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+Equality is necessary to include all voices in moral deliberation and avoid unjustly imposing values on others. This is the central message of egalitarian social movements. Anderson: |
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+ “There must be… their claim heard” |
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+Anderson, Elizabeth Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109.2 (1999). |
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+The standard is consistency with basic capability equality. Only this provides the true value of equality – not concerned with goods or happiness, but what people can do. Sen: |
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+“It is arguable… basic capability equality” |
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+ Sen, Amartya Professor of Economics and Philosophy, Harvard University. “Equality of What?” Tanner Lectures on Human Values (1979). |
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+A focus on capabilities allows the maintenance of intuitions about fundamental human rights without requiring people to fulfill them. It creates consensus among conceptions of the good. Nussbaum: |
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+Nussbaum, Martha Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Chicago. “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice.” Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33-59. |
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+Only it allows dialogue between the oppressed, philosophers, and policymakers on equal comprehensible terms. Glass |
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+“Can liberalism provide... proper discussion possible” |
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+Glass, Arthur Professor of Law, University of New South Wales. “A Review of Postcolonial Liberalism by Duncan Iverson.” Australian Humanities Review 30 (2003). |
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+The capabilities approach best captures the value of rights – rights are not valuable as abstract rules, but are only fulfilled when people have the ability to exercise them. For example, someone who cannot walk lacks the full value of the freedom of movement without extra resources. Nussbaum 2 |
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+“Regarding fundamental rights... right to someone.” |
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+Nussbaum, Martha Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Chicago. “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice.” Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33-59. Bracketed for Grammar |
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+Capabilities can be interpreted in different ways in different societies – that is the point of pluralism. Nussbaum 3 |
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+“I also insist… the two nations.” |
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+Nussbaum, Martha Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Chicago. “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice.” Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33-59. Bracketed for Grammar |
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+No agent has greater epistemic access to moral truths because morals aren’t verifiable with empirical fact. Markovitz |
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+“Relatedly, internalism about… some of us are” |
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+ Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. Oxford University Press, 2014. |