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-Part 1 is the Framework |
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-Proper human action can only be guided by constraints that are agreed to. This necessitates the sovereign to unify action. Hobbes 1 |
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-The only way ... Commonwealth by institution |
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-Thus the standard is consistency with the will of the sovereign. Prefer additionally: |
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-1. Without the sovereign, each person becomes their own sovereign and attempts to put their own will over others until one sovereign is victorius. Parrish 2 |
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-Derrida`s Economy of ... creator of meaning. |
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-2. analytic |
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-3. Constructivism is true—moral facts aren't "out there" to be found but linguistic categories created by humans for humans. Parrish 3: |
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-Derrida`s Economy of ... as extrinsic facts. |
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-Part 2 is the Offense |
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-Public colleges are the sovereign 2 warrants: |
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-1. Supreme Court cases have explicitly ruled. Buchter 73 |
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-This theoretical mixture was applied in student-university litigation until Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education? was decided in 1961. Dixon held, generally, that a public university's actions were state actions and therefore subject to constitutional restraints and, more particularly, that a student must be afforded procedural due process prior to expulsion.1 " However, the state action doctrine in Dixon has not replaced the implied contract theory. Courts still view the student-university relationship as one of contract with certain constitutional protections required if the institution is public."1 Thus, there may currently be some limits on what the public university may demand from the student. For example, a public university may not be able to deny a student certain first amend ment rights." However, since the Dixon holding is limited to public institutions, a private university may be able to contract in such a way as to limit these constitutional rights."3 |
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-2. Engaging in the sphere of public education constitutes state action. Dagger et al 14 |
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-The second line of response to criticisms of consent theory is to argue in one way or another that the critics construe “consent” too narrowly. Thus John Plamenatz (1968, Postscript) and Peter Steinberger (2004, p. 218) have maintained that voting or otherwise participating in elections the state should count as consent; and Steinberger produces a lengthy list of fairly ordinary activities — calling the police or fire department for help, sending children to a public school, using a public library, and more — that constitutes “active participation in the institutions of the state” (2004, pp. 219–20). Mark Murphy and Margaret Gilbert have sounded variations on this theme by arguing, in Murphy's case, that “surrender of judgment is a kind of consent” (in Edmundson 1999, p. 320), or, in Gilbert's, that “joint commitment” is an important source of obligations, including political obligations (1993, 2006, 2013). For Murphy, surrender of judgment is consent in the usual sense of voluntary agreement or acceptance. As he says, “One consents to another in a certain sphere of conduct in the acceptance sense of consent when one allows the other's practical judgments to take the place of his or her their own with regard to that sphere of conduct. (This consent may be either to a person or to a set of rules: both of these can be authoritative)” (1999, p. 330). As the earlier discussion of her views indicates §2.3, Gilbert differs from Murphy, and others, in taking a joint commitment to be something that need not arise voluntarily. According to her theory, “an understanding of joint commitment and a readiness to be jointly committed are necessary if one is to accrue political obligations, as is common knowledge of these in the population in question. One can, however, fulfill these conditions without prior deliberation or decision, and if one has deliberated, one may have had little choice but to incur them” (2006, p. 290). Indeed, membership in a “plural subject” formed through nonvoluntary joint commitments plays such a large part in Gilbert's theory that it may be better to place her with those who advocate an associative or membership theory of political obligation than with the adherents of consent theory. |
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-Because colleges and universities are the sovereign, it is incoherent to limit the will of the sovereign when we willingly traded our rights claims to be protected in the state of nature. |