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  • Caselist.RoundClass[41]
  • Caselist.CitesClass[13]

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Caselist.RoundClass[41]

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1		-2017-04-12 23:12:04.150
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Caselist.CitesClass[13]

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	1	+==Util 1AC==
	2	+===Framework===
	3	+====I Value Morality as per evaluative term "Ought" in the resolution which is defined as "used to express duty or Moral Obligation" by Merriam Webster====
	4	+http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought
	5	+
	6	+
	7	+====The Criterion is Maximizing Expected Wellbeing ====
	8	+
	9	+====4 Justifications====
	10	+
	11	+==== Countries as moral institutions have a moral obligation to be just through promoting individual capacities to express values. ====
	12	+**Young ‘90** ~~Iris Marion. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, affiliated with the Center for Gender Studies and the Human Rights program @ UChicago. Justice and the Politics of Difference, published by Princeton University Press in 1990. pp. 91~~
	13	+I have defined justice as the institutionalized conditions that make it possible for all to learn and use satisfying skills in socially recognized settings, to participate in decisionmaking, and to express their feelings, experience, and perspective on social life in contexts where others can listen. This understanding of justice specifies a certain range of distributive out­ comes. In particular, justice in modern industrial societies requires a societal commitment to meeting the basic needs of all persons whether or not they contribute to the social product (see Sterba, 1980, chap. 2; Gut- mann, 1980, chap. 5; Walzer, 1983, chap. 3). If persons suffer material deprivation of basic needs for food, shelter, health care, and so on, then they cannot pursue lives of satisfying work, social participation, and expression. Justice equally requires, however, participation in public discussion and processes of democratic decisionmaking. All persons should have the right and opportunity to participate in the deliberation and decisionmaking of the institutions to which their actions contribute or which directly affect their actions. Such democratic structures should regulate decision­ making not only in government institutions, but in all institutions of collective life, including, for example, production and service enterprises, universities, and voluntary organizations. Democracy is both an element and a condition of social justice.
	14	+
	15	+====Moral actors have an obligation to minimize actions that inhibit human flourishing—this is critical to allow the full expression of values and promote justice.====
	16	+-exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural domination, violence
	17	+**Young ‘10** ~~Iris Marion. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, affiliated with the Center for Gender Studies and the Human Rights program @ UChicago. Responsibility for Justice, published by Oxford University Press in 2010. pp.137-9~~
	18	+Some philosophers reject the claim that the scope of obligations of justice extends only to members of the same political community. On a cosmopolitan-utilitarian view, nation-state membership or any other sort of particularist relationship among persons is irrelevant to assessing the nature, depth, or scope of obligations that those persons have to one another. Moral agents have identical obligations to all human beings, as well as perhaps to some nonhuman beings. There is a moral imperative to minimize suffering, wherever it occurs. Every agent is obliged to do what he or she can to minimize suffering everywhere, right up to the point where he or she begins to suffer. Membership in a common political community, on the part of either the agent or the sufferers, is relevant only instrumentally as sometimes providing efficient means of discharging obligations and distributing particular tasks. Much about global relationships, however, can override this convenience. Peter Singer and Peter Under are two prominent theorists who hold this view.22 I think both of these positions are wanting. Some critics of the cosmopolitan-utilitarian position argue that it is implausibly demanding. There are some reasons for persons to distinguish bet- ween obligations they derive from special particular relationships, and sometimes to give these priority over more general cosmopolitan obligations.23 It is certainly not sufficient to argue against a claim of moral obligation that it asks more of moral agents than they are inclined to do. Our intuitions and inclina- tions about our obligations are likely to be self-serving and underdemanding. I think that several different objections should be brought against the cosmopolitan-utilitarian position. First, to the extent that it asserts that political jurisdiction makes no difference for what obligations people have to one another, and thus what some agents in one place may have a legitimate right to do in relation to people in another jurisdiction, this position challenges too much a collective right to self-determination. Local political or nation-state borders certainly should not have absolute moral force. If, for example, members of a political community suffer severe repression or deprivation because the political regime under which they live is either too evil or too weak to protect their lives, then outsiders may have obligations to intervene. Even apart from direct intervention, as