I affirm, I value justice since the resolution asks how universities ought act in context of the constitution. First, To act in a moral sense is to recognize a relationship between the subject and rules, which allows the individual to claim an identity as a moral subject Foucault writes: http://foucault.info/doc/documents/foucault-historyofsexuality2-en-html The Use of Pleasure. They concern what might be called the determination of the ethical substance; that is, the way in which the individual has to constitute this or that part of himself as the prime material of his moral conduct. Thus, one can relate the crucial aspects of the practice of fidelity to the strict observance of interdictions and obligations in the very acts one accomplishes. But one can also make the essence of fidelity consist in the mastery of desires, in the fervent combat one directs against them, in the strength with which one is able to resist temptations: what makes up the content of fidelity in this case is that vigilance and that struggle. In these conditions, the contradictory movements of the soul-much more than the carrying out of the acts themselves-will be the prime material of moral practice. Alternatively, One can have it consist in the intensity,continuity, and reciprocity of feelings that are experienced vis-a-vis the partner, and in the quality of the relationship that permanently binds the two spouses. HE continues: In short, for an action to be "moral," it must not be reducible to an act or a series of acts conforming to a rule, a law, or a value. Of course all moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, and a relationship with the self. The latter is not simply "self-awareness" but self-formation as an "ethical subject," a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform him self. There is no specific moral action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not call for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without "modes of subjectivation" and an "ascetics" or "practices of the self' that support them. Moral action is indissociable from these forms of self-activity, and they do not differ any less from one morality to another than do the systems of values, rules, and interdictions. Thus, an understanding of the self is a prerequisite to understanding moral maxims and responsibility. Moral conduct creates a new identity construction of the ethical subject, forming the object of his ethical practice. Thus, moral actions are those that promote representations which include varying claims of recognition. In order to be a moral subject at all, there must be a space to be recognized as one, and thus the aft framework is a prerequisite, Butler 1: Frames of War. Verso 2009 Those norms draw upon shifting schemes of intelligibility, so that we can and do have, for example, histories of life and histories of death. Indeed, we have ongoing debates about whether the fetus should count as life, or a life, or a human life; we have further debates about conception and what constitutes the first moments of a living organism; we have debates also about what constitutes death, whether it is the death of the brain, or of the heart, whether it is the effect of a legal declaration or a set of medical and legal certificates. All of these debates involve contested notions of personhood and, implicitly, questions regarding the "human animal" and how that conjunctive (and chiasmic) existence is to be understood. The fact that these debates exist, and continue to exist, does not imply that life and death are direct consequences of discourse (an absurd conclusion, if taken literally). Rather, it implies that there is no life and no death without a relation to some frame. Even when life and death take place between, outside, or across the frames by which they are for the most part organized, they still take place, though in ways that call into question the necessity of the mechanisms through which ontological fields are constituted. If a life is produced according to the norms by which life is recognized, this implies neither that everything about a life is produced according to such norms nor that we must reject the idea that there is a remainder of "life"-suspended and spectral-that limns and haunts every normative instance of life. Production is partial and is, indeed, perpetually haunted by its ontologically uncertain double. Indeed, every normative instance is shadowed by its own failure, and very often that failure assumes a figural form. The figure lays claim to no certain ontological status, and though it can be apprehended as "living," it is not always recognized as a life. In fact, a living figure outside the norms of life not only becomes the problem to be managed by normativity, but seems to be that which normativity is bound to reproduce: it is living, but not a life. It falls outside the frame furnished by the norm, but only as a relentless double whose ontology cannot be secured, but whose living status is open to apprehension. Finally, relations to regimes of truth is what generates identity. Butler writes: Giving an Account of Oneself. Judith Butler. Fordham University 2005. His point, however, is not only that there is always a relation to such norms, but that any relation to the regime of truth will at the same time be a relation to myself. An operation of critique cannot take place without this reflexive dimension. To call into question a regime of truth, where that regime of truth governs subjectivation, is to call into question the truth of myself and, indeed, to question my ability to tell the truth about myself, to give an account of myself.Thus if I question the regime of truth, I question, too, the regime through which being, and my own ontological status, is allocated. Critique is not merely of a given social practice or a certain horizon of intelligibility within which practices and institutions appear, it also implies that I come into question for myself. Self-questioning becomes an ethical consequence of critique for Foucault, as he makes clear in ''What Is Critique?'' It also turns out that self-questioning of this sort involves putting oneself at risk, imperiling the very possi- bility of being recognized by others, since to question the norms of recognition that govern what I might be, to ask what they leave out, what they might be compelled to accommodate, is, in relation to the present regime, to risk unrecognizability as a subject or at least to become an occasion for posing the questions of who one is (or can be) and whether or not one is recognizable. Thus, agents need to question larger structures of power in order to be included into the moral calculus. Identity is a process, not an absolute, which means recognition is a prerequisite to ethical considerations. Thus, the criterion is Creating more inclusive norms of recognition. Part 2 offense
Allowing the judicial system to define which speech is injurious allows the judiciary to enact a particular violence of its own through the ability to interpret protected and unprotected speech.
Butler, Judith. "Burning Acts: Injurious Speech." The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 9. January 1996. Web. December 07, 2016. http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable/vol3/iss1/9. Two remarks of qualification: first, some critical race theorists such as Charles Lawrence AND speech: with so much protection, what do we have to fear?
Hate speech prosecution ignores the violence inherent to the judicial decision which allows an arbitrary exertion of power to define injurious acts.
Butler, Judith. "Burning Acts: Injurious Speech." The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 9. January 1996. Web. December 07, 2016. http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable/vol3/iss1/9. The Court seeks to decide whether or not the selection of the target of violence AND threaten the pieties and purities of race and sexuality will become most vulnerable.
Injurious words receive their power within a context of iterability and citationality, which complicates the notion of accountability. Rather than a singular act, injurious words rely on multiple acts and interpretations.
