Changes for page Westview Sudhakar Aff
Summary
-
Objects (0 modified, 8 added, 6 removed)
- Caselist.CitesClass[8]
- Caselist.CitesClass[23]
- Caselist.CitesClass[24]
- Caselist.RoundClass[9]
- Caselist.RoundClass[28]
- Caselist.RoundClass[29]
- Caselist.CitesClass[25]
- Caselist.CitesClass[26]
- Caselist.CitesClass[27]
- Caselist.CitesClass[28]
- Caselist.RoundClass[30]
- Caselist.RoundClass[31]
- Caselist.RoundClass[32]
- Caselist.RoundClass[33]
Details
- Caselist.CitesClass[8]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,5 +1,0 @@ 1 -Hey I'm Rohith. Message me on facebook(I might not see this) or message me(858-774-1149) if you want me to disclose a broken position or ask me about past ACs or what I am going to read. If I don't respond, just check the rest of my wiki. If my phone is dead, just ask me questions before the round. 2 - 3 -Please note, I am under no obligation to tell you anything if I am breaking a new aff. 4 - 5 -Also, I very rarely read disclosure theory so don't be worried about it. - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2016-10-30 23:49:19.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -X - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -X - ParentRound
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -9 - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -1 - Team
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Westview Sudhakar Aff - Title
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Contact Information - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Voices
- Caselist.CitesClass[23]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,57 +1,0 @@ 1 -College Campus 2 - 3 -The value of human freedom is a precondition to all other values, because the act of valuing itself presupposes freedom and thus principles of consistency necessitate reflexive endorsement. The sphere of the state is derived from the constitutive force of agreement from the general will of the population. Such conceptions stem from the natural value of human freedom. 4 - 5 -====Rousseau ==== 6 -I SUPPOSE men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and ~Since~ the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence. But, as men cannot engender new forces, but ~can~ only unite and direct existing ~forces~ ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power and cause to act in concert. This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force and liberty of each man ~person~ are the chief instruments of his ~their~ self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on my present subject, may be stated in the following terms: "The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting ~themselves~ himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain~s~ as free as before." This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the solution. If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms: "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when passive. Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and taken one for another: it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are being used with precision. This formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals, and that each individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself, is bound in a double capacity; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign. But the maxim of civil right, that no one is bound by undertakings made to himself, does not apply in this case; for there is a great difference between incurring an obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of which you form a part. But the body politic or the Sovereign, drawing its being wholly from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to do anything derogatory to the original act, for instance, to alienate any part of itself, or to submit to another Sovereign. Violation of the act by which it exists would be self-annihilation; and that which is itself nothing can create nothing. In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that the will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful abuse. 7 -If the sovereign does not respect the general will, then they exert power over and above the citizenry and the contract dissolves since something other than the collective contract would govern state action. 8 - 9 -====Rousseau 2 ==== 10 -I WARN the reader that this chapter requires careful reading, and that I am unable to make myself clear to those who refuse to be attentive. Every free action is produced by the concurrence of two causes; one moral, i.e., the will which determines the act; the other physical, i.e., the power which executes it. When I walk towards an object, it is necessary first that I should will to go there, and, in the second place, that my feet should carry me. If a paralytic wills to run and an active man wills not to, they will both stay where they are. The body politic has the same motive powers; here too force and will are distinguished, will under the name of legislative power and force under that of ~the~ executive power. Without their concurrence nothing is, or should be done. We have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people, and can belong to it alone. It may, on the other hand, readily be seen, from the principles laid down above, that the executive power cannot belong to the generality as legislature or Sovereign, because it consists wholly of particular acts which fall outside the competency of the law, and consequently of the Sovereign, whose acts must always be laws. The public force therefore needs an agent of its own to bind it together and set it to work under the direction of the general will, to serve as a means of communication between the State and the Sovereign, and to do for the collective person more or less what the union of soul and body does for man. Here we have what is, in the State, the basis of government, often wrongly confused with the Sovereign, whose minister it is. What then is government? An intermediate body set up between the subjects and the Sovereign, to secure their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty, both civil and political. The members of this body are called magistrates or kings, that is to say governors, and the whole body bears the name prince.18 Thus those who hold that the act, by which a people puts itself under a prince, is not a contract, are certainly right. It is simply and solely a commission, an employment, in which the rulers, mere officials of the Sovereign, exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries. This power it can limit, modify or recover at pleasure; for the alienation of such a right is incompatible with the nature of the social body, and contrary to the end of