic measure demanding the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and prohibiting recruitment at high schools and colleges. City residents tried to stop Navy sponsorship of a summer concert, successfully blocked the docking of the USS Iowa at the Port of San Francisco and are trying to eliminate Fleet Week and the Blue Angels air shows. Congress In Congress, many Democrats and several Republicans are invoking the Vietnam “quagmire” descriptive to support demands to curtail the Iraq war and withdraw U.S. troops. The Democrat electorate has chosen to interpret recent election results as a sign that the public is opposed to the war, rather than opposed to the way the war is being fought. According to a recent national survey by Public Opinion Strategies, a majority of Americans (57) wants to win the war in Iraq and makes the connection between Iraq and the global jihad. Fifty-three percent feel the Democrats are acting precipitously in pushing for immediate withdrawal and a majority (56) also believes that Americans should stand behind the president in times of war. Most telling, 74 of those surveyed disagreed with the statement, “I don’t care what happens in Iraq after the U.S. leaves. I just want the troops brought home.” Last week, on the same day that Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki told Bush that the new security plan and heightened troop presence in Baghdad were “a dazzling success,” the House passed a non-binding resolution rejecting Bush’s 21,500-troop surge in Iraq. In the Senate, the resolution was just four votes short of the sixty required for cloture, which would have limited debate on the resolution and ensured passage. As a consequence of this narrow defeat, Democrats have pledged to repeal a 2002 measure authorizing and defining the mission of U.S. troops in Iraq. With no consideration of how this plays with the enemy, the morale of U.S. troops and the U.S. ground troops’ ability to build alliances with Iraqis, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid issued a statement that the invasion of Iraq was “the worst foreign policy mistake” in U.S. history. In further attempts to block the deployment of more troops, House Democrats hope to restrict parts of a $100 billion emergency military funding request by the President. Rep. John Murtha (D-PA) and other Democrats have joined forces with anti-war groups to limit the President’s powers as Commander-In-Chief. Murtha and company plan to attach stipulations to any military appropriations; embark on a multi-million dollar, anti-war advertising campaign; and target vulnerable Republicans. Murtha is also seeking legislation as part of what he calls his “slow bleed strategy.” It would prevent military units from being deployed unless they meet certain standards and receive a break of at least one year between deployments. This damaging action by politicians and their failure to support the U.S. government “destroys morale, stymies success and emboldens the enemy,” says Rep. Sam Johnson (R-TX), a former Vietnam prisoner of war. “Words cannot fully describe the horrendous damage of the anti-American efforts against the war back home to the guys on the ground,” Johnson said. “We must stick by ‘the troops.’ We must support them all the way. To our troops we must remain always faithful.” This inattention to the message being sent to our soldiers is part of the broader failure by Iraq war opponents to recognize the dire consequences of U.S. withdrawal. It completely escapes opponents of the war on all fronts anti-war activists, Hollywood, colleges and universities and politicians that the conflict is not regional and one from which we can walk away without harm. It is positively stunning that they fail to recognize that Iraq could fall to Islamic terrorists. If this happened, Iraq would be a fertile base for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and a haven from which emboldened terrorists could attack U.S. allies and interests and threaten the very existence of our nation.
Resolve is the THE determiner of American hegemony – it’s key to deterrence and conflict effectiveness – anything else just prolongs violence
Eyago ‘5  7 / 8 / 05    Political Commentary – Sound Politics Reporter http://www.soundpolitics.com/archives/004721.html, Sound Commentary on Current Events in Seattle, Puget Sound and Washington State
Finally, I am angry at those who undermine our efforts to conduct this war. I am angry at people, who through their words, and efforts contribute to the injury and death of our soldiers, who provide encouragement to the enemy, who weaken our efforts and prolong the war, who, for political gain put our soldiers, our people, and our nation at greater risk.  There is a LOT of anger going on. Many times it is inappropriately acted upon. Islamists are angry, so they blow up people. Conservatives are angry so they advocate indiscriminate retaliation. Liberals are angry so they advocate undermining the war. All this anger is misdirected. We can see how the killing of innocents is wrong, but sometimes we cannot see how allowing innocents to be killed is wrong. One should seriously consider the impacts of certain types of dissention in this country before embarking on said dissentious course.  I have many issues with the war in Iraq, but I will focus on just a couple. When President Bush pronounced to the world that he would defeat terrorism, he made a promise. He promised that he would not only pursue the terrorists wherever they may be, but he promised to go after the countries that enable those terrorists. When the UN made resolution after resolution against Iraq those too were promises. The difference comes in whether one follows up a promise or not. You see, no one embarks on a major undertaking with the expectation of losing. The choices any person or group are almost always predicated on the fact that the reward exceeds the price or risk. Hitler would not have invaded Czechoslovakia unless he though he could get away with it. He would not have invaded Poland unless he though he could get away with it. The success of those events and reaction of Europe convinced him that he could press on and take all of Europe. Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait unless he thought he could get away with it. He would not have defied the UN unless he though he could get away with it. In those cases, the acting party decided that they could attain their goals using the methods employed. The same thing goes for the terrorists. They methods they employ are based on the expectation of ultimate success. The methods they employ are also based on their own capabilities, capabilities that stem from the support of governments both passive and active, the support of moneyed benefactors, and the support of powerful influencers such as media and high profile personalities. This brings me back to promises made. Part of the reason these terrorists became so bold is that there were few significant reprisals for their actions. In the same way Hitler moved on Poland and Hussein defied the UN, Al Qaeda flew planes into our buildings. Ultimately it was because they could and that the reprisals had insufficient deterrent effect. Now, when President Bush announced that he would pursue the nations that supported terrorism, he basically set the stage for action. The choice was, rattle the saber and hope it is enough, or draw the saber and demonstrate our commitment to living up to our promises. It is fair to debate whether Iraq was the best choice for an operation, but the stage had also been set there as well. With promises being made at the UN, the choice was to continue to prove that promises meant nothing or to prove that they did. I believe that the lack of consequences in the past was a key factor in the terrorist activity leading up to and including 9/11. Without the resolve to back up our promises, our enemies will be emboldened to act. It does not get any simpler than that.   Iraq was a promise kept. Now, some people want us to renege on that promise and others. That is a dangerous position to be advocating. The thing is, the debate about Iraq belongs BEFORE we took action. And that debate DID occur. It occurred BEFORE the war. And the result was overwhelmingly in FAVOR of action. The congress granted President Bush the authority to act. The fact that they did not like his decision is moot. If they did not trust his ability to act, they were wrong to have given him the authority to do so. NOW they are wrong for challenging his decision after the fact. That brings us back to the concept of one's expectation of the results of one's actions. In many cases throughout history, the winner of a conflict was not always the one with the bigger army, the better equipment, and the best trained, or any of those factors. The winner quite often was the one with the greater will to win. Wars are won by will in far greater weight then in anything else. I would say that will is THE determining factor in success in any conflict. Obviously will is not enough. A greater force can sap the will of another army, but not always. The revolutionary war was won by will, not by military might. Vietnam was lost by will not by military might. And, Iraq will be won or lost by will alone. The consequences of this outcome will have long lasting impacts on the security of our nation. At this point, it does not matter whether we should have gone into Iraq. The fact is we are there now. We either complete the job and fulfill our promises to rebuild that nation and leave it with a stable and free society or we cut and run and have the world know with certainty that our word is null and void and that we have no resolve. That is the stakes. That is the goal of the terrorists: to prove they have resolve, to prove that we do not. Their victory will ensure increased attacks on all nations because the terrorists will have unimpeachable proof that their tactics will ultimately succeed. Bombings, beheadings, gross atrocities will be the weapons of choice in the future. Tactics that have been proven to bring down the mighty.   If will is the factor that determines the outcome, then will is the place where we must consider here and now. As far as our enemy is concerned, we MUST make them believe that they cannot succeed. We MUST make them sure that WE will prevail. We MUST prove to them that their tactics are ineffectual. There is a down side to that. Once an enemy realizes their tactics are not succeeding, they will change them. With an enemy of this nature, that could result in greater atrocities than we have yet seen. Yet, even then we must prevail. We must continue to demonstrate OUR resolve and OUR willingness to see this to the end and DEFEAT them. Since they have shown little regard for decency and life, since they have shown that our very existence is provocation to them, no amount of diplomacy or concessions will achieve an end satisfactory to our nation. The only solution is the demonstration of our willingness to defeat them despite their tactics.  Our goal is to defeat the will of the enemy. His goal is to defeat ours. Any indication that the enemy's will is faltering will bolster our own will. However, the opposite is true as well. Any indication that our will is faltering will embolden the enemy's  will. Unfortunately, from the very first minute of this conflict, parts of our country have shouted from the very mountain tops just how little will they have to win the war. They demonstrate clearly for our enemies that we don't want to fight. They give clear indication that enemy tactics are successful. In effect, they give aid and comfort to the enemy and spur them on to continued fighting because they tell the enemy in clear messages that if they continue in their tactics, the United States will be defeated.  As I said before, the debate about whether we go to war is over. We are now at war, and the ONLY debate we should have is on what tactics are most appropriate for prosecuting that war. It is marginally fair to state that you are unhappy about our decision to go to war, but beyond that, anything else will embolden the enemy. Think very long and about what is at stake here. It is almost IMPOSSIBLE to be pro America while actively dissenting on ongoing conflict. It is bordering on treason for a public official to undermine the war effort, the Commander in Chief and the military publicly for all the world to see. We have started down this path, and there are but two choices: to win or to lose. There is no "suing for peace" with this enemy. Now, that does not mean you have to become militaristic and be a war monger. You can be a peacenik, but you need to consider that unless you want to see the United States harmed, you should cease criticism of the war itself until after it is won. There is plenty of time to castigate the people who made what you perceive as errors AFTER we have finished the job. However, if you persist in presenting disunity and a weakened resolve to the enemy, you take direct responsibility for the lives of all Americans, Iraqis and foreign terrorists that will die subsequently. The quickest way to end the war is to be united, to demonstrate unshakable resolve, and to have the enemy surrender. Or, YOU can surrender to the enemy. Anything else will just prolong the killing. This goes infinitely more so for our public leaders. What they do for political gain is completely unconscionable.