Butler, Judith. "Burning Acts: Injurious Speech." The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 9. January 1996. Web. December 07, 2016. http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable/vol3/iss1/9. If performativity requires a power to effect or enact what one names, then who AND in the future bc justice is in the furture not justicie in the present
Hate speech interpellates a certain subject into being but it is a messy process which opens up a space for agency, transgression, and resignification.
Bailey, Courtney. "Coming Out As Homophobic: Isaiah Washington And The Grey's Anatomy Scandal." Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 8:1, 1-21. February 24, 2011. Web. December 04, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2010.541926. The contrast between Washington and Knight belied another conspicuous silence within mainstream public discourse, AND blacks are straight,'' that was at least a place to start.
Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech
1AC
Framework
The starting point for ethical discussion must be grounded in the material world and non-ideal theory. Ideal theory ignores social realities, which influence what we can count as an ideal in the first place, which means that they can never be applied in the real world.
In the non-ideal reality of the heterogeneous United States, difference is inevitable. Three warrants:
All forms of politics rely on linguistic norms that have no fundamental source of authority. Language is constructed through use, which is social in nature.
Mouffe, Universities of Louvain, Paris and Essex and professorship at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster in the United Kingdom, 1999 Chantal, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?", The New School, Social Research AND always abridgments of practices, they are inseparable of specific forms of life.
Socialization creates language, which means that the systems of power we construct using language are also social in nature.
This means that difference is inevitable because each time we use a word, we play an active, constant role in shaping language.
There is no I without the other. Identity is intersubjective and constructed through social relations, which are always changing. BUTLER:
(Judith Butler. 1992. "Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism" Feminists Theorize the Political) "In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, AND the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself."
Justice finds itself in discrimination. All ethical frameworks must concede the exclusion of certain beliefs. Other theories would have to concede exclusion of certain beliefs as a condition for their normativity in the first place
Given this, the mission of politics is to deal with these differences in a way that maintains the political system. Otherwise, the differences are left to fester and branch out to individual collectivities that destroy society, which is deeply antithetical to the practical goal of ethics.
"The Democratic Paradox" by Chantal Mouffe 2000 "A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions AND antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility." (104)
An agonistic democracy where difference is respected and all viewpoints are given a chance to engage in the political discourse is key to this end.
"The Democratic Paradox" by Chantal Mouffe 2000 DD "Envisaged from the point of view of 'agonistic pluralism', the aim of AND should be seen as temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation." (102)
Aiming toward consensus is a false goal because consensus is impossible, difference is inevitable and contestation is key. Dividing people up and treating them as enemies is an equally false goal because it denies that the existence of an opposing identity is what constructs yours. The only way to resolve the inevitable conflict that comes with pluralism in our agency and ethics is to embrace an agonistic commitment, which recognizes that conflict is inevitable, but frames the other as a legitimate opponent instead of an enemy because without the opponent, your identity doesn't exist.
Thus, the standard is cultivating agonistic democratic subjects.
Impact calculus: The best way to foster agonistic democracy is by training people through participation in democratic practices. People are not created independently of socialization. Therefore, the standard must socialize people in an agonistic manner.
Prefer additionally: double bind – to act morally one must first know what is the right thing to do, which means any moral system has to be derivative of the procedures intrinsic to agonistic conflict:
A. If our moral belief changes after an agonistic conflict, then it shows that preserving the relationship based off of openness and disagreement is necessary to identity moral errors.
B. If my moral belief remains the same, it shows our beliefs are strong against criticism and therefore true.
Contention
The punishment from speech codes deter discussion, especially since they are often vague and up to the interpretation of the administration.
Powers, Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Public Affairs in the Clinton administration from 1993 to 1998 and column for The American Prospect and her numerous articles have appeared in USA Today, Elle, the New York Observer, Salon, and the Wall Street Journal, 2015 Kirsten, "How Liberals Ruined College", Daily Best, June 11th, Online: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/11/how-liberals-have-ruined-college.html - MG On today's campuses, left-leaning administrators, professors, and students are working AND them "harm" by saying something that offended them, case closed.
Speech codes create a culture of suppression that deter discussion. This creates a cycle where students never learn how to engage with other positions.
Mandava, Claremont McKenna College majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, 2015 Sidd, "The 'Chilling Effect' in Action: Campus Speech Codes and Political Disengagement", The FIRE, June 19th, Online: https://www.thefire.org/the-chilling-effect-in-action-campus-speech-codes-and-political-disengagement/ - MG Almost 95 percent of the U.S. colleges and universities evaluated by FIRE AND to be offended and therefore avoid situations where someone might offend them.
Constitutionally protected speech solves.
FIRE, 1999 by University of Pennsylvania professor Alan Charles Kors and Boston civil liberties attorney Harvey Silverglate, no date Foundation for Individual Rights In Education, "State of the Law: Speech Codes AND constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."
The AFF is try or die. Millennials aren't engaged now.
Mandava, Claremont McKenna College majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, 2015 Sidd, "The 'Chilling Effect' in Action: Campus Speech Codes and Political Disengagement", The FIRE, June 19th, Online: https://www.thefire.org/the-chilling-effect-in-action-campus-speech-codes-and-political-disengagement/ - MG By one measure, millennials are the United States' least politically engaged generation, with AND whether our colleges are actually guiding students towards a path of political disengagement.
Starting at the college campus creates a spillover effect.
Extra
Restrictions on speech chills teachers and their ability to freely discuss with their students.
Simon, a master's degree in journalism, and advanced studies in developmental psychology and teaches writing at American University's School of Communication, 2016 Cecilia, "Fighting for Free Speech on America's Campuses", New York Times, August 1st, Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/education/edlife/fire-first-amendment-on-campus-free-speech.html** - MG The chill can affect teaching as well. Potentially offending material is being removed from AND of Education advisements regarding Title IX, maintains it is following the law.