association. I call then government, or supreme administration, the legitimate exercise of the executive power, and prince or magistrate the man or the body entrusted with that administration. In government reside the intermediate forces whose relations make up that of the whole to the whole, or of the Sovereign to the State. This last relation may be represented as that between the extreme terms of a continuous proportion, which has government as its mean proportional. The government gets from the Sovereign the orders it gives the people, and, for the State to be properly balanced, there must, when everything is reckoned in, be equality between the product or power of the government taken in itself, and the product or power of the citizens, who are on the one hand sovereign and on the other subject. Furthermore, none of these three terms can be altered without the equality being instantly destroyed. If the Sovereign desires to govern, or the magistrate to give laws, or if the subjects refuse to obey, disorder takes the place of regularity, force and will no longer act together, and the State is dissolved and falls into despotism or anarchy. Lastly, as there is only one mean proportional between each relation, there is also only one good government possible for a State. But, as countless events may change the relations of a people, not only may different governments be good for different peoples, but also for the same people at different times. In attempting to give some idea of the various relations that may hold between these two extreme terms, I shall take as an example the number of a people, which is the most easily expressible. Suppose the State is composed of ten thousand citizens. The Sovereign can only be considered collectively and as a body; but each member, as being a subject, is regarded as an individual: thus the Sovereign is to the subject as ten thousand to one, i.e., each member of the State has as his share only a ten-thousandth part of the sovereign authority, although he is wholly under its control. If the people numbers a hundred thousand, the condition of the subject undergoes no change, and each equally is under the whole authority of the laws, while his vote, being reduced to a hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in drawing them up. The subject therefore remaining always a unit, the relation between him and the Sovereign increases with the number of the citizens. From this it follows that, the larger the State, the less the liberty. When I say the relation increases, I mean that it grows more unequal. Thus the greater it is in the geometrical sense, the less relation there is in the ordinary sense of the word. In the former sense, the relation, considered according to quantity, is expressed by the quotient; in the latter, considered according to identity, it is reckoned by similarity. Now, the less relation the particular wills have to the general will, that is, morals and manners to laws, the more should the repressive force be increased. The government, then, to be good, should be proportionately stronger as the people is more numerous. On the other hand, as the growth of the State gives the depositaries of the public authority more temptations and chances of abusing their power, the greater the force with which the government ought to be endowed for keeping the people in hand, the greater too should be the force at the disposal of the Sovereign for keeping the government in hand. I am speaking, not of absolute force, but of the relative force of the different parts of the State. It follows from this double relation that the continuous proportion between the Sovereign, the prince and the people, is by no means an arbitrary idea, but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic. It follows further that, one of the extreme terms, viz., the people, as subject, being fixed and represented by unity, whenever the duplicate ratio increases or diminishes, the simple ratio does the same, and is changed accordingly. From this we see that there is not a single unique and absolute form of government, but as many governments differing in nature as there are States differing in size. If, ridiculing this system, any one were to say that, in order to find the mean proportional and give form to the body of the government, it is only necessary, according to me, to find the square root of the number of the people, I should answer that I am here taking this number only as an instance; that the relations of which I am speaking are not measured by the number of men alone, but generally by the amount of action, which is a combination of a multitude of causes; and that, further, if, to save words, I borrow for a moment the terms of geometry, I am none the less well aware that moral quantities do not allow of geometrical accuracy. The government is on a small scale what the body politic which includes it is on a great one. It is a moral person endowed with certain faculties, active like the Sovereign and passive like the State, and capable of being resolved into other similar relations. This accordingly gives rise to a new proportion, within which there is yet another, according to the arrangement of the magistracies, till an indivisible middle term is reached, i.e., a single ruler or supreme magistrate, who may be represented, in the midst of this progression, as the unity between the fractional and the ordinal series. Without encumbering ourselves with this multiplication of terms, let us rest content with regarding government as a new body within the State, distinct from the people and the Sovereign, and intermediate between them. There is between these two bodies this essential difference, that the State exists by itself, and the government only through the Sovereign. Thus the dominant will of the prince is, or should be, nothing but the general will or the law; his force is only the public force concentrated in his hands, and, as soon as he tries to base any absolute and independent act on his own authority, the tie that binds the whole together begins to be loosened. If finally the prince should come to have a particular will more active than the will of the Sovereign, and should employ the public force in his hands in obedience to this particular will, there would be, so to speak, two Sovereigns, one rightful and the other actual, the social union would evaporate instantly, and the body politic would be dissolved. 11 -The standard is consistency with deliberative democracy. This differs from other social contracts by 12 -AND 13 -subvert the general will for particular ends, which is inconsistent with society. 14 - 15 -Offense 16 - 17 -Hence, colleges and universities ought not restrict any form of constitutionally protected speech because speech is key to the procedural inclusion of voices and upholding a deliberative democracy. 