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+Koppelman 15 . Andrew Koppelman John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, "Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions," Emory University School of Law, Volume 65, Issue 3, 09/14/15, http://law.emory.edu/elj/content/volume-65/issue-3/articles/revenge-pornography-first-amendment-exceptions.html//AD |
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+People are marvelously inventive in devising new ways to hurt each other. Some of these new ways involve speech. The Supreme Court has recently declared that speech is protected by the First Amendment unless it is a type of communication that has traditionally been unprotected. If this is the law, then harms will accumulate and the law will be helpless to remedy them. A recent illustration is the new phenomenon of “revenge pornography”—the online posting of sexually explicit photographs without the subject’s consent, usually by rejected ex-boyfriends. The photos are often accompanied by the victim’s name, address, phone number, Facebook page, and other personal information. They are sometimes shared with other websites, viewed by thousands of people, and become the first several pages of hits that a search engine produces for the victim’s name. The photos are emailed to the victim’s family, friends, employers, fellow students, or coworkers. They are seen on the Internet by prospective employers and customers. Victims have been subjected to harassment, stalking, and threats of sexual assault. Some have been fired from their jobs. Others have been forced to change schools. The pictures sometimes follow them to new jobs and schools. The pictures’ availability can make it difficult to find new employment. Most victims are female. 1 Twenty-six states have passed laws prohibiting this practice, and others are considering them. 2 (Civil remedies are often available but have not been much of a deterrent: victims often cannot afford to sue, and perpetrators often have few assets to collect. 3 ) The constitutionality of such laws is uncertain, however. These laws restrict speech on the basis of its content. Content-based restrictions (unless they fall within one of the categories of unprotected speech) are invalid unless necessary to a compelling state interest. 4 The state’s interest in prohibiting revenge pornography, so far from being compelling, may not even be one that the state is permitted to pursue. The central harm that such a prohibition aims to prevent is the acceptance, by the audience of the speech, of the message that this person is degraded and appropriately humiliated because she once displayed her naked body to a camera. The harm, in other words, consists in the acceptance of a viewpoint. Viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are absolutely forbidden. 5 There are exceptions to the ban on content-based restrictions: the Court has held that the First Amendment does not protect incitement, threats, obscenity, child pornography, defamation of private figures, criminal conspiracies, and criminal solicitation, for example. 6 None of those exceptions is applicable here. The pathologies of revenge pornography I have just described are the product of entirely new technologies: digital photography and the Internet. Because it is so new, however, it is not a category of speech that has traditionally been denied First Amendment protection. The Court has recently announced that unless speech falls into such a category, it is fully protected. There can be no new categories of unprotected speech. Laws prohibiting revenge pornography thus violate the First Amendment as the Court now understands it. The crux of the problem is the Court’s announced unwillingness to create new categories of non-protection. That unwillingness is not a necessary inference from the First Amendment. The present exceptions to free speech protection are judge-made doctrines. The courts that made them are by the same authority free to construct additional exceptions. Those exceptions would be justified by whatever justified the exceptions already on the books. Free speech is a complex cultural formation that aims at a distinctive set of goods. Its rules must be formulated and reformulated with those specific goods in mind. Pertinently here, one of those goods is a citizenry with the confidence to participate in public discussion. Traumatized, stigmatized women are not the kind of people that a free speech regime aims to create. Revenge pornography threatens to create a class of people who are chronically dogged by a spoiled social identity, and a much larger class of people who know that they could be subjected to such treatment without hope of redress. That state of affairs is directly contrary to the ideal of a regime in which everyone is empowered to participate in public discourse. Part I of this Article examines the constitutional objections to a statute that bans revenge pornography, and argues that those objections, although they are firmly rooted in the doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court, rest on an indefensibly wooden vision of free speech. Part II argues that this vision rests on an impoverished understanding of liberalism, which does not merely aim at constraint on government but which affirmatively seeks a society whose citizens have certain desirable traits of character, notably the courage to participate in public discourse. I develop this claim with a close reading of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. Part III argues that revenge pornography has a silencing effect on its victims that directly attacks the Millian ideal. Part IV argues that the creation of free speech exceptions cannot persuasively be ruled out in the way the Court has done, but are a normal part of judicial construction of the First Amendment’s text. The Conclusion reflects on the mechanical character of the free speech rules that the Court has constructed. |
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+Jensen and Okrina 4. Robert Jensen Professor in the School of Journalism at the University of Texas, a founding board member of the Third Coast Activist Resource Center, and a member of the board of Culture Reframed., Debbie Okrina Member of VAWnet – staff writer, “Pornography and Sexual Violence”, National Resource Center on Domestic Violence |
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+Commercial pornography in the United States is at the same time increasingly more normalized and more denigrating to women. There is understandable interest in the question about the connection between pornography and sexual violence. Rather than asking "does pornography cause rape?" we would be better served by investigating whether pornography is ever a factor that contributes to rape. In other words, Is pornography implicated in sexual violence in this culture? There are limits to what research can tell us about the complex interactions of mass media and human behavior. But from both laboratory research and the narratives of men and women, it is not controversial to argue that pornography can: (1) be an important factor in shaping a male-dominant view of sexuality; (2) be used to initiate victims and break down their resistance to unwanted sexual activity; (3) contribute to a user's difficulty in separating sexual fantasy and reality; and (4) provide a training manual for abusers. These conclusions provide support for the feminist critique of pornography that emerged in the 1970s and '80s, which highlighted pornography's harms to the women and children: (1) used in the production of pornography; (2) who have pornography forced on them; (3) who are sexually assaulted by men who use pornography; and (4) living in a culture in which pornography reinforces and sexualizes women's subordinate status. People who raise critical questions about pornography and the sex industry often are accused of being prudish, anti-sex, or repressive, but just the opposite is true. Such questions are crucial not only to the struggle to end sexual and domestic violence, but also to the task of building a healthy sexual culture. Activists in the anti-violence and anti-pornography movements have been at the forefront of that task. |