12/17/16
AC-Util
Tournament: Newman | Round: 6 | Opponent: ur mom | Judge: ur mom
1AC
The value's morality as the word ought implies a moral obligation. Epistemology comes before all other ethical foundations because labeling things moral or immoral is just a function of our knowledge. We need to know how we know what right and wrong are before we can pick the best definition. And, a priori reasoning is impossible so the only epistemologically sound basis for Morality is experience. Schwartz: The empirical support for the fundamental principle of empiricism is diffuse but salient. Our common empirical experience and experimental psychology offer evidence that humans do not have any capacity to garner knowledge except by empirical sources. The fact is that we believe that there is no source of knowledge, information, or evidence apart from observation, empirical scientific investigations, and our sensory experience of the world, and we believe this on the basis of our empirical a posteriori experiences and our general empirical view of how things work. For example, we believe on empirical evidence that humans are continuous with the rest of nature and that we rely like other animals on our senses to tell us how things are. If humans are more successful than other animals, it is not because we possess special non-experiential ways of knowing, but because we are better at cooperating, collating, and inferring. In particular we do not have any capacity for substantive a priori knowledge. There is no known mechanism by which such knowledge would be made possible. This is an empirical claim. Utilitarianism is an empirical fact—its hardwired into our brains. Greene et al. In our more recent work we have collected brain imaging data suggesting that "cognitive" factors are important as well and that emotional and "cognitive" processes compete for control of behavior. (Click here to download the paper.) For example, consider the following moral dilemma: It's war time, and you are hiding in a basement with several other people. The enemy soldiers are outside. Your baby starts to cry loudly, and if nothing is done the soldiers will find you and kill you, your baby, and everyone else in the basement. The only way to prevent this from happening is to cover your baby's mouth, but if you do this the baby will smother to death. Is it morally permissible to do this? According to our theory, this dilemma is difficult and uncomfortable because it creates a conflict between a strong emotional response ("Don't kill the baby!") and a strong "cognitive" response that points in the opposite direction ("But if you don't kill the baby, you gain nothing and have much to lose.") Two findings from our most recent neuroimaging study support this interpretation. First, we have found that in response to difficult moral dilemmas such as this a brain region associated with response conflict (the anterior cingulate cortex, or ACC) exhibits increased activity, suggesting that the difficulty associated with dilemmas such as this results from response conflict and not just a need for extended computation. Second, we have found that in response to dilemmas such as this brain regions associated with cognitive control (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, or DLPFC, and inferior parietal cortex) exhibit greater activity when people favor the promotion of the best overall consequences. In other words, when people say, "Yes, it's okay to smother the baby," they exhibit increased activity in parts of the brain associated with high-level cognitive function. Thus the standard is maximizing expected well-being Comparing worlds is also most educational – policy-making paradigm teaches us to become more effective real world activists. Keller writes: Policy practice encompasses social workers' "efforts to influence the development, enactment, implementation, or assessment of social policies" (Jansson, 1994, p. 8). Effective policy practice involves analytic activities, such as defining issues, gathering data, conducting research, identifying and prioritizing policy options, and creating policy proposals (Jansson, 1994). It also involves persuasive activities intended to influence opinions and outcomes, such as discussing and debating issues, organizing coalitions and task forces, and providing testimony. According to Jansson (1984, pp. 57-58), social workers rely upon five fundamental skills when pursuing policy practice activities: * value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing the underlying values inherent in policy positions; * conceptual skills for identifying and evaluating the relative merits of different policy options; * interactional skills for interpreting the values and positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in a convincing manner; * political skills for developing coalitions and developing effective strategies; and * position-taking skills for recommending, advocating, and defending a particular policy. These policy practice skills reflect the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookfield, 1987; Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of critical thinking are identifying and challenging underlying assumptions, exploring alternative~s~ ways of thinking and acting, and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis, and reflection (Brookfield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policy-making process—identifying the values underlying policy choices, recognizing and evaluating multiple alternatives, and taking a position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy practice skills seems to share~s~ much in common with developing capacities for critical thinking. Finally, Threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – so, my util offense outweighs theirs under their own framework
Consequences are the only values we can experience. Harris 10' Sam Harris 2010. CEO Project Reason; PHD UCLA Neuroscience; BA Stanford Philosophy. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values." I believe that we will increasingly understand good and evil, right and wrong, in scientific terms, because moral concerns translate into facts about how our thoughts and behaviors affect the well-being of conscious creatures like ourselves. If there are facts to be known about the well-being of such creatures—and there are—then there must be right and wrong answers to moral questions. Students of philosophy will notice that this commits me to some form of moral realism (viz. moral claims can really be true or false) and some form of consequentialism (viz. the rightness of an act depends on how it impacts the well-being of conscious creatures). While moral realism and consequentialism have both come under pressure in philosophical circles, they have the virtue of corresponding to many of our intuitions about how the world works. Here is my (consequentialist) starting point: all questions of value (right and wrong, good and evil, etc.) depend upon the possibility of experiencing such value. Without potential consequences at the level of experience—happiness, suffering, joy, despair, etc. —all talk of value is empty. Therefore, to say that an act is morally necessary, or evil, or blameless, is to make (tacit) claims about its consequences in the lives of conscious creatures (whether actual or potential).I am unaware of any interesting exception to this rule. Needless to say, if one is worried about pleasing God or His angels, this assumes that sudch invisible entities are conscious (in some sense) and cognizant of human behavior. It also generally assumes that it is possible to suffer their wrath or enjoy their approval, either in this world or the world to come. Even within religion, therefore, consequences and conscious states remain the foundation of all values. AND, Governements are util. government actions will inevitably lead to trade-offs between citizens since they benefit some and harm others; the only justifiable way to resolve these conflicts is by benefitting the maximum possible number of people since anything else would unequally prioritize one group over another. no act/omission distinction for governemtns Sunstein Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermuele, "Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life‐Life Tradeoffs," Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 85 (March 2005), p. 17. The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action – for example, private killing – becomes obscure when government formally forbids private action but chooses a set of policy instruments that do~es~ not adequately or fully discourage it.
