## 1

#### Interpretation: The aff must defend that no constitutionally protected speech may be restricted by public colleges or universities. To clarify, they can’t defend a restriction on only a kind, setting, or timing of speech.

The term “any” in the res is the weak form of “any” - “not any” statements refer to “all”. **Cambridge Dictionary**

Cambridge Dictionary, Any, <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/grammar/british-grammar/quantifiers/any>. NS

We use any before nouns to refer to indefinite or unknown quantities or an unlimited entity: Did you bring any bread? Mr Jacobson refused to answer any questions. If I were able to travel back to any place and time in history, I would go to ancient China. Any as a determiner has two forms: a strong form and a weak form. The forms have different meanings. Weak form any: indefinite quantities We use any for indefinite quantities in questions and negative sentences. We use some in affirmative sentences: Have you got any eggs? I haven’t got any eggs. I’ve got some eggs. Not: I’ve got any eggs. We use weak form any only with uncountable nouns or with plural nouns: [talking about fuel for the car] Do I need to get any petrol? (+ uncountable noun) There aren’t any clean knives. They’re all in the dishwasher. (+ plural noun) Warning: We don’t use any with this meaning with singular countable nouns: Have you got any Italian cookery books? (or … an Italian cookery book?) Not: Have you got any Italian cookery book? Strong form any meaning ‘it does not matter which’ We use any to mean ‘it does not matter which or what’, to describe something which is not limited. We use this meaning of any with all types of nouns and usually in affirmative sentences. In speaking we often stress any:. (+ uncountable noun) When you make a late booking, you don’t know where you’re going to go, do you? It could be any destination. (+ singular countable noun) [talking about a contract for new employees] Do we have any form of agreement with new staff when they start? (+ singular countable noun) [a parent talking to a child about a picture he has painted] A: I don’t think I’ve ever seen you paint such a beautiful picture before. Gosh! Did you choose the colours? B: We could choose any colours we wanted. (+ plural countable noun) See also: Determiners and types of noun Some and any Any as a pronoun Any can be used as a pronoun (without a noun following) when the noun is understood. A: Have you got some £1 coins on you? B: Sorry, I don’t think I have any. (understood: I don’t think I have any £1 coins.) [parents talking about their children’s school homework] A: Do you find that Elizabeth gets lots of homework? Marie gets a lot. B: No not really. She gets hardly any. (understood: She gets hardly any homework.) A: What did you think of the cake? It was delicious, wasn’t it? B: I don’t know. I didn’t get any. (understood: I didn’t get any of the cake.) See also: Determiners used as pronouns Any of We use any with of before articles (a/an, the), demonstratives (this, these), pronouns (you, us) or possessives (his, their): Shall I keep any of these spices? I think they’re all out of date. Not: … any these spices? We use any of to refer to a part of a whole: Are any of you going to the meeting? I couldn’t answer any of these questions. I listen to Abba but I’ve never bought any of their music. Any doesn’t have a negative meaning on its own. It must be used with a negative word to mean the same as no. Compare Not Any: there aren’t any biscuits left. They’ve eaten them all. No: There are no biscuits left. They’ve eaten them all.

#### Outweighs - it takes into account AFF definitions which assume a strong form of “any” that justifies singular cases.

#### Determining semantics comes before other standards:

#### A. It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.

#### B. Grammar is the most objective since it doesn’t rely on arbitrary determinants of what constitutes the best type of debate – it’s the only impact you can evaluate.

#### C. The AFF isn’t topical regardless of fairness or education since it doesn’t affirm the text - we wouldn’t debate rehab again just because it was a good topic..

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### 1. Limits: They allow way too many affs, newpapers, protests, specific races, sexual orientations, and places on campuses. That explodes neg prep burden and predictability which kills fairness and engagement. Procedurally, if I can’t access their education it doesn’t matter. T version of the AFF solves their offense – they can read advantages in any topic area which ensures NEG responses.

#### 2. Legal precision – multiple court rulings agree with our interp. Elder 91

Elder ‘91(David S. Elder, October 1991, "Any and All": To Use Or Not To Use?” "Plain Language' is a regular feature of the Michigan Bar Journal, edited by Joseph Kimble for the State Bar Plain English Committee. Assistant editor is George H. Hathaway. Through this column the Committee hopes to promote the use of plain English in the law. Want to contribute a plain English article? Contact Prof. Kimble at Thomas Cooley Law School, P.O. Box 13038, Lansing, MI 48901, <http://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/plainenglish/pdfs/91_oct.pdf> | SP)

