Tournament: Harvard Westlake | Round: 2 | Opponent: x | Judge: x
Framework
V: Morality
VC: Furthering Discussion
Discourse ought to be focused on inclusion, universalized decision making, and socialization. Key to form ethics.
Gingrich’2k- Paul Gingrich is a professor in the department of sociology and social studies at the University of Regina. (Paul Gingrich. “Sociology 319. March 16 2000. Habermas”. 2000. 8 January 2017. JB)
As a result, the pursuit of rationality in this more inclusive sense would lead to "the removal of the barriers that distort communication, but more generally it means a communication system in which ideas are openly presented and defended against criticism" (Ritzer, p. 294). e. Public Sphere i. Public and Private (p. 456) Integration of private and public spheres in traditional societies, where the lifeworld and system more or less identical. Separation of public and private with development of modernity corresponds to separation of lifeworld and system. Public = collective concerns and activities of state Private = affairs not so subject to state but more concerned with personal Colonization of lifeworld could be viewed as invasion of private by the public. Social self-organization through greater participation in rational-critical discourse (middle of p. 456). ii. Exclusion and Inclusivity Women and non-property holders excluded. Issues involve not just who is excluded and who included, but the form of discourse that results. How are diverse identities included and how might the form of discourse change as more are included. This is especially relevant today when issues of multiculturalism and gender inclusiveness are considered. This might lead to questioning Habermas approach of a single public discourse. Several publics or a sphere of publics. Discourse across lines of difference. Multiple intersections among heterogeneous publics. But this creates problems as well, because nationalism and identity imply boundaries, where some are excluded. This also ties the individual to the group as "personally embodied" (bottom, p. 457). Habermas – "disinterested rational-critical public discourse" (middle, p. 458). That is, this is not bringing particular material or other interests and not negotiating as interest groups. That is, Habermas downplays specific interests and disregards status in favour of being willing to work mutually toward a rational-critical understanding. This means settling arguments on the basis of the merits of the argument, rather than the identities of the actors (top of p. 459). This is similar to liberal arguments and ignores some of the points noted earlier by Habermas, that differences can be relegated to the private sector. Calhoun notes that Habermas assumes a "private, pre-political life that enables and encourages citizens to rise above private identities and concerns" (middle, p. 459). iii. Multiplicity of Publics. Not a single public, and common membership not prior to other memberships. People are part of different public arenas and address multiple centres of power. (Folbre) Public discourse must involve discourse in multiple arenas. Power means exercising of debate in only one public. Must have it in all. eg. many seemingly private issues brought into public arena. Habermas – does not deal adequately with identity formation or culture as public activity f. Notes on "Discourse Ethics" All references in this section are to "Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel’s Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?" pp. 195-215 in Habermas, 1991. For Habermas, discourse ethics is study and analysis of the possibility of "grounding moral norms in communication" (p. 195). Habermas identifies ideal speech and communicative action as arekey to developing discourse and understanding, so that these may be important for developing agreed upon norms. This is especially the case in modern society since the authority associated with traditional norms has disappeared and communicative action becomes the only basis on which common agreement can be reached, at least if coercion and power are to be avoided. In this article, Habermas approaches these from a philosophical point of view, but uses some ideas from sociology and develops some sociologically relevant implications. i. Valid Norms. Pages 196 and 197 are primarily philosophic, but the principle of moral augmentation on the middle of p. 197 states the principle that Habermas develops: "Only those norms may claim to be valid that could meet with the consent of all affected in their role as participants in a practical discourse." In society there are various norms – for example, in our society there are norms against theft, for mobility rights, and for rights to vote. While these are generally regarded as valid in our society, they might not be in other societies, or the consequences for violation of these might be treated quite differently. The criterion Habermas uses to consider whether these are something isvalid in any society or group is based on what all those affected by such norms would say if they were involved in a practical discourse, that is a discourse where everyone could participate and where the result would be decided by force of discussion and argument. If all consented, following such discussion, then this would be a valid norm. ii. Universal. But the norm might not be universal, because those in other cultures or societies might not consent to this norm. Here Habermas notes that there is a danger or fallacy in applying any norm to other groups or societies. This is because the norm might reflect the prejudices of a powerful group like upper class males who themselves are agreed on the norm, but others might not. iii. Practical Discourse. Habermas notes how his criterion or procedure differs from some other approaches. He notes that Rawls uses the criterion of contract. More relevant for this course is a comparison with Mead who uses an approach that Habermas terms "ideal role taking." From Mead he draws out the criterion that the individual put himself or herself in the position of others who would be affected by an action, and on this basis determine whether the action is appropriate. This is from Mead’s view of action involving consideration of the possible responses of others, and adjusting one’s behaviour accordingly. For Habermas, the principle is rather that of argumentation, discussion, and discourse, where "all concerned take part, freely and equally, in a cooperative search for truth, where noting coerces anyone except the force of a better argument." While Habermas notes that this is a demanding condition, it is a reasonable one, and one we often attempt to use in practice. There may be some problematic assumptions built into this, but perhaps no more so than the other criteria.