Prescence in Afghanistan is key to break the stalemate and check back the terrorist threat
Browne 17 http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/09/politics/afghanistan-us-troops-shortfall-general-nicholson/ CS
Washington (CNN)Gen. John Nicholson, commander of US forces in Afghanistan, said Thursday that the coalition faced "a shortfall of a few thousand" troops to break the "stalemate" it faces there. He said troops were needed for the NATO-led train, advise and assist mission in Afghanistan. He said that the resources for the counterterrorism mission there, in contrast, are "adequate." Nicholson, testifying before a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Afghanistan, said the shortfall could be made up by US or coalition troops. He added that Secretary of Defense James Mattis would address the issue during this month's meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels. Currently there are a total of 8,400 US troops in Afghanistan. There are also 6,000 troops from NATO and other allied countries. President Barack Obama oversaw the withdrawal of some 1,400 US troops during his last months in office. Nicholson said he hoped the additional reinforcements would allow the coalition to advise Afghan troops at the brigade level, bringing them closer to the intense fight between the government and Taliban insurgency. Read More The general also said additional resources were needed to develop the Afghan air force and grow Afghan special forces. Nicholson said the US was seeking to establish an "enduring counterterrorism platform" in Afghanistan, noting that of the 98 US-designated terrorist groups globally, 20 operate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. "This is the highest concentration of terrorist groups anywhere in the world," he told the Senate. The general also said that he remains "concerned about the influence of certain external actors -- particularly Pakistan, Russia, and Iran -- who continue to legitimize and support the Taliban and undermine the Afghan governments' efforts to create a stable Afghanistan." "Iran is directly supporting the Taliban in Western Afghanistan," Nicholson said, adding that Russia was offering political support to the Taliban in order "to undermine the United States and NATO." A recent report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found that the Afghan government controlled just under 60 of territory, with the remainder either being contested by the Taliban or under the control of the insurgency. Asked by Sen. John McCain, an Arizona Republican, whether the US was winning or losing in Afghanistan, Nicholson said, "I believe we are in a stalemate." President Donald Trump, who spoke to President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan Thursday, told reporters: "Afghanistan -- I would say that that's a tough situation, but we'll do something about it." "We'll be giving you some pretty good information soon," he told reporters during a brief spray at the White House.
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction – independent of retaliation
Owen B. Toon 7, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,”
To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

Tournament: College Prep | Round: 4 | Opponent: - | Judge: -
College campus activism against war undermines morale and forces withdrawal – collapses American presence abroad and causes massive instability that culminates in extinction
Janet Levy 7 (Janet Levy, ) Iraq’s only Similarity to Vietnam: Its Dangerous Anti-War Movement, Accuracy in Media 2-28-2007 AT
Contrary to media reports and the perception of a majority of Americans, the United States was winning the war in Vietnam following the successful watershed battle known as the Tet Offensive.  Sadly, the Vietnam War was not lost on the battlefield.  The carnage and repressive regimes that followed the U.S. exit may have been avoided had the truth been known by the American public.  The United States was defeated by a carefully conceived, multi-pronged propaganda campaign that set the stage for America’s eventual failure in the region. The ingredients for the U.S. defeat consisted of the funding and encouragement of the anti-war movement by Hanoi and Communist splinter groups, enlistment of “useful idiots” in Hollywood to publicize and popularize the movement, media complicity with negative portrayals of the war, anti-American proselytizing by professors and students on American university campuses, denigration and demonizing of the military and, ultimately, withdrawal of support and appropriations by the U.S. Congress. All these factors led to the perceptual reframing of the Vietnam War as an ignoble imperialistic atrocity, a far cry from its launch as a fight to extinguish communism in Southeast Asia. Today, many of these same elements have reappeared as the United States struggles to defeat Islamic terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan and to apprehend a fifth column of jihadists at home. Inherited from the Vietnam experience, they are now evident within the new conflict. This time, the risks to our country’s future are even greater should they succeed. Anti-War Groups As was true during the Vietnam War, today’s anti-war groups hide their anti-Americanism behind the politics of peace. Recruiting others on a platform of “peace,” they ally themselves with radical Islamists, glorify the enemy’s goals and identify themselves as “freedom fighters,” battling an imperialistic world power. In the lead up to the war against Iraq, anti-war activists effectively mobilized some of the largest protests and demonstrations since the Vietnam War. They attacked the war effort abroad and security measures at home, sympathized with Saddam Hussein as a victim of American war-mongering and even served as strategically-placed human shields. Although Operation Iraqi Freedom was welcomed by the vast majority of Iraqis and succeeded in liberating 25 million people from the ravages of a murderous despot, anti-war protestors decried the U.S. “occupation” of Iraq and the alleged subjugation of the Iraqi people. Their steadfast position was that any use of American military power was an attempt to establish American hegemony in the region and exploit Iraq’s oil resources. The discovery of Saddam’s mass