The Michigan Supreme Court seemed to approve our dictionary definitions of "any" in Harrington v Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n, 210 Mich 327, 330; 178 NW 19 (1920), when it quoted Hopkins v Sanders, 172 Mich 227; 137 NW 709 (1912). The Court defined "any" like this: "In broad language, it covers 'arl'v final decree' in 'any suit at law or in chancery' in 'any circuit court.' Any' means ,every,' 'each one of all."' In a later case, the Michigan Supreme Court again held that the use of "any" in an agency contract meant "all." In Gibson v Agricultural Life Ins Co, 282 Mich 282, 284; 276 NW 450 (1937), the clause in controversy read: "14. The Company shall have, and is hereby given a first lien upon any commissions or renewals as security for any claim due or to become due to the Company from said Agent." (Emphasis added.) The Gibson court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's insistence that the word "any" meant less than "all": "Giving the wording of paragraph 14 oJ the agency contract its plain and unequivocable meaning, upon arriving at the conclusion that the sensible connotation of the word any' implies 'all' and not 'some,' the legal conclusion follows that the defendant is entitled to retain the earned renewal commissions arising from its agency contract with Gibson and cannot be held legally liable for same in this action," Gibson at 287 (quoting the trial court opinion). The Michigan Court of Appeals has similarly interpreted the word "any" as used in a Michigan statute. In McGrath v Clark, 89 Mich App 194; 280 NW2d 480 (1979), the plaintiff accepted defendant's offer of judgment. The offer said nothing about prejudgment interest. The statute the Court examined was MCL 600.6013; MSA 27A.6013: "Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment recovered in a civil action...." The Court held that "the word 'any' is to be considered all-inclusive," so the defendants were entitled to interest. McGrath at 197 Recently, the Court has again held that "[alny means 'every,' 'each one of all,' and is unlimited in its scope." Parker v Nationwide Mutual Ins Co, 188 Mich App 354, 356; 470 NW2d 416 (1991) (quoting Harrington v InterState Men's Accident Ass'n, supra)

Legal precision determines topic literature and pre round prep – it’s a legal topic about first amendment jurisprudence. This is key to predictability and giving the neg a fair research burden to engage the affirmative.

#### Vote on substantive engagement: otherwise we’re *speaking* without *debating* and there’s nothing to separate us from dueling oratory. It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics.

#### Drop the debater on T:

#### A. Hold them accountable for their interp – a topical advocacy frames the debate - drop the arg lets them jump ship to a new layer killing NEG ground.

#### B. Drop the arg on T is the same thing as drop the debater since T indicts their advocacy

#### Competing interps since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

#### No RVIs:

#### A. They incentivize debaters to go all in in theory and bait it with abusive practices, killing substantive clash on other flows. B. They can run theory on me too if I’m unfair so 1) theory is reciprocal because we’re both able to check abuse and 2) also cures time skew because they can collapse in the 2ar to their shell.

## 2

#### Interview with US general proves Morale is high now – homefront and mission pride. Garamone 2-8

Jim Garamone, Air Force Chief of Staff Targets Improving Quality of Service, DoD News, Defense Media Activity, Feb. 8, 2017 EE

Some airmen are living in rough conditions, and yet there are no complaints, the general said, because they are doing what they signed up to do. They take great pride in the mission and their parts in performing that mission, he added, and they believe they are part of something big -- part of “a high-powered team of people that had a mission every day accomplishing something that matters.” The key is making sure that type of attitude happens not just overseas, but at home stations, Goldfein said. “I’ve got folks contributing to this fight and the global challenges we face right here at home stations,” he said. “As the chief, I’ve got a lot of things to worry about, but I believe I have one moral obligation, and that is I can never send someone into harm’s way that is not properly organized, trained, equipped and led, and [I must] take care of their families while they are gone. “That’s my mirror check. That, I’ve got to get right,” he continued. “Everything else, I do the best I can.”

#### Campus activism against war undermines morale and forces withdrawal – collapses American presence abroad and causes massive instability that culminates in terror attacks and extinction. Levy 07

Janet Levy , MBA, MSW, is an activist, world traveler, and freelance journalist, Iraq’s only Similarity to Vietnam: Its Dangerous Anti-War Movement, Accuracy in Media 2-28-2007 EE