Democratic societies must have inclusive communication, that’s key to universalizability. Within an increasingly diverse society, in inclusiveness would provide perspective and generates key skills for engagement in higher education
Gingrich’2k- Paul Gingrich is a professor in the department of sociology and social studies at the University of Regina. (Paul Gingrich. “Sociology 319. March 16 2000. Habermas”. 2000. 8 January 2017. JB)
iv. Ideal Speech. Habermas grounds his arguments in the concept of ideal speech and the ideal speech situation – "a situation in which everyone would have an equal chance to argue and question, without those who are more powerful, confident, or prestigious having and unequal say. True positions would prevail under these circumstances because they are more rational" (Wallace and Wolf, p. 178). The ideal speech situation is one in which the participants are oriented toward developing a mutual understanding, and not just to achieving some specific purposive result through the interaction. As a result, his model would seem to argue against rational choice theory and even take a different direction than the more purposive models of Weber and Parsons. Habermas notes: the goal of coming to an understanding is to bring about an agreement that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another. Agreement is based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness. (Wallace and Wolf, p. 178, from Habermas "What is Universal Pragmatics?") This ideal speech situation is thus oriented toward developing an understanding, and when agreement is reached, this is the knowledge and truth of the situation. Several principles of the ideal speech situation are as follows (adapted from Ritzer, p. 295). Mutual Understanding. What the speaker says is understandable and comprehensible by others. Same language, structures that are understandable, topics and claims that make sense to others involved in conversation. Truthful. The speaker provides reliable knowledge in the sense that the propositions stated by the speaker are true. When specific facts and statements concerning the natural or social world are made, the speaker provides statements that he or she understands to be correct. That is, there is not deliberate misrepresentation by the speaker. Sincere Expression. The speaker is sincere or reliable in the sense that the speaker is truthful and believable. When opinions, attitudes, views, and interpretations are being provided, the speaker generally attempts to be sincere and not deliberately mislead. Right to Speak. The speaker has the right and it is proper for the speaker to speak. Individuals who have a statement to make should be allowed to do so, and their view should be listened to and seriously considered. Legitimacy. Speech acts take a position with respect to normative or legitimate social order. This may be connected to the first point, that the speech acts relate in some way to the social order of which one is part. These are five validity claims that Habermas argues must be associated with conversation and communication in order to develop and maintain communication and develop common understandings. For social interaction through communication to occur, each of these validity claims or conditions must be met. If one of them breaks down or is violated, then that distorts or limits the interactive process, and prevents consensus from emerging. This could be at the individual level, where one or more parties to a conversation do not abide by these, or where there is an unequal power situation. At the level of institutions and structures, many of these conditions may be violated. Social organization developed on the basis of these ideal speech assumptions is likely to be associated with a number of positive features – openness, fairness, democracy, and consensus. Note the relevance of these conditions for public discourse. It is often minority groups, women, and the disadvantaged or powerless who are left out in discussion. The conditions of Habermas would require their inclusion in discussion and debate. Habermas argues that communicatively competent individuals are committed to reaching understanding and a consensus. "The theory of communicative competence holds that there is at least one end (mutuality) to which we are committed in virtue of being capable of communication and that this end is prior to personal ends" (Braaten, p. 64). That is, while we each may have personal ends in mind, an encounter through communication is in some senses prior to this theoretically, in that we are committed to the communicative principles first. Habermas develops this view partly from Mead and partly by analyzing the structure of speech and communication. At one level, the conditions associated with ideal speech can be considered utopian. That is, if each of these conditions is met, there could be true discussion or discourse among those involved. There would not be power imbalances and this would provide a way of developing consensus. At the same time, the ideal speech situation can be regarded as an ideal type of the Weberian sort, and it is a useful analytical tool for considering how social interaction at the individual, small group, and societal level takes place. Further, these conditions can be regarded as the basic set of assumptions and concepts for the communicative action theory of Habermas, perhaps in with the same sort of role that the commodity and exchange plays in Marxian theory or the unit act in Parsonian theory. That is, from this basic concept of ideal speech, Habermas is able to build a comprehensive theory of social interaction, life-world, system, and public discourse. These latter ideas are examined in the following notes.
AND Racism is a decision rule
Memmi 2k (Albert, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165)
The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduit only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice, a just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
Thus the standard is furthering discussion. Prefer the standard for two reasons:
- Furthering discussion creates universalizability which is good since we are able to create understanding and consensus and not having universalizability norms is bad because it hurts inclusiveness making discussion flawed.
2. Habermas discourse ethics creates universalizable norms because it upholds individuals interacting in order to reach a discussion, argument, and consensus.
