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+Only internal motivations have the conceptual capacity to motivate action, which is a prerequisite for moral considerations. |
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+Katsafanas, Paul. “Deriving ethics from action: a nietzschean version of constitutivism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83:3, pp. 620-660, November 2011. |
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+While externalism captures…decidedly odd property. |
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+ |
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+Thus, morality is a system of reasons we can all accept—mutual justifiability is the only way to solve the subjectivity of abstract moral theories. |
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+Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print. |
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+Contractualism can also … in certain contexts. |
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+Moral principles are adopted only if they can be justified on the basis of agent specific reasonable rejection. |
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+Nagel, Thomas. "One-to-One’." London Review of Books 4 (1999). |
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+The nerve of Scanlon’s … of any individual. |
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+Contractualism forms the basis for a moral community. If the purpose of moral norms is to facilitate life and communal interactions in a society, then a contractualist account of reasons comes first. |
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+Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print. |
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+According to contractualism, … these principles require. |
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+Contractual obligations are agent relative—reasonable rejection of principles can only come between two rational agents. This means we evaluate every moral consideration on a 1-1 ratio, not whether the aggregate of everyone following the principle would have a positive net effect. James: |
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+James, Aaron. "Contractualism's (not so) slippery slope." Legal Theory 18.03 (2012): 263-292. |
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+According to contractualism, …reasonably object to the imposition. |
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+Thus the standard is consistency with the agent relative principle of reasonable rejection. |
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+Students cannot accept restrictions relative to the college because the basis of public universities and colleges is the constitution, which the protection of speech. Buchter: |
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+Buchter, Jonathan. “Contract law and the student-university relationship.” Indiana Law Journal, vol. 48, issue. 2, article 5, Winter 1973. |
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+This theoretical mixture …these constitutional rights. |
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+Metaethical actualism means no fiat for counteradvocacies. Jackson and Pargetter: |
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+Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, “Oughts, Options, and Actualism”, Philosophical Review, 1986 |
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+There are four considerations … referred to at the beginning.” |
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+ |
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+And, contracts will always be made based on subjective emotions because that contributes to agent relative rejection. |
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+Spranca, Mark, Elisa Minsk, and Jonathan Baron. "Omission and commission in judgment and choice." Journal of experimental social psychology 27.1 (1991): 76-105. |
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+Subjects read scenarios …ignorant of the effects of not acting. |