Contrary to media reports and the perception of a majority of Americans, the United States was winning the war in Vietnam following the successful watershed battle known as the Tet Offensive. Sadly, the Vietnam War was not lost on the battlefield. The carnage and repressive regimes that followed the U.S. exit may have been avoided had the truth been known by the American public. The United States was defeated by a carefully conceived, multi-pronged propaganda campaign that set the stage for America’s eventual failure in the region. The ingredients for the U.S. defeat consisted of the funding and encouragement of the anti-war movement by Hanoi and Communist splinter groups, enlistment of “useful idiots” in Hollywood to publicize and popularize the movement, media complicity with negative portrayals of the war, anti-American proselytizing by professors and students on American university campuses, denigration and demonizing of the military and, ultimately, withdrawal of support and appropriations by the U.S. Congress. All these factors led to the perceptual reframing of the Vietnam War as an ignoble imperialistic atrocity, a far cry from its launch as a fight to extinguish communism in Southeast Asia. Today, many of these same elements have reappeared as the United States struggles to defeat Islamic terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan and to apprehend a fifth column of jihadists at home. Inherited from the Vietnam experience, they are now evident within the new conflict. This time, the risks to our country’s future are even greater should they succeed. Anti-War Groups As was true during the Vietnam War, today’s anti-war groups hide their anti-Americanism behind the politics of peace. Recruiting others on a platform of “peace,” they ally themselves with radical Islamists, glorify the enemy’s goals and identify themselves as “freedom fighters,” battling an imperialistic world power. In the lead up to the war against Iraq, anti-war activists effectively mobilized some of the largest protests and demonstrations since the Vietnam War. They attacked the war effort abroad and security measures at home, sympathized with Saddam Hussein as a victim of American war-mongering and even served as strategically-placed human shields. Although Operation Iraqi Freedom was welcomed by the vast majority of Iraqis and succeeded in liberating 25 million people from the ravages of a murderous despot, anti-war protestors decried the U.S. “occupation” of Iraq and the alleged subjugation of the Iraqi people. Their steadfast position was that any use of American military power was an attempt to establish American hegemony in the region and exploit Iraq’s oil resources. The discovery of Saddam’s mass graves and torture chambers were ignored by the anti-war movement in the service of demonizing the actions of the evil, American empire. Hollywood Similarly, in the tradition of Hanoi Jane Fonda, Hollywood plays a highly visible role in opposing the Iraq war and in spearheading demonstrations. Fonda is back in the anti-war fray as Jihad Jane joined by actors Susan Sarandon, Tim Robbins, Sean Penn and others. Before the invasion by coalition forces, Penn embarked on a “fact finding mission” in Iraq, where he met with Saddam Hussein. In a propaganda coup for the anti-war movement and the Baathists, Penn proclaimed to the media that the United States had initiated the war effort on false and illegitimate premises and declared that Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction. Since then, the Hollywood anti-war cabal has threatened the political future of elected representatives unwilling to support the recent, nonbinding resolution against the war. As Hollywood stars use their celebrity in their attempts to sabotage the U.S. war effort, they fail to mention Saddam’s rape rooms, gassing of Kurds and murder of children in front of their parents. These movie stars deny the valiant purpose of the U.S. mission and its committed and brave soldiers. Instead, they give aid, comfort and legitimacy to the enemy. Mass Media As in the Vietnam era, the media has become the propaganda machine for the anti-war movement, using the same tactics of the 1960s and 1970s. The overwhelmingly negative and biased reporting of the Vietnam War era is very much in evidence in today’s Iraq coverage. The press continually advances the notion that life was better for the Iraqis under Saddam, minimizes the atrocities committed by Saddam and his henchman, and focuses instead on the U.S. role in “destabilizing” Iraq. The “good news” about economic recovery, business successes, progress made by the Iraqi government and improvements in public services are ignored in favor of stories of civil strife. Every attack on American soldiers and Iraqis is magnified and featured prominently, while successes are largely ignored or reported in passing. Few news stories focus on the heroism and generosity of American troops. Any hint of malfeasance, allegations of combat errors or misconduct on the part of the U.S. military gets center stage. U.S. forces are portrayed as an enemy as dangerous or even more so, than the terrorist groups they fight. U.S. soldiers are portrayed as acting without regard to the rule of law and abusing the rights of captured “insurgents.” Schools Equally reminiscent of the ’60s and ’70s, university and high school campuses are hotbeds for anti-American and anti-war sentiments. Prior to the inception of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the “Books Not Bombs” strike was coordinated on campuses nationwide by the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition, whose members include the Young Communist League, USA, and the Muslim Students’ Association of the U.S. and Canada. This anti-war protest was endorsed by professors in a wide variety of disciplines, from economics to biology, who cancelled classes or assured anti-war students they would not be penalized for absences. Some professors even focused the day’s class material on the potential war. Thus, a majority of institutions of higher education appeared to expect conformity of anti-war opinion and, in some cases, actually imposed the strike on the student population. This behavior continues today as literature and anthropology professors use classroom time to express their opinions against the war and pressure students to toe their ideological line. Often, students who agree with the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq jeopardize their grades by coming forward. They are treated with disdain and even disrespect in the classroom. Returning Iraq war veterans have been insulted, harassed and called “baby killers” in university classrooms. The Military Finally, as was the case during the U.S. fight against communism in Southeast Asia, the mission of the military has been undermined by blatant hostility and blanket condemnations. Venomous slurs have been directed toward the dedicated servicemen and women who toppled a brutal dictator, struggled against radical Islamists, and fought for a better life for the Iraqi people. Politicians have been extremely negative. For example, Illinois senator Barrack Obama referred to the “wasted” lives of our soldiers. Massachusetts Senator John Kerry insulted the intelligence of our armed forces by proclaiming that people end up in the military if they’re not smart or studious. Anti-military groups have tried to stop military recruitment drives and job fair participation in high schools and on college campuses. Even though all recruits today are committed volunteers who believe in the U.S. mission, anti-war activists portray them as victims, mercenaries or butchers. Isolated military improprieties committed by a few soldiers, like the Haditha incident and the Abu Ghraib scandal, receive outsized attention and are portrayed as representative of all military conduct. The slightest hint of misconduct is used to characterize all recruits and to malign the entire military mission. Anti-militarism has even been expressed by sweeping, local government measures. The city of San Francisco has engaged in various actions to rid itself of any relationship whatsoever to the military. Residents recently passed a symbolic measure demanding the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and prohibiting recruitment at high schools and colleges. City residents tried to stop Navy sponsorship of a summer concert, successfully blocked the docking of the USS Iowa at the Port of San Francisco and are trying to eliminate Fleet Week and the Blue Angels air shows. Congress In Congress, many Democrats and several Republicans are invoking the Vietnam “quagmire” descriptive to support demands to curtail the Iraq war and withdraw U.S. troops. The Democrat electorate has chosen to interpret recent election results as a sign that the public is opposed to the war, rather than opposed to the way the war is being fought. According to a recent national survey by Public Opinion Strategies, a majority of Americans (57) wants to win the war in Iraq and makes the connection between Iraq and the global jihad. Fifty-three percent feel the Democrats are acting precipitously in pushing for immediate withdrawal and a majority (56) also believes that Americans should stand behind the president in times of war. Most telling, 74 of those surveyed disagreed with the statement, “I don’t care what happens in Iraq after the U.S. leaves. I just want the troops brought home.” Last week, on the same day that Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki told Bush that the new security plan and heightened troop presence in Baghdad were “a dazzling success,” the House passed a non-binding resolution rejecting Bush’s 21,500-troop surge in Iraq. In the Senate, the resolution was just four votes short of the sixty required for cloture, which would have limited debate on the resolution and ensured passage. As a consequence of this narrow defeat, Democrats have pledged to repeal a 2002 measure authorizing and defining the mission of U.S. troops in Iraq. With no consideration of how this plays with the enemy, the morale of U.S. troops and the U.S. ground troops’ ability to build alliances with Iraqis, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid issued a statement that the invasion of Iraq was “the worst foreign policy mistake” in U.S. history. In further attempts to block the deployment of more troops, House Democrats hope to restrict parts of a $100 billion emergency military funding request by the President. Rep. John Murtha (D-PA) and other Democrats have joined forces with anti-war groups to limit the President’s powers as Commander-In-Chief. Murtha and company plan to attach stipulations to any military appropriations; embark on a multi-million dollar, anti-war advertising campaign; and target vulnerable Republicans. Murtha is also seeking legislation as part of what he calls his “slow bleed strategy.” It would prevent military units from being deployed unless they meet certain standards and receive a break of at least one year between deployments. This damaging action by politicians and their failure to support the U.S. government “destroys morale, stymies success and emboldens the enemy,” says Rep. Sam Johnson (R-TX), a former Vietnam prisoner of war. “Words cannot fully describe the horrendous damage of the anti-American efforts against the war back home to the guys on the ground,” Johnson said. “We must stick by ‘the troops.’ We must support them all the way. To our troops we must remain always faithful.” This inattention to the message being sent to our soldiers is part of the broader failure by Iraq war opponents to recognize the dire consequences of U.S. withdrawal. It completely escapes opponents of the war on all fronts anti-war activists, Hollywood, colleges and universities and politicians that the conflict is not regional and one from which we can walk away without harm. It is positively stunning that they fail to recognize that Iraq could fall to Islamic terrorists. If this happened, Iraq would be a fertile base for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and a haven from which emboldened terrorists could attack U.S. allies and interests and threaten the very existence of our nation.