Util bad
a. Util promotes inequity and inherently discriminates against minority like slavery
Odell, 04 – University of Illinois is an Associate Professor of Philosophy (Jack, Ph.D., “On Consequentialist Ethics,” Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, Inc., pp. 98-103)
A classic objection to both act and rule utilitarianism has to do with inequity, and is related to the kind of objection raised by Rawls, which I will consider shortly. Suppose we have two fathers-Andy and Bob. Suppose further that they are alike in all relevant respects, both have three children, make the same salary, have the same living expenses, put aside the same amount in savings, and have left over each week fifteen dollars. Suppose that every week Andy and Bob ask themselves what they are going to do with this extra money, and Andy decides anew each week (AU) to divide it equally among his three children, or he makes a decision to always follow the rule (RU) that each child should receive an equal percentage of the total allowance money. Suppose further that each of his children receive five degrees of pleasure from this and no pain. Suppose on the other hand, that Bob, who strongly favors his oldest son, Bobby, decides anew each week (AU) to give all of the allowance money to Bobby, and nothing to the other two, and that he instructs Bobby not to tell the others, or he makes a decision to follow the rule (RU) to always give the total sum to Bobby. Suppose also that Bobby gets IS units of pleasure from his allowance and that his unsuspecting siblings feel no pain. The end result of the actions of both fathers is the same-IS units of pleasure. Most, if not all, of us would agree that although Andy's conduct is exemplary, Bob's is culpable. Nevertheless, according to both AU and RU the fathers in question are morally equal. Neither father is more or less exemplary or culpable than the other. I will refer to the objection implicit in this kind of example as (H) and state it as: ' (H) Both act and rule utilitarianism violate the principle of just distribution. What Rawls does is to elaborate objection (H). Utilitarianism, according to Rawls, fails to appreciate the importance of distributive justice, and that by doing so it makes a mockery of the concept of "justice." As I pointed out when I discussed Russell's views regarding partial goods, satisfying the interests of a majority of a given population while at the same time thwarting the interests of the minority segment of that same population (as occurs in societies that allow slavery) can maximize the general good, and do so even though the minority group may have to suffer great cruelties. Rawls argues that the utilitarian commitment to maximize the good in the world is due to its failure to ''take seriously the distinction between persons."· One person can be forced to give up far too much to insure the maximization of the good, or the total aggregate satisfaction, as was the case for those young Aztec women chosen by their society each year to be sacrificed to the Gods for the welfare of the group.
Advantages
Inherency
Currently all students have the right to free speech, however across the nation, this free speech is now being threatened
Friedersdorf’16- Conor Friedersdorf is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he focuses on politics and national affairs. (Conor Friedersdorf. “The Glaring Evidence that Free Speech is Threatened on Campus”. 2016. 5 January 2017. JB.)
At a recent Intelligence Squared debate, an audience filled an auditorium at Yale University to weigh the timely proposition, “Free speech is threatened on campus.” The debate concerned higher education generally, not just the host institution. And at the event’s conclusion, having heard arguments on both sides of the question, 66 percent of the crowd agreed: free speech is threatened. That represented a 17-point shift from a poll taken as the event began. The evidence is that persuasive. One of the losers in the debate was Professor Shaun Harper of the University of Pennsylvania, who heads its Center for the Study of Race and Equity in Education. He began by noting that “there has been a significant increase in the demand for our campus climate work” since last semester’s protests. In fact, he added, “this past December, we brought together 8,000 college presidents and other senior leaders who came to us for guidance on how to respond to racism on their campuses.” With that background, I expected Professor Harper to have a broad sense of how common speech restrictions are at American colleges and universities. And I assumed that he would offer arguments for the position that they do not threaten free speech. I was wrong on both counts. Late in the event, he declared, “I don't want anyone's speech to be suppressed in any setting.” The root of the disagreement was his belief that little speech is restricted. And earlier in his remarks, Harper declared that while colleges may ask students to voluntarily limit their speech in various ways, like not wearing offensive costumes, “I invite our opponents to present us more than a handful of written, institutional policies––where it's been put in writing that you can't say certain things. You can't wear certain costumes. Sure, students would be encouraged to do or not do something. But I, as a higher-education scholar who studied thousands of colleges and universities, have never seen a written institutional policy.” That statement is baffling. The Foundation of Individual Rights in Education keeps track of colleges that have speech restrictions, rating each institution green, yellow, or red. To receive the worst rating, a college must have at least one policy “that both clearly and substantially restricts freedom of speech.” That threshold is met only when a policy “unambiguously infringes on what is or should be protected expression” in a way that is “obvious on the face of the policy and does not depend on how the policy is applied.” The University of Pennsylvania, where Harper teaches, earns the best rating from FIRE, green, for having policies that “normally protect free speech.” Institutions with “red light” ratings for policies that unambiguously impinge upon expression include the following: That is only the beginning. I trust that I needn’t run through D, E, an F colleges to hammer home the ubiquity of written rules that limit what one can express. Even if Professor Harper were to defend some of those rules, it beggars belief to think that he could run through colleges beginning with G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, and P and still fall short of his “handful of written, institutional policies” threshold, let alone his claim to have “never seen” one. What’s more, a written policy doesn’t determine if free expression is protected or