US leadership independently solves multiple scenarios for extinction.
Nye and Armitage explains Joseph Nye (Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard, and previous dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government) and Richard Armitage (13th United States Deputy Secretary of State, the second-in-command at the State Department, serving from 2001 to 2005), "CSIS Reports – A Smarter, More Secure America", 11/6, 2007 http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4156/type,1/ Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion. Legitimacy AND least as much as their ability to destroy the enemy's will to fight.
Limiting Qualified immunity holds police officers accountable for their actions
Wright, 2015 (Journalist and PHD in Law. "Want to Fight Police Misconduct? Reform Qualified Immunity." http://abovethelaw.com/2015/11/want-to-fight-police-misconduct-reform-qualified-immunity/) In order to truly hold police accountable for bad acts, civilians must be able AND show that that conduct's illegality has already been clearly established in the courts?
C2 Rule of Law
Police currently operate in a state of impunity—above the rule of law
Tom Carter 15 ~(Tom Carter, World Socialist Website) US Supreme Court expands immunity for killer cops, International Committee of the Fourth International International Committee of the Fourth International 11-12-2015~ LADI With the death toll from police brutality continuing to mount, the US Supreme Court AND the imposition of de facto martial law in Ferguson last year, NAPO issued
Police killings disproportionately affect communtiies of color
Hadden et. all '16 (Bernadette R. Hadden, MSW, PHD, is Assistant professor in the MSW program at Hunter College School of Social Work New York. Willie Tolliver, PhD. Associate Professor at Silberman School of Social Work. Fabienne Snowden PHD. Professor at Hunter College School of Social Work. and Robyn Brown Manning, PHD. Professor at Hunter College School of Social "An authentic discourse: Recentering race and racism as factors that contribute to police violence against unarmed Black or African American men, Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment" http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10911359.2015.1129252~~#abstract) Police shootings of unarmed Black or African American men are occurring at alarming rates ( AND , they do not inform us of the incidence or prevalence of this phenomenon
Lawsuits fill gaps of information in police internal investigations—allows reform to take place
Schwartz 10 Joanna C. Schwartz. Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law "WHAT POLICE LEARN FROM LAWSUITS" 33 CARDOZO L. REV. (2010) For these departments, lawsuits are a valuable source of information about police misconduct allegations AND affairs.2 Lawsuits filled critical gaps in police department internal reporting systems.
All agents are inundated in linguistic constructions that constitute them. Gadamer writes:
Gadamer, Hans-George. "Analysis of Historically Affected Consciousness." Truth and Method. 1960 Hermeneutical experience is concerned with tradition. This is what is to be experienced. AND have seen in the teleological interpretation of the concept of induction since Aristotle.
~Habermas~ Cultures, or particular livelihoods prescribe meaning to actions. However, there is not a single conception of the good life, Habermas:
"The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory." Habermas, Jurgen; Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Frankfurt. 1998, MIT Press. Without the priority of the right over the good one cannot have an ethically neutral AND good, insofar as they cannot be a priori principles absent social context.
~Criterion~Thus, the criterion is maintaining open access to dialogue. This means that not one single participants discursive position should be preferred outright over another's.
Additional reasons to prefer
First, there is no truth outside of the dialogic process, because the dialogic process is a search for the meaning of words and terms, Chevigny 1:
Chevigny, Paul G. "Philosophy of Language and Free Expression." NYUL Rev. 55 (1980): 157. So far I have argued the position of modern philosophy, that the "meaning AND of the problem of hidden meanings, and opens the possibility of understanding.
Second, one cannot just reflect out of these linguistic constructions. Language, tradition, and subjectivity are intertwined which forms the basis of all knowledge, Gadamer 2:
In the hermeneutical sphere the parallel to this experience of the Thou is what we generally call historical consciousness. Historical consciousness knows about the otherness of the other, about the pastin its otherness,just as the understanding of the Thou knows the Thou as a person. In the otherness of the past it seeks not the instantiation of a general law but something historically unique. By claiming to transcend its own conditionedness completely in knowing the other, it is involved in a false dialectical appearance, since it is actually seeking to master the past, as it were. This need not be accompanied by the speculative claim of a philosophy of world history; as an ideal of perfect enlightenment, it sheds light on the process of experience in the historical sciences, as we find, for example, in Dilthey. In my analysis of hermeneutical consciousness I have shown that the dialectical illusion which historical consciousness creates, and which corresponds to the dialectical illusion of experience perfected and replaced by knowledge, is the unattainable ideal of the Enlightenment.A person who believes he is free of prejudices, relying on the objectivity of his procedures and denying that he is himself conditioned by historical circumstances, experiences the power of the prejudices that unconsciously dominate himas a vis a tergo. A person who does not admit that he is dominated by prejudices~and~ will fail to see what manifests itself by their light. It is like the relation between I and Thou. A person who reflects himself out of the mutuality of such a relation changes this relationship and destroys its moral bond. A person who reflects himself out of a living relationship to tradition destroys the true meaning of this tradition in exactly the same way: In seeking to understand tradition historical consciousness must not rely on the critical method with which it approaches its sources, as if this preserved it from mixing in its own judgments and prejudices.It must, in fact, think within its own historicity. To be situated within a tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it possible.
Contention
My thesis and sole contention is that restrictions on speech are inconsistent with discourse ethics.