#### Homefront moral is key to the war on terror and preventing future attacks – funding, mandate and morale. Snavely 02

Christopher B. Snavely, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING HOMEFRONT MORALE FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, June 2002 EE

Persuasion is the ultimate purpose of every terrorist action and relies on both the rallying of ones own morale combined with the degradation of the opposition’s morale. Terrorism hopes to provide "propaganda by deed," whereby a terrorist act seeks to “awaken the consciousness of the people” to their cause. [Laqueur] By inducing a western escalation of the conflict, al-Qaeda hopes to provide the catalyst for an Arab revolution in opposition to the West. The coalition of Arab states would constitute a force capable of threatening the prosperity of western civilization, and therefore capable of forcing the withdrawal of western presence in the Middle East. Terrorism also seeks to undermine homefront support of American foreign policy. Al-Qaeda hopes to meet their 3 political aims by having a dramatic effect on the American will to fight. By inflicting, or threatening to inflict significant damage to the United States and its populace, al-Qaeda hopes to force the American public into opposition of the governments Middle East policy. [Tugwell, pg. 68] By developing and maintaining homefront morale the American government would deny the terrorists the effect their attacks intend. Further, The War on Terrorism will undoubtedly be a protracted campaign, requiring a great deal of budgetary investment. In order to assure continued monetary support for the war effort, the public must believe that victory is possible. Public support for the war will lead to political support for the war, which in turn will lead to budgetary support. Armed with the necessary funds and political mandate, the government will be empowered to take the necessary measures to prevent further attacks and effectively prosecute the terrorist networks. Maurice Tugwell, author of Terrorism as a Psychological Strategy, claims that a military campaign can only exist if the warring nation meets three psychological criteria. The three convictions, termed the Mobilizing Trinity, consist of the following: First, a belief in something good to be promoted or defended; Second, a belief in something evil to be destroyed or resisted; Third, a belief in the ultimate victory of the good cause. [Tugwell, pg. 70] 4 While it cannot do so alone, a homefront morale campaign can aid in meeting the criteria by serving as the intermediary between the public and the cause. The development and implementation of a campaign for homefront morale can help form the public’s perception of what is at stake, who the enemy is, and the prospect of victory. The question thus becomes how should the U.S. government develop, maintain, and regulate public support for the war?

#### A single coordinated attack escalates and kills billions Myhrvold 2014

Myhrvold 2014 (Nathan P [chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief technology officer at Microsoft]; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action; cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic\_Terrorism\_corrected\_II.pdf; kdf)

Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often hope to provoke reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually, the world will recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.