violated in practice. And one needn’t search long to find widespread examples of free speech being threatened or assaulted outright. To cite just one example, since Harper brought up the matter of costume controversies: UCLA is a public institution that is bound by the First Amendment; as such, it has no written policy banning students from wearing offensive costumes. Nevertheless, administrators at the campus suspended a fraternity for holding a “Kanye Western” theme party, where attendees dressed like the famous rapper and his celebrity wife, Kim Kardashian. Later in the debate, during a back and forth with Wendy Kaminer, who was arguing that free speech is threatened on campus, Harper said: Wendy, it could be that maybe we're talking to completely different students and hearing completely different things, because quite honestly, when we have students in our studies who are talking with us about the realities of race on their campuses… when we hear students of color unpack these painful stories and these microaggressions and stereotypes and other things that have happened to them, we ask them, ‘What is it that you want the institution to do?’ Never once, not once have I heard them say anything about a speech code. I don’t doubt Harper's account of his own research. But I fail to understand how any scholar who takes the campus climate and last semester’s protests as a core focus of their research could miss student demands to punish speech. The Wall Street Journal reported on a survey of 800 college students that found 51 percent favored speech codes. Yale protestors formally demanded the removal of two professors from their jobs in residential life because they were upset by an email one of them wrote. Missouri law students passed a speech code that Above the Law called Orwellian. Amherst students called for a speech code so broad that it would’ve sanctioned students for making an “All Lives Matter” poster. At Duke, student activists demanded disciplinary sanctions for students who attend “culturally insensitive” parties, mandatory implicit-bias training for all professors, and loss of the possibility of tenure if a faculty member engages in speech “if the discriminatory attitudes behind the speech,” as determined by an unnamed adjudicator, “could potentially harm the academic achievements of students of color.” At Emory, student activists demanded that student evaluations include a field to report a faculty member’s micro aggressions to help ensure that there are repercussions or sanctions, and that the social network Yik Yak be banished from campus. Activists at Wesleyan trashed their student newspaper then pushed to get it defunded because they disagreed with an op-ed that criticized Black Lives Matter. Dartmouth University students demanded the expulsion of fraternities that throw parties deemed racist and the forced a student newspaper to change its name. Need I go on? Harper’s ally in the debate, the Yale philosophy Professor Jason Stanley, didn’t perform any better. During portions the event, he claimed that folks on the other side, who say free speech is under threat, aren’t really engaged in a debate about free speech––he said the real debate is about racism and anti-racism and about leftism. In this telling, free speech is being invoked as a cover, in service of less-sympathetic agendas. That grossly distorted the positions taken by his opponents at the Intelligence Squared debate. And the broader claim about free-speech defenders—which is lamentably common in public discourse on the subject—can be refuted a dozen different ways. Here’s one: Many college newspapers are struggling with free-speech issues that have nothing to do with race or leftism, as David Wheeler reported. Or consider another narrow area of campus expression that is under threat: the formal speech, delivered to a broad audience. We’ll restrict our “threat survey” to a single year. In 2015 alone, Robin Steinberg was disinvited from Harvard Law School, the rapper Common was disinvited from Kean University, and Suzanne Venker was disinvited from Williams College. Asra Nomani addressed Duke University only after student attempts to cancel her speech were overturned. UC Berkeley Chancellor Nicholas Dirks participated in an event on his own campus that student protestors shut down. Speakers at USC needed police to intervene to continue an event. Angela Davis was subject to a petition that attempted to prevent her from speaking at Texas Tech. The rapper Big Sean faced a student effort to get him disinvited from Princeton. Bob McCulloch faced a student effort to disinvite him from speaking at St. Louis University. William Ayers was subject to an effort to disinvite him from Dickinson School of Law. Harold Koh faced a student effort to oust him as a visiting professor at New York University Law School. That list includes speakers from the right and the left. It involves several controversies that have nothing to do with antiracism. How many examples are needed to persuade Stanley that there is a problem? Because I only stopped listing them to avoid being tedious. Those examples are a mere subset of 2015 efforts to censor speakers based on their viewpoints. There are still more from 2014. Further roundups could be written about 2013, 2012, and beyond. Speech is frequently threatened. Speeches are regularly disrupted. Some are cancelled every year. To perceive no threat is to ignore reality. Or forget big speeches and look to another example of left-leaning speech that is threatened. As Glenn Greenwald wrote at The Intercept, “One of the most dangerous threats to campus free speech has been emerging at the highest levels of the University of California system, the sprawling collection of 10 campuses that includes UCLA and UC Berkeley. The university’s governing Board of Regents, with the support of University President Janet Napolitano and egged on by the state’s legislature, has been attempting to adopt new speech codes that—in the name of combating ‘anti-Semitism’—would formally ban various forms of Israel criticism.” He continued: Under the most stringent such regulations, students found to be in violation of these codes would face suspension or expulsion. In July, it appeared that the Regents were poised to enact the most extreme version, but decided instead to push the decision off until September, when they instead would adopt non-binding guidelines to define “hate speech” and “intolerance.” One of the Regents most vocally advocating for the most stringent version of the speech code is Richard Blum, the multi-millionaire defense contractor who is married to Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California. At a Regents meeting last week, reported the Los Angeles Times, Blum expressly threatened that Feinstein would publicly denounce the