graves and torture chambers were ignored by the anti-war movement in the service of demonizing the actions of the evil, American empire. Hollywood Similarly, in the tradition of Hanoi Jane Fonda, Hollywood plays a highly visible role in opposing the Iraq war and in spearheading demonstrations. Fonda is back in the anti-war fray as Jihad Jane joined by actors Susan Sarandon, Tim Robbins, Sean Penn and others. Before the invasion by coalition forces, Penn embarked on a “fact finding mission” in Iraq, where he met with Saddam Hussein. In a propaganda coup for the anti-war movement and the Baathists, Penn proclaimed to the media that the United States had initiated the war effort on false and illegitimate premises and declared that Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction. Since then, the Hollywood anti-war cabal has threatened the political future of elected representatives unwilling to support the recent, nonbinding resolution against the war. As Hollywood stars use their celebrity in their attempts to sabotage the U.S. war effort, they fail to mention Saddam’s rape rooms, gassing of Kurds and murder of children in front of their parents. These movie stars deny the valiant purpose of the U.S. mission and its committed and brave soldiers. Instead, they give aid, comfort and legitimacy to the enemy. Mass Media As in the Vietnam era, the media has become the propaganda machine for the anti-war movement, using the same tactics of the 1960s and 1970s. The overwhelmingly negative and biased reporting of the Vietnam War era is very much in evidence in today’s Iraq coverage. The press continually advances the notion that life was better for the Iraqis under Saddam, minimizes the atrocities committed by Saddam and his henchman, and focuses instead on the U.S. role in “destabilizing” Iraq. The “good news” about economic recovery, business successes, progress made by the Iraqi government and improvements in public services are ignored in favor of stories of civil strife. Every attack on American soldiers and Iraqis is magnified and featured prominently, while successes are largely ignored or reported in passing. Few news stories focus on the heroism and generosity of American troops. Any hint of malfeasance, allegations of combat errors or misconduct on the part of the U.S. military gets center stage. U.S. forces are portrayed as an enemy as dangerous or even more so, than the terrorist groups they fight. U.S. soldiers are portrayed as acting without regard to the rule of law and abusing the rights of captured “insurgents.” Schools Equally reminiscent of the ’60s and ’70s, university and high school campuses are hotbeds for anti-American and anti-war sentiments. Prior to the inception of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the “Books Not Bombs” strike was coordinated on campuses nationwide by the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition, whose members include the Young Communist League, USA, and the Muslim Students’ Association of the U.S. and Canada. This anti-war protest was endorsed by professors in a wide variety of disciplines, from economics to biology, who cancelled classes or assured anti-war students they would not be penalized for absences. Some professors even focused the day’s class material on the potential war. Thus, a majority of institutions of higher education appeared to expect conformity of anti-war opinion and, in some cases, actually imposed the strike on the student population. This behavior continues today as literature and anthropology professors use classroom time to express their opinions against the war and pressure students to toe their ideological line. Often, students who agree with the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq jeopardize their grades by coming forward. They are treated with disdain and even disrespect in the classroom. Returning Iraq war veterans have been insulted, harassed and called “baby killers” in university classrooms. The Military Finally, as was the case during the U.S. fight against communism in Southeast Asia, the mission of the military has been undermined by blatant hostility and blanket condemnations. Venomous slurs have been directed toward the dedicated servicemen and women who toppled a brutal dictator, struggled against radical Islamists, and fought for a better life for the Iraqi people. Politicians have been extremely negative. For example, Illinois senator Barrack Obama referred to the “wasted” lives of our soldiers. Massachusetts Senator John Kerry insulted the intelligence of our armed forces by proclaiming that people end up in the military if they’re not smart or studious. Anti-military groups have tried to stop military recruitment drives and job fair participation in high schools and on college campuses. Even though all recruits today are committed volunteers who believe in the U.S. mission, anti-war activists portray them as victims, mercenaries or butchers. Isolated military improprieties committed by a few soldiers, like the Haditha incident and the Abu Ghraib scandal, receive outsized attention and are portrayed as representative of all military conduct. The slightest hint of misconduct is used to characterize all recruits and to malign the entire military mission. Anti-militarism has even been expressed by sweeping, local government measures. The city of San Francisco has engaged in various actions to rid itself of any relationship whatsoever to the military. Residents recently passed a symbolic measure demanding the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and prohibiting recruitment at high schools and colleges. City residents tried to stop Navy sponsorship of a summer concert, successfully blocked the docking of the USS Iowa at the Port of San Francisco and are trying to eliminate Fleet Week and the Blue Angels air shows. Congress In Congress, many Democrats and several Republicans are invoking the Vietnam “quagmire” descriptive to support demands to curtail the Iraq war and withdraw U.S. troops. The Democrat electorate has chosen to interpret recent election results as a sign that the public is opposed to the war, rather than opposed to the way the war is being fought. According to a recent national survey by Public Opinion Strategies, a majority of Americans (57) wants to win the war in