## 3

#### Despite budget cuts, our military is a beast right now. Patraues and O’Hanlon 16

Petraeus, David and Michael O'Hanlon. "The Myth of a U.S. Military 'Readiness' Crisis." Wall Street Journal, Aug 10, 2016, Eastern edition. EE

U.S. military readiness is again a hot issue in the presidential election, but unfortunately the current debate glosses over some of the most important facts. While Congress's sequestration-mandated cuts to military spending have hurt preparedness, America's fighting forces remain ready for battle. They have extensive combat experience across multiple theaters since 9/11, a tremendous high-tech defense industry supplying advanced weaponry, and support from an extraordinary intelligence community. For those concerned that America's military is in decline or somehow not up to the next challenge, we offer a few reassuring facts: -- The current national defense budget of over $600 billion a year far exceeds the Cold War average of about $525 billion (in inflation-adjusted 2016 dollars) and the $400 billion spent in 2001, according to official Pentagon and Office of Management and Budget data. The national defense budget, which doesn't include Veterans Affairs or the Department of Homeland Security, constitutes 35% of global military spending and is more than that of the next eight countries -- including China and Russia -- combined. Spending has been reduced from the levels of the late Bush and early Obama years, but that isn't unreasonable in light of scaled-down combat operations abroad and fiscal pressures at home. -- Assuming no return to sequestration, as occurred in 2013, Pentagon budgets to buy equipment now exceed $100 billion a year, a healthy and sustainable level. The so-called "procurement holiday" of the 1990s and early 2000s is over. -- While some categories of aircraft and other key weapons are aging and will need replacement or major refurbishment soon, most equipment remains in fairly good shape. According to our sources in the military, Army equipment has, on average, mission-capable rates today exceeding 90% -- a historically high level. Marine Corps aviation is an exception and urgently needs to be addressed. -- Training for full-spectrum operations is resuming after over a decade of appropriate focus on counterinsurgency. By 2017 the Army plans to rotate nearly 20 brigades -- about a third of its force -- through national training centers each year. The Marine Corps plans to put 12 infantry battalions -- about half its force -- through large training exercises. The Air Force is funding its training and readiness programs at 80%-98% of what it considers fully resourced levels. This situation isn't perfect, but it has improved -- and while the military is still engaged in combat operations across the world. -- The men and women of today's all-volunteer military continue to be outstanding and committed to protecting America. Typical scores of new recruits on the armed forces qualification test are now significantly better than in the Reagan years or the immediate pre-9/11 period, two useful benchmarks. The average time in service, a reflection of the experience of the force, is now about 80 months in the enlisted ranks, according to Defense Department data. That is not quite as good as in the 1990s, when the average was 85-90 months, but is better than the 75-month norm of the 1980s. While there are areas of concern, there is no crisis in military readiness. But that doesn't mean the U.S. is good enough -- especially in a world of rapidly changing technology, new threats emerging across several regions, and a constantly evolving strategic landscape. Here are some of the most pressing issues:

#### The pursuit of heg is inevitable – it’s just a question of effectiveness. Tellis ’09,

Tellis, senior associate at Carnegie, 9 — Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense and Asian strategic issues, Research Director of the Strategic Asia program at NBR—the National Bureau of Asian Research, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, 2009 (“Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States,” Global Asia, Volume 4, Number 1, Available Online at http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue9/Ashley\_J.\_Tellis.pdf, Accessed 09-13-2011, p. 54-55) recut from Woodward

This hegemony is by no means fated to end any ¶ time soon, however, given that the United States ¶ remains predominant by most conventional indicators of national power. The character of the ¶ United States’ hegemonic behavior in the future ¶ will thus remain an issue of concern both within ¶ the domestic polity and internationally. Yet the ¶ juvenescence of the United State’s “unipolar ¶ moment,” combined with the disorientation ¶ produced by the September 11 attacks, ought to ¶ restrain any premature generalization that the ¶ imperial activism begun by the clinton administration, and which the Bush administration took ¶ to its most spirited apotheosis, would in some ¶ way come to define the permanent norm of US ¶ behavior in the global system. In all probability, ¶ it is much more likely that the limitations on US ¶ ¶ power witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq will ¶ produce a more phlegmatic and accommodating United States over the longer term, despite ¶ the fact that the traditional US pursuit of dominance — understood as the quest to maintain a ¶ preponderance of power, neutralize threatening ¶ challengers, and protect freedom of action, goals ¶ that go back to the foundations of the republic — ¶ is unlikely to be extinguished any time soon.¶ Precisely because the desire for dominance is ¶ likely to remain a permanent feature of US geopolitical ambitions — even though how it is exercised will certainly change in comparison to ¶ the Bush years — the central task facing the next ¶ administration will still pertain fundamentally ¶ to the issue of US power. This concern manifests ¶ itself through the triune challenges of: redefining ¶ the United States’ role in the world, renewing the ¶ foundations of US strength, and recovering the ¶ legitimacy of US actions. In other words, the next ¶ administration faces the central task of clarifying ¶ the character of US hegemony, reinvigorating the ¶ material foundations of its power, and securing ¶ international support for its policies.