university if it failed to adopt far more stringent standards than the ones it appeared to be considering, and specifically demanded they be binding and contain punishments for students found to be in violation. The San Francisco Chronicle put it this way: “Regent Dick Blum said his wife, U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., ‘is prepared to be critical of this university’ unless UC not only tackles anti-Jewish bigotry but also makes clear that perpetrators will be punished.” The lawyer Ken White wrote that “Blum threatened that his wife … would interfere and make trouble if the Regents didn’t commit to punish people for prohibited speech.” As campus First Amendment lawyer Ari Cohn put it the following day, “Feinstein and her husband think college students should be expelled for protected free speech.” For now, no such speech code has been adopted. Does Stanley deny that the powerful, politically connected forces pushing for it are a threat to speech on campus? There are still more examples. Here is a Marquette professor whose tenure was threatened over a blog post. Two years ago, I wrote about the NYPD’s efforts to spy on Muslim students using undercover agents for no reason other than their religion, an effort that spanned months and produced zero leads. Anyone who doubts that this abhorrent profiling chilled the speech of an ethnic-minority group should inform themselves about their understandable reaction to discovering that government spies were in their midst. To sum up: free speech on campus is threatened from a dozen directions. It is threatened by police spies, overzealous administrators, and students who are intolerant of dissent. It is threatened by activists agitating for speech codes and sanctions for professors or classmates who disagree with them. It is threatened by people who push to disinvite speakers because of their viewpoints and those who shut down events to prevent people from speaking. Harper and Stanley were unpersuaded that free speech is under threat not because they defend speech codes or sanctions––both say outright at different times that they are for untrammeled speech––but because they are blind to the number and degree of threats to speech. And this whole discussion has been restricted to documented, overt threats to speech. Chilling effects are harder to quantify or cite, but they are real. Professors and students see those around them being punished for their viewpoints and decide to hold their tongues rather than speak their minds. Stanley denies that this is a significant problem. And yet, last semester, without looking very hard, I found and spoke to tenured and non-tenured professors and students at Yale, his own institution, who told me that their speech was chilled. They feared that their place at the school would be jeopardized if they opined honestly about campus controversies; or did not want to be targets of intolerant activists like the ones who spat on lecture attendees because the activists disagreed with words spoken at the lecture. The evidence that free speech is threatened on college campuses is overwhelming. Doubters who can’t accurately characterize the evidence should study the relevant material more thoroughly before dismissing free-speech concerns and impugning the motives of the people who raise them––especially if, like Harper and Stanley, they earnestly believe that free speech should be protected. I urge them to look again at the evidence and to join other liberals already engaged in this fight. The marginalized college students of the future will thank them.
Taking away freedom of expression ultimately harms minorities, criticism, and dissent because it makes the environment non-inclusive and unequal
Lectlaw’14- The Lectric Law Library is the internet’s finest legal resource for legal pros and laypeople alike. (The Lectric Law Library. “Freedom of Expression ACLU Briefing Paper Number 10”. 2014. 5 January 2017. JB.)
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and the other framers of the Bill of Rights were products of the Age of Enlightenment. They eschewed the superstitions and intolerance of earlier times, believing instead in the power of reason, the search for truth, and the perfectability of human society. Freedom of inquiry and liberty of expression were clearly essential to the process of debate and discovery that they viewed as indispensable to the achievement of human progress. Questioning of authority was also a central theme of the Enlightenment era. The philosophers of the day well understood the tendency of government to perpetuate itself by enacting repressive measures to silence those opposed to its conduct. According to one libertarian thinker of the period, a citizen had the right to "say everything which his passions suggest; he may employ all his time, and all his talents...to do so, in speaking against the government matters that are false, scandalous and malicious," and yet he should be "safe within the sanctuary of the press." Speech was regarded as beyond the reach of criminal sanctions; only "overt acts" could be punished. Given the primacy that the framers assigned to the values the First Amendment embodies, it is fitting that freedom of expression should be the first freedom cited in the Bill of Rights. Why does freedom of expression play such a critical role in our constitutional system? There are four primary reasons why freedom of expression, which encompasses speech, the press, assembly and petition, is essential to a free society: First, freedom of expression is the foundation of self-fulfillment. Self- expression whichenables an individual to realize his or her full potential as a human being. The right of individuals to express their thoughts, desires, and aspirations, and to communicate freely with others, affirms the dignity and worth of each and every member of society. Thus, freedom of expression is an end in itself and should not be subordinated to any other goals of society. Second, freedom of expression is vital to the attainment and advancement of knowledge. The eminent 19th century civil libertarian, John Stuart Mill, contended that enlightened judgment is possible only if one considers all facts and ideas, from whatever source, and tests one's own conclusions against opposing views. But the right to express oneself is not conditioned on the content of one's views, which may be true or false, "good" or "bad," socially useful or harmful. All points of view should be represented in the "marketplace of ideas" so that society can benefit from debate about their worth. Third, freedom of expression is necessary to our system of self-government. If the American people are to be truly sovereign, the masters of their fate and of their elected government, they must be well-informed. They must have access to