I will discuss, outsiders do have obligations to promote justice across borders. It is wrong to take political community as merely instrumental to discharging obliga- tion, however. Most people value a sense of local membership, and there are rights for those who share this sense of membership to set the terms of their relationships among themselves.24 As articulated by writers such as Singer and Unger, moreover, the cosmopolitan-utilitarian position is overly individualist and offers few guidelines to set action priorities. One gets the impres- sion that each individual is obliged to act on her own to discharge her demanding cosmopolitan responsibilities, by, for example, giving away her individually owned property. The position has too thin an account of the role of institutions and collective action. The view that says that the scope of obligations of justice is limited to members of the same political community is even more flawed, however. Critics of this view are right to argue that nation-state membership is somewhat arbitrary from a moral point of view; political communities have evolved in contingent ways that derive more from power struggle than from moral right. People often stand in dense relationships with others prior to, apart from, or outside of political communities. These relationships may be such that people’s actions affect one another in ways that tend to produce conflict. Or people may cooperate with numbers of others in ongoing practices and institutions across jurisdictions. In such relations, we expect fair terms of conflict-resolution and coopera- tion. In contrast with the cosmopolitan-utilitarian position, some account needs to be offered of the nature of social relationships that ground claims that people have obligations of justice to one another. It is not enough to say that the others are human. The nation-state view, however, makes prior what is posterior from a moral point of view. As I argued in chapter 2, ontologically and morally, though not necessarily temporally, social connection is prior to political institutions. This is the great insight of social contract theory. The social connections of civil society may exist without political institutions to govern them. A society consists in connected or mutually influencing institutions and practices through which people enact their projects and seek their happi- ness, and in doing so they affect the conditions under which others act, often profoundly. A social contract theory like that of John Locke argues that the need and desire for political institu- tions arises because socially connected persons with multiple and sometimes conflicting institutional commitments recognize that their relationships are liable to conflict and that inequalities of power can lead to mistrust, violence, exploitation, and domina- tion.25 It is these structural relationships and vulnerabilities that generate obligations of justice. They create the need for public regulation and strong institutions to implement such regulation, so that people can maximize their ability to act jointly and minimize violent conflict among them.
	19	+
	20	+====States do and should act in a utilitarian manner.====
	21	+**Woller 97** ~~Gary, Brigham Young University, "A Forum On The Role of Environmental Ethics in Restructuring Environmental Policy and Law for the Next Century", Policy Currents, 1997, BE~~
	22	+Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's expense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such justification cannot simply be assumed by invoking some a priori higher-order moral principle. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers' duty to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their polices are somehow to the overall advantage of society. At the same time, deontologically based ~~other~~ ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. It therefore follows that in a democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives and the problems they address, and the public must be reasonably assured ~~reasonable assurance~~ that a policy will actually do something about an existing problem; this requires the means-end language and methodology of utilitarian ethics. Good intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient, though perhaps at times a necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy.
	23	+
	24	+====Moral uncertainty means we should minimize existential risk====
	25	+**Bostrom 12** ~~Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. "Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority." Global Policy (2012)~~
	26	+These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe
	27	+
	28	+====Oxford dictionary defines Nuclear power as: Electric or motive power generated by a nuclear reactor.====
	29	+http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american'english/nuclear-power
	30	+
	31	+===Contention 1 is Nuclear Proliferation===
	32	+====Nuclear Power multiplies the risk for nuclear proliferation and nuclear terror – safeguards are uncertain and nuclear power weakens them ====
	33	+**Miller and Sagan 9** - Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security ("Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?" Journal Article, Daedalus, volume 138, issue 4, pages 7-18, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/19850/nuclear'power'without'nuclear'proliferation.html) LADI
