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+First, it is a requirement of prescriptive thought that one reflect upon ends to decide; otherwise one’s action would be determined by causal influences. Hence morality presupposes independent subjects—humanity is the condition of moral force. And practical identity—like parent, teacher, or debater—requires valuing our human identity first. |
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+Korsgaard 92 Korsgaard, Christine M. The Sources of Normativity. THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University. November 16 and 17, 1992. Pg. 81-85. |
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+The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent |
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+AND |
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+identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids. |
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+To attach value to any identity means you must value yourself as someone who needs reasons to act and live. You can shed every identity except your human identity; we can shed conflicting impulses by choosing not to take them as reasons, but you cannot have reason to reject the value of the source of your moral reasons. Identities as policy-makers would come second since a ‘country’ is only an agent by being informed by people, each rational agents. Their practical identities as legislators must be contextualized accordingly. |
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+Second, claims of goodness are filtered. Something good must be good to someone – chocolate is good for me, but not for my dog, which it will kill. Humanity must endorse all goods as good for someone, thus only if that someone has value can any good act as an object of will. All value judgments thus presuppose the ultimate end of humanity. Takes out util since the maximization of everyone’s desires and lives is not good for any particular somebody, but all goods must be good for the particular. |
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+Hence, one can never restrict the ends a subject can set because to be human is to autonomously set the ends To treat humanity as an end in itself requires one to respect the legislative right of agents to use their means as they see fit free of domination. |
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+Ripstein Arthur Ripstein. “Beyond the Harm Principle.” University of Toronto. 2006. http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Ripstein/beyond_harm_principle.pdf. |
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+You are independent if you are the one who decides what ends you will use |
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+AND |
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+deprive another of theirs, or uses another person’s powers without their permission. |
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+The standard is respecting liberty. To clarify, the framework is not concerned with availability of ends but a right to pursue them. I do not wrong you by buying the last jar of peanut butter before you get to the store but I do if I legislate that you have no right to attempt to purchase peanut butter as that subverts the ends to which you can direct your will. |
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+Negate—a ban on nuclear power is a government restriction on people’s capacity to set their own ends by imposing some restriction on their free access to construct and operate nuclear reactors. It may be true that using them in certain context is unethical, but irrespective of that there are no grounds to legislatively require it. You cannot subject another person’s means to good ends, just as slavery is no less repugnant if one sets their slaves to humanitarian purposes. |
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+And, there is nothing a priori about nuclear power that violates freedom since it can be operated in a remote location on private property—one non-coercive use proves it isn’t inherently coercive. |
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+I advocate that aff actor ought to follow the Libertarian Party platform on energy policy. This negates—no government control. |
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+LP 16 Libertarian Party. “Platform.” 2016. https://www.lp.org/platform |
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+While energy is needed to fuel a modern society, government should not be subsidizing any particular form of energy. We oppose all government control of energy pricing, allocation, and production. |