18 - 19 -Maloney '16 20 -In grade school, I learned that debate is defined as "a discussion between people in which they express different opinions about something." Such open discourse was historically encouraged on our college campuses. Universities exemplified intellectual discussion and debate in America. No one voiced their opinions louder than students, professors and administrators. They pushed society's limits by admitting women and people of color, and by encouraging diversity of thought amongst the college community. Historically, young people flocked to universities to learn more about the world around them, to encounter people from different backgrounds, to expand their minds and to form their own opinions. Unfortunately, things have changed. Recently on college campuses, our open discourse has been threatened, particularly when discussing politics. While the current presidential election represents polarizing wings of both the Democratic and Republican parties, we should be able to openly debate their policies and the direction in which they plan to take our country if elected. We should be able to discuss the abuse of power within our government and the consistent violations of our Bill of Rights. We should be able to participate in the free market of ideas. But our students are being silenced. University campuses are now home to a plethora of speech restrictions. From sidewalk-sized "free-speech zones" to the criminalization of microaggressions, America's college campuses look and feel a lot more like an authoritarian dictatorship than they do the academic hubs of the modern free world. When rolling an inflated free-speech ball around campus, students at the University of Delaware were halted by campus police for their activities. A Young Americans for Liberty leader at Fairmont State University in West Virginia was confronted by security when he was attempting to speak with other students about the ideas he believes in. A man at Clemson University was barred from praying on campus because he was outside of the free-speech zone. And a student at Blinn College in Texas abolished her campus' free-speech zone in a lawsuit after administrators demanded she seek special permission to advocate for self-defense. How have we let this happen in America, the land of the free? It's because of what our universities have taught a generation of Americans: If you don't agree with someone, are uncomfortable with an idea, or don't find a joke funny, then their speech must be suppressed. Especially if they don't politically agree with you. Instead of actually debating ideas that span topics from the conventional to the taboo, a generation of American students don't engage, they just get enraged. In doing so, many students believe that they have a right to literally shut other people up. This is not only a threat to the First Amendment, but also to American democracy. In their manifestation, safe spaces and free-speech zones at public universities enable prejudice against unfavorable ideologies. Guised as progressive measures to ensure inclusion, these often unconstitutional policies exclude new and competing ideas, and are antithetical to a free academia. In excluding different ideologies, supposedly progressive campus speech codes do one thing: prevent the progression of ideas. Restrictive campus speech codes are, in fact, regressive. With over 750 chapters nationwide at Young Americans for Liberty, we are fighting against public universities that stifle free speech. We've launched the national Fight for Free Speech campaign to reform unconstitutional speech codes and abolish these so-called free-speech zones on college campuses. By hosting events such as large free speech balls, YAL chapters across the country are petitioning their campuses to adopt the University of Chicago's principles on freedom of expression—the hallmark of campus speech policies. Our members have geared up with First Amendment organizations to ensure that their free speech rights on campus are protected. America is a land rooted in the ideas of a free society: the freedom to be who you are, to speak your mind and to innovate. By silencing our students and young people, we have started down a slippery slope. It is up to us to fight back to ensure that our First Amendment rights remain protected—not just on college campuses, but everywhere in America. 21 - 22 -To clarify, speech that produces a clear an imminent danger is considered unconstitutional 23 -Joshua Waimberg 15, is a legal fellow at the National Constitution Center., 11-2-2015, "Schenck v. United States: Defining the limits of free speech," Constitution Daily, a href="http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/11/schenck-v-united-states-defining-the-limits-of-free-speech/"http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/11/schenck-v-united-states-defining-the-limits-of-free-speech//a 24 -This quote, while famous for its analogy, also gave the Court a pragmatic 25 -AND 26 -both Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden have also been charged under the Act. 27 - 28 -Impacts of speech are instantaneous and have no recourse. Lawrence 29 -Lawrence, C. R. (1990). If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus. Duke Law Journal, 1990(3), 431. doi:10.2307/1372554 30 -This regulation and others like it have been characterized in the press as the work 31 -AND 32 -of response until well after the assault when the cowardly assaulter has departed. 33 - 34 -Hate speech excludes Lawrence 35 -Lawrence, C. R. (1990). If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus. Duke Law Journal, 1990(3), 431. doi:10.2307/1372554 36 -A second factor that distinguishes racial insults from protected speech is the preemptive nature of 37 -AND 38 -the effect of pervasive racial and sexual violence and coercion on individual 39 - 40 - 41 -And, Post fiat policy requires free speech, the aff is the prerequisite to neg restrictions or alternatives. 42 -Jones et Al. 09 Nicola Jones, Ajoy Datta and Harry Jones. "Knowledge, policy and power Six dimensions of the knowledge– development policy interface." Overseas Development Institute 43 -At the knowledge generation end of the 'funnel', IS approaches to policymaking emphasise 44 -AND 45 -ways in which new knowledge can empower end users (see Box 8). 46 - 47 -Endorsing restrictions ignores that exclusive educational norms are the root cause of disempowerment. The aff's method of inclusive is key to solving. 48 -bell hooks 49 -Many of our colleagues were initially reluctant participants in this change. Many folks found 50 -AND 51 -approaching a novel could not coexist in classrooms that also offered new perspectives. 52 - 53 -And, restrictions won't work, they will only rally the alt right. The rhetoric and logic of liberal movements has couched the advancement of the radical right. 54 -Zachary Woodman 16, 11-29-2016, "Identity Politics, the Alt-Right, and Empathy in Cultural Discourse," Notes On Liberty, a href="https://notesonliberty.com/2016/11/29/identity-politics-the-alt-right-and-empathy-in-cultural-discourse/"https://notesonliberty.com/2016/11/29/identity-politics-the-alt-right-and-empathy-in-cultural-discourse//a 55 -Indeed, this type of rhetoric is at the heart of the rise of the 56 -AND 57 --culture current of the gay rights movement. Rorty describes it beautifully: - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-02-06 01:20:39.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Tabroom - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Tabroom - ParentRound
