| ... |
... |
@@ -1,69
+1,0 @@ |
| 1 |
|
-====The standard is consistency with a Hobbesian social contract, defined as a hypothetical political arrangement where contractors agree to lay down their right to private judgment in favor of absolute sovereignty. ==== |
| 2 |
|
- |
| 3 |
|
- |
| 4 |
|
-====Justification:==== |
| 5 |
|
- |
| 6 |
|
- |
| 7 |
|
-====Meta-ethical constructivism – moral facts aren~’t "out there" to be found but linguistic categories created by humans for humans==== |
| 8 |
|
- |
| 9 |
|
- |
| 10 |
|
-**====Parrish 04 ====** |
| 11 |
|
-~~Rick, "Derrida~’s Economy of Violence in Hobbes~’ Social Contract." 1/5/16 6. Pg 4-7. Rick Parrish teaches at Loyola University New Orleans. His current research is focused on the play of violence and respect within justice. http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=026type=summary26url=/journals/theory_and_event/v007/7.4parrish.html~~ |
| 12 |
|
- |
| 13 |
|
-"For Hobbes truth is a function of logic and language, not of the |
| 14 |
|
-AND |
| 15 |
|
-regarding whether or not a specific situation fits a commonly-held definition." |
| 16 |
|
- |
| 17 |
|
- |
| 18 |
|
-====Prefer Parrish because it~’s a linguistic warrant – it defines what we~’re doing when we use ethical terms.==== |
| 19 |
|
- |
| 20 |
|
- |
| 21 |
|
-====Only a sovereign can unify conficting assertions of value from individuals. ==== |
| 22 |
|
- |
| 23 |
|
- |
| 24 |
|
-====PARRISH 2:,,====,, |
| 25 |
|
-~~Rick, "Derrida~’s Economy of Violence in Hobbes~’ Social Contract." 1/5/16 6. Pg 4-7. Rick Parrish teaches at Loyola University New Orleans. His current research is focused on the play of violence and respect within justice. http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=026type=summary26url=/journals/theory_and_event/v007/7.4parrish.html~~ |
| 26 |
|
- |
| 27 |
|
-All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign~’s first |
| 28 |
|
-AND |
| 29 |
|
-security dilemmas and attempts to force one~’s own meanings upon others are overcome. |
| 30 |
|
- |
| 31 |
|
- |
| 32 |
|
-====Independently, stable political order is a prerequisite to any theory of the good since no one can guarantee they achieve their ends or have their desires fulfilled in a disordered state of nature. Rights are meaningless in a societal arrangement where they cannot be protected. Only absolute power prevents warring factions or political gridlock that makes political organizing impossible. ==== |
| 33 |
|
- |
| 34 |
|
- |
| 35 |
|
-====And **absolute power is key to avoid the problem of private judgment. Widespread ethical disagreement creates disarray – everyone has a different conception of how political systems should be built and what policies should be passed. ====** |
| 36 |
|
- |
| 37 |
|
- |
| 38 |
|
-**====Only submission to an absolute sovereign solves, ====** |
| 39 |
|
-**Renzo 11** |
| 40 |
|
-~~Renzo, Massimo. "State Legitimacy and Self Defense." Law and Philosophy. 4 May 2011. http://philpapers.org/rec/RENSLA~~ |
| 41 |
|
- |
| 42 |
|
-As Gregory Kavka has persuasively argued, there are at least three kinds of reasons |
| 43 |
|
-AND |
| 44 |
|
-an important sense there can be no justice in the state of nature. |
| 45 |
|
- |
| 46 |
|
- |
| 47 |
|
-====And ought implies can justifies stability as a prereq. No one can fulfill their obligations in a state of nature where basic means of living and safety aren~’t guaranteed. For instance, if you don~’t have the means to live a decent life, you can hardly fulfill special obligations to provide for your family members.==== |
| 48 |
|
- |
| 49 |
|
- |
| 50 |
|
-====It~’s incoherent for the sovereign to be subject to laws because then it wouldn~’t be sovereign, something else would because it has the power to judge and punish. ==== |
| 51 |
|
- |
| 52 |
|
- |
| 53 |
|
-====Also proves the inevitability of absolute sovereignty,==== |
| 54 |
|
-**Hobbes 68 ** |
| 55 |
|
-Thomas — philosopher, historian, ethicist, geometrician, squarer of the circle — Leviathan, selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, ed. w/ intro by Edwin Curley, Hackett. p. 213 |
| 56 |
|
- |
| 57 |
|
-XXIX ~~9~~ A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth is |
| 58 |
|
-AND |
| 59 |
|
-and so continually without end, to the confusion and dissolution of the commonwealth |
| 60 |
|
- |
| 61 |
|
-The sovereign unifies the desires and wills of the entire commonwealth into one body, which means my framework controls the internal link to intent-based and ends-based frameworks since the sovereign resolves conflicting claims among citizens. That~’s key to avoid intent-based problems for government actors. You can~’t analyze the intent of a group since they have conflicting motivations and judgments, but you can for the sovereign. |
| 62 |
|
- |
| 63 |
|
-I contend that a prohibition on the production of nuclear power is inconsistent with sovereign authority for three reasons. |
| 64 |
|
- |
| 65 |
|
-1. Affirming isn~’t part of the state~’s duty since its duty is to be the definer and prevent regress to the state of nature. Not affirming doesn~’t actually lead to a regress to the state of nature, which means the status quo is actively good because it is consistent with state created standards for goodness. The squo negates. ~~Extend out of their AC.~~ |
| 66 |
|
- |
| 67 |
|
-2. It~’s impossible to generate external obligations for the sovereign because to do so would require that there~’s some higher power to order the sovereign to do so, but since the sovereign is all powerful that~’d be impossible. The only obligation a sovereign can have is one that it creates itself but that would still concede the authority of the sovereign. |
| 68 |
|
- |
| 69 |
|
-3. Affirming imposes an obligation on the sovereign to prohibit nuclear power, even if they do not want to – inconsistent with absolute sovereign authority. That~’s Hobbes 68. |