Summary

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  • Caselist.CitesClass[31]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[32]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[31]

EntryDate

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1		-2016-11-20 19:42:31.318
	1	+2016-11-20 19:42:31.0

Caselist.CitesClass[32]

Cites

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	1	+Courts are barely declogged now – but that state requires extreme and careful management – along with very high levels of policy intervention
	2	+Bates 14. Judge John Bates, 2015. Bates is a United States District Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, "Annual Report 2014," USCourts.gov, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/annual-report-2014//AD
	3	+It was a great privilege to be only the second judge to serve as Director in the 75-year history of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO). As of January 2015, I relinquished my duties as Director to take on additional judicial duties at my court, the District Court for the District of Columbia. I return better informed about judicial administration and with a renewed appreciation for the excellence that exists in both the AO and the courts.I am grateful to the Chief Justice for placing his confidence in me, and I greatly appreciate the tremendous support I received from judges, and from court and AO staff. It may seem trite to say that I am proud of our success in keeping courthouse doors open and cases moving. However, it took great coordination and planning to begin the recovery from the severe funding reductions we endured during sequestration. In many ways, this rebuilding process was our greatest accomplishment in 2014.We were exceedingly fortunate that, when a funding bill finally was enacted, Congressional appropriators treated the Third Branch as a priority in both Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015. I believe that our cost containment efforts continue to demonstrate that we are serious about using taxpayer money prudently. We also have in place numerous broad accountability controls, ranging from audits and program reviews to required stewardship training for senior AO and court managers. Our strong commitment to the highest fiscal and ethical standards helps assure that the limited resources available are carefully managed and properly spent. Much of our cost-saving focus has been on court space. We have scoured our rent bills; courts have developed space management and reduction plans; and our integrated workplace initiative will enable courts to use space in a flexible and efficient manner. We also are reexamining staffing formulas, using less costly and easier ways to reach prospective jurors, and replacing our aging legacy accounting system with a new, centralized financial management system. As Director, I’ve had the opportunity to participate in conferences, advisory councils, workshops and other meetings involving judges and court staff from across the country. While I delivered news from Washington and the Administrative Office, I also absorbed a tremendous amount by listening and observing our courts in action. I learned that we are uniquely skilled problem solvers on both a local and national level. As one example, the District of Nevada developed an automated system for processing and managing vouchers submitted by lawyers appointed to represent indigents under the Criminal Justice Act. Through a collaborative effort, the system, known as eVoucher, is being adopted for national use and shared with courts throughout the country. On a broader scale, the national roll out of the Next Generation of our Case Management/Electronic Case Files System has begun in the courts of appeals. It will increase chambers’ and clerks’ office efficiency and, when fully implemented, will provide for a single sign-on for public users. Testing in district and bankruptcy courts will begin in 2015.The strength of the federal Judiciary lies in our ability to work together to confront the challenges that come our way. While I will remain a committed member of that team, it was a unique honor to serve in a leadership position as Director. The AO plays a central role in helping courts function smoothly. I benefitted greatly from Judge Tom Hogan’s fine work before me. I am also proud of what we have accomplished and know that Director Jim Duff, with his accomplished leadership skills, will continue the tradition of excellent public service.
	4	+Judicial resources are overstretched but qualified immunity doctrine allows quick dismissal of frivolous suits – the plan would clog the courts
	5	+Putnam and Ferris 92 (Charles Putnam, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the New Hampshire Attorney General, J.D. 1985, University of Connecticut. Charles Ferris, J.D. 1992, Franklin Pierce Law Center, Concord, New Hampshire.)“DEFENDING A MALIGNED DEFENSE: THE POLICY BASES OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE IN ACTIONS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983” BRIDGEPORT LAW REVIEW QUINNIPIAC COLLEGE Volume 12 Number 3 Spring 1992 LADI
