Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.RoundClass[52]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[46]

Details

Caselist.RoundClass[52]

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@
1		-2017-03-05 16:50:13.110
	1	+2017-03-05 16:50:13.0

Caselist.CitesClass[46]

Cites

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,60 @@
	1	+=1AC=
	2	+
	3	+
	4	+==Part 1 is Framework==
	5	+First is the problem: Attempting to understand agents and ethics from an idealized, static, non-violent starting point fails
	6	+Ethical decision-making is inherently discriminatory- any obligation is violent to all other obligations. If I help one person, it means I cannot spend that time helping another.
	7	+Haggulund 04, THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS" MARTIN HÄGGLUND, 2004, p 56.
	8	+For the same reason, Derridaʼs notion of "infinite responsibility" should not be confl ated with Levinasʼs. For Derrida, the infinitude of responsibility answers to the fact that responsibility always takes place in relation to a negative infinity of others. The negative infinity of responsibility is both spatial (innumerable fi nite others that exceed my horizon) and temporal (innumerable times past and to come that exceed my horizon). Far from conf rming Levinasʼs sense of responsibility, the negative infi nity of others is fatal for his notion of an originary encounter that would give ethics the status of "first philosophy" and be the guiding principle for a metaphysical "goodness." Even if it were possible to sacrifi ce yourself completely to another, to devote all your forces to the one who is encountered face-to-face, it would mean that you had disregarded or denied all the others who demanded your attention or needed your help. For there are always more than two, as Richard Beardsworth has aptly put it ~~137~~. Whenever I turn toward another I turn away from yet another, and thus exercise discrimination. As Derrida points out in The Gift of Death, "I cannot respond to the call, the demand, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrifi cing the other other, the other others" ~~68~~. Consequently, Derrida emphasizes that the concept of responsibility lends itself a priori to "scandal and aporia" ~~68~~. There are potentially an endless number of others to consider, and one cannot take any responsibility without excluding some others in favor of certain others. What makes it possible to be responsible is thus at the same time what makes it impossible for any responsibility to be fully responsible. Responsibility, then, is always more or less discriminating, and infi nite responsibility is but another name for the necessity of discrimination.
	9	+takes out all other frameworks that rely on an idealized starting point- they fail to guide action because the create infinite contradictory obligations that produce violence.
	10	+Impact turns idealized frameworks, which try to create absolute peace. This justifies absolute violence where nothing can ever occur.
	11	+**Hagglund 2**""~~THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS" MARTIN HÄGGLUND~~, 2004
	12	+"A possible objection here is that we must strive toward an ideal origin or end, an arkhe or telos that would prevail beyond the possibility of violence. Even if every community is haunted by victims of discrimination and forgetting, we should try to reach a state of being that does not exclude anyone, namely, a consummated presence that includes everyone. However, it is precisely with such an "ontological" thesis that Derridaʼs hauntological thinking takes issue. At several places in Specters of Marx he maintains that a completely present life—which would not be "out of joint," not haunted by any ghosts—would be nothing but a complete death. Derridaʼs point is not simply that a peaceful state of existence is impossible to realize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, he challenges the very idea that absolute peace is desirable. In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as Derrida argued already in "Violence and Metaphysics." Anything that would finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea of eliminating the undecidable future that is the con- dition for anything to happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence." (49)
	13	+2. Ontological Discrimination is constitutive of any theory because it requires one to distinguish between the ethical and the unethical. Thus violence is inevitable because making a decision for something requires excluding something else.
	14	+**Hagglund 3 **""~~THE NECESSITY OF DISCRIMINATION DISJOINING DERRIDA AND LEVINAS" MARTIN HÄGGLUND~~, 2004
	15	+"Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatology, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting. Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the "ethico-theoretical decision" of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on. All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of "alienation," and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any "positive" term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its "other." Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical decisions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls "undecidability." With this term he designates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking "undecidable," since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defi nitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, political ~~decision~~, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a constitutive condition. Without divisional marks—which is to say: without segregating borders—there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatsoever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What cannot be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters of Marx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary "spec- trality." A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derridaʼs aim is to formulate a general "hauntology" (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional "ontology" that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time— the disjointure between past and future—is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it can- not integrate in itself—haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an "economy of violence" where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call "lesser violence." Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay "Violence and Metaphysics," but I will seek to develop its significance.The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are ~~is~~ implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and here can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better." (46-48)