	34	+Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold. —President Barack Obama Prague, April 5, 2009 The global nuclear order is changing. Concerns about climate change, the volatility of oil prices, and the security of energy supplies have contributed to a widespread and still-growing interest in the future use of nuclear power. Thirty states operate one or more nuclear power plants today, and according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), some 50 others have requested technical assistance from the agency to explore the possibility of developing their own nuclear energy programs. It is certainly not possible to predict precisely how fast and how extensively the expansion of nuclear power will occur. But it does seem probable that in the future there will be more nuclear technology spread across more states than ever before. It will be a different world than the one that has existed in the past. This surge of interest in nuclear energy — labeled by some proponents as "the renaissance in nuclear power" — is, moreover, occurring simultaneously with mounting concern about the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the regulatory framework that constrains and governs the world's civil and military-related nuclear affairs. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and related institutions have been taxed by new worries, such as the growth in global terrorism, and have been painfully tested by protracted crises involving nuclear weapons proliferation in North Korea and potentially in Iran. (Indeed, some observers suspect that growing interest in nuclear power in some countries, especially in the Middle East, is not unrelated to Iran's uranium enrichment program and Tehran's movement closer to a nuclear weapons capability.) Confidence in the NPT regime seems to be eroding even as interest in nuclear power is expanding. This realization raises crucial questions for the future of global security. Will the growth of nuclear power lead to increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism? Will the nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely and heavily invested in nuclear power? The authors in this two-volume (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010) special issue of Dædalus have one simple and clear answer to these questions: It depends. On what will it depend? Unfortunately, the answer to that question is not so simple and clear, for the technical, economic, and political factors that will determine whether future generations will have more nuclear power without more nuclear proliferation are both exceedingly complex and interrelated. How rapidly and in which countries will new nuclear power plants be built? Will the future expansion of nuclear energy take place primarily in existing nuclear power states or will there be many new entrants to the field? Which countries will possess the facilities for enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium, technical capabilities that could be used to produce either nuclear fuel for reactors or the materials for nuclear bombs? How can physical protection of nuclear materials from terrorist organizations best be ensured? How can new entrants into nuclear power generation best maintain safety to prevent accidents? The answers to these questions will be critical determinants of the technological dimension of our nuclear future. The major political factors influencing the future of nuclear weapons are no less complex and no less important. Will Iran acquire nuclear weapons; will North Korea develop more weapons or disarm in the coming decade; how will neighboring states respond? Will the United States and Russia take significant steps toward nuclear disarmament, and if so, will the other nuclear-weapons states follow suit or stand on the sidelines? The nuclear future will be strongly influenced, too, by the success or failure of efforts to strengthen the international organizations and the set of agreements that comprise the system developed over time to manage global nuclear affairs. Will new international or regional mechanisms be developed to control the front-end (the production of nuclear reactor fuel) and the back-end (the management of spent fuel containing plutonium) of the nuclear fuel cycle? What political agreements and disagreements are likely to emerge between the nuclear-weapons states (NWS) and the non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and beyond? What role will crucial actors among the NNWS — Japan, Iran, Brazil, and Egypt, for example — play in determining the global nuclear future? And most broadly, will the nonproliferation regime be supported and strengthened or will it be questioned and weakened? As IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has emphasized, "The nonproliferation regime is, in many ways, at a critical juncture," and there is a need for a new "overarching multilateral nuclear framework."1 But there is no guarantee that such a framework will emerge, and there is wide doubt that the arrangements of the past will be adequate to manage our nuclear future effectively.
	35	+
	36	+====Prolif in new states causes nuclear conflict. ====
	37	+**Kroenig 14** – Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown University, and Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council ("The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?", April 2014, http://www.matthewkroenig.com/The20History20of20Proliferation20Optimism'Feb2014.pdf)