Iraq and makes the connection between Iraq and the global jihad. Fifty-three percent feel the Democrats are acting precipitously in pushing for immediate withdrawal and a majority (56) also believes that Americans should stand behind the president in times of war. Most telling, 74 of those surveyed disagreed with the statement, “I don’t care what happens in Iraq after the U.S. leaves. I just want the troops brought home.” Last week, on the same day that Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki told Bush that the new security plan and heightened troop presence in Baghdad were “a dazzling success,” the House passed a non-binding resolution rejecting Bush’s 21,500-troop surge in Iraq. In the Senate, the resolution was just four votes short of the sixty required for cloture, which would have limited debate on the resolution and ensured passage. As a consequence of this narrow defeat, Democrats have pledged to repeal a 2002 measure authorizing and defining the mission of U.S. troops in Iraq. With no consideration of how this plays with the enemy, the morale of U.S. troops and the U.S. ground troops’ ability to build alliances with Iraqis, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid issued a statement that the invasion of Iraq was “the worst foreign policy mistake” in U.S. history. In further attempts to block the deployment of more troops, House Democrats hope to restrict parts of a $100 billion emergency military funding request by the President. Rep. John Murtha (D-PA) and other Democrats have joined forces with anti-war groups to limit the President’s powers as Commander-In-Chief. Murtha and company plan to attach stipulations to any military appropriations; embark on a multi-million dollar, anti-war advertising campaign; and target vulnerable Republicans. Murtha is also seeking legislation as part of what he calls his “slow bleed strategy.” It would prevent military units from being deployed unless they meet certain standards and receive a break of at least one year between deployments. This damaging action by politicians and their failure to support the U.S. government “destroys morale, stymies success and emboldens the enemy,” says Rep. Sam Johnson (R-TX), a former Vietnam prisoner of war. “Words cannot fully describe the horrendous damage of the anti-American efforts against the war back home to the guys on the ground,” Johnson said. “We must stick by ‘the troops.’ We must support them all the way. To our troops we must remain always faithful.” This inattention to the message being sent to our soldiers is part of the broader failure by Iraq war opponents to recognize the dire consequences of U.S. withdrawal. It completely escapes opponents of the war on all fronts anti-war activists, Hollywood, colleges and universities and politicians that the conflict is not regional and one from which we can walk away without harm. It is positively stunning that they fail to recognize that Iraq could fall to Islamic terrorists. If this happened, Iraq would be a fertile base for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and a haven from which emboldened terrorists could attack U.S. allies and interests and threaten the very existence of our nation.
Resolve is the THE determiner of American hegemony – it’s key to deterrence and conflict effectiveness – anything else just prolongs violence
Eyago ‘5  7 / 8 / 05    Political Commentary – Sound Politics Reporter http://www.soundpolitics.com/archives/004721.html, Sound Commentary on Current Events in Seattle, Puget Sound and Washington State
Finally, I am angry at those who undermine our efforts to conduct this war. I am angry at people, who through their words, and efforts contribute to the injury and death of our soldiers, who provide encouragement to the enemy, who weaken our efforts and prolong the war, who, for political gain put our soldiers, our people, and our nation at greater risk.  There is a LOT of anger going on. Many times it is inappropriately acted upon. Islamists are angry, so they blow up people. Conservatives are angry so they advocate indiscriminate retaliation. Liberals are angry so they advocate undermining the war. All this anger is misdirected. We can see how the killing of innocents is wrong, but sometimes we cannot see how allowing innocents to be killed is wrong. One should seriously consider the impacts of certain types of dissention in this country before embarking on said dissentious course.  I have many issues with the war in Iraq, but I will focus on just a couple. When President Bush pronounced to the world that he would defeat terrorism, he made a promise. He promised that he would not only pursue the terrorists wherever they may be, but he promised to go after the countries that enable those terrorists. When the UN made resolution after resolution against Iraq those too were promises. The difference comes in whether one follows up a promise or not. You see, no one embarks on a major undertaking with the expectation of losing. The choices any person or group are almost always predicated on the fact that the reward exceeds the price or risk. Hitler would not have invaded Czechoslovakia unless he though he could get away with it. He would not have invaded Poland unless he though he could get away with it. The success of those events and reaction of Europe convinced him that he could press on and take all of Europe. Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait unless he thought he could get away with it. He would not have defied the UN unless he though he could get away with it. In those cases, the acting party decided that they could attain their goals using the methods employed. The same thing goes for the terrorists. They methods they employ are based on the expectation of ultimate success. The methods they employ are also based on their own capabilities, capabilities that stem from the support of governments both passive and active, the support of moneyed benefactors, and the support of powerful influencers such as media and high profile personalities. This brings me back to promises made. Part of the reason these terrorists became so bold is that there were few significant reprisals for their actions. In the same way Hitler moved on Poland and Hussein defied the UN, Al Qaeda flew planes into our buildings. Ultimately it was because they could and that the reprisals had insufficient deterrent effect. Now, when President Bush announced that he would pursue the nations that supported terrorism, he basically set the stage for action. The choice was, rattle the saber and hope it is enough, or draw the saber and demonstrate our commitment to living up to our promises. It is fair to debate whether Iraq was the best choice for an operation, but the stage had also been set there as well. With promises being made at the UN, the choice was to continue to prove that promises meant nothing or to prove that they did. I believe that the lack of consequences in the past was a key factor in the terrorist activity leading up to and including 9/11. Without the resolve to back up our promises, our enemies will be emboldened to act. It does not get any simpler than that.   