Tournament: yes | Round: 1 | Opponent: yes | Judge: yes

Link

Apocalypse discourse creates mass fear and anxiety

Quinby, Lee, 1994, Macaulay Honors College's Distinguished Lecturer, Anti-Apocalypse, Exercises in Geological Criticism,
U. S. society suffers from apocalyptic fits of two different kinds. First
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regard worldwide devastation as a necessary step for a transformation in human consciousness. 

Impact:

The fear of the apocalypse leads to helplessness means social change won't actually happen mean the K is a prior question; focus on a future that will never come means questions of oppression are always pushed to the side, turns aff because people are not given value.

Quinby, Lee, 1994, Macaulay Honors College's Distinguished Lecturer, Anti-Apocalypse, Exercises in Geological Criticism,
In the twentieth century, belief in a technological disaster of irrevocable proportions on the
AND
are merely among the unfortunate ones who will be here for the end. 

Alternative:

The narrative that tells us of this apocalyptic future must be rejected, there is no future apocalypse, we already live in the apocalypse. The alternative is to reject the traditional form of political rhetoric of this future apocalypse and form one that accepts an apocalyptic life.

Erik Swyngedouw (2013), professor of geography at the University of Manchester, Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 9-18, DOI: 10.1080/10455752.2012.759252
Against this cynical stand, the third, and for me proper, leftist response
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within this reality that political choices have to be made and sides taken.

Tournament: Churchill | Round: 2 | Opponent: TomC | Judge: Jonat Torrez

Kant NEG

1NC

FW

Reciprocity of external freedoms cannot exist without government
Ripstein '04 Arthur Ripstein, 2004 ("Authority and Coercion" http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00003.x/abstract, Arthur Ripstein is Professor of Law and Philosophy. He was appointed to the Department of Philosophy in 1987, promoted to full professor in 1996, appointed to the Faculty of Law in 1999, and appointed to the rank of University Professor in 2016. He received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, a degree in law from Yale, and an undergraduate degree from the University of Manitoba.)
Kant sees the state of nature as lacking in this sort of reciprocity for two distinct, but related, reasons. The first is a problem about determnacy: even if everyone recognizes the fundamental principles of right, and the limits on freedom that they demand, and also agrees about every situation where rights are in dispute, there is, Kant contends, no basis to expect unforced agreement on the application of the general principles to particular facts. The problem is not just that the principles are too general—though that, too, is a problem—but rather, that the application of interpersonal norms to facts always generates problems of determinacy, for reasons that we will explore. When different people apply the same standards differently, people are not subject to reciprocal limits on their freedom. As reciprocal limits on freedom, those rights are enforceable even if people do not agree about them. But they must be made reciprocal in order to be enforceable. The second is a problem about assurance, which Kant makes in the Hobbesian-sounding passage to which I referred earlier: I do not need to refrain from interfering with the possessions of others unless I can be assured that they in turn will refrain from interfering with my possessions. That is because, for Kant, right requires a reciprocal authorization to coerce, and where an authorization to coerce is not reciprocal it is not a matter of right. If the ability to secure compliance from others depends upon the incidental features of my strength, we are not subject to a universal law after all. The two problems, taken together, require a single solution, that is, a state that will render the demands of right determi- nate, through legislation and adjudication, and will render the enforce- ability of those demands reciprocal through an enforcement mechanism, so that the enforceability of rights is not a reflection of the strength of the particular parties to a dispute.

A state is uniquely necessary to create rightful obligations

 Ripstein 2 Arthur Ripstein, 2004 ("Authority and Coercion" http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00003.x/abstract, Arthur Ripstein is Professor of Law and Philosophy. He was appointed to the Department of Philosophy in 1987, promoted to full professor in 1996, appointed to the Faculty of Law in 1999, and appointed to the rank of University Professor in 2016. He received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, a degree in law from Yale, and an undergraduate degree from the University of Manitoba.)
People may still be under an ethical obligation to respect the person and goods of
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the primary way in which it can create a regime of equal freedom.

Thus, the standard is ensuring the conditions of equal external freedom

Coercion is acceptable when it acts as a hindrance of a hindrance

Ripstein 3 Arthur Ripstein, 2004 ("Authority and Coercion" http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00003.x/abstract, Arthur Ripstein is Professor of Law and Philosophy. He was appointed to the Department of Philosophy in 1987, promoted to full professor in 1996, appointed to the Faculty of Law in 1999, and appointed to the rank of University Professor in 2016. He received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, a degree in law from Yale, and an undergraduate degree from the University of Manitoba.)
Because wrongdoing grounds redress, coercion can also operate to deter wrongdoing, for deterrence
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is just to say that threats may be used to protect right.

