Summary

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  • Caselist.RoundClass[33]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[32]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[33]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-01-15 19:37:05.832
	1	+2017-01-15 19:37:05.0

Caselist.CitesClass[32]

Cites

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	4	+====Interpretation: The affirmative must defend (resolution). You can discuss non-topical issues under the world of my interp, you just cannot claim that your advocacy is to fight them and that you should win for that. ====
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	11	+====1. They use a system of identifying disability that privileges a social model of conceptualizing impairment that marginalizes those with non-apparent impairments. This leads to a system where either disabled individuals have to self-identify with disability that stigmatizes those that don't appear "disabled enough" or it outright excludes them from their alternative. The question of who "counts" as disabled is the key question to resolve the efficacy of the aff.
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	13	+Jill C.HUMPHREY, (Faculty of applied social science, the Open University, Researching disability politics, or, some problems with the social model in practice, Disability and Society 15.1)2000 The danger here is that the political principles of more powerful disabled actors can be prioritised over the personal perceptions of less powerful disabled actors until the principle of self-definition lapses into self-contradiction: DW ~~W~~e work with a lot of disabled people who are not interested in the social model or anything like that. What we've said is we won't use the language they've asked us to use about them—we'll just call them their name—it's not that difficult—you don't have to refer to that language necessarily, because you have to hold on to your principles as well. Second, we can witness the silencing of impairments, as impairment is relegated to a clandestine and privatised space, an effectwhich Hughes and Paterson (1997) have attributed to the social model, and its dualism between impairment and disability. Whilst some interviewees were explicit about their impairments, these were people with apparent impairments in any event. One interlocutor enshrouded her impair¬ments in layers of secrecy so that after 2 hours of otherwise frank and detailed dialogues I was still bemused as to which impairments she had experienced. Whilst I was led to believe that different impairments had impacted differently upon her career in workplaces, trade unions and civil rights politics, the discursive absence around impairments in their specificity prevented me from developing an accurate or adequate understanding of her narrative: JCH: I find it interesting that you had, like, an invisible impairment that became, kind of, visible— DW: No, that was a different thing. JCH: Oh, that was a different thing—right. W: So then I was diagnosed as having something completely different. I've still got this other things but at the moment it's not so visible. (Emphases added.) At the time, my concerns that explicit interrogations could become oppressive intrusions meant that I accepted the veil of ignorance and castigated myself for my curiosity. Subsequently, I discovered that it was not just 'outsiders' who could be perplexed by these 'impairments with no name'. A blind man discussed his frus¬tration with other disability activists who challenged his inquiries as to the nature of their impairments—his standard reply was that it was an access issue not only for him, in virtue of his blindness, but also for them, in virtue of his role as a service-provider and access advisor. At the same time, this interviewee exhibited a more general awareness that both disability politics and disability theory had been dominated by people with particular disability identities like his own: DM: It's very convenient for people with apparent disabilities or impair¬ments to operate a social model which says. 'We don't want to discuss things in terms of 'impairments'. Because these people have got priority anyway, and impairment-related provision~~in UNISONJ ... The trouble with it ~~thesocial model~~ is that it's very difficult ... for people with learning difficulties or other conditions ... which are not catered for ... to raise their concerns as things which need dealing with on a service level, without feeling that they're breaking the law and talking about impairments.Third, the right to self-define as disabled has as its logical corollary the duty to accept others' self-definitions, but suspicions that people are not who they claim to be circulate around the disabled communityin UNISON. Casting aspersions upon the purported disability of other group members in veiled or outright manners, with or without names attached, arose spontaneously during interviews. In my naivete, I neither comprehended nor challenged this at the time, but from re-reading and de-coding interview transcripts, I can discern three themes as follows: a self-defined disabled person may be suspected of not being disabled when they harbour a non-apparent impairment, and/or express views which diverge from the prevailing consensus, and/or simultaneously belong to one of the other self-organised groups. These themes, in turn, suggest the operation of hierarchies of impairments, ortho¬doxies and oppressions,respectively. This is a strange juncture, where the propensity to treat only tangible impairments as evidence of a bona fide disability identity clearly marginalises those with non-apparent impairments, such as learning or mental health ones, whilst the reluctance or refusal to differentiate between impairments by identifying them bolsters up the claims by people with apparent impairments that they represent all disabled people.The twist in the tale is that when other disabled people do become visible and audible in interrogating the hierarchy of impairments. they may find themselves once again marginalised as the other hierarchies of orthodoxies and oppressions come into play. For one thing, people with learning or mental health difficulties may speak with a different voice, given the qualitatively different stigmata attached to different impairments and given the fact that the social model has been developed by those with physical impairments, so that their contributions may be interpreted as deviating from prevailing orthodoxies. For another, people who belong to another oppressed group may be all too visible in their