Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[57]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[58]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[57]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-02-04 01:48:40.991
	1	+2017-02-04 01:48:40.0

Caselist.CitesClass[58]

Cites

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	1	+First, to evaluate ethical judgments we must interrogate ontologies of exclusion to filter out ethical biases.
	2	+Butler 09. Judith Butler, “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Jan 1st 2009, Pg.138, http://books.google.com/books/about/Frames_of_War.html?id=ga7hAAAAMAAJ
	3	+We ask such normative questions as if we know what we mean by the subjects even as we do not always know how best to represent or recognize various subjects. Indeed, the “we” who asks such questions for the most part assumes that the problem is a normative one, namely, how best to arrange political life so that recognition and representation can take place. And though surely this is a crucial, if not the most crucial, normative question to ask, we cannot possibly approach an answer if we do not consider the ontology of the subject whose recognition and representation is at issue. Moreover, any inquiry into that ontology requires that we consider another level at which the normative operates, namely, through norms that produce the idea of the human who is worthy of recognition and representation at all. That is to say, we cannot ask and answer the most commonly understood normative questions, regarding how best to represent or recognize such subjects, if we fail to understand the differential of power at work that distinguishes between those subjects who will be eligible for recognition and those who will not.
	4	+
	5	+Morality mandates expression of all voices, which necessarily prohibits structural oppression.
	6	+Young 74. Iris Marion Young, Professor in Political Science at the University of Chicago since 2000, masters and doctorate in philosophy in 1974 from Pennsylvania State University. “Justice and the Politics of Difference”. Princeton University Press, 1990, Digital Copy.
	7	+Group representation, third, encourages the expression of individual ¶ and group needs and interests in terms that appeal to justice, that transform an "I want" into an "I am entitled to," in Hannah Pitkin's words. In ¶ Chapter 4 I argued that publicity itself encourages this transformation ¶ because a condition of the public is that people call one another to account. Group representation adds to such accountability because it serves as an antidote to self-deceiving self-interest masked as an impartial or general interest. Unless confronted with different perspectives on social relations and events, different values and language, most people tend to assert their perspective as universal. When social privilege allows some group perspectives to dominate a public while others are silent, such universalizing of the particular will be reaffirmed by many others. Thus the test of whether a claim upon the public is just or merely an expression of self interest is best made when those making it must confront the opinion of ¶ others who have explicitly with different, though not necessarily conflicting, ¶ experiences, priorities, and needs (cf. Sunstein, 1988, p. 1588). As a person of social privilege, I am more likely to go outside myself and have ¶ regard for social justice when I must listen to the voice of those my privilege otherwise tends to silence.
	8	+
	9	+Thus the standard is combatting structural violence.
	10	+Prefer consequence-based frameworks:
	11	+Only naturalism is epistemically accessible
	12	+Papinaeu 11 David Papineau, “Naturalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007
	13	+Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.
	14	+Intentions and states of being are non-falsifiable and can only be informed by hypothetical consequences
	15	+Life is a pre-requisite to agency and freedom – that justifies exceptions to hyper-individualist ethics

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-02-04 01:48:41.701

Judge

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	1	+Dino De La O

Opponent

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	1	+Aledo BY

ParentRound

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	1	+50

Round

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	1	+1

Team

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	1	+Westwood Shhah Neg

Title

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	1	+0 - FWK - Structural violence v2

Tournament

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	1	+Colleyville