#### Ineffective crisis response guarantees extinction --- a laundry list of threats are on the brink

Paul Miller 11, Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at the National Defense University, former director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council, October 17, 2011, “This is no time to cut defense,” online: http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/17/this\_is\_no\_time\_to\_cut\_defense

The threats to us are more numerous, not less. There are two major families of threats to U.S. national security today. First, at one end of the state spectrum, are the nuclear-armed authoritarian powers: Russia, China, soon Iran, North Korea as a junior partner, and Pakistan if it falls to jihadists. The latter three are (or will be) new to the nuclear club since the Cold War, and China is vastly more powerful today than it was in 1989. Second, at the other end, is the aggregate global consequences of state failure and anarchy across much of the world -- such as the rise of terrorist groups, organized crime, drug cartels, human traffickers, nuclear smugglers, pandemic disease, and piracy -- that will collectively erode global stability and raise the cost of U.S. leadership. State failure, with its effects magnified by globalization, is also a vastly greater threat that during the Cold War. These two families are the threats we face in the 21st Century. By contrast, we faced fewer threats and a simpler world at almost every point in our history before 1989.¶ The threats are equally apocalyptic. Nuclear war with the Soviet Union was the gravest danger we ever faced, and we came perilously close to it in 1962. Nuclear war with Iran or North Korea would be almost equally dangerous, especially after they have acquired longer-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting U.S. allies and even the U.S. homeland. (Yes, the Soviet Union had thousands of warheads, but you only need a few nukes to cause more damage to us than all the wars we have fought in history, combined, and only a few dozen to effectively wipe out the United States. And if I were a new nuclear power, I wouldn't announce my capability until I already had a few dozen to make sure I could withstand an attack on my arsenal. Which means that North Korea and Iran (when it announces) will almost certainly be existential threats). The difference is that war with them or their proxies may be more likely to actually happen. The latter two countries may be less deterrable, less predictable, and more prone to transfer nuclear technology to proxies and non-state groups, given their history of erratic behavior, sponsoring terrorism, and proliferation. All told, the chances of a nuclear detonation in New York City are higher, not lower, today than twenty years ago. Unfortunately, we do not have a team of patriotic mutant superheroes to avert disaster this time.¶ Our allies are less capable, not more. Militarily, the Allies have underinvested in defense for decades-nothing new there. But the situation is actually getting worse, not better. The European allies spent 1.7 percent of GDP on defense in 2010 compared to 3.7 percent in 1985, according to NATO figures, a huge decline. As a result, the allies' performance in Libya and Afghanistan has not covered them with glory. And the alliance -- including us -- is still using mostly the same weapons systems and platforms that were developed in the late Cold War, just with a layer of IT, often glitchy and unreliable, grafted on in recent years (I agree with Tom's new post in this respect). Politically, the alliance has suffered tremendous strain from the double hammer-blows of disagreement over Iraq followed by unequal burden-sharing and nearly losing the war in Afghanistan. I am less confident in the alliance now than during the Cold War.¶ Our enemies and competitors are more capable, not less. Again, several states have acquired nuclear weapons since 1989. China has engaged in a massive conventional military buildup. Russia, after initially suffering a crippling loss of manpower, resources, and morale, has undertaken a long process of professionalizing and modernizing its military. Non-state actors have harnessed the tools of globalization and exploited the weakness of failed states to give them a global operating scope and comfortable safe haven.¶ Our values are not ascendant. The global financial crisis has (unfairly, I think) cast disrepute on the west in the eyes of many developing nations. China's rise has made state-managed and autocratic development attractive to many an aspiring power. Illiberal political Islam, with its hostility to women's rights and religious freedom, is at least competing aggressively with democracy and human rights across the Islamic world. Hindutva, largely content to compete peacefully through the Indian democratic system so far, may not always be so. Marxism of a sort is still alive, fashionable, and even resurgent in a few quarters like Venezuela and Bolivia. Democracy has indeed spread farther since 1989 than ever before in human history, but that is different from "ascendancy." Democratic gains since 1989, for example in Africa and Latin America, are new and might easily be reversed, especially given the competition.¶ What worries me is that I am increasingly convinced that we do not have the capabilities to meet the various threats we face today. We don't need to be omnipotent, but we do need to be able to protect ourselves. Can we stave off state failure in Pakistan? Can we prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, or contain it afterwards? Could we prevent Russia from doing to Ukraine what it did to Georgia in 2008? Can we defeat the drug cartels wreaking havoc in Mexico and Columbia? Is al-Qaida really nearing "strategic defeat," as Panetta claims? Are we prepared to handle a collapse in North Korea -- possibly having to fight a sudden war with a desperate regime, contribute to a multilateral occupation and reconstruction afterwards, and handle the delicate diplomacy with the Chinese?

## Case

#### A decline in heg would trigger drastic measures from the White House – means even if heg is bad, declining heg now would cause more extremist policies to attempt to maintain heg. Gottileb 12

Gottlieb 9/19—adjunct professor of International Affairs and Public Policy at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, two MA degrees and a PhD in international relations from Columbia (Stuart, 9/19/12, “What if U.S. stops policing the world?,” http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/18/opinion/gottlieb-us-retrenchment/index.html, RBatra)