	38	+The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late Naughts.49 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure second-strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use ‘em or loose ‘em pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.50 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.51 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.52 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a "threat that leaves something to chance."53 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.54 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism. The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.55 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a "religious duty" for Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.56 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them. Indeed, in recent years, many U.S. politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to U.S. national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hezbollah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al Qaeda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. U.S. officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a break down in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability: The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the "stability-instability paradox" maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62
	39	+
	40	+====Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now – largest threat of extinction====
	41	+**Bunn et al 14** ~~Matthew, Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School, with Martin Malin, Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Nickolas Roth, Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom, and William Tobey, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March, "Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals," The Project on Managing the Atom, pg. 5-9/AKG~~
	42	+Unfortunately, nuclear and radiological terrorism remain real and dangerous threats.1 The conclusion the assembled leaders reached at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit and reaffirmed in Seoul remains correct: "Nuclear terrorism continues to be one of the most challenging threats to international security. Defeating this threat requires strong national measures and international cooperation given its potential global political, economic, social, and psychological consequences."2 There are three types of nuclear or radiological terrorist attack: • Nuclear weapons. Terrorists might be able to get and detonate an assembled nuclear weapon made by a state, or make a crude nuclear bomb from stolen separated plutonium or HEU. This would be the most difficult type of nuclear terrorism for terrorists to accomplish—but the devastation could be absolutely horrifying, with political and economic aftershocks reverberating around the world. • "Dirty bombs." A far simpler approach would be for terrorists to obtain radiological materials—available in hospitals, industrial sites, and more—and disperse them to contaminate an area with radioactivity, using explosives or any number of other means. In most scenarios of such attacks, few people would die from the radiation—but the attack could spread fear, force the evacuation of many blocks of a major city, and inflict billions of dollars in costs of cleanup and economic disruption. While a dirty bomb attack would be much easier for terrorists to carry out than an attack using a nuclear explosive, the consequences would be far less—an expensive and disruptive mess, but not the heart of a major city going up in smoke. • Nuclear sabotage. Terrorists could potentially cause a Fukushima-like meltdown at a nuclear reactor or sabotage a spent fuel pool or high-level waste store. An unsuccessful sabotage would have little effect, but a successful one could spread radioactive material over a huge area. Both the scale of the consequences and the difficulty of carrying out a successful attack would be intermediate between nuclear weapons and dirty bombs. Overall, while actual terrorist use of a nuclear weapon may be the least likely of these dangers, its consequences would be so overwhelming that we believe it poses the most significant risk. A similar judgment drove the decision to focus the four-year effort on securing nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them. Most of this report will focus on the threat of terrorist use of nuclear explosives, but the overall global governance framework for nuclear security is relevant to all of these dangers. The danger of nuclear terrorism is driven by three key factors—terrorist intent to escalate to the nuclear level of violence; potential terrorist capability to do so; and the vulnerability of nuclear weapons and the materials needed to enable terrorists to carry out such an attack—the motive, means, and opportunity of a monstrous crime. Terrorist intent. While most terrorist groups are still focused on small-scale violence for local political purposes, we now live in an age that includes some groups intent on inflicting large-scale destruction to achieve their objectives. Over the past quarter century, both al Qaeda and the Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo seriously sought nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials and expertise needed to make them. Al Qaeda had a focused program reporting directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri (now head of the group), which progressed as far as carrying out crude but sensible conventional explosive tests for the nuclear program in the desert of Afghanistan. There is some evidence that North Caucusus terrorists also sought nuclear weapons—including incidents in which terrorist teams were caught carrying out reconnaissance on Russian nuclear weapon storage sites, whose locations are secret.3 