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -28 - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -4 - Team
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Westview Sudhakar Aff - Title
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -JAN FEB Rosseau - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Puget
- Caselist.CitesClass[24]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,34 +1,0 @@ 1 -I value morality. When it comes to moral values, nothing is new under the sun. We can build upon our innate evaluative function, but never uproot it. Lewis 1 2 - 3 -The truth finally ... obligatory at all. 4 - 5 -Thus, all moral claims must be based on foundational beliefs that already exist, meaning moral claims cannot be grounded in external obligations. Otherwise, nothing can actually be obligatory. Moreover, only this coherentist approach to ethics takes the necessary holistic path that avoids infinite regress. Olsson 6 - 7 -The coherentist may ... never gets started. 8 - 9 -Therefore, all ethics that take a linear approach only result in infinite regress. Moreover, any innovation that claims to come from outside of tradition is self-contradictory. Lewis 2 10 - 11 -Since I can ... to move in. 12 - 13 -The fact that removed criticism is unfounded does not mean that moral progress is impossible. Building off of old traditions, progress can come from within. However, only those who live the moral life and are known to epitomize virtue have the ability to interpret and define the codes, which they practice. Lewis 3 14 - 15 -A theorist about ... Law was deficient. 16 - 17 -Thus, the standard is maintaining consistency with the teachings of moral authorities. This standard means that on each moral dilemma we appeal to what moral authorities specifically say, and not implications from one’s moral philosophy. 18 - 19 -Prefer my standard for three additional reasons: 20 -1. Epistemological justifications must be inferential because they require deducing normative principles by inference to features about the world. Non-inferential beliefs result in contradictions and are unreliable for moral judgments leading to skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong 21 - 22 -A person S ... held by S. 23 - 24 -analytic 25 -analytic 26 -3. Appeal to authority is the only way for an agent to recognize the subjective limitations of their reasoning. Gadamer 27 - 28 -Despite the radicalness... to be true. 29 - 30 -Advocacy Text: whole res 31 - 32 -I contend that moral authorities affirm. 33 - 34 -check ollie sussman's wiki - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-02-06 01:23:11.741 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Tabroom - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Tabrrom - ParentRound
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -29 - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -6 - Team
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Westview Sudhakar Aff - Title
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -JAN FEB Testimony AC - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Puget
- Caselist.RoundClass[9]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -8 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2016-10-30 23:49:18.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -X - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -X - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -1 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Voices
- Caselist.RoundClass[28]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -23 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-02-06 01:20:37.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Tabroom - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Tabroom - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -4 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Puget
- Caselist.RoundClass[29]
-
- EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -2017-02-06 01:23:10.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Tabroom - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Tabrrom - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -6 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,1 +1,0 @@ 1 -Puget
- Caselist.CitesClass[25]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,46 @@ 1 +Levinas AC 2 +Part 1 is Framework 3 + 4 +Morality must be derived from respect for the other. The face to face encounter with the other is the starting point from which we derive our ethical obligations. Grob 5 + 6 +This face-to-face encounter ... an ethical context. 7 + 8 +This has two implications: 9 +1. analytic 10 +2. analytic 11 +It is wrong for an agent to totalize the other since they do not understand them enough to do so. Imposing ideas onto people who may not want them to apply to them isn’t correct. Blum 12 +The experience of ... answer for me"(97). 13 + 14 +Outweighs other framework warrants: 15 +1. analytic 16 +2. analytic 17 + 18 +Rather than reject the state, the state ought to change its obligation to the other. The state as an entity maintains its obligation to the other by maintaining its ability to pursue its conception of the good rather than imposing strict laws and totalizing the other. Simmons 19 +So, unconditional hospitality ... anti-foundationalism and justice. 20 + 21 +AND: analytic 22 +Thus, the standard is rejecting totalization of the other. I define the other as anything that ethics relates to. Prefer the standard additionally: 23 + 24 +1. analytic 25 + 26 +2. Ethical Theorizing: Moral cognition is a mental process, but ideas don’t directly refer directly to anything in external world. Totalization severs the link between your idea and an external person, so it could not be endorsed by an ethical theory. Beavers 27 +If we can ... itself, be unethical. 