Iraq was a promise kept. Now, some people want us to renege on that promise and others. That is a dangerous position to be advocating. The thing is, the debate about Iraq belongs BEFORE we took action. And that debate DID occur. It occurred BEFORE the war. And the result was overwhelmingly in FAVOR of action. The congress granted President Bush the authority to act. The fact that they did not like his decision is moot. If they did not trust his ability to act, they were wrong to have given him the authority to do so. NOW they are wrong for challenging his decision after the fact. That brings us back to the concept of one's expectation of the results of one's actions. In many cases throughout history, the winner of a conflict was not always the one with the bigger army, the better equipment, and the best trained, or any of those factors. The winner quite often was the one with the greater will to win. Wars are won by will in far greater weight then in anything else. I would say that will is THE determining factor in success in any conflict. Obviously will is not enough. A greater force can sap the will of another army, but not always. The revolutionary war was won by will, not by military might. Vietnam was lost by will not by military might. And, Iraq will be won or lost by will alone. The consequences of this outcome will have long lasting impacts on the security of our nation. At this point, it does not matter whether we should have gone into Iraq. The fact is we are there now. We either complete the job and fulfill our promises to rebuild that nation and leave it with a stable and free society or we cut and run and have the world know with certainty that our word is null and void and that we have no resolve. That is the stakes. That is the goal of the terrorists: to prove they have resolve, to prove that we do not. Their victory will ensure increased attacks on all nations because the terrorists will have unimpeachable proof that their tactics will ultimately succeed. Bombings, beheadings, gross atrocities will be the weapons of choice in the future. Tactics that have been proven to bring down the mighty.   If will is the factor that determines the outcome, then will is the place where we must consider here and now. As far as our enemy is concerned, we MUST make them believe that they cannot succeed. We MUST make them sure that WE will prevail. We MUST prove to them that their tactics are ineffectual. There is a down side to that. Once an enemy realizes their tactics are not succeeding, they will change them. With an enemy of this nature, that could result in greater atrocities than we have yet seen. Yet, even then we must prevail. We must continue to demonstrate OUR resolve and OUR willingness to see this to the end and DEFEAT them. Since they have shown little regard for decency and life, since they have shown that our very existence is provocation to them, no amount of diplomacy or concessions will achieve an end satisfactory to our nation. The only solution is the demonstration of our willingness to defeat them despite their tactics.  Our goal is to defeat the will of the enemy. His goal is to defeat ours. Any indication that the enemy's will is faltering will bolster our own will. However, the opposite is true as well. Any indication that our will is faltering will embolden the enemy's  will. Unfortunately, from the very first minute of this conflict, parts of our country have shouted from the very mountain tops just how little will they have to win the war. They demonstrate clearly for our enemies that we don't want to fight. They give clear indication that enemy tactics are successful. In effect, they give aid and comfort to the enemy and spur them on to continued fighting because they tell the enemy in clear messages that if they continue in their tactics, the United States will be defeated.  As I said before, the debate about whether we go to war is over. We are now at war, and the ONLY debate we should have is on what tactics are most appropriate for prosecuting that war. It is marginally fair to state that you are unhappy about our decision to go to war, but beyond that, anything else will embolden the enemy. Think very long and about what is at stake here. It is almost IMPOSSIBLE to be pro America while actively dissenting on ongoing conflict. It is bordering on treason for a public official to undermine the war effort, the Commander in Chief and the military publicly for all the world to see. We have started down this path, and there are but two choices: to win or to lose. There is no "suing for peace" with this enemy. Now, that does not mean you have to become militaristic and be a war monger. You can be a peacenik, but you need to consider that unless you want to see the United States harmed, you should cease criticism of the war itself until after it is won. There is plenty of time to castigate the people who made what you perceive as errors AFTER we have finished the job. However, if you persist in presenting disunity and a weakened resolve to the enemy, you take direct responsibility for the lives of all Americans, Iraqis and foreign terrorists that will die subsequently. The quickest way to end the war is to be united, to demonstrate unshakable resolve, and to have the enemy surrender. Or, YOU can surrender to the enemy. Anything else will just prolong the killing. This goes infinitely more so for our public leaders. What they do for political gain is completely unconscionable.