difference, but their blackness or gayness may be construed as detracting from their contributions as disability activists, given the propensities of each group to prioritise its own specific identification-discrimination nexus. The following intervie¬wee testifies to some of these dynamics: DM: People have the right to self-define. But what we've never said is who has got the right to challenge. So if somebody says 'I'm a disabled person; I've come to this disability group' I don't know how you can deal with your suspicion that they're not. In fact you can't deal with it. And you have to ask yourself why you want to deal with it ... ~~names mentionedj ... But I'm absolutely convinced that there are lots of people who don't come to groups because they're frightened that they don't look disabled enough.Indeed, this hierarchy of impairments and this 'policing' of the disability identity does act to excludeUNISON members who believe that they experience the disabling effects of an impairment, but who suspect that they would not 'count' as disabled people according to the prevailing criteria in the disabled members' group. Evidence for this emerged during a detailed case-study of the lesbian and gay group, and two examples should suffice. The first example is of a lesbian who had been dyslexic since childhood, who had experienced a range of discriminations in edu¬cation, employment and everyday life, and who was registered as disabled with the Department of Employment. She sought to engage in her local disabled members' group, but disengaged after the first meeting: DL: I'm also disabled with an invisible disability, dyslexia ... I have to educate people about dyslexia as well ... An invisible disability is very difficult for people to cope with—you have to tell each new person, and then they each interpret it differently, and then they can forget ... And it's a fluid disability as well—it's manageable sometimes and unmanageable other times ... and people can't deal with that either ...' JCH: Did you ever go to the disabled members' group? DL: I did. And I got stared at when I walked in. By people who really should know better. JCH: Sorry. Why did you get stared at? This is not obvious to me! DL: Because I didn't look like I was disabled. The second example is, perhaps paradoxically, someone whose impairment was visible, but who dared not join the disabled members' group on the grounds that it was not 'severe' enough to be taken seriously by other group members. The impairment in question was skin allergies over her entire body, including facial disfigurement which is recognised under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, as one of its few token gestures towards the social model of disability (Hqual Opportu¬nities Review, 1996). Nevertheless, this interviewee's self-definition as disabled was confounded and then crushed by her convictions that disability activists would define her as non-disabled: DL: 'I get quite bitter sometimes. I don't think I'm disabled, because I don't think that what I've got prevents me from functioning, or society doesn't prevent me from functioning. But it probably does ... And my skin tissue scars very easily, and I've got visible marks on my face, and people do look, and I do feel conscious of it, and I'm made to feel conscious of it. But I would feel like I was—what's the word?—an impostor if I attended a disability caucus for those reasons. I feel that the disability caucus excludes people like that ... Nobody takes things like that into account. JCH: The crazy thing is, that until people like you get involved in the disability movement in the union, then they won't take things like that into account! But that does put a big burden on you—or on people in your position—to come out and say 'Hey! We're here too! What about us?' DL: But I feel like mine is a minimal complication. Or whether I'm made to feel that way ...? The argument here is that the social model as operationalised within the UNISON group has both reified the disability identity and reduced it to particular kinds of impairments—physical, immutable, tangible and 'severe' ones—in a way which can deter many people from adopting a disabled identity and participating in a disability community.Whilst this indicates that the social model may harbour its own set of indigenous essentialisms and exclusions, the solution is not to capitulate to the other-imposed essentialisms and exclusions of the medical model, but rather to work towards a more inclusive model. This will entail a more welcoming stance towards all those who self-define as disabled whatever their impairment might be and towards those who experience impairments and who want to combat discrimina¬tions, but who do not choose to identify as 'disabled' for whatever reason. It is time for people to ask 'What do we mean by "our" community? Are its building-blocks safe or its boundaries sensible?' There may be merit in reflecting upon Young's (1990a) warning that communities are often fabricated out of the yearning to be among similar-and-symmetrical selves, to the point where members respond to alterity by expelling it beyond their border. Clearly, a self-perpetuating spiral can be set in motion, whereby the tighter the boundaries are drawn, the more those included will normalise their sameness and exclude others, the more the excluded will become estranged others, and the less the community will be informed by experiences of and reflection upon diversity, etc. This should not be misread—the UNISON group, like many other disabled people's organisations, is at least as democratic as any other social or political group in its constitution, and it is at least as diverse as any other in respecting multiple identities. Paradoxically, some disabled people's organisations may have expended more energies in reaching out to black and gay people who harbour specific impairments than in reaching out to differently disabled people whatever their other oppressions. Of course, we must do both. But the question 'Who is to "count" as a member of the disability community?' is not as strange as it may sound and may even be the Achilles heel of disability politics to date.====