	6	+A second policy consideration present in section 1983 litigation and furthered by the qualified immunity defense is the limiting of overdeterrence. Increasingly, courts are sensitive to the possibility that state and local government officials, because they are so often targets of section 1983 actions, are being improperly deterred in the performance of their duties.1 " The Supreme Court's absolute and qualified immunity decisions demonstrate its desire to reduce not only the incidence of official liability but the financially burdensome costs of defense, as well.14 National resources are obviously scarce, yet increasing numbers of section 1983 actions are being filed in overburdened federal courts. Reducing the load of these cases on the court system is a third essential policy consideration. Some courts have questioned whether the abundance of section 1983 cases in federal courts is an efficient use of judicial resources in light of the perception that many such actions are of questionable merit."6 The Supreme Court has thus encouraged the use of summary judgment where courts are faced with such cases. For instance, in Butz v. Economou, 7 the Court held: Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief under the Federal Constitution, it should not survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheuer that damages suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity.... In responding to such a motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure whichwill ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits.18 The courts' use of summary judgment and other procedural devices is thus an important safety measure for both the courts and defendants facing suit. Finally, because it creates a monetary damages action for constitutional violations, section 1983 may encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to push a number of constitutional provisions to their outer limits. The presence of further incentives, such as the availability of attorney's fees, creates an additional inducement to plaintiffs' lawyers who may read the Constitution too expansively. Such incentives tend to propagate constitutionally trivializing actions. The avoidance of these constitutionally unworthy cases is the fourth major objective of the qualified immunity defense in section 1983 litigation.'9 The Court voiced this concern in Baker v. McCollan.20 In Baker, the Court held that "section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law."'" To protect against such trivialization, the United States Supreme Court has established that merely negligent conduct does not implicate the Due Process Clause and is therefore not actionable under section 1983.2
	7	+
	8	+Court clog collapses the federal judiciary due to institutional strains
	9	+Oakley 96. John B. Oakley. J.D. Yale University, 1972. Professor at UC Davis School of Law.¶ “The Myth of Cost-Free Jurisdictional Reallocation”. 1996.
	10	+Personal effects: The hidden costs of greater workloads. The hallmark of federal justice traditionally has been the searching analysis and thoughtful opinion of a highly competent judge, endowed with the time as well as the intelligence to grasp and resolve the most nuanced issues of fact and law. Swollen dockets create assembly-line conditions, which threaten the ability of the modern federal judge to meet this high standard of quality in federal adjudication. No one expects a federal judge to They can’t function without an adequate level of available tangible resources: sufficient courtroom and chambers space, competent administrative and research staff, a good library, and a comfortable salary that relieves the judge from personal financial pressure. Although salary levels have lagged—encouraging judges to engage in the limited teaching and publication activities that are their sole means of meeting such newly pressing financial obligations as the historically high mortgage expenses and college tuitions of the present decade—in the main, federal judges have received a generous allocation of tangible resources. It is unlikely that there is any further significant gain to be realized in the productivity of individual federal judges through increased levels of tangible resources,13 other than by redressing the pressure to earn supplemental income.14 On a personal level, the most important resource available to the federal judge is time.15 Caseload pressures secondary to the indiscriminate federalization of state law are stealing time from federal judges, shrinking the increments available for each case. Federal judges have been forced to compensate by operating more like executives and less like judges. They cannot read their briefs as carefully as they would like, and they are driven to rely unduly on law clerks for research and writing that they would prefer to do themselves.16 If federal judges need more time to hear and decide each case, an obvious and easy solution is to spread the work by the appointment of more and more federal judges. Congress has been generous in the recent creation of new judgeships,17 and enlargement of the federal judiciary is likely to continue to be the default response, albeit a more grudging one, to judicial concern over the caseload consequences of jurisdictional reallocation. Systemic effects: The hidden costs of adding more judges. However, Increasing the size of the federal judiciary creates institutional strains that reduce and must ultimately rule out its continued acceptability as a countermeasure to caseload growth. While the dilution of workload through the addition of judges is always incrementally attractive, and in the long run it will cause the present system to collapse. I am not persuaded by arguments that the problem lies in the declining quality of the pool of lawyers willing to assume the federal bench18 or in the greater risk that, as the ranks of federal judges expand, there will be more frequent lapses of judgment by the president and the Senate in seating the mediocre on the federal bench.19 In my view, the diminished desirability of federal judicial office is more than offset by the rampant dissatisfaction of modern lawyers with the excessive