Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[44]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[45]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[44]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-04-12 23:55:01.991
	1	+2017-04-12 23:55:01.0

Caselist.CitesClass[45]

Cites

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	1	+====In the context of the border, working within the state will always be ideal fiction. The surveillance state requires the differentiation between mobilities and proliferates the locations where border performances occur. This produces a “culture of fear” that only further excludes the migrant other from entering public spaces.====
	2	+**McDowell and Wonders ‘10** (Meghan G., M.S., is an instructor at Northern Arizona University, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice and Nancy A., Ph.D., is a Professor at Northern Arizona University, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice “Keeping Migrants in Their Place: Technologies of Control and Racialized Public Space in Arizona” 2010 Social Justice Vol. 36, No. 2)
	3	+The literature on surveillance and social sorting as technologies of control argues that nation-states are (re)drawing moral boundaries, (re)fortifying “assumptions about national identity,” and defending the body politic from the foreign Other, through practices of banishment and/or exclusion (Aas, 2007: 288). Aas suggests that the contemporary image of the disciplinary state is being transformed from a Panopticon to a “Banopticon” (p. 288). The “Banopticon” state continues to foster discipline in the classic Foucauldian sense by habituating migrants “to their status as excluded” (Engbersen, 2001: 242), but it also operates as a “factory of exclusion” for those marked as “undesirable,” as well as one capable of selective inclusion of those same undesirables. The state uses technologies of control to engage in surveillance and “social sorting” (Lyon, 2003); a central strategic goal is to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate mobilities in the global era (Amoore, 2006; Wonders, 2006). This state-sponsored commitment to surveillance and social sorting operates to discipline migrants and has fundamentally altered the character of the border and public space.¶ The “idea” of the border has undergone a significant transformation due to globalization. No longer conceptualized as a fixed “line in the sand,” the border is increasingly being understood through the lens of performativity (Wonders, 2006) and mobility (Amoore, 2006). Under pressure to curb “illegal” immigration, states have moved toward internal, mobile border-control policies that rely heavily on various forms of surveillance and exclusion by law enforcement of- ficials and government workers. Weber (2006: 25) argues that “the state’s arsenal of exclusionary devices increasingly involves preemptive measures to prevent and deter unauthorized arrival; efforts to increase the efficient sorting of desirable and undesirable passengers at the border; and punitive responses.” Wonders (2006: 66) extends this point further by arguing that many “border performances occur in locations that may be far from the actual geographic border” and that day-to- day decisions by government agents, police officers, airport workers, employers, and others “play a critical role in determining where, how, and on whose body a border will be performed.” Some argue that these mobile border performances, along with the potential for 24-hour surveillance and the development of fortress-style architectures within urban and public spaces, have a subliminal impact, reinforcing a “culture of fear.” As Davis (1992: 224) notes, “the social perception of threat becomes a function of the security mobilization itself so that fear proves itself.” The result of the “secure the city crusade” in part has been the destruction of legitimate democratic public space and access to public space for society’s “undesirables” (Mitchell, 2003). The ensuing proliferation of privatized and “defensible” public spaces has “become a means of constituting a public through relative inclusions and exclusions and the regulation of bodies within the space” (Peterson, 2006: 377).
	4	+
	5	+====Civil suits don’t encourage reform- prefer our evidence it’s a direct response to their evidence====
	6	+**Harmon 09** Rachel A., PROMOTING CIVIL RIGHTS THROUGH PROACTIVE POLICING REFORM, 2009 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, from the Stanford Law Review at 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009). For information visit http://lawreview.stanford.edu.
	7	+Federal law has played an important role in regulating police misconduct. In particular, federal criminal prosecutions, civil suits for damages under § 1983, and the exclusionary rule are all legal tools that attempt to reduce police misconduct by punishing specific incidents of it and by deterring it in the future. Unfortunately, each is inadequate to promote wholesale institutional change. Federal criminal civil rights prosecutions face significant legal and practical obstacles, including that federal law imposes an onerous intent requirement on civil rights crimes; that victims of police misconduct often make problematic witnesses; and that juries frequently believe and sympathize with defendant officers.16 As a result, prosecutions against police officers are too rare to deter misconduct. Even if criminal prosecutions were more common, however, it is not clear that charges against individual officers would encourage departmental change. Almost inevitably, when some officers in a department are prosecuted, others are not. Criminal prosecution may therefore enable cities to characterize egregious misconduct as resulting from individual pathology rather than systemic problems and to deny the need for departmental improvement.17 Successful § 1983 suits for damages encourage some departmental reform, but they too are limited. Suits against individual officers are difficult to win, both because they suffer some of the same trial challenges as criminal cases against officers, and because officers often have qualified immunity for their actions, even when the conduct is unconstitutional.18 Suing supervisors or chiefs often requires establishing deliberate indifference or reckless action rather than negligence, and suing a city requires a plaintiff to show that misconduct was not only unconstitutional, but reflected municipal “policy” or “custom.”19 Some civil actions succeed despite these obstacles, but many incidents of serious misconduct result in an unsuccessful § 1983 suit or an inexpensive settlement, and therefore provide little incentive for reform.20 Moreover, some scholars have argued that even when plaintiffs win civil suits, damages actions against government actors are an ineffectual—even perverse—means of encouraging local officials to reduce misconduct.21 Daryl Levinson, for example, contends that government officers, police chiefs, and mayors respond to political incentives, and may never be forced to internalize the economic costs of damages paid by municipalities.22 Although Levinson may overstate the case against civil suits,23 he persuasively argues that even when they are successful, civil suits are at best an inefficient and limited means of encouraging institutional reform.24 Footnote- 16. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 465-67 (2004); Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE 247, 253, 258-59, 266 (William A. Geller and Hans Toch eds., 1996); John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 806-11; David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 488, 490-92 (1992).

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-04-12 23:55:02.653

Judge

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	1	+Jacob Koshak, Tim Davies, Nikunj Patel

Opponent

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	1	+Westwood RS

ParentRound

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	1	+59

Round

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	1	+Quarters

Team

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	1	+Warren Okunlola Neg

Title

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	1	+7 - Case Defense - Border Patrol - University of Texas Quarters

Tournament

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	1	+University of Texas