Summary

• Objects (1 modified, 1 added, 0 removed)
  • Caselist.CitesClass[19]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[20]

Details

Caselist.CitesClass[19]

EntryDate

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1		-2017-04-12 19:00:36.405
	1	+2017-04-12 19:00:36.0

Caselist.CitesClass[20]

Cites

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	1	+====Institutions check ====
	2	+**NESG 5**- Nuclear Energy Study Group, Members Include: Roger Hagengruber, Chair, Nuclear Energy Study Group Director, John F. Ahearne Director, Ethics Programs, Sigma Xi Vice Chair, Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee, Robert J. Budnitz Energy and Environment Directorate, Ernest J Moniz Director of Energy Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Thomas E. Shea Director of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs, Francis Slakey, APS Advisor Associate Director of Public Affairs("Nuclear Power And Proliferation Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risk", May 2005, A report by the Nuclear Energy Study Group of the American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs https://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/proliferation-resistance/upload/proliferation.pdf) LADI
	3	+The challenges to the non-proliferation regime are evident worldwide. Negotiations are under way to persuade Iran to abandon a uranium enrichment program, heavy water production plant and high-power research reactor that Iran claims are for civilian use but could easily be used to produce high-enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. In North Korea, negotiations continue on termination of its nuclear weapons program and the associated reprocessing and enrichment activities. 8
	4	+
	5	+====Nuclear power doesn’t cause prolif – empirics prove, no means and no motive ====
	6	+**Harack 10** – writes for vision of earth (Ben Harack, "Does nuclear power lead to weapons proliferation?" September 5, 2010http://www.visionofearth.org/featured-articles/does-nuclear-power-lead-to-weapons-proliferation/) LADI
	7	+Not all used nuclear fuel material is suitable for bombs, particularly the materials found in spent reactor fuel that has undergone a full cycle of use in a reactor. A variety of plutonium and uranium isotopes, the usual materials used to form the core of a nuclear warhead, are found in spent nuclear fuel. The issue is that they are quite difficult to separate from the rest of the material. It possible to do, but not easy. Making a bomb out of used fuel is not a simple process. Current techniques require sizable infrastructure for refining the fuel and extracting the plutonium. This is the sort of industry that the United Nations Security Council keeps a close eye on in the world today. There are very few nations with the scientific and industrial base necessary to build this sort of industry who do not already have nuclear weapons or have chosen to not create them. This is a point often missed by people who lobby against using nuclear power or nuclear fuel reprocessing. They do not realize that a large part of the developed world has both the technical affluence and the available physical resources to create nuclear weapons and yet have chosen not to. The ‘nuclear club’, those nations who possess nuclear weapons is only composed of The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and probably Israel. There are many wealthy nations that possess nuclear power plants who do not have nuclear weapons such as Canada, Germany, Japan, Finland, South Korea and many others. For the full list see Wikipedia’s article on Nuclear Power By Country. These countries have chosen to use their technical ability to create prosperity rather than weapons. This is important because these countries demonstrate that it is by no means a certainty that development of nuclear power technologies leads to availability of weapons.
	8	+
	9	+====Terrorists have an incentive not to use WMDs – undermines perception and legitimacy====
	10	+**Forest 12** (James, PhD and Director of Terrorism Studies and an associate professor at the United States Military Academy, "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism," Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 5, Number 4, Article 9, Winter 2012, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193andcontext=jss) NOTE—-CBRN weapon = chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapon
	11	+The terrorist group would additionally need to consider whether a WMD attack would be counterproductive by generating, for example, condemnation among the group's potential supporters. This possible erosion in support, in turn, would degrade the group's political legitimacy among its constituencies, who are viewed as critical to the group's long-term survival. By crossing this WMD threshold, the group could feasibly undermine its popular support, encouraging a perception of the group as deranged mass murders, rather than righteous vanguards of a movement or warriors fighting for a legitimate cause.16 The importance of perception and popular support—or at least tolerance—gives a group reason to think twice § Marked 09:38 § before crossing the threshold of catastrophic terrorism. A negative perception can impact a broad range of critical necessities, including finances, safe haven, transportation logistics, and recruitment. Many terrorist groups throughout history have had to learn this lesson the hard way; the terrorist groups we worry about most today have learned from the failures and mistakes of the past, and take these into consideration in their strategic deliberations. Furthermore, a WMD attack could prove counterproductive by provoking a government (or possibly multiple governments) to significantly expand their efforts to destroy the terrorist group. Following a WMD attack in a democracy, there would surely be a great deal of domestic pressure on elected leaders to respond quickly and with a massive show of force. A recognition of his reality is surely a constraining factor on Hezbollah deliberations about attacking Israel, or the Chechen's deliberations about attacking Russia, with such a weapon.

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-04-12 19:00:37.17

Judge

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	1	+Javier Gonzalez

Opponent

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	1	+Reagan RB

ParentRound

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	1	+50

Round

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	1	+1

Team

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	1	+Warren Okunlola Neg

Title

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	1	+7 - Case Defense - Nuclear Proliferation- Brandeis Round 1

Tournament

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	1	+Brandeis