all information, ideas and points of view. The precondition for a free society is an informed and enlightened citizenry. Tyrannies thrive on mass ignorance. Fourth, freedom of expression provides a "check" against possible government corruption and excess, which seem to be permanent features of the human condition. Restrictions on freedom of speech always authorize the government to decide how, and against whom, the restrictions should apply. The more authority the government has, the more it will use that authority to suppress unpopular minorities, criticism and dissent. Because freedom of expression is so basic to a free society, the ACLU believes that it should 'never' be abridged by the government. What was the early history of the First Amendment and freedom of expression? The First Amendment's early years were not entirely auspicious. Although the early Americans enjoyed great freedom compared to citizens of other nations, even the Constitution's framers, once in power, could not resist the strong temptation to circumvent the First Amendment's clear mandate. In 1798, seen years after the First Amendment's adoption, Congress, over the objections of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, passed the Alien and Sedition Act. Ironically, this Act incorporated much of the English law of seditious libel (indeed, seditious libel remained a part of our law for the next 171 years), and was used by the dominant Federalist Party to prosecute a number of prominent Republican newspaper editors. But none of those cases reached the Supreme Court. Throughout the 19th century and much of the 20th, federal and state sedition, criminal anarchy and criminal conspiracy laws were used repeatedly to suppress expression by slavery abolitionists, religious minorities, early feminists, labor organizers, pacifists and left-wing political radicals. For example, prior to the Civil War every Southern state passed laws limiting speech in an attempt to stifle criticism of slavery. In Virginia, anyone who "by speaking or writing maintains that owners have no right of property in slaves" was subject to a one-year prison sentence. In 1929, feminist Margaret Sanger was arrested for giving a lecture on birth control. Trade union meetings were banned and courts routinely granted employers' requests for injunctions that prohibited strikes and other labor protest. Protest against U.S. entry into World War I was widely suppressed, and dissenters were jailed for their pronouncements and writings. In the early 1920s, many states outlawed the display of red or black flags, symbols of communism and anarchism. In 1923, author Upton Sinclair was arrested for trying to read the First Amendment at a union rally. Many people were arrested merely for membership in groups regarded as radical by the government. It was in response to the excesses of this period that the ACLU was born in 1920.
Not giving access to free speech creates a dehumanizing and racist culture
Freiere’68- Paulo Freiere is a Brazilian educator and philosopher who was leading expert on critical pedagogy. (Paulo Freiere. “Pedagogy of the Oppressed”. 1968. 5 January 2017. JB.)
As we attempt to analyze dialogue as a human phenomenon, we discover something which is the essence of dialogue itself: the word. But the word is more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, we must seek its constitutive elements. Within the word we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed—even in part—the other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis.1Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world.2 An unauthentic word, one which is unable to transform reality, results when dichotomy is imposed upon its constitutive elements. When a word is deprived of its dimension of action, reflection automatically suffers as well; and the word is changed into idle chatter, into verbalism, into an alienated and alienating "blah." It becomes an empty word, one which cannot denounce the world, for denunciation is impossible without a commitment to transform, and there is no transformation without action. On the other hand, if action is emphasized exclusively, to the detriment of reflection, the word is converted into activism. The latter—action for action's sake—negates the true praxis and makes dialogue impossible. Either dichotomy, by creating unauthentic forms of existence, creates also unauthentic forms of thought, which reinforce the original dichotomy. Human existence cannot be Silent, nor can it be nourished by false words, but only by true words, with which men and women transform the world. To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the namers as a problem and requires of them a new naming. Human beings are not built in silence,3 but in word, in work, in action-reflection. But while to say the true word—which is work, which is praxis—is to transform the world, saying that word is not the privilege of some few persons, but the right of everyone. Consequently, no one can say a true word alone—nor can she say it for another, in a prescriptive act which robs others of their words. Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world and those who do not wish this naming—between those who deny others the right to speak their word and those whose right to speak has been denied them. Those who have been denied their primordial right to speak their word must first reclaim this right and prevent the continuation of this dehumanizing aggression. If it is in speaking their word that people, by naming the world, transform it, dialogue imposes itself as the way by which they achieve significance as human beings. Dialogue is thus an existential necessity. And since dialogue is the encounter in which the united reflection and action of the dialoguers are addressed to the world which is to be transformed and humanized, this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one persons "depositing" ideas in another, nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be "consumed" by the discussants. Nor yet is it a hostile, polemical argument between those who are committed neither to the naming of the world, nor to the search for truth, but rather to the imposition of their own truth. Because dialogue is an encounter among women and men who name the world, it must not be a situation where some name on behalf of others. It is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another. The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialogues; it is conquest of the world for the liberation of humankind.
And Restricting free speech causes oppression that’s our second impact
Durden’15- Tyler Durden is a writer for Zero Hedge which shows news and editorial opinions. (Tyler Durden. “Why Only Free Speech Gives Safe Space To The Oppressed”. 2015. 9 January 2017.)