28 +This has three implications: 29 +1. analytics 30 + 31 +3. Phenomenology: the perspective of your consciousness means directly “seeing” yourself is impossible. If you could do that, it wouldn’t be you perceiving anymore. Only being called by another agent can ground your experience of your status as a receptive to moral claims, so my framework is the only possible starting point. Levinas 32 + 33 +One has to ... a profound utopia. 34 + 35 +Part 2 is Offense 36 +First, Restricting free speech is totalizing. It doesn’t respect the other and imposes a set of rules on the Other rather than letting it pursue it’s own conception of the good. Hovinhiemo 37 +At the core ... ethics as responsibility. 38 + 39 +Prefer this additionally: 40 +analytics 41 + 42 +Second, it is totalizing to assume that one narrative accurately describes the Other. Forcing the Other to adhere to another person’s narrative is totalizing. Powell 96 43 + 44 +An extreme form ... existing legal categories 45 + 46 +analytics - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-02-06 01:57:59.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabroom - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabroom - ParentRound
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +30 - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Doubles - Team
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Westview Sudhakar Aff - Title
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +JAN FEB Levinas AC - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Puget
- Caselist.CitesClass[26]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,34 @@ 1 +I value morality. When it comes to moral values, nothing is new under the sun. We can build upon our innate evaluative function, but never uproot it. Lewis 1 2 + 3 +The truth finally ... obligatory at all. 4 + 5 +Thus, all moral claims must be based on foundational beliefs that already exist, meaning moral claims cannot be grounded in external obligations. Otherwise, nothing can actually be obligatory. Moreover, only this coherentist approach to ethics takes the necessary holistic path that avoids infinite regress. Olsson 6 + 7 +The coherentist may ... never gets started. 8 + 9 +Therefore, all ethics that take a linear approach only result in infinite regress. Moreover, any innovation that claims to come from outside of tradition is self-contradictory. Lewis 2 10 + 11 +Since I can ... to move in. 12 + 13 +The fact that removed criticism is unfounded does not mean that moral progress is impossible. Building off of old traditions, progress can come from within. However, only those who live the moral life and are known to epitomize virtue have the ability to interpret and define the codes, which they practice. Lewis 3 14 + 15 +A theorist about ... Law was deficient. 16 + 17 +Thus, the standard is maintaining consistency with the teachings of moral authorities. This standard means that on each moral dilemma we appeal to what moral authorities specifically say, and not implications from one’s moral philosophy. 18 + 19 +Prefer my standard for three additional reasons: 20 +1. Epistemological justifications must be inferential because they require deducing normative principles by inference to features about the world. Non-inferential beliefs result in contradictions and are unreliable for moral judgments leading to skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong 21 + 22 +A person S ... held by S. 23 + 24 +analytic 25 +analytic 26 +3. Appeal to authority is the only way for an agent to recognize the subjective limitations of their reasoning. Gadamer 27 + 28 +Despite the radicalness... to be true. 29 + 30 +Advocacy Text: whole res 31 + 32 +I contend that moral authorities affirm. 33 + 34 +Check ollie sussman's wiki for the offense. - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-02-07 02:09:03.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabroom - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabrrom - ParentRound
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +31 - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +6 - Team
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Westview Sudhakar Aff - Title
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +JAN FEB Testimony AC - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Puget
- Caselist.CitesClass[27]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,57 @@ 1 +College Campus 2 + 3 +The value of human freedom is a precondition to all other values, because the act of valuing itself presupposes freedom and thus principles of consistency necessitate reflexive endorsement. The sphere of the state is derived from the constitutive force of agreement from the general will of the population. Such conceptions stem from the natural value of human freedom. 4 + 5 +====Rousseau ==== 6 +I SUPPOSE men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and ~Since~ the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence. But, as men cannot engender new forces, but ~can~ only unite and direct existing ~forces~ ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power and cause to act in concert. This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force and liberty of each man ~person~ are the chief instruments of his ~their~ self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on my present subject, may be stated in the following terms: "The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting ~themselves~ himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain~s~ as free as before." This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the solution. If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms: "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when passive. Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and taken one for another: it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are being used with precision. This formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals, and that each individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself, is bound in a double capacity; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign. But the maxim of civil right, that no one is bound by undertakings made to himself, does not apply in this case; for there is a great difference between incurring an obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of which you form a part. But the body politic or the Sovereign, drawing its being wholly from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to do anything derogatory to the original act, for instance, to alienate any part of itself, or to submit to another Sovereign. Violation of the act by which it exists would be self-annihilation; and that which is itself nothing can create nothing. In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that the will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful abuse. 