	16	+3. Basic facts are always defined by social relations. The word green only refers to the color green rather than black because socially we defined it to mean that. These social relations are based on power and exclusion.
	17	+Butler 92 (Judith 1992. "Continent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism" Feminists Theorize the Political)
	18	+"In a sense, the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy. In this sense, autonomy is the logical consequence of a disavowed dependency, which is to say that the autonomous subject can maintain the illusion of its autonomy insofar as it covers over the break out of which it is constituted. This dependency and this break are already social relations, ones which precede ,,and condition the,,formation of the ,,subject.,,As a result, this is not a relation in which the subject finds itself, as one of the relations that forms it situation. The subject is constructed through acts of exclusion and differentiation that distinguish the subject from its constitutive outside, a domain of abjected alterity. There is no ontologically intact reflexivity to the subject ,,which is then,,placed within a cultural context; that cultural context, as it were, is already there as the disarticulated process of ,,that subject's,,production, one that is concealed by the frame that would situate a ready-made subject in an external web of cultural relations. We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the ,,very,,precondition of its agency. For what is it that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked, resisted? Do we need to assume theoretically from the start a subject with agency before we can articulate the terms of a significant social and political task of transformation, resistance, radical democratization? If we do not offer in advance the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we doomed to give up transformation and meaningful political practice? My suggestion is that agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an external political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction. Consider that "agency" has no formal existence or, if it does, it has no bearing on the question at hand. In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only ,,a,,political ,,prerogative,,. As such, it seems crucial to question the conditions of its possibility, not to take it for granted as an a priori guarantee. We need instead to ask, what possibilities of mobilization that are produced on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation at can destabilize existing power regimes? For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process, one which gets detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power's own possibility of being reworked. The subject is an accomplishment regulate and produced in advance. And is as such fully political; indeed, perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself."
	19	+Takes out all other frameworks at their highest assumption- linguistics and basic assumptions are not neutral. All other framework must resolve this problem or else people have different starting points making it impossible to create moral agreement.
	20	+Takes out frameworks that rely on a static notion of identity like state bad or Kantianism- identity is defined by the social world and basic assumptions, which are constantly in flux.
	21	+Second is the solution:
	22	+Conflict and violence are inevitable; the only way to organize it is through agonism. It frames those with opposing views as not the enemy who must be destroy, but an adversary whose ideas should be fought. I don't pretend to resolve exclusion, I just exclude the exclusionary thing.
	23	+Mouffe 2k brackets for gendered langauge, Chantal, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX, 2000
	24	+One of the principal theses that I have defended in my work is that properly political questions always involve decisions which require a choice between alternatives that are undecidable from a strictly rational point of view. This is something the liberal theory cannot admit due to the inadequate way it envisages pluralism. The liberal theory recognises that we live in a world where a multiplicity of perspectives and values coexist and, for reasons it believes to be empirical, accepts that it is impossible for each of us to adopt them all. But it imagines that these perspectives and values, brought together, constitute a harmonious and non-conflictual ensemble. This type of thought is therefore incapable of accounting for the necessarily conflictual nature of pluralism, which stems from the impossibility of reconciling all points of view, and it is what leads it to negate the political in its antagonistic dimension. I myself argue that only by taking account of the political in its dimension of antagonism can one grasp the challenge democratic politics must face. Public life will never be able to dispense with antagonism for it concerns public action and the formation of collective identities. It attempts to constitute a 'we' in a context of diversity and conflict. Yet, in order to constitute a 'we', one must distinguish it from a 