But the question is not whether promises to bring home troops and reduce military spending can be sold in an election year -- the question is what impact would retrenchment have on future U.S. and global security. If history is any guide, the answer is troubling: Over the past century, each of America's attempts to reduce its role in the world was met by rising global threats, eventually requiring a major U.S. re-engagement.¶ This is not to argue that the U.S. should sustain its muscular post-9/11 global posture or continue its land war in Afghanistan. It is to urge caution against a growing belief that scaling back American power in the world will be without risks or costs.¶ History shows that in the aftermath of America's major wars of the 20th century -- World War I, World War II and Vietnam -- the American public and powerful leaders in Washington demanded strict new limits in foreign policy. After World War I, that meant rejecting participation in the League of Nations and receding into isolation. After World War II, it meant embarking on one of the largest voluntary military demobilizations in world history. And after Vietnam, it meant placing new restrictions on a president's ability to conduct overseas operations.¶ But in each case, hopes were soon dashed by global challengers who took advantage of America's effort to draw back from the world stage -- Germany and Japan in the 1930s, the Soviet Union in the immediate post-World War II period and the Soviet Union again after Vietnam. In each case, the United States was forced back into a paramount global leadership role -- in World War II, the Cold War and the military build-up and proxy wars of the 1980s.¶ Similar effects have also followed the withdrawal of U.S. troops from global hot spots, as in Somalia in 1993. America's need to extricate itself from that calamitous humanitarian mission, in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, was clear. But the withdrawal came at a huge strategic cost: It emboldened the narrative of the emerging al Qaeda network that America was a "paper tiger," setting the stage for the escalating terrorist attacks of the 1990s and September 11, 2001.¶ Obama's desire to withdraw from costly and unpopular foreign conflicts and refocus on domestic issues is understandable. And he is by no means an isolationist, as his intensified war on al Qaeda can attest.¶ But Obama's assertion that his recalibration of U.S. foreign policy -- centered on withdrawing U.S. troops from Mideast wars and leaning more on allies and the United Nations -- has awakened "a new confidence in our leadership" is without foundation.¶ Like Great Britain in the 19th century, America since the turn of the 20th century has been the world's pivotal global power. Fair or not, in moments when America seemed unsure of its role in the world, the world noticed and reacted.¶ There is no reason to believe now is different. Indeed, in many ways looming opportunists are more obvious today than the 1930s, 1970s and 1990s. These include al Qaeda and other Islamist movements spinning U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan as strategic defeats; an emboldened Iran on the cusp of attaining nuclear weapons; and a rising China flexing its muscles in the South China Sea.

#### Framing of “imperial university’ militarizes academic discourse and creates a self-fullfilling prophecy. Kennedy, JD, 89

(Randall L, Law @Harvard, RACIAL CRITIQUES OF LEGAL ACADEMIA Harvard Law Review JUNE, 1989 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745)

Second, Professor Delgado's writings express and popularize a militarization of academic discourse. n297 The very imagery of his rhetoric -- such as the reference to "imperial" scholars -- calls to mind a notion of "us" and "them," a conception of academia as battleground. Adopting that conception of the situation might very well entail, for many of "us," adopting a mode of conduct that would include a disposition to assume the worst about everything said and done by "them." If warlike conditions really do exist, defensive thinking of this sort makes perfect sense. If, on the other hand, one mistakenly perceives a condition as warlike, the defensive thinking generated by that misperception may be wasteful, cutting one off, for instance, from fruitful collegial exchange. Worse, it may actually help to create or exacerbate hostilities via a self-fulfilling prophecy. n298 Because descriptions can help to create the very thing they purport to describe, one ought to be cautious in the way one defines socially vexing situations. Professor Delgado fails to use appropriate caution. Instead of alleging racial bias at the end of a process in which other plausible explanations have been fully considered and found wanting, he seems eager to make such allegations as a first choice. The militarization of discourse also increases pressure on intellectuals to "choose sides" and to display loyalty to the side chosen. In such a setting, disagreement becomes attack and dissent becomes betrayal -- hardly an atmosphere conducive to free intellectual discussion or self-critical reflection. Moreover, as in so many other contexts in our society, the overall burden of a bad situation falls especially hard upon minorities. The sense of isolation that many minority academics feel creates a particularly powerful demand for loyal conformity to whatever becomes the group's dominant political program. This is the socio-psychological dynamic that lays behind the charge [\*1816] that an article like this one, written by a minority scholar, displays a special lack of political responsibility.

#### The marketplace of ideas is terrible – government influence creates a chilling effect, it acts as a palliative for broader reform, and shuts dissent into endless debate instead of action – the aff opens a procedural can of worms that makes change impossible. Inbger 84

Stanley Ingber, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: A LEGITIMIZING MYTH, Duke Law Review, February 1984 EE

