Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[44]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[46]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[44]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-03 15:44:40.914
	1	+2016-12-03 15:44:40.0

Caselist.CitesClass[46]

Cites

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	1	+I value morality as per the evaluative term “ought” in the resolution, which is defined as “used to express duty or moral obligation”. By Merriam-Webster.
	2	+Therefore you automatically look to my value because it has a much stronger link to the resolution. The standard is maximizing utilitarianism.
	3	+
	4	+1. Experience is the source of epistemic knowledge as it is how we empirically ground our existence. We cannot derive truth from reason as conceptions of reason differ from person to person and reason is socially constructed and thus dynamic. Sentience is the only non-arbitrary source of normativity. Pain is universally bad and pleasure is universally good.
	5	+Thomas Nagel ‘86 “The View From Nowhere”, 1986 //AG
	6	+I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter whose they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just is a sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost everyone takes the avoidance of his own pain and the promotion of his own pleasure as subjective reasons for action in a fairly simple way; they are not back up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure, either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism. What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain… Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. No objective view we can attain could possibly overrule our subjective authority in such cases. There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.
	7	+
	8	+And, all ethical theories collapse into util because the only way to evaluate actions is through their results, 2 reasons.
	9	+1. Intentions are unverifiable, so action can only be judged through outcomes of actions, which are inherently utilitarian.
	10	+2. Even theories that evaluate side constraints ultimately look to see if those side constraints have been met through consequences. Even deon looks at consequences to see who was treated as a means to an end.
	11	+
	12	+Qualified immunity requires a consequentialist perspective – prefer over their normative framework justifications because ours is uniquely key when evaluating qualified immunity.
	13	+Chen 97. Alan Chen is a leading national expert in free speech doctrine and theory, 1997, " THE BURDENS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE ROLE OF FACTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LAW," The American University Law Review, http://www.americanuniversitylawreview.org/pdfs/47/47-1/chen.pdf //RS
	14	+In the modem constitutional era, the Court defines the scope of substantive constitutional law by articulating balancing tests-broad, open-ended standards that define the scope of most individual constitutional rights. 267 Rather than providing a set of bright-line rules divining predetermined results for particular types of government conduct or regulation, balancing tests identify general criteria for constitutional decisionmaking, but leave great discretion to the decisionmaker to apply these criteria to the individual circumstances of each case.' When it creates balancing tests, the Court instructs lower courts to explicitly "weigh" individual rights (e.g., privacy, equality, speech) against governmental interests (e.g., public health, social welfare, social order) .26 The balancing metaphor symbolizes the evaluation of the relative substantive importance of these often competing values. Balancing tests, like all legal standards, necessitate individualized, context-specific determinations of constitutional rights because the quantum of interests may vary substantially from case to case, even under the same constitutional provision. In each case, the decisionmaker determines the outcome by evaluating which interest or value is "weightier.”

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-12-03 15:44:43.139

Judge

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	1	+Tim Davis

Opponent

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	1	+Harlin IT

ParentRound

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	1	+44

Round

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	1	+3

Team

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	1	+Westwood Shhah Neg

Title

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	1	+0 - FWK - Util

Tournament

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	1	+UT