Because a hindrance of a hindrance is protecting reciprocal external freedoms, and the state is the only agent who may act towards protecting external freedoms, it is therefore necessary that the state execute the hindrances of hindrances.

Thus, the advocacy. Public colleges and universities in the US ought to restrict the use of hate speech and seditious speech on their campuses.

Contention 1- Seditious Speech

In the status quo, seditious speech is constitutionally protected.

Seditious Speech and Seditious Libel.—Opposition to government through speech alone has been subject to punishment throughout much of history under laws proscribing "seditious" utterances. In this country, the Sedition Act of 1798 made criminal, inter alia, malicious writings which defamed, brought into contempt or disrepute, or excited the hatred of the people against the Government, the President, or the Congress, or which stirred people to sedition.966 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,967 the Court surveyed the controversy surrounding the enactment and enforcement of the Sedition Act and concluded that debate "first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.... Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history .... ~That history~ reflect~s~ a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment." The "central meaning" discerned by the Court, quoting Madison's comment that in a republican government "the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people," is that "~t~he right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government."

In the squo, if the threat of sedition is imminent, that it would cause immediate damage, then seditious speech is banned. Wilderson, a siditous author is alive and breathing, and his books are still in production.

Seditious speech is incompatible with ensuring the conditions of reciprocal external freedom because it threatens the state Varden 09

Helga Varden, April 2009 ("A Kantian Conception of Free Speech". Helga Varden is currently the co-president for the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love and the Vice-President of the North American Kant Society. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4)
To understand Kant's condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does consider seditious speech a public crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the government or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as seditious, the speaker's intention must be to encourage and support efforts to subvert the government or to instigate its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might. Since the state is the only means through which right can replace might, the state outlaws it. And since it is a crime that "endanger~s~ the commonwealth" rather than citizens qua private citizens, it is a public crime (6: 331). The refutation of a natural executive right also explains why Kant holds that public right covers speech amounting to a private crime, such as a serious contractual lie. An act of aggression, or coercion, against another person is also an attempt to undermine the state's rightful monopoly on coercion. Hence all violent aggressions, including serious contractual lies, are crimes covered by public law – what we call 'private crime laws'. They are not regulated by private law (6: 331) The refutation of a natural executive right also explains why Kant holds that public right covers speech amounting to a private crime, such as a serious contrac- tual lie. An act of aggression, or coercion, against another person is also an attempt to undermine the state's rightful monopoly on coercion. Hence all violent aggres- sions, including serious contractual lies, are crimes covered by public law – what we call 'private crime laws'. They are not regulated by private law (6: 331 

Contention 2- Hate Speech

Hate speech is constitutionally protected under the first amendment

Volokh 15 Helga Varden, April 2009 ("A Kantian Conception of Free Speech". Helga Varden is currently the co-president for the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love and the Vice-President of the North American Kant Society. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4)
I keep hearing about a supposed "hate speech" exception to the First Amendment
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. Constitutional law is no more set in stone than any other law. 

Hate speech is inherently incompatible with ensuring conditions of reciprocal external freedoms

Varden 2 Helga Varden, April 2009 ("A Kantian Conception of Free Speech". Helga Varden is currently the co-president for the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love and the Vice-President of the North American Kant Society. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-90-481-8999-1_4)
Even if we accept that issues of systemic dependency explain why the state will regulate
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the state's systemic inability to provide rightful interaction for all of its citizens.

Tournament: yes | Round: Finals | Opponent: yes | Judge: yes

Special obligation NC

1NC

FW

1. Agency is set apart from other enterprises in that it is inescapable

(Luca Ferrero, "Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency". Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV, Jan 12, 2009.(https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/ferrero/www/pubs/ferrero-constitutivism.pdf) Professor of Philosophy, University of Wesconsin at Milwaukee.)
The initial appeal of the shmagency objection rests on the impression that there is a
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. This is the kind of nonoptionality that supports the viability of constitutivism. 

2. Truth does not exist independently of humans. For instance, individuals would have different interpretations of what is true if they were kept separate from each other. Thus, there are no a priori truth claims that can apply to every instance regardless of the context. Instead, we derive truth based on our relationships and agreements with others. Truth is intersubjective in that it can only exist based on the understanding and affirmation of certain identities and their relationship to others. Without this understanding or affirmation, it is impossible to claim anything as true since everything would be disagreed upon with no reason to prefer one interpretation over any other.

3. Actions that we take are predicated upon confirming/furthering the identity that is based on an aggregate of interactions with others. Because of this, our identities are an established truth. This means that when we take any action, it perpetuates and legitimizes that identity.

