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+Moral obligations arise from individuals’ internal consideration of right conduct. Bedke: |
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+“If John Doe… motivation to X” |
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+Bedke, M.S. Dept of Philosophy, University of Arizona “Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism.” Philosophical Studies, 144: 189-209, 2009. |
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+ |
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+Judgments based on external considerations are not moral judgments because they arise from considerations other than right and wrong. Bedke 2: |
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+“Consider a distant… judgments in Amoralsville” |
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+Bedke, M.S. Dept of Philosophy, University of Arizona “Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism.” Philosophical Studies, 144: 189-209, 2009. |
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+ |
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+Further, the very idea of externalist moral considerations assumes a background understanding that morality is internal. Bedke 3: |
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+“My own judgment… is not out” |
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+Bedke, M.S. Dept of Philosophy, University of Arizona “Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism.” Philosophical Studies, 144: 189-209, 2009. |
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+ |
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+Also, externalist moral conceptions collapse into desire rather than moral consideration. Roojen: |
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+“Second, whether the..;. what is right” |
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+Van Roojen, Mark. “Humean and anti-Humean internalism about moral judgements.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 65, no. 1, July 2002, pp. 26-49. |
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+ |
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+Further, internal moral reasoning is idiosyncratic to individuals. This is true because moral reasoning cannot produce objectively verifiable outcomes for all moral reasoners. Coburn: |
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+“If criteria encapsulate… such a process” |
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+Coburn, Robert C. Quals “A defense of ethical noncognitivism.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 62, no. 1, April 1991, pp. 67-80. |
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+ |
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+And, objective or universalist conceptions of morality devolve to totalitarianism. Rawls: |
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+“A continuing adherence… to remain so” |
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+Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. |
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+ |
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+Thus, the criterion is consistency with internal moral standards. |
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+ |
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+Externalist thought is embedded within the nature of restrictions in relation to speech acts. |
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+Harnish: |
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+“Summarizing, internalists hold… offered mixed analyses.” |
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+Harnish, Robert. "Internalism and externalism in speech act theory." Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 5.1 (2009): 9-31. |
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+ |
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+Restrictions establish conditions of which speech is acceptable which is externalist by virtue as it requires an externalist declaration of which speech applies. ACLU: |
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+“Because the ultimate… we'll be next” |
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+"Hate Speech On Campus". American Civil Liberties Union. N. p., 2016. Web. 4 Dec. 2016. |
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+ |
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+presume aff because there is an 11 side bias towards the neg |
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+Henson, Clifford and Paul Dorasil. “Judging bias in competitive academic debate: the effects of region, side, and sex.” Contemporary Economic Policy, July 4, 2013 |