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	16	+====2. And Turn. Views on disabilities in regards to "disabled" and "abled" bodies are rooted in European concepts of the normal and abnormal. Your criticism functions within Eurocentric ideologies routed in whiteness and will never be able to solve for oppression because it's only defined under the traditional sense of Western Man. It excludes all bodies whether they are black, brown, poor, or have disabilities, etc. We are all excluded by your rhetoric. Wynter 3 (Sylvia Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument," CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 3, Number 3,257-337)//The argument proposes that the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves. Because of this overrepresentation, which is defined in the first part of the title as the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom, any attempt to unsettle the coloniality of power will call for the unsettling of this overrepresentation as the second and now purely secular form of what Aníbal Quijano identifies as the "Racism/ Ethnicism complex," on whose basis the world of modernity was brought into existence from the fifteenth/sixteenth centuries onwards (Quijano 1999,2000), and of what Walter Mignolo identifies as the foundational "colonial difference" on which the world of modernity was to institute itself (Mignolo 1999, 2000). The correlated hypothesis here is that all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources (20 percent of the world's peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of earth's peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South4)—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle. Central to this struggle also is the usually excluded and invisibilized situation of the category identified by Zygmunt Bauman as the "New Poor" (Bauman 1987). That is, as a category defined at the global level by refugee/economic migrants stranded outside the gates of the rich countries, as the postcolonial variant of Fanon's category of les damnés (Fanon 1963)—with this category in the United States coming to comprise the criminalized majority Black and dark-skinned Latino inner-city males now made to man the rapidly expanding prison-industrial complex, together with their female peers—the kicked-about Welfare Moms—with both being part of the ever-expanding global, transracial category of the homeless/the jobless, the semi-jobless, the criminalized drug-offending prison population. So that if we see this category of the damnés that is internal to (and interned within) the prison system of the United States as the analog form of a global archipelago, constituted by the Third- and Fourth-World peoples of the so-called "underdeveloped" areas of the world—most totally of all by the peoples of the continent of Africa (now stricken with AIDS, drought, and ongoing civil wars, and whose bottommost place as the most impoverished of all the earth's continents is directly paralleled by the situation of its Black Diaspora peoples, with Haiti being produced and reproduced as the most impoverished nation of the Americas)—a systemic pattern emerges. This pattern is linked to the fact that while in the post-sixties United States, as Herbert Gans noted recently, the Black population group, of all the multiple groups comprising the post-sixties social hierarchy, has once again come to be placed at the bottommost place of that hierarchy (Gans, 1999), with all incoming new nonwhite/non-Black groups, as Gans's fellow sociologist Andrew Hacker (1992) earlier pointed out, coming to claim "normal" North American identity by the putting of visible distance between themselves and the Black population group (in effect, claiming "normal" human status by distancing themselves from the group that is still made to occupy the nadir, "nigger" rung of being human within the terms of our present ethnoclass Man's overrepresentation of its "descriptive statement" ~~Bateson 1969~~ as if it were that of the human itself), then the struggle of our times, one that has hitherto had no name, is the struggle against this overrepresentation. As a struggle whose first phase, the Argument proposes, was first put in place (if only for a brief hiatus before being coopted, reterritorialized ~~Godzich 1986~~) by the multiple anticolonial social-protest movements and intellectual challenges of the period to which we give the name, "The Sixties." The further proposal here is that, although the brief hiatus during which the sixties' large-scale challenge based on multiple issues, multiple local terrains of struggles (local struggles against, to use Mignolo's felicitous phrase, a "global design" ~~Mignolo 2000~~) erupted was soon to be erased, several of the issues raised then would continue to be articulated, some in sanitized forms (those pertaining to the category defined by Bauman as "the seduced"), others in more harshly intensified forms (those pertaining to Bauman's category of the "repressed" ~~Bauman 1987~~). Both forms of "sanitization" would, however, function in the same manner as the lawlike effects of the post-sixties'vigorous discursive and institutional re-elaboration of the central overrepresentation, which enables the interests, reality, and well-being of the empirical human world to continue to be imperatively subordinated to those of the now globally hegemonic ethnoclass world of "Man." This, in the same way as in an earlier epoch and before what Howard Winant identifies as the "immense historical rupture" of the "Big Bang" processes that were to lead to a contemporary modernity defined by the "rise of the West" and the "subjugation of the rest of us" (Winant 1994)—before, therefore, the secularizing intellectual revolution of Renaissance humanism, followed by the decentralizing religious heresy of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of the modern state—the then world of laymen and laywomen, including the institution of the political state, as well as those of commerce and of economic production, had remained subordinated to that of the post-Gregorian Reform Church of Latin-Christian Europe (Le Goff 1983), and therefore to the "rules of the social order" and the theories "which gave them sanction" (See Konrad and Szelenyi guide-quote), as these rules were articulated by its theologians and implemented by its celibate clergy (See Le Goff guide-quote).====

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-01-15 19:37:08.695

Judge

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	1	+Michael OKrent

Opponent

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	1	+Palo Alto CF

ParentRound

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	1	+33

Round

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	1	+4

Team

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	1	+West Ranch Won Neg

Title

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	1	+JANFEB - Harvard Westlake R4 NC

Tournament

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	1	+Harvard-Westlake