That’s key to solve great power war and existential governance crises
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)
A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85
Turn – War engenders worse forms of oppression and suppression of rights
Goldstein 1—Prof  PoliSci @ American University, Joshua, War and Gender , P. 412
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice". Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influences wars' outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, if you want justice (gener and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to "reverse women's oppression/" The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

Tournament: HW | Round: 4 | Opponent: - | Judge: -
Colleges must continue banning offensive speech under Title IX provisions or lose federal funds. This does not follow the first amendment but is necessary to secure funding and maintain a suitable educational environment.
Bernstein 3 David E. Bernstein – professor of Constitutional law at George Mason University since 1995, visiting professor at Brooklyn Law School, Georgetown Law Center, University of Michigan Law School, and William and Mary Law School, You Can’t Say That: The Growing Threat to Civil Liberties From Antidiscrimination Laws, pg. 60-61, DS
Given these constitutional barriers, public university speech codes were on the way out until the federal Department of Education revived them in 1994. Male students at Santa Rosa Community College had posted anatomically explicit and sexually derogatory remarks about two female students in a discussion group hosted by the college’s computer network. Several aggrieved students filed a complaint against the college with the DOE’s Office for Civil Rights. The DOE found that the messages probably created a hostile educational environment on the basis of sex for one of the students. University toleration of such offensive speech, the government added, would violate Title IX, the law banning discrimination against women by education institutions that receive federal funding. Under this standard, to avoid losing federal funds, universities must proactively ban offensive speech by students and diligently punish any violations of that ban. The DOE failed to explain how its rule was consistent with the First Amendment. Speech codes enacted by public universities clearly violate the First Amendment even if the codes are enacted in response to the demands of the DOE, so requiring public universities to enact speech codes or forfeit public funds would obviously be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, facing this choice, public university officials have ignored the First Amendment issue and complied with DOE guidelines. Although a few schools may truly be concerned about the potential loss of federal funding, the prevailing attitude among university officials seems to be that the DOE’s Santa Rosa decision provides a ready excuse to indulge their preference for speech codes. University officials implicitly reason that if the DOE can get away with ignoring the First Amendment, then so can they. Unfortunately, they may be right.
Federal funding is key to public universities and colleges by funding for research, student aid, and low-income students’ access to higher education.
Woodhouse 15 Kellie Woodhouse, journalist at Inside Higher Ed, digital media company with decades of journalism experience covering higher education. “Impact of Pell Surge” June 12, 2015 https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/12/study-us-higher-education-receives-more-federal-state-governments, DS
Federal spending has surpassed state spending as the main source of public funding in higher education, and the primary reason is a surge in Pell Grants in the last decade. Federal and state funds have different missions. The majority of state funding is used to fund specific public institutions, whereas federal funding is generally awarded through student aid and research grants. State funding goes primarily to public institutions, while federal funding goes to students at public, private and for-profit colleges, and to researchers at public and private universities. Historically, state funding has been heftier than federal funding. In the 25 years leading up to 2012, states spent 65 percent more on higher education than the federal government. Yet that trend has rapidly changed in the past decade. In 2010 federal funding overtook state funding as the main source of public support for universities and colleges throughout the country, according to a report released Thursday by the Pew Charitable Trusts. That same year funding for Pell Grants -- grants awarded to college students from low-income families -- hit an all time high of about $36 billion. In fact, during the five-year period leading up to 2013, Pell funding increased by 72 percent, and funding of college benefits for veterans tripled. In 2013 the federal government spent nearly $76 billion on higher education, while states spent about $3 billion less, according to the "Federal and State Funding of Higher Education" study. Federal support include nearly $25 billion in research funding obligations, which are paid over a series of years depending on the length of a research project. “Our biggest surprise was just the shift that we saw in federal and state higher education funding,” said Phil Oliff, a higher education analyst at Pew. “This is a really significant shift in a pretty short period of time.” Though the federal government now funnels more money to higher education as a whole, states still supply a greater share of funding to public universities. Public colleges educate 68 percent of all students in the U.S., and in 2013 they received an average of 21 percent of their funding from state funds and 16 percent of their funding from the federal government. Tuition and fees also accounted for 21 percent of public university revenue. Those averages hide wide variations. Community colleges and nonresearch public institutions tend to get much larger shares of their budgets from state funds. And even at research universities, research grants have a big impact on faculty projects and graduate education, but don't necessarily pay for undergraduate education. Total public funding per full-time-equivalent student for higher education fell 12 percent in the 12-year period starting in 2000, when adjusted for inflation. Yet during that time, federal funding nearly doubled while state funding fell -- federal funding grew from $43 billion to $83 billion, while state funding dropped from $78 billion to $71 billion. Meanwhile, enrollment skyrocketed, growing by 45 percent. Pew’s report shows that state funding is responsive to the economic climate, while federal funding was less restricted by the economic downturn that began in 2008. In fact, more low-income students attended college during the downturn, and the federal government actually increased its Pell Grant support during that time. Oliff noted that both federal and state funding vary widely by state. For example, Alaska universities receive, on a per-student basis, six times the state funding of New Hampshire universities. Meanwhile, per-student federal funding in Hawaii is more than double the federal funding in most other states. Pell funding also varies state to state. There are higher concentrations of Pell recipients in the Southeast, compared to relatively lower concentrations in the Northeast. On average, the federal government provided nearly $2,100 in Pell funding for every full-time-equivalent student in 2013.