Social justice protests have been roiling American universities, even causing administrative heads to roll. To a significant degree, these campus uprisings have been characterized by an impulse to restrict speech and expression for the sake of creating “safe spaces” for marginalized groups. However, speech restriction is a double-edged sword that can just as easily injure the very people campus activists seek to help. The turmoil at the University of Missouri (Mizzou) in particular was sparked by racial incidents. And the protesters are closely aligned with the Black Lives Matter movement, which combats police brutality against black Americans. Moreover, these threats are emerging on university campuses and are being justified on “social justice” grounds. Like the cops, defenders of the Israeli occupation of Palestine are seeking to restrict speech on an “anti-hate” basis in order to insulate the occupation’s brutality and atrocities from criticism. As Nora Barrows-Friedman recently reported: “A member of the University of California’s governing body has called for the expulsion or suspension of students for expressing their views about Israel, under the guise of combating anti-Jewish bigotry. “This comes as Israel lobby groups, flush with huge new injections of cash, are stepping up their efforts to silence the Palestine solidarity movement on campuses nationwide. “During a 17 September meeting of the University of California (UC) Regents to discuss a ‘statement of principles against intolerance,’ Richard Blum also threatened to have his wife, US Senator Dianne Feinstein, publicly criticize the university if it did not enforce penalties against perceived bigotry. “Feinstein’s criticism could put the university system under federal scrutiny. “Another regent, Hadi Makarechian, agreed, according to The San Francisco Chronicle, saying that without punishment, ‘we’re just stating a lot of stuff on paper.’ “Blum and other regents, backed by Israel lobby groups, are pushing the university to adopt policies that free speech advocates warn could violate the First Amendment. “The Board of Regents had been due to vote on whether to adopt the US State Department’s definition of anti-Semitism as university policy at its meeting in July. “That definition is based on a ‘working definition’ of anti-Semitism once considered by a European Union body but later dropped. “Palestine solidarity and free speech advocates point out that the government definition conflates criticism of Israel with anti-Jewish bigotry. A key strategy of Israel advocates, they say, has been to urge university administrators to treat criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism as one and the same.” Just as the cops are blaming Black Lives Matter and viral videos for “inciting” violence against police, the hard-right Israeli government and its champions throughout the world have similarly been accusing the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, and the online dissemination of documented Israeli brutality, of being “incitement” for terrorism against Israel. They are pushing to have such “incitement” restricted. And they are succeeding. In October, France’s highest court ruled that advocacy of BDS is illegal “incitement” and “hate speech.” And as Glenn Greenwald wrote in The Intercept: “In May, CBC reported that Canadian officials threatened to prosecute BDS activists there under ‘hate speech’ laws, and after those officials denied doing so, we obtained and published the emails proving they did just that. The February Haaretz article described this troubling event in the U.K.: ‘In 2007, the British University and College Union said it would drop plans to boycott Israeli institutions after legal advisers said doing so would violate anti-discrimination laws.’ In 2013, New York City officials joined an (ultimately failed) Alan Dershowitz-led campaign to threaten the funding of Brooklyn College for the crime of hosting pro-BDS speakers.” Again, restricting speech is a double-edged sword. As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) warned: “Free speech rights are indivisible. “Restricting the speech of one group or individual jeopardizes everyone’s rights because the same laws or regulations used to silence bigots can be used to silence you. Conversely, laws that defend free speech for bigots can be used to defend the rights of civil rights workers, anti-war protesters, lesbian and gay activists and others fighting for justice.” Many campus activists have lashed out in frustration at “free speech purism,” which they regard as misplaced in the context of institutionalized oppression. But it is extremely short-sighted to sacrifice universal principle on the altar of identity politics for the sake of marginalized groups. Once you accept the infringement of universal rights as an acceptable political weapon, it will be wielded more effectively by oppressors against the oppressed (cops against blacks, Israeli occupiers against Palestinians, etc.), and not the other way around. Authoritarian restriction is a game much better suited for the mighty than for the marginalized. If you replace the power of principle with the principle of power, it is the relatively powerless who will get the worst of it.
Thus I affirm the resolution on constitutionally protected speech
Resolved: Public Colleges and Universities in the United States ought not restrict any unconstitutionally protected speech.