Despite the death of Osama bin Laden and the severe disruption of the core of al Qaeda, there are no grounds for complacency. There is every reason to believe Zawahiri remains eager to inflict destruction on a nuclear scale. Indeed, despite the large number of al Qaeda leaders who have been killed or captured, nearly all of the key players in al Qaeda’s nuclear program remain alive and at large—including Abdel Aziz al-Masri, an Egyptian explosives expert who was al Qaeda’s "nuclear CEO." In 2003, when al Qaeda operatives were negotiating to buy three of what they thought were nuclear weapons, senior al Qaeda officials told them to go ahead and make the purchase if a Pakistani expert with equipment confirmed the items were genuine. The US government has never managed to determine who the Pakistani nuclear weapons expert was in whom al Qaeda had such confidence—and what he may have been doing in the intervening decade. More fundamentally, with at least two, and probably three, groups having gone down this path in the past 25 years, there is no reason to expect they will be the last. The danger of nuclear terrorism will remain as long as nuclear weapons, the materials needed to make them, and terrorist groups bent on large-scale destruction co-exist. Potential terrorist capabilities. No one knows what capabilities a secret cell of al Qaeda may have managed to retain or build. Unfortunately, it does not take a Manhattan Project to make a nuclear bomb—indeed, over 90 percent of the Manhattan Project effort was focused on making the nuclear materials, not on designing and building the weapons. Numerous studies by the United States and other governments have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude nuclear bomb if it got enough separated plutonium or HEU.4 A "gun-type" bomb, such as the weapon that obliterated Hiroshima, fundamentally involves slamming two pieces of HEU together at high speed. An "implosion-type" bomb, which is needed to get a sub-stantial explosive yield from plutonium, requires crushing nuclear material to a higher density—a more complex task, but still plausible for terrorists, especially if they got knowledgeable help. Many analysts argue that, since states spend billions of dollars and assign hundreds or thousands of people to building nuclear weapons, it is totally implausible that terrorists could carry out this task. Unfortunately, this argument is wrong, for two reasons. First, as the Manhattan Project statistic suggests, the difficult part of making a nuclear bomb is making the nuclear material. That is what states spend billions seeking to accomplish. Terrorists are highly unlikely to ever be able to make their own bomb material—but if they could get stolen material, that step would be bypassed. Second, it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable bomb of uncertain yield, which might be delivered in the back of a truck, than to make the kind of nuclear weapon a state would want in its arsenal—a safe, reliable weapon of known yield that can be delivered by missile or combat aircraft. It is highly unlikely terrorists will ever be able to build that kind of nuclear weapon. Remaining vulnerabilities. While many countries have done a great deal to strengthen nuclear security, serious vulnerabilities remain. Around the world, there are stocks of nuclear weapons or materials whose security systems are not sufficient to protect against the full range of plausible outsider and insider threats they may face. As incidents like the intrusion at Y-12 in the United States in 2012 make clear, many nuclear facilities and transporters still grapple with serious problems of security culture. It is fair to say that every country where nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, major nuclear facilities, or dangerous radiological sources exist has more to do to ensure that these items are sustainably secured and accounted for. At least three lines of evidence confirm that important nuclear security weaknesses continue to exist. First, seizures of stolen HEU and separated plutonium continue to occur, including, mostly recently HEU seizures in 2003, 2006, 2010, and 2011.5 These seizures may result from material stolen long ago, but, at a minimum, they make clear that stocks of HEU and plutonium remain outside of regulatory control. Second, in cases where countries do realistic tests to probe whether security systems can protect against teams of clever adversaries determined to find a weak point, the adversaries sometimes succeed—even when their capabilities are within the set of threats the security system is designed to protect against. This happens with some regularity in the United States (though less often than before the 9/11 attacks); if more countries carried out comparable performance tests, one would likely see similar results. Third, in real non-nuclear thefts and terrorist attacks around the world, adversaries sometimes demonstrate capabilities and tactics well beyond what many nuclear security systems would likely be able to handle (see the discussion of the recent Västberga incident in Sweden). Of course, the initial theft of nuclear material would be only the first step. Adversaries would have to smuggle the material to wherever they wanted to make their bomb, and ultimately to the target. A variety of measures have been put in place in recent years to try to stop nuclear smuggling, from radiation detectors to national teams trained and equipped to deal with nuclear smuggling cases—and more should certainly be done. But once nuclear material has left the facility where it is