The clear and present danger test presupposes that market imperfections sometimes give speakers an unacceptable level of advantage in influencing others. Because information opposing the speaker's viewpoint cannot be transmitted instantaneously to all market participants, the real market substantially departs from the theoretical one.80 Therefore, emergency situations are exempted from first amendment coverage. As long as sufficient time remains for the marketplace's process of deliberation to persist, however, and as long as lawless action is not imminent, no emergency exists and all speech must be protected. Yet the goal of free speech is not merely to have citizens enjoy participating in an effete truth-seeking process. Instead, citizens seek truth through free speech precisely to influence choice and behavior. Recognizing that beliefs are important primarily because those who hold them are likely to act accordingly, Holmes conceded that "every idea is an incitement. '81 Ironically, however, Holmes's "clear and present danger" formula allows government officials to prohibit expression precisely when such speech threatens to incite action.82 An interpretation of the first amendment that permits the state to cut off expression as soon as it comes close to being effective essentially limits the amendment's protection to encompass only abstract or innocuous communication. 83 Consequently, speech is constitutionally protected under the clear and present danger test as long as it is either ineffective84 or insignificant. 85 In either instance the test creates an establishment bias. Other factors peculiar to the clear and present danger test accentuate this bias. The test is both ad hoc and vague. Speakers receive no warning whether their contemplated speech extends beyond the parameters of constitutional protection. The test is totally contextual, giving little guidance to either the speaker or the official censor who must predict the impact of the expression. 6 For the speaker, this lack of notice fosters continuous uncertainty and thus may chill a risk-averse speaker who desires to minimize his personal legal peril.87 Such a person may censor himself by intentionally avoiding those messages he perceives as approaching the fringe of official acceptability. The official, in turn, must decide when the expression is clearly dangerous and when insufficient time exists for a full and fair hearing of responsive expression that would allow good counsel to defeat bad.88 The censor's evaluation involves a two-tiered decision. First, the official must evaluate the speech ideologically to determine whether it is good or evil, because if the speech is good the lack of sufficient time for response is irrelevant. 89 But under the market model, only the marketplace can accurately separate good from evil; therefore, no criteria can exist to determine whether speech is sufficiently evil to warrant exclusion from the market. Second, the official must calculate the seriousness of the speech's evil, because the market requires greater response time for more serious evils. This requirement forces the official to differentiate without any guidelines between evil counsel that is about to lead an insufficiently educated public astray, and good counsel that merely has convinced an adequately informed public of its "rightness." Under a test with such elasticity, speakers who proclaim any radical political doctrine may expect to receive little or no protection because they will always appear as a threat to the nation and, thus, embody the most serious of all possible evils. 90 The establishment bias is again obvious. The clear and present danger test also encourages prolonging debate indefinitely. According to Brandeis, expression may not be prohibited so long as debate remains ongoing. 91 Thus, only the process of truth-seeking is fully protected; decisions and actions predicated upon truths once discovered are protected not at all.92 Brandeis's approach to the marketplace of ideas accordingly encourages prolonged discussion and, therefore, the delay of decisions that might lead to actions contrary to society's generally accepted "truths." There is, however, little value in the discovery of truth that cannot be used as a basis of choice and behavior. Brandeis's focus on procedural aspects of the market rather than on the substantive actions it triggers also fosters delay in implementing any ideas that challenge the status quo perspective. Disputes over the best solutions for societal problems are converted into disputes over proper marketplace processes. For example, rather than focusing on whether the military draft should be reinstated, the debate may well center on whether antidraft groups should be allowed to stage a massive demonstration in a business district. Such procedural concerns divert attention from the substantive issue so that the status quo is more easily preserved. Through this process of transforming substantive conflicts into procedural debates, challengers to the status quo may be placated with a procedural victory while their overt threat is defused.93 This shift in focus helps to insulate society from the trauma of having to reconsider its accepted values while at the same time it allows the protesting individual and his supporters to believe that they have a fair opportunity to win popular support for their position.94 If freedom of expression only gives protection as long as decisions are not yet made, actions are not yet taken, and debate is still in progress, then there is little threat to established norms

#### The marketplace of ideas causes perspectives to be ignored and entrenches already dominant power structures. Bietzke 97.

Paul H. Brietzke. “How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fail”. Valparaiso Scholar. 1997. <http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1846&context=vulr> AGM

Advocates of a broad and absolutist political speech are right: dissenters are protected against the tyranny of the majority, without having to prove the "hard-to-measure worth" of free speech.37 This is an obviously-important protection, during crisis times or when the speech-harm can indeed be cured by more speech, but it should not forestall the search for protections which are more "cost-effective" in terms of having fewer speech-harm side effects. The nature of such protections is suggested by persistent critiques of the political speech/marketplace of ideas nexus. Critics plausibly argue that this nexus operates "to exaggerate the evils of government and [as in Areopagitica] the goodness of people," to "understate the risks and harms of speech and to overstate its benefits,"" and to understate the physical and psychological dangers, and often the futility, of attempts to counter bad speech with good. Stanley Ingber concludes that the ideas marketplace changes little and has little to do with an informed choice. Rather, this nexus serves to socialize the citizenry into a conformity to some perspectives rather than others. The "marketplace of ideas is as flawed as the economic market ...[, and] ideas that support an entrenched power structure or ideology are most likely to gain acceptance. " Society is not a debating club like the Oxford Union, not a "town meeting or... a group of scientists interested in figuring out some truth."' Producers often speak to make a profit, and they are usually very different people from the ostensible consumers, who often misunderstand or ignore the message, often lack a viable channel for communicating their response, and are often afraid to make fools of themselves by speaking up. Feeling cut off from an active participation, many people are left with the passivity of an evening in front of the TV that is controlled (even after the advent of cable TV) by oligopolistic networks practicing a very definite viewpoint censorship. Many subjects or perspectives are ignored or relegated to fragmented "market surrogates," like a "counterculture" newspaper or a "public access" TV channel, because they are thought to be "distressing" or "unentertaining" and, thus, unprofitable. Most of effective political speech is really a commercial speech, and it would receive less ("low value") protection if the Supreme Court pushed some of its analyses to their logical conclusions.4 The deep (economic)42 rationality assumption characteristic of the ideas marketplace, and of other markets as well, cannot hold in the real world: it ignores a host of factors that make us human, including altruism, habit, bigotry, panic, genius, luck or its absence, and factors such as peer pressures, institutions, and cultures that turn us into social animals. A dehumanized, desocialized, and often sexist "economic man" [or "speech man"] supposedly goes through life as if it were one long series of analogies to isolated transactions on the New York Stock Exchange.4