Access to higher education is key to social mobility and US competitiveness under globalization and evolving technologies. Anything else risks the system going obsolete.
Spellings 6 Margaret Spellings, Secretary of Education. “A Test of Leadership: Chartering the Future of U.S. Higher Education”  a report of the commission. Pre-Publication Copy https://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/hiedfuture/reports.html , DS
To reach these objectives, we believe that U.S. higher education institutions must recommit themselves to their core public purposes. For close to a century now, access to higher education has been a principal—some would say the principal—means of achieving social mobility. Much of our nation’s inventiveness has been centered in colleges and universities, as has our commitment to a kind of democracy that only an educated and informed citizenry makes possible. It is not surprising that American institutions of higher education have become a magnet for attracting people of talent and ambition from throughout the world.
But today that world is becoming tougher, more competitive, less forgiving of wasted resources and squandered opportunities. In tomorrow’s world a nation’s wealth will derive from its capacity to educate, attract, and retain citizens who are to able to work smarter and learn faster—making educational achievement ever more important both for individuals and for society writ large.
What we have learned over the last year makes clear that American higher education has become what, in the business world, would be called a mature enterprise: increasingly risk-averse, at times self-satisfied, and unduly expensive. It is an enterprise that has yet to address the fundamental issues of how academic programs and institutions must be transformed to serve the changing educational needs of a knowledge economy. It has yet to successfully confront the impact of globalization, rapidly evolving technologies, an increasingly diverse and aging population, and an evolving marketplace characterized by new needs and new paradigms.
History is littered with examples of industries that, at their peril, failed to respond to—or even to notice—changes in the world around them, from railroads to steel manufacturers. Without serious self-examination and reform, institutions of higher education risk falling into the same trap, seeing their market share substantially reduced and their services increasingly characterized by obsolescence.
US leadership prevents great power war and existential governance crises. A decrease in competitiveness leads to great power war, its try or die.
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)
A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

Tournament: Western Nats | Round: 1 | Opponent: - | Judge: -
North Korea is becoming more aggressive- armament testing is imminent and south korea is hapless to stop it
Kim 1/01 Sam, Kim Says North Korea Close to Testing Inter-Continental Missile. Bloomberg.com. Retrieved 19 January 2017, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-01/kim-says-north-korea-in-last-stage-for-icbm-test-yonhap-reports~~ CS
Kim Jong Un said North Korea is in the "last stage" of preparations
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, after the country conducted its fifth test in September. Bottom of Form 

US prescence key to maintain stability and check aggression in the region
Mason 10 Jeff, Obama Tells Military: Prepare for North Korea Aggression. (2017). Common Dreams. Retrieved 19 January 2017, from http://www.commondreams.org/news/2010/05/24/obama-tells-military-prepare-north-korea-aggression~~ CS
WASHINGTON - President Barack Obama has directed the U.S. military to coordinate
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Korea counterparts to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression" he said.

The plan forces withdrawal—Counterrecruitment movements are rising now – social media technologies and movement miscibility allow an unprecedented rise which decks mobilsiation capabilities and army recruitment, the only thing keeping them down was college crackdown
Vasi 06 Ion Bogdan Vasi (2006) The New Anti-war Protests and Miscible Mobilizations, Social Movement Studies, 5:2, 137-153 AT
Mobilization against war has been one of the most visible forms of collective action in
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information technologies such as the Internet offered efficient resources for the rapid mobilization of 

A phased withdrawal would start with the U.S. transferring wartime operational control of the ROK armed forces back to South Korea
Doug Bandow 14, aff guy, 7/28/14, "South Korea: Forever Dependent on America," http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/south-korea-forever-dependent-america
At the same time, there is widespread fear, mostly among South Koreans,
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, transforming the alliance from a relationship of dependence into one of cooperation.

University Restiction and Crackdown on free speech is the only deterrent from keeping the movement rising
SW 5 (Socialist Workers) Cracking down on student protests, International Socialist Review10-7-2005 AT
CAMPUS ADMINISTRATORS are cracking down on student activists who stand up against the presence of
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HCC and GMU students have a more powerful movement that's got their back."

Withdrawal from korea goes nuclear
Cirincone 2000 Joseph, The Asian Nuclear Chain Reaction, Joseph Cirincione, Senior Fellow and Director for Nuclear Policy at the Center for American Progress, Foreign Policy, Spring 2000, p. 120 CS
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already
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, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.