7 +If the sovereign does not respect the general will, then they exert power over and above the citizenry and the contract dissolves since something other than the collective contract would govern state action. 8 + 9 +====Rousseau 2 ==== 10 +I WARN the reader that this chapter requires careful reading, and that I am unable to make myself clear to those who refuse to be attentive. Every free action is produced by the concurrence of two causes; one moral, i.e., the will which determines the act; the other physical, i.e., the power which executes it. When I walk towards an object, it is necessary first that I should will to go there, and, in the second place, that my feet should carry me. If a paralytic wills to run and an active man wills not to, they will both stay where they are. The body politic has the same motive powers; here too force and will are distinguished, will under the name of legislative power and force under that of ~the~ executive power. Without their concurrence nothing is, or should be done. We have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people, and can belong to it alone. It may, on the other hand, readily be seen, from the principles laid down above, that the executive power cannot belong to the generality as legislature or Sovereign, because it consists wholly of particular acts which fall outside the competency of the law, and consequently of the Sovereign, whose acts must always be laws. The public force therefore needs an agent of its own to bind it together and set it to work under the direction of the general will, to serve as a means of communication between the State and the Sovereign, and to do for the collective person more or less what the union of soul and body does for man. Here we have what is, in the State, the basis of government, often wrongly confused with the Sovereign, whose minister it is. What then is government? An intermediate body set up between the subjects and the Sovereign, to secure their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty, both civil and political. The members of this body are called magistrates or kings, that is to say governors, and the whole body bears the name prince.18 Thus those who hold that the act, by which a people puts itself under a prince, is not a contract, are certainly right. It is simply and solely a commission, an employment, in which the rulers, mere officials of the Sovereign, exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries. This power it can limit, modify or recover at pleasure; for the alienation of such a right is incompatible with the nature of the social body, and contrary to the end of association. I call then government, or supreme administration, the legitimate exercise of the executive power, and prince or magistrate the man or the body entrusted with that administration. In government reside the intermediate forces whose relations make up that of the whole to the whole, or of the Sovereign to the State. This last relation may be represented as that between the extreme terms of a continuous proportion, which has government as its mean proportional. The government gets from the Sovereign the orders it gives the people, and, for the State to be properly balanced, there must, when everything is reckoned in, be equality between the product or power of the government taken in itself, and the product or power of the citizens, who are on the one hand sovereign and on the other subject. Furthermore, none of these three terms can be altered without the equality being instantly destroyed. If the Sovereign desires to govern, or the magistrate to give laws, or if the subjects refuse to obey, disorder takes the place of regularity, force and will no longer act together, and the State is dissolved and falls into despotism or anarchy. Lastly, as there is only one mean proportional between each relation, there is also only one good government possible for a State. But, as countless events may change the relations of a people, not only may different governments be good for different peoples, but also for the same people at different times. In attempting to give some idea of the various relations that may hold between these two extreme terms, I shall take as an example the number of a people, which is the most easily expressible. Suppose the State is composed of ten thousand citizens. The Sovereign can only be considered collectively and as a body; but each member, as being a subject, is regarded as an individual: thus the Sovereign is to the subject as ten thousand to one, i.e., each member of the State has as his share only a ten-thousandth part of the sovereign authority, although he is wholly under its control. If the people numbers a hundred thousand, the condition of the subject undergoes no change, and each equally is under the whole authority of the laws, while his vote, being reduced to a hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in drawing them up. The subject therefore remaining always a unit, the relation between him and the Sovereign increases with the number of the citizens. From this it follows that, the larger the State, the less the liberty. When I say the relation increases, I mean that it grows more unequal. Thus the greater it is in the geometrical sense, the less relation there is in the ordinary sense of the word. In the former sense, the relation, considered according to quantity, is expressed by the quotient; in the latter, considered according to identity, it is reckoned by similarity. Now, the less relation the particular wills have to the general will, that is, morals and manners to laws, the more should the repressive force be increased. The government, then, to be good, should be proportionately stronger as the people is more numerous. On the other hand, as the growth of the State gives the depositaries of the public authority more temptations and chances of abusing their power, the greater the force with which the government ought to be endowed for keeping the people in hand, the greater too should be the force at the disposal of the Sovereign for keeping the government in hand. I am speaking, not of absolute force, but of the relative force of the different parts of the State. It follows from this double relation that the continuous proportion between the Sovereign, the prince and the people, is by no means an arbitrary idea, but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic. It follows further that, one of the extreme terms, viz., the people, as subject, being fixed and represented by unity, whenever the duplicate ratio increases or diminishes, the simple ratio does the same, and is changed accordingly. From this we see that there is