4. Identities are recognitive:

a. If truth is intersubjective then when we come into the world and identify other agents we encounter alterity because it has already been given to them as a condition of their identity, and in order for us to recognize that they are other we have to look at their differences; this also means that you can only hold an identity if it is recognized by others because identities are intersubjective truths.

b. When we look to understand alterity, it's impossible to look at all instances at once so we have to focus on specific groups and in doing so that inevitably excludes a forms of the other.

c. Interaction with the other makes us vulnerable because we extend ourselves to the other and become vulnerable to the way that they construct our identities and our necessity for them to affirm our identity. This also opens the possibility for them to misrecognize us, or not recognize us at all.

d. Precariousness must then be the condition for life because what someone considers to be living can only be possible if that person holds an identity that creates conditions for life, this also becomes true at the point that our identity is a form of truth, which is intersubjective.

5. If we do not recognize the precarity of life, then we reject the system of intersubjectivity. If we do not recognize this system, then our conceptions of our own identity and how it is formed ceases to exist. It becomes permissible to misrecognize others, and thus our understanding of our own identity breaks down.  We wouldn't be able to be recognized as people or an identity

6. These norms of recognizing alterity predate us which forces us to evaluate why we should care in the first place. In order to engage in any interaction, including debate, we are already engaging with the structures of recognition to facilitate it. There are no instances in which someone is completely isolated from relationships who would be asking the questions about why this matters, because everyone is unwillingly cast into these relationships. Apprehending the recognition of alterity is a necessary step in making sure we don't misrecognize, or fail to recognize, the other in these inevitable confrontation.

7. Traditional framing mechanisms don't assign value to special obligations which breaks down reasonability, when a promise is made or you owe a group something it creates a special obligation.

SEP, 2014, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public, Special Obligations, First published Thu Oct 17, 2002; substantive revision Sun Jan 5, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/~~#
What is special about special obligations? One way to answer this question is to
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full assurance relied fails them in the hour of need" (59).

8. Ought is defined as mora obligations, an obligation is created when there is sufficient reason to act

Contention 1:

Special Obligations are agent relative reasons for the government to act

SEP, 2014, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public, Special Obligations, First published Thu Oct 17, 2002; substantive revision Sun Jan 5, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/~~#
The discussion of the previous section stressed that the alleged difficulties that consequentialism has in
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we did. (See Orsi for a discussion of nearness and obligations.)

Special obligations as a guide to good and bad creates moral danger, therefore they can't hold moral value or else moral reasoning breaks down.

SEP, 2014, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public, Special Obligations, First published Thu Oct 17, 2002; substantive revision Sun Jan 5, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/special-obligations/~~#
Special relationships take many forms, and the parties to those relationships range across the
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we ought to balance moral and non-moral reasons against one another.

Collapse of moral reasoning means you vote neg because then there can't be a moral obligation to limit qualified immunity for police officers.

Tournament: yes | Round: 1 | Opponent: yes | Judge: yes
Part 1 - Resolutional burdens

The aff only justifies the need for prohibition if they can prove that the harms in their case are inseparable from the production of nuclear power. Otherwise, those harms could be solved through regulations without prohibition. The aff only has ground to win on an advocacy that is a prohibition of nuclear power while the neg has ground to win on regulation. This is because regulations still allow the existence and production of nuclear power that include revisions and innovation whereas prohibition means halting the production immediately halting all potential progress. If the aff only regulates and does not prohibit, they are not meeting the resolution.
There is a difference in what is required to justify each- a prohibition is to forbid an action or activity by authority or law. In contrast, a regulation is an official rule or law that says how something should be done. The difference is about whether the law will permit any form of nuclear power whatsoever.
To prove that there ought to be be no nuclear power whatsoever requires that an issue to be presented that is inherent to nuclear power. Otherwise, the need to solve that harm would only justify a regulation because the problem could one day be separated from the production of nuclear power, thus solving the AFF harms. Therefore, the Affirmative burden is to prove that the harms identified in the AFF are necessarily inseparable from nuclear power. The failure to meet that burden means that the aff harms justify a solution that takes the form of a regulation. This is sufficient to negate. If I show they are theoretically separable from the production of nuclear power, then that justifies a regulation, and therefore you negate.

Part 2 - Offense
I advocate that instead of prohibiting the production of nuclear power, countries ought to enact regulations that only permits the production of nuclear power that only allows for nuclear power production does not do insert internal links to impacts here
Two reasons to negate under the burden structure:
First, as I will demonstrate later in the line-by-line,
Subpoint A) Prohibition kills research and development

Subpoint B) It is theoretically possible to develop nuclear power that is good under the AFF standard, which is a unique disadvantage to the AFF