First, no speech exists except free speech. The concept of a restriction on speech is incoherent, Chevigny 2
We are confronted at last with a general consensus in the philosophy of both the human sciences and the natural sciences, that the meaning of man-made artifacts—linguistic facts—whether norms, values, acts, or scientific facts, can be understood only in a context determined through discourse. This consensus is an accepted, legitimate view from which other philosophical departures may be taken, a premise from which consequences may be drawn. It is accepted as fully as the consensus among liberal political philosophers on the importance of the autonomous individual, and its implications for political philosophy are no less legitimate.125 The consensus of modern linguistic philosophy about meaning implies a position about the right to speak. It implies that limitations on discourse about the meanings of words, especially those that relate to action and value, create a risk that those who use or hear words literally will not understand them, not know what they mean. It implies that there is no "speech" except free speech, because speech is dialogue to learn the meaning of words. This rationale for freedom of expression, rooted in the nature of speech itself, implies that slogans, formulas for which no reply is permitted, are not really part of language. They have no meaning because they have no context, and cannot he put in context without the social dimension of language, without interplay between the slogan and a responsive reader or speaker. We cannot want to fort;01 dialogue about anything spoken or written in a human language, un-less we want to eliminate the search for the purpose and understanding of what is said. The force of such a rationale is perhaps most obvious in the analysis of ideas that are "political" on their face; indeed the philosophy of language underlying the rationale is applied to two leading endeavors in political philosophy in the section that follows. But the rationale is at bottom equally applicable to the discussion of the most basic phenomena. Debate on the proposition, say, that the earth is flat might lead to an interesting explanation of the physical conditions that would have to prevail if the earth were flat. It would certainly lead the round-earthers to reconsider the basis of their conviction that the earth is not flat, lead them to see why the conviction is true in the universe as they understand it, and how much that understanding depends upon assumptions that are the "river-bed- of their perceptions of the universe. The statement that the earth is not flat comes to life as "true" for those of us who are round-earthers because we come to understand why we believe it.
Second, dialogic model is key to understanding which creates a demand on the government to make speech as open as possible, Chevigny 3:
Once participants in any discussion accept the premise drawn from the philosophy of language that discussion is essential to under-standing, then to be sure that they know what they are talking about, that they do not fail to take anything into account, and that they have some basis for believing their conclusions true, their discussion must take place in as open a system of discourse as possible. Their concern is to minimize the risks that the "wrong" meaning will be accepted and acted upon or, if a factual question is at issue, he recorded as a judgment of history or science. If a topic is excluded from discussion by governmental fiat, the inference is strong that the government does not want the participants to understand. In the case of a practi-cal question, the exclusion implies that the government may aim to make a decision that is "wrong" for the context and the society. It may imply, for example, that the government wants the decision to appear to be one in the general interest, when discussion would show that it is not. When the participants are excluded from discussion, they do not "believe" the government's position because dialogue is the only basis for belief that they know. In short, once the right of free discussion is accepted, it creates a demand on the government to preserve and extend it to every sort of inquiry. That demand will be the same even when the government says it values the "collective good" over "individual rights." Three implications: Only the aff solves for oppression- any top down approach AND that the wrong will be replicated, because lack of dialogue means less truth
Next, even if ideas are without redeeming virtues, the structure of free speech grounded in a dialogic model requires equal recognition of participants, thus consistent with the framework. Chevigny 4
Although this explanation seems to me sufficient, there is another reason that the advocacy of ideas without apparent redeeming virtues should be tolerated. Haberrnas and others have argued that the act of participating in dialogue is enough by itself to create an ethical commitment to the others in the dialogue.196 As Karl-Otto Apel has put it: Whoever poses the . . . question of the justification of the moral • principle already takes part in the discussion. And one can "make him aware" . . . of what he has "already" accepted, and that he should accept this principle through intentional affirmation as the condition of the possibility and of the validity of argumentation. 197 I am doubtful that this argument for an ethical commitment from discussion alone will hold in the bare form that I have quoted it. There seems to be insufficient reason, for example, to assume that each of the speakers thinks he is "speaking" in the same sense as the others; a speaker who believes that words are magic may suppose that he is uttering a deadly curse instead of an idea. As with other ethical precepts, in short, it is doubtful whether the "ought" can he derived from the "is" without the intervention of other factors. In a proper institutional setting, of course, a mere "fact," such as an act, may give rise to an obligation.198 I suggest that the acceptance by society of the notion of meaning I have earlier outlined in this Article,199 and the establishment of rights based on that notion, supplies the institu-tional setting missing from the bare idea of "communicative ethics." When the society accepts the precept that normative and historical questions will be resolved through dialogue, each of the speakers is aware that ~s~he is speaking in a situation in which that precept is ac-cepted. It matters little whether one of the speakers has contempt for the communicative institutional setting or will not listen to the answers to his ideas; he knows that when he presents an idea under conditions in which an answer is possible, he opens the idea to ques-tions of its validity and himself to questions of motive and character. By presenting the idea discursively, rather than through force, lie has expressed his recognition of the dialogical assumptions of the institutional setting. He knows that the idea will he discussed, and not accepted as magic or incantation, and sooner or later he will have to anjections or step out of the discourse.
First, The self is always indicted in a certain relation of power structures, Butler:
Butler, Judith. "Gender is Burning: Questions of Appropriation and Subversion." No date. Consider that the use of language is itself enabled by first having been called a name-, the occupation of the name is that by which one is, quite without choice, situated within discourse. This "I," which is produced through the accumulation and convergence of such "calls," cannot extract itself from the historicity of that chain or raise itself up and confront that chain as if it were an object opposed to me, which is not me, but only what others have made of me; for that estrangement or division produced by the mesh of interpellating calls and the "I" who is its site is not only violating, but enabling as well, what Gayatri Spivak refers to as "an enabling violation." The "I" who would oppose its construction is always in some sense drawing from that construction to articulate its opposition; further, the "I" draws what is called its "agency" in part through being implicated in the very relations of power that it seeks to oppose. To be implicated in the relations of power, indeed, en abled by the relations of power that the "I" opposes is not, as a consequence, to be reducible to their existing forms. The I thus is constituted by social relations of power- the I is called AND must ask is the question of violence and our obligations to the other.