not a single unique and absolute form of government, but as many governments differing in nature as there are States differing in size. If, ridiculing this system, any one were to say that, in order to find the mean proportional and give form to the body of the government, it is only necessary, according to me, to find the square root of the number of the people, I should answer that I am here taking this number only as an instance; that the relations of which I am speaking are not measured by the number of men alone, but generally by the amount of action, which is a combination of a multitude of causes; and that, further, if, to save words, I borrow for a moment the terms of geometry, I am none the less well aware that moral quantities do not allow of geometrical accuracy. The government is on a small scale what the body politic which includes it is on a great one. It is a moral person endowed with certain faculties, active like the Sovereign and passive like the State, and capable of being resolved into other similar relations. This accordingly gives rise to a new proportion, within which there is yet another, according to the arrangement of the magistracies, till an indivisible middle term is reached, i.e., a single ruler or supreme magistrate, who may be represented, in the midst of this progression, as the unity between the fractional and the ordinal series. Without encumbering ourselves with this multiplication of terms, let us rest content with regarding government as a new body within the State, distinct from the people and the Sovereign, and intermediate between them. There is between these two bodies this essential difference, that the State exists by itself, and the government only through the Sovereign. Thus the dominant will of the prince is, or should be, nothing but the general will or the law; his force is only the public force concentrated in his hands, and, as soon as he tries to base any absolute and independent act on his own authority, the tie that binds the whole together begins to be loosened. If finally the prince should come to have a particular will more active than the will of the Sovereign, and should employ the public force in his hands in obedience to this particular will, there would be, so to speak, two Sovereigns, one rightful and the other actual, the social union would evaporate instantly, and the body politic would be dissolved. 11 +The standard is consistency with deliberative democracy. This differs from other social contracts by 12 +AND 13 +subvert the general will for particular ends, which is inconsistent with society. 14 + 15 +Offense 16 + 17 +Hence, colleges and universities ought not restrict any form of constitutionally protected speech because speech is key to the procedural inclusion of voices and upholding a deliberative democracy. 18 + 19 +Maloney '16 20 +In grade school, I learned that debate is defined as "a discussion between people in which they express different opinions about something." Such open discourse was historically encouraged on our college campuses. Universities exemplified intellectual discussion and debate in America. No one voiced their opinions louder than students, professors and administrators. They pushed society's limits by admitting women and people of color, and by encouraging diversity of thought amongst the college community. Historically, young people flocked to universities to learn more about the world around them, to encounter people from different backgrounds, to expand their minds and to form their own opinions. Unfortunately, things have changed. Recently on college campuses, our open discourse has been threatened, particularly when discussing politics. While the current presidential election represents polarizing wings of both the Democratic and Republican parties, we should be able to openly debate their policies and the direction in which they plan to take our country if elected. We should be able to discuss the abuse of power within our government and the consistent violations of our Bill of Rights. We should be able to participate in the free market of ideas. But our students are being silenced. University campuses are now home to a plethora of speech restrictions. From sidewalk-sized "free-speech zones" to the criminalization of microaggressions, America's college campuses look and feel a lot more like an authoritarian dictatorship than they do the academic hubs of the modern free world. When rolling an inflated free-speech ball around campus, students at the University of Delaware were halted by campus police for their activities. A Young Americans for Liberty leader at Fairmont State University in West Virginia was confronted by security when he was attempting to speak with other students about the ideas he believes in. A man at Clemson University was barred from praying on campus because he was outside of the free-speech zone. And a student at Blinn College in Texas abolished her campus' free-speech zone in a lawsuit after administrators demanded she seek special permission to advocate for self-defense. How have we let this happen in America, the land of the free? It's because of what our universities have taught a generation of Americans: If you don't agree with someone, are uncomfortable with an idea, or don't find a joke funny, then their speech must be suppressed. Especially if they don't politically agree with you. Instead of actually debating ideas that span topics from the conventional to the taboo, a generation of American students don't engage, they just get enraged. In doing so, many students believe that they have a right to literally shut other people up. This is not only a threat to the First Amendment, but also to American democracy. In their manifestation, safe spaces and free-speech zones at public universities enable prejudice against unfavorable ideologies. Guised as progressive measures to ensure inclusion, these often unconstitutional policies exclude new and competing ideas, and are antithetical to a free academia. In excluding different ideologies, supposedly progressive campus speech codes do one thing: prevent the progression of ideas. Restrictive campus speech codes are, in fact, regressive. With over 750 chapters nationwide at Young Americans for Liberty, we are fighting against public universities that stifle free speech. We've launched the national Fight for Free Speech campaign to reform unconstitutional speech codes and abolish these so-called free-speech zones on college campuses. By hosting events such as large free speech balls, YAL chapters across the country are petitioning their campuses to adopt the University of Chicago's principles on freedom of expression—the hallmark of campus speech policies. Our members have geared up with First Amendment organizations to ensure that their free speech rights on campus are protected. America is a land rooted in the ideas of a free society: the freedom to be who you are, to speak your mind and to innovate. By silencing our students and young people, we have started down a slippery slope. It is up to us to fight back to ensure that our First Amendment rights remain protected—not just on college campuses, but everywhere in America. 