Deliberative Pedagogy
Due to the need to help save a crumbling college system, the AC offers a deliberative pedagogy as the answer:
A Deliberative Pedagogy not only stops oppression and racist culture but also shows student engagement and development
Doherty’12- Joni Doherty is the director of the New England Center for Civic Life and teaches in the American Studies program at Franklin Pierce University. (Joni Doherty. “Deliberative Pedagogy: An Education that Matters”. 2012. 10 January 2017)
Deliberation is a set of practices that foster the conditions needed to understand and address these kinds of dilemmas. Participants in deliberative forums are encouraged to consider not only statistics and expert analysis, but also the experiential and value-laden aspects. Everyone affected by the issue needs to feel both welcome and encouraged to participate in defining and addressing the problem. Public deliberation requires each person to think critically and creatively and, listen attentively, examine assumptions, value differences, engage in respectful and honest dialogue, and reach well-reasoned judgments. Deliberating together is about deepening understanding of the problem in order to craft solutions, not about winning a debate or standing your ground. Deliberation is can be understood as the cultivation of a set of capacities that can lead to a new construction of knowledge, one that comes out of the public’s work together. Higher education has long embraced the expert construction of knowledge. Although this is changing, traditionally colleges and universities have conducted research and educated students on principles guided by this assumption. For example, many instructors focus on “covering” the course material through methods that ensure the efficient “delivery” of discipline-specific knowledge. This model, in which each side has clearly designated positions, may have secured the desired outcomes in a political, social, and economic environment where roles and responsibilities were categorically and hierarchically structured and in situations where everyone shared a common set of values and experiences. However, in rapidly changing and diverse societies, things are far messier. Today, because of the overlap of private, professional, and public realms, knowledge is pluralistic and situated. Situated knowledge is context specific. “What is known to be true” depends on its relationship to other conditions present in any particular situation. Multiple understandings might exist around one event or a common understanding may emerge over time. This isn’t relativism but instead requires that we take into account the dynamic interplay of shifting contexts, diverse perspectives, and competing demands. Deliberative pedagogies call for a rethinking and restructuring of the activities of teaching and learning. Through calling on each person to engage with others in democratic, inclusive, and respectfully discursive practices, deliberative pedagogies help students better understand differing perspectives and the complexity of persistent problems that spring from ethical dilemmas. Deliberative democracy minimizes or avoids the traditional leader/follower or expert/novice structure and foregrounds teamwork, intercultural knowledge, ethical reasoning, and action. For instructors who chose to fully employ deliberative democratic pedagogies, the shifts in teaching and learning would be far-reaching. Some of these would include a restructuring of traditional hierarchies and an inter-rogation of the very nature of what we understand to be knowledge and truth. Teaching and learning based on the principles of deliberative deliberation democracy are valuable in all fields, not just those related to communication, public policy, or politics. The need to make complex decisions about matters of common concern extends across every discipline. Deliberative pedagogies provide the interdisciplinary perspective and social and communicative skills necessary for successfully navigating and engaging in a post-industrial and increasingly diverse society. Connecting discipline-specific knowledge to concrete problems that transcend disciplinary boundaries opens pathways for students to become engaged with public and professional issues both inside and outside the classroom. The primary goal isn’t civic education per se, but for students to develop the commitment, knowledge, and skills necessary for creating and maintaining equitable, diverse, and democratic spaces, whether it be in the local community, the workplace, the nation, or the world.
AC Does not claim that Deliberative Pedagogy is completely perfect, just that it’s good idea and a great first step to create change
Longo’13- Nicholas V. Longo is a professor at Providence College who completes studies in public and community service studies. (Nicholas V. Longo. “Deliberative Pedagogy in the Community: Connecting Deliberative Dialogue, Community Engagement, and Democratic Education”. 2013. 10 January 2017.)
The efficacy of public deliberation at resolving complex issues has led to its elements being incorporated into domains beyond the public policy or political sphere. One of the most prominent of these areas is education, specifically, deliberation as an integral part of pedagogy. The difference between deliberative politics and deliberative pedagogy is that the former integrates deliberative decision-making with public action (Mathews, 2012), and the latter integrates deliberative decision-making with teaching and learning. Deliberative pedagogy in the community itis a collaborative approach that melds deliberative dialogue, community engagement, and democratic education. While different, the approach is not entirely new. It draws upon the historical efforts of the Highlander Folk School during the civil rights movement that was led by pioneering educators such as Myles Horton, Septima Clark, and Bernice Robinson. Much has been written about the Highlander tradition that connects education with social change (see for instance, Adams, 1975 and Glen, 1996), but there has been little research on how the processes used at Highlander can inform the practices of deliberative pedagogy. This is especially timely as a growing number of projects are involving college students in deliberative conversations outside what can sometimes be “the bubble” of the college campus. Specifically, students are stepping outside the classroom and connecting theory with real-world community problem-solving through intergenerational “learning circles” with new immigrants, forums with community members on public issues, and multiyear civic engagement courses. Faculty and students are co-creating shared spaces for dialogue and collaborative action in the community and rethinking long-held power dynamics between the campus and the community. This effort—and others like it—is not without its challenges; however they have the potential to shift our basic understanding of the role of higher education in society. Deliberative pedagogy holds enormous promise in promoting the civic mission of higher education through more collaborative approaches to teaching and learning that respond to important and rapidly shifting contextual trends: increasing diversity, new technologies that promote transparency and collaboration, and ardent desire of young people to “make a difference” through concrete social action. It moves the academy from the more traditional “teaching-to-learning” dynamic toward a model of “collaborative engagement” in which knowledge is more genuinely co-created through reflective public action. This shift toward collaboration also helps illuminate the civic dimensions of teaching and learning that increasing numbers of students are demanding and for which the communities in which higher education institutions are located—most of which are struggling with complex problems—are asking.
If there is time go over this:
Look to the aff as a way to free people of this problem, by not restricting free speech we give those who are oppressed and dealing with racist culture a chance to become freed of these problems through deliberative pedagogy. Note that the AC understands that this road may be difficult but regardless through the use of deliberative pedagogy, we are able to help others. Our Lectlaw evidence builds upon this further through the four key reasons of why free speech is necessary, this further supports AC solvency.