~Derrida 2~ Justice grounded in presence is something impossible since it denies the possibility of future. Undecidability and violence opens up the possibility of doing justice to the other Derrida writes:
Pg 29-34 B. And yet, declaring this "without equivocation, the Spruch also says something else-or it only says this on condition. It would name the disjointure (adikia) or the "injustice" of the present only in order to say that it is necessary didonai diken. (The duty or the debt of the "it is necessary" is perhaps excessive, even if Nietzsche translates: Sie miissen Busze zaWen, they must pay penalty.) In any case, it is clearly a matter of giving. of giving Dike. Not of rendering justice, to render it in return by means of punishment, payment, or expiation, as one most often translates (Nietzsche and Diels). There is first of all a gift without restitution, without calculation, without accountability. Heidegger thus removes such a gift from any horizon of culpability, of debt, of right, and even, perhaps, of duty. He would especially like to wrest it away from that experience of vengeance whose idea, he says, remains "the opinion of those who equate the Just (das Gerechte) with the Avenged (das Geriichte). (Which, let us say in passing, would surely not in the least disqualify, in this case or in others, a reading, for example in Hamlet, of the logic of vengeance, whether psychoanalytic or not, and wherever it remains so powerful. All the same, without depriving it of its pertinence, this other reading causes to appear precisely its economic closure, even its circular fatality, the very limit that makes possible the pertinence or correctness of this interpretation; this latter limit prevents one in fact from understanding the very things which it wants to explain: tragedy, precisely ~justement~, the hestitation to take revenge, the deliberation, the non-naturality orthe non-automaticity ofthe calculation: neurosis, if you like.) The question of justice, the one that always carries beyond the law, is no longer separated, in its necessity or in its aporias, from that of the gift. Heidegger interrogates the paradox of this gift without debt and without guilt in a movement that I have evoked elsewhere. 26 He then wonders in fact, following the traces of Plotinus whom he does not name here, or hardly ever: is it possible to give what one does not have? "What does 'give' mean here? How should whatever lingers awhile, whatever comes to presence in disjunction, be able to give jointure ~Wie soli das Je-weilige, das in der Un-Fuge west, Fuge geben kiinnen~? Can it give what it doesn't have? ~Kann es geben, was es nieht hat?~ If it gives anything at all, doesn't it give jointure away?"27 Heidegger's answer: giving rests here only in presence (Anwesen), it does not signify simply to give away (weggeben) but, more originarily, to accord, that is here, zugeben which most often indicates addition, even excess, in any case that which is offered in supplement, over and above the market, off trade, without exchange, and it is said sometimes of a musical or poetic work. This offering is supplementary, but without raising the stakes, although it is necessarily excessive with regard to the giving away or a privation that would separate one from what one might have. The offering consists in leaving: in leaving to the other what properly belongs to him or her (Solches Geben liisst einem anderen das gehiiren, was als Gehiiriges ihm eignet). Now, Heidegger then specifies, what properly (eignet) belongs to a present, be it to the present of the other, to the present as the other, is the jointure of its lingering awhile, of its time, of its moment (die Fuge seiner Weile). What the one does not have, what the one therefore does not have to give away, but what the one gives to the other, over and above the market, above market, bargaining, thanking, commerce, and commodity, is to leave to the other this accord with himself that is proper to him (ihm eignet) and gives him presence. If one still translates Dike with this word "justice, and if, as Heidegger does, Dike is thought on the basis of Being as presence, then it would turn out that "justice" is first of all, and finally, and espeCially properly, the jointure of the accord: the proper jointure to the other given by one who does not have it. Injustice would be the disjointure or disjoining (let us quote again: "Dike, aus dem Sein aIs Anwesen gedacht, ist der fugend-fiigende Fug. Adikia, die Un-Fuge, ist der Un-Fug"). This is where our question would come in. Has not Heidegger, as he always does, skewed the asymmetry in favor of what he in effect interprets as the possibility of favor itself, of the accorded favor, namely, of the accord that gathers or collects while harmonizing (Versammlung, Fug) , be it in the sameness of differents or of disagreements ~differends~, and before the synthesis of a sys-tem? Once one has recognized the force and the necessity of thinking justice on the basis of the gift, that is, beyond right, calculation, and commerce, once one has recognized therefore the necessity (without force, precisely ~justement~, without necessity, perhaps, and without law) of thinking the gift to the other. as gift of that which one does not have and which thus, paradoxically, can only come back or belong to the other, is there not a risk of inscribing this whole movement of justice under the sign of presence, be it of the presence to meaning of the Anwesen, of the event as coming into presence, of Being as presence joined to itself, of the proper of the other as presence? As the presence of the received present, yes, but appropriable as the same and therefore gathered together? Beyond right, and still more beyond juridicism, beyond morality, and still more beyond morallsm, does not justice as relation to the other suppose on the contrary the irreducible excess of a disjointure or an anachrony, some Un-Fuge, some"out ofjoint" dislocation in Being and in time itself, a disjointure that, in always risking the evil, expropriation, and injustice (adikia) against which there is no calculable insurance, would alone be able to do justice or to render justice to the other as other? A doing that would not amount only to action and a rendering that would not come down just to restitution? To put it too qUickly and to formalize in the extreme the stakes: here, in this interpretation ofthe Un-Fug (whether or not it is on the basis of Being as presence and the property ofthe proper), would be played out the relation of deconstruction to the possibility of justice, the relation of deconstruction (insofar as it proceeds from the irreducible possibility ofthe Un-Fug and the anachronic disjointure, insofar as it draws from there the very resource and injunction ofits reaffirmed affirmation) to what must (without debt and without duty) be rendered to the singularity of the other, to his or her absolute precedence or to his or her absolute previousness,28 to the heterogeneity of a pre-, which, to be sure, means what comes before me, before any present, thus before any past present, but also what, for that very reason, comes from the future or as future: as the very coming of the event. The necessary disjointure, the de-totalizing condition of justice, is indeed here that of the present-and by the same token the very condition of the