21 + 22 +To clarify, speech that produces a clear an imminent danger is considered unconstitutional 23 +Joshua Waimberg 15, is a legal fellow at the National Constitution Center., 11-2-2015, "Schenck v. United States: Defining the limits of free speech," Constitution Daily, a href="http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/11/schenck-v-united-states-defining-the-limits-of-free-speech/"http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/11/schenck-v-united-states-defining-the-limits-of-free-speech//a 24 +This quote, while famous for its analogy, also gave the Court a pragmatic 25 +AND 26 +both Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden have also been charged under the Act. 27 + 28 +Impacts of speech are instantaneous and have no recourse. Lawrence 29 +Lawrence, C. R. (1990). If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus. Duke Law Journal, 1990(3), 431. doi:10.2307/1372554 30 +This regulation and others like it have been characterized in the press as the work 31 +AND 32 +of response until well after the assault when the cowardly assaulter has departed. 33 + 34 +Hate speech excludes Lawrence 35 +Lawrence, C. R. (1990). If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus. Duke Law Journal, 1990(3), 431. doi:10.2307/1372554 36 +A second factor that distinguishes racial insults from protected speech is the preemptive nature of 37 +AND 38 +the effect of pervasive racial and sexual violence and coercion on individual 39 + 40 + 41 +And, Post fiat policy requires free speech, the aff is the prerequisite to neg restrictions or alternatives. 42 +Jones et Al. 09 Nicola Jones, Ajoy Datta and Harry Jones. "Knowledge, policy and power Six dimensions of the knowledge– development policy interface." Overseas Development Institute 43 +At the knowledge generation end of the 'funnel', IS approaches to policymaking emphasise 44 +AND 45 +ways in which new knowledge can empower end users (see Box 8). 46 + 47 +Endorsing restrictions ignores that exclusive educational norms are the root cause of disempowerment. The aff's method of inclusive is key to solving. 48 +bell hooks 49 +Many of our colleagues were initially reluctant participants in this change. Many folks found 50 +AND 51 +approaching a novel could not coexist in classrooms that also offered new perspectives. 52 + 53 +And, restrictions won't work, they will only rally the alt right. The rhetoric and logic of liberal movements has couched the advancement of the radical right. 54 +Zachary Woodman 16, 11-29-2016, "Identity Politics, the Alt-Right, and Empathy in Cultural Discourse," Notes On Liberty, a href="https://notesonliberty.com/2016/11/29/identity-politics-the-alt-right-and-empathy-in-cultural-discourse/"https://notesonliberty.com/2016/11/29/identity-politics-the-alt-right-and-empathy-in-cultural-discourse//a 55 +Indeed, this type of rhetoric is at the heart of the rise of the 56 +AND 57 +-culture current of the gay rights movement. Rorty describes it beautifully: - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-02-07 02:09:31.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabroom - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabroom - ParentRound
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +32 - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +4 - Team
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Westview Sudhakar Aff - Title
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +JAN FEB Rosseau AC - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Puget
- Caselist.CitesClass[28]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,7 @@ 1 +Hey I'm Rohith. Message me on facebook(I might not see this) or message me(858-774-1149) if you want me to disclose a broken position or ask me about past ACs or what I am going to read. If I don't respond, just check the rest of my wiki. If my phone is dead, just ask me questions before the round. 2 + 3 +Please note, I am under no obligation to tell you anything if I am breaking a new aff. 4 + 5 +Also, I very rarely read disclosure theory so don't be worried about it. 6 + 7 +Also, anything from the following wikis is fair game: Newport, Interlake, Green Valley, Sunset RB, Hunter ML, or Rancho Bernardo. - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-02-08 18:28:51.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +X - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +X - ParentRound
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +33 - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +1 - Team
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Westview Sudhakar Aff - Title
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Contact Information - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Contact
- Caselist.RoundClass[30]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +25 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-02-06 01:57:57.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabroom - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabroom - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Doubles - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Puget
- Caselist.RoundClass[31]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +26 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-02-07 02:09:02.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabroom - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabrrom - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +6 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Puget
- Caselist.RoundClass[32]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +27 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-02-07 02:09:29.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabroom - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Tabroom - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +4 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Puget
- Caselist.RoundClass[33]
-
- Cites
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +28 - EntryDate
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +2017-02-08 18:28:50.0 - Judge
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +X - Opponent
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +X - Round
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +1 - Tournament
-
... ... @@ -1,0 +1,1 @@ 1 +Contact