'they'. Consequently, the crucial question of democratic politics is not to reach a consensus without exclusion which would amount to creating a 'we' without a corollary 'they' but to manage to establish the we/they discrimination in a manner compatible with pluralism. According to the 'agonistic pluralism' model that I developed in The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000) and On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005), pluralist democracy is characterised by the introduction of a distinction between the categories of enemy and adversary. This means that within the 'we' that constitutes the political community, the opponent is not considered an enemy to be destroyed but an adversary whose existence is legitimate. His ~~Their~~ ideas will be fought with vigour but ~~their~~his right to defend them will never be questioned. The category of enemy does not disappear, however, for it remains pertinent with regard to those who, by questioning the very principles of pluralist democracy, cannot form part of the agonistic space. With the distinction between antagonism (friend/enemy relation) and agonism (relation between adversaries) in place, we are better able to understand why the agonistic confrontation, far from representing a danger for democracy, is in reality the very condition of its existence. Of course, democracy cannot survive without certain forms of consensus, relating to adherence to the ethico-political values that constitute its principles of legitimacy, and to the institutions in which these are inscribed. But it must also enable the expression of conflict, which requires that citizens genuinely have the possibility of choosing between real alternatives.
	25	+The standard is consistency with agonistic democracy.
	26	+Prefer the standard
	27	+1. Agonism outweighs regardless of the role of the ballot or framework. To make claims about the structure and shape of either the activity or morality relies on the initial assumption that debaters have the ability to contest these things. This entails that higher-level deliberation and contestation about how the ballot should function or what ethics is relies on the initial AC premise.
	28	+2. Educational spaces must embrace contestation as a condition for resistance. Any attempt to exclude challenges reaffirms pedagogical imperialism, where the teacher knows best.
	29	+Rickert 01 ~~Thomas, ""Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World", JacOnline Journal~~
	30	+"This essay will employ Deleuze's and Zizek's theories to illustrate the limitations of writing pedagogies that rely on modernist strategies of critical distance or political agency. Implicit in such pedagogies is the faith that teaching writing can resist dominant social practices and empower students; however, the notion that we can actually foster resistance through teaching is questionable. As Paul Mann states, "all the forms of opposition have long since revealed themselves as means of advancing it. ... The mere fact that something feels like resistance and still manages to offend a few people (usually not even the right people) hardly makes it effective" (138). In light of Mann's statement, I urge us to take the following position: teaching writing is fully complicitous with dominant social practices, and inducing students to write in accordance with institutional precepts can be as disabling as it is enabling. By disabling, I do not mean that learning certain skills-typically those most associated with current-traditional rhetorics, such as superficial forms of grammatical correctness, basic organization, syntactic clarity, and such-are not useful. Such skills are useful, and they are often those most necessary for tapping the power that writing can wield. In learning such skills, however, we should also ask what students ~~aren't~~ are not learning. What other forms of writing and thinking are being foreclosed or distorted, forms of writing that have their own, different powers? If one of our goals as teachers of writing is to initiate students into rhetorics of power and resistance, we should also be equally attuned to rhetorics of contestation. Specifically, we must take on the responsibility that comes with the impossibility of knowing the areas of contention and struggle that will be the most important in our students' lives. Pedagogy could reflect this concern in its practices by attending to the idea that each student's life is its own telos, meaning that the individual struggles of each student cannot and should not necessarily mirror our own. Or, to put it another way, students must sooner or later overcome us, even though we may legitimate our sense of service with the idea that we have their best interests in mind. However, we should be suspicious of this presumptive ethic, for, as Mann astutely observes, "nothing is more aggressive than the desire to serve the other" (48)
	31	+Impact Calc- Consequences are irrelevant to the framework, it is about creating the procedures for agonistic discourse
	32	+a. being denied access to discourse is not a material condition but a procedure that is created
	33	+through the structure of our actions- only institutional arrangements can ensure a proper discursive sphere
	34	+b. aggregation is impermissible under the framework- it justifies why rationality and utility calculus are bad because they rely on idealized notions of subjects that we can compare and count.
	35	+c. Problem of induction-We have no evidence that the past can be used to predict the future. The only evidence we could point to is that in the past, the past has always been used to predict the future accurately, but that assumes what we are trying to prove.
	36	+Vickers 14, John, 2014, The Problem of Induction, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
	37	+The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume's words, that "instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience" (THN, 89). Such methods are clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductively—by arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the past—for that would beg the question by assuming just what is to be proved.