supposed to be, it could be anywhere, and finding and recovering it poses an enormous challenge. The immense length of national borders, the huge scale of legitimate traffic, the myriad potential pathways across these borders, and the small size and weak radiation signal of the materials needed to make a nuclear bomb make nuclear smuggling extraordinarily difficult to stop. There is also the danger that a state such as North Korea might consciously decide to provide nuclear weapons or the materials needed to make them to terrorists. This possibility cannot be ruled out, but there is strong reason to believe that such conscious state decisions to provide these capabilities are a small part of the overall risk of nuclear terrorism. Dictators determined to maintain their power are highly unlikely to hand over the greatest weapon they have to terrorist groups they cannot control, who might well use it in ways that would provoke retaliation that would remove the dictator from power forever. Although nuclear forensics is by no means perfect, it would be only one of many lines of evidence that could potentially point back to the state that provided the materials; no state could ever be confident they could make such a transfer withoutbeing caught.6 And terrorists are unlikely to have enough money to make a substantial difference in either the odds of regime survival or the wealth of a regime’s elites, even in North Korea, one of the poorest countries on earth. On the other hand, serious risks would arise in North Korea, or other nuclear-armed states, in the event of state collapse—and as North Korea’s stockpile grows, one could imagine a general managing some of that stockpile concluding he could sell a piece of it and provide a golden parachute for himself and his family without getting caught. No one knows the real likelihood of nuclear terrorism. But the consequences of a terrorist nuclear blast would be so catastrophic that even a small chance is enough to justify urgent action to reduce the risk. The heart of a major city could be reduced to a smoldering radioactive ruin, leaving tens to hundreds of thousands of people dead. The perpetrators or others might claim to have more weapons already hidden in other major cities and threaten to set them off if their demands were not met—potentially provoking uncontrolled evacuation of many urban centers. Devastating economic consequences would reverberate worldwide. Kofi Annan, while serving as Secretary-General of the United Nations, warned that the global economic effects of a nuclear terrorist attack in a major city would push "tens of millions of people into dire poverty," creating a "second death toll throughout the developing world."7
	43	+
	44	+===Contention 2 is Meltdowns ===
	45	+====Meltdowns are inevitable – other models are flawed ====
	46	+**Max - Planck- Gesselschaft 12** –The Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science is a formally independent non-governmental and non-profit association of German research institute (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Major Reactor, 5-22-2012, "Severe nuclear reactor accidents likely every 10 to 20 years, European study suggests," ScienceDaily, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/05/120522134942.htm) LADI
	47	+Fukushima are more likely to happen than previously assumed. Based on the operating hours of all civil nuclear reactors and the number of nuclear meltdowns that have occurred, scientists at the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry in Mainz have calculated that such events may occur once every 10 to 20 years (based on the current number of reactors) — some 200 times more often than estimated in the past. The researchers also determined that, in the event of such a major accident, half of the radioactive caesium-137 would be spread over an area of more than 1,000 kilometres away from the nuclear reactor. Their results show that Western Europe is likely to be contaminated about once in 50 years by more than 40 kilobecquerel of caesium-137 per square meter. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, an area is defined as being contaminated with radiation from this amount onwards. In view of their findings, the researchers call for an in-depth analysis and reassessment of the risks associated with nuclear power plants. The reactor accident in Fukushima has fuelled the discussion about nuclear energy and triggered Germany's exit from their nuclear power program. It appears that the global risk of such a catastrophe is higher than previously thought, a result of a study carried out by a research team led by Jos Lelieveld, Director of the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry in Mainz: "After Fukushima, the prospect of such an incident occurring again came into question, and whether we can actually calculate the radioactive fallout using our atmospheric models." According to the results of the study, a nuclear meltdown in one of the reactors in operation worldwide is likely to occur once in 10 to 20 years. Currently, there are 440 nuclear reactors in operation, and 60 more are planned. To determine the likelihood of a nuclear meltdown, the researchers applied a simple calculation. They divided the operating hours of all civilian nuclear reactors in the world, from the commissioning of the first up to the present, by the number of reactor meltdowns that have actually occurred. The total number of operating hours is 14,500 years, the number of reactor meltdowns comes to four — one in Chernobyl and three in Fukushima. This translates into one major accident, being defined according to the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), every 3,625 years. Even if this result is conservatively rounded to one major accident every 5,000 reactor years, the risk is 200 times higher than the estimate for catastrophic, non-contained core meltdowns made by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1990. The Mainz researchers did not distinguish ages and types of reactors, or whether they are located in regions of enhanced risks, for example by earthquakes. After all, nobody had anticipated the reactor catastrophe in Japan.