present and of the presence of the present. This is where deconstruction would always begin to take shape as the thinking of the gift and of undeconstructible justice, the unde-constructible condition of any deconstruction, to be sure, but a condition that is itself in deconstruction and remains, and must remain (that is the injunction) in the disjointure of the Un-Fug. Otherwise it rests on the good conscience of having done one's duty, it loses the chance of the future, of the promise or the appeal, of the desire also (that is its "own" possibility), of this desert-like messianism (without content and withoutidentifiable messiah), of this also abyssal desert, "desert in the desert, that we will talk about later (p. 209), one desert signaling toward the other, abyssal and chaotic desert, if chaos describes first of all the immensity, excessiveness, disproportion in the gaping hole of the open mouth-in the waiting or calling for what we have nicknamed here without knowing the messianic: the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice. We believe that this messianic remains an ineffaceable mark-a mark one neither can nor should efface-of Marx's legacy, and doubtless of inheriting, of the experience of inheritance in general. Otherwise, one would reduce the event-ness of the event, the singularity and the alterity of the other. Otherwise justice risks being reduced once again to juridical-moral rules, norms, or representations. within an inevitable totalizing horizon (movement of adequate restitution. expiation, or reappropriation). Heidegger runs this risk, despite so many necessary precautions. when he gives priority. as he always does. to gathering and to the same (Versammlung. Fuge. legein, and so forth) over the disjunction implied by my address to the other. over the interruption commanded by respect which commands it in turn, over a difference whose uniqueness. disseminated in the innumerable charred fragments of the absolute mixed in with the cinders. will never be assured in the One. Which. moreover. never fails to happen also. but it happens only in the trace of what would happen otherwise and thus also happens. like a specter. in that which does not happen. Hamlet could never know the peace of a "good ending": in any case in the theater and in history. To be "out of joint." whether it be present Being or present time. can do harm and do evil. it is no doubt the very possibility of evil. But without the opening of this possibility, there remains. perhaps. beyond good and evil, only the necessity of the worst. A necessity that would not (even) be a fated one. Justice based in incalculability presents itself as the gift. Ideal forms of justice are inherently violent, which means that any ethical framework needs to negotiate the irreducibility of violence.
~Chambers~ Universality relies on atemporalization; a lack of a concept of time. To transcend the failings of formalism, a temporalized approach is necessary, a politics that takes into account the spectre that always haunts the decision, Chambers writes:
I contend that this hint at "static conceptions" actually holds the key to Butler's entire critique of formalism, for it is precisely the static, timeless conception of universality that falls prey to all the false trappings of formalism. Butler's strongest political critiques of both Laclau and, especially, Zizek fall under this heading of an inabil-ity to "accommodate challenge." The shielding of the Lacanian Real or the formal model of language from political scrutiny rests on a sta-tic, atemporal conception of those theoretical constructs, which are said to be "explicable through recourse to anachronistic structuralist accounts" (140). A nontemporalized conception of universality re-mains isolated and closed off from particularity exactly because it is not subject to historicity in the same way that contingent historical events must be. And as I delineated earlier, natural rights theories fall under this same static, nontemporalized conception. It is a static con-ception of time that undergirds any Kantian formalism of univer-sal/particular, and that founds a naively universalist conception of rights. In contrast, a temporalized approach-or what I will describe as a radical, untimely approach-to both the universal and the par-ticular would prohibit recourse to the terms of formalism and help to theorize a more rigorous and politically salient conception of the universal/particular relation. This thinking of untimeliness will pro-duce a theory of rights that avoids the formalist impasse. He adds: Or, to phrase it otherwise, what must be developed AND -versalism but a spectral one-not an ontology but a hauntology.
Finally rights must be ghostly- these are the only way our discourse can reconcile empirical realities and idealizations. They are always articulated in a future to come. Chambers 2:
When my students and I very briefly cover the basic facts of the Bowers v. Hardwick decision, they often have a hard time even believing me. They consistently ask me to restate the terms of the decision; they feel certain that they must have heard wrong. This retroactive installment of a rights teleology might also help to explain the conWdence with which many younger, pro-choice Republicans voted for George W. Bush. Their decision to vote for Bush, despite his pro-life stance and despite the strong possibility that he will appoint at least two Supreme Court justices during his time in ofWce, rested (perhaps tacitly, but nonetheless) on the belief that Roe v. Wade simply could not and cannot be overturned, since it establishes a woman's right to choose—and rights, on this teleological model, cannot be taken away once they are granted.38 That decision, in other words, presumes that rights are real and ghosts are not. The untimeliness, the spectrality of rights, interrupts any sort of seamless historical narrative that we might wish to tell about rights in our democracy. A theory of ghostly rights calls our attention to the vigilance and patience required both to bring rights into being and to make sure that they do not disappear. And it highlights the common disjuncture, the gap between rights on paper and rights in the world. Ghostly rights thereby bring into our purview what Butler calls the "spectral remainder, which does not have a home in the forward march of the universal" (178). This remainder is formed by those people who remain excluded from rights, and whose exclusion forms the basis for a false conception of rights as universals, marching forward in time. With a theory of ghostly rights, there can be no naïve faith in the "real" of rights and there can be no allegiance to a humanist story of progress. The notion of ghostly rights allows us to focus on the way that rights tend to work in history, and it offers us a more viable approach to negotiating the future of rights for democracy.39 story of progress. The notion of ghostly rights allows us to focus on the way that rights tend to work in history, and it offers us a more viable approach to negotiating the future of rights for democracy.39
Thus, the standard is maintaining a system of ghostly rights. What this means is that we must maintain undecidability and indeterminancy, using deconstruction as a practice that destabilizes binaries. Rather, justice resides in undecidability.