	38	+
	39	+
	40	+==Part 2 is Advocacy ==
	41	+I defend the text of the resolution, Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech. CX clarification solves for any ambiguities in the advocacy or role of the ballot since it's whole res.
	42	+
	43	+
	44	+==Part 3 is Contention==
	45	+1. Censorship is never justifiable since censorship relies on the assumption that some viewpoint is not legitimate enough to be voiced. Institutions should foster free speech not destroy it.
	46	+Mouffe 2 ~~Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. "The Democratic Paradox"~~
	47	+I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'ddiberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that through rational deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where decisions would be taken that are equally in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. we should acknowledge and valorize the diversity of ways in which the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. This would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that there cannot be one single best, more 'rational' way to obey those rules and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. 'Following a rule', says Wittgenstein, 'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And it cannot be resolved, pace the rationalists, by claiming that there is a correct understanding of the rule that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But space needs to be provided for the many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed. And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms and such a diversity, far from being a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But this struggle will not be one between 'enemies' but among 'adversaries', since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones. Such an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call 'agonistic pluralism', is unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by necessity. tcods to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable.
	48	+2 Censorship destroys agonistic discourse by turning speech into a weapon. Thus we must allow all instances of disagreement, which turns PICs.
	49	+Butler 13, Judith, "Judith Butler's Remarks to Brooklyn College on BDS," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/judith-butlers-remarks-brooklyn-college-bds/
	50	+And yet all of us here have to distinguish between the right to listen to a point of view and the right to concur or dissent from that point of view; otherwise, public discourse is destroyed by censorship. I wonder, what is the fantasy of speech nursed by the censor? There must be enormous fear behind the drive to censorship, but also enormous aggression, as if we were all in a war where speech has suddenly become artillery. Is there another way to approach language and speech as we think about this issue? Is it possible that some other use of words might forestall violence, bring about a general ethos of non-violence, and so enact, and open onto, the conditions for a public discourse that welcomes and shelters disagreement, even disarray?
	51	+3. Consequential Frameworks affirm-
	52	+A. Empirics show reverse enforcement and increased discrimination
	53	+Strossen 01 (Nadine, Law @NYU, Incitement to Hatred: Should There Be a Limit Copyright (c) 2001 Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University Southern Illinois University Law Journal Winter, 2001 25 S. Ill. U. L. J. 243)
	54	+Based on actual experience and observations in countries around the world, the respected international human rights organization, Human Rights Watch, concluded that suppressing hate speech does not effectively promote equality or reduce discrimination. In 1992, Human Rights Watch issued a report and policy statement opposing any restrictions on hate speech that go beyond the narrow confines permitted by traditional First Amendment principles. Human Rights Watch's policy statement explains its position as follows: The Human Rights Watch policy attempts to apply free speech principles in the anti-discrimination context in a manner that is respectful of both concerns, believing that they are complementary, not contradictory. While we recognize that the policy is closer to the American legal approach than to that of any other nation, it was arrived at after a careful review of the experience of many other countries . . . . This review has made clear that there is little connection in practice between draconian "hate speech" laws and the lessening of ethnic and racial violence or tension. Furthermore, most of the nations which invoke "hate speech" laws have a long way to go in implementing the provisions of the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination calling for the elimination of racial discrimination. Laws that penalize speech or membership are also subject to abuse by the dominant racial or ethnic group. Some of the most stringent "hate speech" laws, for example, have long been in force in South Africa, where they have been used almost exclusively against the black majority. n42 Similar conclusions were generated by an international conference in 1991 organized by the international free speech organization, Article 19, ~~*259~~ which is named after the free speech guarantee in the Universal Declaration of HumanRights. That conference brought together human rights activists, lawyers, and scholars, from fifteen different countries, to compare notes on the actual impact that anti-hate-speech laws had in promoting equality, and countering bias and discrimination, in their respective countries. The conference papers were subsequently published in a book, Striking A Balance: Hate Speech, Free Speech, and Non-Discrimination. n43 The conclusion of all these papers was clear: not even any correlation, let alone any causal relationship, could be shown between the enforcement of anti-hate-speech laws by the governments in particular countries and an improvement in equality or inter-group relations in those countries. In fact, often there was an inverse relationship. These findings were summarized in the book's concluding chapter by Sandra Coliver, who was then Article 19's Legal Director: Laws which restrict hate speech have been flagrantly abused by the authorities. Thus, the laws in Sri Lanka and South Africa have been used almost exclusively against the oppressed and politically weakest communities. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union these laws were vehicles for the persecution of critics who were often also victims of state-tolerated or sponsored anti-Semitism. Selective or lax enforcement by the authorities, including in the United Kingdom, Israel and the former Soviet Union, allows governments to compromise the right of dissent and inevitably leads to feelings of alienation among minority groups. Such laws may also distract from the need for effective legislation to promote non-discrimination. The rise of racism and xenophobia throughout Europe, despite laws restricting racist speech, calls into question the effectiveness of such laws in the promotion of tolerance and non-discrimination. One worrying phenomenon is the sanitized language now adopted to avoid prosecution by prominent racists in Britain, France, Israel and other countries, which may have the effect of making their hateful messages more acceptable to a broader audience. n44
	55	+B. Free speech on campus allows students to become critical advocators who demand liberation themselves
	56	+DeBrabander 15: DeBrabander, Firmin. ~~Associate Professor of Philosophy, Maryland Institute College of Art~~ "Do Guns Make Us Free?: Democracy and the Armed Society." Yale University Press, May 19, 2015
	57	+The famed education theorist Paolo Freire called mistrust a major tool of oppression. Freire was interested in educating the children of oppressed populations with a view to politically empowering them, teaching them to act and behave as invested, willful citizens such as democracy requires. In his most important work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire deplores what he calls the "banking concept" of education, whereby students are deemed fit only to fill up with useful information, digested via rote learning, so that they might become cogs in the machine of society, or in some cases, members of an existing oppressive system. 60 Freire wished that schools might produce individuals who could think critically for themselves, demand their rights, and freely choose their own paths. To that end, he favors "dialogical theory of education," which he describes as follows: "problem-posing education, which breaks with the vertical patterns characteristic of banking education, can fulfill its function as the practice of freedom only if … the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teacher." 61 Dialogue carried out in this manner, problem-posing engaged in collectively by students and teachers, produces a community of questioners in the classroom. It introduces a horizontal relationship— a fundamental equality that will later be politically significant for emergent citizens. Most colleges in twenty-first-century America take Freire's approach— it's how they already conduct learning in the classroom: faculty are urged to create a decentered classroom where students are not intimidated by professors lecturing from the podium, but rather, engaged in discussion— and direct questioning— by professors who are seated at the same table as students, and who encourage students to speak their minds and experiment with their thoughts. Obviously, Freire's account does not map neatly onto, say, the kindergarten classroom. Children that age need a disciplinary figure, and democracy should not necessarily reign in kindergarten. But, Freire would say, his basic theory bears important intuitions even there: we must still strive to make young students responsive and critical learners, and teach them as far possible horizontally and collaboratively. They are not simply to be lectured to.
	58	+C. Studies show that counterspeech is more likely to happen.
	59	+**Strossen 90 ** (Nadine, National President, American Civil Liberties Union; Professor of Law, New York Law School, 25 S. Ill. U. L. J. 243, "Incitement to Hatred: Should There Be a Limit?", lexis)
	60	+A study that was done by a professor at Smith College in Massachusetts demonstrated the effectiveness of this kind of counterspeech in combating bias and prejudice. It showed that when a student who hears a statement conveying discriminatory attitudes also promptly hears a rebuttal to that statement-especially from someone in a leadership position-then the student will probably not be persuaded by the initial statement. Dr. Fletcher ~~*276~~ Blanchard, a psychologist at the college who conducted the experiment, concluded that "A few outspoken people who are vigorously anti-racist can establish the kind of social climate that discourages racist acts." n82 Thus, this study provides empirical social scientific support for the free speech maxim, discussed above, that the appropriate response to any speech with which one disagrees is not suppression but rather counterspeech.

EntryDate

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+2017-03-05 16:50:15.905

Judge

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Dan Armitage

Opponent

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+Servite PA

ParentRound

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+52

Round

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+1

Team

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+West Ranch Won Aff

Title

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+JANFEB - USC R1 AC

Tournament

...	...	@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@
	1	+USC