	48	+
	49	+====Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima, and the current leaks at the Hartford Nuclear Reservation all reveal a telling fact about the price of nuclear energy—the negative and fatal impacts on human health. Exposure to nuclear material often results in sickness, cancers, and death. ====
	50	+**Caldicott ‘6** ~~Dr. Helen Caldicott, July 2006, devoted the last 35 years to an international campaign to educate the public about the medical hazards of the nuclear age. "Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer," http://www.helencaldicott.com/chapter3.pdf~~
	51	+Few, if any, estimates of the costs of nuclear energy take into account the health costs to the human race. Even when nuclear power plants are operating normally, these costs are not insignificant. Miners, workers, and residents in the vicinity of the mining and milling functions, and workers involved in the enrichment processes necessary to create nuclear fuel are at risk for exposure to unhealthy amounts of radiation and have increased incidences of cancer and related diseases as a result. Routine and accidental radioactive releases at nuclear power plants as well as the inevitable leakage of radioactive waste will contaminate water and food chains and expose humans and animals now and for generations to come. Accidents such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl condemn thousands if not millions to pay the cost of nuclear power with their own health. Understanding the nature of radiation is critical to understanding the health impacts of nuclear energy.
	52	+
	53	+===Contention 3 is Environmental Racism===
	54	+====Nuclear plants exploit poor migrant labor and deem workers expendable – colonialism manifests itself through governments taking land from local farmers and maintaining closed contracts that doom vulnerable populations====
	55	+**Biswas 14**, Shampa Biswas Paul Garrett Professor of Political Science at Whitman College, Ph.D., Political Science, University of Minnesota, 1999, M.A., International Relations, Maxwell School of Citizenship, Syracuse University, 1990, M.A., Economics, Dehli School of Economics, University of Dehli, 1988, “Nuclear Desire: Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order,” Chapter: Costly Weapons: The Political Economy of Nuclear Power, University of Minnesota Press, 2014,
	56	+It should not surprise us, then, as we are learning with the nuclear power industry in Japan, that much of the labor involved in the active day- to-day operations of power plants, which involves hazardous exposure to radiation, uses subcontracted, part-time temporary workers without adequate protections—termed “nuclear gypsies” by Kunio Horie (Chandler 2011). Hence, even when the nuclear e ects are clear and visible—such as in the higher level of exposure resulting from major nuclear incidents such as the one at Fukushima Daiichi recently—it is the e ects on the most vulnerable workers laboring at much more mundane levels that are the least visible. Large numbers of workers adversely a ected by the economic downturn and from all across Japan have been traveling to Fukushima, despite the dangers, to work in the cleanup e orts. Most of these are un- skilled temporary migrant laborers contracted or subcontracted at very low wages, with no job security, bene ts, or insurance for the e ects of radiation exposure. But reporters point out that the Japanese nuclear in- dustry has always relied on such informal contract labor for most of its most demanding and dangerous jobs (Tabuchi 2011a; 2011c; McCurry 2011). Much like day laborers in the United States, workers exposed to the highest levels of toxicity within a short period are just rotated out, con- sidered largely “expendable” by the corporations running nuclear power plants (Dwyer 2012).63 Drawing from the experience of Japanese work- ers and communities a ected by the meltdowns in Fukushima, India is currently witnessing a massive public protest against the creation of the largest power plant ever proposed anywhere in the world in the Western coastal town of Jaitapur, a movement that began with protests against forc- ible land grabs by the government and that has now expanded to include nuclear safety issues (see Bajaj 2011; Dietrich 2011; Bidwai 2011). This land grab is occurring against the objections of local farmers and fishers fearing for their livelihoods and is made possible through the strong collusions between the nuclear industry and officials of the nuclear regulatory board. Similar examples of indigenous communities affected by the expansion of nuclear power are available elsewhere. When fetishized nuclear weapons are so far removed from the process of production, and national security keeps the closed bidding of corporate contracts in the industry so much under wraps, labor exploitation in the handling of materials and land appropriation for mining, testing, and setting up nuclear power plants can often occur without the protective apparatus of regulatory mechanisms. As the previous chapter argued, the fetishization of nuclear weapons conceals these collusions of corporate and state interests in nuclear power in the exploitation of vulnerable work- ers and communities. Moving beyond the fetishized nuclear weapons them- selves to reveal the conditions of their making lays bare the severe e ects of nuclear nonuse.
