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  • Caselist.CitesClass[44]
  • Caselist.RoundClass[26]

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Caselist.CitesClass[44]

Cites

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1		-I value morality as per the evaluative term “ought” in the resolution, which is defined as “used to express duty or moral obligation”. By Merriam-Webster.
2		-The standard is minimizing oppression
3		-Structural violence is based in moral exclusion, which is fundamentally flawed because exclusion is based on arbitrarily perceived difference.
4		-Winter and Leighton 01. Winter, D. D., and Dana C. Leighton." Structural violence." Peace, conflict and violence: Peace psychology for the 21st century (2001): 99-101.
5		-Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social jus- tice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.
6		-Theories that can’t account for the reality we live in fail as normative guides to action.
7		-Farrely 07. Colin Farrelly, 2007, Professor of Political Studies, Queen's University, "Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation", Political Studies, 2007. RFK
8		-Political philosophers have recently begun to take seriously methodological questions concerning what a theoretical examination of political ideals (e.g. justice) is supposed to accomplish and how effective theorizing in ideal theory is in securing those aims. Andrew Mason (2004) and G. A. Cohen (2003), for example, believe that the fundamental principles of justice are logically independent of issues of feasibility and questions about human nature. Their position contrasts sharply with political theorists like John Dunn (1990) and Joseph Carens (2000) who believe that normative theorizing must be integrated with an appreciation of the empirical realities of one’s society. Rather than bracket questions of feasibility and human nature, empirically oriented political theorists believe that real, non-ideal considerations (like our historical circumstances, problems of institutional design, etc.) must be taken seriously when deriving normative theories of justice.1 And some justice theorists, most notably John Rawls (1971; 1996), attempt to occupy a middle position that acknowledges some moderate feasibility constraints (e.g. pluralism) but also employs a number of idealizing assumptions (e.g. society is closed, full compliance, etc.) when deriving the principles of justice. The disagreement between those political philosophers who feel inclined to invoke highly abstract hypotheticals when deriving the principles of justice, and those political theorists who take seriously real, non-ideal considerations, is a disagreement over how fact-sensitive a theory of distributive justice ought to be. Mason raises a challenge for the more empirically grounded political theorists when he asks: ‘what reason do we have for thinking that any adequate analysis of an ideal such as justice must be conducted in the light of an investigation of what is feasible?’ (Mason, 2004, p. 255). In this article I hope to provide a compelling response to Mason’s question. I believe there is some conceptual incoherence involved in saying ‘This is what justice involves, but there is no way it could be implemented’ (Mason, 2004, p. 255).This incoherence stems from the fact that a theory of social justice, and the principles of justice it endorses, must function as an adequate guide for our collective action. A theory of social justice that yields impotent or misguided practical prescriptions is a deficient theory of justice. If the collective aspiration to implement the conclusions of a theory would not result in any noticeable increase in the justness of one’s society, then it fails as a normative theory. In this article I argue that theorising about justice at the level of ideal theory is inherently flawed and thus has impoverished liberal egalitarianism. I believe that moderate ideal theorists, such as Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, are actually much closer to the idealizing end of the spectrum and thus their theories are not adequately fact-sensitive to be considered realistically utopian.2 Ideal theorists (falsely) assume that a political philosopher can easily determine (or has privileged access to) what constitutes the ‘best foreseeable conditions’. Furthermore, by assuming full compliance, ideal theorists violate the constraints of a realistic utopia. Determining what is feasible in partially compliant societies that exist in the modern area of rapid globalisation is perhaps one of the major sources of political disagreement in contemporary democratic societies. Rather than side-stepping such disagreement, political philosophers should advance theories of justice that adopt a critically reflective attitude towards their own background empirical assumptions concerning what is realistically possible. The moderate ideal theories of Rawls and Dworkin fail to internalize such a reflective attitude. By illustrating the shortcomings of Rawls and Dworkin I hope to convince political philosophers that they need to take the empirical realities of real societies more seriously. Rather than moving in the direction advocated by Cohen and Mason (i.e. towards a more extreme idealized position) political philosophers should take more seriously non-ideal theory. This will help equip them with a theory of justice that can provide some normative guidance for real, non-ideal societies. More specifically, I argue that liberal egalitarians who function at the level of ideal theory adopt a cost-blind approach to rights and a narrow view of possible human misfortune. The former issue leads liberal egalitarians to give priority to a serially ordered principle of equal basic liberties (Rawls, 1971; 1996) or to treat rights as ‘trumps’ (Dworkin, 1978); and the latter to a stringent prioritarian principle (Rawls’ difference principle) or luck egalitarianism. Taken together, the costblind approach to rights, coupled with the narrow view of human misfortune, mean the liberal egalitarian theories of justice cannot address the issue of tradeoffs that inevitably arises in real non-ideal societies that face the fact of scarcity. This makes liberal egalitarianism an ineffective theory of social justice. Liberal egalitarian theories of justice are theories that typically function at the level of ideal theory. The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory is not given rigorous classification in the existing literature. As Mason (2004, p. 265) notes, this distinction is employed by Rawls in The Law of Peoples. An account of justice in ideal theory must recognize ‘some moderately strong feasibility constraints which require it to be realistic in the best of foreseeable conditions’ (Mason, 2004, p. 265). Rawls describes ideal theory as being realistically utopian. Political philosophy is realistically utopian ‘when it extends what are ordinarily thought of as limits of practical political possibility’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 6). This contrasts with non-ideal theory, which is concerned with problems of noncompliance or unfavourable (historical, social or economic) conditions.

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-02 22:47:32.0

Judge

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1		-Rey Aguilar

Opponent

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1		-San Marcos Adam Helbig

ParentRound

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1		-25

Round

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1		-1

Team

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1		-Westwood Mandavilli Neg

Title

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1		-4 - NC - Oppression

Tournament

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1		-University of Texas

Caselist.RoundClass[26]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-12-02 22:53:41.663
	1	+2016-12-02 22:53:41.0