commercialization of the practice of law. There is no shortage of sound judicial prospects willing and able to serve, and no sign that the selection process—never the perfect meritocracy—is becoming less effective in screening out the unfit or undistinguished. Far more serious are other institutional effects of continuously compounding the number of federal judges. Collegiality among judges, consistency of decision, and coherence of doctrine across courts are all imperiled by the growth of federal courts to cattle-car proportions. Yet the ability of the system to tolerate proliferation of courts proportional to the proliferation of judges is limited, and while collapse is not imminent, it cannot be postponed indefinitely. Congress could restructure the federal trial and appellate courts without imperiling the core functions, but the limiting factor is the capacity of the Supreme Court to maintain overall uniformity in the administration and application of federal law. That Court is not only the crown but the crowning jewel of a 200-year-old system of the rule of law within a constitutional democracy, and any tinkering with its size or jurisdiction would raise the most serious questions of the future course of the nation.
	11	+A Analytic
	12	+B Court Clog leads to extinction. Effective separation of power solves unaccountable decisions to go to war. Prefer – we cannot inquire if we are all dead and the 1AC inquiries would be meaningless because there would be no standard for morality.
	13	+Adler 96. (David, professor of political science at Idaho State, The Constitution and Conduct of American Foreign Policy, p. 23-25)
	14	+The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter the abuse of power, misguided policies, irrational action, and unaccountable behavior. As a fundamental structural matter, the emphasis on joint policymaking permits the airing of sundry political, social, and economic values and concerns. In any event, the structure wisely ensures that the ultimate policies will not reflect merely the private preferences or the short-term political interests of the president. Of course this arrangement has come under fire in the postwar period on a number of policy grounds. Some critics have argued, for example, that fundamental political and technological changes in the character of international relations and the position of the United States in the world have rendered obsolete an eighteenth-century document designed for a peripheral, small state in the European system of diplomatic relations. Moreover, it has been asserted that quick action and a single, authoritative voice are necessary to deal with an increasingly complex, interdependent, and technologically linked world capable of massive destruction in a very short period of time. Extollers of presidential dominance have also contended that only the president has the qualitative information, the expertise, and the capacity to act with the necessary dispatch to conduct U.S. foreign policy. These policy arguments have been reviewed, and discredited, elsewhere; space limitations here permit only a brief commentary. Above all else, the implications of U.S. power and action in the twentieth century has have brought about an even greater need for institutional accountability and collective judgment that existed 200 years ago. The devastating, incomprehensible destruction of nuclear war and the possible extermination of the human race demonstrate the need for joint participation, as opposed to the opinion of one person, in the decision to initiate war. Moreover, most of the disputes at stake between the executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs, including the issues discussed in this chapter, have virtually nothing to do with the need for rapid response to crisis. Rather, they are concerned only with routine policy formulation and execution, a classic example of the authority exercised under the separation of powers doctrine. But these functions have been fused by the executive branch and have become increasingly unilateral, secretive, insulated from public debate, and hence unaccountable. In the wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and the Iran-Contra scandal, unilateral executive behavior has become even more difficult to defend. Scholarly appraisals have exploded arguments about intrinsic executive expertise and wisdom on foreign affairs and the alleged superiority of information available to the president. Moreover, the inattentiveness of presidents to important details and the effects of “group-think” that have dramatized and exacerbated the relative inexperience of various presidents in international relations have also devalued the extollers arguments. Finally, foreign policies, like domestic policies, are a reflection of values. Against the strength of democratic principles, recent occupants of the White House have failed to demonstrate the superiority of their values in comparison to those of the American people and their representatives in Congress.

EntryDate

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	1	+2016-11-20 19:42:31.941

Judge

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	1	+Michael OKrent

Opponent

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	1	+Oliver Sussman

ParentRound

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	1	+19

Round

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	1	+6

Team

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	1	+Westwood Mandavilli Neg

Title

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	1	+NOVDEC - DA - Court Clog

Tournament

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	1	+Glenbrooks