	57	+
	58	+====From nuclear testing, uranium mining, and dumping waste has all occrued at the expense of Indigenous lives and their land====
	59	+Danielle **Endres** "The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical Exclusion of American Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision." Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 6.1 (2009): 39-60. JSTOR. Web. 19 Aug. 20**16**.)
	60	+Since the Manhattan…and plant life.
	61	+
	62	+====Nuclear power production has now become a tool of neocolonialism that is parasitic on the exploitation of black people in Africa====
	63	+**Wittmann**, N. (20**11**, 06). The scramble for africa's nuclear resources. New African,, 72-74. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/903556455?accountid=14026
	64	+The nuclear powers are increasingly experiencing and preparing for problems of supply with the necessary crude nuclear materials such as uranium and plutonium. Even though it is said that countries such as the USA, Russia and China have or rather had vast uranium resources themselves, all of these countries are now very eager to identify, secure and exploit mines for nuclear materials throughout Africa. Africa, the continent endowed with the richest natural resources, has vast nuclear materials in its soil. Almost every African country is currently being mined or examined and prepared for nuclear exploitation. According to are the World Information Service on Energy (WISE), an environmental activist amalgamation based in Amsterdam, China, National Nuclear Group, being that country’s biggest nuclear powerplant builder, signed a deal with the China-Africa Development Fund, a Chinese state run institution, in 2010 to examine and exploit uranium resources throughout Africa. French, Canadian, British, Swiss, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Australian and other companies are mining uranium, or have signed contracts to do so very soon with Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Gabon, Malawi, Mali, Chad, South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia and other African countries. Botswana's former mineral minister, Ponatshego Kedikilwe, said that such activity is taking place "across the length and breadth of Botswana". It also resulted in the eviction of Kalahari bushmen from their ancestral lands. In Malawi, water has been found to be radioactively contaminated, and various protests against uranium mining have flared up,yet to no avail. In Mali, people are also protesting against mining and nuclear pollution in the Falea region, as in Zambia and other countries. In South Africa, several chiefs who opposed mining projects by the world's biggest nuclear concern, France's Areva, were killed indubious circumstances. Lastyear, Namibia saw a massive increase in mining as well as interest for nuclear exploitation coming rom India, Russia, France and other non-African states. The USA, a country that until recently had vast uranium resources itself and also imported crude nuclear material from South Africa, is now increasingly turning to Namibia and especially Niger for its supplies. Some say that Niger might have the world's largest uranium resources. Countries that are already active in their exploitation are India, Korea, China and France. France and its state-controlled mega concern Avera already have a long and dirty past in Niger. It is claimed that in 1974, the then Niger president, Hamani Diori, involuntarily signed up to his own dismissal when he manifested intentions to index the price for uranium at a time when the French company Cogema had for some decades conducted massive uranium extraction in his country. Soon after, he was chased from office by Seyni Kountché, formerly a lieutenant in the French army. Once Kountché was in power, Niger's uranium prices crumbled. Consecutively, Cogema and later Avera helped to make France the world's fourth-largest uranium producer and the second-largest nuclear energy producer, even though that country only naturally possesses 4 of the world's uranium resources. As with the mining of other mineral resources in Africa, France aspires to extract the highest profits possible by reducing exploitation costs. Thus, in the surroundings of Niger's uranium mines in Arlit and Agadez, very high incidences of cardiovascular diseases, allergies, cancer, birth defects and malformations have been observed. Up to 2006, Areva extracted 100,000 tonnes of uranium from Arlit, whereasNiger in that year remained 172nd in the UND Phuman development index.

EntryDate

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	1	+2017-04-12 23:12:06.661

Judge

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	1	+Lindsey Wilson

Opponent

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	1	+Mansfield Legacy MB

ParentRound

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	1	+41

Round

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	1	+2

Team

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	1	+Warren Okunlola Aff

Title

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	1	+5 - Util Affirmative Version 2 - 1AC - St Marys Hall Round 2

Tournament

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	1	+St Marys Hall