The Values morality as the word ought implies a moral obligation
Absent an examination of individual differences, ethics becomes a tool to dominate and is useless as an impartial guide to action. Young:
Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990. Print. CM Some feminist and postmodern writers have suggested that a denial of difference structures Western reason AND offer a vision of a heterogeneous public that acknowledges and affirms group differences.
This requires a reconciliation between different groups values. Embracing pluralism is key to acknowledging the social oppression of heterogeneous groups. Young 2
Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990. Print. CM Second, because it assures a voice for the oppressed as well as the privileged AND silenced by cultural imperialism. Group representation in the public facilitates such expression.
Ensuring that voices are included the political system requires questioning the assumptions behind the stratification of individuals. Winters and Leighton 99:
Winter, D. D., and Leighton, D. C. (2001). Structural violence. In D. J. Christie, R. V. Wagner, and D. D. Winter (Eds.), Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century. New York: Prentice-Hall. CM Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about AND thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity.
Thus the standard is resisting structural violence.
And, material solutions come first— ideal theories fail to account for personal identity and marginalized groups.
Dr. Tommy J. Curry. The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century. 2014 Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real AND used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.
And moral theories that can't account for the reality we live in fail as normative guides to action—we cannot look to idealistic conditions.
Farrelly 7 Colin Farrelly 07, ~Professor of Political Studies, Queen's University~, "Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation", Political Studies, 2007. Political philosophers have recently begun to take seriously methodological questions concerning what a theoretical AND -compliance or unfavourable (historical, social or economic) conditions.
Plan: Countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power.
I reserve the right to clarify, I don't spec a country or reactors but I'm willing to in CX
C1 Health
====Nuclear Power Plants are Sited in Disproportionately Minority and Disadvantaged Community, Empirics prove Cousins 1:==== Elicia Cousins, Claire Karban, Fay Li, and Marianna Zapanta (Carleton College, Environmental Studies Comprehensive Project). "Nuclear Power and Environmental Justice: A Mixed-Methods Study of Risk, Vulnerability, and the Victim Experience." Carleton College. 2013. JDN. https://apps.carleton.edu/curricular/ents/assets/Cousins_Karban_Li_Zapanta.pdf From a Rawlsian perspective, there are injustices in the distribution of harms posed by AND of existing problems of injustice, and guide policy to create appropriate solutions.
And, In TX, Cancer Rates Increased Significantly After the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants
Reedy, Tom Staff Writer Denton Record-Chronicle "Scientist Links Cancer to Nuclear Power" http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2001/nn11105.htm The cancer rate in north central Texas has increased alarmingly since the Comanche Peak nuclear AND a nuclear plant in Wisconsin to 54 percent around a plant in Michigan.
C2 Proliferation
Nuclear Power multiplies the risk for nuclear proliferation and nuclear terror – safeguards are uncertain and nuclear power weakens them
Miller and Sagan 9 - Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security ("Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?" Journal Article, Daedalus, volume 138, issue 4, pages 7-18, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/19850/nuclear_power_without_nuclear_proliferation.html) LADI Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. AND , can color code the cards, toread certain impacts against certain debaters)
Nuclear power overwhelms barriers for expertise to build nuclear weapons, the two are inextricably linked
Ackland 9 - Len Ackland, co-director of the Center for Environmental Journalism., ("Weapons proliferation a big risk with nuclear power" February 10, 2009, http://www.cejournal.net/?p=903) LADI As Tom Yulsman points out in his Feb. 5 posting, the tight connection AND record. And that still would be a long way from proliferation proof.
Countries increasingly look to economic sanctions as a response to nuclear weapons production
Portela, Clara EU Non-Proliferation Consortium "THE EU'S EVOLVING RESPONSES TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CRISES: FROM INCENTIVES TO SANCTIONS" https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EUNPC_no-46.pdf The management of proliferation crises emerges as a field in which the EU has upgraded AND time, been willing to bear the notable costs of imposing economic sanctions.
Even Very Targeted Sanctions Largely Affect the Poor, and Fail at Attempts to Force a Change in Policy
Add tag EIA (Energy Information Administration), "U.S. uranium production is near historic low as imports continue to fuel U.S. reactors" June 1, 2016 http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=26472 Most of the uranium loaded into U.S. nuclear power reactors is imported. During 2015, owners and operators of U.S. nuclear power reactors purchased 57 million pounds of uranium. Nearly half of these purchases originated from two countries, Canada and Kazakhstan, providing 17 million pounds and 11 million pounds of uranium, respectively. U.S. uranium concentrate production, which started in 1949 and peaked in 1980, has recently been near historic lows. Uranium production was 0.63 million pounds of uranium (U3O8) in the first quarter 2016. At that rate, total 2016 production may be about 2.5 million pounds, only slightly higher than the low of 2.0 million pounds produced in 2003.
World Uranium Demand is Growing and Outpacing Production
And, Ukraine is almost completely dependent on Russia in its production of nuclear power, outweighs fossil fuels disad
Zuzanna Nowak, Energy Post "Why Ukraine's dependence on Russia in nuclear is worse than in gas – and what to do about it" http://www.energypost.eu/ukrainian-nuclear-power-emerges-russian-shadow/ August 27, 2014 Nevertheless, the gas crises of 2006 and 2009, and especially the current destabilisation AND more, make the link clearer btwn uranium dependency and oppression of the tatars
And, lack of a response to Russia in Crimea facilitates Russian oppression of Tatars
Nuclear Production is uniquely linked in the status of Indigenous Peoples, the entire process
Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) "Environmental Racism, Tribal Sovereignty and Nuclear Waste" http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/pfsejfactsheet.htm Both the federal government and the commercial nuclear power industry have targeted Native American reservations AND areas is bad for other forms of oppression, leads to alienation, etc
C5 Fem
Nuclear Power is a form of masculine domination over nature and feminism